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Stave Lake Water and Supply and Treatment Project Business Case - April 15, 2011 PDF
Stave Lake Water and Supply and Treatment Project Business Case - April 15, 2011 PDF
Figures
Tables
Appendices
A References
B Qualitative risk assessment workshop results
C Multi-criteria analysis workshop results
D Cost Estimate Summary
E Risk quantification results
F Value for money subcomponents
Broadly, the business case examines the suitability of the Project to be fulfilled through a Public-Private-
Partnership (P3, or PPP) delivery model.
1.4 Limitations
This report was prepared for the exclusive use of the City of Abbotsford, and is not intended for general
circulation or publication, nor is it to be reproduced or used without written permission of Deloitte with
the exception of its submission to PPP Canada for purposes of seeking financial support from the P3
Canada Fund. It relies on certain information provided by third parties, none of which Deloitte has
independently reviewed. No third party is entitled to rely, in any manner or for any purpose, on this
report. Deloittes services may include advice or recommendations, but all decisions in connection with
the implementation of such advice and recommendations shall be the responsibility of, and be made by,
the City of Abbotsford.
The City of Abbotsford provides community water supply as one of its many municipal responsibilities
and services. The City obtains bulk potable water from a regional supply system, which it owns in
conjunction with the District of Mission and which is managed by the Abbotsford Mission Water &
Sewer Commission (AMWSC). The AMWSC is administered by the City, and the regional water system
infrastructure is operated by the City for the AMWSC.
Water supply is a fundamental municipal service that is crucial for human health, quality of life, fire
protection, and economic development. Due to continued growth in the communities, the AMWSC
expects that demand for water will exceed supply capacity from its existing three sources as early as
2015. The AMWSC is currently expanding its groundwater pumping capacity and implementing demand
management measures to meet immediate needs. However a completely new water source is required to
meet long term demand. The Stave Lake Water Supply and Treatment Project (the Project) will
provide this new water source.
Without the Project, the City will be unable to meet the projected water demand. The Project is therefore
in complete alignment with the municipal responsibilities and objectives of the City with regard to public
health and safety and community development. The Project, though owned 100% by the City and
therefore not a part of the regional water system, will be capable of supplying water to the regional water
system.
The Project is a very high priority given that the City will not be able to meet its fundamental objective of
water supply by as early as 2015 unless the Project is completed. Meeting water demand is mission-
critical for the City, and the residents and businesses served by the City water system and regional water
system.
The ultimate water supply capacity of the project is 400 million litres per day (MLD). The Intake
& Pump Station superstructure will be sized for the ultimate capacity as it is impractical to develop
such facilities incrementally. The transmission main and WTP capacity will be developed in
1
If no demand reduction through conservation is realized, groundwater not used, no expansion of Norrish Creek capacity
2
If conservation demand is realized and groundwater is not utilized, no expansion of Norrish Creek capacity
3
If conservation demand is realized and groundwater use is maximized, no expansion of Norrish Creek capacity
Approximately 88% of the growth in water demand shown is attributable to the City of Abbotsford.
the AMWSC was water-short as early as 2007, when supply and demand were approximately
equal;
the watering restrictions are expected to mitigate the supply shortfall until 2013; and
operation of the Bevan wells at 25 MLD5 is expected to mitigate the shortfall until 2017.
The need for an additional source of water for the communities is very clear, with demand exceeding
supply at some point between 2013 and 2017 assuming that watering restrictions remain as effective as
they have so far.
The Stave Lake Water Supply Conceptual Design report (the Conceptual Design) developed the Project to
a higher level of detail by examining permitting requirements, water rights, intake alternatives, treatment
4
Stave Lake Water Supply Conceptual Design, Figure E-1
5
the City is currently pursuing an environmental assessment certificate to operate the Bevan wells at 25 MLD
The benefits of the Project are best understood by considering the outcomes if the Project is not
completed. These may include:
Rationing of water;
Decline in quality of life;
Impairment of existing commercial/industrial activity;
Stifling of economic development;
Over-taxing of existing water sources (surface and groundwater) with attendant environmental
impacts and need for additional investment in treatment to deal with lower quality source water;
and
Risk to life and property due to lack of redundancy in fireflow supply.
This list provides the context to consider the social and economic benefits of the Project.
Therefore, the key economic benefits stemming from the Project are:
In addition, the Project itself is a significant size and will generate both construction and long term
operation and maintenance jobs.
Despite these efficiency measures, the AMWSC has determined that an additional water supply is
required to support the City and District. It has further determined that the Project as described above is
the lowest cost option that meets the water quality and quantity requirements of the communities. The
City has therefore decided to move ahead with the Project, and is taking the steps necessary to have the
Project in service by the summer of 2016.
Although the investment decision for the Project, has been made by the City rather than the AMWSC, the
City and District have been collaborating on regional water system planning, including development of
this business case, through the AMWSC. The Project is advancing under a range of recent and ongoing
initiatives that including the following.
The following summarizes the key approvals that have advanced the Project to its current stage.
Budgeting Jan 2010, WSC 8-2010 - AMWSC approves 2010 Capital Budget to be sent to
municipal councils
Nov 2010, WSC 107-2010 - AMWSC approves 2011 Capital Budget to be sent to
municipal councils
Water Master Plan Jun 2008, UMC 43-2008 - AMWSC approves proceeding with update of 2006 version
Aug 2008, ENG 132-2008 - Award of Master Plan Study to AECOM
Apr 2010, WSC 34-2010 AMWSC approved master plan as a public document
Stake Lake Water Supply Oct 2008, UMC 2008-75 AMWSC Approval to award Stave Lake Conceptual Study
Conceptual Plan to AECOM
Project Development Dec 2009, UMC 105-2009 AMWSC Approval to Proceed with Preliminary Activities
to develop Stave Lake
Preliminary Engineering Mar 2010, WSC 18-2010 AMWSC Approval to Award of Transmission Main
Preliminary Design to Dayton & Knight
Apr 2010, WSC 28-2010 AMWSC Approval to Award of Intake & Pump Station
Preliminary Engineering to CH2M HILL
P3 Canada Fund Preliminary June 2010, District of Mission submitted Preliminary Submission Form for the Project
Submission to PPP Canada for Round 2 of the P3 Canada Fund on behalf of the AMWSC
P3 Feasibility Assessment / Oct 2010, ENG 173-2010 Approval to contract services with Partnership BC
Business Case for P3 Nov 2010, ENG 199-2010 Approval to have CH2M HILL provide Stave Lake WTP
Canada Fund Funding and Maclure Reservoir Cost Estimates
Request Nov 2010, ENG 201-2010 Approval to Award P3 Financial Advisor role to Deloitte
Dec 2010, ENG 210-2010 Approval to Award Owners Engineer to CH2M HILL
Figure 3 is the schedule for the overall project development. While this figure contemplates Traditional
project delivery for all components of the Project, the overall process would be similar if any components
are procured with P3 delivery models. As the land acquisition, water sampling, process piloting, and
water system integration planning proceed the Projects definition can be expected to be refined. The
schedule indicates that the City has identified and prioritized the key approval and technical activities and
planned for their completion to meet the Projects target in-service date.
The outcome of this application is expected to be known in April 2011. If the exemption is not
granted, then the Project would be subject to review, a process that is expected to take at least one
year from the time the City is advised that an assessment is required.
If the Project receives federal funding support (from the P3 Canada Fund or other federal source),
the Project may be reviewable under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA). If
required, the time required to complete a CEAA assessment will depend on the CEAA level
(screening, comprehensive, mediation, panel review) that is required. The type of review that may
be required is not known at this time.
The timing and extent of environmental assessment(s) must be taken into account in the project
scheduling for all delivery models.
