Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Third World Quarterly

Military Coups in the Post-Cold War Era: Pakistan, Ecuador and Venezuela
Author(s): Steven Barracca

Source: Third World Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2007), pp. 137-154
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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Third World Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp 137-154, 2007 R Routledge
lzTaylor &FrancisGroup
Military Coups in the Post-cold War

Era: Pakistan, Ecuador and Venezuela
STEVEN BARRACCA
ABSTRACT This article compares the failed military coups in Ecuador (2000)
and Venezuela (2002) with the successful 1999 military putsch in Pakistan in
order to identify what factors affect coup outcomes in third-wave democracies.
The unity of the armedforces in support of the Pakistani coup, and its division
in the two Latin American cases, are critical in explaining the divergent
outcomes. In turn, the degree of cohesion within the military in each case was
affected by perceptions of domestic support and international reaction to
military rule. In Ecuador and Venezuela there was greater public antipathy for
military rule and stronger international opposition. This increased the armed
forces' perceptions of the costs of governing, fostering divisions within the
officer corps that ultimately scuttled the coups. In contrast, the successful coup
in Pakistan was largely attributable to the unified military, which was a product
of greater domestic and international tolerance of military rule.
One of the great historical obstacles to the stability of democracy in developing

countries has been subordinating the military to civilian rule. The most high-
profile manifestation of this struggle has been the frequency of military coups
d'etat. However, with the third wave of democratisation and the end of the Cold
War, scholars have argued that we have entered a new era of civil - military
relations in which successful military putsches against democracies will be less
common and less of a threat.1 While statistics support this general contention, it
is estimated that between 30 and 40 coup attempts did take place between 1980
and the mid-1990s.2 Most of these attempts failed, but notable successes
occurred in Nigeria, Sudan, Thailand, Haiti and Pakistan. It might be argued
that the coups in Sudan (1989), Haiti (1990) and Nigeria (1993) do not present
serious challenges to the idea of a new era of civil -military relations, since the
governments overthrown in these cases all represented weak and nascent
democratic experiments in countries with long-entrenched traditions of
authoritarian rule. However, in the case of Pakistan the 1999 coup brought
an end to a more substantial I1-year period of electoral democracy. Most
recently, in September 2006, Thailand experienced its second post-cold war
putsch, bringing an end to 14 years of uninterrupted electoral democracy.
Steven Barracca is in the Department of Government, McCreary Hall 113, Eastern Kentucky University, 521
Lancaster Ave, Richmond KY 40475, USA. Email: Steve.barracca@eku.edu.
ISSN 0143-6597 print/ISSN 1360-2241 online/07/010137-18 ? 2007 Third World Quarterly

