NO 11

2012
Published by Swedish Institute
of International Affairs. www.ui.se

From a European Security

Strategy to a European
Global Strategy:
Ten Content-Related Issues

Lars-Erik Lundin
Research Associate at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs
Index
Introduction .................................................................................................................. 3
Point of departure: The European Security Strategy in the 2011 UI study ........... 4
Political State of Play ................................................................................................... 5
Ten Content-Related Issues ........................................................................................ 8
One: New structures require an updated strategic setting .................................. 9
Two: New budgets require updated strategic objectives ................................. 11
Three: Developing Measurements of Success ................................................. 14
Four: Moving Towards More Comprehensive Strategies ................................ 16
Five: Mainstreaming Other Perspectives into the Geographic Paradigm ........ 18
Six: Geography ................................................................................................ 19
Seven: Crisis Prevention and Response ........................................................... 21
Eight: Mobilising Thematic Capabilities and Deploying Them in Context .... 22
Nine: Towards Effective Multilateralism ........................................................ 24
Ten: From a Security to an External Action Perspective ................................. 25
Final remarks ............................................................................................................. 26
About the author ........................................................................................................ 28
Introduction
Almost a decade after agreement over the first European Security Strategy
(ESS), a debate is evolving over whether, how, and with what content a new
security strategy should be devised.

In July 2012, the foreign ministers of Italy, Poland, Spain and Sweden
proposed the creation of a European Global Strategy (EGS) to expand the
discussion beyond security questions. Think tanks in each of their countries
were encouraged to take the discussion forward, initiate a process of debate and
reflection, and propose ideas for a new global strategy for the European Union
(EU) in May 2013.

This paper serves as input to that process, although it stems from research
carried out via a separate project spanning from spring until autumn 2012.
Through personal interviews and document analysis, this project seeks to map
different perspectives (amongst officials and within texts) on the main issues
confronting any effort to revise the EUs security strategy.

As such, this UI Occasional Paper focuses less on why a new effort following
on to the European Security Strategy of 2003 may be necessary, and more on
issues of content. Discussion of a new security strategy, both pro and con, has
thoroughly explored the former but less the latter. 1 This does not mean
proposing a new draft strategy but rather indicating some of the key issues of
content that will need to be settled in some cases regardless of whether a new
strategy document is eventually agreed.

The paper begins by summarising a previous study conducted on this topic, in

order to show connections between this and previous UI Occasional Papers. It
then offers a political state of play regarding the notion of an updated EU
strategy document. The remaining section outlines ten content-related issues
that must be addressed in an EU strategy revision.

1
The Egmont institute in Belgium (Sven Biscop, Jo Coelmont and others have made particularly
vigorous efforts to keep the debate alive throughout the years - see http://www.egmontinstitute.be
which lists recent contributions both as regards the pro and con debate and the issue of scope and
content, including commenting on the EGS initiative.

3
Point of departure: The European Security Strategy in
the 2011 UI study
The EU Heads of State and Government in December 2003 after the second
Iraq War approved the European Security Strategy (ESS). 2 In 2008, an
implementation report was issued. 3 Many argue that it is high time to make a
second strategic review, a decade after the initial document.

Three options were proposed in a study from 2011 by the Swedish Institute for
International Affairs (UI): The European Security Strategy: Reinvigorate,
Revise or Reinvent:

The first option was to reinvigorate the ESS, preserving the current ESS but
making it more effective. This is best achieved through drafting separate
sub-strategies, in particular for partnerships, operations, neighbours, EEAS,
and for the EU in the global multilateral environment.
The second option was to revise the ESS, keeping the structure and
orientation of the current strategy yet updating it for new threats, objectives,
partnerships, and relevant capabilities.
The third and final option was to reinvent the ESS through drafting a new
document, perhaps a grand strategy that articulates and sharpens the
EUs values and interests as defined in the Lisbon Treaty. This strategy
would encompass a broader set of external policies, ranging from conflict
prevention to trade and from internal security to humanitarian relief. As
such, this document might be more aptly titled an External Action
Strategy for the EU. 4

This third option is closest to that proposed recently by foreign ministers, in the
form of a European Global Strategy focussing not only on threats but also on
opportunities for the EU to play a more important role in supporting EU goals,
values and interests globally.

2
European Security Strategy (2003) A Secure Europe in a Better World, Brussels: 12 December
2003. Available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.
3
Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy (2008) Providing Security in a
Changing World, Brussels: 11 December 2008. Available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf
4
Available at www.ui.se

4
This would make it possible to steer clear of laborious discussions of the
definition of security. Putting the entire strategy again under the heading of
security, yet using a wide scope, would raise difficult issues concerning the
relationship of this concept to development, human rights, environmental
safety, economy, etc. It would risk diminishing the sense of ownership of the
strategy among those not directly dealing with what they perceive as security
issues. Communities focussing on developing strategies in these latter areas
could become worried about the risk of unduly securitising their policy
agendas. It is also important to avoid a bias in terms of prioritising military
solutions as opposed to longer-term civilian efforts - including broad-based
conflict prevention processes. The issue of capacity building is very much one
of budgets, the point of departure must be seen as unbiased in this regard in
order to maximise support for engaging in the strategic deliberations. This does
not exclude concepts such as human security, which may be discussed and
again used in future documents. But experience shows from the debate over the
last decade that this and other very wide security concepts also have led to
debates about undue securitisation that may be unproductive at this stage.