The component of the Project expected to be of greatest interest to the EAO is the lake intake given
its potential to interact with the aquatic environment. The exemption request is based on the lake
tap intake design. If an exemption (or approval) is obtained based on this type of intake, it is
likely that an additional approval would be required if a significantly different intake design is
proposed (i.e. by a P3 Proponent). Market sounding indicates that it is unlikely that a P3 Proponent
would deviate from an approved construction process.
6
CEA reference 10-01-59226
To date, the City has discussed the Project with the Kwantlen First Nation, Matsqui First Nation,
and St:l Tribal Council. These First Nations have been provided copies of the Stave Lake Water
Supply Conceptual Design Report and the Stave Lake Intake & Pump Station Preliminary
Engineering Pre-Design Report for review.
The City plans to engage all relevant First Nations in consultation as the Project proceeds, and in
conjunction with the requirements of EAO, CEA Agency, and/or other permitting agencies. The
requirements of the environmental permitting processes will dictate the timelines and consultation
processes upcoming. These requirements are not yet known.
The AMWSC has conducted a range of open houses on both the Master Plan (which established the
need for the Project and outlined its likely form) and the Intake & Pump Station preliminary
engineering, as follows:
In the event that a P3 delivery model is selected for the Project, the City will seek assent of the
electors by referendum on November 19th 2011 in conjunction with the municipal election.
The City has developed and implemented a communications plan that addresses the need for the
Project, Project description, and procurement models. The plan will keep the public informed and
provide background facts throughout the approvals phase (i.e. until the referendum is complete),
procurement phase, and construction phase of the Project.
A licence under the Water Act to use part of the water that BC Hydro is authorized to store in
Stave Lake Reservoir to support its power generation purposes. The water licence granted to
the City would include a condition that the City and BC Hydro hold a valid agreement for the
City to use part of the stored water for the Project. BC Hydro and the City are working
towards finalizing this agreement by September 2011. The water licence application has been
prepared and will be submitted to the Comptroller of Water Rights at that time.
A Construction Permit and an Operation Permit from Fraser Health Authority (the drinking
water regulator); and
Crown land tenure (Licence of Occupation) from the BC Integrated Land Management Bureau
for Project facilities located on Crown Land.
With regard to these expected permitting requirements, the City has commenced consultation with
BC Hydro, BC Ministry of Environment Water Stewardship Division, Fraser Health Authority, and
BC Ministry of Tourism, Culture and the Arts (Archaeology Branch). These consultations and
permitting requirements are anticipated in the timeline presented on Figure 3 above.
For the most part, such permits approvals, authorizations and licenses will be obtained by the City
and in coordination with the procurement process for the Project. If a P3 delivery model is selected
for the Project, responsibility for certain approvals may be dependent on the P3 contractors designs
and construction, in which case responsibility for obtaining those approvals (only) will be
transferred to the P3 contractor (e.g. the Construction and Operation permits noted above, building
permits, etc.).
7
For more information, see Reference #4 (references are listed in Appendix A)
Procurement objectives have been developed based on the Project objectives as shown on Table 4.
As indicated in the last line of the table, the Project has been broken down and analyzed as two
separate sub-Project bundles as follows:
This approach allows for the separate analysis of each Bundle and an overall bundling of both
Bundles to be undertaken to determine the preferred delivery model or combination of models for
the Project as a whole.
The only practical and broadly marketable approach is for the City to specify the initial
pumping and water treatment capacity (i.e. 150 MLD) rather than leave it for proponents to
determine;
For the pump station, specify (as a compliance measure) expandability without alteration of
superstructure from 150 MLD to 400 MLD (e.g. by swapping pumps);
For the WTP, specify (as a compliance measure) that expansion of treatment capacity to 400
MLD be accommodated in the site layout and plant connectivity but not included in the
proposal pricing.
Through this approach, the City will retain the ability to add additional treatment capacity whenever
it deems necessary without necessarily being tied to using the P3 contractor.
4.1.2.3 Timing
The objective is to have the Project fully operational and in regular service by the summer peak
demand period of 2016. To commission the WTP, all upstream components (Intake & Pump
Station, raw water transmission mains) and the downstream treated water transmission mains must
be commissioned.
There is therefore an argument to combine Bundle A and Bundle B into one contract, to provide
single-point accountability for bringing the new water supply into service. Whether or not there is
value for money in combining the Bundles is assessed in Section 4.3.6.
Based on this assessment, a 25 year term is most appropriate, with the primary criteria being the
transfer of performance and lifecycle cost risk and the consistency with City policy. In the
remainder of this document, the operating term is deemed to be 25 years unless specifically
mentioned otherwise.
8
The only sub-components not notionally covered with a 25 year term with five-year service life handback requirement are the
vertical turbine pumps in the Pump Station, and their associated electrical components. These elements have a 35 year life
expectancy. Some or all of the pumps would be replaced earlier than this as pumping capacity is expanded from initial through
ultimate sizing, so the service life of some or all of the pumps would effectively be longer than 35 years, well outside any
potential P3 operating term.
In the Traditional delivery model, the construction contractor would be paid based on monthly
progress. The completed Project would be operated by the Commission with costs paid as they are
incurred for management, labour, materials, power, etc. Table 7 compares the bundling of project
responsibilities under Traditional and the P3 delivery models under consideration.
Needs
Municipality Municipality Municipality
Assessment
Investment
Municipality Municipality Municipality
Decision
Consultant selected on
Design
qualifications and price
Qualified general
Construction contractor selected by
tender
Operation Municipal staff
Qualified special-purpose
Maintenance Municipal staff P3 contractor selected on Qualified special-purpose
design, O&M plan, and P3 contractor selected on
Municipal staff or design price. Typically a
Rehabilitation contract and tendered design, O&M plan, and
consortium of firms price. Typically a
construction contract organized into a Special consortium of firms
Design contract and Purpose Company (SPC). organized into Special
Expansion tendered construction Purpose Company (SPC).
contract
Generally not required
Construction
since municipality pays
(short-term)
general contractor for
Financing
construction progress
Models screened out of consideration include those that transfer maintenance responsibility but not
operations responsibility (e.g. Design-Build-Maintain and Design-Build-Finance-Maintain as are
commonly used in hospital projects) because of the tightly integrated nature of operations and
maintenance of the Project infrastructure.
Also screened out of consideration are models that transfer long term financing responsibility
without a corresponding transfer of operating or maintenance responsibility (e.g. Design-Build-
Finance) because there is no long term benefit received in exchange for the higher cost of long term
private financing.
Payment for the capital investment in a DBO is typically made at substantial completion or on an
interim milestone basis during construction. Milestone payments reduce the cost of the contractors
financing during construction, which in turn would be savings realized by the City.9 A milestone
approach has been assumed for the financial analysis in this funding request10.
Payment for operations and routine maintenance (O&M) would be made on a monthly basis
according to the schedule bid by the contractor in its proposal, which may include both a fixed
component and a variable component based on water production (for the WTP). It is envisioned
that the cost of chemicals and power would flow through to the City, however the contractor would
be responsible for the portion of power and chemical cost that is attributable to inefficient operation
of the WTP as compared to the benchmark efficiency factor included in its proposal. It is standard
practice to index O&M payments to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) or other relevant inflation
index.
Payment for major maintenance (rehabilitation) would be made on the schedule bid by the
contractor in its proposal. Alternatively the City could require a smooth annual payment for major
maintenance to be bid. The latter is less efficient for the contractor but a smooth payment schedule
may be desired by the City11. A lumpy schedule is assumed for analysis as it is most cost-effective.
9
Because a DBO is defined on a performance, or outcome, pure progress payments as used on Traditional DBB projects are
not suitable because they compensate the contractor for interim steps toward outcomes, rather than achievement of specified
outcomes.
10
Because milestone payments lag the contractors construction costs, the contractor must finance construction until it is paid in
full through the final milestone payment. Short-term private construction financing is therefore implied in the DBO model.
