Shemmesne fatuset Janean Acevedo Daniele Attorney at Law Sew aan anun BSRRERSLSSEsSeoRae EE JANEAN ACEVEDO DANIELS FILED mwa supenion count syeoney at Law, State Bar No. 145707 SSOUNTYO? SETA BARBARA tan. Santa Barbara, CA 93101 OCT 19 2004 i (8 63-4694 4 + (805) 564-2081 O89). BLAS ony OS Janeanesq@cox.net ee fer Attorney for Plaintiff CAROLINE LEAKAN _ AN f at : ae FN SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA ApH FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA Pry | CAROLINE LEAKAN, CASENO. 94460445 a i Plaintiff, COMPLAINT FOR: st | ve 1, Sex Discrimination in Violation | _. of Fair Employment and Housing C} Act (FEHA); i CKE RESTAURANTS, INC., a | Delaware Corporation; ANDY 2. Harassment on the Basis of SexigpoS! PUZDER, an individual; TED in Violation of FEHA; ABAJIAN, an individual; DENNIS LACEY, an individual; and a 3. Failure to Prevent DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Discrimination and Harassment ‘ In Violation of FEHA; Defendants. 4. Retaliation in Violation of FEHA; 5. Termination in Violation of Public Policy; 6. Violation of the California Equal Pay Act (Labor Code Section 1197.5) 7. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL ComplaintJanean Acevedo Daniels Atomey ot Law wwe a awe 10 uw 12 1B 4 15, 16 17 18 19 20 2 22 23 24 25 27 28 Plaintiff CAROLINE LEAKAN alleges: E NS 1. Plaintiff CAROLINE LEAKAN (“Plaintiff) is a resident of the City of Santa Barbara, County of Santa Barbara, California and is a woman, 2. The true names and capacities of DOES 1-50, whether individual, corporate, associate or otherwise are unknown to Plaintiff at this time, who therefore sues these defendants by such fictitious names, When the true names and capacities of such defendants are ascertained, Plaintiff will amend this complaint to insert the true names and capacities of said DOE defendants. 3. Defendant CKE RESTAURANTS, INC. (“Defendant” or “CKE”) is, and at all times pertinent hereto has been, @ corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, operating within the County of Santa Barbara, California, CKE is an "employer" as defined under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“the PEHA”), Government Code section 12926 et. seq. At all times pertinent to this complaint, Plaintiff was employed by the CKE. 4, Defendant ANDY PUZDER (““PUZDER") is an individual employed by CKB as its President and Chief Executive Officer. At all times as described herein, PUZDER was Plaintiff's supervisor as defined under the FEHA. 5. Defendant TED ABAJIAN (“ABAJIAN”) is an individual employed by CKE as its Chief Administrative Officer. At all times as described herein, ABAJIAN was Plaintiff’s supervisor as defined under the FEHA. 6. Defendant DENNIS LACEY (“LACEY”) is an individual formerly employed by CKE as its Chief Financial Officer. At all times as described herein, LACEY was Plaintiff's supervisor as defined under the FEHA. 7. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges that each defendant in this Complaint was, at all times mentioned, the agent, servant *2- ComplaintJanean Acevedo Daniels Atorey at Law 10 u 2 B “4 15 16 7 18 19 20 21 2 23 24 25 26 27 28 Cm a aw een and/or employee of CKE and was at all such times acting within the course and scope of said agency and/or employment. 8. Plaintiffis informed and believes and on that basis alleges that each defendant named as a DOE defendant is responsible for each and every act and obligation set forth in this complaint. E IN SUPPORT. AIMS. ortly After Beginni ent, Plainti jected Discrimination ai ostile Work Environment B cy By Her Supervis ce 9. In June 2002, Plaintiff was hired as CKE’s Vice President of Investor Relations. Plaintiff joined CKE at a critical point in its development. Although CKE had posted its first profitable quarter in several years shortly after Plaintiff was hired, the Hardee’s restaurant chain remained a trouble spot. In addition, the sudden termination of all but one member of the corporate, Carl’s Ir. and Hardee’s communications and public relations teams thrust considerable responsibility upon Plaintiff from the start. 10, Through carefully-crafted strategic efforts and hard work, Ms. Leakan helped CKE turn around unfavorable public opinion and investor community attitudes regarding the Hardee’s brand. Plaintiff also-successfully managed ongoing challenges related to aggressive pricing from leading industry competitors, unfavorable commodities pricing, and the “Mad Cow” crisis. While Plaintisf was praised for her capable handling of these and other difficult issues, she faced increasing obstacles and hostile treatment at CKE. 11, Shortly after joining CKE, Plaintiff informed her then-supervisor, Chief Financial Officer Dennis Lacey (“LACEY”), that she was pregnant. LACEY responded to Plaintiff's news by telling her that he would not be surprised if she failed to return to work after taking her maternity leave, and that he believed that women should “stay home with the kids,” as his wife had <3 ‘ComplaintJanean Acevedo Daniels Attorney at Law won ee ew ae 10 u 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 2 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 done. Plaintiff was shocked and offended by LACEY's comments. 12. Thereafter, LACEY continued to treat Plaintiffand other female employees ina hostile and demeaning manner, referring to Plaintiffand other womenas “stupid” and “an idiot,” using aloud and abusive tone of voice, rolling his eyes at Plaintiff’s comments, and becoming angry, annoyed and resentful whenever she took time away from work to visit her doctor for prenatal care, 13, AsPlaintiff’s delivery dateneared, LACEY madeit clear thathe expected her to continue handling her extensive workload without adjustment until the birth ofher child, including into her scheduled pregnancy leave, Over Plaintiff’s objections, LACEY required Plaintiff to handlea variety oftasks related to CKE’s third quarter earnings, including preparing an carnings press release on the day she went into labor with her daughter, and working onthe CKE2002 Annual Report during her pregnancy leave. Plaintiff ints to CKE’s -esident of Hw Resources Were Ignored 14, In early 2003, shortly after returning from her protected pregnancy leave, Plaintiff discussed her concerns about LACEY’s hostile and discriminatory actions with CKE Senior Vice President of Human Resources Victoria Straschil (“Straschil”) , with the expectation that Straschil would take appropriate action to investigate and remedy the situation 15, Plaintiff was stunned when, instead of attempting to gather more information about Plaintiff's concerns, Straschil told Plaintiff that she should do what Straschil had done when she was confronted with sexual discrimination and harassment at CKE: go to Chief Executive Officer Andy Puzder (“PUZDER”) and “threaten to quit” unless she was allowed to report to someone else. Straschil explained to Plaintiff that she had complained to PUZDER about “sexist” behavior by then Chief Administrative Officer Ted Abajian “4. ‘ComplaintJanean Acevedo Daniels ‘Attomey at Law Ce a aw aw DD 10 uw 12 13 4 15 16 7 18 19 20 2 22 23 24 25 26 27 (“ABAJIAN"), and told PUZDER that she would leave CKE unless arrangements were made for her to report to a different supervisor. 