Arms Race: The Global

Perspective

Project Submitted By:

RAVI KISHAN
Semester V
Roll No. 151

Project Submitted To:

Dr. B. K. Mahakul
Faculty: Political Science

Hidayatullah National Law University,

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New RaipurTable of Contents

1. Acknowledgement
02

2. Objectives
02

3. Research Methodology
02

4. Introduction
03

5. Rousseaus Stag Hunt and The Prisoners Dilemma

04

6. Security Dilemma Sensibility

07

7. Offensive Realism
08

8. Changing Nature of Arms Races Globally

10

9. Impacts of Recent Changes on Stability

12

10. The Future of Arms Race Theory

13

11. Conclusion
16
References
17
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Acknowledgement

I extend my heartfelt gratitude to Mr. B. K. Mahakul for his guidance and mentorship. It has
been most enlightening for me to work on a subject of such crucial relevance to society today.
This project is a product of his knowledge as well as scholarly guidance.

Objectives

This paper seeks to analyse the contemporary theoretical perspectives on Arms Race as a
subject matter of political theory and its cumulative effect on World Peace and the probability
of War. Among its other objectives, this paper seeks to

i. Introduce the concept of arms race as perceived in political theory.

ii. Understand and evaluate the various theories propounded by political thinkers to
explain arms race.
iii. Analyse the efficacy of these theories on the study of International Relations how is
the arms race likely to affect global stability?

Research Methodology
The research methodology used for this project is doctrinaire in nature. Liberal use of
secondary sources has been made, such as newspaper articles, books and other sources.
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Introduction

Arms Race is defined as the competitive, resource constrained, dynamic process of

interaction between two states or coalitions of states in their acquisition of weapons. Such
arms race phenomena have been known in virtually all recorded history. Arms races were
certainly known to the ancient Greeks and Romans. The Greeks built fleets in the Persian
Wars and the Romans in the Punic Wars. In this century there was the naval arms race prior to
World War I and the East- West arms race of the Cold War. Today there are various regional
arms build ups, some of which are arms races. Until the East-West arms race of the Cold War
period, most arms races were naval. There are several reasons. First, aircraft did not exist
until the twentieth century. Second, until the twentieth century, armies were highly labor
intensive institutions with relatively little capital. Roman soldiers furnished their own
equipment until the late Republic. Feudal levies also furnished their own equipment, where
the obligation of a fief holder under military tenure was to furnish a certain number of knights
and men at arms for a given number of days a year and to provide arms and horses for these
men. The key element in deploying military power at that time was the organization of the
state and its ability to raise revenue. The possibility of organizing and disciplining free men
to serve as heavy infantry was the key to the Greek and Roman armies. Heavy infantry
required a body of free men willing to serve. It is very difficult to find examples of heavy
infantry manned by mercenaries until the sixteenth century.

Arms races as exemplified by the accumulation of stocks of weapons represent a very

special case of weapons as an instrument of power. We have argued that arms races in the
twenty-first century will be very different from the Cold War arms race. One of the things
that are different about arms races now is the presence of increasing returns in the production
of weapons. Further, the presence of increasing returns to scale in production is reinforced by
the fact that software, microelectronics, and information are becoming increasingly important
components of modern weapons systems. A thirty-year old airframe with modern electronics,
software, and computers can dominate a modern airframe with antiquated equipment.
Constant or increasing returns to scale have always created difficulties for economic theory.
An economy with constant returns to scale is indeterminate with respect to the scale size of
firms, and it is necessary to appeal to some fixed factor to determine the size of the economy.
Increasing returns to scale leads to monopolies constrained only by demand.
Rousseaus Stag Hunt and The Prisoners Dilemma
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Jean-Jacques Rousseaus Stag Hunt begins with the assumption that, amongst a group of
five hunters, all would eat well by cooperating to hunt a stag. Such cooperation, however,
collapses when the men see a hare. Although the hunger of each of the hunters would be less
satisfied by the hare than the stag, each of them fears that the others cannot be trusted to
refrain from catching the hare first. Fearing such defection from cooperation, one of the
hunters chooses instead to catch the hare and satisfy his own hunger. In so doing, however, he
scares the stag away and thus deprives the other hunters of a meal.1

