Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc.
vs averred that this violated the principle in eminent domain which provides
Secretary of Agrarian Reform
175 SCRA 343 Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Equal
Protection Valid Classification
Eminent Domain Just Compensation
These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e.,
Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and
Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian
reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform
program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are
landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of
other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844
was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for
the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-
farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. In 1987,
President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land
ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the
valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the
manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a comprehensive
agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229,
providing the mechanics for its (PP131s) implementation, was also
enacted. After which is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while considerably changing the
earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect
insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought
exception from the land distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The
Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose
landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their
landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to
distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves
have shown willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to be
exempted from agrarian reform program because they claim to belong to a
different class.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27,
EO 228, and 229) on the ground that these laws already valuated their
lands for the agrarian reform program and that the specific amount must
be determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay
that only courts can determine just compensation. This, for Manaay, also
violated due process for under the constitution, no property shall be taken
for public use without just compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may
be paid for their land in bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred
that just compensation has always been in the form of money and not in
bonds.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program,
must be in terms of cash.
HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a
different class exempt from the agrarian reform program. Under the law,
classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar
to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these
same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated
must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities
imposed. The Association have not shown that they belong to a different
class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only
landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the
burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a
substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly
visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on
this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in
providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and
respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused
to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that
Congress is right in classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian
reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power
lodged in the courts. However, there is no law which prohibits
administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just compensation. In
fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed upon by the landowner
and the government even without judicial intervention so long as both
parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through
appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not
needed. What is contemplated by law however is that, the just
compensation determined by an administrative body is merely preliminary.
If the landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation by
an administrative body, then it can go to court and the determination of
the latter shall be the final determination. This is even so provided by RA
6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the
matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just
compensation.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept
in traditional exercise of eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is a
revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The program will require billions
of pesos in funds if all compensation have to be made in cash if
everything is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient money
hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for
just compensation.
SAME
Facts: These are consolidated cases which involve common legal, including
serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures such as
P.D. No. 27, E.O. No. 228, Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229,
and R.A. No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79777
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on
grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection
and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for
public use without just compensation. G.R. No. 79310
G.R. No. 79310
This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O.
No. 229. They contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of
just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in
full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative of the
constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due
process or just compensation.
Issue: Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of police power or eminent
domain
Ruling: There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the
power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both
powers at the same time on the same subject. Property condemned under
the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a
building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the
public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the
interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not
compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of
expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the
owner.
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question
of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures
under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is
an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in
accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation,
it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may
own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking
under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just
compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere
limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the
title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial
rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is
definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent
domain.

G.R. No. 78742

Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy
their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so
far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted
decree.
RA 6657 Sec. 17-19
CHAPTER VI
Compensation
Section 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just
compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of the
like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by
the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government
assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits
contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to
the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from
any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered
as additional factors to determine its valuation.
Section 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. The LBP shall
compensate the landowner in such amounts as may be agreed upon by the
landowner and the DAR and the LBP, in accordance with the criteria
provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent provisions hereof,
or as may be finally determined by the court, as the just compensation for
the land.
The compensation shall be paid on one of the following modes, at the
option of the landowner:
(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions;
(a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the excess hectarage is
concerned.
Twenty-five percent (25%) cash, the balance to be paid in government
financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(b) For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and up to fifty (50) hectares.
Thirty percent (30%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial
instruments negotiable at any time.
(c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below.
Thirty-five percent (35%) cash, the balance to be paid in government
financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP
preferred shares, physical assets or other qualified investments in
accordance with guidelines set by the PARC;
(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;
(4) LBP bonds, which shall have the following features:
(a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day treasury bill rates. Ten
percent (10%) of the face value of the bonds shall mature every year from
the date of issuance until the tenth (10th) year: provided, that should the
landowner choose to forego the cash portion, whether in full or in part, he
shall be paid correspondingly in LBP bonds;
(b) Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP bonds may be used by the
landowner, his successors in interest or his assigns, up to the amount of
their face value, for any of the following:
(i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of the government, including
assets under the Asset Privatization Program and other assets foreclosed
by government financial institutions in the same province or region where
the lands for which the bonds were paid are situated;
(ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of government-owned or -controlled
corporations or shares of stocks owned by the government in private
corporations;
(iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the provisional release of
accused persons, or performance bonds;
(iv) Security for loans with any government financial institution, provided
the proceeds of the loans shall be invested in an economic enterprise,
preferably in a small-and medium-scale industry, in the same province or
region as the land for which the bonds are paid;
(v) Payment for various taxes and fees to government; provided, that the
use of these bonds for these purposes will be limited to a certain
percentage of the outstanding balance of the financial instruments:
provided, further, that the PARC shall determine the percentage mentioned
above;
(vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of the original
bondholder in government universities, colleges, trade schools, and other
institutions;
(vii) Payment for fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in
government hospitals; and
(viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from time to time allow.
In case of extraordinary inflation, the PARC shall take appropriate measures
to protect the economy.
Section 19. Incentives for Voluntary Offers for Sales. Landowners, other
than banks and other financial institutions, who voluntarily offer their lands
for sale shall be entitled to an additional five percent (5%) cash payment.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,PETITIONER ,VS.COURT OF
APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO,
AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT &DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
RESPONDENTS.I.
