PEOPLE vs.
TRANQUILINO LAGMAN & PRIMITIVO DE SOSA provision against involuntary servitude was never intended to
Facts:
1. Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with
a violation of Section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1,
known as the National Defense Law. It is alleged that these
two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the age
of twenty years in 1936 refused to register in the military
service between the 1st and 7th of April of said year.
2. The evidence shows that these two appellants were duly
notified by the corresponding authorities to appear before the
Acceptance Board, in spite of these notices, had not
registered up to the date of the filing of the information.
3. Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a
brother eight years old to support, and Tranquilino Lagman
also has a father to support, has no military learnings, and
does not wish to kill or be killed.
WON the National Defense Law is valid
Ruling: Yes. The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes
compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional
provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith.
The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be
performed except through an army. This is so because the right of
the Government to require compulsory military service is a
consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with
its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen.
ROBERT ROBERTSON vs. BARRY BALDWIN
Facts:
1. This was an appeal from a judgment of the District Court for
the Northern District of California, rendered August 5, 1895,
dismissing a writ of habeas corpus issued upon the petition
of Robert Robertson, H. H. Olsen, John Bradley, and Morris
Hanson.
2. The petition set forth in substance that the petitioners were
unlawfully restrained of their liberty by Barry Baldwin,
Marshal for the Northern District of California, in the county
jail of Alameda County, by virtue of an order of commitment,
made by a United States commissioner, committing them for
trial upon a charge of disobedience of the lawful orders of the
master of the American barkentine Arago.
3. Section 4598, which was taken from 7 of the Act of July 20,
1790, reads as follows:
SEC. 4598. If any seaman who shall have signed a
contract to perform a voyage shall at any port or place
desert, or shall absent himself from such vessel without
leave of the master or officer commanding in the
absence of the master, it shall be lawful for any justice
of the peace within the United States, upon the
complaint of the master, to issue his warrant to
apprehend such deserter x x x
4. Petitioners had shipped on board the Arago at San
Francisco for a voyage to Knappton; that they had each
signed shipping articles to perform the duties of seamen
during the course of the voyage, but, becoming dissatisfied
with their employment, they left the vessel at Astoria, in the
State of Oregon, and were subsequently arrested, under the
provisions of Revised Statutes Sections 4596 to 4599
5. Section 4599, which was taken for 53 of the Shipping
Commissioners' Act of June 7, 1872, authorizes the
apprehension of deserting seamen, with or without the
assistance of the local public officers or constables and
without a warrant, and their conveyance before any court of
justice or magistrate of the state, to be dealt with according
to law. It also provides for punishment by imprisonment for
desertion, refusal to join the vessel, or absence without
leave.
WON the Section 4596-4599 of the Shipping Commissioners Act
is valid
Ruling: Section 4598 and 4599, insofar as they require seamen to
carry out the contracts contained in their shipping articles, are not
in conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment forbidding slavery and
involuntary servitude, and it cannot be open to doubt that the
apply to such contracts.
The Court is also of opinion that even if the contract of a seaman
could be considered within the letter of the Thirteenth Amendment,
it is not, within its spirit, a case of involuntary servitude. From the
earliest historical period, the contract of the sailor has been treated
as an exceptional one, and involving, to a certain extent, the
surrender of his personal liberty during the life of the contract; that
the sailor will not desert the ship at a critical moment or leave her
at some place. Such desertion might involve a long delay of the
vessel while the master is seeking another crew, an abandonment
of the voyage, and, in some cases, the safety of the ship itself.
Hence, the laws of nearly all maritime nations have made provision
for securing the personal attendance of the crew on board, and for
their criminal punishment for desertion, or absence without leave,
during the life of the shipping articles.
UNITED STATES vs. SILVESTRE POMPEYA
Facts:
1. On or about March 20 of, 1914, in the jurisdiction of the
municipality of Iloilo, Philippine Islands, the said accused,
Silvestre Pompeya, did willfully, illegally, and criminally and
without justifiable motive fail to render service on patrol duty;
an act performed in violation of the law. For this violation the
said accused was sentenced to pay a fine of P2
2. Pompeya maintained that the complaint filed in this case and
charged therein do not constitute a crime; and that it is
unconstitutional because it is repugnant to the Organic Act
of the Philippines which guarantees the liberty of the citizens.
CFI dismissed the case in favor of Pompeya.
