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States CP

1nc States CP

Text:
The 50 states and all relevant territories in the United States
should collectively announce that, pursuant to all allowances in
current laws, they are no longer participating in any law
enforcement or surveillance activities with U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement. All states and local police
departments should adopt an internal system of oversight for
pulling drivers over and require officers to demonstrate
probable cause in order to receive authorization by a supervisor
conduct searches.

States can empirically pass legislation to opt out of cooperation


with ICE policies
Wessler, 13 --- independent reporter in New York who has reported from across
the United States, Mexico and the Caribbean on immigration, the safety net,
criminal justice, poverty and the human fallout of the financial collapse (6/3/2013,
Scott Freed Wessler, Connecticut Limits Cooperation With Secure Communities,
http://www.colorlines.com/articles/connecticut-limits-cooperation-secure-
communities, JMP)
The Connecticut State Senate voted unanimously on Friday to substantially limit
cooperation between local police departments and federal deportation officials.
The House already approved the bill. It will now move to the governor, who has
vowed to sign it. The state will be the first in the country to pass a version of the
so-called Trust Act, which prohibits local authorities from detaining most non-
citizens at the request of Immigration and Customs Enforcement unless the
individual has been convicted of a felony or was already ordered deported.

The bill comes in response to the Secure Communities program, a federal-


state data sharing program that sends finger print records from local arrests to
the federal government. Though ICE has consistently claimed that it uses the
program to target people with criminal convictions, over half of those removed
from the country under the program were charged with no crime or a minor
violation.

"It's now unanimous in Connecticut: not one more innocent person should be
racially profiled and turned over to Immigration Customs Enforcement ,"
Megan Fountain of the group Unidad Latina en Accin said in a statement. "Not
one more worker should be unable to report abuse to the police."
Critics say S-Comm feeds on unaccountable local policing, including the use of
racial profiling and breeds fear in immigrant communities. A recent study by a
University of Illinois Chicago professor found that 44% of the 1000 immigrants and
Latinos surveyed said the program made them less likely to contact cops if they are
the victims of crime. Nearly 40 percent of respondents said that local immigration
enforcement programs make them fearful of leaving their home.
Since the S-Comm program was first rolled out in 2008, 140,000 of the 266,000
people deported through data sharing were convicted of no criminal charge or a
low-level charge. The Connecticut legislation will limit local compliance with the
program to cases involving serious convictions, as well as to people with
outstanding arrest warrants, existing deportation orders, or who've been listed on
federal gang and terrorism databases. The bill also permits local authorities to
detain an immigrant at ICE's request if cops deem them to "present an
unacceptable risk to public safety."
A verison of the Trust Act has been introduced in other states, including California,
where California Gov. Jerry Brown vetoed the bill last year. A more limited version
has been introduced in the California state legislature. As of March of this year,
80,000 people had been deported from California through S-Comm. In the two
years it's been operational in Connecticut, where Gov. Dan Malloy has said he will
sign the bill into law, just 456 immigrants were removed from that state.
Immigrant rights advocates say that's hundreds too many.
"This is a monumental victory for the immigrant rights movement, Ana Maria
Rivera, of the New Haven group Junta for Progressive Action, said in a statement.
"The fact that advocates, our Governor and the entire Connecticut legislature
worked together to send the message to ICE that we will not allow our
communities to be separated is historic."
The Connecticut bill is the second in a week in that state to protect the rights of
uncodumented immigrants. On Thursday, the state legislature there passed a bill
that let's all residents, incuding those lacking immigration papers, to apply for
driver's licenses.