FACTS
In this agrarian dispute, it is once more imperative that the aforestated
principles be applied in its resolution. Separate petitions for review were
filed by petitioners Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and Land Bank of
the following the adverse ruling by the Court of Appeals. Private
respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR
and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect
to the valuation and payment of compensation for their land, they sought
to compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative
proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of their properties,
and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively
"earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private
respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same. DAR and Land Bank
filed for petitions but it was dismissed and they filed a Motion for
Reconsideration.
II. ISSUES
Whether or not the opening of "trust accounts" is within the coverage of
term "deposit.
III. HELD no (PET loss) MUST BE IN CASH OR IN LBP BONDS
The provision is very clear and unambiguous, foreclosing any doubt as to
allow an expanded construction that would include the opening of "trust
accounts" within the coverage of term "deposit. Accordingly, we must
adhere to the well-settled rule that when the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction,
but only for application. The validity of constituting trust accounts for the
benefit of the rejecting landowners and withholding immediate payment to
them is further premised on the latter's refusal (DAR VALUATION) to accept
the offered compensation thereby making it necessary that the amount
remains in the custody of the LBP for safekeeping and in trust for eventual
payment to the landowners. As an exercise of police power, the
expropriation of private property under the CARP puts the landowner, and
not the government, in a situation where the odds are already stacked
against his favor. He has no recourse but to allow it. His only consolation
is that he can negotiate for the amount of compensation to be paid for the
expropriated property. Unduly burdening the property owners from the
resulting flaws in the implementation of the CARP which was supposed to
have been a carefully crafted legislation is plainly unfair and unacceptable.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELICIANO F. WYCOCOG.R. No.
146733January 13, 2004
FACTS:
This case is a consolidated petition of one seeking review of the decision of
CA modifying the decision of RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court, and
another for mandamus to compel the RTC to issue a writ of execution and
to direct Judge Caspillo to inhibit.
Feliciano F. Wycoco is the registered owner of a 94.1690 hectare land.
Wycoco voluntarily offered to sell the land to the Department of Agrarian
Reform for P14.9 million. DAR offered P2,280,159.82. The area which the
DAR offered to acquire excluded idle lands, river and road located therein.
Wycoco rejected the offer, prompting the DAR to indorse the case to the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for the
purpose of fixing the just compensation in a summary administrative
proceeding. Thereafter, the DARAB requested LBP to open a trust account
in the name of Wycoco and deposited the compensation offered by DAR. In
the meantime, the property was distributed to farmer-beneficiaries.
On April 13, 1993, Wycoco filed the instant case for determination of just
compensation with the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City against DAR
and LBP.
On March 9, 1994, the DARAB dismissed the case on its hand to give way
to the determination of just compensation by the RTC.
Meanwhile, DAR and LBP filed their respective answered that the valuation
of Wycocos property was in accordance with law and that the latter failed
to exhaust administrative remedies by not participating in the summary
administrative proceedings before the DARAB which has primary
jurisdiction over determination of land valuation.
On November 14, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
Wycoco. It ruled that there is no need to present evidence in support of
the land valuation in as much as it is of public knowledge that the
prevailing market value of agricultural lands sold in Licab, Nueva Ecija is
from P135,000.00 to 150,000.00 per hectare. The court thus took judicial
notice thereof and fixed the compensation for the entire 94.1690 hectare
land at P142,500.00 per hectare or a total of P13,428,082.00. It also
awarded Wycoco actual damages for unrealized profits plus legal interest.
The DAR and the LBP filed separate petitions before the Court of Appeals.
The petition brought by DAR on jurisdictional and procedural issues was
dismissed. This prompted Wycoco to file a petition for mandamus before
this Court praying that the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City be executed, and that Judge Caspillo be compelled to
inhibit himself from hearing the case.
The petition brought by LBP on both substantive and procedural grounds
was likewise dismissed by the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of
Appeals modified its decision by deducting from the compensation due to
Wycoco the amount corresponding to the 3.3672 hectare portion of the
94.1690 hectare land which was found to have been previously sold by
Wycoco to the Republic.
LBP contended that the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case acting as
Special Agrarian Court.
2. Assuming that it acquired jurisdiction, whether or not the compensation
arrived at supported by evidence.
3. Whether or not Wycoco can compel DAR to purchase the entire land.
4. Whether or not the awards of interest and damages for unrealized
profits is valid.
HELD: - Loss
1. Yes, the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court, acquired jurisdiction of the
case. Sections 50 and 57 of Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) provides:
Section 50.Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested
with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
Section 57.Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian Court shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of
just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal
offenses under this Act.
2. No, the compensation arrived is not supported by evidence. In arriving
at the valuation of Wycocos land, the trial court took judicial notice of the
alleged prevailing market value of agricultural lands without apprising the
parties of its intention to take judicial notice thereof. Section 3, Rule 129 of
the Rules on Evidence provides:
Sec. 3. Judicial Notice. When Hearing Necessary. During the trial, the
court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its
intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be
heard thereon.
After trial and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own
initiative, or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter
and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a
material issue in the case.
The trial court should have allowed the parties to present evidence thereon
instead of practically assuming a valuation without basis. Only the market
value was taken into account in determining the just compensation. Since
other factors were not considered, the case was remanded for
determination of just compensation.
3. No, the DAR cannot be compelled to purchase the entire property
voluntarily offered by Wycoco. The power to determine whether a parcel of
land may come within the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program is essentially lodged with the DAR. That Wycoco will suffer
damages by the DARs non-acquisition of the approximately 10 hectare
portion of the entire land which was found to be not suitable for agriculture
is no justification to compel DAR to acquire the whole area.