11
A smooth major maintenance payment means that the City would be paying for major maintenance in advance of its completion.
To protect the funds in such a situation, a trust account is often set up. Draws from the trust account by the contractor to
undertake rehabilitation would require approval of the City. This is a relatively common process, but requires that the City take a
more active role in major maintenance planning for a P3-procured asset then it may desire. It should be noted however that the
City has the expertise in-house to effectively fulfill such a role.
an O&M performance bond (typically with limited value of one or two years of O&M
payments); and
a letter of credit or parent company guarantee.
The performance bond alone is not considered sufficient security for the handback obligation of the
contractor because the O&M payments may be relatively small compared to the major maintenance
requirements and relative to the cost of any corrective action required to ensure ongoing operational
performance.
Contractors may have different preferences for providing letters of credit versus parent company
guarantees, although the latter approach is apparently very common on water sector DBO projects
in the United States. We expect that requiring a substantial letter of credit to be posted for a 25 year
operating term (requiring annual renewal) is not likely to find favour with the market and therefore
that the parent company guarantee is the most likely form of security for a DBO. The City would
likely require a parent company guarantee in any case, to cover off the risk that the contractor
cannot renew its letter of credit at some point during the term.
Payment for any unfinanced portion12 (capital contribution) of the capital investment in a DBFO
is typically made at substantial completion, on an interim milestone basis during construction, or on
a modified progress payment basis13. Milestone and modified progress payments reduce the cost of
the contractors financing during construction, which in turn would be savings realized by the City.
A milestone approach has been assumed for the financial analysis in this funding request.
Payment for the privately financed portion of the capital investment would be made over the
operating period, as capital payments which would include repayment of capital as well as
financing costs. The privately financed portion would be financed by the contractor using a non-
recourse project finance structure, typically made up of approximately 90% debt (invested by banks
or bondholders) and 10% equity (invested by one or more of the member firms of the contractor
team). The capital payments would be bid by the contractor in its proposal.
Payment for operations and routine maintenance (O&M) would be made on a monthly basis
according to the schedule bid by the contractor in its proposal, which may include both a fixed
12
In current markets, it is typically necessary that the government owner of a P3 project pay for a portion of the capital investment
during construction (typically in the range of 50%), leaving the balance to be privately financed. This reduces the cost of private
financing to the point where value for money is realized. The owner should not contribute capital to the point where the
privately financed amount becomes too small to interest the market and/or too small to provide adequate security for the
handback responsibility of the contractor. Most market sounding participants indicated that the minimum amount of private
financing required is approximately $110M although two participants had lower minimum requirements.
13
The modified progress payment approach makes payments to the contractor on a prorata basis (capital contribution/total capital
cost x % complete) on a scheduled basis during the construction period, but only after a threshold milestone has been reached
(e.g. 30% of project completion is required before any progress payments are made). This approach is suitable for a DBFO
because of the capital that has not been paid at the end of construction (i.e. the privately financed amount) which provides the
incentive to the contractor complete the project on time so that capital repayment can begin. The initial threshold milestone
protects the owner from paying for activity rather than outcomes.
Payment for major maintenance (rehabilitation) would be made on the schedule bid by the
contractor in its proposal. Alternatively the City could require a smooth annual payment for major
maintenance to be bid. The latter is less efficient for the contractor but a smooth payment schedule
may be desired by the City. A lumpy schedule is assumed for analysis as it is most cost-effective.
The project agreement would allow for the City to hold back capital and rehabilitation payments in
the last few years of the operating term as security to ensure that the contractor is meeting its
handback obligation. Security for the operating period stems from the private financing that is at
risk of not being repaid if the contractor does not meet its obligations. The providers of equity and
debt financing, and debt in particular, will take steps to ensure that contractual obligations are met
so as not to risk their investment returns.
The delivery models under consideration were evaluated on a qualitative basis through two
different approaches:
A qualitative risk assessment which evaluated the overall risk profile of the Project when
delivered under each of the delivery models; and
A high-level multi-criteria analysis (MCA) which rated the traditional and P3 delivery models
on the extent to which they are believed to meet the objectives of the City for the Project.
The objective of these analyses was to determine if either of the P3 models could or should be
eliminated from further consideration. In addition, the results are used in concert with the Value for
Money (VFM) analysis results to assess the recommended procurement option.
Each risk has a calculated risk score that is the product of the probability and impact assessed.
Figure 5 illustrates the results, with a more readable version available in Appendix B. Each risks
score is provided, as well as a color-coding of the risks from lowest (green) to highest (red).
14
The bundling definitions used in the qualitative workshop were slightly different than those defined in this document because the
project analysis framework evolved during the analysis. For the qualitative risk assessment, Bundle A did not contain the
reservoir, but included a piece of transmission main. However the discussion, and hence the assessment, focused primarily on
the Intake & Pump Station and WTP and the swapping of one passive element (reservoir) for another passive element
(transmission main) is not considered to require the adjustments of the qualitative workshop findings. The reservoir was later
deleted from the Project scope, with any reservoir-specific risk quantification accordingly removed from the analysis.
The reservoir in Bundle A was later deleted from the Project scope.
Bundle A Bundle B
DBB DBO DBFO DBB DBO DBFO
Risk Score 244 215 204 115 116 111
For Bundle A, the unweighted risk scores are interpreted to mean that the workshop panel believes
that Traditional DBB presents the highest project risk and DBFO presents the lowest project risk,
with DBO lying in between. The results reflect the theory behind the different models, which is
that by allocating more risks to the private sector contractor under DBO and DBFO (but only those
that the contractor is better able to mitigate than the City), the overall project risk can be reduced.
For Bundle B, the unweighted risk scores are nearly identical for all three delivery models. This
suggests that there are few risks that are better mitigated by the private sector contractor than the
City for the transmission mains, and/or that the Project if delivered by Traditional DBB is not
believed to be particularly risky.
These results reflect that compared to Bundle A, the transmission mains (Bundle B) have
considerably less risk to transfer, for at least two key reasons:
There is little to no operational responsibility associated with the transmission mains, they are
passive infrastructure. Since there is little responsibility to transfer, there is little risk to
transfer.
One of the biggest construction risks for a pipeline (with a long, linear site that can cross many
different geological formations) is geotechnical information risk. It is not believed possible to
transfer this risk to a contractor in any procurement model because conditions encountered are
beyond the contractors control and could vary significantly from the information available at
the time of procurement.
At this point in the analysis, what is key to note is that there may be a different degree of optimality
in terms of applying the P3 delivery models to Bundle A and Bundle B, but that the P3 models have
been assessed to be at least as good as the Traditional DBB model for both Bundles.
In addition to informing this business case analysis, the results of the qualitative risk analysis are
valuable for project management purposes as the Project is advanced. The findings identify risks
that need mitigating regardless of delivery model, and with respect to the P3 models, can form the
basis for the initial risk allocation that would guide development of the procurement
documentation.
15
The scores are unweighted because the relative importance of each risk is not factored into the totals. The risk quantification
described in Section 4.3.5 takes into account the relative magnitude, or importance, of each risk.
Traditional
Procurement Criteria DBO DBFO
DBB
Maximize certainty that 2016 target will be met
Schedule
16
Although not discussed or rated in the MCA workshop it should be noted that the DBO and DBFO models also provide cost
certainty earlier than Traditional DBB, which may be an advantage for the City. This would be at the time of award for Bundle A.
For Bundle B, with greater retained risk due to geotechnical conditions, cost certainty would be at the time of award for the fixed-
price portion of Bundle B.
Traditional DBB fails to maximize costs covered by other levels of government because it is
not eligible for P3 Canada Fund funding which is the only known available source of senior
government funding for the Project. Traditional DBB scores only a single because it is
not a P3 model, but that does not make it an unsuitable model to deliver the Project.