The key variable is drawing a clear distinction between ICE and


state and local police roles --- the counterplan does this
Lansdowne, 7/25/15 --- served as chief of police in San Diego, Richmond and
San Jose (William, Keep clear, separate roles for local law enforcement and ICE,
http://www.sacbee.com/opinion/op-ed/soapbox/article28641010.html, JMP)
The tragic killing of Kathryn Steinle by an undocumented immigrant in San
Francisco has drawn national attention to the relationship between local police and
immigration enforcement. In my four decades in uniform and 20 years as police
chief, I saw again and again politicians temptation to respond to a singular, heart-
wrenching incident with sweeping policy change. In my experience, this always
does more harm than good.
In response to Steinles senseless death, some have called for an end to policies
that limit local agencies entanglement with federal immigration enforcement,
blaming San Francisco for this tragedy. In the wake of a devastating incident like
this, it is difficult, yet important, to take a step back to examine why it is that so
many law enforcement officers believe it is critical to maintain clear and
separate roles for local law enforcement and federal Immigration and
Customs Enforcement. Carrying out our respective roles, we keep our
communities and country safe.
Helping to advance the technique of community-oriented policing is one of my
proudest accomplishments in my decades of law enforcement service. Having
officers meet regularly and frequently with the community members they are
sworn to protect and serve is the foundational element of this proven technique.
Requiring those same officers to inquire about the immigration status of a victim,
witness or even a suspect dismantles the trust we are working to build and
undermines our ability to investigate and prevent crime.
When police officers and sheriffs deputies are tasked with carrying out federal
immigration enforcement, immigrant families many of whom are of mixed status,
with some members legal and some undocumented understandably become
fearful of any encounter with law enforcement.
This has the ill effect of making routine law enforcement duties much more difficult
and in some cases impossible. A study by the University of Illinois at Chicago found
that 44 percent of Latinos surveyed said they would be less likely to contact police
officers if they were the victims of a crime because they feared any interaction
with police might lead officers to ask about their immigration status or that of
family members.
Sound policing requires trust between law enforcers and the members of the
public, so that community members share information that helps prevent crimes
from occurring and so that victims and witnesses come forward to help police solve
crimes. For years, we saw the negative consequences when cities and counties
were forced to bear the costs of complying with federal immigration policies. We
learned the hard way that wedding local law enforcement agencies work to the
federal governments deportation tactics breeds deep-seated mistrust in the police.
To date, more than 320 localities throughout the country, including 50 in
California, have stopped holding individuals beyond their ordinary release merely
on the basis of an ICE detainer request. Instead, sheriffs and police
departments have adopted due process protections to operate within the
law, reduce the risk of deterring innocent crime victims and witnesses from
coming forward, and restore community trust. In the tragic killing of Steinle,
all ICE would have had to do is present San Francisco with a judicial order
authorizing detention, and local authorities could legally have kept Lopez-Sanchez
in custody.
Instead of using Steinles tragic death as a vehicle to tear down smart policing
policies across our state, our members of Congress should use this moment as an
opportunity to ask law enforcement officials why they have worked so hard to
establish trust and cooperation with immigrant communities.
Solvency --- State / Locals Key

Counterplan solves --- most profiling occurs by state and local


agents
Hannon, 14 (12/8/2014, Elliot, Justice Department Announces New Limits on
Racial Profiling by Law Enforcement,
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2014/12/08/new_limits_on_racial_profiling_b
y_law_enforcement_announced.html, JMP)
The Obama administration released a new set of guidelines on Monday aimed at
curtailing the profiling of specific groups by law enforcement. The Justice
Department issued the expanded rules prohibiting profiling on the basis of race,
religion, national identity, gender, sexual orientation, and gender identity by
federal law enforcementsuch as the FBI. The new policy broadens the Bush
administration's 2003 policy that banned racial and ethnic profiling, except for
cases of national security. The new rules, however, wont apply to screening at
borders and airports, where Department of Homeland Security personnel have
long given extra scrutiny to people from certain countries, the Wall Street Journal
reports. The policy also doesnt apply to local or state law enforcement, beyond
those personnel assigned to federal task forces.
Attorney General Eric Holder ordered the review to the Justice Department policy
in 2009 and the new guidlines were announced this week as local police tactics
faced enormous criticism following the deaths of Michael Brown and Eric Garner.
While the newly announced guidelines extend the restrictions on the use of
profiling, [c]oncerns about racial profiling on the part of civil-liberties
groups mostly have to do with traffic stops and pat-downs of pedestrians,
according to the Journal. Because federal law-enforcement agents rarely
engage in those activities, barring them from profiling may have little impact on
how and why people are stopped in their everyday lives.

State and local officers commit most of the abuses


Saab, 14 --- Senior Government Relations Analyst at Deloitte (12/8/2014, Maria,
One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: DOJ Profiling Guidance Revisions Fail to Ban
Profiling, http://www.aaiusa.org/blog/entry/one-step-forward-two-steps-back-doj-
profiling-guideline-revisions-fail-to-a/, JMP)
Holders new guidelines arrive during a time where law enforcement activities are
under intense scrutiny. Conversations regarding immigration reform, border
security, and recent events in Ferguson, MO., New York City, and Cleveland not
only emphasize the need to address such activities, but also highlight how little
these new guidelines will address the real issues at stake. For one thing, the
changes will only apply to federal law enforcement agencies, and will not extend
to local and state law enforcement officers, which have been the source of
a number of related controversies. The Obama Administration hopes that the
new guidelines will serve as a possible roadmap for local police to reform their
own practices regarding profiling, but this does not ultimately guarantee
change on behalf of local police forces that work closely with particularly
vulnerable communities.
Solvency --- Internal Guidelines

The counterplan solves overreach and racism by police


departments
Epp et. Al 14 (Charles R. Epp - Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of
Wisconsin-Madison, Stephen Maynard-Moody- Ph.D. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, and
Donald P. Haider-Markel- University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Ph.D., Political Science.
Pulled Over How Police Stops Define Race and Citizenship. University of Chicago Press.
Published in 2014.)//lb