DOI: 10.1080/01436590601081948 137
STEVEN BARRACCA
These cases make it clear that the military coup is not just a problem of the
political past, but a continuing danger, even for electoral democracies that
have persisted for over a decade. Indeed, there are at least two reasons why
these cases merit the attention of scholars interested in preserving third-wave
democracies. First, if we can determine why coups succeed in some cases and
fail in others, it will help us identify countries that are at greater risk. Second,
an examination of recent coups will shed light on what factors affecting
military intervention have changed in the post-third wave, post-cold war era,
and which factors have remained the same. This is necessary for drawing an
accurate picture of the threat posed by military intervention, and for
assessing the current status of civil-military relations in the contemporary
developing world.
With these goals in mind, this article examines three case studies: the failed
military golpes in Ecuador (2000) and Venezuela (2002), and the successful
1999 coup in Pakistan. A few considerations guided the case selection. First,
all three instances involved a coup coalition-or at least a significant faction
within it that took power with the intention of breaking with the
constitutional order for an extended period in order to 'reform' the prevailing
form of democracy. This distinguishes these cases from palace coups, where
the military plays a role in removing an unpopular chief executive for the
purpose of preserving the current democratic regime. While both types of
coups are threats to democracy, the former poses a greater threat and,
therefore, is more relevant to the concerns of this study. A second reason for
the case selection relates to the coups in Ecuador and Venezuela. These cases
were specifially chosen because they eliminate tactical issues as explanations
for the failed coups. In military circles there are widely known tactics that are
considered basic in executing a successful putsch. However, since coup-
plotters' knowledge of these tactics can be assumed to be constant over time,
they are not useful for addressing the question of how the threat of military
intervention and rule has changed in the post-cold war era. The Ecuadorian
and Venezuelan coups were tactical successes in that elements of the military
were able to seize power. But the armed forces were also instrumental in the
rapid restoration of the constitutional order-within 24 hours in Ecuador and
after 48 hours in Venezuela. Since the military voluntarily gave up power after
successfully seizing it, the cases better cast light on the factors in the post-cold
war environment that enter into calculations by the armed forces about
whether they should establish long-term rule. A final rationale for the case
selection relates to Pakistan. It was chosen not only to include an example of a
successful coup, but also because the country has a fundamentally different
national security situation and geopolitical significance from that of the two
Latin American cases. This allows for a more fruitful comparison of how these
variables shape coup outcomes.
The analysis focuses on three major explanatory factors for coup success
and failure: 1) the level of popular support and mobilisation for and against
the coup; 2) the degree of unity within the military in support of the coup and
military rule; and 3) the international response to the coup. I argue that the
unity of the armed forces in support of the Pakistani coup, and its division in
138
MILITARY COUPS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
the two Latin American cases, are critical in explaining the divergent
outcomes. In turn, the degree of cohesion within the military in each case was
affected primarily by perceptions of domestic support and international
reaction to military rule. In Ecuador and Venezuela there was greater public
antipathy to military rule, and in the case of Ecuador, more effective
international opposition. This increased the armed forces' perceptions of the
costs of rule, fostering divisions within the officer corps that ultimately
scuttled the coups. In contrast, the successful coup in Pakistan was largely
attributable to the unified military, which was, in part, a product of greater
domestic and international tolerance of military rule in that particular case.
This foreign response was derivative of Pakistan's more significant
geostrategic status for the West. The findings point to the importance of
strong international regimes for the defence of democracy in creating
incentives for the military to stay out of politics. They also highlight the
affect of a country's national security environment on subordinating the
military to civilian rule, a factor that individual states often have a limited
ability to control.
This introduction is followed by a discussion of recent literature on coup
outcomes. Based on this literature, I offer a justification for the focus on the
three explanatory variables and set out the hypotheses that will be tested. In
the third section the hypotheses are examined in light of the three case
studies.
The literature and hypotheses
While the causes of coup attempts are well understood, the reasons for their
success or failure in the third wave era have received comparatively less
systematic analysis.3 This study focuses on three major explanatory factors
for coup outcomes: popular attitudes and responses, military cohesion and
foreign reaction. In this section I seek to justify this focus in light of existing
literature on the subject.
Popular attitudes and responses
Recent literature has identified popular support and mobilisation for and
against coups as a highly significant variable affecting the outcome.4 Aside
from the military itself, mass publics arguably have the greatest potential
impact on the success or failure of a golpe. This was exemplified in the failed
August 1991 Soviet putsch, in which public resistance dramatically altered
the calculation of the coup plotters regarding the costs of rule. In general, if
mass demonstrations in the form of general strikes, road blockades and
seizures of government buildings and media outlets make governing
impossible, the military may not be willing to use the deadly force necessary
to end the resistance.5
The important role of social protest in advancing or thwarting a coup has
presented a challenge to rational choice theory. This is because the approach
views social protest as fundamentally irrational and facing many obstacles.6
139
STEVEN BARRACCA
One argument along these lines is that democratic regimes are providers of
inclusive collective goods, including civil liberties and political rights. As
such, their defence is subject to the free-rider problem. In response it has been
noted that democracies also dispense excludable collective goods, such as
contracts for private businesses, jobs and a variety of transfer payments and
subsidies. The beneficiaries of these excludable goods will have a stronger
motivation to defend 'the hand that feeds them', especially if there is an
expectation that a regime change could result in a net loss of benefits.7
Additional obstacles to collective action include transaction costs and the
fear of punishment. However, the existence of groups with experience of
organising social protests can reduce these obstacles.8 Where labour unions,
political parties and social movements have demonstrated previous success in
mobilising mass protests, this reduces transaction costs associated with
learning how to protest. Moreover, the existence of these organisations can
reduce the fears associated with resistance because, as the number of
protestors increases, the odds that any individual will be punished for non-
compliance decrease. This is the strength in numbers argument. Applications
of rational choice theory to the problem of social protest have also
demonstrated that individual decisions can be influenced by non-material
interests, such as normative ideological commitments and the desire not to
disappoint one's peers.9
Given that mass resistance to a coup can greatly increase the costs to the
armed forces of governing, it is reasonable to assume that the military
considers public opinion and mobilisation in both its decision to seize power
and in whether to hold on to power once it has been seized. For this reason
existing public opinion polls are used in this study to gauge popular attitudes
about coups and military rule. While the preceding discussion evokes many
hypotheses that could be tested, I limit myself to one: the greater the public
opposition to military rule, expressed in opinion polls or in the size and
intensity of mass mobilisations, the more likely it is that a coup will fail.
Conversely, the greater the public support for military rule, evidenced by
public opinion polls or mass mobilisations, the more likely a coup will succeed.
Military cohesion
Divisions within the military have also been identified as a factor with great
potential for undermining a coup.10 The reason for this is straightforward.
One of the great advantages the armed forces enjoy in successfully executing
a putsch is a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. Even in cases of
armed insurgencies, where the military's monopoly of force is contested, the
military typically enjoys an edge in terms of weaponry, training, intelligence
and strategy. However, when schisms within the armed forces emerge during
a coup, these advantages can be lost as one faction of the military faces the
prospect of fighting against equally matched fellow soldiers. Such a scenario
will increase the coup plotters' perceptions of the cost of rule significantly, a
factor that figured prominently in failed coups in Argentina in 1990 and in
Venezuela in February and November 1992.
140
During a golpe, and in its immediate aftermath, divisions within the

military can result from many factors. These include disagreements over
promotions and demotions, preservation of the chain of command, and
inter-branch rivalries. Conflict can also arise over broader issues, such as
preserving public prestige and changes in the economic and political model.
However, an issue that is likely to be particularly divisive is the use of
lethal force against citizens. Once again, this suggests the importance of
popular resistance as a factor that can undermine a coup. A final source
of divisions within the military is likely to be the international response.
Faced with the threat of economic sanctions or military intervention,
officers may differ in their assessments about the probable use and effec-
tiveness of international retaliation and whether the benefits of military rule
will outweigh the costs. Whatever the cause for a split in the military, the
schism can lead the coup plotters to decide that the costs of seizing power
and consolidating rule will be too great. This suggests the importance of
the following hypothesis: divisions in the military decrease the odds of a
successful coup, whereas unity within the armed forces increases the odds
of success.
Foreign response
As noted, the potential for economic sanctions and military intervention by

foreign actors can produce factionalism within the armed forces. The threat
of international retaliation, once a coup has been launched, is likely to have
an important impact on its success or failure. Indeed, an important reason
cited for the decrease in the number of successful military coups in the
developing world over the past quarter century is greater pressure from the
West on countries to democratise and stay democratic. However, the
willingness of the USA, the EU and Western-led multilateral institutions to
use this pressure, as well as the capacity to use it effectively, varies from case
to case and from region to region. In terms of capacity, the effectiveness of
foreign pressure varies depending upon the degree to which a country is
linked to the West. These linkages take many forms, including cultural ties,
economic integration, military and political alliances and penetration by
international non-governmental organisations (INGOs). As a general rule, the
greater the linkages a country has to the West, the greater leverage or
influence the West has over that country.11
Finally, the effectiveness of multilateral institutions in applying leverage is
predicated upon their willingness to use it, something that cannot be taken
for granted. Both realist and rational choice approaches to international
relations argue that normative commitments, like multilateral agreements to
defend democracy, are likely to be trumped by the material and security
interests of individual states. 2 In practice this means that organisations such
as the UN, the EU, and the Organization of American States (OAS) would act
more cohesively in defence of democracy as long as none of the material and
security interests of it members would be advanced by a successful coup. This
suggests the following hypothesis: the greater leverage that foreign actors
141
STEVEN BARRACCA
have to oppose a coup, and the more willing they are to use it, the greater the
odds of a failed coup.
The case studies
Before examining the hypotheses in light of the case studies, it is useful to