DBO and DBFO fail to meet the criteria of having the river crossing available when the
transmission mains south of the river, which are being constructed in 2011, are completed.
However the benefit of being able to use the river crossing prior to the Stave Lake supply
being online is marginal (reduced headlosses for a period of time), and Traditional DBB only
minimally meets the requirement since the exact timing of the river crossing construction
under DBB is not known.
It is worthy of note that all three models scored with regard to delivering a sufficient
quality and quantity of water, which is the overarching goal of the Project. In other words, the
evaluation panel believes that any of the delivery models is broadly equally effective for meeting
the Citys water quality and quantity requirements.
Generally, the P3 models score highest with respect to innovation potential, long term cost
optimization, and time and cost certainty. DBFO scores better than DBO with respect to handback
quality at the end of the operating term and maximizes the costs covered by other levels of
government.
Traditional DBB scores highest with respect to long term adaptability and flexibility simply
because there is no contractual process that must be followed to make changes, and working with
the incumbent contractor by definition does not provide as much freedom as if the City is self-
performing17.
The MCA analysis reveals that the P3 delivery models require the City to give up unfettered control
of the Project components in exchange for cost certainty, cost minimization, major maintenance
certainty, and time certainty. This does not mean giving up total control, but it does mean that it
must work with the incumbent contractor and within the change processes built into the contract if
the need to make changes during the term of the contract arises.
4.1.5.3 Relative Quality of Long Term Performance Security in DBO and DBFO
In a DBFO, the long term performance of the contractor is secured by the direct investment in the
Project by the contractor. The security for the City arises from the ability, using the payment
mechanism, to hold back payments for non-performance, including if it becomes apparent that the
handback conditions are not likely to be met by the contractor. If the City needed to utilize its
security, it would not need to actively pursue the contractor or seek funds from a third party, it
would withhold payments as permitted by the contractual payment mechanism. This would either
17
It should be noted that it is standard practice for P3 project agreements to prescribe the process that is followed if capital
modifications are required to meet changes in the performance specification that result from regulatory requirements or simply
changes in the requirements of the owner. Generally, the process is for the contractor to develop a solution and price the
change, and for the owner to then decide whether to have the contractor proceed or whether to tender the work competitively.
Operating changes may be accommodated in a similar manner although it will generally not be practical for any party other than
the contractor to make operating changes, so an open-book or time-and-materials basis may be used.
In a DBO, the long term performance of the contractor may be secured either by a letter of credit or
parent company guarantees from one or more of the contractor parent companies. If the contractor
provided a letter of credit, the City would need to seek the funds from the guaranteeing bank19. If
the contractor provided a parent company guarantee, the City would need to pursue the parent
company for performance and/or funds, and if the company did not respond appropriately, sue the
parent company.
The relative quality of the security in a DBFO is higher than in a DBO because the City is in
control of the funds needed to rectify non-performance. In a DBO, it is not in control of the funds,
and has to make a claim to third parties to rectify non-performance. A related concern with parent
company guarantees is the ability to fairly compare guarantees from different companies. In a
DBFO, there is a commitment to fund the project investment bound into the proposal. The ability
of the contractor and its debt and equity providers to fund the investment can be verified during the
procurement process and compared between bidders if needed. The availability of the security can
be determined objectively.
In a DBO using parent company guarantees as security there is no way to verify that the parent
company guarantee will be acted upon appropriately by the parent or its successor companies at the
time it may be needed, which could be 20 or more years hence. Therefore evaluating the backstop
quality of a parent company guarantee at bid time requires either speculation as to the future
financial and technical state of the parent company, or requires that the guarantee simply to be
taken at face value based on the reputation of the company and perhaps, if available and reliable, its
record of action on its parent guarantees. This would be a subjective appraisal.
On a related note, if there are any problems with the funding of the contractors investment in a
DBFO (and therefore with the availability of the security) it will be discovered early, during the
financial close period before design/construction begin.
This discussion should not be read as a dismissal of the value of a parent company guarantee or the
viability of DBOs, but rather a contrasting of the quality of security provided by a guarantee as
compared to a direct investment in a project as in a DBFO. If there is a choice between the two
delivery models for a project, this difference is an important consideration.
The importance of the long term performance security depends on the nature of the infrastructure
assets. For Bundle A that has significant electrical / mechanical components and is highly
operationally intensive, the performance security is very important. For Bundle B, for which
performance is largely certain as long as the assets are properly constructed, long term performance
security is much less important, and perhaps even unimportant.
18
In such a situation, it is important that that amount of private financing be large enough that withholding of payments would
provide sufficient funds to rectify any handback non-performance. This is one consideration in determining the upper limit of
capital contribution by the owner that may be made during construction in a DBFO. The other consideration is that there needs
to be enough private financing in the project to interest the market of debt and equity providers.
19
It is unlikely that a letter of credit of sufficient size to provide the necessary security would be an attractive alternative for the
market, and therefore parent company guarantees are the most likely approach.
The public sector comparator (PSC) for the VFM analysis is the Traditional DBB delivery model.
There are two shadow bids for the VFM analysis: DBO, and DBFO.
It is evident that there is considerable market interest in the Project as either a DBO or DBFO. Each
company has a different outlook on the private financing component depending on their corporate focus
pure financial investors are only interested in the DBFO model. All of the companies interviewed
expressed their interest in the Project and would seriously consider an opportunity to participate in a
procurement process for a DBO or DBFO as indicated. This confirms the assessments made with respect
to marketability and competitiveness in the qualitative risk assessment and MCA analysis.
Other key findings of the market sounding are taken into consideration throughout this document, with
reference to the market of service providers or the market.
(1) Capital cost savings are as compared to owners estimate for traditional procurement,
information as made public by government owners of each project.
(2) Net present value savings over 21 year project life (i.e. capital and operating cost) is 31%.
Source: Partnerships BC.
The average capital cost savings in the above table is approximately 30%. Although the projects
listed are considerably smaller than the Stave Lake Water Supply and Treatment Project in terms of
total capital cost, it is difficult to anticipate whether the larger size would change the potential for
savings positively, negatively, or at all.
CH2M HILL has undertaken some confidential analysis of projects in which it has had involvement
as a DBO or DB + short-term O bidder, and has concluded the following with respect to the
potential savings as compared to owners Traditional DBB project cost estimates:
True performance-based procurements will most likely result in the greatest potential savings;
perhaps in the range of 15 to 25 percent.
A moderate approach, whereby allowable technologies are limited, will generally achieve less
significant savings; perhaps in the range of 5 to 15 percent.
A prescriptive procurement approach may not result in any project costs savings over the PSC
approach (i.e. DBB estimate).
Based on the above, and with reference to Section 4.1.2.4, the following efficiency estimates are
selected for use in the analysis, for translation of Traditional DBB cost estimates to DBO and
DBFO cost estimates20:
25% for the WTP, as it is expected that it will be specified primarily on a performance basis;
15% for the Intake & Pump Station, as it is expected that the specification for the intake
portion will be fairly prescriptive but less so for the pump station portion21; and
20
Efficiencies could be greater in a DBFO than a DBO since there may be a heightened level of competition for the equity returns,
and because the equity returns offer a cushion against higher costs that may allow capital and O&M pricing to be more
aggressive in a DBFO. However there is no basis for estimating what the difference in the efficiency levels may be.
This results in an overall efficiency estimate of approximately 20% for Bundle A and 5% for
Bundle B based on the initial capital costs. These efficiency factors are considered conservative
(i.e. they do not set an unrealistically high expectation of savings through innovation and
competition). It is evident that higher savings are possible, but it would not be prudent to expect
such savings as the basis for selecting a delivery model. This efficiency estimate is applied to
capital and major rehabilitation costs to translate DBB estimates to DBO/DBFO estimates. This
estimate is also subject to sensitivity analysis.