16. _ Inresponse, Plaintiff told Straschil that she could not threaten to resign from CKE in order to avoid further discrimination and harassment from LACEY because she was the main source of financial support for her family, and needed to keep her job. Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s reported concerns, Straschil took no action to investigate or address the discriminatory treatment or hostile work environment about which Plaintiffhad complained. 17, In April2003, when LACEY finally left CKE, President and CEO PUZDER remarked to Plaintiff“I’m sure you’re not sorry to see him go.” iff Was S cted to Sexually Ina jate and Humil! ction: d Com) ind Other CK) ale Executives 18. In addition to LACEY’s discriminatory actions toward Plaintiff based on her sex, including her pregnancy, childbirth and pregnancy and childbirth-related medical condition, Plaintiff endured sexual harassment from President and CEO PUZDER and other male executives, and a work environment that was degrading and hostile toward women. 19, Onmany occasions Plaintiff was subjected to lewd comments from male executives regarding CKE's sexually suggestive advertising campaigns. During viewings in Plaintiff's office of CKE’s television commercial featuring a voluptuous blond woman writhing on top of a mechanical bull in a sexual fashion, various male executives made sexually inappropriate comments as, “She’s hot,” and “Oooh baby, I'd like some of that.” The male executives wryly commented that they needed to remove themselves from the office because of their sexual reaction to the viewing of the commercial. Plaintiff, angry and humiliated by the comments, silently endured the behavior to avoid jeopardizing her position at CKE. 20, In October 2003, during the taping of an Entertainment Tonight “5: ConepaintDaniels Attorney at Law Bom ra avaun it 12 B 4 15 16 7 18 19 20 2 23 24 2s 26 27 28 (“ET”) segment highlighting a CKE campaign featuring Playboy founder Hugh Hefner which Plaintiff attended, President and CEO PUZDER repeatedly commented on the appearance and specific body parts of several ofthe Playboy “Bunnies” featured inthe campaign. In one exchange included in the final ET segment that aired on national television, PUZDER was heard asking one ofthe women about Hefner’s preferences for her wardrobe, to which she replied, “nothing.” Plaintiff found the campaign, and particularly, PUZDER’s comments, offensive and degrading to women. 21. When CKE’s sexually explicit and degrading advertising campaigns drew significant public criticism, Plaintiff was required to defend the campaigns, over her expressed objection to doing so. In response tothe thousands of complaints CKE received regarding the Hefner commercial, for example, PUZDER directed Plaintiffto issue a letter under her name written by him which defended the campaign. 22. In December 2003, ata CKE holiday party hosted by CEO PUZDER in December, PUZDER humiliated Plaintiffin front of her husband and colleagues by commenting upon a quote attributed to her in an Associated Press article regarding the controversy surrounding the Hefner campaign and chiding, “What do you mean we don’t use sex to sell? Of course we use sex to sell.” PUZDER repeated his statements several times in front of various CKE employees, laughing each timehe didso. 23, PUZDER’s inappropriate behavior continued to cause Plaintiff considerable discomfort and humiliation. In January 2004, PUZDER openly gazed up and down Plaintiff's body, asking her if she had “lost weight,” and telling her that she looked “really good.” PUZDER also made it ahabitof reaching downto his genitals and “adjusting himself” in front of Plaintiff. 24, OnFebruary 13,2004, Plaintiffarranged for aninvestor conference call with PUZDER, ABAJIAN, another male CKE executive, and Te ComplaintJanean Acevedo ‘Daniels Auomney at Law ee ee 10 it 12 13 4 15 16 7 18 19 20 a4 22 23 24 2s 26 2 28 herself, Shortly before the call was scheduled to begin, Plaintiffrealized that the usual conferencing facility was not working properly and that a regular phone would have to beused, At the start of the call, Plaintifftold PUZDER thathe would need to sit close to her so that investors could hear them clearly. Moving closer to Plaintiff, PUZDER replied in a sexual tone, “Oh, this could turnoutto bea very interesting call, very interesting!” 25, PUZDER frequently discussed his wife’s body in the office, and even commented upon his wife’s body dimensions during investor meetings. PUZDER also touched and rubbed his wife in an explicit, sexual manner in front of Plaintiffand other Company personnel during executive business trips. 26. Other male CKE executives also made sexually inappropriate and offensive comments to Plaintiff, Ona return flight from a corporate trip to St. Louis, Missouri, one male executive told Plaintiff thathe could not wait to get hometo “get laid.” The executive proceeded to discuss his sexual needs, including how often he needed to have sex. During a separate conversation in Plaintiff's office, the executive told Plaintiff ina sexually suggestive manner that he should have taken her on a recent vacation to Mexico with him to “help herrelax.” 27. Another male éxecutive repeatedly made lewd comments to Plaintiffabout women he found to be sexually appealing as he encountered them while conducting business, and in public. 28. InJanuary 2004, Plaintiffwas intimidated and humiliated by amale CKE executive who called her into his office and berated her for sending a memo to company managers urging caution in distributing information regarding employee terminations, calling the document the “stupidest fucking memo I’ve ever seen,” and describing Plaintiff's actions as “stupid, stupid, stupid.” ComplaintJanean Acevedo Daniels Astor at Law 2003, Plaintiff Was Assigned The Workload of Three Departin; KE Emplo m i in ilarly-Situated Male Executives Receiv Adjustments an: Merit Increases 29, In April 2003, LACEY resigned, and ABAJIAN became Plaintiff’s new supervisor and acting CFO. Shortly before LACEY left, he informed Plaintiff that three other CKE managers were slated for termination, and that she would be expected to handle their key job responsibilities in addition to her own. LACEY told Plaintiff that she would not be given any salary increase for the increased workload due to budgetary constraints, notwithstanding the additional responsibilities she was being assigned. 