MAGESTRADO v PP

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the (1) Resolution [1] dated 5 March 2001 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63293 entitled, Francisco Magestrado v. Hon. Estrella T. Estrada, in
her capacity as the Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 83 of Quezon City, People of the
Philippines and Elena M. Librojo, which dismissed petitioner Francisco Magestrados Petition
for Certiorari for being the wrong remedy; and (2) Resolution[2] dated 3 May 2001 of the same Court
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Private respondent Elena M. Librojo filed a criminal complaint[3] for perjury against petitioner with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, which was docketed as I.S. No. 98-3900.

After the filing of petitioners counter-affidavit and the appended pleadings, the Office of the City
Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information for perjury against petitioner. Thus, Assistant City
Prosecutor Josephine Z. Fernandez filed an information for perjury against petitioner with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City. Pertinent portions of the information are hereby quoted
as follows:

That on or about the 27th day of December, 1997, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and knowingly make an
untruthful statement under oath upon a material matter before a competent officer
authorized to receive and administer oath and which the law so require, to wit: the said
accused subscribe and swore to an Affidavit of Loss before Notary Public Erlinda B.
Espejo of Quezon City, per Doc. No. 168, Page No. 35, Book No. CLXXIV of her notarial
registry, falsely alleging that he lost Owners Duplicate Certificate of TCT No. N-173163,
which document was used in support of a Petition For Issuance of New Owners Duplicate
Copy of Certificate of Title and filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
docketed as LRC# Q-10052 (98) on January 28, 1998 and assigned to Branch 99 of the
said court, to which said Francisco M. Mag[e]strado signed and swore on its verification,
per Doc. 413 Page 84 Book No. CLXXV Series of 1998 of Notary Public Erlinda B.
Espejo of Quezon City; the said accused knowing fully well that the allegations in the said
affidavit and petition are false, the truth of the matter being that the property subject of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-173163 was mortgaged to complainant Elena M. Librojo
as collateral for a loan in the amount of P 758,134.42 and as a consequence of which
said title to the property was surrendered by him to the said complainant by virtue of said
loan, thus, making untruthful and deliberate assertions of falsehoods, to the damage and
prejudice of the said Elena M. Librojo.[4]
The case was raffled to the MeTC of Quezon City, Branch 43, where it was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 90721 entitled, People of the Philippines v. Francisco Magestrado.
On 30 June 1999, petitioner filed a motion[5] for suspension of proceedings based on a prejudicial
question. Petitioner alleged that Civil Case No. Q-98-34349, a case for recovery of a sum of money
pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 84, and Civil Case No. Q-98-
34308, a case for Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of Title and Damages, pending before the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 77, must be resolved first before Criminal Case No. 90721 may proceed since the
issues in the said civil cases are similar or intimately related to the issues raised in the criminal action.

On 14 July 1999, MeTC-Branch 43 issued an Order[6] denying petitioners motion for suspension of
proceedings, thus:

Acting on the Motion for Suspension of Proceedings filed by the [herein petitioner
Magestrado], thru counsel, and the Comment and Opposition thereto, the Court after an
 evaluation of the same, finds the aforesaid motion without merit, hence, is hereby
DENIED, it appearing that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil actions is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Hence, the trial of this case shall proceed as previously scheduled on July 19
and August 2, 1993 at 8:30 in the morning.

On 17 August 1999, a motion[7] for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but was denied by the
MeTC in an Order[8] dated 19 October 1999.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari[9] under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court,
with a prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 83,
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-39358, on the ground that MeTC Judge Billy J. Apalit committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying his motion to suspend
the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90721.

On 14 March 2000, RTC-Branch 83 dismissed the petition and denied the prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction, reasoning thus:

Scrutinizing the complaints and answers in the civil cases abovementioned, in

relation to the criminal action for PERJURY, this Court opines and so holds that there is
no prejudicial question involved as to warrant the suspension of the criminal action to
await the outcome of the civil cases. The civil cases are principally for determination
whether or not a loan was obtained by petitioner and whether or not he executed the
deed of real estate mortgage involving the property covered by TCT No. N-173163,
whereas the criminal case is for perjury which imputes upon petitioner the wrongful
execution of an affidavit of loss to support his petition for issuance of a new owners
duplicate copy of TCT No. 173163. Whether or not he committed perjury is the issue in
the criminal case which may be resolved independently of the civil cases. Note that the
affidavit of loss was executed in support of the petition for issuance of a new owners
duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163 which petition was raffled to Branch 99 of the
RTC. x x x.[10]

Again, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration [11] but this was denied by RTC- Branch 83 in an
Order[12] dated 21 December 2000.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari[13] under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 63293. Petitioner alleged that RTC
Judge Estrella T. Estrada committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in denying the Petition for Certiorariin Civil Case No. Q-99-39358, and in effect sustaining the denial by
MeTC-Branch 43 of petitioners motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90721, as well
as his subsequent motion for reconsideration thereof.

