CRIMINAL LAW

1. The doctrine embodied in Romualdez and Estrada remains good law. The rule
established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom,
and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may
ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenged. The rationale is
obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of
crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism
against employing a facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is
allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an
existing and concrete controversy before judicial power may be appropriately
exercise. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and
speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties who are
not before it. As the court said in its opposition to the allowance of ac facial
challenge to attack a penal statutes, such a test will impair the States ability to
deal with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder an accused
from defeating the States power to prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied
to third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the
law is clear as applied to him. (Spouses Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda R.
Romualdez vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 167011, December 11, 2008)

2. The Affidavit of Desistance submitted by the complainant will not justify the
dismissal of the action. By itself, an affidavit of desistance is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action, once the action has been instituted in court. The
complainant made so-called pardon of the accused after the institution of the
action. He made the affidavit of desistance only on October 25, 1999, more than 2
years, after the trial court had rendered its decision. The court attaches no
persuasive value to a desistance especially when executed as an afterthought. It
would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before the court of justice
simply because the witness who had given it later on changed his mind for one
reason or another. Such rule will make a solemn trail a mockery and place the
investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Moreover, if we allow the
dismissal of the case in view of the complainants affidavit of desistance, there is
always the probability that it would later on be repudiated, and criminal
prosecution would thus be interminable. (Arnold Sta. Catalina vs. People, G.R.
No.167805, November 14, 2008).

3. Witnessing a crime is one novel experience which elicits different reactions from
witnesses for which no clear-cut standard of behavior can be drawn, and this
especially true if the assailant is physically near the witness. (People vs. Aviles,
G.R. No. 172967, December 19, 2007)
 4. Where the prosecution proved the act of stabbing but failed to prove intent to kill,
which is an element of both frustrated and attempted homicide, and neither was
there proof either as to the extent of the injury or the period of incapacity for labor
or of the required medical attendance, the accused can only be convicted of slight
physical injuries. (People vs. Aviles, G.R. No. 172967, December 19, 2007)

TREACHERY

1. Treachery is present when the offender commits the crime employing means,
methods or forms in its execution which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense that the offended party
might take. For the alternative circumstance of intoxication to be treated as a
mitigating circumstance, the defense must show that the intoxication is not
habitual, not subsequent to a plan to commit a felony and the accuseds
drunkenness affected hid mental faculties; The low alcohol content of beer, the
quantity of such liquor the accused imbibed, and the absence of any independent
proof that accuseds alcohol intake affected his mental faculties all negate the
finding that he was intoxicated enough at the time he committed the crimes to
mitigate his liability. (People vs. Mondigo, G.R. No.167954, January 31, 2008)

2. There is treachery when the mode of the attack tends to insure the
accomplishment of the criminal purpose without risk to the attacker arising from
any defense the victim might offer; An attack by a man with a deadly weapon
upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes abuse of superior strength;
Abuse of superior strength as an aggravating circumstance is absorbed in
treachery.(People vs. Brodett; G.R. No. 170136, January 18, 2008).

3. There is treachery when the following requisites are present: 1) the employment
of means, methods, or manner of execution to ensure the safety of the malefactor
from defensive or retaliatory action on the part of the victim and 2) the deliberate
or conscious adoption of such means, method or manner of execution. (People vs.
Aviles, G.R. No. 172967, December 19, 2007)

4. Mere suddenness of the attack does not amount to treachery. (People vs.
Tabuelog, G.R. No. 178059 January 22, 2008)
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE

In self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, the onus probandi is shifted to the

accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence all the elements of justifying
circumstance. (People vs. Tabuelog, G.R. No. 178059 January 22, 2008)

QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE

Qualifying circumstances must be proven beyond reasonable doubt as the crime

itself- it cannot be considered on the strength of evidence which merely tends to show
that the victim was probably surprised to see the assailant trying to get inside the
jeepney. (People vs. Aviles, G.R. No. 172967, December 19, 2007)

BRIBERY

The crime of direct bribery as defined in Art. 210 of the Revised Penal Code contains the
following elements: 1) that the accused is a public officer; 2) that he received directly or
through another some gift or present, offer or promise; 3) that such gift, present or
promise has been given in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not
constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something which is his official duty to do;
and 4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer.
(Balderama vs. People, G.R. No.147578-85, January 28, 2008).