establish the background conditions prevailing in each country where the
coups in question occurred.
Background
Pakistan has a long history of intervention in politics. Since gaining

independence in 1947, the country has experienced four coups and the armed
forces have ruled the country directly for over half that time. The most recent
coup occurred on 12 October 1999, when Pakistan's Prime Minister, Nawaz
Sharif, was ousted by the Chief of Army Staff, General Pervez Musharraf.
This ushered in a period of military rule that continues as of this writing.
While the trigger for the coup was Sharif s dismissal of Musharraf, it was the
accumulation of political, economic and military crises that created the
context in which the military intervention would receive broad public
support. On the political front the coup was motivated by Sharifs attempts
to centralise political power in his hands, undermine democratic checks and
balances and harass critics of his regime. The prime minister also presided
over a declining economy. In 1998 Pakistan was on the brink of defaulting on
its international debt. While good relations with the IMF and international
investors were requisite for economic recovery, Sharif inopportunely picked a
fight with these institutions over electricity power projects, destroying the
confidence of foreign investors. The resulting economic downturn, along with
escalating sectarian strife, lawlessness and government corruption fuelled
regular anti-government demonstrations in the months before the coup.
The biggest factor setting the stage for the coup was Sharifs tense relations
with the military over the Kargil war fiasco. In May 1999 the prime minister
authorised militants and paramilitary forces to begin an offensive against
India in the disputed Kashmir region. The military initially viewed the
operation as a success after Pakistani forces captured the strategic heights in
the Kargil district. However, by July, the success of the Indian counter-
offensive and pressure from the Clinton administration led Prime Minister
Sharif to call for the withdrawal of forces. In the wake of the conflict, in
which an estimated 4000 Pakistanis died, Sharif disavowed his support for
the offensive and blamed Musharraf and the generals for the humiliating
defeat. From the perspective of the military, Sharif was damaging the public
reputation of the military, destroying the country's fragile democratic
institutions and mishandling the economy. Not surprisingly, rumours of a
putsch were circulating widely at the time of the COUP.13
Similarly to Pakistan, Ecuador is a country where endemic poverty, venal
civilian rule and social instability have motivated the military to play a
prominent role in politics. In the post-World War II period Ecuador has
142
experienced five coups and 14 years of direct military government. The most
recent coup took place on 21 January 2000, sending Ecuador's President
Jamil Mahuad into exile. Mahuad came to office in August 1998, inheriting
an economy in rapid decline thanks to falling oil prices and a near collapse of
the banking system. During his 18-month tenure Ecuador suffered its worst
economic crisis in a century, leaving roughly 70% of the population living
below the poverty line.14
The coup coalition that deposed Mahuad consisted of an alliance between
junior military officers and the country's most powerful indigenous
organisation, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador
(CONAIE). The economic collapse, along with the president's support of
neoliberal economic policies, generated fierce opposition to the government
within the CONAIE. Mahuad lost the support of the military for a variety of
reasons. The economic crisis had resulted in a 60% cut in the armed forces'
budget. The military was also disillusioned with corruption in the Mahuad
administration. Further fuelling the rift, the president signed a peace treaty
with Peru in October 1998, and the military believed that Mahuad had given
away too much in the accords to the country's long-time nemesis.15 With two
of the country's most powerful political actors working in concert to remove
Mahuad from office, the coup was not unexpected.
Venezuela has been much more successful than either Pakistan or Ecuador
in subordinating its military to civilian rule. This achievement was largely a
by-product of the Punto Fijo pact of 1958, which brought an end to military
dictatorship and ushered in some 30 years of stable democracy under a two-
party power-sharing arrangement. However, during the 1980s and 1990s, the
public became increasingly frustrated with the regime's corruption and
ineffective responses to the country's socioeconomic inequality. The resulting
rise in social instability tempted the military to play a greater role in politics,
as was manifest by two failed coup attempts in 1992. As a clear sign of the
public's frustration with the ossified partyocracy, it rewarded the leader of
the first failed coup, Hugo Ch'avez, by electing him to the presidency in 1998.
In contrast to the lower-class-based Ecuadorian coup and the broad-based
Pakistani coup, the Venezuelan golpe was the inspiration of the upper and
middle classes. The strident populism that earned Ch'avez the support of
Venezuela's poor also earned him the ire of the country's more affluent
groups. The nation's economic elite was directly threatened by Chavez's
implementation of 49 revolutionary laws, including a sweeping land reform
that took away private property without compensation, and measures for
tightening government control over the state-owned oil company, Petroleos
de Venezuela (PDVSA). Any groups that criticised Chavez's policies were
denounced as 'traitors' and 'counter-revolutionaries'. This included members
of the private media, who lived with threats of having their radio and
television licences revoked. Ch'avez even garnered criticism from the Catholic
Church, which denounced the president for stoking class conflict. Some of
the members of the middle class who had cautiously supported Ch'avez in the
1998 election moved into the opposition as the Venezuelan economy
experienced its worst crisis in 30 years under his leadership. Between 1
143
STEVEN BARRACCA
and 2002 the national economy contracted by 10%, the result of capit
and declining production at PDVSA. Unemployment reached 25%. With the
traditional political parties AD and COPEI in decline, the country's main
labour and business confederations united to lead an anti-Ch'avez coalition
that held demonstrations throughout 2001. This same coalition organised the
march on the Presidential Palace on 12 April 2002 that precipitated the
coup. 16
Popular support and mobilisation
It has been hypothesised that the greater the public opposition to military
rule, expressed in opinion polls or in the size and intensity of mass resistance,
the more likely it is that a coup will fail. Conversely, the greater the public
support for military rule, evidenced by public opinion polls or mass
mobilisation, the more likely a coup will succeed. This hypothesis finds
strong support in the Pakistan case, and weaker confirmation in the cases of
Ecuador and Venezuela.
Public support for the coup in Pakistan, and relative tolerance of military
rule, made it easier for Musharraf to consolidate military governance.
Accounts of the coup uniformly describe the military intervention as
receiving overwhelming public support.17 This was a response to Sharifs
corruption and authoritarianism, his mishandling of the economy and the
Kargil conflict, and a growing sense of lawlessness in the country. Moreover,
as Sharifs tenure was marked by a repression of critics in civil and political
society, the coup was welcomed by leaders from across the political
spectrum.18 Indicative of the depth of public disgust with Sharif, not a
single member of his own political party, the Pakistan Muslim League,
condemned the coup or spoke in defence of the prime minister. Public
approval ratings for Sharif or his government are not available; however, an
indirect measure of this is the public's disillusionment with the civilian
politics that Sharif represented. On this score, a 1997 World Values Survey
question asked how much confidence citizens had in the political parties.
Almost 67% responded 'not very much' or 'none at all'.'9
Of course, public support for the ouster of an unpopular prime minister is
not the same thing as support for military rule. Yet, in the Pakistan case,
more so than in the other two cases, public tolerance for military rule was
greatest. This is reflected in Table 1. Two years before the coup 41% of
respondents to the World Values Survey indicated that military rule would be
very good or fairly good for governing the country. This was nearly double
the percentage of those responding similarly in Venezuela. While a
comparable survey is not available for Ecuador, Table 2 suggests that
tolerance for military government was not as strong in Ecuador as in
Pakistan in the period before the coup. These data are also reinforced by
qualitative accounts, which suggests that, during Musharrafs first year in
power, there was virtually no public resistance to military rule.20 To be sure,
democracy activists in political and civil society spoke out on the need to
restore civilian rule quickly; yet Musharraf no doubt understood that the
144
TABLE 1. Attitudes towards military and democratic rule in Pakistan and Venezuela
What do you think about military rule as a way of