On 5 March 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed [14] the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 63293 on the
ground that petitioners remedy should have been an appeal from the dismissal by RTC-Branch 83 of his
Petition for Certiorari in Q-99-39358. The Court of Appeals ruled that:

Is this instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 the correct and appropriate
remedy?
We rule negatively.
The resolution or dismissal in special civil actions, as in the instant petition, may
be appealed x x x under Section 10, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and not
by petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the same rules. Thus, the said rule provides:
 Section 10. Time for filing memoranda on special cases. In certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus cases, the parties shall file in lieu of briefs,
their respective memoranda within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt
of the notice issued by the clerk that all the evidence, oral and documentary, is already
attached to the record x x x.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the instant Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is hereby DISMISSED. [15]

The Court of Appeals denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration [16] in a Resolution[17] dated 3
May 2001.

Hence, petitioner comes before us via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court raising the following issues:

1. Whether or not the Orders of Judge Estrella T. Estrada dated March 14, 2000
denying petitioners Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and her
subsequent Order dated December 21, 2000, denying the Motion for Reconsideration
thereafter filed can only be reviewed by the Court of Appeals thru appeal under
Section 10, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

2. Whether or not Judge Estrella T. Estrada of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 83,
Quezon City, had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess
of her jurisdiction in denying the Petition for Certiorari and petitioners subsequent
motion for reconsideration on the ground of a prejudicial question pursuant to the
Rules on Criminal Procedure and the prevailing jurisprudence.

After consideration of the procedural and substantive issues raised by petitioner, we find the
instant petition to be without merit.

The procedural issue herein basically hinges on the proper remedy which petitioner should have
availed himself of before the Court of Appeals: an ordinary appeal or a petition for certiorari. Petitioner
claims that he correctly questioned RTC-Branch 83s Order of dismissal of his Petition for Certiorari in Civil
Case No. Q-99-39358 through a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Private respondent
and public respondent People of the Philippines insist that an ordinary appeal was the proper remedy.

We agree with respondents. We hold that the appellate court did not err in dismissing petitioners
Petition for Certiorari, pursuant to Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court (and not under Rule
44, Section 10, invoked by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 5 March 2001).

The correct procedural recourse for petitioner was appeal, not only because RTC-Branch 83 did
not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No.
Q-99-39358 but also because RTC-Branch 83s Order of dismissal was a final order from which
petitioners should have appealed in accordance with Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court.

An order or a judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of a pending action, so that
nothing more can be done with it in the trial court. In other words, the order or judgment ends the
litigation in the lower court. Au contraire, an interlocutory order does not dispose of the case completely,
but leaves something to be done as regards the merits of the latter. [18] RTC-Branch 83s Order dated 14
March 2001 dismissing petitioners Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358 finally disposes of
the said case and RTC-Branch 83 can do nothing more with the case.

Under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by the Revised Rules of
Court to be appealable. The manner of appealing an RTC judgment or final order is also provided in Rule
41 as follows:

Section 2. Modes of appeal.

(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a
notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from
and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be
required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals
where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be
filed and served in like manner.

Certiorari generally lies only when there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy or adequate
remedy available to petitioners. Here, appeal was available. It was adequate to deal with any question
whether of fact or of law, whether of error of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion or error of judgment
which the trial court might have committed.But petitioners instead filed a special civil action for certiorari.