4. Yes, Wycocos claim for payment of interest is partly meritorious. The
trust account opened as the mode of payment of just compensation should
be converted to a deposit account. The conversion should be retroactive in
application in order to rectify the error committed by the DAR in opening a
trust account and to grant the landowners the benefits concomitant to
payment in cash or LBP bonds. Otherwise, petitioners right to payment of
just and valid compensation for the expropriation of his property would be
violated. The interest earnings accruing on the deposit account of
landowners would suffice to compensate them pending payment of just
compensation.
The award of actual damages for unrealized profits should be deleted
because Wycoco failed to show proof of loss.
Wycocos petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 146733 was dismissed. The
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, acting as Special
Agrarian Court cannot be enforced because there is a need to remand the
case to the trial court for determination of just compensation. Likewise,
the prayer for the inhibition of Judge Rodrigo S. Caspillo was denied for lack
of basis.
Apo Fruits vs CA
APO Fruits Corporation, Inc. (AFC) and Hijo Plantation Inc. (HPI) were
owners of 5 parcels of land (1338.60 has.) located in San Isidro, Tagum,
Davao. On 12 October 1995, the two voluntarily offered to sell the
properties to the DAR. DAR offered P86.9 million for AFCs land and
P164.40 million for HPIs land (total of about P251.3 million). AFC, HPI and
DAR cannot agree on a price hence the Complaint for Determination of Just
Compensation was filed before the DAR Adjudication Board on 14 February
1997. The DARAB failed to render a decision on the valuation of the land
for three years. But nevertheless, the government, through the Land Bank
of the Philippines, deposited P26M into AFCs account and P45M into HPIs
account as down payment in 1996. The DAR also caused the titling of the
land in the name of the Republic of the Philippines in December 1996.
Later, titles were given to farmers under the CARP (Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program).
Due to DARABs failure to adjudicate, AFC and HPI filed a complaint for
determination of just compensation before the RTC of Davao which
rendered a decision in favor of AFC and HPI. The RTC ruled, based on the
reports it gathered from assessors, that the purchase price should be
higher than what was offered by DAR; that the purchase price should be at
P103.33/ sq. m; that DAR is to pay AFC and HPI a total of P1.38 billion. DAR
appealed to the CA, the CA reversed the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was just compensation.
HELD: No. AFCs and HPIs land were taken in 1996 without just
compensation. DARAB, an agency of the DAR which was commissioned by
law to determine just compensation, sat on the cases for three years,
which was the reason that AFC and HPI filed the cases before the RTC. The
RTCs finding is to be sustained as it based its ruling on evidence. DAR was
given chance to support its ruling on why the purchase price should be at a
lower amount but DAR failed to present such evidence. To allow the taking
of landowners properties, and to leave them empty-handed while
government withholds compensation is undoubtedly oppressive.
The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct
determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also
the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without
prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just inasmuch as
the property owner is being made to suffer the consequences of being
immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or
more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property
taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed
by this Court that the measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss.
The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word
compensation to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for
the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.
The power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is
absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that
private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from
the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper
exercise of the power are:
(1) public use and
(2) just compensation.
Section 57 of Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law)
provides:
SEC. 57. Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian Courts shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of
just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal
offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings
before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act
Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, which is particularly relevant,
providing as it does the guideposts for the determination of just
compensation, reads, as follows:
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just
compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like
properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the
owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government
assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits
contributed by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the Government
to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from
any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered
as additional factors to determine its valuation.
Note should be taken that in said Appraisal Report, permanent
improvements on AFCs and HPIs lands have been introduced and found
existing, e.g., all weather-road network, airstrip, pier, irrigation system,
packing houses, among others, wherein substantial amount of capital
funding have been invested in putting them up.
The agricultural properties of AFC and HPI are just a stones throw from the
residential and/or industrial sections of Tagum City, a fact DAR should
never ignore. The market value of the property (plus the consequential
damages less consequential benefits) is determined by such factors as the
value of like properties, its actual or potential use, its size, shape and
location. Therefore, AFC and HPI is entitled to the amount of just
compensation (Php 1.38 billion) as computed with 12% interest per annum
plus attorneys fees amounting to 10% of the just compensation or P138
million.
conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that
rendered it or by the highest court of the land. In this case, the judgment
already became final on May 16, 2008. Sure there are exceptions to this
rule, to wit:
(1) the correction of clerical errors;
(2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any
party;
(3) void judgments; and
(4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision
rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.
But none of these exceptions are applicable in this case. In fact, the private
claim by AFC and HPI does not even qualify either as a substantial or
transcendental matter, or as an issue of paramount public interest, for no
special or compelling circumstance has been presented to warrant the
relaxation of the doctrine of immutability in their favor.
632 SCRA 727 Civil Law Award of Interest
Political Law Constitutional Law Eminent Domain Just Compensation Resolution here).
Doctrine of Transcendental Importance
Still not satisfied with the December 4, 2009 Resolution, AFC and HPI filed
a motion for reconsideration on the said Resolution. (Note: This is the third
MFR but is technically the first MFR filed by AFC/HPI concerning the
December 4, 2009 Resolution). In their Motion, AFC and HPI pointed out
that the principle of immutability of judgment cannot be applied because in
the first place, the entry of judgment of the April 30, 2008 Resolution was
made on May 16, 2008 which was still within the prescriptive period for
them to file their MFR (though it was not indicated what date AFC and HPI
received the April 30, 08 Resolution); and second, this case involves a
paramount public concern hence it should be taken as an exception to the
rule (Doctrine of Transcendental Importance).
