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NewLex: Laws-15th Congress
o NewLex: Laws-14th Congress (Republic Act Nos. 9496 to 10146)
o Laws-13th Congress (Republic Act Nos. 9333 to 9482)
o Laws-8th Congress (Republic Act Nos. 6636 to7638)
April 2012 Philippine Supreme Court

Decisions on Criminal Law and Procedure
Posted on May 21, 2012 by Dominador Maphilindo O. Carrillo Posted in Criminal
Law, Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law Tagged dangerous
drugs, estafa, evidence, murder, preliminary investigation, probable
cause, rape, theft, treachery
Here are select April 2012 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on criminal
law and procedure:
1. REVISED PENAL CODE
Composite crime; defined. The felony of rape with homicide is a composite crime. A
composite crime, also known as a special complex crime, is composed of two or more
crimes that the law treats as a single indivisible and unique offense for being the
product of a single criminal impulse. It is a specific crime with a specific penalty
provided by law and differs from a compound or complex crime under Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code, which states that [w]hen a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing
the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period. People v. Villaflores,G.R. No. 184926, April 11, 2012.
Composite crime and compound crime differentiated. There are distinctions between a
composite crime, on the one hand, and a complex or compound crime under Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand. In a composite crime, the composition
of the offenses is fixed by law; in a complex or compound crime, the combination of
the offenses is not specified but generalized, that is, grave and/or less grave, or one
offense being the necessary means to commit the other. For a composite crime, the
penalty for the specified combination of crimes is specific; for a complex or
compound crime, the penalty is that corresponding to the most serious offense, to be
imposed in the maximum period. A light felony that accompanies a composite crime is
absorbed; a light felony that accompanies the commission of a complex or compound
crime may be the subject of a separate information. People v. Villaflores, G.R. No.
184926, April 11, 2012.
Criminal liability; effect of death pending appeal. On 29 July 2009, a Notice of

Appeal was filed by Brillantes through counsel before the Supreme Court. While this
case is pending appeal, the Prisons and Security Division Officer-in-Charge informed
the Court that accused-appellant Brillantes died while committed at the Bureau of
Corrections on 3 January 2012 as evidenced by a copy of death report signed by New
Bilibid Prison Hospitals Medical. Hence, the issue here is the effect of death pending
appeal of the conviction of accused-appellant Brillantes with regard to his criminal
and pecuniary liabilities. People of the Philippines v. Saturnino Dela Cruz, et al., G.R.
No. 190610, April 25, 2012.
Criminal liability; effect of death pending appeal. The Revised Penal Code is
instructive on the matter. It provides in Article 89(1) that criminal liability is totally
extinguished by the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment. It is plain that both the personal penalty of
imprisonment and pecuniary penalty of fine of Brillantes were extinguished upon his
death pending appeal of his conviction by the lower courts. There is no civil liability
involved in violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. No
private offended party is involved as there is in fact no reference to civil liability in
the decision of the trial court. The appeal of Brillantes culminating in the
extinguishment of his criminal liability, however, does not have any effect on his co-
accused De la Cruz who did not file a notice of appeal. People of the Philippines v.
Saturnino Dela Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 190610, April 25, 2012.
Criminal liability; extinguishment by death. In a Decision dated May 9, 2006, the

Court of Appeals affirmed appellants conviction with modification, increasing the
award of indemnity from P40,000.00 to P50,000.00. It likewise awarded moral
damages in favor of AAA in the amount of P50,000.00. However, appellant died on
December 4, 2004. Nonetheless, the Public Attorneys Office still appealed the
aforesaid Court of Appeals Decision to the Supreme Court. Appellants death during
the pendency of his appeal before the Court of Appeals extinguished not only his
criminal liability for the crime of rape committed against AAA, but also his civil
liability solely arising from or based on said crime. People of the Philippines v.
Nelson Bayot y Satina, G.R. No. 200030, April 18, 2012.
Criminal liability; extinguishment by death. Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, specifically provides the effect of death of the accused on his criminal, as
well as civil, liability. It reads thus: Criminal liability is totally extinguished: (1) By
death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before
final judgment. . . It is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as the civil liability ex delicto.
The rationale, therefore, is that the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there
is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for
recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the
criminal case. People of the Philippines v. Nelson Bayot y Satina, G.R. No. 200030,
April 18, 2012.
Murder; treachery. The stabbing of Alfredo by Samson was qualified by treachery.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. In order for treachery to be properly
appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was
not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately
adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him. The
essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the
unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby
ensuring its commission without risk to himself. Here, while it is true that the attack
on Alfredo was frontal, the same was so sudden and unexpected. Alfredo was
completely unaware of the imminent peril to his life. Alfredo was walking to meet
Samson, expecting that they would only talk. Alfredo was unarmed while Samson
had a knife. Alfredo was deprived of the opportunity to defend himself and repel
Samsons attack. Clearly, treachery attended Samsons stabbing to death of Alfredo,
hence, qualifying the crime to murder. People of the Philippines v. Samson
Escleto, G.R. No. 183706, April 25, 2012.
Qualified theft; elements. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain,
but without violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall
take the personal property of another without the latters consent. If committed with
grave abuse of confidence, the crime of theft becomes qualified. In prcis, qualified
theft punishable under Article 310 in relation to Articles 308 and 309 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) is committed when the following elements are present: (1) taking
of personal property; (2) that the said property belongs to another; (3) that the said
taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that it be done without the owners consent; (5)
that it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons,
nor of force upon things; and (6) that it be done with grave abuse of confidence. Here,
the first and second elements are unquestionably present. The money involved is the
personal property of Trias employer, PNB. Trias argument that the amount does not
belong to PNB even if it is the depositary bank is erroneous since it is well established
that a bank acquires ownership of the money deposited by its clients. The third
element, intent to gain or animus lucrandi, is an internal act that is presumed from the
unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation. This element is
immediately discernable from the circumstances narrated in the affidavits submitted
by PNBs employees. The fourth element of the crime clearly also exists. PNB did not
consent to the issuance of the check and its eventual encashmentwhich both
constitute the taking of personal propertyas respondents had made sure that the
bank was rendered inutile and incapable to give its consent. The fifth element is also
undisputed here; while the last element, that the taking be done with grave abuse of
confidence, is sufficiently shown by the affidavits of PNB and Trias own admission
of the position he held at the Bank. A banks employees are entrusted with the
possession of money of the bank due to the confidence reposed in them and as such
they occupy positions of confidence. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City is ordered to file an Information charging Amelio C. Tria and Atty. Reyes/John
Doe for Qualified Theft. Philippine National Bank v. Amelio Tria and John Doe, G.R.
No. 193250, April 25, 2012.
Qualifying circumstance; treachery. The essence of treachery is the sudden and

unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on the part of the person
attacked. Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend
directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. In the case at bar, the attack on Magdalino
Olos was treacherous, because he was caught off guard and was therefore unable to
defend himself, as testified to by the prosecution witnesses and as indicated by the
wounds inflicted on him. The prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the
attendance of treachery in this case. People v. Asilan, G.R. No. 188322, April 11,
2012.
Rape; elements. The crime of rape is defined in the Revised Penal Code as amended
by the Anti-Rape Law of 1997. The essential elements that the prosecution must prove
are, first, that a man succeeded in having carnal knowledge of a woman; and, second,
that the act was accomplished through force, threat or intimidation. In this case, AAA
positively testified to the presence of both elements. In her testimony, she recounted in
detail her harrowing experience at the hands of Ganzan how she and her friend,
while on their way home from a disco, were intercepted by the appellant; how they
were made to undress at gunpoint; how her friend was sent away so that the appellant
would be left alone with her to fulfill his lewd designs; and how he actually succeeded
in having carnal knowledge of her against her will while poking a knife against her
neck. These accusations were further buttressed by the findings of Dr. Carlos Ray
Sanchez, who concluded that there was a possibility of sexual abuse after he found
fresh lacerations in her hymen and confirmed the presence of sperm in her vagina. In
this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the prosecution has fulfilled its burden of
establishing appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt. People v. Ganzan, G.R. No.
193509, April 11, 2012.
Syndicated estafa; elements. Gilbert Guy, et al. should be charged for syndicated
estafa in relation to Section 1 of PD No. 1689, which has the following elements: (a)
estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Artilce 315 and 316 of the Revised
Penal Code is committed; (b) the estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate of
five or more persons; and (c) defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys
contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives, samahang
nayons, or farmers associations or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from
the general public. Rafael H. Galvez and Katherine L. Guy v. Asia United Bank/Asia
United Bank v. Gilbert Guy, et al./Gilbert Guy, et al. v. Asia United Bank, G.R. No.
187919/G.R. No. 187979 & G.R. No. 188030, April 25, 2012.
Syndicated estafa; elements. Here, five (5) accused, namely, Gilbert G. Guy, et al,
were, (a) all involved in the formation of the entities used to defraud AUB; and (b)
they were the officers and directors, both of RMSI and SPI, whose conformities paved
the way for AUB to grant the letter of credit subject of this case, in AUBs honest
belief that SPI, as Gilbert Guy, et al. represented, was a mere division of RMSI.
Furthermore, while these corporations were established presumably in accordance
with law, it cannot be denied that Gilbert G. Guy, et al, used these corporations to
carry out the illegal and unlawful act of misrepresenting SPI as a mere division of
RMSI, and, despite knowing SPIs separate juridical personality, applied for a letter of
credit secured by SPIs promissory note, knowing fully that SPI has no credit line with
AUB. The circumstances of the creation of these entities and their dealings with the
bank reveal this criminal intent to defraud and to deceive AUB. Lastly, the fact that
the defraudation of AUB resulted to misappropriation of the money which it solicited
from the general public in the form of deposits was substantially established. Thus, the
Decision of the Court of Appeals finding probable cause against private respondents
for the crime of estafa under Article 315, par 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code is
affirmed with modification such that Gilbert G. Guy, et al, be charged for syndicated
estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 1689. Rafael H. Galvez and Katherine L. Guy v. Asia United
Bank/Asia United Bank v. Gilbert Guy, et al./Gilbert Guy, et al. v. Asia United
Bank, G.R. No. 187919/G.R. No. 187979 & G.R. No. 188030, April 25, 2012.
2. SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
Dangerous Drugs; buy bust operation; coordination with PDEA. On appeal, accused-
appellant assailed his conviction by insisting that the buy bust operation conducted by
the Philippine National Police (PNP) which was instrumental to his arrest was invalid
because of alleged violation of Section 86 of R.A. 9165, requiring that the PNP
maintain close coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
on all drug related matters. The Supreme Court ruled that accused-appellants
contention is unmeritorious. It is settled that Section 86 of R.A. 9165 does not
invalidate operations on account of the law enforcers failure to maintain close
coordination with the PDEA. Section 86, as well as the Internal Rules and
Regulations implementing the same, is silent as to the consequences of the failure on
the part of the law enforcers to seek the authority of the PDEA prior to conducting a
buy-bust operation. This silence [cannot] be interpreted as a legislative intent to
make an arrest without the participation of PDEA illegal or evidence obtained
pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible. People v. Figueroa, G.R. No. 186141, April
11, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs; buy bust; required procedures. Given the nature of buy-bust
operations and the resulting preventive procedural safeguards crafted in R.A. 9165,
courts must tread carefully before giving full credit to the testimonies of those who
conducted the operations. Although it has been ruled in the past that mere procedural
lapses in the conduct of a buy-bust operation are not ipso facto fatal to the
prosecutions cause, so long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items have been preserved, courts must still thoroughly evaluate and differentiate
those errors that constitute a simple procedural lapse from those that amount to a
gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the safeguards drawn by the law.
Accordingly, despite the presumption of regularity in the performance of the official
duties of law enforcers, we stress that the step-by-step procedure outlined under R.A.
9165 is a matter of substantive law, which cannot be simply brushed aside as a simple
procedural technicality. Here, the conduct of the buy-bust operations was peppered
with defects, which raises doubts on the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items from accused-appellant. First, there were material
inconsistencies in the marking of the seized items. Second, the SAID-SOTF failed to
show genuine and sufficient effort to seek the third-party representatives enumerated
under Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. Third, the SAID-SOTF failed to duly accomplish
the Certificate of Inventory and to take photos of the seized items pursuant to Section
21(1) of R.A. 9165. Accused-appellant Sammy Umipang y Abdul is
therefore acquitted of the charges in Criminal Cases No. 14935-D-TG and No. 14936-
D-TG on the ground of reasonable doubt. People of the Philippines v. Sammy
Umipag y Abdul, G.R. No. 190321, April 25, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs; chain of custody and prescribed procedures. Non-compliance with