Political State of Play

To what extent is the ESS/EGS issue on the table of political leaders in Europe
and why?

EU Foreign ministers met at Copenhagen for the traditional informal

Gymnich meeting early March 2012. Not much has been said publicly about
the consultations that took place during this meeting on the way forward as
regards the European Security Strategy. There is reported to have been a clear
emphasis on the human dimension elements of the strategic discourse as well
as on sanctions.

Efforts will now most likely be made in the short term to define strategic action
elements covering the period until the end of the current mandate of the High
Representative/Vice President of the Commission. Sub strategies are also likely
to be further updated or created, such as already has been done in the area of
human rights.

5
In parallel there seems, however, also to be preparations for a wider exercise,
which may come to fruition only at, or shortly after the end, of the HR/VPs
mandate.

As proposed in the EGS initiative, which recently was welcomed by the

HR/VP at the launching press conference 23 July in Brussels, think tanks in
Europe will need to cooperate to set the stage for that possibly very wide-
ranging exploration of the external action/security provider potential of the EU.

Already a debate is underway on some aspects relevant to the strategy in the

context of the preparations for the next financial perspective (covering the
budgetary allocations for 2014-2020).

This debate addresses the topic from several different perspectives, which in
turn relate to important international challenges and trends.

The Geographic Dimension. Priorities and action plans need to be set for a
number of areas ranging from the EUs neighbourhood including Northern
Africa and the Middle East, and in regards to strategic partnerships, where
updating and coherence is needed.
Crisis Management Capacity. A clear signal needs to be sent that lessons
have been learned from the broad spectrum of crises since the 2003 ESS on
how the EU should get its act together in future crises, in particular ones
which might hit both inside and outside the EU and affect several societal
sectors at the same time.
New Threats, Challenges and Opportunities. Thematically, new challenges
are more acute, ranging from piracy to freedom of the media and the
Internet. The financial crisis has further broadened security concerns while
at the same time forcing stricter prioritisation as regards the use of financial
resources. Globalisation also brings new opportunities.
Implementing Effective Multilateralism. In the multilateral context the need
to operationalise the notion of multilateral effectiveness (already in the
2003 ESS) is discussed not only in legal representational terms, but also in
key substantial areas such as non-proliferation and conflict resolution.
Human Rights. The issue of how experiences from the Arab Spring as
regards the need to work with civil society, also using modern tools of

6
 communication, including social media, is discussed which has already
been done in the human rights strategy.
Other issues in the debate include how to update existing sub strategies on
WMD, terrorism etc. and how to establish a clearer link to the internal security
strategy adopted in 2010. Decision makers need an updated frame of reference
to do this.

What people across Europe think about security is indicated by the opinion
polls periodically taken throughout the EU, the so-called Euro barometers.
These further illustrate that an update is needed. Fundamental changes have a
taken place in the security Euro barometer of 2011, compared with the one of
2007 with more concern as regards challenges and threats related to economy,
including indeed the financial crisis.
Taking a decision on how to move on from the existing European Security
Strategy is not a small endeavour, however. Different perspectives abound.

There has been a considerable debate about the pros and cons both
academically and on the political level. Achieving a consensus on such a
complex task will of course be difficult. Some might argue that the effort in
2003 was only possible to bring to fruition due to the crisis around the Iraq
war.
The feasibility of a new overall strategy is contested. It is generally believed to
be a more difficult endeavour than was the case in 2003. Many developments
have taken place since 2003, and the stakeholders would this time need to
seriously include several EU institutions. In 2003 this author was involved
from the Commission side and can testify to the lack of interest both in the
Commission and in the Council in making the 2003 exercise a full scope
endeavour. This time not only the Commission but also importantly the
European Parliament are likely to engage fully, as shown in a recent plea from
the Parliament to develop a strategic concept for EU foreign policy.

What nobody can deny, however, is that the EU will have to find its way
forward, with or without a strategy. Even a non-decision on a strategy is in this
sense a decision, since a number of key issues will need to be resolved one way

7
or another. Doing this without strategic perspectives and priorities is not a good
idea in a dramatically changing environment, not least in terms of economy.
The EU leaders have, as noted above, approved two documents on the external
side, the European Security Strategy itself from 2003 and the Implementation
report after five years in 2008. Some may argue that the EU should be able to
live with these two documents and instead focus on more concrete planning
tasks, including the review of the External Action Service in 2013, and key
external policies.