The Prisoners Dilemma game is driven by a similar logic and assumes the presence
of two persons in a prison who have the choice of either cooperating (by denying
involvement in a crime) or defecting (by confessing to the crime and implicating the other),
without knowing if the other person will cooperate or defect. 2 Their choice of action has to be
decided without knowing in advance what the other side will do. At the same time, however,
both sides are aware that mutual cooperation would lead to a higher benefit than mutual
defection. Furthermore, as the same logic operates for both sides, they are aware that should
they choose unilateral defection against a cooperating partner, the defector would benefit at
the expense of the cooperative side.3 Under these circumstances, and based on the assumption
that both actors are rational egoists who seek to maximise their own benefit, when the
relationship between the two sides is characterised by mistrust, the likelihood is that both will
believe that the other will defect. Rather than face unilateral loss, both sides will choose to
defect, their preference for mutual cooperation notwithstanding.4

1 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contrast and Discourses (London: Dent,

1973), cited in Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, p.14.

2 Robert Axelrod, the Evolution of Co-operation (New York: Basic Books, 1984),
pp.7-9.

3 Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, p.8.

4 Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, pp.8-10. See also Robert Jervis,

Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, International Security, 30/2 (1978),
pp.167-68.
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The notion that cooperation between actors in an anarchic environment is impossible

was challenged by Robert Axelrod in The Evolution of Cooperation. Axelrod noted that,
when several rounds of the Prisoners Dilemma game are repeated between two players an
Iterated Prisoners Dilemma - the choices that they undertake cooperate, or defect could
be used by either side to signal an intent to cooperate, build trust and thus increase their
resulting mutual payoff from each round of the game. 5 Labelling this strategy as tit-for-tat,
Axelrod argued that when the players value their future benefits, they stood to maximise their
gains when they responded to cooperative moves by reciprocal cooperation. Conversely, the
players minimised their losses by responding to defection by the other player with a defection
of their own. The players in the Prisoners Dilemma could indicate their preferences (for
cooperation or defection) and thus build a basis for cooperation even in the absence of a
Hobbesian Leviathan. Even when the players in a Prisoners Dilemma prioritised self-
interest, cooperation between rival parties was still possible as they could reciprocally signal
to one another an interest in mutual cooperation rather than continued competition that
neither side really wanted.

From the perspective of offensive realism, anarchy results in an irreducible level of

uncertainty in international politics. Thus, from this perspective, security-seeking states
constantly view one another as threats to their own security. Anarchy inescapably leads to
paradoxical security competition between defensive states (although short-term self-
interested cooperation is still possible). In contrast, however, from the perspective of
defensive realism and constructivism, long-term cooperation between defensive states in
mitigating security competition under the condition of anarchy is possible. Where defensive
realism and constructivism differ, however, is in how they explain the possibilities of long-
term cooperation in mitigation of the security dilemma. Although defensive realist theory
shares offensive realisms assumption that anarchy is a potential source of security
competition in international politics, defensive realists also argue that, under certain
conditions, it may be possible for states to reduce uncertainty by signalling their defensive
intentions to one another. Although uncertainty would remain in their relationship, it is
nonetheless possible for both sides to mitigate the extent of security competition through
long-term cooperation.6 The constructivist perspective goes further and contends that
paradoxical security competition between defensive states occurs when policymakers interact

5 Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, pp.12-15.

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based on socially constructed antagonistic images of one another. At the same time, however,
constructivists argue that such socially constructed antagonistic relationships can be
reinterpreted. Policymakers can reinterpret the meaning of the hostile images that they have
assigned to one another and instead consider the possibility that the other side is driven by
fear, rather than malice. Interests can thus change, leading to the possibility of a new
relationship based on trust and cooperation.7

We explore the theoretical background of the differing approaches to explaining

security dilemma dynamics in the academic literature. A review of this literature highlights an
academic debate between offensive realism, defensive realism, and constructivism on the
implications of uncertainty in the anarchic world of international politics.

6 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton:

Princeton University Pres, 1976), p.81.