Second, to enforce this requirement, police departments should adopt internal


guidelines and systems of oversight governing the decision to make a stop and
conduct investigatory intrusions that are modeled on how departments regulate
uses of force.26 Thus, departments should prohibit pretextual stops except when
justified by an overriding public safety exigency. To oversee this guidance,
departments should require officers in every stop to articulate and record their
reason for the stop and departments should conduct internal reviews of these
reasons. Departments should strive to make pretextual stops the rare exception
rather than the common pattern. Further, a computerized search of the persons
name in crime records should be allowed only after the legal ba sis for the stop is
reported and recorded. These recording and oversight procedures would severely
limit the use of pretext stops in the hunt for crime and deliberately sobut this is
an essential step in limiting the racial bias now so evident in investigatory
stops. The essential third step is to prohibit searches unless based on probable
cause to believe a crime has been committed. Consent searches authorize
unfettered police discretion to search whoever they wish, even though a drivers
consent cannot be considered freely given. Drivers told us that they felt they were
incarcerated when pulled over and that they had no choice but to consent.
Training police officers to solicit permission to search cars or persons takes undue
advantage of individuals who are psychologically, if not legally, held by the police.
Such consent relies on manipulation, as documented in Charles Remsbergs police
training manual.27 Searches should be conducted only after receiving specific au-
thorization by a supervisor and should be allowed on an articulation of probable
cause, or, in other words, particularized evidence to believe the person has
committed a crime. This evidence should be recorded and evaluated by
supervisors.
AT: Cant Solve --- USFG Forces Cooperation

Connecticut proves thats states can pass legislation to block


state and local police cooperation with ICE. Thats Wessler.

And, the only action the federal government compels state


action on is the sharing of fingerprints but that is not what
their internal link to the police advantage is about --- it assume
other, more overt forms of local and state police cooperation.

Federal government doesnt mandate state and local law


enforcement cooperation
Linthicum & Romney, 7/19/15 (Kate Linthicum and Lee Romney, L.A.
County considers new immigration program for jails in light of S.F. slaying,
http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-immigration-jails-20150720-
story.html#page=1, JMP) *** Note --- Jeh Johnson is the Homeland Security
Secretary
At the hearing, Johnson faced heavy criticism from Republicans, who asked why
ICE hasn't required local agencies to comply with all aspects of the new program.

"I do not believe that we should mandate the cooperation of state and local
law enforcement officials," Johnson said. "I believe that the most effective way
to work with jurisdictions, particularly the larger ones, is through a cooperative
effort with a program that removes the legal and political controversy."
Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-San Jose) welcomed Johnson's approach, which she called
more "respectful to local communities" than previous ICE jails programs. While
Secure Communities was at times presented as a mandatory program that local
officials had to comply with, the new program acknowledges that local
jurisdictions may craft their own policies about what types of criminal
convictions would warrant notification, she said.
"Somebody sitting in Washington doesn't know the details of how to do policing in
San Jose or San Francisco or Chicago," she said.
For some local officials, giving ICE agents so much as a heads up on release
even for those previously convicted of violent felonies and facing new charges of
violence is unacceptable without a warrant.
"The idea of notifying undermines the interest of limiting compliance with ICE,"
said San Francisco Supervisor John Avalos.
10th amendment also prevents federal mandates
Asian Law Caucus, 15 (4/13/2015, ICE Out of California Implementation Act:
Building Upon the California Trust Act,
http://www.slideshare.net/JenniferRojas10/ice-out-of-california-implementation-
guide, JMP)
Just like ICE holds, notification to ICE of an individuals release date is completely
voluntary. Under the Tenth Amendment, ICE is prohibited from imposing
any mandatory duties on local law enforcement agencies to engage in civil
immigration enforcement. Because notification runs contrary to the purpose of
the TRUST Act and creates distrust within immigrant communities, advocates
should ask local law enforcement to opt out of PEP-Comm by adopting policies that
refuse notification to ICE.