We have time and again reminded members of the bench and bar that a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court lies only when there is no appeal nor plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. [19] Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party
to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, [20] certiorari not being a
substitute for lost appeal.[21]
As certiorari is not a substitute for lost appeal, we have repeatedly emphasized that the perfection
of appeals in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional,
and that the failure to perfect an appeal renders the decision of the trial court final and executory. This
rule is founded upon the principle that the right to appeal is not part of due process of law but is a mere
statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the
law. Neither can petitioner invoke the doctrine that rules of technicality must yield to the broader interest
of substantial justice. While every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from constraints of technicalities, the failure to perfect an appeal within
the reglementary period is not a mere technicality. It raises a jurisdictional problem as it deprives the
appellate court of jurisdiction over the appeal.[22]

The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.
[23]
A party cannot substitute the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the
remedy of appeal. The existence and availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availability of
the special civil action for certiorari.[24] As this Court held in Fajardo v. Bautista[25]:

Generally, an order of dismissal, whether right or wrong, is a final order, and hence a
proper subject of appeal, not certiorari. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are
mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. Accordingly, although the special
civil action of certiorari is not proper when an ordinary appeal is available, it may be
granted where it is shown that the appeal would be inadequate, slow, insufficient, and will
not promptly relieve a party from the injurious effects of the order complained of, or where
appeal is inadequate and ineffectual. Nevertheless, certiorari cannot be a substitute for
the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, where such loss is occasioned by the petitioners
own neglect or error in the choice of remedies.

On 21 December 2000, petitioner received a copy of the Order of the RTC-Branch 83 denying his
motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his Petition for Certiorariin Civil Case No. Q-99-39358;
hence, he had until 18 January 2001 within which to file an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Petition
for Certiorari filed by petitioner on 19 February 2001 with the Court of Appeals cannot be a substitute for
the lost remedy of appeal. As petitioner failed to file a timely appeal, RTC-Branch 83s dismissal of his
Petition for Certiorari had long become final and executory.

For this procedural lapse, the Court of Appeals correctly denied outright the Petition
for Certiorari filed by petitioner before it.

Moreover, there are even more cogent reasons for denying the instant Petition on the merits.

In the Petition at bar, petitioner raises several substantive issues. Petitioner harps on the need for
the suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90721 for perjury pending before MeTC-Branch
43 based on a prejudicial question still to be resolved in Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 (for cancellation of
mortgage) and Civil Case No. Q-98-34349 (for collection of a sum of money) which are pending before
other trial courts.

For clarity, we shall first discuss the allegations of petitioner in his complaint in Civil Case No. Q-
98-34308 (for cancellation of mortgage) and that of private respondent in her complaint in Civil Case No.
Q-98-34349 (for collection of a sum of money).

Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 is a complaint for Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of Title and
Damages filed on 8 May 1988 by petitioner against private respondent with RTC-Branch 77. Petitioner
alleges that he purchased a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-173163 thru
private respondent, a real estate broker. In the process of negotiation, petitioner was pressured to sign a
Deed of Sale prepared by private respondent. Upon signing the Deed of Sale, he noticed that the Deed
was already signed by a certain Cristina Gonzales as attorney-in-fact of vendor Spouses Guillermo and
Amparo Galvez. Petitioner demanded from private respondent a special power of attorney and authority
to sell, but the latter failed to present one. Petitioner averred that private respondent refused to deliver the
certificate of title of the land despite execution and signing of the Deed of Sale and payment of the
consideration. Petitioner was thus compelled to engage the services of one Modesto Gazmin, Jr. who
agreed, for P100,000.00 to facilitate the filing of cases against private respondent; to deliver to petitioner
the certificate of title of the land; and/or to cancel the certificate of title in possession of private
respondent. However, Mr. Gazmin, Jr., did nothing upon receipt of the amount of P100,000.00 from
petitioner. In fact, petitioner was even charged with perjury before the Office of the City Prosecutor, all
because of Mr. Gazmin, Jr.s wrongdoing. Petitioner further alleged that he discovered the existence of a
spurious Real Estate Mortgage which he allegedly signed in favor of private respondent. Petitioner
categorically denied signing the mortgage document and it was private respondent who falsified the same
in order to justify her unlawful withholding of TCT No. N-173163 from petitioner. Thus, petitioner prayed
for:

1. The cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage dated August 2, 1997 as null and
void;

2. As well as to order [herein private respondent] to DELIVER the Owners

Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-173163 to [herein petitioner];

3. Condemning [private respondent] to pay [petitioner] the sums of

a) P100,000.00 as MORAL DAMAGES;

b) P50,000.00 as EXEMPLARY DAMAGES;

c) P50,000.00 as Attorneys fees and

d) Cost of suit.