AFC and HPI invoked their right for their claim of interest and did not
invoke anymore their claim for attorneys fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not AFCs and HPIs motion for reconsideration should
be granted.
HELD: Yes. AFC and HPI is correct in asserting their right to interest. They
rightfully argued that the interest is part of just compensation. Hence,
the earlier Decision by the SC which states that there was no delay on the
part of Land Bank because it actually made a downpayment, albeit for the
wrongfully computed amount of just compensation, is wrong. In fact, there
is actually delay in payment.
It is to be noted that the government immediately took over the property
of AFC and HPI without the full payment. In fact, AFC and HPI were
immediately deprived of their property. And for 12 years, they were
deprived of the payment of the correct amount of just compensation. It is
therefore proper to award interest in this case. The rate of interest should
be 12% per annum (legal rate, but note that we now have a new legal rate,
see Nacar vs Gallery Frames) to be computed from the day the
downpayment was made in 1996 until full payment of the just
compensation. This is justified because when the land was taken away
from AFC and HPI without being paid the proper amount, they were not
only deprived of the land but were also deprived of the rightful profit and
gains they would have had from their property and were made to wait for a
long time just so to be paid the proper amount of just compensation.
So as a rule, the final compensation must include interest[s] on its just
value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when
compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court (in this case
since downpayment was made, reckoning point shall be the day when
downpayment was made; interest to be computed against unpaid
balance).
Note: Land Bank filed another Motion for Reconsideration which was denied
by the Supreme Court on November 23, 2010 (see the full text of the
Eudosia Daez and/or Her heirs, Represented by Adriano D. Daez
vs. Court of Appeals, Macario Sorientes, Apolonia Mediana,
Rogelio Macatulad and Manuel Umali
G.R. No. 133507 (February 17, 2000)
Facts:
Eudosia Daez applied for exemption of her 4.1685 hectare riceland in Brgy.
Lawa, Meycauayan, Bulacan being cultivated by the herein respondents.
DAR Undersecretary Jose C. Medina denied the application for exemption
upon finding that the subject land is covered under LOI 474, the
petitioner's total properties having exceeded the 7-hectare limit provided
by law.
The Secretary of DAR, Benjamin T. Leong, the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court all affirmed the said Order and disregarded an Affidavit
executed by the respondents stating that they are not the tenants of the
land. Their findings was that the Affidavit was merely issued under duress.
In the meantime, Emancipation Patents (EPs) were issued to the
respondents.
Undaunted, Daez next filed an application for retention of the same
riceland under R.A. No. 6657. DAR Region III OIC-Director Eugenio B.
Bernardo allowed her to retain the subject riceland but denied the
application of her children to retain three (3) hectares each for failure to
prove actual tillage or direct management thereof. This order was set aside
by the DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao but reinstated on appeal by the
Office of the President. The Court of Appeals again reversed this Decision
and ordered the reinstatement of the previous Decision of DAR Secretary
Ernesto D. Garilao. Hence, this Appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner can still file a petition for retention of the subject
landholdings, despite the fact that a previous decision denying the petition
for exemption had long become final and executory
Held:
It is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application
for retention are one and the same thing. Being distinct remedies, finality
of judgment in one does not preclude the subsequent institution of the
other. There was, thus, no procedural impediment to the application filed
by Eudosia Daez for the retention of the subject 4.1865 hectare riceland,
even after her appeal for exemption of the same land was denied in a
decision that became final and executory.
The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is
subject to qualification by the legislature. It serves to mitigate the effects
of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner
and the tenant by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not
meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner. A retained area as
its name denotes, is land which is not supposed to anymore leave the
landowner's dominion, thus, sparing the government from the
inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the landowner afterwards,
which would be a pointless process.
The issuance of EPs and CLOAs to beneficiaries does not absolutely bar the
landowner from retaining the area covered thereby. Under Administrative
Order No. 2, Series of 1994, an EP or CLOA may be cancelled if the land
covered is later found to be part of the landowner's retained area.
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres vs. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform and DAR Regional Director (Region V)
G.R. No. 139285 (December 21, 2007)
Facts:
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres is the registered owner of several
properties in Camarines Sur, with a total area of 268.5668 hectares. Of that
land, 249.0236 hectares are planted with rice and corn, while the
remaining 19.5432 hectares are planted with coconut trees.
Archbishop filed with the Municipal Agrarian Reform District Office petitions
for exemption from the coverage of Operation Land Transfer (OLT) under
Presidential Decree No. 27. Two of these petitions were denied.
Archbishop appealed and sought exemption from OLT coverage of all lands
planted with rice and corn which were registered in the name of the Roman
Catholic Archdiocese of Caceres.
This appeal was denied by then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao and a
subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied.
The matter was then raised to the CA via Petition for Review on Certiorari.
The petition was dismissed by the CA. Archbishop filed a motion for
reconsideration, but was also denied.
Issue:
Whether or not as administrator of the Roman Catholic properties, these
subject properties should have been exempt from the OLT?
Held:
YES!!!
The laws simply speak of the "landowner" without qualification as to under
what title the land is held or what rights to the land the landowner may
exercise. There is no distinction made whether the landowner holds "naked
title" only or can exercise all the rights of ownership. To do so would be to
frustrate the revolutionary intent of the law, which is the redistribution of
agricultural land for the benefit of landless farmers and farmworkers.