7 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.279-96, 326-30
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Security Dilemma Sensibility

Booth and Wheeler coined the term security dilemma sensibility to refer to the ability of
policymakers to perceive the motives behind, and to show responsiveness towards, the
potential complexity of the military intentions of others. In particular, it refers to the ability to
understand the role that fear might play in their attitudes and behaviour, including, crucially,
the role that ones own actions may play in provoking that fear.8

When policymakers show security dilemma sensibility, they enter into the counter-fear of
other states, acknowledging how their own defensive military postures may have contributed
to the fears of others. Under such circumstances, policymakers would be more inclined to
seek diplomatic and security postures that assuage the security concerns of other states.
Status quo states might, for example, implement Confidence and Security Building Measures
(CSBMs) that address the security concerns of others and build trust to mitigate the effects of
uncertainty in an anarchic world.9 Moreover, security dilemma sensibility also requires that
policymakers are willing and able to continue implementation of CSBMs with rival states
even in the face of opposition from domestic critics as well as regional allies.10

Three distinct theoretical approaches have been explored offensive realism,

defensive realism and critical constructivism in explaining how security dilemma dynamics
occur. Given their differing theoretical assumptions, each of these approaches also offers an
alternative explanation as to how far policymakers can exercise security dilemma sensibility
in their response to the military postures of other states. Booth and Wheeler caution us
against categorising the three logics of insecurity as schools of thought. Rather these
schools are considered to be ideal schools in present era.

8 Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p.7. In outlining the notion of security dilemma sensibility, Booth and
Wheeler build on John Herzs 1959 work, International Politics in the Atomic Age, and Robert Jerviss work,
Perception and Misperception in International Politics.

9 This concept was initially coined as confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and
disarmament in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in Helsinki in 1975
(also known as the Helsinki Accords). See Helsinki Final Act,

10 Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, pp.5, 7-8.

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Offensive Realism

The offensive realist perspective suggests that, because states are never able to distinguish
one anothers defensive military capabilities from their offensive ones, uncertainty in
international politics is irreducible.11 Faced with the perennial fear of attack, states constantly
adopt worst case assumptions in interpreting one anothers intentions and seek to secure their
survival through maximising their own power base. Because this dynamic of irreducible
uncertainty affects both sides, security-seeking states will constantly fear one another, and
envisage a long-term geo-strategic setting based on inescapable security competition. This
logic of worst-case thinking will prevail on policymakers even when they are aware of the
possibility that their actions may be seen as provocative by the other side. As Barry Posen
argued, even if policymakers recognised that their own actions may be seen as threatening, it
does not matter if they know of this problem. The nature of their situation compels them to
take the steps they do they must assume the worst because the worst is possible.12

The notion that policymakers adopt worst-case thinking in anarchy is similarly

reflected in John Mearsheimers articulation of uncertainty as the driving force behind the
fatalist logic of insecurity. In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Mearsheimer argued that
states are constantly uncertain about one anothers intentions, and this uncertainty can never
be reduced. This, along with the constant fear of attack and the absence of a global Leviathan,
means that states constantly adopt worst-case scenario analysis and interpret other states as
potential threats. States thus constantly seek military superiority over their rivals as the surest
means of self-preservation. Even if they are stronger than their rivals, they fear that they may
be overtaken militarily in the future. States thus continue seeking to increase their military
advantage. The ambiguous symbolism of weapons can never be reduced. Furthermore,
Mearsheimer rejects the notion that states may adopt policies to reassure one another on the
grounds that these constitute appeasement that is likely to whet ... an aggressor states
appetite for conquest.

11 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics ((New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2001),
pp.30-31.

12 Barry Posen, The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict, Survival, 35/1 (1993), p.28.
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Moreover, uncertainty itself can be exploited by aggressive revisionist states.

Aggressor-states may claim to have defensive intent to lull their opponents into a false sense
of security and thus make them easier to conquer 13. Given that strategic disinformation and
deception have long been instruments of Machiavellian statecraft, Dale Copelands
observation that when we consider the implications of a Hitlerite state deceiving others to
achieve a position of military superiority, we understand why great powers in history have
tended to adopt postures of prudent mistrust is particularly telling. Thus, if State A assumes
that State B is seeking only to enhance its own security, and acts to assuage State Bs fears by
unilateral restraint, State A would be making a fatal mistake if State B turns out to be an
aggressor.