The Priority Enforcement Program replaced the Secure


Communities program their evidence is discussing --- it is
VOLUNTARY program
Ocampo, 7/20/15 --- Associate Director of Immigration at the Center for
American Progress (Lizet, Federal-Local Coordination on Immigration
Enforcement: Prioritizing Public Safety,
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2015/07/20/117772/fe
deral-local-coordination-on-immigration-enforcement-prioritizing-public-safety/,
JMP)
The recent shooting death of Kathryn Steinle in San Francisco is a tragedy. The
United States must do everything in its power to avoid tragedies like this in the
future. Given that the suspect was undocumented, some public figures have used
this instance to ignite a debate about the U.S. immigration system. Policymakers
should look at what more can be done to ensure better communication between
federal and local authorities. But the furor surrounding this controversy has been
sorely lacking in actual facts regarding both local cooperation with federal
immigration enforcement and the role of trust in effective local law enforcement.
With the U.S. undocumented population totaling an estimated 11 million people,
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, or DHS, and U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, or ICE, must determine how to prioritize their resources in
order to enforce immigration law. Given that most immigrants have deep
community tieshaving lived in the country for more than 10 years and having
made substantial contributions to both U.S. society and the economythe Obama
administration has focused on specific enforcement priorities, which include
national security threats and convicted violent criminals.
As the federal government has tailored its enforcement priorities, states and
localities also have a strong need to prioritize resources for the benefit of public
safety. In response, they have worked to create community trust policies:
individualized polices that determine what is best for local law enforcement
agencies and the communities they serve.
The evolution of federal-local collaboration
The practice of engaging local police in federal immigration enforcement has
dramatically increased in recent years. While some forms of collaboration with
local law enforcement has existed for decades, the federal government has only
just recently asked local police to act as enforcers of federal immigration policies.
In 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act added
Section 287(g) to the Immigration and Nationality Act, which authorized ICE to
enter into agreements with state and local law enforcement in order to enforce
immigration law. However, it was not until 9/11 and the ensuing heightened focus
on national security that 287(g) agreements were implemented: The number of
jurisdictions participating in the program jumped from eight in 2006 to 69 in 2010.
This new relationship, combined with a lack of adequate training for all parties
involved, began to increase concerns about racial profiling in some jurisdictions,
drastically damaging trust with police.
In 2008, the George W. Bush administration began piloting the Secure
Communities program, which expanded nationwide under the Obama
administration. Under Secure Communities, when anyone was booked into police
custody, local law enforcement were required to send fingerprints to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, or FBI, and the DHS. For those the DHS wanted removed
from the country, a detainer was issueda request that the state or local jail hold
the individual for 48 hours, allowing ICE to remove them from the United States.
Many of the same concerns that arose from 287(g) resurfaced with the
implementation of Secure Communities, including continued concerns regarding
racial profiling; undocumented individuals with minor offenses, such as traffic
violations, being targeted for arrest by local police, leading to deportation; and a
continued undermining of trust in police.
Entanglement can harm public safety, encourage racial profiling, and violate the
Constitution
As the practice of engaging police in immigration enforcement has become more
widespread, so has concern with the system itself. As law enforcement leaders
have stated, requiring state and local law enforcement agencies to enforce federal
immigration laws leads to communities fearing the police, undermines community
trust, and leads to a decline in reported crimes, as well as the level of cooperation
with law enforcement officials. For example, a 2013 study found evidence of fear
and lack of trust in major cities across the country: 70 percent of undocumented
individuals reported that they are less likely to contact police if they are the victim
of a crime due to local police entanglement with federal immigration enforcement.
And the trust concerns go beyond the undocumented population as it affects those
with citizenship and the community at large. In the same study, nearly half of all
Latinos said they are less likely to contact the police because they fear that officers
will take the opportunity to inquire into either their immigration status or the
status of people they know.
These fears are not unfounded. Past iterations of the programnamely 287(g) and
Secure Communitiesled to numerous deportations of individuals with deep
community ties and no criminal history, as well as extensively documented racial
profiling. That is why hundreds of local sheriffs and law enforcement officials
support policies that limit federal-local entanglement on immigration. These
community trust policies would allow police departments to work more effectively
with their communities to both solve and prevent crimes. In addition, a number of
federal courts have ruled that holding someone beyond the time permitted under
state law without a judicial finding of probable cause is an unconstitutional
deprivation of an individuals liberty. In other words, the DHS detainer policies
violate the Constitutions Fourth Amendment.

Due to the community-related and legal concerns, President


Obama announced in November 2014 that Secure Communities would be
replaced with a new voluntary program called the Priority
Enforcement Program, or PEP. The Obama administration has recently begun to
roll out the program.

There are several key differences between PEP and Secure Communities. In
addition to sending fingerprints to the FBI and the DHS at booking, the DHS now
determines if an undocumented individual is a priority for removal under more
specific and narrower enforcement priorities. Given the constitutional
concerns, the new PEP program moves away from detainers and toward
notificationsdefined as requests for local police to notify ICE 48 hours before an
individual is released. Local jurisdictions can then fulfill the requests based on
their local enforcement policies and priorities. If necessary, ICE has the legal
avenue to ask local jurisdictions to detain individuals through a warrant, and the
agency maintains the authority to detain individuals it deems a priority at any time.
Additionally, in March, ICE announced new, enhanced oversight and release
procedures focused on individuals that pose a public safety or national security
threat.
AT: Cant Solve --- Federal Rollback

***note when prepping file --- a version of this ev is in the AT:


USFG Forces Cooperation Block

Secretary of Homeland Security empirically resists GOP


criticism to force more state and local cooperation. Even the
impetus for rollback proves we have a strong politics link too.
Linthicum & Romney, 7/19/15 (Kate Linthicum and Lee Romney, L.A.
County considers new immigration program for jails in light of S.F. slaying,
http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-immigration-jails-20150720-
story.html#page=1, JMP) *** Note --- Jeh Johnson is the Homeland Security
Secretary

At the hearing, Johnson faced heavy criticism from Republicans, who asked
why ICE hasn't required local agencies to comply with all aspects of the
new program.
"I do not believe that we should mandate the cooperation of state and local
law enforcement officials," Johnson said. "I believe that the most effective way
to work with jurisdictions, particularly the larger ones, is through a cooperative
effort with a program that removes the legal and political controversy."
Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-San Jose) welcomed Johnson's approach, which she called
more "respectful to local communities" than previous ICE jails programs. While
Secure Communities was at times presented as a mandatory program that local
officials had to comply with, the new program acknowledges that local
jurisdictions may craft their own policies about what types of criminal
convictions would warrant notification, she said.
"Somebody sitting in Washington doesn't know the details of how to do policing in
San Jose or San Francisco or Chicago," she said.
For some local officials, giving ICE agents so much as a heads up on release
even for those previously convicted of violent felonies and facing new charges of
violence is unacceptable without a warrant.
"The idea of notifying undermines the interest of limiting compliance with ICE,"
said San Francisco Supervisor John Avalos.
AT: Cant Solve --- Not Resolve Trust

CP solves --- it draws a clear distinction between federal and


state and local efforts --- that is the key variable in rebuilding
with local communities. Thats Lansdowne.