the prescribed procedural requirements does not necessarily render the seizure and
custody of the items void and invalid; the seizure may still be held valid, provided that
(a) there is a justifiable ground for the non-compliance, and (b) the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are shown to have been properly preserved.
These conditions, however, were not met in the present case as the prosecution did
not even attempt to offer any justification for the failure of SPO4 Mendoza to follow
the prescribed procedures in the handling of the seized items. As held in People v. De
Guzman, the failure to follow the procedure mandated under RA 9165 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations must be adequately explained. The justifiable
ground for the non-compliance must be proven as a fact. The Court cannot presume
what these grounds are or that they even exist. In dubio pro reo. When moral
certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt
inevitably becomes a matter of right. Petitioners Valentin Zafra y Dechosa and Eroll
Marcelino y Reyes are acquitted for the failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Valentin Zafra y Dechosa and Eroll Marcelino y Reyes v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 190749, April 25, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs; illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs; elements.
Illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs is committed when the following
elements concur: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is
identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. All these elements
were established beyond reasonable doubt in the cases against accused-appellant. The
prosecution witnesses consistently and categorically testified that pursuant to a search
warrant duly issued by a judge, they found and seized from accused-appellants house
and actual possession a brick of marijuana leaves and heat-sealed sachets of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. People v. Velazquez, G.R. No.
177244, April 11, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs; illegal sale of dangerous drugs. This appeal involves two distinct
drug-related offenses, namely: illegal sale of dangerous drugs, and illegal possession
of dangerous drugs. The successful prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs
requires: (a) proof that the transaction or sale took place, and (b) the presentation in
court as evidence of the corpus delicti, or the dangerous drugs themselves. It is crucial
that the Prosecution establishes the identity of the seized dangerous drugs in a way
that the integrity thereof has been well preserved from the time of seizure or
confiscation from the accused until the time of presentation as evidence in court.
Nothing less than a faithful compliance with this duty is demanded of all law
enforcers arresting drug pushers and drug possessors and confiscating and seizing the
dangerous drugs and substances from them. Here, the Prosecution failed to
demonstrate a faithful compliance by the arresting lawmen of the rule on chain of
custody. Further, the State did not establish the identity of the dangerous drugs
allegedly seized from petitioner with the same exacting certitude required for a
finding of guilt. Although PO2 Payumo declared that he was the one who had
received the sachet of shabu (RRS-1) from petitioner and who had confiscated the
two sachets of shabu (RRS-2) from petitioner, all of which he had then sealed,
nothing more to support the fact that the evidence thus seized had remained intact was
adduced. Also, the Prosecution did not show to whom the seized articles had been
turned over following the conduct of the laboratory examination, and how the seized
articles had been kept in a manner that preserved their integrity until their final
presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti. Such lapses of the Prosecution
were fatal to its proof of guilt because they demonstrated that the chain of custody did
not stay unbroken, thereby raising doubt on the integrity and identity of the dangerous
drugs as evidence of the corpus delicti of the crimes charged. Petitioner is acquitted of
the crimes charged in Criminal Case No. 05-234564 and Criminal Case No. 05-
234565. Rogelio S. Reyes v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 180177, April 18,
2012.
Dangerous Drugs; illegal sale of dangerous drugs. For the successful prosecution of
offenses involving the illegal sale of drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165,
the following elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, object
and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that
the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
evidence of the corpus delicti. After a careful examination of the records of this case,
the Supreme Court was convinced that that the prosecutions evidence established
Abedins guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution was able to prove the
existence of all the essential elements of the illegal sale of shabu. Abedin was
positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as the person who sold and
possessed the shabu. People v. Abedin, G.R. No. 179936, April 11, 2012.
3. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Evidence; circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence may prove the guilt of

appellant and justify a conviction if the following requisites concur: (a) there is more
than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient
to support conviction, all circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent
with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with
the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that
of guilt. Here, the circumstances accused-appellant (i) was the legal secretary and
liaison officer of private complainant, (ii) was tasked to process land titles of private
complainants clients, (iii) was confidently given considerable amounts of cash
without need of receipts by private complainant, (iv) submitted handwritten padded
liquidation statements because her reported expenses turned out to be higher than
what she actually spent and the official receipts she submitted to private complainant
were fake, and (v) did not specifically deny her submitting altered or fake receipts,
and (vi) suddenly disappeared leaving some of her tasks, unfinished lead to the
reasonable conclusion that appellant took amounts of money from Rebecca. People of
the Philippines v. Remedios Tanchanco y Pineda, G.R. No. 177761, April 18, 2012.
Evidence in Rape; credibility of witness. There can be no question that the testimony
of a child who has been a victim in rape is normally given full weight and credence.
Judicial experience has enabled the courts to accept the verity that when a minor says
that she was raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was
committed against her. The credibility of such a rape victim is surely augmented
where there is absolutely no evidence that suggests the possibility of her being
actuated by ill-motive to falsely testify against the accused. Truly, a rape victims
testimony that is unshaken by rigid cross-examination and unflawed by
inconsistencies or contradictions in its material points is entitled to full faith and
credit. AAAs failure to shout for help although she knew that her father was tending
to the family store just downstairs was not a factor to discredit her or to diminish the
credibility of her evidence on the rape. She explained her failure by stating that
Taguilid had threatened to harm her should she shout. She thereby commanded
credence, considering that she was not expected to easily overcome her fear of him
due to her being then a minor just under 13 years of age at the time of the
rape. People v. Taguilid, G.R. No. 181544, April 11, 2012.
Preliminary investigation; no vested right to file a reply. According to petitioner, he

was denied his right to due process when he was not given a copy of the: (i) Counter-
affidavit, (ii) Asst. Prosecutors 10 September 2008 Resolution, and (iii) 17 February
2009 Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman. He also claims he was deprived of
due process because he was not able to file his Reply to the Counter-affidavit.
However, a complainant in a preliminary investigation does not have a vested right to
file a Replythis right should be granted to him by law. P/Insp. Ariel S. Artillero v.
Orlando C. Casimiro, etc., et al, G.R. No. 190569, April 25, 2012.
Preliminary investigation; no vested right to file a reply. There is no provision in Rule

112 of the Rules of Court that gives the Complainant or requires the prosecutor to
observe the right to file a Reply to the accuseds counter-affidavit. To illustrate the
non-mandatory nature of filing a Reply in preliminary investigations, Section 3 (d) of
Rule 112 gives the prosecutor, in certain instances, the right to resolve the Complaint
even without a counter-affidavit, viz: (d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, of
if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the
investigating officer shall resolve the complaint based on the evidence presented by
the complainant. On the other hand, petitioner was entitled to receive a copy of the
Counter-affidavit filed by Aguillon. P/Insp. Ariel S. Artillero v. Orlando C. Casimiro,
etc., et al, G.R. No. 190569, April 25, 2012.
Preliminary investigation; non-receipt of counter-affidavit. The procedural defect of