Furthermore, Copeland directed our attention to the problem of future uncertainty

and how this caused policymakers to adopt worst-case scenario thinking in interpreting the
intentions of other states. Even when states believe that their rivals are security-seekers, they
also have to take into account the possibility of future security threats that might emerge as a
result of domestic political developments in other states. Such changes may occur in the form
of political succession of new leaders, changing ideologies, or military coups, resulting in the
emergence of aggressive, revisionist leaderships, and may occur in spite of a states efforts to
form a cooperative relationship. Failing to prepare for security threats emerging from future
uncertainty may prove fatal for a security-seeking state. The benign Weimar Republic, for
instance, was replaced by Hitler and the Nazi Party through domestic political developments
in Germany.

13 Copeland, The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism, pp.202-03

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Changing Nature of Arms Races Globally

There have been several major changes in the nature of the arms race over the last ten years.
The most important has clearly been the end of the Cold War. This epochal change began
with the emergence of independent states in Central and Eastern Europe and the end of the
Warsaw Pact in 1989 and ended with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991.
The result has been the end of the global East-West arms race of the Cold War period, with an
end of global politics being dominated by the existence of such an arms race. Among the
implications of this profound change, there have been drastic reductions in arms expenditures
by states of the former Soviet Union and its former allies, accompanied by relatively smaller
reductions in arms expenditures by the United States and its allies in NATO. As a result, the
United States is currently by far the world leader in expenditures on arms, spending more
than the next several nations put together.

Another major change over the last ten years has been the substantial increases in
arms expenditures by China and its neighbouring states in East and Southeast Asia. In China,
the reforms that started as a result of Deng Xiaopings four modernizations of 1978
profoundly changed the course of the country and its economy and society. The last of these
four modernizations, however, was that of the military. It led to the rapid modernization of
the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), involving the deployment of newer weapons
and major expenditures on arms. The neighbouring nations of East and Southeast Asia have
reacted to the developments in China by increasing their own arms expenditures. As a result,
this region is witnessing major increases in arms, including substantial arms imports that have
moderated but not stopped as a result of the Asian financial and economic crisis that began in
July 1997.

The Arab-Israeli arms race has demonstrated a continuity in terms of continued

qualitative and quantitative arms developments, including imports of arms and weapons
technologies. The India-Pakistan arms race also continues with both qualitative and
quantitative arms developments, both nations having demonstrated their nuclear weapons
capabilities in tests conducted in May 1998. In both cases, third parties have played an
important role. In the Middle East, the United States has provided Saudi Arabia with
weapons, given financial and military assistance to both Israel and Egypt, and has shared
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anti-missile defence technology with Israel. China has shared nuclear and missile technology
with Pakistan. While Russia can no longer afford to support the former client states of Soviet
Union, it appears to be willing to sell weapons technology to any country that can afford it for
purely commercial, as opposed to diplomatic or military, purposes.

An important change of recent years has been the appearance of certain newer or
evolving regional arms races or arms build ups. One is the important arms race of the nations
of the Gulf, including Iraq, Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Gulf States, that was
both stimulated by and resulted in wars in the region, including the Iran-Iraq war and the
Iraqi invasion and annexation Kuwait, with the resulting war to liberate it. The major supplier
of weapons to all parties in the region except Iran is the United States and its European allies.
Second, there have also been arms buildups among the states of the former Soviet Union that
are seeking to preserve their independence through their military capabilities. A third type of
arms buildup is that in the former Warsaw Pact states of Central and Eastern Europe that have
joined NATO or hope to do so and that have to upgrade their weapons capabilities to become
members of the alliance.