The provisions of PD 27 and RA 6657 are plain and require no further
interpretation there is only one right of retention per landowner, and no
multiple rights of retention can be held by a single party.
Archbishop makes much of the conditional donation, that he does not have
the power to sell, exchange, lease, transfer, encumber or mortgage the
transferred properties. He claims that these conditions do not make him
the landowner as contemplated by the law. This matter has already been
answered in Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, Cebu City (Hospicio) v.
Department of Agrarian Reform. In that case, wherein Act No. 3239
prohibited the sale under any consideration of lands donated to the
Hospicio, a charitable organization, the Court found that the lands of the
Hospicio were not exempt from the coverage of agrarian reform.
Archbishop's claim that he does not have jus disponendi over the subject
properties is unavailing. The very nature of the compulsory sale under PD
27 and RA 6657 defeats such a claim. Other less scrupulous parties may
even attempt creating trusts to prevent their lands from coming under
agrarian reform, and say that the trustee has no power to dispose of the
properties. The disposition under PD 27 and RA 6657 is of a different
character than what is contemplated by jus disponendi, wherein under
these laws, voluntariness is not an issue, and the disposition is necessary
for the laws to be effective.
Under PD 27 and RA 6657, Archbishop cannot claim that the alleged
conditions of the donations would have primacy over the application of the
law. This forced sale is not even a violation of the conditions of the
donation, since it is by application of law and beyond Archbishop's control.
The application of the law cannot and should not be defeated by the
conditions laid down by the donors of the land. If such were allowed, it
would be a simple matter for other landowners to place their lands without
limit under the protection of religious organizations or create trusts by the
mere act of donation, rendering agrarian reform but a pipe dream.
Archbishop's contention that he is merely an administrator of the donated
properties will not serve to remove these lands from the coverage of
agrarian reform. The lands in Archbishop's name are agricultural lands that
fall within the scope of the law, and do not fall under the exemptions.
Archbishop would claim exemption from the coverage of agrarian reform
by stating that he is a mere administrator, but his position does not appear
under the list of exemptions under RA 6657. His claimed status as
administrator does not create another class of lands exempt from the
coverage of PD 27 or RA 6657, and The Roman Catholic Apostolic
Administrator of Davao, Inc. does not create another definition for the term
"landowner."
Petition Denied.
The Facts
Archbishop is the registered owner of several properties in Camarines
Sur, with a total area of 268.5668 hectares. Of that land, 249.0236
hectares are planted with rice and corn, while the remaining 19.5432
hectares are planted with coconut trees.
In 1985, Archbishop filed with the Municipal Agrarian Reform District
Office No. 19, Naga City, Camarines Sur several petitions for exemption of
certain properties located in various towns of Camarines Sur from the
coverage of Operation Land Transfer (OLT) under Presidential Decree No.
(PD) 27. 2 Two of these petitions were denied in an Order dated November
6, 1986, issued by the Regional Director of DAR, Region V, Juanito L.
Lorena. 3
Archbishop appealed from the order of the Regional Director, and
sought exemption from OLT coverage of all lands planted with rice and corn
which were registered in the name of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of
Caceres. In his appeal, Archbishop cited the following grounds:
a) That said properties are all covered by conditional donations
subject to the prohibitions of the donors to SELL, EXCHANGE, LEASE,
TRANSFER, ENCUMBER OR MORTGAGE the properties;
b) That they are used for charitable and religious purposes;
c) That the parishes located in depressed areas badly need them for
the furtherance of their mission work, propagation of the faith,
maintenance and support of their chapels, churches and educational
religious institutions like the Holy Rosary Major and Minor Seminaries for
the promotion of the priesthood vocation;
d) For the preservation of good relationship between church and state
thru non-infringement of the right to exercise religious profession and
worship;
e) For the maintenance of the Cathedral and Peafrancia Shrine,
which now include the Basilica Minore Housing our venerable image of Our
Lady of Peafrancia and the venerable portrait of Divine Rostro;
f) That the petitioner (church) is amenable to continue the leasehold
system with the present cultivators or tenants. 4
This appeal was denied by then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao in
an Order dated December 8, 1997. 5 A subsequent motion for
reconsideration was denied in an Order dated June 10, 1998. 6
The matter was then raised to the CA via Petition for Review on
Certiorari. Archbishop argued that even if the lands in question are
registered in his name, he holds the lands in trust for the benefit of his
followers as cestui que trust. Archbishop further argued that the deeds of
donation by which the lands were transferred to him imposed numerous
fiduciary obligations, such that he cannot sell, exchange, lease, transfer,
encumber, or mortgage the subject lands. By this reasoning, Archbishop
concluded that he is not the "landowner" contemplated by PD 27 and
Republic Act No. (RA) 6657, the CARL of 1988. He then prayed that the
assailed orders of the DAR be reversed, or in the alternative, that the
alleged beneficiaries of the trust be each allowed to exercise rights of
retention over the landholdings. 7
The petition was dismissed by the CA in its February 4, 1999 Decision.
8 Archbishop filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied in the June
18, 1999 CA Resolution. 9
Archbishop now brings the matter before us through this petition.