4. A general relief is likewise prayed for (sic) just and equitable under the
premises.
 Civil Case No. Q-98-34349,[26] on the other hand, is a complaint for a sum of money with
a motion for issuance of a writ of attachment filed by private respondent against petitioner on 14 May
1988 before RTC-Branch 84. Private respondent alleges that petitioner obtained a loan from her in the
amount of P758,134.42 with a promise to pay on or before 30 August 1997. As security for payment of the
loan, petitioner executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage covering a parcel of land registered under TCT
No. N-173163. Petitioner pleaded for additional time to pay the said obligation, to which respondent
agreed. But private respondent discovered sometime in February 1998 that petitioner executed an
affidavit of loss alleging that he lost the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163, and succeeded in
annotating said affidavit on the original copy of TCT No. N-173163 on file with the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City. Private respondent further alleges that she also discovered that petitioner filed a petition for
issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163 with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 98,
docketed as LRC Case No. Q-10052. Private respondent demanded that petitioner pay his obligation, but
the latter refused to do so. Resultantly, private respondent prayed for the following:

A. That upon filing of this Complaint as well as the Affidavit of attachment and a
preliminary hearing thereon, as well as bond filed, a writ of preliminary
attachment is (sic) by the Honorable Court ordering the Sheriff to levy [herein
petitioner] property sufficient to answer [herein private respondents] claim in this
action;

B. That after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered in [private

respondents] favor as against [petitioner], ordering the latter to pay the former the
sum of P758,134.42 plus interest thereon at 5% per month from September 1997
up to the date of actual payment; actual damages in the sums of P70,000.00
each under paragraphs 11 and 12 of the complaint; P200,000.00 as moral
damages; P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; twenty (20%) of the principal
claim as attorneys fees plus P2,500.00 per appearance honorarium;
and P60,000.00 as litigation expense before this Honorable Court.

[Petitioner] prays for such further relief in law, justice and equity.

As to whether it is proper to suspend Criminal Case No. 90721 for perjury pending final outcome
of Civil Case No. Q-98-34349 and Civil Case No. Q-98-34308, we take into consideration Sections 6 and
7, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, which read:

Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for suspension

of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action
may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary
investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to
suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution
rests.

Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of a prejudicial question

are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related
to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question
is to avoid two conflicting decisions.[27]

A prejudial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to
try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused.[28]

For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend criminal action, it must appear not only that
said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based
but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined.

Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension
of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must be
present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence
of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged
in another tribunal.[29]

If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the
accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity that the civil case be
determined first before taking up the criminal case, therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial
question.[30] Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law,
proceed independently of each other.[31]

However, the court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and
upon proper application for a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance to abide by the outcome of
another case pending in another court, especially where the parties and the issues are the same, for
there is power inherent in every court to control the disposition of cases on its dockets with economy of
time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights of parties to the second action
cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first action are settled, the second action
should be stayed.[32]

The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the
disposition of the cases on its dockets, considering its time and effort, those of counsel and the litigants.
But if proceedings must be stayed, it must be done in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent
vexatious litigations, conflicting judgments, confusion between litigants and courts. It bears stressing that
whether or not the trial court would suspend the proceedings in the criminal case before it is submitted to
its sound discretion.[33]

Indeed, a judicial order issued pursuant to the courts discretionary authority is not subject to
reversal on review unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion. As the United States Supreme Court aptly
declared in Landis v. North American Co., the burden of making out the justice and wisdom from the
departure from the beaten truck lay heavily on the petitioner, less an unwilling litigant is compelled to wait
upon the outcome of a controversy to which he is a stranger. It is, thus, stated that only in rare
circumstances will a litigant in one case is compelled to stand aside, while a litigant in another, settling the
rule of law that will define the rights of both is, after all, the parties before the court are entitled to a just,
speedy and plain determination of their case undetermined by the pendency of the proceedings in
another case. After all, procedure was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice.[34]

As stated, the determination of whether the proceedings may be suspended on the basis of a
prejudicial question rests on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the civil cases are so
related with the issues raised in the criminal case such that the resolution of the issues in the civil cases
would also determine the judgment in the criminal case.

A perusal of the allegations in the complaints show that Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 pending
before RTC-Branch 77, and Civil Case No. Q-98-34349, pending before RTC-Branch 84, are principally
for the determination of whether a loan was obtained by petitioner from private respondent and whether
petitioner executed a real estate mortgage involving the property covered by TCT No. N-173163. On the
other hand, Criminal Case No. 90721 before MeTC-Branch 43, involves the determination of whether
petitioner committed perjury in executing an affidavit of loss to support his request for issuance of a new
owners duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163.