Their ev ssumes SQ piecemeal efforts by states and localities ---


the counterplan has EVERY STATE simultaneously refuse
cooperation with ICE. This is clear national action that would
send an unmistakable signal.

States are perceived as agents of the U.S. as a whole and the


collective nature of the counterplan ensures a deeper and more
sustainable relationship
Blase, Phd-Government-UT Austin 2k3 pg online @
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/etd/d/2003/blasejm039/blasejm039.pdf
Although what the states and cities are doing may not rise to the level of federal law,
many of these policy initiatives are in harmony with domestic policy goals.
Collectively, it can be argued, they serve to shape the foreign relations of the
nation as a whole. Ivo Duchacek sees no difference in relations conducted by federal
actors and by subnational actors. If by diplomatic negotiation we mean processes by
which governments relate their conflicting interest to the common ones, there is,
conceptually, no real difference between the goals of paradiplomacy and traditional
diplomacy: the aim is to negotiate and implement an agreement based on
conditional mutuality.45 Brian Hocking objects to treating the foreign relations of
subnational governments as if they were something distinct from the federal level .
Hocking studies what happens in federal systems when foreign policy issues
become local concerns. He sets his approach apart from the complex
interdependence crowd, such as Duchacek, saying that ideas such as
paradiplomacy places subnational activities outside of traditional diplomatic
patterns. Hocking sees non-central governments as integrated into a dense web
of diplomatic interactions , in which they serve more as allies and agents in
pursuit of national objectives rather than as flies in the ointment. The nature
of contemporary public policy with its dual domestic- international features, creates a
mutual dependency between the levels of government and an interest in devising
cooperative mechanisms and strategies to promote the interests of each
level.46 Rather than separating the activities of non-central governments from those
of central governments, Hockings goal is to locate subnational governments in the
traditional diplomatic and foreign policy processes initiated and carried through by the
federal government.
Politics
Agency Links

Executive Action links to politics and gets rolled back


Weaver 13 (Kent, Professor at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow in
Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, Policy Leadership and the Blame
Trap: Seven Strategies for Avoiding Policy Stalemate, March 2013
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/3/29%20policy
%20leadership%20blame%20weaver/weaverpolicy%20leadership%20and%20the
%20blame%20trapv5032813.pdf\\CLans)
EXECUTIVE ACTION: If a hyper-partisan and divided Congress is unable to break
policy stalemates, what about executive action as an alternative? There certainly
are some opportunities for breaking stalemate through executive action, as
President Obama showed in June 2012 when he suspended deportation of young
illegal immigrants who had entered the country illegally. Additional executive
action by the Obama administration has been promoted by liberal advocates of
action in policy areas such as climate change, gun control home mortgage
refinancing, and gay and lesbian rights. But it clearly has limitations as well: most
changes taken through executive action are reversible, relatively modest, and risk
being portrayed in Republican blame-generating narratives as the actions
of an arrogant president who skirts the law.