The Issues
Archbishop raises issues he had raised previously, which, he
contends, the CA failed to properly address. He claims that the CA erred in
holding that he is only entitled to assert one right of retention as the
subject properties are registered in his name. He further claims that an
express trust had been created wherein he only held naked title to the
subject properties on behalf of the beneficiaries. He argues that it is not
the "landowner" contemplated by the law, but merely a trustee, and as
such is entitled to as many rights of retention on behalf of the beneficiaries
of each particular property. He then raises the question of the applicability
of the ruling in The Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc.
v. The Land Registration Commission and the Register of Deeds of Davao
City, 10 which, he cites, ruled that properties held by the Church are held
by it as a mere administrator for the benefit of the members of that
particular religion. As Archbishop claims to be merely an administrator of
the subject properties, he argues that these subject properties should have
been exempt from the OLT.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Archbishop's arguments, while novel, must fail in the face of the law
and the dictates of the 1987 Constitution.
The laws simply speak of the "landowner" without qualification as to
under what title the land is held or what rights to the land the landowner
may exercise. There is no distinction made whether the landowner holds
"naked title" only or can exercise all the rights of ownership. Archbishop
would have us read deeper into the law, to create exceptions that are not
stated in PD 27 and RA 6657, and to do so would be to frustrate the
revolutionary intent of the law, which is the redistribution of agricultural
land for the benefit of landless farmers and farmworkers.
Archbishop was found to be the registered owner of the lands in
question, and does not contest that fact. For the purposes of the law, this
makes him the landowner, without the necessity of going beyond the
registered titles. He cannot demand a deeper examination of the
registered titles and demand further that the intent of the original owners
be ascertained and followed. To adopt his reasoning would create means of
sidestepping the law, wherein the mere act of donation places lands
beyond the reach of agrarian reform.
There can be no claim of more than one right of retention per
landowner. Neither PD 27 nor RA 6657 has a provision for a landowner to
exercise more than one right of retention. The law is simple and clear as to
the retention limits per landowner. PD 27 states, "In all cases, the
landowner may retain an area of not more than seven (7) hectares if such
landowner is cultivating such area or will now cultivate it"; while RA 6657
states:
SEC. 6. Retention Limits. Except as otherwise provided in this Act,
no person may own or retain, directly, any public or private agricultural
land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable
family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and
soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
(PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall the retention by the
landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to
each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that
he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the
land or directly managing the farm: Provided, That landowners whose lands
have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep
the area originally retained by them thereunder; Provided, further, That
original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the
original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the
same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
Nothing in either law supports Archbishop's claim to more than one
right of retention on behalf of each cestui que trust. The provisions of PD
27 and RA 6657 are plain and require no further interpretation there is
only one right of retention per landowner, and no multiple rights of
retention can be held by a single party. Furthermore, the scheme proposed
by Archbishop would create as many rights of retention as there are
beneficiaries, which could in effect protect the entire available land area
from agrarian reform. Under Archbishop's reasoning, there is not even a
definite landowner to claim separate rights of retention, and no specific
number of rights of retention to be claimed by the landowners. There is
simply no basis in the law or jurisprudence for his argument that it is the
"beneficial ownership" that should be used to determine which party would
have the right of retention.
Archbishop makes much of the conditional donation, that he does not
have the power to sell, exchange, lease, transfer, encumber or mortgage
the transferred properties. He claims that these conditions do not make
him the landowner as contemplated by the law. This matter has already
been answered in Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, Cebu City (Hospicio) v.
Department of Agrarian Reform. 11 In that case, wherein Act No. 3239
prohibited the sale under any consideration of lands donated to the
Hospicio, a charitable organization, the Court found that the lands of the
Hospicio were not exempt from the coverage of agrarian reform. In
characterizing the sale of land under agrarian reform, we stated:
Generally, sale arises out of contractual obligation. Thus, it must meet the
first essential requisite of every contract that is the presence of consent.
Consent implies an act of volition in entering into the agreement. The
absence or vitiation of consent renders the sale either void or voidable.
In this case, the deprivation of the Hospicio's property did not arise as a
consequence of the Hospicio's consent to the transfer. There was no
meeting of minds between the Hospicio, on one hand, and the DAR or the
tenants, on the other, on the properties and the cause which are to
constitute the contract that is to serve ultimately as the basis for the
transfer of ownership of the subject lands. Instead, the obligation to
transfer arises by compulsion of law, particularly P.D. No. 27. 12
We discussed further:
The twin process of expropriation under agrarian reform and the payment
of just compensation is akin to a forced sale, which has been aptly
described in common law jurisdictions as "sale made under the process of
the court and in the mode prescribed by law," and "which is not the
voluntary act of the owner, such as to satisfy a debt, whether of a
mortgage, judgment, tax lien, etc." The term has not been precisely
defined in this jurisdiction, but reference to the phrase itself is made in
Articles 223, 242, 237 and 243 of the Civil Code, which uniformly exempt
the family home "from execution, forced sale, or attachment." Yet a forced
sale is clearly different from the sales described under Book V of the Civil
Code which are conventional sales, as it does not arise from the
consensual agreement of the vendor and vendee, but by compulsion of
law. Still, since law is recognized as one of the sources of obligation, there
can be no dispute on the efficacy of a forced sale, so long as it is
authorized by law. 13
Archbishop's claim that he does not have jus disponendi over the
subject properties is unavailing. The very nature of the compulsory sale
under PD 27 and RA 6657 defeats such a claim. Other less scrupulous
parties may even attempt creating trusts to prevent their lands from
coming under agrarian reform, and say that the trustee has no power to
dispose of the properties. The disposition under PD 27 and RA 6657 is of a
different character than what is contemplated by jus disponendi, wherein
under these laws, voluntariness is not an issue, and the disposition is
necessary for the laws to be effective.