Ten Content-Related Issues

From what has been set out above a number of content related discussions can
be pursued:

The first and second questions focus on structure and budgets, including the
need for a strategy that will shape structures and budgets, rather than the
other way around.
The third question relates to the measurements of success to apply in such a
strategy.
The fourth question concerns the issue of comprehensiveness, which is
partially an issue of codifying what already seems to be happening - a de
facto move towards using all the tools at the disposal of the EU to help
solve complex problems inside and outside the borders of the Union.
The fifth question relates to a discussion, which arose during the
preparation for the current financial perspective (2007-2013), regarding the
need to mainstream thematic concerns into the predominantly
geographically defined programs of the EU a more pressing issue in the
light of new external action structures.
The sixth question relates to geographic priorities both in terms of strategic
partners and regional policies.
The seventh question refers to coherence and meaningful crisis
management, a concern in the EU especially since 9/11 and reiterated after
the Asian Tsunami, Haiti, Fukushima, and Syria.

8
 The eighth question focuses on thematic issues and their relative priority in
external action.
The ninth issue comes back to a prominent objective set out in the 2003
ESS, namely: effective multilateralism.
The tenth issue refers to the opportunities and problems in terms of content
that may arise if the next strategy has a full external action scope rather than
one dealing with security.

The discussion below draws on personal interviews and document analysis

(mainly the 2003 ESS and the 2008 Implementation Report, but including other
EU documents) and will be further developed in time, following additional
interviews and analysis planned as part of this project.

One: New structures require an updated strategic setting

Important changes have taken place in the structures dealing with security and
external action in the last years. Before the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty
there was what can be described as a triangle consisting of: (a) services
situated in the Council Secretariat dealing with CFSP/ESDP issues, (b) external
action services situated within the Commission, and (c) Commission services
(what may be called line DGs) dealing mainly with thematic issues internal to
the EU but with clear relevance also for external action.

The political and administrative line of command and legal setting for these
systems changed considerably with the entry into force in the end of 2009 of
the Lisbon Treaty.

At that time some of the Commission external action departments were

transferred into the newly formed European External Action Service (EEAS)
together with the civil and military entities dealing with CFSP/ESDP in the
Council Secretariat. So there still was a triangle, but with a different
organisational content and somewhat different line of command.

Seen from the perspective of the Member States, the foreign Ministers and as
regards the ESDP, also the defence Ministers, from that time found themselves
working with one High Representative heading up the EEAS and at the same
time coordinating the work of several Commissioners and services in the

9
Commission external action domain in her capacity as first vice president of
the Commission. The latter role was one which she took over from the
President of the European Commission during the period 2005-2009 (the first
Barroso Commission).
Thus Catherine Ashton took over three jobs, from the President of the
Commission, from the Commissioner for external relations in the succession
Hans van den Broek/Chris Patten/Benita Ferrero-Waldner and from the High
Representative function in the Council, Javier Solana.

But the foreign ministers and other cabinet members in national governments
with external portfolios also retained important counterparts among
Commissioners dealing with trade, development, enlargement, neighbourhood
policy, humanitarian affairs and certain external financial and economic issues
as well as aid implementation, etc. These portfolios were also somewhat
rearranged during the last decade, but all stayed in the Commission.

In a yet another context, ministers responsible for justice, interior affairs,

energy, infrastructure, including informatics, research, etc. worked with
Commissioners and Commission services more and more explicitly addressing
external and not least security issues, particularly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks
in 2001. Commissioners responsible for what often is labelled justice and home
affairs, energy and environment (earlier also responsible for some nuclear and
civil protection issues) as well as research are of course also very important for
external action.

It is a well-known truth that reorganisation is a period where effectiveness

often is drastically reduced and years are lost before the organisation can come
back with new strength. For this to occur, the organisation needs unifying and
strategic directions.

This is another reason for an updated overall strategy, which often has been
overlooked in the debate. Such directions cannot be issued by the Commission
alone, or by the President of the European Council or the HR/VP. The only
competent body with an overall mandate remains the European Council with
the Heads of State and Government.

10
In order to make such directions effective, the content needs to fit the frame of
reference of the addressees of the messages and above all be forward-looking
and possible to operationalize in terms of more detailed objectives. This
requires strategic overview covering all those EU actors working in different
contexts and often with different specific goals. A new strategy therefore needs
to be formulated in a way to maximise ownership - a full external action scope
should be helpful in this regard but interviews will hopefully further illustrate
organisational and legal complexities related to this endeavour.

The creation of the post of High Representative/first vice president of the

Commission underlines the ambition to increase synergies on the external level
and remedy this lack of coherence. Already during the first Barroso
Commission in 2005 the need for increased synergies between internal and
external security was underlined.

However, the unifying elements also in terms of structure are currently

vulnerable. Only one political level official is directly involved in all three
contexts mentioned above, namely the High Representative/First vice president
of the Commission who as a member of the College of Commissioners also has
a full collegiate responsibility for Commission decisions on thematic policies.

Two: New budgets require updated strategic objectives

The next financial perspective for the EU starts in 2014 and will cover the
period until 2020. Now is therefore the time to start influencing the shape and
content of the next generation of EU budgets (the clock is ticking: the debate
for the previous round covering the period 2007-2013 began in 2004). The
European Parliament, as a part of the EU budgetary authority, is contributing to
this through reports, debates and also by commissioning various publicly
available studies.

But the discussion on the highest strategic level is missing. The financial crisis
dominates the picture, making the issue of where to cut more important than
the issue where the EU budget could be an effective tool to make overall
savings and to be more effective than national budgets.