governing this country? (%)
Response Pakistan (1997) Venezuela (2000)
Very good 25.2 7.8

Fairly good 16.3 13.9
Fairly bad 58.5 31.4
Very bad 0 43.0
Don't know 0 3.8
What do you think about democracy as a way of governing

this country? (0)
Response/country (year) Pakistan (1997) Venezuela (2000)
Very good 56.0 63.9

Fairly good 11.9 28.2
Fairly bad 32.1 4.2
Very bad 0 2.2
Don't know 0 1.4
Source: World Values Survey, at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/.

Note: Ecuador is not included in the World Values Survey.
TABLE 2. Attitudes about democracy and authoritarian alternatives: Ecuador and

Venezuela
Ecuador Venezuela
Question (1998) (2001)
Percentage agreeing with the statement, 'Democracy is 57 57

preferable to any other kind of government'.
Percentage agreeing with the statement, 'In certain circumstances, 19 20
an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one'.
Source: www.latinobarometro.org.
broader public did not share this sense of urgency, at least initially. The
public's willingness to give military rule a try was a product of widespread
disillusionment with the previous 1 1-year period of democratic rule, which
was marked by government instability and gross mismanagement and
corruption.
In Ecuador popular mobilisation against the coup was insignificant, but
the military was aware that public opinion was strongly opposed to military
rule. These public attitudes almost certainly influenced the decision of senior
military officials to oppose the putsch led by junior offices and to opt for
restoring the constitutional order. After 18 month in office President Mahuad
appeared incapable of reversing the country's economic crisis, which
generated widespread public sympathy for removing him. The president's
145
STEVEN BARRACCA
approval rating plummeted from 60% in October 1998 to 6% in January