It is evident that the civil cases and the criminal case can proceed independently of each
other. Regardless of the outcome of the two civil cases, it will not establish the innocence or guilt of the
petitioner in the criminal case for perjury. The purchase by petitioner of the land or his execution of a real
estate mortgage will have no bearing whatsoever on whether petitioner knowingly and fraudulently
executed a false affidavit of loss of TCT No. N-173163.

MeTC-Branch 43, therefore, did not err in ruling that the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-98-34308
for cancellation of mortgage before the RTC-Branch 77; and Civil Case No. Q-98-34349 for collection of a
sum of money before RTC-Branch 84, do not pose a prejudicial question in the determination of whether
petitioner is guilty of perjury in Criminal Case No. 90721. RTC-Branch 83, likewise, did not err in ruling
that MeTC-Branch 43 did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion for
suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90721.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions dated 5 March 2001 and 3 May
2001of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63293 are hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition
is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 43, is
hereby directed to proceed with the hearing and trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 90721, and to
expedite proceedings therein, without prejudice to the right of the accused to due process. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED
 PIMENTEL vs. PIMENTEL, G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010

Facts: Respondent, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel, filed an action for frustrated parricide against
petitioner, Joselito R. Pimentel. The Information for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004 and
was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004. The pre-trial and trial was set on 14 February 2005.
She also filed on 5 November 2004, a petition, dated 4 November 2004, for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity

Petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City on 7 February
2005, for the pre-trial and trial of the Civil Case. He then filed an urgent motion to suspend the
proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question
asserting that the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the
outcome of Civil Case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon
City.

The RTC Quezon City held that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial
question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it.

The Court of Appeals also denied the petition holding that the issue in the criminal case for frustrated
parricide differs from the issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage. It ruled that even if the
marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the
criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of
frustrated parricide had already been committed. At the time of the commission of the crime, the
marriage is still subsisting.

Issue: Whether or not the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that
warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide.

Ruling: The elements of a prejudicial question under Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed, were not met.

Civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In this case, the civil case for
annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide.

Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of
the criminal action.

There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists
in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case.

The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide. However,
the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case
for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt
or innocence of the accused.

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in
parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed
respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of petitioners will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and
respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case
is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of
the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner
could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still
married to respondent.

A Prejudicial Question Generally Exists In A Situation Where A Civil Action And A Criminal Action Are Both
Pending, And There Exists In The Former An Issue That Must Be Pre-emptively Resolved Before The
Latter May Proceed, Because Howsoever The Issue Raised In The Civil Action Is Resolved Would Be
Determinative Juris Et De Jure Of The Guilt Or Innocence Of The Accused in The Criminal Case
SEPTEMBER 25, 2015 BY THE LAWYER'S POST

The Case:

During the stockholders meeting of the JM Dominguez Agronomic Company, presided by Cecilia (one of
the respondents,) and attended by Norma and Purita (her co-respondents) and petitioners Helen, Patrick,
Kenneth and Shirley, Patrick and Kenneth were not allowed to vote as their mother and grandmother,
both deceased are the stockholders of the company and no settlement of estate was shown to transfer
their shares in the company. Tensions rose, and respondents walked out of the meeting. Since quorum
still existed, the election proceeded. As a result, Helen, Patrick, Kenneth and Shirley were elected
officers. On the other hand, after staging the walkout, the respondents executed a Board Resolution
certifying that during the meeting, the following set of officers were elected as officers: Cecilia, Norma,
Purita, Tessie, and Shirley.

The petitioners then filed a complaint against respondents before the RTC of Baguio City for nullification
of meetings, election and acts of directors and officers, injunction and other reliefs, docketed as Civil
Case No. 6623-R. It was raffled off to Branch 7 of the RTC for Judicial Dispute Resolution. The
petitioners as stockholders then represented themselves as JMDs lawful directors and officers, collected
rentals and deposited rents due the company to its bank account. They then filed a complaint for
Qualified Theft against Ceclia, Norma and Purita. They alleged that the respondents, without any
authority, conspired to withdraw the amount of P852,024.19 from the corporations savings account with
Equitable PCIBank, and issued Check No C0002489901 in the amount of P200,000.00 payable to cash,
drawn against JMDs account with Robinsons Savings Bank. In another compliant, they claimed that
respondents issued Equitable PCIBank check no. 320953 payable to one Atty. Alexander Lava for
P200,000.00.