The latter contingency is included in the base costs of the financial model (for all delivery models)
because it is essentially a budgeting allowance that is very likely to be utilized as the preliminary
designs and concept designs are further advanced (i.e., projects tend not to get cheaper as the design
level advances).
The former contingency is not included in the base costs of the financial model as it would be a
double-counting of costs that area accounted for in the risk quantification.
21
The intake is estimated to comprise approximately 22%, and the pump station approximately 78%, of the capital cost for the
Intake and Pump Station
Adjustment for
Infrastructure Component Basis of Estimate Adjustment for PSC
Shadow Bids
Increased by a profit
margin, insurance and
Assuming operation by
Intake & Pump Station None overhead costs added
the City
to reflect an expected
bid price.
Staffing reduced by 4 Increased by a profit
to account for sharing margin, insurance and
Assuming operation by
WTP of responsibilities with overhead costs added
a contractor
existing City staff to reflect an expected
22
positions bid price.
Increased by a profit
margin, insurance and
Assuming operation by
Transmission Mains None overhead costs added
the City
to reflect an expected
bid price.
The O&M estimates used in the VFM analysis therefore reflect anticipated efficiencies for self-
delivery by the City in the PSC and profit margins and overhead costs for the O&M contractor in
the shadow bids. The profit margin used in the DBFO is slightly lower than the profit margin in the
DBO, as the market has indicated that the higher total return (equity return plus profit margin on
O&M) allows for lower margins.
The cost of power and water treatment chemicals are assumed to flow through to the City, so no
markup on these costs is included in the shadow bids.
22
Labour positions eliminated for the PSC are 1 WTP Manager, 1 Maintenance Mechanic, and 2 Lead Operators.
We are aware of two potential contractors in the market that may take a different view of the
project size because they have alternative approaches to securing financing and different investment
criteria that may allow them to fund a smaller amount of private financing. However, there does
not appear to be broad enough market appetite for Bundle B to be procured on its own
competitively (i.e. with three qualified bidders) as a DBFO.
As discussed in Section 4.1.5.3, the long term security benefit of a DBFO is not considered very
important for Bundle B, and so eliminating DBFO from consideration for Bundle B is of little
concern.
The schedules anticipate the Project being fully commissioned and in service at the end of March
2016, to meet the Project goals. The schedules have been developed in consultation with the
Owners Engineer and there is adequate time to procure the Project under either Traditional or P3
delivery models. In both schedules, the WTP is anticipated to require the longest design period,
and the longest construction period. The timing of the construction of the other elements is planned
around the WTP timing.
The sections of the transmission mains are constructed sequentially with minimal construction
intensity, and are completed a full year earlier than the planned completion of the WTP. This gives
significant contingency allowance.
The transmission main timing shows the river crossing being constructed early, so that the
AMWSC may avail itself of the (relatively minor) benefit of headloss reduction in the existing
transmission system as early as possible. This also provides three additional fisheries windows in
the schedule that may be utilized if the crossing construction is delayed by permitting issues or field
conditions.
4.3.2.2 P3 Schedule
The design-build of the WTP governs and there is sufficient but not an excessive amount of time
available assuming (reasonably) that contract close can be achieved by the April 2013. The design-
build of the other components of Bundle A are timed in relation to the WTP construction.
The watermains in Bundle B are shown on the schedule assuming that Bundle B is procured
separately from Bundle A. The assumption is that the City would dictate completion at the end of
2014 to provide significant contingency time to guarantee that the transmission mains would be in
place in time for WTP commissioning (and thus not interfere with the ability of the P3 contractor
on Bundle A to complete on time).
If Bundle A and Bundle B are procured under one P3 contract, the P3 contractor may decide to
delay transmission main construction to coincide more closely with the completion of the Intake &
Pump Station and WTP.
The schedule shows the river crossing being constructed in the winter of 2013/2014. This allows
for a contingency fisheries construction window in the winter of 2014/2015 in the event that there
are problems in the field or with environmental permitting, still preserving a margin of safety to
complete the crossing before the WTP is completed.
Key financial assumptions used in the financial analysis are provided in Table 14. Where a
parameter is the subject of sensitivity testing23, the sensitivity range is documented as well.
4.3.4 Financing
In the DBO model, the contractor must finance the construction costs during construction to the
extent that the costs are not recovered by the milestone payments. A construction loan and its
associated costs must therefore be modelled in the DBO shadow bid. The key short term financial
assumptions, based on market conditions at the time of writing, are summarized below.
The financing assumptions used to model private financing in the DBFO model are based on
current market conditions as if the Project was being bid as of the time of writing. Sensitivity
analysis on the key elements of the financing assumptions is done to examine the potential impact
on value for money if market conditions change either positively or negatively between the time
23
The variables tested in sensitivity testing are those recommended by Partnerships BC
4.3.4.1 Honorariums
Honorariums are assumed to be paid to two Proponents in the financial model. The amount of the
honorarium is $250,000 for DBO, and $350,000 for DBFO. At this level, the honorariums are
expected to cover perhaps 20% of the actual cost of bidding. Market feedback on honorariums is
that while the contribution towards costs is helpful and can make a project more attractive if it is
being compared to projects not offering honorariums, the key benefit is that the honorarium
demonstrates commitment to the procurement process on behalf of the Owner. It also provides
some compensation for ideas that may be taken from non-winning proposals and utilized by the
Owner.
For each delivery model, the previously-determined risk was confirmed, and a consensus best-case,
worst-case, and expected or typical impact was established. The impacts were expressed as either a
percentage of a relevant base cost (e.g. construction cost, operations cost), as direct dollar figures,
as time delay estimates, or other metrics such as contract termination and re-tendering costs.
Risks that are transferred to the contractor are not without cost. However, the nature of the risk will
dictate whether the risk cost is added as a contingency to the contractors own budget (i.e. a
priced risk), whether it is ignored by the contractor due to competitive bid pressure or optimism
bias (i.e. an unpriced risk) or whether the risk cost would be absorbed by financing costs (equity
and/or debt) in a DBFO. Each transferred risk has been categorized as priced (in which case the
risk cost flows explicitly into the financial model) or unpriced. During the risk workshop there
were some risks that were determined to be transferred but unpriced and therefore the risk
quantification was not completed.
Table 17 presents a summary representation of the results of the risk quantification, which are
suitable for making some general observations regarding the risk profiles of the bundles and the
delivery models24.
Table 17 - Net Present Value of Quantified Risks (50th percentile expected value)
Bundle A Bundle B
25
NPV of: DBB DBO DBFO DBB DBO DBFO
Retained Risk $13.1 M $ 1.6 M $ 1.3 M $3.6 M $ 2.3 M $ 2.3 M
Transferred Risk $ 2.0 M $ 6.2 M $ 4.7 M $ 0.6 M $ 0.4 M $ 0.3 M
Total Risk $ 15.1 M $ 7.8 M $ 6.0 M $ 4.2 M $ 2.7 M $ 2.6 M
for Bundle A, the majority of risk cost is transferred to the contractor in DBO and DBFO,
suggesting that there is value from risk transfer in the P3 models for Bundle A;
for Bundle B, the majority of risk cost is retained by the City in DBO and DBFO, suggesting
that value from risk transfer is limited in the P3 models for Bundle B; and
24
These numbers are an intermediate output of the financial model suitable for comparative purposes as shown above only. They
should not be deemed to be equivalent to the risk adjustments made to each model in the VFM analysis, as a portion of the
costs shown are subject to financing costs being added in the DBFO and DBO models.
25
Net present values shown are calculated using a 6% discount rate
The table echoes the findings of the qualitative risk assessment in that the benefits of the P3 models
are more evident for Bundle A than Bundle B.
Appendix E provides a summary of the quantified risk costs resulting from the workshop.