2000, the month of the coup.21 Public opinion polls conducted hours after the
golpe showed that 74% of the public supported the occupation of the
congress by the indigenous movement, the event which allowed the military
to justify its call for Mahuad's resignation.22 However, widespread support
for Mahuad's removal did not translate into broad support for military rule.
The same survey showed that 79% of Ecuadorians supported the
maintenance of the constitutional order. These results were actually
broadcast on television as senior military officers were involved in
negotiations with the junta the evening of the coup. It is almost certain
that the Military High Command was aware of the survey, and it is
reasonable to assume it had some bearing on the decision of senior officers to
oppose the junta's plan for abandoning the constitutional order.
In Venezuela public support for the coup and military rule was the weakest
of all three cases, falling primarily along class lines. Opposition to Chatvez
was concentrated among the upper and middle classes, but he maintained
strong support among the working class and poor. This polarisation of
society was reflected in an opinion poll conducted two months before the
coup in February 2002, which showed a slim majority of 56% wanting
Chaivez to step down. Yet, as in the Ecuadoran case, a desire to see a chief
executive leave office is not the same thing as a desire for military rule. In a
survey of public opinion two years before the coup, only a fifth of
Venezuelans characterised military rule as a very good or fairly good way to
govern the country (see Table 1). This compared with 92% who responded in
this way for democratic rule.
In terms of popular mobilisation against the putsch, this was slow to
materialise, and thus it did not have a direct impact on the coup's ultimate
failure. This is an interesting point, because a great potential did exist for
popular resistance to the coup. Beginning in 1999 Chavez began to organise
his supporters into the 'Bolivarian circles', 'expansive networks of grass-roots
associations' whose purpose was to facilitate the delivery of public works and
services, and to provide the president with both 'symbolic and real
protection' against his enemies.23 It was members of this network who came
to the presidential place to confront the 500 000 anti-Ch'avez marchers on the
day of the coup.24 However, by the evening, when the military had
sequestered Chaivez and announced his resignation on national television,
president's supporters had left the streets, probably fearing reappraisals.
Some of Ch'avez's staunchest supports did begin to organise popular
resistance to the coup, but this was made more difficult because the military
controlled the state-run television and anti-Ch'avez forces controlled the
private media. So by 14 April, when some 40 000 of Chaivez's supporters d
eventually gather at the presidential palace to greet their returning president,
the military had already withdrawn its support for the coup-coalition for
reasons to be detailed below. While popular mobilisation against the coup
was not an overt factor affecting the military's decision to restore Chavez to
power, the military was aware of the significant potential for resistance, and
this doubtless factored into their calculations.
146
Division within the military
The hypothesis receiving the clearest support from the case studies is that
divisions in the military decrease the odds of a successful coup. In Pakistan
real political power lies in the hands of the nine corps commanders of the
armed forces, who were united behind the coup and the need for an extended
period of military rule.25 This unity can be explained by a number of factors.
Aside from a consensus among the generals that Sharif was destroying the
country's democratic institutions and economy, they also drew together
because of the damage the prime minister was inflicting on the military
institution itself. Specifically Sharif was perceived to be politicising and
dividing the military high command through controversial firings and
appointments.26 He also created a rift within the military by emasculating the
Inter-Services Intelligence, the army's most powerful intelligence agency.
However, it was the debacle over the Kargil conflict that created the greatest
friction. By making the military the scapegoat for this failed offensive, the
senior generals anticipated that Sharif might try to remove Musharraf.
However, as evidence of the military's cohesion, the nine corps commanders
met on 18 September and agreed to a contingency plan that would block
attempts to dismiss him.27 When the prime minister did sack Musharraf less
than a month later on 12 October, the military knew what to do and worked
in unison to execute a textbook coup. As further evidence of the military's
cohesion, when Sharif attempted to replace Musharraf with a crony, General
Ziauddin, the latter was not able to find a single senior officer willing to
accept his command.28
In Ecuador the military was united regarding the need to remove Mahuad,
but junior and senior officers were divided over the question of what type of
regime would replace him. The junior officers and leadership of CONAIE who
had co-conspired in the coup favored a populist democracy and economy
modelled after Hugo Chavez's Venezuela. 9 After seizing power, the military
representative on the Junta of National Salvation, Lieutenant Colonel Lucio
Gutierrez, declared: 'We are here to overthrow this ignominious model, to
change the structure of the state, and to strengthen democratic institutions'.30
In contrast to the lieutenant colonels, the senior officers were not
supportive of a fundamental break with the constitutional order. This
position can be attributed to a number of factors. First, the upper-echelon of
the military had close ties with the country's political and economic elite who
opposed the junta's aspirations. Second, the reluctance of the generals to
direct rule was reflective of public opinion, which strongly opposed regime
change. A third factor, to be discussed below, were threats by US officials of
economic sanctions. A final factor was that the Military High Command and
its Chief, General Carlos Mendoza, viewed the junior officers' leadership of
the coup as a subversion of the military's institutional hierarchy. This was
clearly communicated in a meeting between the junta and General Mendoza
inside the congress building shortly after the coup was executed. In the
talks Mendoza told Colonel Gutierrez that the Military High Command
would not accept a colonel as the military representative on the junta.
147
STEVEN BARRACCA
Mendoza offered the support of the generals for the junta in exchange for his
replacing Gutierrez. After representatives of CONAIE initially rejected the
offer, the members of the junta reluctantly accepted the deal. 1 Shortly
thereafter, Mendoza hijacked the coup and put an end to it by handing power
over to the vice president of the country.
In Venezuela there existed long-standing divisions within the military over
Ch'avez's rule. This stemmed from the president's confrontational approach
in domestic politics, his attempts to politicise the military, and his
aggressively anti-American foreign policy.32 Events surrounding the coup
brought this factionalism to the surface, and these splits would influence both
the initial success and subsequent implosion of the golpe. First, the incident
that led the military to depose Ch'avez on 12 April was the fatal shooting of
some 20 anti-Ch'avez protestors in a march on the presidential palace that
day. While subsequent congressional investigations into the deaths proved
inconclusive, it is widely held that shots fired by the National Guard and the
Bolivarian circles were responsible for at least some of these deaths. Senior
officers held Ch'avez responsible, since he had ordered the National Guard to
confront the marchers, and his defence minister had ordered the Bolivarian
circles to come to the president's aid. As images of the street violence were
broadcast repeatedly on television, leaders of the armed forces feared that the
military's reputation among the public would be severely damaged. Trying to
avoid this, they attempted to place the blame on Chavez. The armed forces'
top generals withdrew their support for the president, sequestered him at a
military base, and asked for his resignation.
It was also divisions within the military that led to the unravelling of the
coup. The critical factor here were the actions taken by Pedro Carmona, the
president of the business confederation, leader of the coup-coalition, and the
man chosen by the military to head the interim government. First, in selecting
members of the interim government, Carmona did not create a body
representative of his support base. Instead, it was dominated by the political
right. This caused a major member of the coalition, the Confederation of
Venezuelan Workers (CTV), to distance itself from Carmona. Second, when
Carmona announced his plan for governing, it was viewed by the more
moderate members of the coup-coalition as an extreme power grab. The plan
included dissolving the legislature, the supreme court and the constitution.
These moves caused the withdrawal of the CTV and pro-democracy civil
society groups from the coup-coalition. In turn, the senior military leadership
became uneasy, because without these moderate groups in the coalition, the
golpe would appear to be a power grab by the 'oligarchy', which would be
difficult to justify domestically and internationally.
Issues internal to the armed forces were also decisive in undermining the
military's support for the interim government. First, Carmona named a navy
admiral as his minister of defence. The army's senior officers, who had taken
great risks in opposing Ch'avez, saw this as a slap in the face. Most decisively,
in reaction to Carmona's moves and Ch'avez's refusal to sign a letter of
resignation, key pro-Ch'avez army officers initiated plans to return the
president to power. The most important figure was General Raul Baudel, the
148
head of the 43rd Paratrooper Brigade, the best equipped and best trained
fighting force in the Venezuelan army. General Baudel's decision to support
Ch'avez was critical, because the rest of the senior army officers realised that
to defend the coup they would have to fight against Baudel's troops on behalf
of an interim government that lacked broad domestic and international
support. This calculation led senior military officers to withdraw their
support for the coup, paving the way for Ch'avez's restoration to power on
14 April.
Foreign reaction
The final hypothesis is that the greater leverage foreign actors have to oppose
a coup, and the more willing they are to use it, the more likely the coup will
fail. This idea is clearly supported in the cases of Pakistan and Ecuador, but
is ambiguous in the case of Venezuela. The USA and the EU were quick to
denounce the coup in Pakistan and call for the immediate restoration of
democracy.33 The Western powers also had significant leverage to reinforce
these denunciations. Under pressure from India, western European leaders
moved to suspend Pakistan from the councils of the Commonwealth nations.
More importantly, Pakistan had a foreign debt of more than $30 billion and
rapidly diminishing foreign currency reserves. Pakistan's economic recovery
was dependent on the IMF releasing a $280 million tranche of a $1.6 billion
aid package, and the USA and EU had influence over this decision. However,
for two principal geostrategic reasons, the Western powers were not willing
to use this leverage. First, Pakistan is a nuclear state with a domestic hard-
line Islamist movement. The West, being very concerned that this nuclear
capability might fall into the wrong hands, adopted a position of guarded
tolerance toward Musharraf, viewing him as the best means for preventing a
takeover by Islamists.34 Second, the Sharif government supported the
Taliban regime in neighbouring Afghanistan, which had become a safe haven
for terrorist organisations. The USA and EU viewed the Musharraf coup as
an opportunity to reorient Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan so that they
were more in line with the West's security interests. In sum, in accord with
expectations, the West had leverage to oppose the coup, but lacked the will to
take anything but symbolic measures of opposition.
In contrast to Pakistan, where international actors had the leverage to
oppose the coup, but lacked the will to use it, in Ecuador there was both a
will and a way. The putsch was swiftly condemned by major regional
governments. The OAS called an emergency meeting on the day of the coup
and the Secretary General of the OAS, Cesar Gaviria, warned that any regime
resulting from the coup would come under 'enormous international
pressure'.36 The response of the USA was particularly important in
convincing Ecuador's Military High Command to restore the constitutional
order. On the night of the coup, acting on President Clinton's direct orders,
officials of the US embassy met personally with General Mendoza, the
former Chief of the Military High Command and then military representative
on the junta. They warned him that the USA would freeze investments if the
149
STEVEN BARRACCA
constitutional order was not restored.37 Given that Ecuador had sizable
investments in the USA, and that it was the country's largest trading partner
these threats carried weight. This is confirmed by comments made by General
Mendoza following the coup, when he stated that the quick decision to
dissolve the junta was made after these conversations with US diplomats.38
In the case of Venezuela foreign reaction to the coup was divided. The
putsch received strong condemnation from Latin American governments and
the OAS. In contrast, the position of the Bush administration was one of tacit
approval. Ch'avez had become a thorn in the side of the US government. He
had made alliances with Cuba and sold them oil at bargain prices. He had
sought to form close relations with enemies of the US government, including
Saddam Hussein and Muammar Qadhafi. He declared neutrality in
Colombia's war against its Marxist guerrilla insurgency, and was rumoured
to be providing sanctuary to the guerrillas on the Venezuelan side of the
border. Moreover, Ch'avez was attempting to organise Latin American
countries in opposition to the US-backed Free Trade Agreement of the
Americas and to the war on terror.
Chavez's strident opposition to US foreign policy, and the bad example he
could set for the region, led the Bush administration to direct financial support
to anti-Ch'avez groups through the National Endowment for Democracy and
the International Republican Institute. However, there is no evidence that
these funds went into coup-related activities. News reports also reveal that
members of the Bush administration met high-level members of the
Venezuelan opposition. However, no evidence exists of US help in
orchestrating the coup. As further evidence of tacit US support, CIA reports
indicate that the Bush administration knew that a coup was in the works;
however, it did nothing to discourage it.39 Yet, based on the evidence
available, it seems safest to conclude that Washington's role in the coup was
marginal. While the tacit support of the Bush administration probably
emboldened the coup-plotters, the seizure of power and the ultimate failure of
the coup were driven largely by domestic events. The initial decision of senior
officers to withdraw support from Ch'avez and back the coup was motivated
by a desire to protect the public image of the military. The subsequent decision
by the generals to withdraw support for the coup was primarily a response to
factionalism within the military and in the coup-coalition, and to a sense that
there would be significant domestic resistance to the interim government.
In the end, the findings of the Venezuela case for the foreign reaction
hypothesis are ambiguous. On the one hand, expectations were confirmed in
that regional actors had some political and economic leverage over
Venezuela, but this was weakened by Venezuela's position as a major oil
exporter. Also in line with realist and rational choice theory, foreign leverage
was weakened because the USA tacitly supported the coup, and it did so
because its national security interests trumped normative commitments to
democracy. On the other hand, the Venezuelan case demonstrates the
limitations on the power of a regional hegemon like the USA. Specifically
the coup failed despite tacit US support, and the events that precipitated the
coup and led to its ultimate demise could not be controlled by the USA.
150
Summary and conclusion
This article has examined coups in three third-wave democracies to determine