3. Prosecutor appealed stating that section 40 (m) of the
Municipal Code (which was adopted in accordance with the
provisions of Act No. 1309):
authorizing the municipal president to require able-
bodied male residents of the municipality, between the
ages of 18 to 50, to assist, for a period not exceeding
five days in any one month, in apprehending robbers,
and other lawbreakers and suspicious characters, and
to act as patrols for the protection of the municipality
4. The amendment contains a punishment for those who may
be called upon for such service, and who refuse to render
the same.
WON said Act No. 1309 section 40 (m) of the Municipal Code is
violative of constitutional rights
Ruling: Do not individuals whose rights are protected by the
Government, owe some duty to such, in protecting it against
lawbreakers, and the disturbers of the quiet and peace? If tradition
may be relied upon, the primitive man, living in his tribal relations
before the days of constitutions and states, enjoyed the security
and assurance of assistance from his fellows when his quiet and
peace were violated by malhechores. This ancient obligation of the
individual to assist in the protection of the peace and good order
of his community is still recognized in all well-organized
governments in the "posse comitatus" (power of the county).
This was a right well recognized at common law. Act No. 1309 is
a statutory recognition of such common-law right. Said Act
attempts simply to designate the cases and the method when and
by which the people of the town (pueblo) may be called upon to
render assistance for the protection of the public and the
preservation of peace and order. It is an exercise of the police
power of the state. The Court is of the opinion, and so hold, that
the power exercised under the provisions of Act No. 1309 falls
within the police power of the state and that the state was fully
authorized and justified in conferring the same upon the
municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that, therefore, the
provisions of said Act are constitutional and not in violation nor in
derogation of the rights of the persons affected thereby.
KAISAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA KAHOY SA
PILIPINAS vs. GOTAMCO SAW MILL
Facts:
1. The Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Pilipinas
declared a strike on September 10, 1946, against Gotamco
Sawmill, which suspended all the work in the respondent
company, for salary increase.
 2. After a series of conferences held on September 23, 1946,
the labor leader decided to accept a temporary
arrangement of the wage problem as proposed by
management, that is, P2.00 over-all increase without meal to
all striking laborers; and that Francisco Cruz, President of the
Union, stated that they were going to accede to this
proposition, provided that the management would permit the
laborers to bring with them home, if available, small pieces
of lumber to be utilized as firewood
3. Finding the above temporary agreement between the parties
to be reasonable and advantageous to both, the court
approves the same and orders the striking laborers of the
respondent company to return to their work on Tuesday,
September 24, 1946 at 7:00 o'clock in the morning, and
the respondent company to resume its operation and admit
the striking laborers
4. It appears that on January 7, 1947, the respondent Gotamco
Saw Mill filed with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) an
urgent motion asking that the petitioning union be held for
contempt of court for having staged a strike during the
pendency of the case. Petitioner said that the respondent
ordered the stoppage of the work and consequently the
workers did then and there stop working.
5. In the counter-petition said petitioner asked the respondent
be held for contempt for having employed four new Chinese
laborers during the pendency of the hearing of the main
case, without express authority of the court and in violation
of section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103

WON the provisions of section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103,

upon which order of September 23, 1946, is constitutional

Ruling: We agree with the CIR that section 19 of Commonwealth

Act No. 103 is constitutional.

It does not offend against the constitutional inhibition prescribing

involuntary servitude. An employee entering into a contract of
employment said law went into effect, voluntarily accepts, among
other conditions, those prescribed in said section 19, among which
is the

"implied condition that when any dispute between the employer

or landlord and the employee, tenant or laborer has been
submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations for settlement or
arbitration, pursuant to the provisions of this Act, and pending
award or decision by it, the employee, tenant or laborer shall not
strike or walk out of his employment when so joined by the court
after hearing and when public interest so requires, and if he has
already done so, that he shall forthwith return to it, upon order
of the court, which shall be issued only after hearing when public
interest so requires or when the dispute can not, in its opinion,
be promptly decided or settled ..."

The voluntariness of the employee's entering into such a contract

of employment he has a free choice between entering into it or
not with such an implied condition, negatives the possibility of
involuntary servitude ensuing.