11
It is now incumbent upon European structures to do what citizens would expect
them to do; namely, to put the horse before the cart. It is not appropriate to take
decisions on the European budget for the period 2014 to 2020, to allocate tens
or even hundreds of billions of euro, for purposes that have not been clearly set
out also on the highest strategic level.

The external action side of this debate concerns nine proposed instruments for
the coming period amounting according to the Commission proposal to
96,249.4 million over the period 2014-2020 (current prices). See Table 1.

Table 1. External Funding Instruments

Pre-accession instrument (IPA): 14,110 million

European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI): 18,182 million

Development Cooperation Instrument DCI): 23,295 million

Partnership Instrument (PI): 1,131 million
Instrument for Stability (IfS): 2,829 million

European Instrument for Democracy & Human Rights (EIDHR):1,578 million

Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation: 631 million

Instrument for Greenland: 219 million

European Development Fund (EDF, outside EU Budget): 34,276 million

In addition, there is the CFSP budget, which is likely to encompass more than 2
billion euros for the period, in addition to the direct contributions from Member
States to ESDP.

A series of regulations will determine the legal basis for the use of these
instruments. These regulations, during the previous financial perspective,
severely limited the possibilities of several instruments to be synergetic with
others. This was not least the case in the area of security, which was mainly
seen in the CFSP/ESDP intergovernmental context. The way various relevant
instruments will be referred to in the next strategy will therefore be extremely

12
important in terms of further developing the legal basis for the use of the
instruments themselves. If, for instance, a firewall in terms of governance is
built between development and security programs it is obvious that the
possibilities for the EU to get its act fully together will continue to be
hampered.

The development of EU external action, again not least in the security domain,
should of course not be dependent upon how skilfully drafters can play with
words in order to create a space for comprehensive action where there formally
is no such space. This is what to some extent has happened in the area of
counterterrorism. Everyone knows, including non-experts, that border
management is fundamental for counterterrorism but also for development.
Sound border management brings income to a government though customs,
etc. It is therefore only natural that Community funds have been used for
border management programs. The counterterrorism objective has in many
cases had to remain implicit since it has lacked a legal basis in most
Community programs.

The net effect of this has most likely been to diminish the effectiveness of the
programs themselves and on a more general level to contribute to
underestimating the importance of the EU as a security actor. A new strategic
document could help to determine synergies, which in turn could influence
priorities in terms of funding and decisions on the future legal basis for EU
actions.
As an example, if it were more clearly shown that taking up defence in depth
outside the Union when it comes to organised crime, drugs, other forms of
trafficking and terrorism this would make the justice and home affairs
strategies of the Union more effective and could influence the relative
allocation of funding for internal and external programs.
Or, if research and other capacity-building programs in the EU were even more
clearly related to external security requirements this could also influence
priority setting in these domains.

13
Or, finally, if external security-related programs (ranging from demining to
military operations) were more clearly identified as necessary conditions for
development, trade, etc., this could also affect funding.

Three: Developing Measurements of Success

The European Security Strategy document from 2003 focussed on a number of
priorities, which were set out without much time for discussion about
modalities of implementation. In a few areas sub-strategies were developed for
this purpose, mainly in the context of WMD proliferation and counterterrorism.

It would have been natural to expect the review of implementation in 2008 to

remedy this deficit. The absence of clarity on the organisational and legal level
in 2008 (would the Lisbon Treaty be adopted?) however made it difficult for
decision-makers to be clear about the options to pursue. Leaders chose to
approve what had been written in 2003 and to add on a second layer of
priorities, which actually rather has increased than decreased confusion.
It is high time to remedy this. A strategy must also, in order to be effective, be
possible to evaluate in terms of implementation. How can you evaluate the
implementation of a strategy if it does not prescribe the way forward in a
coherent way but concentrates more on what has already been done and
outlines far too many priorities to pursue? And how can a strategy be used
which does not fully take into account strategic changes in the environment?

Yes, it is possible that this is how some would like to see the current strategy
documents - keeping all options open. But then the costs will be several: No
true measurement of success can be established and the real decisions will be
taken elsewhere, perhaps in the budgetary process itself or in the development
of more concrete sub strategies. This in turn will possibly mean that a few EU
Member States, perhaps the Big Three 5, may agree among themselves on the
real strategy, keeping other member States outside the true deliberations.

It should thus be possible to move several steps forward in the combined

directions of codifying the need to think in terms of comprehensive solutions

5
As recently analysed by Stefan Lehne. For more, see http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=48759

14
and at the same time elaborate clearer directions to EU structures on
measurements of success.
What does this mean? Spending the money, maintaining diplomatic relations,
organising meetings, being present in the field, setting up structures, this is all
related to capacity building but not necessarily to measuring success. The way
the EU sometimes declares what already has been done a success may be
useful as a political message but not as a way forward. If one can agree that
European policy should be less event driven, focus less on crisis only after it
has erupted and more on its prevention, then public diplomacy and strategic
documents should avoid focusing primarily on events and more on ideas and
processes. To force the High Representative only to be present in meetings and
at crisis locations contradicts age-old principles on the role of the hierarchy in
crisis management, let alone war. The hierarchy must have time to think, in the
words of Daniel Kahneman, not only fast but slow and the High Representative
needs to be supported in this role by the European leaders. 6 See Table 2 for
examples of success measures.