ISSUE: whether or not there exists a prejudicial question that could affect the criminal proceedings for
qualified theft against respondents.

The challenged Orders of the trial court were issued in grave abuse of discretion

We have previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal violates
or contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. By grave abuse of discretion is meant,
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. The word
capricious, usually used in tandem with the term arbitrary, conveys the notion of willful and
unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the corrective hand of certiorari, a clear showing of caprice and
arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion is imperative.23ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the case at bar, the CA correctly ruled that Judge Tiongson-Tabora acted with grave abuse of discretion
when she ordered the arrests of respondents Isip and Liclican despite the existence of a prejudicial
question.

As jurisprudence elucidates, a prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must be pre-emptively
resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.24The
rationale behind the principle is to avoid two conflicting decisions,25and its existence rests on the
concurrence of two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.26ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Here, the CA aptly observed that Civil Case No. 6623-R, the intra-corporate dispute, posed a prejudicial
question to Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R and 29176-R. To be sure, Civil Case No. 6623-R involves the
same parties herein, and is for nullification of JMDs meetings, election and acts of its directors and
officers, among others. Court intervention was sought to ascertain who between the two contesting group
of officers should rightfully be seated at the companys helm. Without Civil Case No. 6623-Rs resolution,
petitioners authority to commence and prosecute Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R and 29176-R against
respondents for qualified theft in JMDs behalf remained questionable, warranting the suspension of the
criminal proceedings.

Judge Tiongson-Taboracannot deny knowledge of the pendency of Civil Case No. 6623-R as the judge
presiding over its JDR. As correctly held by the CA:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Judge Tiongson-Tabora is well-aware of the existence of said prejudicial question that should have barred
the filing of the criminal complaint against petitioners Liclican and Isip, for the simple reason that a
juridical person can only act through its officers, and the issue in the main case submitted for JDR before
Judge Tiongson-Tabora is one for nullification of meetings, election and act of directors and officers,
injunction and other reliefs. Thus, she knows for a fact that there is a question as to who are the legitimate
directors of JMD such that there is doubt as to whether private respondents are in a position to act for
JMD. (emphasis added)

chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Verily, the RTC ought to have suspended the proceedings, instead of issuing the challenged Orders
issued by the RTC.

The subsequent resolution of the prejudicial question did not cure the defect

It may be, as the petitioners pointed out in their motion for reconsideration filed before the CA, that Civil
Case No. 6623-R was eventually resolved in their favor through a Judgment27 dated May 6, 2011
rendered by the RTC, Branch 59, the dispositive portion of which reads:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing disquisitions, the Court hereby declares that the plaintiffs
[petitioners herein] are the duly elected board of directors and officers of the JM Dominguez Agronomic
Company, Inc. for the year 2008 and hold-over capacity unless here had already been an election of new
officers.

Consequently, all Corporate Acts which the defendants [herein respondents and one Gerald Cabrera and
one Oscar Aquino] have done and performed and all documents they have executed and issued have no
force and effect.

Considering that the amount of Php850,000.00 which defendants have withdrawn under the account of
JM Dominguez Agronomic Company, Inc. from the Equitable PCI Bank (now Banco de Oro) is the same
subject in CC no. 29175-R entitled Pp. vs. Cecilia Liclican and Norma D. Isip for Qualified Theft, the Court
will no longer dwell on the same.

xxxx

SO ORDERED. (emphasis and words in bracket added)

chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

This Judgment has, on June 6, 2011,become final and executory, as per the Notice of Entry of Judgment
issued by the same trial court.28 Evidently, whatever cloud of doubt loomed over petitioners actuations
has already been dispelled. Petitioners then postulate that the question on whether or not the challenged
Orders were issued in grave abuse of discretion has already been rendered moot and academic by the
June 6, 2011 ruling and by Judge Tiongson-Taboras subsequent inhibition in the criminal proceedings.
Consequently, they argue that their motion for reconsideration should have been granted by the appellate
court.

We are not convinced.

The resolution of the prejudicial question did not, in context, cure the grave abuse of discretion already
committed. The fact remains that when the RTC, Branch 7 issued its challenged Orders on March 10,
2009, the Judgment in favor of petitioners was not yet rendered. Consequently, there was still, at that
time, a real dispute as to who the rightful set of officers were. Plainly, Judge Tiongson-Tabora should not
have issued the challenged Orders and should have, instead, suspended the proceedings until Civil Case
No. 6623-R was resolved with finality.