not having received a copy of the Counter-affidavit, however, was cured when
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Provincial Prosecutor Dusaban had the
duty to send petitioner a copy of Aguillons Counter-affidavit. Section 3(c), Rule 112
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, grants a complainant this right, and the
Provincial Prosecutor has the duty to observe the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in the cases presented before it. That the requirements of
due process are deemed complied with in the present case because of the filing of an
MR by Complainant was simply a fortunate turn of events for the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor. P/Insp. Ariel S. Artillero v. Orlando C. Casimiro, etc., et
al, G.R. No. 190569, April 25, 2012.
Probable cause. A finding probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that
more likely than not a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe
that it was committed by the accused. It need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. A
finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a
pronouncement of guilt.The term does not mean actual and positive cause nor does
it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.
Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction. Cruz v. Hon. Gonzales, et al, G.R. No. 173844, April 11, 2012.
Probable cause. In this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals in line with the principle of non-interference with the prerogative of the
Secretary of Justice to review the resolutions of the public prosecutor in the
determination of the existence of probable cause. The Secretary of Justice found
sufficient evidence to indict petitioner. It was adequately established by DBP and
found by the Secretary of Justice that the funds would not have been released pursuant
to the subsidiary loan agreement if HSLBI had no sub-borrowers/Investment
Enterprises to speak of. As it turned out, not only were the collaterals submitted
inexistent, all the purported sub-borrowers/Investment Enterprises were also fictitious
and inexistent. In fact, the signatures of the sub-borrowers and the supporting
documents submitted to DBP by petitioner and her co-respondents were all forged.
The findings of probable cause against petitioner was based on the document showing
that petitioners opinion was instrumental in the deceit committed against DBP. Cruz
v. Hon. Gonzales, et al, G.R. No. 173844, April 11, 2012.
EN BANC
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 168050

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
BERNARDINO GAFFUD, JR., Promulgated:
Accused-Appellant. September 19, 2008
x------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
For review before this Court is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated March 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00060 finding the
accused-appellant Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. guilty of the complex crime of double
murder and sentencing him to death, affirming with modification the Decision [2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) dated August 28, 2002 in Criminal Case No. 1125.
The facts of this case were aptly summarized by the CA as follows:
Records show that accused-appellant Bernardino Gaffud, Jr., along with two John
Does were indicted for Double Murder for the killing of Manuel Salvador and
Analyn Salvador, under the following Information:
The undersigned 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses Bernardino

Gaffud, Jr. and two (2) JOHN DOES of the crime of DOUBLE MURDER
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
committed as follows:
That on or about 8:00 oclock in the evening of May 10, 1994 at Sitio Biton,
Barangay Wasid, Municipality of Nagtipunan, Province of Quirino,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused with intent to kill and motivated by long standing grudge,
after conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, by means
of fire, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, shot and
burn Manuel Salvador and Analyn Salvador which caused their
instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 15, Records)
It appears that Manuel Salvador and his daughter Analyn Salvador were killed
when the house they were staying in located at Sitio Biton, Barangay Wasid,
Nagtipunan, Quirino was burned down while they were inside. An eyewitness
pointed to accused-appellant Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. as one of the arsonists.
Upon preliminary investigation, where appellant Gaffud, Jr. failed to appear

despite being subpoenaed to submit his counter-affidavit, Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Ferdinand Orias resolved that charges for double murder by means of
fire be filed against herein appellant and two John Does, (p.14, Records).
When arraigned on June 6, 1995, accused-appellant Gaffud, Jr. entered a plea of

Not Guilty, (p. 48, Records), paving the way for his trial.
The prosecution presented six (6) witnesses against appellant Gaffud, Jr., namely
Dominga Salvador, common-law wife of Manuel Salvador and mother of Analyn
Salvador, Orly Salvador, nephew of Manuel Salvador, Potado Ballang, Barangay
Captain of Wasid, Nagtipunan, Quirino, Dan Dangpal, a neighbor of the deceased,
SPO2 Dominador Tabal, the investigating police, and Dr. Teodomiro Hufana who
conducted the autopsy on the deceased Manuel Salvador.
Evidence for the prosecution tended to prove that on the night of May 10, 1994,
Orly Salvador was on his way to the house of his uncle Manuel Salvador to fetch
the latter as they were going to attend a wedding at the nearby barangay hall. He
suddenly heard two gunshots. Thereafter, he saw the house of his uncle
burning. Because of the glow emanating therefrom, he saw three persons within
the vicinity of the burning house. He saw them hurriedly leaving the place
towards the direction of the Cagayan river. One of the three was holding a
flashlight, whom he identified as appellant Gaffud, Jr. He could not identify the
two other persons. After the house was burned, Orly went towards the barangay
hall to see if his uncle Manuel Salvador was there, but he met Brangay Captain
Potado Ballang who informed him that his uncle was not at the barangay
hall. They then proceeded to the burned house, and found the charred remains of
Manuel Salvador and Analyn Salvador. (TSN, October 10, 1995, pp. 3-8)
Barangay Captain Potado Ballang testified that he saw appellant Gaffud, Jr. on the
fateful day at around 6:30 PM, along the riverbank, a few meters away from the
house of Manuel Salvador. When Potado asked what he was doing there, Gaffud,
Jr. said he was looking for his boat. However, Potado knew that the appellant did
not own a boat. After a few minutes, Potado left to attend the wedding party being
held at the barangay hall. (TSN, November 4, 1996, pp. 2-5)
Dan Dangpals testimony was dispensed with, but the defense agreed to the nature
of the testimony he would have given, which tended to show that sometime at
about 8:00 PM on the fateful evening, while inside his house, he heard successive
gunshots, and when he went out of his house, he saw the deceaseds house burning
about 200 meters away. He heard persons laughing and saw the light of a
flashlight and persons moving away from the burning house. He could not
recognize any of them. (TSN, February 24, 1997; Exhibit D, p. 8, Records)
Dominga Salvadors testimony tended to show that the appellant Gaffud, Jr. was
their neighbor. In the morning of May 10, 1994, she went to the house of the
appellant to see him about her husbands share in the construction of the barangay
hall, which was contracted to the appellant. Gaffud, Jr. told her that he would go
to her house that afternoon to introduce his in-law Balbino Bravo to her
husband. Thereafter, she went home, and left again at around 11:00 AM, leaving
behind her husband Manuel Salvador and their daughter Analyn. Later that night,
she was at Natipunan, Quirino attending a seminar for hilot, (TSN, July 4, 1995,
pp. 3-15). In hersinumpaang salaysay, offered in evidence as Exhibit A, Dominga
also related that she had earlier filed a complaint in the barangay against the
appellant and his brother for slaughtering her pig.
SPO2 Dominador Tabal was a police investigator who investigated the killing of
Manuel and Analyn Salvador. Thereat, he saw two dead bodies hanging from a
Melina tree. They were put there so that they would not be reached by the
dogs. He saw that one of the victims had a fractured head, while the other had a
wound on the side. Pictures of the victims including the scene of the incident were
taken by them. Among those interviewed the appellant Gaffud, Jr. and his brother,
(TSN, June 5, 1997, pp. 2-7).
Dr. Teodomiro Hufanas testimony was also dispensed with, (p. 127, Records) in
view of the defense counsels admission of the contents of his Autopsy Report on
Manuel Salvador, (Exhibit C), which reads in pertinent part:
FINDINGS
-Cremated charcoaled, about 3 ft. long, stomach and intestine (Large)

protruding from the abdomen.
-Presence of semi-burned rattan about 1 inch long about 1 cm. in diameter

on the burned hand.
-Presence of a peculiar hole from the thoracic cavity directed downward to

the body, probably gunshot wound.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
-CREMATION (Burned)
REMARKS: Cannot be identified if male or female