Table 2. Examples of measurements of success.

Some non-strategic measurements of success for:

a project implementation official: follow the so called internal control

standards implement the project correctly choose large projects with well
known partners in as favourable conditions as possible

a programmer: propose something that can be implemented make sure to

introduce enough flexibility to allow for adjustments

a military official responsible for a strategic concept: take limited risks with
appropriate resources

an official responsible for the implementation of aid programmes: see to it that

the statistics for implementation of the budget are satisfactory to the Parliament
and Court of Auditors

6
See Kahneman, Daniel (2011). Thinking Fast and Slow. London: Penguin Books.

15
 an official responsible to formulate mandates for the work of EU delegations -
dont forget any possible goal

an official responsible for security focus on security of information and

focus on the development of rules and regulations try to delegate responsibility
for implementation

an official responsible for crisis management coordination don't take on

more responsibility than you can handle

a Commission official - dont allow for going back on community principles.

Four: Moving Towards More Comprehensive Strategies

It is often argued that the EU moves forward during times of crisis - not before
the crisis erupts and not when the crisis is perceived to be over. The political
will to use all available tools is mobilised when there is a manifest need to do
so.
A case in point is the issue of failing states. The problem was discussed during
the seminars preceding the 2003 strategy but the 2003 ESS stopped short in
terms of legitimising what kinds of programs that would be necessary in order
to deal with the problem. Considerable progress has taken place in this regard
in recent years. There is now a need to codify and systematically build upon
this progress, as illustrated in the Horn of Africa strategy.

The EEAS has recently updated its concept for fighting piracy around the Horn
of Africa. It is a very interesting document. Rather than, as would have been
the practice in the past to focus on the ESDP naval operation ATALANTA as
such and then to refer in general terms to what the Commission is doing, it
details a series of interlocking steps including various parts of the programmes
also on the Community side, including of course the general program
addressing the situation in Somalia.

At the same time EEAS has published the even broader picture including all
the various aid programs related to the euro 1bn package for Somalia. The spin

16
off effects of this and other similar programs (such as the Sahel strategy) may
be important over time.
Such comprehensive programs were not possible to develop 10 years ago. It is
not only an issue of lack of capacity at the time. It is also an issue of progress
in terms of what social psychologists may call the cognitive frame of reference
for European security. Of course, there were always certain legal barriers
against a more comprehensive approach. Security was ten years ago (and for
some: still) very much seen as an intergovernmental domain where community
resources could only be referred to as contextual elements. The European
Commission complied to a certain extent by more or less avoiding until 2003 to
use the concept of security in its documents. But nothing prevented also at that
time people to collaborate across the pillars if they wanted to do so.

The initial CFSP/ESDP concentration on military crisis management and the

need to focus on capacity building for this purpose was fully warranted, no
doubt. But the need to develop civilian crisis management capabilities and to
seek cooperation with the United Nations and later also with the African Union
was also essential in order to operate first on the Western Balkans and then in
Africa. Some initial battles inside the EU structures on who should do what,
soon illustrated the need not just to claim competences but also to use them.

The 2003 ESS was in many ways before its time pointing towards the
comprehensive strategies now being elaborated. It stresses the need for not just
looking at military solutions and the need for the EU to cooperate with others,
seeking multilateral effectiveness. At the same time it was a document of its
time with the focus on WMD and terrorism, which was shared with the US
government after 9/11 and in the context of the 2003 Iraq debate. The focus on
regional conflicts, organised crime and failing states was not initially
conceptualised on the same level as the first two elements of the strategy. It
was in the latter areas where the 2003 debate during three think tank seminars
in Rome, Paris and Stockholm (with American participation) could add
significantly to the document.

There was, as mentioned above, a new attempt in 2008 to look into the
strategy. As will be indicated below, the 2008 document did some useful work

17
in mapping progress that had taken place in the first 5 years and also in putting
the emphasis on some issues that needed strategic attention in the coming years
(such as energy).

Five: Mainstreaming Other Perspectives into the Geographic

Paradigm
The main organising principle of the External Action Service is geography: the
main departments are geographic and almost all EU delegations are working
with geographically-defined mandates. The main budgetary instruments are
also geographically-defined and prioritised, and an effort has been deployed
already in view of the last financial perspective to reduce the number of
instruments by abolishing some of the earlier thematic ones (such as mine
action and drugs) and mainstreaming their objectives into the geographic
programs and a few broader thematic ones, mainly the Instrument for Stability.

But the issue of who is in the lead does not always have an obvious answer.
What about crisis situations? When and how should crisis management
structures take over? What about important thematic areas such as energy?
Who should manage external coordination? And what about multilateral
contexts? Who should give instructions?