30. President and CEO PUZDER later confirmed LACEY’s statements in a meeting with Plaintiff in his office, telling Plaintiff that taking on the additional work responsibilities of her departing colleagues would be a “good move” for her within the organization, and that it would be in her “best interest” to do so to ensure job security, 31, In February 2003, the three executives were let go, and Plaintiff assumed their workload as directed by CKE. Plaintiff performed exceedingly well, notwithstanding the fact that CKE failed to increase her compensation to reflect her significant additional responsibility, and failed to provide an appropriate level of administrative support to address the numerous projects and corporate issues for which Plaintiff had become responsible. 32, In August 2003, CKE lifted the salary freeze that, accordingly to LACEY, had precluded any increase in salary for Plaintiff at the time she took on the additional workload described herein, On several occasions by email and phone, Plaintiff requested to meet with ABAJIAN to disouss her performance and request a salary adjustment commensurate with her inoreased level of responsibility. Plaintiff informed ABAJIAN that she also wanted to discuss key -8- ComplaintJanean Acevedo Daniels | Atiomey at Law Ce 10 u 12 B 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 2 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 strategic and budgetary issues, including the allocation of additional resources for the Plaintiff’s Investor Relations team. 33, In September 2003, Plaintifflearned that several male executives in CKE’s Finance Department in comparable positions to her own had received salary increases to compensate them for taking on the workload of a former female executive. In addition, the male employees had also been given merit increases on top of their salary adjustments. Plaintiff was given no increase in compensation during the same period, despite having taken on the workload of three departing CKE employees (and collectively, the entire Corporate Affairs Department). 34. After learning of the compensation disparity between herself and hermale colleagues, Plaintiffrenewed her efforts to meet with ABAJIAN to discuss her performance and compensation, When ABAJIAN didnot respond to her requests to meet, Plaintiff contacted his assistant, who scheduled meetings for Plaintiff and ABAJIAN ontwo different occasions, Both times, ABAJIAN abruptly cancelled the meetings without explanation. Plaintiffalso attempted to speak with ABAJIAN regarding compensation and budgetary issues via cell phone, and once while he was in her office. Both times, ABAJIAN saidthathe was not prepared to discuss the matters. 35. Although Plaintiff continued to request mectings with ABAJIAN in person, by phone, and by e-mail from August 2003 until her termination in February 2004, ABAJIAN repeatedly ignored her requests, and refused to meet with her. 36. Onatleast three occasions, Plaintiff discussed her frustrations regarding ABAJIAN’s failure to meet with her withregerdingher performance and compensation with Senior Vice President of Human Resources Straschil. Straschil told Plaintiff that she would look into the matter, butnever followed up to indicate whether she had done so. “9 ‘Complaintco 2 Ow ee 10 12 1B 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 2 2 2B 24 26 27 28 Janean Acevedo ‘Daniels ‘Attomey at Law 37. Plaintiff discussed her concerns regarding ABAJIAN’s refusal to ‘meet with her with PUZDER in January 2004. Plaintiffreported thatshehad been passed over for a merit increase without explanation, despite repeated requests for acompensation adjustment. Plaintiff further reported that the Investor Relations team did not have sufficient resources to handle the many responsibilities that had been assigned to it, and that deserving team members would not be eligible for raises or promotions as aresult of ABAJIAN’s refusal to speak with Plaintiff aboutsuch matters. 38, Inresponse, PUZDER indicated that he would explore the possibility ofa dual reporting relationship for Plaintiff. 39. In February 2004, Plaintiff again approached Straschil about her need to meet with ABAJIAN. Straschil curtly replied, “Don't count on Ted meeting with you to discuss your performance. He's not going to do it.” rtly After ti me it CKE’s Discriminatory Pa: B to Her Supervisor. Plaintifi erminated for Frivol Reasons 40. In the months preceding Plaintiff’s termination from CKE, her administrative assistant, Anne Hallock (“Hallock”), demonstrated a variety of performance problems, including failure to complete assigned tasks, failure to follow direction from Plaintiff, poor communication, organization, and time management skills, mistakes in her work, and hostile interactions with other employees and Company investors, At one point, Plaintiff discovered that Hallock was giving out draft 10-Q filings to the public in potential violation of securities regulations. 41. Plaintiff repeatedly counseled Hallock regarding her performance issues, and twice consulted Senior Vice President of Human Resources Straschil to enlist her assistance in addressing the problems. 42, Although Plaintiff continued to counsel and advise Hallock -10- ComplaintJaneen Acevedo Daniels Atorney at Law Ce aa ween 10 IL 12 13 4 15 16 7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 to regarding her performance, and researched and recommended specific training to assist her, Hallook’s performance and attitude continued to decline. Hallock became increasingly insubordinate to Plaintiff, repeatedly questioning, and eventually ignoring, Plaintiff*s communications and directives, and mishandling critical communications with CKE executives and other important job duties. 43. When Plaintiff finally informed Hallock that things were not working out, Hallock submitted a notice of resignation to Straschil without any further communications with Plaintiff. 44, On Friday, February 13, 2004, Plaintiff was preparing to leave the office when she noticed Hallock in a meeting with ABAJIAN and Straschil. Later that afternoon, Plaintiff called ABAJIAN from her car and asked why he had met with Hallock without first discussing the matter with her. 45. In response, ABAJIAN conferenced Straschil into the call and berated Plaintiff for several minutes for expressing her concerns regarding the Hallock situation. 46. When Plaintiff finally had the opportunity to speak, she asked ABAJIAN why he would speak directly with Hallock, who did not report to him, rather than to Plaintiff, who was Hallock’s supervisor, and ABAJIAN’s direct report, Plaintiff also questioned why ABAJIAN would promptly meet with Hallock under such circumstances when he had failed to meet with Plaintiff for nearly six months to address critical compensation and budgetary issues which she had repeatedly requested meetings with him to discuss. ABAJIAN dismissed Plaintiff's concerns, harshly replying, “What's the difference? I had to get someone's side of the story, so why not [Hallock’s]?” 