what factors influence the success or failure of efforts to establish military
rule. The broader purpose was to assess how the threat of military
intervention against democracies has changed in the post-cold war era
compared with the pervious period. Not surprisingly the cases reveal that
some factors have changed, while others remain the same. Two main
conditions have remained constant. The first is the potential for socio-
economic conflict to generate public sympathy for military rule, either to
advance the interests of the poor or to protect the privileged. The coup in
Ecuador was a clear case of a populist golpe, as the plot was hatched by the
poor masses aligned with a sympathetic military which questioned the ability
of the country's neoliberal economic model to benefit the majority of citizens.
The coup-coalition was also incited by the corruption, abuse of power and
economic mismanagement of the political elite, factors that also drove broad
public support for the coup in Pakistan and the 2006 coup in Thailand. In
contrast, Venezuela's coup provides an example of the historically familiar
case of 'oligarchic reaction', where the economic and political elite attempt to
utilise the military to preserve privileges that are being threatened by populist
democracy. To the extent that these conditions of extreme poverty and
economic inequality persist in the developing world, military coups of this
variety are likely to continue as a threat.
A second condition that has not changed from the cold war era is the
tendency for foreign actors to place national security interests over normative
commitments to democracy. This was evident in the case of Pakistan, where
Western powers demonstrated a guarded tolerance for the coup because of a
perception that Musharraf would be a more stable and effective ally against
the threat of radical Islam in the region. Similarly, the vigorous opposition of
the USA to the coup in Ecuador, and its tacit approval of the coup in
Venezuela, is explained by the fact that the USA had no national security
advantage to be gained from Mahuad's removal, but much to be gained from
the fall of Ch'avez.
Speculating about more recent events, the rather pro-forma denunciation
by the USA of the September 2006 coup in Thailand might also be explained
in terms of national security. Historically, Thailand has been one of the
USA's strongest allies in Southeast Asia, a relationship manifest, for
example, by its serving as co-host of the USA's largest annual war games
in the region. While the coup did result-as required by law-in a US freeze
on military aid to Thailand, economic sanctions of the sort threatened
against Ecuador were not forthcoming. A likely explanation for the softer
approach is that the Bush administration did not want to further destabilise a
strategically important ally that was dealing with recovery from the 2004
tsunami, from a year-long political crisis and from an on-going conflict with
a Muslim separatist movement. In regard to this low-grade insurgency,
observers generally agree that the deposed prime minister, Thaksin
Shinawatra, had exacerbated tensions by taking a hard line toward
151
STEVEN BARRACCA
negotiations. In contrast, the Muslim head of the military junta has