For the appellants defense, the defense presented the appellant
himself. His defense of alibi was corroborated by his wife Juanita Gaffud and in-
law Balbino Bravo.
Appellant denied the accusation leveled against him, and testified that the
approximate time of the burning of the victims house, he was at home,
entertaining his in-laws, Balbino Bravo and Rufina Bravo, who was there for a
visit. After eating dinner, he and Balbino Bravo talked. At around 7:00 to 8:00
PM, he and Balbino Bravo saw a blaze coming from the other side of the Cagayan
River, about 50 to 80 meters away from the house of the Bravos. They did not
mind the blaze, and instead went to sleep. The next morning, they heard news
about somebody being burned, and because of this, he and Balbino Bravo hiked to
the place of the incident.Thats where he found that his pare Manuel Salvador and
his daughter were burned in their house. After seeing the dead bodies, appellant
went home. He went back later, and was even designated by the Barangay Captain
to guard the bodies of the deceased.Thereafter, he was forced to evacuate his
family from Nagtipunan, because the Ilongot tribe was forcing him to testify
against someone but he didnt want to. He was told that something might happen
to his family if he didnt leave, (TSN, June 3, 2002).
The appellants defense was corroborated on its material points by the

testimony of his wife, Juanita Gaffud, and his in-law, Balbino Bravo, both of
whom testified that on May 10, 1994, the accused was at his residence
entertaining visiting Bravo spouses and stayed there the whole night,
(TSN January 31, 2002 and March 18, 2002).
Juanita Gaffud also testified that during the pendency of the trial, she
talked to Dominga Salvador about the settlement of the case and even offered a
certain amount for the said purpose, (TSN, March 10, 2002, p. 12).[3]
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision finding accused-appellant guilty of two
(2) counts of murder, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds Bernardino
Gaffud, Jr. GUILTY for two (2) counts of murder and hereby sentences him as
follows, to wit:
a) Death penalty - for the death of Manuel Salvador;
b) Another death penalty - for the death of Analyn Salvador;
c) To pay the legal heirs of the victims:
c-1) SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00) for each

count or a total of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P150,000.00) as death indemnities;
c-2) FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) for each count or a
total of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00)
as moral damages;
c-3) TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000) for each count

or a total of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as
exemplary damages;
c-4) TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as nominal damages;
and
c-5) Costs.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.[4]
As the death penalty was imposed, the case was elevated to this Court for
automatic review. In his Appellants Brief,[5] accused-appellant argued that the RTC
erred in: (i) failing to rule and resolve whether or not conspiracy existed, as the
information charged him with conspiracy with two others in the commission of the
crime; and (ii) convicting him despite the fact that conspiracy was not proven, and
also despite the fact that there was no proof whatsoever as to what overt act he
committed which would constitute the crime of murder.
The case was transferred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition per
Resolution[6] of this Court dated August 24, 2004, in accordance with the ruling
in People v. Mateo.[7] In disposing of the assigned errors, the CA held that the lack
of discussion of conspiracy among accused-appellant and his anonymous co-
accused in the decision of the RTC was not antithetic to his conviction for the
crime of murder, since the charge that he was a principal performer in the killing of
the victims was spelled out in the Information [8] filed against him.[9] Moreover, in
the absence of conspiracy, each of the malefactors is liable only for the act
committed by him.[10] As to the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the
prosecution, the CA held that the circumstantial evidence in this case established
accused-appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[11] Accordingly, the CA affirmed
the Decision of the RTC, finding accused-appellant guilty of the complex crime of
double murder, with the following modifications:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED, although
the decision of the lower court is herebyMODIFIED, in that: The accused
Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of the complex crime of double
murder, and is hereby sentenced to the supreme penalty of Death. He is also
ordered to pay the legal heirs of the victims: (1) P100,000.00 or P50,000.00 for
each victim, as civil indemnity for the death of the victims; (2) P100,000.00 or
P50,000.00 for each victim, as moral damages; and (3) P10,000.00 as nominal
damages plus costs.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
00-5-03-SC dated September 28, 2004, the case was elevated to this Court for
review.
On the first assigned error, we concur with the CA that the failure to prove
conspiracy in this case is not fatal.
The rule is that in the absence of evidence showing the direct participation of the
accused in the commission of the crime, conspiracy must be established by clear
and convincing evidence in order to convict the accused. [13] In the case at bar,
however, we hold that the direct participation of accused-appellant in the killing of
the victims, Manuel Salvador and Analyn Salvador, was established beyond doubt
by the evidence of the prosecution. Hence, a finding of conspiracy in this instance
is not essential for the conviction of accused-appellant.
On the second assigned error, we uphold the finding of both courts a

quo that the evidence proffered by the prosecution, although circumstantial in
nature, leads to the conclusion that accused-appellant is the perpetrator of the act
resulting in the death of the victims.
It is well-settled that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if

(i) there is more than one circumstance; (ii) the facts from which the inference is
derived are proven; and (iii) the combination of all circumstances is such as to
produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[14]
In this case, the following facts or circumstances were proven:
(i) Accused-appellant was near the place of the incident just a few
minutes before the crime was committed.Captain Potado Bollang
testified that he saw the accused-appellant at the riverbank, about 100
meters from the house of the victims, coming to and fro, allegedly
looking for his boat, when in fact, Captain Bollang knew that accused-
appellant did not own one.[15]
(ii) Accused-appellant, together with two unidentified persons, was near

the house of the victims at the time it was on fire. Accused-appellant
was identified by Orly Salvador as one of the three men he saw about 5
meters from the house of his uncle, Manuel Salvador, while it was
burning. Previously, he heard two gunshots as he was on his way towards
the said house. He also saw appellant fleeing with the other malefactors,
while holding a flashlight.[16] His testimony was corroborated by the
admitted testimony of Dan Dangpal who said that he heard two gunshots
while he was at his home, which was near that of the victims. When he
went out, he also heard men laughing, and saw them fleeing from the
burning house, illumined by a flashlight.[17]
(iii) Accused-appellant was in a hurry to leave the place of the incident