To grant the instant petition and rule that the procedural infirmity has subsequently been cured either by
the Judgment or by Judge Tiongson-Taboras inhibition would mean condoning the continuation of the
criminal proceedings despite, at that time, the existence of a prejudicial question. Such condonation
would create a precedent that renders inutile the doctrine on prejudicial question, such that the court
trying the criminal case will be permitted to proceed with the trial in the aberrant assumption that the
resolution of the prior instituted civil case would benefit the private complainant in the criminal
proceedings. To reiterate, there was no certainty yet on how the RTC, Branch 59 would rule; thus, no
assumption on Civil Case No. 6623-Rs resolution can be made when the challenged Orders were issued.
Indeed, had the RTC, Branch 59 not given credence to petitioners arguments,it would have led to an
awkward situation wherein much time and effort is wasted by the RTC, Branch 7 in trying criminal cases it
should not have entertained.

The foregoing notwithstanding, it should be made clear that the nullification of the March 10, 2009 Orders
does not, under the premises, entail the dismissal of the instituted criminal cases, but would merely result
in the suspension of the proceedings in view of the prejudicial question. However, given the resolution of
the prejudicial question and Judge Tiongson-Taboras inhibition, Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R and 29176-
R may already proceed, and ought to be re-raffled to re-determine the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest against respondents.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of
Appeals August 30, 2012 Decision and January 13, 2014 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 108617 are
hereby AFFIRMED.

Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R and 29176-R are hereby REMANDED to the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City to be re-raffled to one of its branches other than Branch 7.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

ROSA H. FENEQUITO, CORAZON E. HERNANDEZ, and LAURO H. RODRIGUEZ, Petitioners,

vs.

BERNARDO VERGARA, JR

G.R. No. 172829

Facts: The MeTC dismissed the criminal case for falsification of public documents upon motion of the
petitioners based on lack of probable cause. The MeTC dismissed the criminal case. With the express
conformity of the public prosecutor, the private complainant Vergara Jr. appealed the dismissal to the
RTC. The RTC set aside the order of dismissal and remanded the case to the MeTC for trial. Petitioners
questioned the order of the RTC by petition for review before the CA which dismissed the petition saying
that the order of the RTC is interlocutory in nature and therefore not appealable. Petitioners filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution hence, the instant petition.

Issue: Whether or not respondent has legal personality to appeal the July 9, 2004 order of the MeTC

Held: Suffice it to say that the appeal filed with the RTC was made with the express conformity of the
public prosecutor who handles the case. It is wrong for petitioners to argue that it is the OSG which has
authority to file an appeal with the RTC. The Administrative Code of 1987 mandates the OSG to represent
the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings.

On the other hand, Section 11 of Presidential Decree No. 1275, entitled Reorganizing the Prosecution
Staff of the Department of Justice and the Offices of the Provincial and City Fiscals, Regionalizing the
Prosecution Service, and Creating the National Prosecution Service, which was the law in force at the
time the appeal was filed, provides that the provincial or the city fiscal (now referred to as prosecutor)
shall have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations of city or municipal
ordinances in the courts of such province or city and shall therein discharge all the duties incident to the
institution of criminal prosecutions. In consonance with the above-quoted provision, it has been held by
this Court that the fiscal represents the People of the Philippines in the prosecution of offenses before the
trial courts at the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, municipal circuit trial courts and the
regional trial courts. Since the appeal, in the instant case was made with the RTC of Manila, it is clear that
the City Prosecutor or his assistant (in this case, the Assistant City Prosecutor) had authority to file the
same.

Moreover, petitioners' reliance on Presidential Decree No. 911 is misplaced, as the cited provision refers
only to cases where the assistant fiscal or state prosecutor's power to file information or dismiss a case is
predicated or conditioned upon the prior authority or approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the Chief
State Prosecutor. There is nothing in the said law, which provides that in cases of appeal, an Assistant
City Prosecutor or a State Prosecutor may file the same only upon prior authority or approval of the City
Prosecutor or the Chief State Prosecutor. In other words, unless otherwise ordered, an Assistant City
Prosecutor or a State Prosecutor may file an appeal with the RTC, questioning the dismissal by the MeTC
of a case for lack of probable cause, even without prior authority or approval of the City Prosecutor or the
Chief State Prosecutor.