that he favours a more conciliatory approach in dealing with the sep
which it is hoped will produce better results in defusing the conflict.
A lesson that can be drawn from these cases is that the threat of
coups and military rule in third-wave democracies is, in part, derivat
economic and national security importance of these countries for the West.
Unlike domestic policies, which can be implemented to advance the
subordination of the military to civilian rule, these international factors are
less subject to the control of democratic governments in the developing
world.
This analysis also indicates that some positive changes have taken place in
the post-cold war era. Particularly in the Latin American cases one sees signs
of greater opposition among the public and within the armed forces to
military rule. While junior officers led the coup in Ecuador, senior officers
opposed it. In Venezuela the top generals withdrew their support from
Ch'avez only after they viewed him as responsible for civilian deaths and a
severe threat to the image of the military. In the core of Venezuela's military
leadership there were no signs of eagerness to abandon the constitutional
order. Even in Pakistan, where public sympathy for military rule was
greatest, the armed forces were reluctant to intervene in politics. Indeed, one
can argue that the military leadership exercised great forbearance in not
intervening earlier, as it watched Sharif undermine democracy, the economy
and the institutional interests of the military. This suggests that the military
wanted to give democracy every chance to succeed and only seized power as a
last resort. Further confirmation of this perspective comes from the fact that,
in the 1999 coup, unlike the three previous military putsches, Musharraf did
not appear to come to power with a grand programme to implement. In fact,
the slowness with which he announced his plan of government is evidence
that the military was assuming power reactively and reluctantly.
In all three cases, greater opposition among the public and within the
armed forces to military rule are probably a by-product of political learning
from failed episodes of military governance in previous decades. The key
issue is how long this lesson will last. To the extent that large segments of the
population in developing countries remain poor, and faith falters in the
ability of democratic regimes to improve living standard and provide
security, historical memories about the failures of military rule are likely to
fade and it will once again become a plausible alternative.
A final area of change evident in this study albeit a very uneven one-is
the appearance of a greater commitment in the international community to
defend democracy, including improved mechanisms for achieving this goal.
Here, advances are most clear in the Americas, were the OAS and its members
states mounted a unified and effective effort to reverse the coup in Ecuador.
Not only did these actors try to turn back the putsch through verbal threats,
the OAS also demonstrated that it has new institutional procedures in place to
make efforts at defending democracy more effective. In this way the Ecuador
case points to the importance of strong international regimes for the defence
of democracy in creating incentives for the military to stay out of politics.
152
Despite these advances, the case studies also highlight weaknesses in the
current international regime to defend democracy. While tacit US support
for the Venezuelan coup was not sufficient to prevent its failure, this episode
demonstrates that multilateral efforts to defend democracy are vulnerable to
divisions among state actors within international organisations. Indeed, both
Latin American cases demonstrate that the USA, as the economic and
political giant of the region, is critical to international attempts to preserve
threatened democracies.
Notes
I wish to thank my graduate assistant, Deepshikha Sigdel, for her assistance with the research.
1 This trend is noted by S Huntington, 'Reforming civil -military relations', Journal of Democracy, 6 (4),
1995, p 15; and D Pion-Berlin, 'Introduction', in D Pion-Berlin (ed), Civil Military Relations in Latin
America: New Analytical Perspectives, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001, p 2.
2 Huntington, 'Reforming civil-military relations', p 14.
3 On the causes of coups, see E Fossum, 'Factors influencing the occurrence of military coups d'6tat in
Latin America', Journal of Peace Research, 4 (3), 1967, pp 228-251; and E Nordlinger, Soldiers and
Politics: Military Coups and Government, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977.
4 JL Gibson, 'Mass opposition to the Soviet putsch of August 1991: collective action, rational choice,
and democratic values in the former Soviet Union', American Political Science Review, 91 (3), 1997,
pp 677-684; and D Sutter, 'Legitimacy and military intervention in a democracy: civilian government
as a public good', American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 58 (1), 1999, pp 129- 143.
5 Sutter, 'Legitimacy and military intervention', p 131.
6 SE Finkel, EN Muller & K Dieter-Opp, 'Personal influence, collective rationality, and mass political
action', American Political Science Review, 83 (3), 1989, pp 895-903.
7 Sutter, 'Legitimacy and military intervention', p 139.
8 MI Lichbach, The Rebel's Dilemma, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1995, pp 144-155.
9 Gibson 'Mass opposition to the Soviet putsch', p 677.
10 WR Thompson, 'Organizational cohesion and military coup outcomes', Comparative Political Studies,
34 (8), 1976, pp 255-276.
11 S Levitsky & LA Way, 'International linkage and democratization', Journal of Democracy, 16 (3),
2005, p 21.
12 DS Boniface, 'Is there a democratic norm in the America? An analysis of the Organization of American
States', Global Governance, 8 (3), 2002, pp 368-381.
13 Facts and analysis of these background events draw on A Rashid, 'Pakistan's coup: planting the seeds
of democracy?', Current History, 98 (632), 1999, pp 409-414; and P Constable, 'Pakistan's
predicament', Journal of Democracy, 12 (1), 2001, p 15-29.
14 JA Lucero, 'Crisis and contention in Ecuador', Journal of Democracy, 12 (2), 2001, p 60.
15 Facts and analysis of these background events draw on Lucero, 'Crisis and contention in Ecuador'; CE
Walsh, 'The Ecuadorian political irruption: uprisings, coups, rebellions, and democracy', Nepantla:
Viewsfrom the South, 2 (1), pp 173-204; and JS Fitch, 'Post-transition coups: Ecuador 2000', Journal
of Political and Military Sociology, 33 (1), 2005, pp 39-58.
16 Facts and analysis of these background events draw on OG Encarnaci6n, 'Venezuela's "civil society
coup"', World Policy Journal, 19 (2), 2002, pp 38-48.
17 See BBC News, 'Pakistan awaits military's next move', BBC Online Network, 13 October 1999, at http:/
news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/south_asia/473370.stm; and J Burke, 'Pakistan: marching to the brin
India Today, 25 October 1999, at http://www.india-today.com/itoday/19991025/cover.html.
18 BBC News, 'Opposition happy at Sharif s dismissal', BBC Online Network, 13 October 1999, at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/ I /hi/world/south_asia/473124.stm.
19 World Values Survey, at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/.
20 Constable, 'Pakistan's predicament', p 27.
21 Walsh, 'The Ecuadorian political irruption', p 185.
22 Ibid, p 181.
23 Encarnaci6n, 'Venezuela's "civil society coup"', p 41.
24 For facts and analysis on the Venezuela coup, I rely heavily upon S LaFuente & A Meza, El acertijo de
abril: Relato periodistico de la breve caida de Hugo Chavez, Caracas: Debate, 2004.
25 A Shah, 'Pakistan's "armored" democracy', Journal of Democracy, 14 (4), 2003, p 37.
26 Rashid, 'Pakistan's coup', p 411.
153
STEVEN BARRACCA
27 Burke, 'Pakistan'.
28 BBC News, 'Pakistan's coup: the 17 hour victory', BBC Online Network, 11 November 1999, at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/475195.stm.
29 Lucero, 'Crisis and contention in Ecuador', p 65.
30 Walsh, 'The Ecuadorian political irruption', p 178.
31 Ibid, pp 200-201.
32 HA Trinkunas, 'The crisis in Venezuelan civil-military relations: from Punto Fijo to the Fifth
Republic', Latin American Research Review, 37 (1), 2002, pp 68-69.
33 BBC News, 'Clinton urges return to civilian rule', BBC Online Service, 14 October 1999, at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/south_asia/473507.stm.
34 Constable, 'Pakistan's predicament', p 21.
35 Rashid, 'Pakistan's coup', p 409.
36 BBC News, 'Ecuador coup condemned', BBC Online Service, 22 January 2000, at http://news.bbc.co.
l /hi/world/americas/614434. stm.
37 Walsh, 'The Ecuadorian political irruption', pp 181, 191.
38 ERRI, 'Ecuador: vice president to take power after coup, ERRI Daily Intelligence Report, ERRI Risk
Assessment Services, 23 January 2000, Vol 6-023, at http://www.emergency.com/2000/ecuacop.htm.
39 CIA, Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Central Intelligence Agency, 6 April 2002.
154