without giving any help to his kumpareManuel Salvador and the
latters daughter, Analyn. Orly Salvador testified that he saw accused-
appellant holding a flashlight, in a hurry to leave the burning house of the
victim, going towards the direction of the river.[18]
(iv) Accused-appellant had a motive to kill the victims because of the

complaint filed by Manuel Salvadors wife, Dominga Salvador, and
the fact that he owed Manuel Salvador some money. Dominga
Salvador testified that she had filed a complaint against accused-
appellant and his brother in their barangay for their act of slaughtering
her pig.Aside from this, in the morning of the same fateful day, she went
to the house of accused-appellant aiming to collect her husbands share in
the profits for the construction of the barangay hall they had built, but the
accused-appellant only told her that he and his in-law would see her
husband later that day.[19]
These circumstances, when taken together, are enough to produce the

conclusion that accused-appellant was responsible for the killing of the victims by
means of burning them inside their house.
Moreover, we sustain the following observation of the CA that against the
convincing evidence of the prosecution, accused-appellants defense of denial and
alibi must fail:
The Court finds incredible appellants story that after seeing the blaze
across his house, he merely slept with his in-laws without investigating. The
Court finds it against human nature for one to sleep soundly during a fire
occurring just 50-80 metes from ones house, even though the blaze is occurring
across a river. Also, appellant muse know, after seeing the location of the blaze,
that the house of his pare, or close friend, was in danger, and his natural reaction
at least was to verify the object of the conflagration.Appellants story that he only
slept soundly after seeing the blaze is therefore unbelievable, and taints the
credibility of his alibi.
Another telling factor on the appellants defense is his flight. Appellant admitted
that in his testimony that he fled Wasid, Nagtipunan, Quirino after he was
investigated at the Municipal Hall, (TSN, June 3, 2002, p. 19). Appellant said he
fled because of threats from the Ilongots. However, appellant said it never entered
his mind to report the threats on him. Appellants explanation fails to convince. It
bears stressing that appellant fled right after being investigated and questioned by
police authorities, and during the time that the preliminary investigation of the
case was ongoing. This is highly suspicious, as such time is the best time for him
to defend his innocence, if he is indeed innocent. As it is, appellant was arrested
in San Vicente, Jones, Isabela, a remote barangay by the elements of the NBI, (Id.,
at 23; reverse of p. 19, Records). Flight is consistently held as and indication of
guilt, (People v. Magaro, 291 SCRA 601 [1998]). There is no showing why such
conclusion should not be made in this case.[20]
We now go to whether or not accused-appellant should be held liable for two

(2) separate counts of murder or for the complex crime of double murder.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, reads:
ARTICLE 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period.
In a complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they
constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the
offender. Hence, there is only one penalty imposed for the commission of a
complex crime.[21]
There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as compound
crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies. The second is known as complex crime proper, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other.[22]
The classic example of the first of kind is when a single bullet results in the
death of two or more persons. A different rule governs where separate and distinct
acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various
victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct
crimes.[23]
In the landmark case People v. Guillen,[24] the Court held that the single act
of throwing a grenade at President Roxas resulting in the death of another person
and injuring four others produced the complex crime of murder and multiple
attempted murders. Under Article 248 of the RPC, murder is committed when a
person is killed by means of explosion. Applying Article 48 of the RPC, the
penalty for the crime committed is death, the maximum penalty for murder, which
is the graver offense.
More recently, in People v. Carpo et al.,[25] we held that the single act of
hurling a grenade into the bedroom of the victims causing the death of three
persons and injuries to one person constituted the complex crime of multiple
murder and attempted murder. Also, in People v. Comadre,[26] we held:
The underlying philosophy of complex crimes in the Revised Penal Code,

which follows the pro reo principle, is intended to favor the accused by imposing
a single penalty irrespective of the crimes committed. The rationale being, that the
accused who commits two crimes with single criminal impulse demonstrates
lesser perversity than when the crimes are committed by different acts and several
criminal resolutions.
The single act by appellant of detonating a hand grenade may

quantitatively constitute a cluster of several separate and distinct offenses, yet
these component criminal offenses should be considered only as a single crime in
law on which a single penalty is imposed because the offender was impelled by a
single criminal impulse which shows his lesser degree of perversity.
In light of these precedents, we hold that the single act of accused-
appellant burning the house of Manuel Salvador, with the main objective of
killing the latter and his daughter, Analyn Salvador, resulting in their deaths
resulted in the complex crime of double murder. Under Article 248 of the RPC,
murder is committed by means of fire. Since the maximum penalty imposed for
murder was death, when the case was pending in the CA, the CA correctly imposed
the penalty of death for the complex crime of double murder instead of the two
death penalties imposed by the RTC for two counts of murder. In view, however, of
the passage of Republic Act No. 9346 (otherwise known as An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines), we reduce the penalty of death
to reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole.[27]
Anent the award of damages, we increase the award of civil indemnity by

the CA for the death of the victims fromP100,000 or P50,000 for each victim,
to P150,000 or P75,000 for each victim in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence.[28]
As to the deletion of exemplary damages by the CA, we reinstate the award

by the RTC of exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000, or P25,000 for each
victim.
By and of itself, nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance. It becomes

aggravating only when: (1) it is especially sought by the offender; or (2) it is taken
advantage of by him; or (3) it facilitates the commission of the crime by ensuring
the offender's immunity from capture.[29] In this case, the RTC correctly appreciated
nighttime as aggravating considering that nighttime was especially sought by
accused-appellant to carry out his evil plan. Evidence shows that accused-appellant
waited for nighttime to consummate his plan. It should be noted that accused-
appellant was seen lurking near the house of the victims earlier in the evening. The
fact that he brought with him a flashlight clearly shows that he intended to commit
the crime in darkness.
We sustain the award by the CA of moral damages in the amount

of P100,000, or P50,000 for each victim, in view of the grief and sorrow suffered
by the heirs of the victims. We likewise affirm the award of nominal damages in
the amount ofP10,000 for the value of the burned house as sufficiently explained
by the RTC and affirmed by the CA.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hereby AFFIRM the March 31, 2005 decision

of the CA in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00060 with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) the penalty of death imposed on accused-appellant is REDUCED

to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole;
(2) the civil indemnity for the death of the victims is increased to P150,000,
or P75,000 for each victim; and
(3) accused-appellant is ordered to pay exemplary damages in the amount
of P50,000, or P25,000 for each victim.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
EGAP MADSALI, SAJIRON G.R. No. 179570