The major weapons states have played an important role in fueling these and other
regional arms races through arms exports, including the disposal of surplus weapons in the
post-Cold War period. The United States, Russia, Germany, Britain and France are the
leading suppliers of surplus weapons, while Turkey, Greece, Pakistan, Morocco and a number
of Middle East countries are the main recipients of such weapons.
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Impacts of Recent Changes on Stability

These changes in arms races over the last decade have had important impacts on the stability
of both the regional and global systems. As a result of these changes, we believe that there are
probably greater instabilities today than those of the earlier Cold War period. Consider first
the principal antagonists of the Cold War. Where there had earlier been two "superpowers,"
now there is only one such superpower as measured by arms expenditure and military
capabilities, the United States. Russia has assumed most of the Soviet weapons of mass
destruction and the associated responsibilities involved with such weapons. The continued
presence of nuclear weapons in Russia and the U.S., albeit at lower levels, is probably
adequate for mutual deterrence, but there are great dangers inherent in the current unstable
political, economic, and social situation in Russia. The result could be a loss of effective
control of weapons of mass destruction, with the possibility of an accidental or inadvertent
launch of such weapons. The disquieting similarities between Russia today and Germany in
the Weimar Republic period between the wars, including loss of empire, inflation, depression,
and the destruction of the middle class, suggest the possibility of the emergence of a new
authoritarian leader in Russia, which would create additional instabilities.

Another major threat to stability at both global and regional levels is the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction. There is now much greater worldwide access to technology
and required material for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons stemming, in part, from
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the desperate situation of its military and scientific
establishment. There is also the continuation of chains of proliferation that started with the
United States and continued with the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, China,
India, and Pakistan and that could continue to other nations, including those of the Gulf
region.

Yet another threat to stability in the post-Cold War world is that of terrorists using
various weapons of mass destruction. Sub-national groups, motivated by extreme ideologies,
religious fanaticism, or other causes, have much greater access to such weapons on world
markets. Large urban centres and freedoms of speech, travel, assembly, and the press have
made modern societies highly vulnerable to possible terrorist attack.
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The Future of Arms Race

The classic Richardson model of arms races has dominated the theoretical work on this topic.
Work in reformulating the Richardson model with a theoretical foundation has addressed
such factors as maximizing behaviour, bureaucratic decision making, alliance formation,
multi-country stability, the balance of power, and proliferation.

Dynamic-economic model of the arms race has four components: a technology that
describes the economic constraints faced by the country in terms of choices between
consumption and investment in weapons; a defence technology that determines the level of
defence capability in terms of the weapons held on both sides; a learning technology that
describes how a country updates the information available to it, and a choice function that
characterizes the choices made by the country, given the technology and information
available to it, such as through the maximization of a utility function. Assuming that the
updating process and the choice function are both continuous and that the choice sets are
compact (closed and bounded for finite dimensional spaces), then it follows that there exists
at least one equilibrium for the arms race, a result that follows from standard results of
optimization theory.

The Richardson model has been the dominant paradigm for both theoretical and
empirical studies of the arms race. However the Richardson paradigm may no longer be
appropriate. Increasing returns to scale in the technology of arms production, as discussed
earlier, and newer types of "smart" weapons that rely heavily on information, electronics,
computers, and software, could change the dynamics of the arms race. Since information is a
public good in the sense that its marginal cost is zero, producing weapons with a large
informational component possibly implies increasing returns to scale technology.

Recent developments, including the large-scale mergers of arms producing firms,

such as those producing military aircraft, highlight the importance of increasing returns in
weapons production as these firms try to establish longer production runs to exploit these
economies. Increasing returns technology in arms production, however, has rather different
implications than diminishing returns to scale technology that is typically assumed in
economic models of the arms race. Increasing returns technology in an arms race implies
there may not be a unique equilibrium. Rather, there may be multiple stable equilibria. One
implication of such multiple stable equilibria is the possibility of a choice between equilibria.
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Thus, institutions such as arms control agreements that reduce weapons stocks to a lower
equilibrium point should be incorporated in the modelling process.