47, In response, Plaintiff reiterated her request to meet with ABAJIAN to discuss her performance, and the need for'additional resources for her department and compensation for her team. Plaintiff emphasized the eae ComplaintJanean Acevedo Daniels Attorney at Law a wD Boma .au importance of addressing compensation in an equitable manner, given that several male executives had been given salary and merit increases while Plaintiff had not, and given the apparent disparity in compensation between herselfand her male colleagues, 48, AfterPlaintiffstated her concerns regarding the apparent compensation disparity between Plaintiffand male CKE executives, ABAJIAN became angry and repeatedly shouted “this conversation is over.” Reluctantly, Straschil and ABAJIAN agreed to meet with Plaintiff the following week regarding her reported concerns, although ABAJIAN stressed that such issues were not his “top priority.” 49. OnFebruary 17,2004, Plaintiff submitted adetailed e-mail to ABAJIAN and Straschil reiterating her concerns about the disparity in pay between herselfand several ofher male colleagues in CKE’s Finance Department, particularly in light of the many additional professional responsibilities she had been asked to assume when key personnel had left CKE in 2003. 50, Inthe February 17,2004 memo, Plaintiffapologized that her conversation with ABAJIAN and Straschil had been heated, and explained that shewas frustrated that ABAJIAN had not been able to meet with her regarding her performance review and professional development matters, Piaintiffwent onto describe in detail the numerous tasks she had successfully handled not only in her own position, but also on behalf of the three CKE employees whose responsibilities she had also taken on. 51. With regard to the pay disparity issue, Plaintiff's February 17, 2004 ‘memo noted that, after being told that her increased work responsibility “would notentail araise or apromotion dueto budgetary constraints,” she was surprised to learn that several of hermale colleagues in the Finance group had received a salary increase when a female executive left in 2003, and that the -2- ComplaintJanean Acevedo Danicle Astorney at Law eo a awaen 10 i 2 13 4 15 16 17 18 19 20 2. 2B 24 25 26 7 28 same male executives had received a merit increase the same year. Plaintiff noted that while she was “not questioning the capabilities of these individuals,” she was nonetheless “confused by the disparity in corporate practices” particularly given her accomplishments at CKE. Plaintiff reiterated, “I strongly believe that my accomplishments at CKE deserve appropriate recognition,” and again asked to discuss those accomplishments with ABAJIAN to permit him to “better understand [her] value and the value of [her] team.” 52. On February 19, 2004, Plaintiff met with ABAJIAN and Straschil to further discuss the issues raised by Plaintiff during their February 13, 2004 conference call, and in Plaintiff’s February 17, 2004 e-mail. With regard to Hallock, Plaintiff described Hallock’s continuing performance problems, and the numerous attempts she had made to counsel the struggling employee and help her improve her performance, all of which were already known to Straschil. 53, When the conversation turned to the issue of Plaintiff's compensation, Plaintiff again described her attempts to meet with ABAJIAN to discuss her performance and compensation, and reiterated her concerns regarding CKE’s disparate pay practices. As in her February 17, 2004 memo, Plaintiff noted that several male employees in CKE's finance group had received salary and merit increases in the Fall of 2003, while she, despite having assumed numerous additional responsibilities and excelling in her performance, hed not. Plaintiff complained that such practices were discriminatory, and told ABAJIAN and Straschil that she believed she had been denied a salary increase because she was a woman. 54, Straschil replied that Plaintiff “should not expect to get a raise every year,” and that CEO PUZDER did not want CKE employees to expect such increases. Plaintiff responded that she did not expect an automatic increase, and that she was seeking compensation which would fairly reflect her increasing Jevel of responsibility and performance, and which would be equivalent to that “13 ComplaintJanean Acevedo Daniels Attomey a Law Ce a aw A wD u 12 1B 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ofher male counterparts. Plaintiffalso questioned why, if PUZDER did not want employees to expect raises, the male Finance Department executives had been granted both salary and merit increases. 58. Inresponse to Plaintiff's concerns, ABAJIAN told her that she had a“problem” with the way she speaks to people. When Plaintiffasked whom, if anyone, had complained about her communication style, ABAJIAN replied that Hallock, and another CKE administrative assistant, made“a few” such complaints. When Plaintiffasked why ABAJIAN had never brought such complaints to her attention before, he had no response, other than to agree with Plaintiff that it was “convenient” that ABAJIAN had raised his alleged concern with her communication style for the first time in response to her request for equitable compensation. 56. The next morning, on February 20, 2004, ABAJIAN and Straschil entered Plaintiff"s office and abruptly terminated her employment based upon. “the way [she speaks] to people.” ABAJIAN then left Plaintifi’s office, while Straschil remained and asked Plaintiff to box up her things and leave. 57. Atnotimepriorto her termination did Plaintiffever receive any verbal or written complaints regarding her performance. Plaintiff’s personnel file as maintained by CKE contains no documentation or other evidence regarding any alleged problems or deficiencies with Plaintiff’s performance, nor any documentation or other evidence regarding concerns or complaints by other employees regarding Plaintiff. 58. OnAugust 19, 2004, Plaintiff filed complaints against CKE, PUZDER, ABAJIAN, and LACBY in connection with their wrongful actions as alleged herein with the Celifornia Department of Fair Employment and Housing (hereinafter, "DFEH"). True and correct copies of the complaint are attached hereto collectively as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein. 59. OnSeptember7, 2004, DFEH issued PlaintiffNotices of Case -14- ComplaintJanean Acevedo Daniels Attomey at Law we aan nun 10 1 12 1B 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 2 23 25 26 27 28 Closure in connection with her complaints of discrimination which give Plaintiff the right to file a private lawsuit based on the allegations contained therein against the named parties. True and correct copies of the notices are attached hereto collectively as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein, FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION (Sexual Discrimination In Violation of FEHA [Govt. Code §12940(a)] Against CKE and DOES 1-50) 60. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates herein Paragraphs 1 through 59 as though set forth in full. 61. CKB’s and DOES 1-50's wrongful and discriminatory actions against Plaintiff as alleged herein, including but not limited to CKE’s disparate compensation practices, and the abrupt and unjustified termination of Plaintiff's employment, constitute unlawful employment discrimination on account of Plaintiff's sex, including her pregnancy, childbirth and pregnancy- and childbirth-related medical condition, in violation of Government Code §12940(a). 62. Asa proximate result of Defendants" wrongful and discriminatory conduct, Plaintiff has been harmed in that she has suffered a substantial loss of earnings, compensation, employment-related opportunities, and other employment bonefits, and has suffered damages in an amount that will be shown according to proof at the time of trial. 63. Asa further proximate result of Defendants’ wrongful acts, Plaintiff has incurred, and will continue to incur, medical and related expenses in an amount to be shown according to proof at the time of trial. 64, Asa further proximate result of Defendants' wrongful actions against Plaintiff, Plaintiff has suffered humiliation, harm to her personal and professional reputation, mental anguish, and emotional and physical injury in -15- ‘ComplaintJanean Acevedo Daniels Astomey at Law we oN em ao 10 ry 12 B 4 15 16 7 18 19 20 an 2 23 25 26 7 28 an amount to be shown according to proof at the time of trial. 65. Defendants’ discriminatory and harassing actions as alleged herein were done with malice, fraud, or oppression, were despicable, and were made in conscious disregard of Plaintiff's rights, dignity, and well-being, thoreby supporting an award of punitive damages against CKE and DOES 1-50 to Plaintiff. SECOND OF CAUSE OF ACTION (Harassment on the Basis of Sex In Violation of FEHA [Govt. Code §12940(j)] Against All Defendants) 66. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates herein Paragraphs 1 through 59 as though set forth in full, 67. Defendants, and/or their agents and/or employees, engaged in the wrongful actions described above herein, with the intent of harassing Plaintiff on account of her sex in violation of Government Code §12940(j)(1). 68. -The unwelcome harassment of Plaintiff as described herein by Defendants was based on Plaintiff's sex, including her pregnancy, childbirth and pregnancy- and childbirth-related medical condition, and/or was sexually offensive. ‘The harassment was 60 pervasive that it altered the condition of Plaintiff's employment and created a hostile, abusive, and intimidating working environment. 69. CKBis strictly liable for the wrongful actions described herein committed by PUZDER, LACEY, and ABAJIAN because, at all times pertinent to Plaintiff’s complaint, PUZDER, LACEY, and ABAJIAN were Plaintiff's supervisors. 70. Asaproximate result of Defendants' harassment, Plaintiff has suffered physical and mental injury, humiliation, damage and harm in an amount to be shown according to proof at the time of trial. -16- ‘ComplaintJanesn Acevedo Daniels Attorney at Law Sen aan vn un 12 13 4 15 16 7 18 19 20 a1 2 23 4 25 26 7 28 7\. Asa further proximate result of Defendants’ harassment, Plaintiff has incurred, and will continue to incur, medical and related expenses in an amount to be shown according to proof at the time of trial. 72, Defendants’ discriminatory and harassing actions as alleged herein were done with malice, fraud, or oppression, were despicable, and were made in conscious disregard of Plaintiff's rights, dignity, and well-being, thereby supporting an award of punitive damages against CKE, PUZDER, LACEY, ABAJIAN and DOES 1-50 to Plaintiff. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION (Failure to Prevent Sexual Discrimination and Harassment In Violation of FEHA (Govt. Code §12940(k)] Against Defendant CKE and DOES 1-50) 73.. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates herein Paragraphs 1 through 59 as though set forth in full, 74. Atall relevant times herein, Government Code section 12940(k) of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, was in full force and offect and binding upon defendants pursuant to Government Code section 12926(4). ‘This subsection requires defendant CKE and DOES 1-50 to take all reasonable steps necessary to provent discrimination and harassment from occurring. 75. Asalleged above, CKE failed to take ail reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment on the basis of sex from occurring at CKE, and in addition, terminated Plaintiff shortly after she raised concerns about unlawful discrimination. 76, Asaproximate result of Defendants’ wrongful conduct, Plaintiff has been harmed in that she has suffered a substantial loss of carnings, compensation, employment-related opportunities, and other employment benefits, and has suffered damages in an amount that will be shown according to -17- ‘ComplaintJenean Acevedo Daniels Automey at Law ee a aw bh wD 10 WW 2 13 4 15 16 7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 proof at the time of trial. 77. Asa further proximate result of Defendants’ wrongful acts, Plaintiff has incurred, and will continue to incur, medical and related expenses in an amount to be shown according to proof at the time of trial 78. Asa further proximate result of Defendants' wrongful actions against Plaintiff, Plaintiff has suffered humiliation, harm to her personal and professional reputation, mental anguish, and emotional and physical injury in an amount to be shown according to proof at the time of trial. 79. Defendants’ wrongful actions as alleged herein were done with malice, fraud, or oppression, were despicable, and were made in conscious disregard of Plaintiff's rights, dignity, and well-being, thereby supporting an award of punitive damages against CKE and DOES 1-50 to Plaintiff. FO CAU! TIO: (Retaliation In Violation of FEHA [Govt, Code §12940(h)] Against CKE, PUZDER, ABAJIAN, and DOES 1-50) 80. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates herein Paragraphs 1 through 59 as though set forth in full. 81. Defendants’ adverse employment actions against Plaintiff as alleged herein after Plaintiff repeatedly reported and opposed Defendants” discriminatory and harassing actions toward Plaintiff, including but not limited to Defendants’ abrupt and unjustified termination of Plaintiff’s employment, constitute unlawful retaliation in violation of Government Code §12940(h) 82. Asa proximate result of Defendants’ retaliatory conduct, Plaintiff has been harmed in that she has suffered a substantial loss of earnings, compensation, employment-related opportunities, and other employment benefits, and has suffered damages in an amount that will be shown according to -18- ComplaintJanean Acevedo Daniels Attomey at Law proof at the time of trial. 