Presidents are tied to agency action --- Obama will get


embroiled
Wallison, 3 --- resident fellow at AEI (1/1/2003, A Power Shift No One Noticed, http://www.aei.org/issue/15652)
recent
Control over independent regulatory agencies has traditionally resided with Congress, which created all of them. The
controversy over the Securities and Exchange Commission suggests, however, that now
Congress, the White House, and the public all take for granted that the independent
agencies are the president's responsibility. The political frenzy surrounding Enron's collapse and
other corporate scandals may have produced--or at least exposed--a significant shift in the relationship between Congress and the
White House. The efforts of congressional Democrats to pin some of the blame for the scandals on the president and the head of
the Securities and Exchange Commission--and President Bush's willingness to act as though the SEC is his responsibility--may
signal the end of more than a century of experimentation with independent regulatory agencies as a so-called "fourth branch" of
government. History of Independent Agencies Independent agencies such as the SEC have always been regarded as "arms of
Congress," outside the control of the executive branch. The president appointed the members and the chairman, but the terms for
these officials overlapped presidential administrations, allowing--and encouraging--them to act without policy direction from the
White House. The political fallout from the recent scandals has turned all this on its head. These independent agencies are
creatures of Congress, not the Constitution. The first, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), was established in 1887 to
control the powerful railroad industry. Later, especially during the Progressive and New Deal eras, a number of other agencies
were created, several of which still exist--including the SEC, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Federal Communications
Commission. Several others, such as the Federal Power Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Board, went out of business a
quarter-century ago. The ICC closed its doors in 1995. There was no clear reason, or constitutional rationale, why the duties of
these bodies could not have been performed by regular executive branch departments. Presidents have expressed their
unhappiness with this diminution of their authority, and some have tried to influence agency policies through the appointments
process, but they have not confronted Congress on the issue. And Congress--always jealous of its prerogatives in the face of the
executive branch's growing power--has never conceded that the independent regulatory agencies could take policy direction from
the president. Then, in 1971, the status quo was called into question. The President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization--
known as the Ash Council after its chairman, Roy L. Ash of Litton Industries--recommended that almost all of the functions of these
bodies be transferred to single administrators, appointed by the president and accountable to him. The Ash Council's rationale for
this reform was simple: If the president's policy control did not extend to these independent agencies, then his responsibility for
them could not be clearly fixed and voters could not hold him accountable. Moreover, the president's policies, even if adopted by
Congress, could be frustrated through contrary actions by the independent agencies. The Ash Council's proposal, like many reform
ideas, went nowhere. There was no support in Congress for enhancing the president's power, and the Nixon administration--beset
first by economic problems and then by the Watergate scandal--had no stomach for challenging Congress. (The Ash Council's
report did lead, however, to the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency, headed by an administrator who answers to the
president.) During the Reagan administration, however, the executive branch became more assertive. The Justice Department took
the Constitution's separation of powers seriously, which by implication challenged the very legitimacy of the independent
regulatory agencies. Nevertheless, because of congressional sensitivities and the continuing sense that these bodies were quasi-
judicial in nature, White House officials were warned that all contacts with the independent regulatory agencies had to be
approved in advance--or actually carried out--by the White House counsel's office. The Reagan administration never seriously
considered taking on Congress through a legislative proposal that would bring these independent agencies within the
constitutionally established structure. The Presidential Role All this history appears to have been forgotten in the politics of 2002.
The Democrats, hoping to make an election issue out of the SEC's "failure" to stop "corporate corruption," proceeded to blame a
Republican president for events that were solely within the authority of the SEC. There was no indication that departments or
agencies unquestionably controlled by the president had any role for policing either the securities industry or the companies
under scrutiny. So if President Bush was somehow responsible for what happened at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and the rest, it had
to be as a consequence of some presidential authority over the SEC. To be sure, the president had appointed the chairman and the
other members of the SEC, but that in itself would not make him blameworthy unless one assumed that he was also directly
responsible for how the SEC acted before, and after, the scandals erupted. That is the nub of the important but largely unnoticed
change that has occurred: the unchallenged assumption on the part of all parties--in Congress, in the media, among the public,
and even in the White House itself--that the president was fully accountable for an agency that has always been viewed as
independent. The significance of this change in the grand government scheme of things can hardly be overstated. Without
the president has suddenly become electorally
legislation or judicial decision,

responsible for the decisions of bodies that were considered to be within


the special purview of Congress, susceptible only to congressional policy
direction. Of course, this functional revolution did not give the president any new powers with respect to the independent
regulatory agencies. But the die is now cast. The way the American people look at the
president's responsibilities apparently is changing, and that will affect the
attitude of Congress. If the American people believe that the president should be responsible for the actions of the
SEC, it will be difficult to convince them otherwise. Significantly, since Harvey Pitt's resignation as SEC chairman in November,
the media have routinely referred to the president's choice to head the SEC, investment banker William H. Donaldson, as a
member of the Bush "economic team."

Independent agency action can spur a congressional backlash


--- especially when it goes counter to its interests
Datla and Revesz 12 (Kirti and Richard, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF
LAW PUBLIC LAW & LEGAL THEORY RESEARCH PAPER SERIES WORKING
PAPER NO. 12-44 LAW & ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER SERIES WORKING
PAPER NO. 12-23t, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive
Agencies), August 2012 \\CLans)
The ability of agency heads to adopt policies somewhat independently of
presidential monitoring and control matters only if agency heads will diverge from
the Presidents preferences in the absence of direct presidential control. One
might ask why the preferences of an agency head would ever diverge from those of
the President who appointed him, given that the President presumably appoints
agency heads who share his policy preferences. But the President is not the only
principal of an agency head. Congress, political parties, regulated interest
groups, and the agency staff exert influence on the agency head.257 Congress
primarily exerts influence over agency heads (and presumably also conveys the
preferences of the political parties) through the power of the purse. Thus [an]
agency has an incentive to shade its policy choice toward the legislatures ideal
point to take advantage of that inducement.258 The preferences of members who
serve on the agencys appropriations committee will presumably carry more
weight than those of Congress generally. Congress also can influence agencies
through hearings and legislative proposals. Political parties also influence agency
heads and can cause an agency head to diverge from the Presidents preferences.
Because agency heads tend not to retire from public life after their tenure, they
therefore consider the impacts of their decisions on future career prospects.259
Agency heads will consider the preferences of their political party, which controls
(or at least influences) their potential for advancement. Decisions that will
optimize the agency heads future stream of income and reputational benefits will
not necessarily be compatible with the [P]residents agenda at all times.260
Interest groups also exert influence over agency heads. The phenomenon of
interest group influence is commonly referred to as agency capture. The capture
thesis recognizes that because interest groups representing regulated entities tend
to be overrepresented in the agency decision-making process compared to interest
groups rep- resenting public interests, the outputs of agencies will tend to be
biased in favor of those interests.261 Interest groups are overrepresented in
agency decision making because they are well organized, well funded, possess an
information advantage over the agency, and can offer perks such as future
employment.262 Finally, agency staff members are able to influence agency heads
as a result of several factors. First, government administrators will seek
employment at an agency because of an ideological identification with that
agencys mission.263 Then, as agency heads serve in their positions, they gain
expertise and adopt the preferences and perspectives of agency careerists on
policy issuescalled going native.264 Finally, the agency staff simply spends
more time with the agency head than the President or his advisors can.
Circumvention
Circumvention --- Agency Reconfiguration