Overall, arms races with increasing returns technology exhibit very different
phenomena than those with constant or diminishing returns to scale technology. The
assumption of constant or diminishing returns to scale technology results in choices that are
marginal, as in the traditional choice between "guns and butter." In an economy where the
technology is characterized by increasing returns to scale and information, however, the
production possibility set may be non-convex, and the important choices may be discrete. For
example, in an arms race with multiple stable equilibria, the choice of equilibrium becomes
an important question that may require consideration of the possibilities for arms control.
Increasing returns to scale also creates the possibility that trade in weapons may be a Pareto
dominant outcome in the arms race, again implying discrete choices. We believe that much
more will have to be done concerning the role of predictions or projections that each side in
an arms race makes as to the opponents changes in weapons stocks. It is necessary to
investigate whether such predictions make an arms race more or less stable, and it will
probably be necessary to bring to bear on this question some of the newer results of game
theory, such as rational learning, subjective games, and evolutionary games.

The behavioural assumption used in early reformulations of the Richardson model

that both countries behave in a myopic manner, without extrapolating changes in weapons
stocks, made it easy to analyze the stability of the equilibrium. Under this assumption there
exists an equilibrium level of armaments that is stable, while the disarmed state is unstable
except under some very special circumstances in which behaviour very similar to that of the
Prisoner's Dilemma game will be observed. The assumption of myopic behaviour is,
however, very unrealistic. Clearly, military expenditures are based not only on the current
arms level of the potential enemy but also on its projected levels.
A more realistic assumption would treat each country as using information about the
current arms level and its rate of change to predict future levels. This projection, that can be
revised periodically or continuously, would then be used to plan current weapons
acquisitions.
The other limitation of these models is that they are not Markov games and thus do
not permit stocks. This is a more serious problem in that stocks appear to be an essential
element of an arms race. The question is then whether the model can be reformulated in a
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fashion that is meaningful and yet permits one to use these new results. The nature of this
equilibrium depends crucially on whether it is stable or not, and we have determined
sufficient conditions for an equilibrium to be stable. To do so, it is necessary to specify how
each of the two countries will react when the weapon stocks are not in equilibrium. The
simplest assumption is that of myopic behaviour, where each country reacts only to the
current levels of weapons stock, disregarding information about the history of the levels of
weapon stocks and the current rate of investment in weapons. It has been proved that the
equilibrium point is stable if each country attempts to behave in such a myopically optimal
manner. An open question is what assumptions are sufficient to transform this dynamic-
economic model into a repeated game and what implications these assumptions would have
on the properties of the model. If these assumptions do not change the essential dynamics of
the arms race in the dynamic-economic model under the assumption of myopic behaviour,
then the new results in repeated games literature have the potential of providing insights into
sophisticated behaviour in arms race models.

A sufficient set of assumptions that would transform the dynamic-economic model of

an arms race into a repeated game is, first, that the choice set is discrete; second, that there
are no income effects; and, third, that investment in weapons is reversible, i.e., that capital in
weapons is putty-putty. The assumption that the choice set is discrete is not a serious issue as
there is no limit to how fine the choice set need be. The defence budget could be specified to
the nearest dollar. Thus, for any game with a bounded continuous choice set, there exists an
equivalent game with a discrete choice set that approximates it. The assumption of no income
effects is less innocuous, yet this is an assumption that is commonly used in the cost-benefit
and applied public finance literature. It is impossible, for example, to use consumer surplus
unless a dollar is a dollar for everyone. The assumption of putty-putty capital is one that has
been common in capital theory, and our conjecture is that this is not a very serious restriction
in the proposed new paradigm for the arms race. Increasing returns to scale and the special
role of information in weapons technology imply that it will be necessary to go beyond
marginal analysis in the allocation of resources in acquiring or transferring weapons.
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Conclusion

Overall, a great amount of work has been done in furthering our knowledge of arms races, but
much remains to be done. Future work should extend insights into the nature of arms races
and determine the nature of the interactions among the nations involved. In this paper we
have defined the arms race and discussed related issues and questions; treated the changing
nature of arms races in the last ten years; identified areas of both continuity and change in
regional arms races; suggested that the implications of these changes has probably been
greater instability than that of the earlier Cold War period; and, finally, discussed some gaps
in the literature and some possible future theoretical developments for this subject. Of the
possible future developments in this area, we believe that the most important are probably the
applications of some of the recent developments in game theory such as rational learning,
subjective games, and evolutionary games.
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