83. Asa further proximate result of Defendants’ wrongful acts, Plaintiff has incurred, and will continue to incur, medical and related expenses in an amount to be shown according to proof at the time of trial. 84, Asa further proximate result of Defendants’ wrongful actions against Plaintiff, Plaintiff has suffered humiliation, harm to her personal and professional reputation, mental anguish, and emotional and physical injury in an amount to be shown according to proof at the time of trial. 85. Defendants’ wrongful actions as alleged herein were done with malice, fraud, or oppression, were despicable, and were made in conscious disregard of Plaintiff's rights, dignity, and well-being, thereby supporting an award of punitive damages against CKE, PUZDER, ABAJIAN, and DOES 1-50 to Plaintiff. Ei Cal FAC (Termination In Violation of Public Policy Against CKE) 86. Plaintiff re-alloges and incorporates herein Paragraphs 1 through 59 as though set forth in full. 87. CKB’s termination of Plaintiff's employment after Plaintiff complained of discriminatory compensation practices and a hostile work environment which she actually and reasonably believed constituted violations of law constitutes termination in violation of fundamental public policy, including but not limited to the public policy reflected in the statutes and regulations specified in the Fair Employment and Housing Act, Government Code Section 12920 et seq., the California Constitution, and other statutory and regulatory provisions of this State. 88. Asa proximate result of CKE’s termination of Plaintiff in viplation of public policy, Plaintiff has been harmed in that she has suffered a -19- ComplaintJanean Acevedo ‘Daniele Avtomey at Law "1 12 3B 4 15 16 7 18 19 20 2 23 24 25 26 27 28 . us i) substantial loss of earnings, compensation, employment-related opportunities, and other employment benofits, and has suffered damages in an amount that will be shown according to proof at the time of trial. 89. Asa further proximate result of Defendants’ wrongful acts, Plaintiffhas incurred, and will continue to incur, medical and related expenses in an amount to be shown according to proof at the time of trial. 90. Asafurther proximate result of Defendants’ wrongful actions against Plaintiff, Plaintiffhas suffered humiliation, harm toher personal and professional reputation, mental anguish, and emotional and physical injury in an amount to be shown according to proofat the time of trial. 91, Defendants’ wrongful actions as alleged herein were done with malice, fraud, or oppression, were despicable, and were made in conscious disregard of Plaintiff's rights, dignity, and well-being, thereby supporting an award of punitive damages against CKE and DOES 1-50 to Plaintiff. s AU! ION (Violation of California’s Equal Pay Act, Labor Code Section 1197: Against CKE and DOES 1-50) 92, Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates herein Paragraphs 1 through 59 as though set forth in full. 93. Asalleged herein, CKE and DOES 1-50 failed to compensate Plaintiff, a female employee, the average wage paid to male employees within the same establishment who were performing equal jobs that required equal skill, effort and responsibility, and that were performed under similar working conditions. 94. Asa proximate result of Defendants’ wrongful acts, Plaintiff hes suffered a substantial loss of earnings, compensation, -20- ‘ComplaintJanemn Acevedo Deniels ‘Attorey st Law See aannrevn ul 2 B 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 employment-related opportunities, and other employment benefits, and has suffered damages in an amount that will be shown according to proof at the time of trial. 95. As a further proximate result of Defendants’ wrongful acts, Plaintiff has incurred, and will continue to incur, medical and related expenses in an amount to be shown according to proof at the time of trial. 96. Asa further proximate result of Defendants’ wrongful actions against Plaintiff, Plaintiff has suffered humiliation, harm to her personal and professional reputation, mental anguish, and emotional and physical injury in an amount to be shown according to proof at the time of trial. 97. Defendants’ wrongful actions against Plaintiff also support an award of liquidated damages according to proof at the time of trial, EVENT) tonal (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Against All Defendants) 98. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates herein Paragraphs 1 through 59 as though set forth in full. 99. In committing the wrongful actions described herein, Defendants acted intentionally and maliciously and for the purpose of causing Plaintiff to suffer humiliation, harm to her professional reputation, mental anguish, and emotional and physical injury. Defendants committed such wrongful acts against Plaintiff with knowledge that her emotional and physical injury would thereby increase, and did so with a wanton and reckless disregard of the consequences to Plaintiff. As a further proximate result of Defendants” wrongful acts, Plaintiff has incurred, and will continue to incur, medical and related expenses in an amount to be shown according to proof at the time of trial. 100. Asa further proximate result of Defendants’ wrongful actions <2 ComplaintJInnean Acevedo Daniels Attomey at Law Camera ane aon 10 uw 2 13 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 21 2 23 24 25 26 2 28 against Plaintiff, Plaintiff has suffered humiliation, harm to her personal and professional reputation, mental anguish, and emotional and physical injury in an amount to be shown according to proof at the time of trial. 101. Defendants’ wrongful actions as alleged herein were done with malice, fraud, or oppression, were despicable, and were made in conscious disregard of Plaintiff's rights and physical and emotional well-being, thereby supporting an award of punitive damages to Plaintiff. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgement against Defendants as follows: 1. For general damages according to proof; 2. For special damages according to proof; 3. For liquidated damages against defendant CKE and DOES 1-50 as provided under Labor Code Section 1197.5; 4. For punitive damages against defendants and DOES 1-50 inan amount appropriate to punish Defendants for their wrongful conduct and set an example for others; 5. For reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to Government Code 12965(b); 6. For pre-judgment interest on the sum of damages awarded; 7. For costs of suit inourred herein; and 8. For such other and further relief as the Court deems proper. -2- ComplaintSEED MACKALL LLP 1332 ANACAPA STREET, SUITE 200 POST OFFICE BOX 2578 SANTA BARBARA, CALIFORNIA 95120 ‘TELEPHONE: (805) 965-0669 FILED TBLBFAX: (605) 962-1404 enone Peter A Umott, Bar No. 091220 IAT of CALIFORNIA ‘Alan D, Condren, Bar No. 180624 COUNTYOF SANTA BARBARA Atlomeys for Defendants CRE RESTAURANTS ING. NOV ¥ ‘ANDY PUZDER, TED ABAJIAN, and DENNIS LACEY, Eh se 5yeeQLormcen, SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA, ANACAPA DIVISION CAROLINE LEAKAN, Case No. 01160115 Plaintiff, (Assigned For All Purposes to the Honorable Thomas P, Anderle) vs, ANSWER TO UNVERIFIED CKE RESTAURANTS, INC., a Delaware COMPLAINT Corporation; ANDY PUZDER, an individual; TED ABAJIAN, an individual; DENNIS LACEY, an individual; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants, Wager (72S COME NOW Defendants CKE Restaurants, Inc. ("CKE"), Andy Puzder, Ted Abajian , and Dennis Lacey (sometimes collectively referred to herein as "Defendants"), and for themselves alone, and for no other defendants, answer the unverified Complaint filed by Plaintiff Ceroline Leakan as follows: GENERAL DENIAI 1. Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 431.30, Defendants generally and specifically deny each and every allegation of Plaintiff's unverified Complaint, and further specifically deny that Plaintiff has been damaged in the sums alleged, or in any other sum, or at all. Defendants also plead the following separate defenses to the Complaint: Ww 1 "ANSWER TO UNVERIFIED COMPLAINT4 See waunun i 12 13 4 15 16 WwW 18 19 2 23 24 25 26 21 28 2. The Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against these answering Defendants, SECOND SEPARATE DEFENSE 3, Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and/or has otherwise has failed to comply with all of the statutory prerequisites to bringing suit as set forth in California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Goverment Code § 12900, et seq. HIRD SEPARATE DEFENSE. 4. The Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, fails to state a cause of action because any alleged act or conduct of purported harassment was not unwelcome, FOURTH SEPARATE DEFENSE 5, ‘The Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, is barred because any actions taken with respect {o Plaintiff's employment were based on legitimate, non- discriminatory and non-retaliatory business considerations, HIFTH SEPARATE DEFENSE 6. The Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, fails to state a cause of action because any alleged act or conduct of purported harassment was consented to, atid willingly participated in, by Plaintiff. BSP EPARATE DEFENSE 7. ‘The Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, is barred because the conduct complained of was not offensive or hostile from Plaintif’s perspective, or from the perspective of a reasonable person. SEVENTH SEPARATE DEFENSE 8, If Plaintiff sustained any loss, injury, damage, or detriment as alleged in the Complaint, the amount of her recovery for any such loss, injury, damage, or detriment must be reduced because Plaintiff has failed to mitigate her damages. at ui 2 "ANSWER TO UNVERIFIED COMPLAINTSow waunun uw 12 13 4 16 7 18 19 20 2 2 23 24 25 26 27 2B EIGHTH SEPARATE DEFENSE 9. IfPlaintiff sustained any Joss, injury, damage, ot detriment as alleged in the Complaint the loss, injury, damage, or detriment was caused and contributed to by the actions of Plaintiff, and Plaintiff's damages, if any, should be reduced in proportion to the percentage of Plaintiff's negligence or in proportion to her fault. NINTH SEPARATE DEFENSE 10. ‘The Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, is barred because Plaintiff willfully breached her duties as an employee in the course of her employment in violation of the California Labor Code. TENTH SEPARATE DEFENSE 11, The Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, is barred because Plaintiff's employment was terminable at will, with or without cause. ELEVE} TE. 12. . The Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, fails to state cause of action because Plaintiff failed to comply substantially with all of the directions of her ‘employer concerning the services for which she was engaged, and such obedience was neither impossible nor unlawful, and it did not impose new and unreasonable burdens on Plaintiff. WELFTH SEPARATE DEFENSE: 13, The Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, is barred because Plaintiff breached any agreement, contract, covenant, or duty which might be found to exist THIRT! iPARATE DEFENSE 14, The Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, are barred because the alleged conduct complained of was protected by the manageri FO 1H SEPARATE DEFEN: privilege. 15, Any and all of Defendants’ actions as alleged in the Complaint were taken in good faith, and in a fair and equitable manner so as to bar each and all of the eauses of action of the Complaint. None of Defendants’ conduct or acts were intolerable or outrageous, but instead were 3 ‘ANSWER TO UNVERIFIED COMPLAINTabsolutely privileged and/or qualifiedly privileged and/or proper and taken in accordance with Defendants’ rights and privileges afforded by statute and/or pursuant to Defendant CKE’s policies regarding its relationship with employees such as Plaintiff. ‘TETEENTH SEI EB. ENSE 16. To the extent that the Complaint and any purported cause of action contained therein is based on any statement by Defendants, itis barred by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and by Article I, Section 2 of the California Constitution, SIXTEENTH SEPARATE DEFENSE 17, Any damage resulting to Plaintiff is the result of Plaintiff's failure to perform her services in conformity to the usage of the place of performance as required by the California Labor Code. SEVENTEENTH SEPARATE DEFENSE 18 The Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, is barred because any alleged damage to Plaintiff was the result of her failure to use ordinary care and diligence in the performance of her employment. EIG] SEPAI 3FENSE 19, ‘The Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, fails to state {acts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendants because the injuries and damages allegedly sustained by Plaintiff, if any, were not the result of any acts, omissions, or other conduct, of Defendants. NINETEENTH SEPARATE DEFENSE 20, Plaintiff, by reason of her own conduct and actions, has waived the right, if any, to assert the claims in the Complaint and each and every purported cause of action contained therein. WENTIETH SEPARATE DEFENSE 21. Plaintiff is estopped by her own actions and conduct from pursuing the claims in the Complaint and all purported causes of action contained therein. ae uw 4 ‘ANSWER TO UNVERIFIED COMPLAINTa auwe wn 10 i 12 13 4 15 16 W7 18 19 20 a 2 2B 4 25 26 27 28 WE) I EPARATE DI E 