LAJIM and MARON LAJIM,
Petitioner, Present:
CARPIO,* J.,
CORONA, J., Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
- versus - NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. February 4, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 00475, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Palawan, Puerto Princesa City, Branch 50, finding accused Sajiron Lajim and
Maron Lajim[2] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of abduction with rape
in Criminal Case No. 12281 and finding accused Egap Madsali and Sajiron Lajim
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of serious illegal detention in Criminal
Case No. 12309.
In view of our decision in People v. Cabalquinto,[3] the real name and identity of
the rape victim, as well as the members of her immediate family, are withheld. In
this regard, the rape victim is herein referred to as AAA; her mother, BBB; and her
father, CCC.
In Criminal Case No. 12281, Sajiron Lajim (Sajiron) and Maron Lajim (Maron)
were charged with the crime of abduction with rape in an Information [4] dated
March 17, 1995, which reads:
That on or about the 1st day of July, 1994, in Barangay Malitub, Municipality of
Bataraza, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating together
and helping one another and by means of force, threat, violence and intimidation,
while armed with a bladed weapon known as Badong, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away one AAA, a girl of 16 years of
age, against her will and consent and brought to the forest and on the occasion
thereof the said accused by means of force, threat, violence and intimidation, and
while armed with a knife, accused Sahiron Lajim, with lewd design, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with said AAA,
against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
That on the occasion of the said Rape, accused Maron Lajim helped Sahiron
Lajim by acting as look-out during the commission of the said crime.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Case No. 12309, Egap Madsali (Egap) and Sajiron Lajim
(Sajiron) were charged with the crime of serious illegal detention in an Amended
Information[5] dated August 28, 1995, which reads:
That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1994 in the morning up to December 15,
1994, at Barangay Malitub, Municipality of Bataraza, Province of Palawan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another,
with the use of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take and detain AAA, an unmarried woman under 15
years of age in the house of Egap Madsali thereby depriving said AAA of her
liberty all against her will and as a result of that illegal detention, said AAA was
not able to go home to her mother for a period of more than five (5) months.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon motion of the private prosecutor and with the conformity of the Provincial
Prosecutor's Office, Criminal Case No. 12309 was consolidated with Criminal
Case No. 12281, pending before the RTC of Palawan, Puerto Princesa City, Branch
50.
Sajiron was arraigned on April 21, 1995 in Criminal Case No. 12281 and on
September 21, 1995 in Criminal Case No. 12309.He pleaded not guilty to both
charges. Egap was arrested and, thereafter, arraigned on March 8, 1996. He
pleaded not guilty in Criminal Case No. 12309. Maron was arrested and, later,
arraigned on March 11, 1996. He pleaded not guilty in Criminal Case No.
12281. A joint trial ensued. However, in July 1996, Egap escaped while under the
custody of prison guards.
The evidence presented by the prosecution are as follows:
On July 1, 1994, around 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon, fifteen-year-old AAA and
her aunt Inon Dama were fetching water in a cave in Barangay (Brgy.) Malitub,
Bataraza, Palawan. Suddenly, Sajiron arrived, running towards them and carrying
a badong(bolo). They tried to run away, but Sajiron overtook them. He held the
hair of AAA and told her, Sara, you go with me. If you will not go with me, I will
kill you. Inon Dama came to AAA's rescue, but Sajiron tried to hack her. Luckily,
she was able to shield herself with a plastic container. AAA was crying while she
held her aunt's hand. Sajiron then drew his gun, which was tucked in his waist,
pointed it at Inon Dama and said, If you will not go, I will shoot you. Inon Dama
went home and reported the incident to AAA's mother. When Inon Dama left the
place, Maron, Sajiron's father, suddenly appeared with a gun and told AAA to
come with them. When AAA refused, Sajiron and Maron tied her hands behind her
back, covered her mouth with a piece of cloth, and brought her to the forest. There,
AAA was untied and undressed, leaving only her bra on. While Sajiron was
undressing AAA, she pleaded with him not to abuse her, but Sajiron told her that if
she would submit to his desire, her life would be spared. Sajiron held her breast,
touched her private parts and inserted his sex organ inside her vagina. AAA
resisted, but to no avail. She felt pain and she noticed blood on her private
parts. She was sexually abused three times on the ground, where she was made to
lie down on a bed of leaves. During the entire time that AAA was being abused by
Sajiron, Maron stood guard and watched them. They left the forest at around 10:00
o'clock in the morning of the following day and brought AAA to the house of
Egap, where she was detained in a room. Sajiron instructed Egap to guard AAA
and to shoot her if she would attempt to escape.
On July 2, 1994, AAAs mother came to get AAA, but Egap refused and
threatened to kill her daughter if she would report the matter to the authorities. Out
of fear of losing her daughter, she went home and did not report the incident to the
police authorities.[6] Egap asked AAA if she wanted to marry Sajiron, but she
refused. AAA was then forced to sign an unknown document, which she was not
able to read.
Nine days after the abduction, or on July 11, 1994, upon instruction of Egap,
AAA and Sajiron were married by Imam Musli Muhammad. The marriage was
solemnized against AAA's will and without the presence of her parents. After the
marriage, AAA and Sajiron lived in the house of Egap, together with the latter's
wife, children and mother-in-law. AAA stayed in one room with Sajiron. While
detained, AAA did not try to escape, because her house was very far from the place
where she was held captive, and her captors threatened to kill her and her family if
she would attempt to escape. During her detention, Sajiron abused her twice every
night. She was free to roam within the vicinity of the house but she was usually
accompanied by Egap's wife who served as her guard. She was also guarded and
threatened by Egap's sons. She got pregnant after some time.
On November 24, 1994, BBB and Inon Dama went to Puerto Princesa City
to report AAA's abduction to the proper authorities. AAA was detained at the
house of Egap from July 2, 1994 until December 15, 1994. On December 16, 1994,
Sajiron and Egap were arrested by the police.
The defense, on the other hand, denied having committed the crimes
charged. Sajiron claimed that he and AAA were engaged for three years prior to
their elopement. During the period of their engagement, Sajiron lived with AAA in
her mother's house. AAA married Sajiron voluntarily and out of her own free will.
The sexual intercourse between AAA and Sajiron was consensual. The defense
further claimed that AAA merely filed criminal charges against Sajiron because he
did not pay the dowry (dower) in the amount of P10,000.00 to AAA's
parents. Sajiron asserted that he did not pay the dowry because he had already
rendered services to AAA's family for about three years prior to his marriage with
AAA. After the marriage, Sajiron and AAA were brought by the latter's father to
his house in Balabac, Palawan. They stayed there for about four months. Then they
went to Brgy. Malitub, Bataraza, Palawan and stayed at the house of Egap for
about two weeks. Sajiron was thereafter arrested by the authorities. He only
learned that a case for abduction with rape was filed against him by AAA when he
was being interrogated by the Bataraza Police.
On July 25, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision [7] finding Sajiron and Maron guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of abduction with rape. Egap and Sajiron
were also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of serious illegal
detention. The dispositive portion of the Decision is as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, to suffer imprisonment as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 12281, the accused Sa[j]iron Lajim and