In many situations, all four dimensions geographic, thematic, crisis

management and multilateral need to come together in a coordinated and
coherent way. This was particularly obvious when looking at the tsunami and
the nuclear catastrophe in Japan in 2011, when the reaction reflected thematic
concerns (energy, for instance, with nuclear stress tests inside the EU),
operational outreach (the need to work both with humanitarian assistance/civil
protection assets and at the same time use available specialised mechanisms for
dealing with thematic threats), and multilateral engagement (the international
community together in the IAEA and in the UN as a whole). There can
sometimes be further implications for hard security matters, in terms of
terrorism and even military conflicts, such as was the case in Indonesia after
the Tsunami in 2004.

18
The way these different dimensions de facto interrelate and need to be
coordinated have only been addressed in a very preliminary way in the 2003
and 2008 documents. This should be a major objective for the next endeavour.

Six: Geography
So in the EEAS, as can be seen from its organigram, geography is and perhaps
must be in the lead. There is an important difference between how the Council
Secretariat was organised during the years of Javier Solana and the way the
Commissions DG for External Relations (RELEX) has been organised during
the same period. The main organising principle for Solana was crisis
management, while for RELEX it was geographic programs and the
management of Commission delegations in some 130 countries.

In the EEAS, covering the entire scope of external action, the geographic
principle probably needs to dominate because this is what foreign ministers, the
main counterpart of the HR, do. As soon as they enter into thematic areas,
including defence, other ministers are in the real lead. Already the organigrams
of other external Commission DGs dealing with the areas of trade,
enlargement, finance or development have far less geographic emphasis. The
last organigram in the newly created combined DG of development and aid
cooperation illustrates the point. In this new DG, given the acronym DEVCO,
the geographic departments are relatively smaller and somewhat differently
organised than in the EEAS.

In some important respects the way services are organised illustrate what may
be paradigmatic differences in how the map of the world is seen. Are Central
Asia-related issues for instance to be seen in the context of the former Soviet
Union (as in EEAS) or together with Afghanistan and Pakistan (as in the US
State Department and DEVCO)? The choice connotes differences in
expectations: postmodern conditions are from the perspective of EEAS
expected to evolve in the former Soviet Union on the basis of OSCE
commitments. But Central Asia is also an area of development and an area
affected by the less orderly realities of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The existence of different geographic paradigms for the coordination of

policies may look obvious in each specific context:

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 For trade...to look at the markets,
For enlargement...to identify candidates,
For aid implementation and development.... to look at needs in terms of
assistance,
For EEAS...to look at diplomatic relations and political/security challenges.

Still, there is a need to clarify the overall geographic paradigm on the highest
strategic level. So geography is in the lead and probably has to be in the lead in
an operational European Security strategy covering the external side, and even
more so if the third option proposed in the recent UI study to develop a grand
strategy covering all EU external action areas is chosen.

This means that the geographic contexts and priorities have to be clearly set
out. This is something which needs to change over time, partly as a result of
crisis. It is not unusual that the European Commission has had to implement
significant changes in the allocation of resources due to crisis situations in
different regions. The methodology for doing this exists since many years
although the augmentation of capabilities in a crisis situation is always difficult
to decide on and implement. At the same time observers are often surprised
how much is possible to do in a crisis situation when the political will is there
in a new way.

The list of contexts where changes that have taken place in geographic terms
since 2003 is long: global vs. regional focus, strategic partners (including
BRICS), EU enlargement, neighbourhood policy (notably the Arab spring),
strategic shift towards Asia, Russia both as a neighbour and strategic partner,
Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, North Korea, and failing states. The fact is that many
or even most of these developments are not covered by the existing documents
and that the implementation of policies in many cases is being made in
different formats now than was the case when the ESS documents 2003/8 were
formulated.

The example of strategic partners is illustrative: this is an emerging concept.

The notion of strategic partners to the EU is missing in the ESS even in 2008,
with the exception of NATO. Since then, nine such partnerships have been
defined and some more potential countries are reported to have been mentioned

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by the High Representative. The list is difficult to pin down - should countries
such as Egypt and Ukraine be included today as was the case in the High
Representatives listing a few years ago? And what about enlargement
candidates, such as Turkey?

Seven: Crisis Prevention and Response

The strategic perspectives applied to crisis in the 2008 document were
significantly more developed than in ESS 2003, given the number of
experiences made not only in the area of terrorism after 9/11 2001 but also in
terms of more general crisis response from the Tsunami 2004 onwards and in
terms of humanitarian intervention through ESDP from 2003 in Congo. As can
be expected, the document devoted significant attention to the need for further
capacity building in areas ranging from defence industry, headline goals, to
early warning and conflict prevention, capacities to fight proliferation and
overall more coherent use of resources and more strategic decision-making. In
geographic terms links were made in particular to Africa and the Western
Balkans. As regards disaster response the focus was on improvements made in
the coordination against terrorist attacks as well as civil protection. But the ESS
perspective was still mainly an ESDP one, outlining ESDP as an integral part
of CFSP, stressing the link between human rights and ESDP and mentioning
concrete ESDP operations on the Western Balkans and in Africa.