The net present value of the base costs are calculated with a cashflow model that distributes the
procurement, design, construction, operation, maintenance, rehabilitation, and financing costs
according to the schedules appropriate for each model as shown in Figure 6. Risk costs, be they
retained or transferred, are also distributed according to the schedules and the timing of the risks.
Value for money has been calculated for Bundle A, Bundle B, and for a combined A+B. As
mentioned earlier, a standalone DBFO for Bundle B is not assessed. For the combined A+B, input
costs are adjusted to account for the savings attributable to running one procurement process rather
than two separate procurement processes.
The VFM methodology utilized is consistent with Partnerships BCs guidance on the quantitative
evaluation of procurement alternatives.
The contribution should not be so high as to reduce the amount of private debt financing
below $100M and the private equity financing below $10M; and
The contribution should not be so high as to make the private investment insignificant relative
to the performance and handback requirements the payments to the contractor need to be
large enough that withholding them will motivate the contractor to perform and/or provide the
City with the funds needed to undertake the necessary work itself.
Capital contributions on recent DBFO and DBFM projects in Canada have ranged from 30% to
60% of the capital cost of the Project. On two hospital projects in BC, capital contributions of
80% were made but the 20% private equity financing was not believed to provide sufficient
security on its own so additional security requirements were put in place this level of funding was
an extraordinary measure to address very high debt costs during the credit crisis.
The 55% maximum contribution for the Bundle is considered to be near the upper limit of what an
owner may typically wish to contribute to a DBFO without potentially reducing the effectiveness of
the long term performance security.
Table 19 presents the VFM estimates. VFM is presented both in dollar terms (NPV of cost savings
over the full term of the agreement28 as compared to DBB) and percentage terms (as compared to
DBB).
DBO shows positive VFM for Bundle A regardless of the discount rate used. DBFO shows
positive VFM for both discount rates as long as a capital contribution is made. Maximizing the
capital contribution to the DBFO, to 35%, is shown to improve value for money.
Figure 7 shows the full range of risk-adjusted project costs from best case to worst case29, reflecting
the range of estimated risk outcomes that is possible for each delivery model.
26
The 35% contribution for Bundle A is $60M, in nominal (as-spent over the construction period) dollars
27
The 55% contribution for Bundle A and B combined is $143.5M, in nominal (as-spent over the construction period) dollars
28
i.e. design-build period plus 25 year operating period
29
The best case is taken as the 5th percentile risk cost, and the worst case as the 95th percentile risk cost.
Regardless of the discount rate used, the figure illustrates the greater cost certainty of the DBO and
DBFO models over DBB (i.e. they have a narrower range of outcomes) and the value for money of
the DBO and DBFO models over DBB (i.e. they are positioned to the left hand side of the figures).
Looking strictly at the VFM estimates, DBO is preferred over DBFO. However, qualitative factors
must also be considered when selecting the preferred procurement option. In considering DBO vs.
DBFO for Bundle A, the discussion in Section 4.1.5.3 is particularly relevant. All else being equal,
the long term performance security of a DBO is considered inferior to that of a DBFO, and given
the operationally intensive nature of the Intake & Pump Station and WTP, where the long term
security is particularly important, the additional cost of DBFO versus DBO has been determined by
the City through preliminary review of these results to be worth the additional cost30.
Although estimated to have a cost premium over DBO, with reference to Figure 7, DBFO is
preferential to DBB regardless of the discount rate used given the narrower range of potential
outcomes. Even at the 6% discount rate, which does not make DBFO as clear a choice over DBB
as the 7.5% rate does, it is evident that DBFO limits the downside risk to the City (i.e. the worst
case is lower for DBFO than DBB) and the expected costs are lower as well, offering positive
VFM.
DBFO is therefore carried forward as the preferred P3 delivery model for Bundle A.
30
Referring to Table 19, the additional cost of a DBFO over a DBO in NPV terms is estimated to be $19M at the 6% discount rate
or $4M at the 7.5% discount rate.
DBO shows positive VFM for Bundle B regardless of the discount rate used.
Although DBFO is not considered to be marketable, the results are shown to illustrate a difference
between Bundle A and Bundle B. Whereas Bundle A showed value from DBFO when calculated
with either discount rate, Bundle B does not show value at the 6% discount rate even with a much
higher capital contribution. This further illustrates the difference in the risk profiles of Bundle A
and Bundle B the value of the risk transfer of DBFO on Bundle B does not clearly overcome the
additional cost of DBFO as it does on Bundle A.
Figure 8 shows the full range of risk-adjusted project costs from best case to worst case, reflecting
the range of risk outcomes that is possible for DBB and DBO. DBFO is not shown as it is not
considered a marketable option.
Regardless of the discount rate used, the figure illustrates the greater cost certainty of DBO over
DBB (i.e. it has a narrower range of outcomes) and the value for money of DBO over DBB (i.e. it is
positioned to the left hand side of the figures).
Given that DBO was not considered the best choice for Bundle A, is it suitable for Bundle B? As
discussed in Section 4.1.5.3, Bundle Bs infrastructure is not operationally intensive, and requires
very minor preventative maintenance only the transmission mains are essentially static elements.
On this basis, the City through preliminary review of these results has determined that DBO is
suitable for Bundle B.
DBO is therefore carried forward as the preferred P3 delivery model for Bundle B.
4.3.6.5 Value for Money Estimates for Combined Bundle Hybrid DBFO+DBO
On a standalone basis, DBFO has been determined to be the preferred P3 model for Bundle A, and
DBO for Bundle B. The two bundles could be combined into a hybrid P3 model for the entire
Project, with one procurement process selecting a contractor to design, build, and operate both
bundles and partially finance Bundle A only. Table 22 presents the NPV of total costs for a single
procurement for a Hybrid DBFO+DBO. These costs take into account the savings of
approximately $2.75M associated with running one procurement that spans both bundles.
Table 22 - Total Estimated Risk Adjusted Project Costs for Combined Bundle Hybrid
There may be additional economies of scale and synergies that would improve VFM over what is
shown above, for example there may be no incremental labour cost for operation of Bundle B when
packaged with Bundle A as the effort is low enough not to require any additional staffing.
4.3.6.6 Value for Money Estimates for Combined Bundle A + Bundle B DBFO
On a standalone basis, DBFO has been determined to be the preferred P3 model for Bundle A, and
DBO for Bundle B. One of the limiting factors on the value for money achievable with DBFO on
Bundle A is the amount of capital contribution (approximately 35%) that can be made without
reducing the privately-financed portion below the marketable threshold. Combining Bundle A and
Bundle B in a DBFO increases the project size and allows a greater portion of the capital costs
(approximately 55%) to be covered by capital contributions from the City without reducing the
privately-financed portion below the marketable threshold.
A combined DBFO for Bundle A and Bundle B is therefore assessed to determine if it improves
value for money compared to the Hybrid DBFO+DBO. Table 24 presents the NPV of total costs
for a single procurement of the entire Project as a DBFO calculated using the discount rates
described in Section 4.3.3. These costs take into account the savings associated with running one
procurement that spans both bundles. Table 25 presents the VFM estimates.
Table 24 - Total Estimated Risk Adjusted Project Costs for Combined Bundle A + Bundle B DBFO
Table 25 - Value for Money Estimates for Combined Bundle A + Bundle B DBFO
With a capital contribution, there is positive value for money regardless of the discount rate used.
There may be additional economies of scale and synergies that would improve VFM over what is
shown above, for example there may be no incremental labour cost for operation of Bundle B when
packaged with Bundle A as the effort is low enough not to require any additional staffing.
Table 26 compares the VFM of the combined DBFO with that of the Hybrid DBFO+DBO.
The value for money of the Hybrid DBFO+DBO is for all intents and purposes identical to the
VFM for the combined DBFO with 55% contribution.