Plan gets circumvented rename agency and redistribute roles


how ICE was formed
US Legal, 7 (US Legal Law Digest, United States U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization, June 3 2007, http://lawdigest.uslegal.com/immigration/u.s.-
immigration-and-naturalization/7262/#ReorganizationAfterSeptember112001) KW
Over the years, INS was repeatedly criticized for its seemingly unmanageable
bureaucracy. Border Patrol agents and INS investigators developed reputations of
being undertrained and overworked. People applying for immigration benefits
often encountered backlogs that stretched for years. Many suggestions were made
for reorganization, but the terrorist attacks of 2001 finally precipitated major
change. In the wake of September 11, INS was criticized for its failure to prevent
the terrorists from entering the country. Calls for change became more strident
after the revelation that several of the hijackers had received visas to come to the
U.S. to attend flight-training schools.
On November 19, 2002, President George W. Bush signed legislation that
established the Department of Homeland Security, a cabinet-level department.
DHS encompassed 22 agencies and 190,000 employees. Along with INS, the Coast
Guard and the Customs Service came under DHS jurisdiction on March 1, 2003.
Under the auspices of DHS, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
has assumed the responsibility for administering benefits, including oversight over:
Immigrant and nonimmigrant admission to the country
Work authorization and other permits
Naturalization of qualified applicants for U.S. citizenship
Asylum and refugee processing
Immigration enforcement now comes within the purview of the Directorate of
Border and Transportation Security. Duties are further divided between the Bureau
of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection (CBP). ICE is responsible for the enforcement of immigration
laws within the U.S. CBP is responsible for inspections of people coming to the
country, and for patrolling the border. Enforcement responsibilities for ICE and
CBP include:
Preventing aliens from entering the country unlawfully
Detection and removal of aliens who are living in the U.S. unlawfully
Preventing terrorists and other criminal aliens from entering or residing in the U.S.
ICE formed when another agency was dismantled same thing
could happen to ICE
Hollingsworth, 14 (Gabrielle, LegalMatch Legal Writer and Attorney at Law,
INS Reorganization, 4/16/14, http://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/ins-
reorganization.html) KW
What Was the INS?
INS is an acronym for the Immigration and Naturalization Service, a U.S. agency
that was dismantled in 2003. The law that formed the INS was the Immigration
and Naturalization Act (INA). As a response to the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade
Center, the Patriot Act made major changes to the INA in 2001. The feeling existed
that the INS no longer met the needs of a society under threat of terrorism.
What Replaced the INS?
Among the changes included creating the Student and Exchange Visitor
Information System (SEVIS), a computerized system to keep track of foreign
students living in the US. Other changes included the 2002 Homeland Security Act
and the 2002 Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act. These
amendments mandated, for reasons of national security, that a number of federal
agencies be created, renamed, and reorganized.
On March 1, 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was
dismantled and reorganized into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Within the DHS there are three new agencies: the U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS), the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE), and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP).
The USCIS absorbed the former INS office administration and immigration
services. ICE, the main enforcement arm of the DHS, absorbed the former U.S.
Customs investigators, the Federal Protective Service, and the Federal Air Marshal
Service. And CBP absorbed the former INS and Customs Inspectors, the
Department of Agriculture, and the Border Patrol.
As a result of these changes, the U.S. immigration agencies are now more
enforcement-oriented, meaning that they aim to help increase the security of the
U.S., while protecting U.S. citizens from terrorism within their borders.