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Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Third World Quarterly

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Military Coups in the Post-Cold War Era: Pakistan, Ecuador and Venezuela

Author(s): Steven Barracca

Military Coups in the Post-cold War

One of the great historical obstacles to the stability of democracy in developing

ISSN 0143-6597 print/ISSN 1360-2241 online/07/010137-18 ? 2007 Third World Quarterly

The literature and hypotheses

Popular attitudes and responses

During a golpe, and in its immediate aftermath, divisions within the

As noted, the potential for economic sanctions and military intervention by

The case studies

Before examining the hypotheses in light of the case studies, it is useful to

Pakistan has a long history of intervention in politics. Since gaining

Popular support and mobilisation

What do you think about military rule as a way of

Response Pakistan (1997) Venezuela (2000)

Very good 25.2 7.8

What do you think about democracy as a way of governing

Response/country (year) Pakistan (1997) Venezuela (2000)

Very good 56.0 63.9

Source: World Values Survey, at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/.

TABLE 2. Attitudes about democracy and authoritarian alternatives: Ecuador and

Percentage agreeing with the statement, 'Democracy is 57 57

approval rating plummeted from 60% in October 1998 to 6% in January

Division within the military

Summary and conclusion

This article has examined coups in three third-wave democracies to determine

negotiations. In contrast, the Muslim head of the military junta has

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