Figure 9 illustrates the similarity in VFM between the Hybrid DBFO+DBO and the combined
DBFO, as well as the advantage of either of the combined bundle alternatives as compared to DBB
(downside risk is limited by the P3 models and the expected costs are lower as well).
Figure 9 Combined DBFO and Hybrid DBFO+DBO Total Estimated Risk-Adjusted Project Cost
Range (best/expected/worst cases)
Reduced coordination risk between the bundles (note: this risk is considered to be relatively
minor, both for construction and operations);
Single point of accountability for the entire Project;
Larger project size, which may marginally increase market interest;
Potential economies and efficiencies over and above those included in the VFM analysis; and
Lower procurement costs for the City.
Either the Combined DBFO or Hybrid DBFO+DBO could offer these incremental benefits.
For Bundle A, long term performance security is very important due to the nature of the assets
and to guarantee the risk transfer that the City would seek in exchange for prescribing the
Bundle on a performance basis. Therefore, DBFO is strongly preferred as the P3 model for
Bundle A with respect to this criteria.
For Bundle B, long term performance security is not very important as the specification will
be primarily prescriptive and there is little operation and maintenance risk to transfer given the
static nature of the assets. Therefore, DBO is preferred as the P3 model for Bundle B with
respect to this criteria because there would be little benefit received in exchange for the
premium paid for a DBFO.
With a combined DBFO, the financing would be exposed to the payment mechanism of both
Bundle A and Bundle B. Despite the low likelihood of penalties being assessed on Bundle B,
lenders may view this structure as exposing their investment to a higher level of risk than in the
hybrid structure. Relative to the hybrid, the combined structure may therefore be less attractive to
the market, or lenders may require a higher percentage of equity investment than in the hybrid
which would reduce the VFM presented above, with the Hybrid DBFO+DBO offering better VFM
in comparison.
Based on this analysis, the Hybrid DBFO+DBO model offers some advantage over the combined
DBFO model and is preferred.
Value for money remains positive within the range of sensitivity testing, with the exception of the
P3 efficiency factors. The sensitivity to the P3 efficiency estimates tested are as follows.
It is evident that the value for money estimated is dependent on the expectation that the DBFO and
DBO delivery models will result in capital cost savings over the DBB cost estimate. The
experience described in 4.3.1.4 and observations of other P3 projects suggests that these
expectations are not unreasonable. The base case efficiencies used are believed reasonable and the
analysis is somewhat conservative in that no expectation of operating efficiencies is included in the
VFM estimates.
Qualitative Analysis
Key Outcomes
Both DBO and DBFO may offer value to the City, but to different extents for Bundle A and Bundle
B.
MCA Analysis
All models are equally and well able to meet the overarching goal of the Project, which is to
deliver a sufficient quality and quantity of water.
The P3 models score highest with respect to innovation potential, long term cost optimization and
time and cost certainty. DBFO scores better than DBO with respect to handback quality at the end
of the operating term and maximizes the costs covered by other levels of government.
Traditional DBB scores highest with respect to long term adaptability and flexibility simply
because there is no contractual process that must be followed to make changes. However this
does not preclude changes from being made, and does not preclude competition on the cost of
capital changes.
The relative quality of the long term performance security is higher in a DBFO than a DBO. The
long term performance security is very important for Bundle A, and considerably less important
for Bundle B.
Key Outcomes
The P3 models are believed to offer cost, schedule, and performance advantages, with
acknowledgement that they lock the City into a relationship with a specific contractor for the long
term which by definition can limit ultimate flexibility. The additional cost of a DBFO is predicted to
be of little value for Bundle B.
Market Sounding
There is a market of potential bidders for the Project with strong background in water and
wastewater design, construction, and operations with DB, DBO and utility-type delivery models.
There is considerable market interest in the Project as either a DBO or DBFO.
Bundle A is large enough to be procured competitively as a DBFO, while Bundle B is too small
on its own.
Key Outcomes
DBFO and DBO may be considered for Bundle A and a combined Bundle A plus Bundle B. As a
standalone project, Bundle B is too small for DBFO.
Both DBO and DBFO offer value for money for Bundle A. The higher cost of DBFO is deemed
worthwhile because of the higher quality long term performance security. DBFO is the preferred
procurement model for Bundle A as a standalone project.
Bundle B is too small to be marketable as a DBFO, which does not represent a lost opportunity
because the higher cost of a DBFO is not believed to be worthwhile for the transmission main
infrastructure due to its static nature, very long service life, and minimal O&M requirements. In
the event that Bundle B was procured as a DBFO, it was demonstrated that the determination of
whether or not value for money is achieved depends on the discount rate used, which illustrates
that the value of DBFO is not as compelling for Bundle B as Bundle A. DBO offers value for
money for Bundle B, and is the preferred procurement model for Bundle B as a standalone
project.
A hybrid consisting of a DBFO for Bundle A and a DBO for Bundle B offers better VFM than
two standalone procurements, due to cost savings in procurement. The incremental savings that
may accrue due to efficiencies from economies of scale may improve VFM further than what has
been estimated. A combined Bundle A and Bundle B DBFO procurement offers similar VFM as
the hybrid and may benefit from similar incremental economy of scale benefits but presents a
higher risk to lenders and equity investors that may reduce VFM relative to the hybrid, and has a
slightly lower quality of long term performance guarantee. The Hybrid DBFO+DBO is the
preferred procurement option overall.
The Hybrid DBFO+DBO procurement model with a 25 year operating term and 35% capital contribution
to the DBFO portion is the preferred procurement option because:
Value for money is estimated to be achieved regardless of the discount rate used
It provides the City with the long term performance security required to confidently transfer the
responsibility and risk for designing, operating, and maintaining the Intake & Pump Station,
Water Treatment Plant, and Transmission mains.
31
See Tables 5 and 6 in Appendix F for the PSC and shadow bid cost breakdowns that lead to the value for money results
Borrowing to fund capital costs, if necessary, will be through the Regional District which in turn would
borrow through the Municipal Finance Authority of BC (MFABC). The MFABC pools the borrowing
needs of most local governments in BC and maintains very strong credit ratings32.
5.5 Affordability
The Project is expected to proceed for the reasons outlined in Section 2. There is no pre-determined
ceiling that sets the affordability of the Project; however, a key objective is to minimize costs as
described in the Financial criteria of the MCA analysis (see Table 9). Minimizing costs will in turn
minimize borrowing requirements and water rates.
In terms of debt servicing (repayment of principal and interest), the use of DBO for Bundle B will
reduce debt servicing costs as compared to DBB due to the expected construction cost savings.
The use of DBFO for Bundle A will result in debt servicing costs being paid under two different
streams: to the MFABC for the City-financed portion (approximately 35% of the capital cost) and
to the P3 contractor for the privately-financed portion (approximately 65% of the capital cost). The
capital cost of Bundle A itself is expected to be approximately 20% less than if delivered as a DBB.
32
(2010 Ratings: Fitch: AAA; Moodys: Aaa; S&P: AAA)
Table 29 - Estimated P3 Canada Fund Contribution for 25% of Eligible Costs ($millions, nominal as-
spent dollars)
A 25% contribution to eligible costs is estimated to amount to $66.5 M over the construction
period, with milestone contributions expected to be in the calendar years of 2014, 2015, and 2016.
33
Total Owners Costs includes some costs (e.g. legal costs) that are not eligible costs for the P3 Canada Fund, therefore a 25%
contribution to eligible owners costs is equivalent to a 19% contribution to Total Owners Costs.
The Investment will improve VFM by approximately $50M, or 16%, by improving the affordability
of the Project. The improvement in affordability will translate to lower water rates, which in turn
make the communities more competitive and better able to sustain and develop their economies.
In accordance with best practice, the high-level steps in the procurement process are recommended as
follows:
No negotiation of the issued final Project Agreement with the Preferred Proponent is contemplated.