22, The Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, is barred by the doctrine of unclean hands, WENTY-SECOND SEPARATE DEFENSE 23, To the extent that Plaintifi's claim for damages for physical, mental, or emotional injuries purportedly suffered as a result of matters arising out of and in the course and scope of the employment relationship, any such claim is barred by the exclusivity provision of the California Workers’ Compensation Act. TWENTY- SEP, E DEFENSE 24, Plaintiff is barred from, and has waived, any recovery for any physical, mental, or ‘emotional injuries purportedly suffered as a result of matters arising out of and in the course and scope of the employment relationship, to the extent that she has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under the California Workers’ Compensation Act, TI J \RATE DE ISI 25. Plaintiff is not entitled to recover any compensatory or other monetary damages for the alleged loss of certain benefits because her sole and exclusive remedy, if any, is under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). TWENTY-FIFTH SEPARATE DEFENSE 26. The Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, fails to set forth facts sufficient to constitute a claims for exemplary or punitive damages pursuant to California Civil Code § 3294, TWENTY-SIXTH SEPARATE DEFENSE 27. Defendants are not liable for exemplary or punitive damages because they did not, ‘commit any alleged oppressive, willful, fraudulent, or malicious acts, did not authorize or ratify any such acts, have advance knowledge of the unfitness of any employee or employees who allegedly committed such acts, or employ any such employee or employees with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. We ANSWER TO UNVERIFIED COMPLAINTSoeywr sun wrn ul 12 2B 4 15 16 W 18 19 20 2 2 23 24 25 26 27 28 ‘WENTY-SEVENTH SEPARATE DEFENSE 28, Plaintiff is not entitled to recover any exemplary or punitive damages as prayed for in the Complaint, on the grounds that any award of exemplary or punitive damages in general or any such award as applied to the facts of this action would violate Defendants’ constitutional rights under provisions of the United States and/or California Constitutions, including, but not limited to, the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and/or Article I, Section VII of the California Constitution, and/or the Bighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. TWENTY-EIGHTH SEPARATE DEFENSE 29, Plaintiff's Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, is barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, including but not limited to, Government Code § 12960, Code of Civil Procedure § 335.1, Code of Civil Procedure § 337, and Code of Civil Procedure § 339. TWENTY-NINTH SEPARATE DEFENSE 30. Plaintiffs Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, is barred by reason of evidence of Plaintifi’s misconduct acquired after her employment with CKE was terminated. WHEREFORE, Defendants pray for judgment against Plaimtifas follows: 1. That Plaintiff take nothing by way of her Complaint and that the Complaint, and each purported cause of! ‘action contained therein, be dismissed with prejudice as against Defendants; 2. That judgment be entered in favor of Defendants; 3, ‘That Defendants be awarded their reasonable attomneys' fees and costs incurred in this action; and Wee we uw wt 6 "ANSWER TO UNVERIFIED COMPLAINT4. For such other relief as the Court deems proper. DATED: November _/ A, 2004, Alan D. Condren ‘Attorneys for Defendants CKE RESTAURANTS, INC., ANDY PUZDER, ‘TED ABAJIAN, and DENNIS LACEY 7 "ANSWER TO UNVERIFIED COMPLAINTa aweon 10 uw 12 13 14 is 16 7 18 19 20 a 2 23 24 25 26 27 28 iF RVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA: Tam employed in the County of Santa Barbara, State of California. 1 am over the age of 18 years and not a party to the within action; my business address is 1332 Anacapa Strect, Suite 200, Santa Barbara, CA 93101, On November 12, 2004 I served the foregoing document described as ANSWER TO UNVERIFIED COMPLAINT on interested partes in this action by placing tue copies thereot enclosed in sealed envelopes addressed as stated on the attached Service List; X_ by placing _ the original X_ a true copy thereof enclosed in sealed envelope(s) addressed as follows: Janean Acevedo Daniels ‘Attomey at Law 505 Bath Street Santa Barbara, CA 93101 (BY MAIL) I deposited such envelope in the mail at Santa Barbara, California, The * envelope was mailed with postage thercon fully prepaid. _X BY MAIL) Tam “readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Santa Barbara, California in the ordinary course of business, I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after Gate of deposit for mailing in affidavit. (BY PERSONAL SERVICE) 1 delivered such envelope by hand to the offices of the addressee. X_ (State) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. Executed on November 12, 2004, at Santa Barbara, California. Julie Yoarra FAPAUICKE Leshan lending opt 8 ‘ANSWER TO UNVERIFIED COMPLAINT("nee Keren De Ey GEN Teron Oi) Or ‘seme aa SSE St ‘Santa Barbara, CA 93101 E I L _AvroRNay FoR (one: Caroline Leakan RSA ng ALOR ‘Santa Barbara Superior Court, Anacapa Division. PrANTiFFPeTiTIONeR: Caroline Leakan eee DEC 23 2004 erenoanrmmesronoent: CKB Restaurants, Ine, Andy Puzder, ‘Ted Abajian, and Dennis Lacey, DOES 1-50 SOX REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL {1 Personal injury, Property Damage, oF Wrongful Death ae olor Veicle other 2 Ea eevee eee 1160115 8 Cope (2 Family Law a Eminent Domain Other (specify: Employment = Kconformed copy will not be returned by the clerk unless a method of retumn Is provided with the document, — 1 & 4, TO THE CLERK: Please dismiss this action as follows; aT a. (4) GZ] With prejudice (2) (J Without prejudice 200 ». (LZ) coment 2)[ Pettion 7 {@) [a] Croce compat ed by (rare on (cat: {@)() Grosscompain fled by (amo) oo amt LLoboo {CZ enue acton ofl pare ard at causes of acon (©) Other (epecity)* Date: December 2}, 2004 ‘encom rawr nave oF (if artonvey C] PaRrywbcoTanrom iris regents of pes patos ot, of peed ces ‘Seon. ocr spaanac cose comelores ms sit ad ony FReporie.caumel noe, or cosvecrpldis abe dares, Croséécomplainant 2.70 THE CLERK; Consent tothe atove dismissal s hereby given" Date: aaa “iar Crone Essar wife Doman Regan (ety in) snr ene ta Peres be cacy searcmpanen (upon ua ‘Spt Cesnresa by colo Sarena con 2°) ah (To bo compioted by cet) 3. (EP dismissal entered as requested on (date: 4 a Dismissal entered on (date): 8 ‘Atiorney or paty without attorney for: {2 PiainitvPettioner [| DetendantRespondent [5 cross-complainant DEC 2 3 2006 ‘as to only (name): Dismissal not entered as roquasted forthe folowing reasons (speoiy: ME er EG dd a b. Altamey or pety without stor (a copy to contorm DEC 23 2 dis ec ary ‘means ta relum conformed copy ARV M, . eee ark, by