CASE: FENEQUITO
CASE: BURGUNDY
CITY PROSECUTOR ARMANDO P. ABANADO, complainant, v JUDGE ABRAHAM A. BAYONA,
Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 7, Bacolod City, respondent.

FACTS:

The case sprang from a criminal case entitled People of the Philippines vs. Cresencio Palo, Sr. It was
initially handled by Investigating Prosecutor Dennis Jarder who found no probable cause against Palo.
However, complainant, upon review, found that there was a probable cause against Palo. Thus,
complainant disapproved Jarders Resolution and filed the Information in court.

In connection with the issuance of a warrant of arrest against accused Palo, respondent Judge Bayona
issued an order directing complainant Abanado to present (1) a copy of the Memorandum of Preliminary
Investigation, (2) Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor Dennis Jarder, (3) Memorandum of the
transfer of case assignment from designated Investigating Prosecutor to the City Prosecutor, and (4)
Exhibit to the Court, to enable his court to evaluate and determine the existence of probable cause.

With respect to item 3, complainant explained in a letter that there was no memorandum of transfer of the
case from Investigating Prosecutor Jarder to him.

Respondent was dissatisfied with the explanation of the Office of the City Prosecutor. In an Order,
respondent stated that the Jarders Resolution dismissing the complaint was part and parcel of the official
records of the case and, for this reason, must form part of the records of the preliminary investigation. He
further stated that because there was a conflict between Jarders and complainants resolutions, those
documents were necessary in the evaluation and appreciation of the evidence to establish probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Palo. He, thus, ordered complainant to complete the
records of the case by producing the Jarders Resolution. The Office of the City Prosecutor again sent a
letter explaining the impossibility of submitting it to the court. The letter stated that the Resolution was no
longer part of the records of the case as it was disapproved by complainant.

Respondent did not accept the explanations made by the Office of the City Prosecutor. In an order, he
required complainant to explain why he should not be cited for contempt. Complainant requested for a
ten-day extension to comply with it but respondent denied the request. He likewise ordered the Clerk of
Court to issue a subpoena duces tecum ad testificandum to Jarder directing him to testify on the
existence of his resolution dismissing the case against Palo and to Office of the City Prosecutors
Records Officer Myrna Vaegas to bring the entire record of the preliminary investigation of the Palo
case.

Aggrieved, complainant immediately filed a motion for inhibition against respondent and a petition for
certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to restrain respondent
from proceeding with the hearing of the contempt proceedings. Complainants prayer for a TRO was
granted by Presiding Judge Pepito Gellada of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Bacolod City.

Judge Gellada granted the petition for certiorari holding that when a city or provincial prosecutor reverses
the investigating assisting city or provincial prosecutor, the resolution finding probable cause replaces the
recommendation of the investigating prosecutor recommending the dismissal of the case. The result
would be that the resolution of dismissal no longer forms an integral part of the records of the case. It is
no longer required that the complaint or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be
submitted to and be examined by the judge. The rationale behind this practice is that the rules do not
intend to unduly burden trial judges by requiring them to go over the complete records of the cases all the
time for the purpose of determining probable cause for the sole purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest
against the accused. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents
(such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcripts of
stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon
which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause.
Complainant executed an administrative complaint and the same was received by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA). He alleged that respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the law or procedure
and gross misconduct. He essentially asserted that respondent unduly burdened himself by obsessing
over the production of the records of the preliminary investigation, especially Jarders Resolution.
Respondent, in his Comment with Counter-Complaint for Disbarment of Prosecutor Abanado, reiterated
the importance of the Jarders Resolution in deciding whether to issue a warrant of arrest.

The OCA submitted its report and recommendation. It noted Judge Gelladas Order which held that the
resolution of the city or provincial prosecutor finding probable cause replaces the recommendation of the
investigating prosecutor. In such case, the resolution recommending the dismissal is superseded, and no
longer forms an integral part of the records of the case and it need not be annexed to the information filed
in court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the conduct of a preliminary investigation is an executive function

HELD:
Yes. The conduct of a preliminary investigation is primarily an executive function.

Thus, the courts must consider the rules of procedure of the Department of Justice in conducting
preliminary investigations whenever the actions of a public prosecutor is put in question. The Department
of Justic-National Prosecution Service (DOJ-NPS) Manual states that the resolution of the investigating
prosecutor should be attached to the information only as far as practicable. Such attachment is not
mandatory or required under the rules.

ggy