This predominance of the ESDP paradigm in 2008 was natural, given the fact
that the document was elaborated before the reorganisation of services which
took place after the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty. The main strategic
analysis was done in the policy planning unit under Javier Solana. Still
apparent, however, is the disconnect between different services dealing with
crisis management and crisis response in the EU. Already by looking at the
webpages of the EEAS crisis response platform and the corresponding
presentation for humanitarian assistance/civil protection under Commissioner
Giorgeva, one is struck by the lack of systematic cross-references.

Before 9/11 there were different hierarchies dealing with humanitarian

assistance, civil protection and civil-military crisis management. Humanitarian
assistance was and is - seen mainly in the context of development and needed

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to avoid taking sides in crisis situations. Civil protection was developed, thus
broadening the cooperation between Member States in areas related to
environmental catastrophes inside and later also to some extent outside the
Union. Crisis management was seen as a second pillar concept where military
and later also police and other rule-of law-related resources needed to be
mobilised for deployment in operations in carefully designated contexts outside
the EU. In some Member States the distance between the military and the
police was small - Italian and French gendarmerie contingents were organised
in a military way. In others the experience in terms of international police
operations was much more limited. It therefore also took some time before the
equivalent to a headline goal in terms of police was developed and in the end it
became more qualitative than quantitative.

With 9/11, and in subsequent crisis situations inside and outside the EU, it
became gradually clearer that these separate approaches needed to
interconnect. But this work still has some way to go. The effort to develop a
crisis communication system in recent years (given the acronym ARGUS) also
needs to become a full scope endeavour; initially it was a Commission exercise
with rather weak links to the Council Secretariat.

Eight: Mobilising Thematic Capabilities and Deploying Them

in Context
Relations between countries today are no longer defined by a simple dichotomy
of peace and war, e.g. diplomatic correspondence in times of peace, military
campaigns in times of war. The world is infinitely more complex nowadays
due to globalisation and industrial progress, but also due to the situation inside
states, including the fact that most military conflicts nowadays are intrastate.
Globalisation brings thematic challenges, some of which also can be defined in
terms of transnational threats. Some are almost virtual, such as the distribution
of financial resources and information. Industrial and scientific progress has led
to a significant degree of specialisation in dealing with thematic challenges.

In the EU, priority has been put on developing capacities to deal with all of this
inside the Union or at its borders. Only gradually has capacity been set aside to
defend these interests in depth outside the borders of the Union. One of the

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significant difficulties in this regard is of course the divide in terms of
competences, budgets and constituencies between the line Commissioners and
the Commissioners with primary external portfolios including the HR/VP
herself. Already the first Barroso Commission stressed the importance of
linking the internal to the external but it has been easier said than done. In this
area a strategic document issued by the Heads of State and Government could
be particularly helpful. This was a point made already during the preparation of
the ESS 2003.
Linking thematic capabilities to geographic contexts will now be necessary.
This work in conceptual terms has only partially been implemented in the last
two documents. Herman van Rompuy has recently argued that the most
important basis for EU influence is leveraging the access of other states to the
EU internal market. But it could equally be said that the power base of the EU
is primarily the resources developed internally. To use them effectively by also
taking up defence in depth when challenges to EU security arise (case in point
Afghanistan and drugs) makes eminent sense. A strategy can also help to more
clearly identify strategic considerations relating to the deployment of ESDP
resources; again Afghanistan being a good case in point with its EU Police
mission working closely with ISAF there.

The state of play in existing ESS documents from 2003 and 2008 in terms of
thematics is not the same in all areas. A preliminary analysis shows that in a
few areas progress was achieved in the 2008 document in relation to 2003. But
in many contexts the thematic challenges are not really spelled out with explicit
links to the geographic, crisis management and multilateral contexts.

It would appear that the weakest links in terms of thematic challenges in the
current documents is the absence of analysis of the impact of the financial
crisis. But also a holistic analysis of the relationship of trade and other
transnational flows to security as threats, challenges, and opportunities is
largely missing. The strong emphasis on issues relating to the freedom of the
internet, to cyber security, to the safety of journalists, etc. in the last years is
not yet reflected. Issues relating to conventional arms control, confidence and
security building measures are also left to other organisations (read: mainly
NATO and OSCE) with the exception of WMD and small arms. This is

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troublesome in a period when the results of decades of hard work in building
up regional and global arms control regimes are now being seriously
challenged.

On the other hand it should be noted that the 2008 document benefits from the
strategic debate inside the EU on energy from 2006 onwards. The relationship
between the human dimension (including the wider concept human security)
and security is also more extensively elaborated, partly responding to the
strong emphasis on these policies made by the European Parliament. This
priority has clearly been carried forward by the current HR/VP. A third strong
area includes WMD proliferation where the existence of a sub strategy since
2003 has been very helpful. An update in this area is however sorely needed
and a large EU think-tank consortium has been formed for this purpose.

Nine: Towards Effective Multilateralism

A perspective extensively developed in the 2003 ESS is multilateralism: an
emphasis on a rules and values based international order, with respect for
international law and the pre-eminence of the UN system. This was at the time
an important element in the discourse with the US with its emphasis on a case-
by-case approach to WMD and terrorism, as symbolised inter alia by the notion
of rogue states.
Multilateralism is given great attention also in the ESS review of 2008. The
references are many, ranging from principles, treaties, formats for cooperation,
operational contexts etc.