Under PD 27 and RA 6657, Archbishop cannot claim that the alleged
conditions of the donations would have primacy over the application of the
law. This forced sale is not even a violation of the conditions of the
donation, since it is by application of law and beyond Archbishop's control.
The application of the law cannot and should not be defeated by the
conditions laid down by the donors of the land. If such were allowed, it
would be a simple matter for other landowners to place their lands without
limit under the protection of religious organizations or create trusts by the
mere act of donation, rendering agrarian reform but a pipe dream.
Archbishop's contention that he is merely an administrator of the
donated properties will not serve to remove these lands from the coverage
of agrarian reform. Under PD 27, the coverage is lands devoted to rice and
corn. Section 4 of RA 6657 states, "The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided
in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands
of the public domain suitable for agriculture." The lands in Archbishop's
name are agricultural lands that fall within the scope of the law, and do not
fall under the exemptions.
The exemptions under RA 6657 form an exclusive list, as follows:
SEC. 10. Exemptions and Exclusions.
(a) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used for parks, wildlife, forest
reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds
and mangroves shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.
(b) Private lands actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn farms
and fishponds shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act: Provided,
That said prawn farms and fishponds have not been distributed and
Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) issued under the Agrarian
Reform Program.
In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have been subjected to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, by voluntary offer to sell, or
commercial farms deferment or notices of compulsory acquisition, a simple
and absolute majority of the actual regular workers or tenants must
consent to the exemption within one (1) year from the effectivity of this
Act. When the workers or tenants do not agree to this exemption, the
fishponds or prawn farms shall be distributed collectively to the worker-
beneficiaries or tenants who shall form cooperative or association to
manage the same.
In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have not been subjected to
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the consent of the farmworkers
shall no longer be necessary; however, the provision of Section 32-A hereof
on incentives shall apply.
(c) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be
necessary for national defense, school sites and campuses, including
experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for
educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot production
center, church sites and convents appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and
Islamic centers appurtenant thereto, communal burial grounds and
cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by the
inmates, government and private research and quarantine centers and all
lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already
developed, shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act. (As amended by
R.A. 7881)
Archbishop would claim exemption from the coverage of agrarian
reform by stating that he is a mere administrator, but his position does not
appear under the list of exemptions under RA 6657. His claimed status as
administrator does not create another class of lands exempt from the
coverage of PD 27 or RA 6657, and The Roman Catholic Apostolic
Administrator of Davao, Inc. 14 does not create another definition for the
term "landowner."
We explained in Hospicio:
It is axiomatic that where a general rule is established by a statute with
exceptions, the Court will not curtail nor add to the latter by implication,
and it is a rule that an express exception excludes all others. We cannot
simply impute into a statute an exception which the Congress did not
incorporate. Moreover general welfare legislation such as land reform laws
is to be construed in favor of the promotion of social justice to ensure the
well-being and economic security of the people. Since a broad construction
of the provision listing the properties exempted under the CARL would tend
to denigrate the aims of agrarian reform, a strict application of these
exceptions is in order. 15
Archbishop cannot claim exemption in behalf of the millions of Filipino
faithful, as the lands are clearly not exempt under the law. He should not
fear that his followers are simply being deprived of land, as under both PD
27 and RA 6657, he is entitled to just compensation, which he may then
use for the benefit of his followers. His situation is no different from other
landowners affected by agrarian reform they are somewhat deprived of
their land, but it is all for a greater good.
As Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform 16 recognized the revolutionary character of
the expropriation under the agrarian reform law, we follow such lofty ideal
for the resolution of this case. This grand purpose under the CARL must not
be hindered by the simple expedient of appending conditions to a donation
of land, or by donating land to a church. This is not to cast aspersions on
religious organizations, but it is not fitting for them to be used as vehicles
for keeping land out of the hands of the landless. The law is indubitably in
line with the charitable ideals of religious organizations to ensure that the
land they own falls into the hands of able caretakers and owners. As a
religious leader, Archbishop can take solace in the fact that his lands are
going to be awarded to those who need and can utilize them to the fullest.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM the February 4, 1999
Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 48282.
SO ORDERED.
People vs Donato
Facts: Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on
October 2, 1986 for acts committed before and after February 1986.
Private respondent filed with a Motion to Quash alleging that: (a) the facts
alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction over
the offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of
the defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished. This was denied. May 9, 1987 Respondent filed a petition for
bail, which was opposed that the respondent is not entitled to bail anymore
since rebellion became a capital offense under PD 1996, 942 and 1834
amending ART. 135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive
Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and
restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it
existed before the amendatory decrees. Judge Donato now granted the
bail, which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a condition that he shall
report to the court once every two months within the first ten days of every
period thereof. Petitioner filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration
indirectly asking the court to deny bail to and to allow it to present
evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the
accused will not comply with this main condition of his bail. It was
contended that:
1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an
escapee from detention when arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA)
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;
3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his
arrest and presented a Driver's License to substantiate his false identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a
false address;
5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared
owner whose identity and address were also found to be false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of
P250,000.00 was offered and paid for his arrest.
This however was denied. Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to bail.
Held: Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since
the crime is not a capital offense, therefore prosecution has no right to
present evidence. It is only when it is a capital offense that the right
becomes discretionary. However it was wrong for the Judge to change the
amount of bail from 30K to 50K without hearing the prosecution.
Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty
of reclusion perpetua to the crime of rebellion, is not applicable to the
accused as it is not favorable to him.
Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case (petition for habeas
corpus). Agreements were made therein: accused to remain under custody,
whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be
released immediately, with a condition that they will submit themselves in
the jurisdiction of the court. Said petition for HC was dismissed. Bail is the
security given for the release of a person in custody of the law. Ergo, there
was a waiver. We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the
constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to
the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order,
public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with
a right recognized by law.
PNB vs Nepomuceno
Facts: Petitioner PNB granted respondents 4 million pesos of credit line to
finance a movie project. The loan was secured by mortgages on
respondents real and personal properties. Respondents defaulted in their
obligation. Petitioner sought foreclosure of the mortgaged properties. The
auction sale was re-scheduled several times without need of republication
of the notice of sale.
Subsequently, the respondents filed an action for annulment of the
foreclosure sale claiming that such was void because, among others, there
was lack of publication of the notice of foreclosure sale.
The trail court ordered the annulment and set aside the foreclosure
proceedings. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the lower court.
Issue: Whether or not publication of foreclosure sale can be validly waived
by agreement of the parties.
Held: Act. No. 3135, as amended, governing extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgages on real property is specific with regard to the posting and
publication requirements of the notice of sale, to wit:
"Sec. 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less
than twenty days in at least three public places of the municipality or city
where the property is situated, and if such property is worth more than four
hundred pesos, such notice shall also be published once a week for at least
three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
municipality or city."
It is well settled that what Act No. 3135 requires is: (1) the posting of
notices of sale in three public places; and, (2) the publication of the same
in a newspaper of general circulation. Failure to publish the notice of sale
constitutes a jurisdictional defect, which invalidates the sale.
Petitioner, however, insists that the posting and publication requirements
can be dispensed with since the parties agreed in writing that the auction
sale may proceed without need of re-publication and re-posting of the
notice of sale.
The Supreme Court is not convinced. Petitioner and respondents have
absolutely no right to waive the posting and publication requirements of
Act No. 3135.
While it is established that rights may be waived, Article 6 of the Civil Code
explicitly provides that such waiver is subject to the condition that it is not
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

The principal object of a notice of sale in a foreclosure of mortgage is not

so much to notify the mortgagor as to inform the public generally of the
nature and condition of the property to be sold, and of the time, place, and
terms of the sale. Notices are given to secure bidders and prevent a
sacrifice of the property. Clearly, the statutory requirements of posting and
publication are mandated, not for the mortgagors benefit, but for the
public or third persons. In fact, personal notice to the mortgagor in
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not even necessary, unless
stipulated. As such, it is imbued with public policy considerations and any
waiver thereon would be inconsistent with the intent and letter of Act No.
3135.
RA 6657
Section 6. Retention Limits. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no
person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private
agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors
governing a viable family-size farm, such as commodity produced, terrain,
infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by
the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be
awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following
qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that
he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm: provided, that
landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27
shall be allowed to keep the areas originally retained by them thereunder:
provided, further, that original homestead grantees or their direct
compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the
approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to
cultivate said homestead.
The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or
contiguous, shall pertain to the landowner: provided, however, that in case
the area selected for retention by the landowner is tenanted, the tenant
shall have the option to choose whether to remain therein or be a
beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with similar or
comparable features.n case the tenant chooses to remain in the retained
area, he shall be considered a leaseholder and shall lose his right to be a
beneficiary under this Act.n case the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in
another agricultural land, he loses his right as a leaseholder to the land
retained by the landowner. The tenant must exercise this option within a
period of one (1) year from the time the landowner manifests his choice of
the area for retention.
In all cases, the security of tenure of the farmers or farmworkers on the
land prior to the approval of this Act shall be respected.
Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition, lease, management,
contract or transfer of possession of private lands executed by the original
landowner in violation of the Act shall be null and void: provided, however,
that those executed prior to this Act shall be valid only when registered
with the Register of Deeds within a period of three (3) months after the
effectivity of this Act. Thereafter, all Registers of Deeds shall inform the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) within thirty (30) days of any
transaction involving agricultural lands in excess of five (5) hectares.
8. How will the government acquire the landholdings?
There are different modes of acquiring and distributing public and private
agricultural lands. For private lands under compulsory acquisition, the DAR
will issue Notices of Coverage to the original owners of the landholdings.
Notices of Coverage will be issued to most of the landholdings by June 30,
2014.
9. What is a notice of coverage?
A Notice of Coverage (NOC) is a letter informing a landowner that his/her
land is covered by CARP, and is subject to acquisition and distribution to
beneficiaries. It likewise informs the landowner of his/her rights under the
law, including the right to retain 5 hectares.
10. After the period of time allotted for CARPER by law is passed (August 7,
2009 to June 30, 2014), how will the remaining landholdings, which are
subject to compulsory acquisition, be distributed to the beneficiaries?
As long as Notices of Coverage are issued on or before June 30, 2014, land
distribution to beneficiaries shall continue until completion, according to
Section 30 of CARPER (R.A. No. 9700). Meaning, even after CARPERs
deadline, the law itself mandates the concerned agencies to finish
distributing lands to the beneficiaries up to the very last hectare. This
assures to the farmers that the process for receiving their land will
continue (e.g., beneficiary identification, survey, generation, and
registration of land titles to beneficiaries).