There are three agreements that span the public/private sector boundary, as follows:
The Project Agreement, setting out all terms and conditions for the Project in the design,
construction, and operations stages;
The Direct Agreement between the lenders (debt providers) to the project, generally required by
lenders to allow them to step in to ensure that continued satisfactory operation of Bundle A in
the event that the P3 Contractor or one of its subcontractors defaults; and
Parent Company Guarantee(s), which guarantee the long term performance of the transmission
mains (Bundle B).
Approval from City Council will be sought for authorization to proceed with the following key
activities. The recommended Council approvals are shown below.
The approach to council approvals outlined, in particular the coordination with gaining the assent of
the electors, is key to minimizing procurement risk in the eyes of the market. As recommended
above, only one Council approval is required once the procurement process commences (the
contract execution). This requires combining what may typically be two separate steps (firstly
approving the selection of preferred proponent, and secondly contract execution).
The approach also seeks to obtain assent of the electors prior to engaging the market of service
providers (i.e. prior to issuing the RFQ). Without this, the market may view the procurement as
having high risk of cancellation and reduce the number of qualified participants.
There is a risk that environmental approvals may delay the Project, as construction cannot
commence until the approvals are in place, and it is not known at this time what types of
environmental review processes the Project faces. Even if the approval processes were known,
uncertainty would remain as to the time each process may take.
If full and/or lengthy environmental reviews are required, it is likely that the City will need to
release the RFP prior to obtaining the environmental certificates. However, by that time, there will
be a full understanding of the review processes and timelines, and the terms of the RFP will be
adjusted accordingly there will be no attempt to transfer environmental assessment risk to the
proponents.
Construction Stage
Director of Water and Solid Waste 25% time allocation
Planning engineers 1 full time equivalents
External owners engineer advisor
The City has agreements in place to access financial, process, and owners engineer advisory services.
Table 32 outlines the recommended approval levels for the major steps of the procurement process.
The following tables outline the anticipated membership of the steering and working committees.
34
It is assumed that as part of the funding agreement between PPP Canada and the City that PPP Canada will wish to approve
any mention of the P3 Canada Fund investment that may be present in the documents.
Role Organization
Chief Project Officer City of Abbotsford
Business Advisor TBD
P3 Advisor TBD
Owners Engineer TBD
City Legal Advisor Murdy & McAllister
P3 Legal Advisor TBD
Communications Officer City of Abbotsford
Funding Stakeholder PPP Canada
Technical Staff City of Abbotsford
The City should not develop these documents in isolation. Rather, it is recommended that the documents
be based on precedent documents from successful DBFO and DBO transactions in Canada, with
schedules and content specific to the Project added. This not only reduces effort and cost for the City, but
assists respondents and proponents in minimizing the cost of their responses since they or their advisors
will likely be familiar with the documentation. Using familiar documents also helps to reduce any
perceived procurement risk on the part of proponents.
The advisors utilized by the City on this business case are familiar with a range of appropriate base
documentation that may be used. The legal advisor retained should be one with strong P3 agreement
development and transaction experience.
The City intends to develop the necessary documents between April 2011 and January 2012, in
anticipation of release of the RFQ in January 2012 if assent of the electors is obtained.
Obtain City Council approval of this business case and authorization to submit funding request to
PPP Canada;
Submit funding request to PPP Canada;
Commence procurement planning (development of documentation, etc.), this may commence
immediately or Council may wish to await PPP Canada funding decision; and
Seek assent of the electors.
Not until any required assent of the electors is obtained should the procurement process commence. The
first step of the procurement process is the release of the RFQ.
The reservoir in Bundle A was later deleted from the Project scope.
Fraser River crossing
available as soon as 2. River Crossing available Can start the river crossing
Reduced headloss in network considerably earlier if it is not tied to Embedding the river crossing in a Embedding the river crossing in a
Phase 1 watermains when Phase 1 water mains
additional capacity to South an overall P3 project. P3 would delay its delivery until P3 would delay its delivery until
completed (relatively minor (south of River) completed
benefit) Funding is not committed which somewhat after the Phase 1 somewhat after the Phase 1
could cause delay as compared to watermains are complete. watermains are complete.
the technical ability to start
Scope is maximal: design, build,
operations, maintenance
Minimize the life-cycle cost Financially sustainable Competition is maximal: design,
of the Project infrastructure and operations 3. Maximize scope for build, operations, maintenance
Maximize long term cost Lowest possible water costs innovation and competition Design innovation is not driven by Scope is maximal: design, build, Lenders are not believed to improve
Financial
certainty (25 35 years) Consistent, predictable costs (i.e. design, construction, competitive process operations, maintenance innovation of technical solution
Lowest net cost to the Maximize costs covered by operation) Scope for innovation relatively Competition is maximal: design, Equity investors are likely to have
AMWSC other levels of government limited in a construction tender build, operations, maintenance water expertise (i.e. be operators)
and may spur further innovation
over and above DBO since there
are greater returns from a winning
DBFO bid
1
Criteria Rating Criteria Rating Criteria Rating
Category Project Objectives Desired Outcomes Procurement Criteria
Traditional DBO DBFO
Trade-off is examined under Trade-off is examined under
competitive pressure and under competitive pressure and under
4. Optimize the trade-offs need to propose fixed long term need to propose fixed long term
Trade off is considered in the
between short term and pricing pricing
traditional design/planning process
long term costs A more intensive optimization A more intensive optimization
but not under competitive pressure
process is believed to occur process is believed to occur
Citys process is focussed more on
The horizon of optimization will be The horizon of optimization will be
capital costs than O&M costs
limited to the operations term, limited to the operations term,
which is shorter than true whole-of- which is shorter than true whole-of-
life term of the assets life term of the assets
Traditional tender is not fixed-price,
Need to provide firm fixed pricing Need to provide firm fixed pricing
5. Maximize cost certainty in has a small number of unit quantity
increases certainty (both to the increases certainty (both to the
construction, and operation, components.
Contractor, and the AMWSC) Contractor, and the AMWSC)
phases Builder has no responsibility for the
Requiring Contractors to bid a Requiring Contractors to bid a
design and will seek extras.
water treatment efficiency factor water treatment efficiency factor
O&M costs are not fixed ahead of brings near-maximum certainty on brings near-maximum certainty on
time, nor are any guarantees on operating costs to AMWSC operating costs to AMWSC
treatment plant efficiency obtained
Eligible for P3 Canada Fund
6. Maximize costs covered by contribution
other levels of government No senior government funding is All else being equal, the greater
Eligible for P3 Canada Fund
available for the project under this involvement of the private sector as
contribution
delivery model. compared to DBO increases the
chance of P3 Canada Fund
contribution
2
Criteria Rating Criteria Rating Criteria Rating
Category Project Objectives Desired Outcomes Procurement Criteria
Traditional DBO DBFO
1
Quality = meeting Canadian and BC Requirements for quality and treatment
3
Criteria Rating Criteria Rating Criteria Rating
Category Project Objectives Desired Outcomes Procurement Criteria
Traditional DBO DBFO
4
Criteria Rating Criteria Rating Criteria Rating
Category Project Objectives Desired Outcomes Procurement Criteria
Traditional DBO DBFO
Contractual requirement for Contractual requirement for
17. Asset when handed back maintenance and handback maintenance and handback
Appropriate remaining life has had all necessary Yearly budgeting process allows
Residual value conditions conditions
when asset is taken back maintenance and is fit for opportunity to defer maintenance
Little ability to defer maintenance Little ability to defer maintenance
purpose as specified. Deferral of maintenance was
but less leverage through payment due to AMWSCs ability to hold
established as possible in the risk
mechanism to ensure no back capital and major
workshops.
maintenance is deferred as maintenance payments
compared to DBFO
Note: at the time of the workshop, the AMWSC (rather than the City) was contemplating undertaking the Project, hence reference to AMWSC as the project owner in the table.
5
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