Some references seem, however, to be made in passing with unclear

operational directives. And some are missing altogether -- such as to the
Council of Europe. The crucial relationship to NATO seems less that clearly
set out. And the OSCE is referred to mainly in specific contexts rather than as a
strategic partner. In multilateral work, the hierarchy of priorities is of
fundamental importance for effectiveness. The EU can still improve on this
point.

Another important aspect in this context is the actor paradigm applied to

external action. In many contexts, the main actor in external assistance is

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described as the host state whose efforts in order to develop can be supported
through international donor coordination. Since many years the EU has chosen
to channel large funds through the UN system and developed an overarching
inter-institutional agreement for this purpose. Similar agreements exist also
inter alia for the Council of Europe and the OSCE. To what extent is working
through international organisations a way for the EU to implement its strategic
goals -- or are these organisations to be seen mainly as partners - or perhaps
even competitors - in the field?
This latter perspective was perhaps natural in an initial period of the ESDP,
when the need for capacity building through gathering actual experiences in
deploying was a very important consideration. But in the second decade, not
least against the backdrop of the financial crisis, it would seem important for
the EU to benefit more extensively from the fact that the EU member States
man and finance large parts of the operations and programs of other, both
regional and global, organisations.

Ten: From a Security to an External Action Perspective

In developing ESDP as an integrated part of CFSP, it was perhaps natural to
focus on defence capabilities and on the deployment of EU military operations.
This had not been done before in the EU and a number of EU Member States
wanted EU capability to do this. The historic compromise between UK and
France in 1998 in St Malo paved the way.

Today this remains a deficit area in the eyes of many. At the same time both
public opinion and finance ministers also see many other areas as
underdeveloped in terms of external action. Most of these are seen as
Community domains, and thus not as sensitive as intergovernmental areas
where specific delimitations are deemed to be necessary in order to safeguard
the sovereignty of member states. The way justice and home affairs have
developed from the third into what used to be called first pillar areas illustrate
the point. Some key issues are also not systematically seen in the context of
security such as environmental safety, climate change or even cyber or energy
security. On the other hand, sometimes, such as in the OSCE, elements relating

25
to human rights and freedom are being more closely linked to issues of
security.
In the final analysis, developing an external action perspective, or the EGS
perspective, has to do with power, influence and the possibility for the EU to
play a role in realising its values and interests.

Final remarks
Foreign and security policy is an area full of hidden motives, where it is
difficult to analyse interests in a systematic and structured way. Too often we
tend to refer to the recent past and make ad hoc forecasts on that basis about
what will be important and what will happen. The well-known CNN-effect
makes us, and therefore also the media, focus on what is perceived to be new
and what can be documented on the screen.

This is unfortunate, especially for conflict prevention efforts. Deadly but

familiar catastrophes happening around the world compete for our attention.
We are not particularly adept at taking the long view, retaining focus and
correcting what has gone wrong in the past.
And in democratic societies there is a public focus on local politics, from
which delegation seems to be made to a distant international elite who then
make decisions in more or less transparent ways. In a globalised world full of
transnational and complicated threats, where international cooperation is a
requirement rather than a luxury, this assumption must be countered. One way
to do so is to profile opportunities and successes. For instance, the last report
on the UNs Millennium Development Goals actually shows remarkable
progress.

What might have been a functioning system from the point of view of rulers in
a world where most international problems were proposed to be given military
solutions and where most people lived in more or less self-sufficient
environments does not work at all with the interdependence we now are
experiencing.

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And - most of us have taboos built into our cognitive frameworks. One would
have thought that it all is rather straightforward: when we are faced with a
problem, let us gather enough resources and partners in order to solve it.

But on the level of security policy it is all so much more complex. And this
goes not least for the EU (and perhaps especially for the EU). European leaders
do not take a complete decision on all relevant parameters at any given time.
Each decision adds on to an existing set-up, somewhat modifying earlier
parameters. How to integrate new priorities into the existing setting is often
delegated to lower-level structures.
One therefore often tends to forget that the EU itself initially was seen as a
peace project and that for instance the enlargement of the EU may be deemed
to be an extremely important security action.
All of this points to the need for a new strategic setting for external action in
the EU.

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About the author
Dr. Lars-Erik Lundin

Is affiliated to UI as Research Associate and is a former diplomat. His last active duty
was as EU Ambassador to the International organisations in Vienna 2009-2011. He
became Deputy Political Director of the European Commission 2006 after having
served as head of the RELEX Security Policy Unit since 2000. He was appointed
Ambassador in the Swedish Foreign Service in 1996. He earned a Ph.D. in 1980 on
the basis of research carried out at UI and is an elected member of the Swedish Royal
Academy of War Sciences.

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29
NR 11, 2012
UI Occasional Papers granskas av seniora och sakkunniga forskare p institutet.
De sikter som uttrycks i denna publikation r frfattarnas.

Publicerat: 10 september 2012

ISBN: 978-91-86704-92-6