Even small changes to names causes them to be considered


new agencies
MCALEENAN and RAGSDALE 14 (KEVIN K. MCALEENAN Acting Deputy
Commissioner U.S. Customs and Border Protection Department of Homeland
Security and DANIEL H. RAGSDALE Deputy Director U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement Department of Homeland Security. Authorizing Customs
and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. April 8, 2014
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/speeches/140408ragsdale.pdf) KW
With the creation of DHS, the enforcement and service functions of INS and the
U.S. Customs Service were absorbed into the Directorate of Border and
Transportation Security, including U.S. Customs, Bureau of Border Security, and
Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services. In 2003, President George W.
Bush submitted a reorganization plan for DHS, renaming the Bureau of Border
Security the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Customs
Service the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection. In 2007, DHS changed the
name of the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection to U.S. Customs and Border
Protection and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement to U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

History proves the agencies always change but immigration


control only gets stronger
Allgov ND (provides up-to-date news about more than 340 departments and
agencies of the U.S. government, http://www.allgov.com/departments/department-
of-homeland-security/us-immigration-and-customs-enforcement-ice?
agencyid=7352). WM
Immigration first became a political issue in the late 19th Century as waves of
European and Asian immigrants flooded into the US. After the Civil War, some
states started to pass their own immigration laws, which prompted the Supreme
Court to rule in 1875 that immigration was the responsibility of the federal
government, not the states. To solidify this duty, US officials created the Office of
the Superintendent of Immigration within the Treasury Department in 1891. This
office was responsible for admitting, rejecting and processing all immigrants
seeking admission to the United States and for implementing national immigration
policy. Legislation in March 1895 upgraded the Office of Immigration to the Bureau
of Immigration and changed the agency heads title from Superintendent to
Commissioner-General of Immigration. Also during the 1890s, the legendary
immigration station at Ellis Island in New York opened and became the nations
largest and busiest immigrant-processing center well into the 20th Century.
In 1906, Congress passed the Basic Naturalization Act which established
naturalization procedures that have endured until today. The act encouraged state
and local courts to relinquish their jurisdiction over immigrants to federal courts,
and it expanded the Bureau of Immigration into the Bureau of Immigration and
Naturalization.
Seven years later, in 1913, the Department of Commerce and Labor reorganized
into todays separate cabinet departments, and for a time, the Bureau of
Immigration and Naturalization followed suit, each becoming a separate bureau,
one for immigration, one for naturalization.
After World War I, immigration into the US again rose, prompting Congress to act
once more by instituting the national-origins quota system. Laws passed in 1921
and 1924 limited the numbers of newcomers by assigning a quota to each
nationality based upon its representation in previous US census figures. Each year,
the State Department issued a limited number of visas; only those immigrants who
had obtained them and could present valid visas were permitted entry. Because of
the limitations that the quota system imposed on immigration, illegal attempts to
enter the US first began to occur. Illegal entries and alien smuggling occurred
along land borders, so Congress created the Border Patrol in 1924 within the
Immigration Service. Stricter immigration policies coupled with Border Patrol
apprehensions resulted in the bureau getting involved in deportations.
In 1933, Congress decided to remarry immigration and naturalization into one
agency, creating the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). With war
brewing in Europe in the 1930s, immigration took on greater importance,
especially with fears of fascist spies entering the country. President Franklin D.
Roosevelt moved the INS from the Department of Labor to the Department of
Justice in 1940. The task of securing American borders against enemy aliens
became a key duty of the INS during WWII, causing it to double in size, from
approximately 4,000 to 8,000 employees.
Following the attack on Pearl Harbor by Japan in December 1941, national fears
about foreign-born citizens and residents erupted. In response, President
Roosevelt signed an executive order that forced thousands of Japanese-Americans
living on the West Coast to live in internment camps. The INS played a role in this
forced relocation, setting up internment camps and detention facilities
In the post-war era, immigration concerns shifted from those of European descent
to those entering the US from Latin America and Asia. In 1965, Congress amended
federal immigration law by replacing the national-origins system with a preference
system designed to reunite immigrant families and attract skilled workers.
Although the number of immigration visas available each year was still limited,
Congress continued to pass special legislation, as it did for Indochinese refugees in
the post-Vietnam era of the 1970s.
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 expanded the INSs
responsibilities, making it more of a modern-day law-enforcement agency. The act
charged INS with enforcing sanctions against American employers who hired
undocumented aliens. This meant the INS was now investigating, prosecuting and
levying fines against corporate and individual employers and deporting aliens
found to be working illegally in the US. Also during the 1980s, anti-immigrant
movements began to rise, focusing mostly on Hispanic immigration in the
American Southwest. This backlash continued into the 1990s with the passage of
initiatives in California that sought to ban social services to illegal immigrants and
eliminate bilingual education in public schools.
The terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, shifted the immigration debate in a
different direction. Upon learning the hijackers of commercial airliners that
crashed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were non-US citizens who
had slipped into the country despite some of them already being on terrorist
watch lists, federal officials decided to make dramatic changes in government
operations overseeing domestic security and immigration. As part of the formation
of the Department of Homeland Security in 2003, the INS was changed into the US
Citizenship and Immigration Services, while the US Customs Service became the
US Customs and Border Protection agency. Furthermore, the law enforcement
arms of the former INS and Customs Service were folded into the newly created
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in order to more effectively enforce
our immigration and customs laws and to protect the United States against
terrorist attacks, according to ICE. Almost overnight, ICE became the second
largest law enforcement agency in the country, next to the FBI.

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