Maron Lajim are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua or forty (years) and each of the accused
are ordered to indemnify the complainant AAA the same
amount of P50,000.00 as and for civil indemnity;
2. In Criminal Case No. 12309, the accused Egap Madsali and

Sa[j]iron Lajim are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua and both accused are ordered to
separately indemnify the complainant AAA the amount
of P50,000.00 as and for civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal, and the records of the case were forwarded to
this Court. However, pursuant to this Courts ruling in People v. Mateo,[8] the case
was transferred to the CA. The CA rendered a Decision dated July 31, 2007
affirming the decision of the trial court in Criminal Case Nos. 12281 and 12309.
Hence, this petition assigning the following errors:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IGNORING THE
IMPLICATION OF THE 5-MONTH INACTION BY THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT'S MOTHER IN REPORTING THE ALLEGED ADBUCTION
AND ILLEGAL DETENTION OF HER DAUGHTER; AND
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IGNORING THE

UNREBUTTED TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S OWN
FATHER.
With respect to the first assigned error, petitioners allege that the five-month
inaction of BBB through his failure to report the alleged abduction and illegal
detention of her daughter is totally inconsistent with AAA's claim that she was
abducted and illegally detained.
We are not persuaded.
Delay in reporting an incident of rape due to death threats does not affect the
credibility of the complainant, nor can it be taken against her. The charge of rape is
rendered doubtful only if the delay was unreasonable and unexplained. [9] BBB
explained that she did not immediately report the abduction, rape and detention of
her daughter to the authorities, because Egap threatened to kill AAA, [10] who was
then in his custody.
Further, BBB testified that, on another occasion, Egap threatened to kill her if she
dared to report the matter to the authorities. True enough, when Egap learned that
she did what he forbade her to do, he made good his threat and shot her at the back.
[11]
Thus, BBB's delay in reporting the incident for five months should not be taken
against her.
Anent the second assignment of error, petitioners argue that the unrebutted
testimonies of CCC and Imam Musli Muhammad cast a reasonable doubt on the
charge against them. CCC testified that Sajiron courted his daughter and proposed
marriage after their three-year courtship. He claimed that he gave his consent to the
marriage of his daughter to Sajiron. Prior to the marriage, CCC said that he was
even able to talk to his daughter and his wife, and both were amenable to the
marriage. AAA never mentioned to him anything about having been kidnapped or
raped. Neither did his wife tell him of their daughter's alleged harrowing
experience. He and his wife were present during the marriage celebration.
Again, the testimony of CCC fails to persuade Us. AAA testified that she had
never seen her father since she was a child, as her father had abandoned them.
[12]
BBB testified that she and her husband had been separated for a long time, and
she did not know his whereabouts. She further said that CCC left their place in
March 1983 to go to Malaysia, and that was the last time she saw him. [13] CCC's
allegation that his wife was present during the marriage celebration was also
controverted by the testimonies of AAA, her mother, and Imam Musli Muhammad.
Thus, save for CCC's self-serving allegations, he could not muster any sufficient
evidence to beef up those allegations. It is also very surprising that CCC, after his
long absence, suddenly appeared and testified for the defense. CCC would like to
impress upon this Court that he has maintained constant communication with his
family; however, no single witness was presented to corroborate this claim.
Furthermore, CCC, in his Malayang Sinumpaang Salaysay[14] dated

December 28, 1995, alleged that in 1991, his wife wrote and informed him that
Sajiron asked for their daughter's hand in marriage. CCC replied that he was giving
his permission for their daughter to marry. In the same salaysay, he also said that
Egap wrote him a letter on July 4, 1994 and instructed him to proceed to Malitub,
Bataraza to discuss the intended marriage of AAA and Sajiron. However, records
are bereft of proof of the existence of these letters. Clearly, these allegations, being
unsupported by evidence, are self-serving and cannot be given any probative value.
Moreover, Imam Musli Mohammad, while testifying as prosecution witness,

attested that the parents of AAA and Sajiron were not present during the marriage,
[15]
thus controverting CCC's allegation that he was present and gave consent to the
marriage. Although Imam Musli Muhammad, when presented as an accused
witness, recanted his earlier testimony that CCC was not present at the wedding,
the same cannot be given credit. Recantations are frowned upon by the courts. A
recantation of a testimony is exceedingly unreliable, for there is always the
probability that such recantation may later on be itself repudiated. Courts look with
disfavor upon retractions, because they can easily be obtained from witnesses
through intimidation or for monetary considerations. Hence, a retraction does not
necessarily negate an earlier declaration. They are generally unreliable and looked
upon with considerable disfavor by the courts. [16] Moreover, it would be a
dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a court of justice, simply
because the witness who has given it later on changes his mind for one reason or
another.[17]
As to the defense of denial, the same is inherently weak. Denial is a self-serving

negative evidence, which cannot be given greater weight than that of the
declaration of a credible witness who testifies on affirmative matters. Like alibi,
denial is an inherently weak defense, which cannot prevail over the positive and
credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Denial cannot prevail over the
positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have any ill
motive to testify against petitioner.[18]
The assertion of the accused that the reason why a criminal case was filed against
him was his failure to pay the P10,000.00 dowry is too lame to be accepted as true.
No young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit she has been raped unless
that is the truth. Even in these modern times, this principle holds true. [19] When the
offended parties are young and immature girls from 12 to 16, as in this case, courts
are inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired, considering not
only their relative vulnerability, but also the public humiliation to which they
would be exposed by a court trial, if their accusation were not true.[20]
It is highly improbable that a young girl, such as AAA, would concoct a horrid
story and impute to the accused a crime so grave and subject herself and her family
to the humiliation and invasive ordeal of a public trial just to avenge the alleged
non-payment of the dowry, unless she be impelled by a genuine desire to expose
the truth, vindicate her honor and seek justice she so greatly deserves.
Neither is the Court convinced of the sweetheart theory, the defense of the accused,
by alleging that AAA and Sajiron were engaged for three years prior to their
elopement and marriage. If there were indeed romantic relationship between AAA
and Sajiron, as the latter claims, her normal reaction would have been to cover up
for the man she supposedly loved. On the contrary, AAA lost no time in reporting
the incident to the National Bureau of Investigation, [21] right after she was rescued
by the authorities.
Moreover, the sweetheart theory proffered by the accused is effectively an

admission of carnal knowledge of the victim, whichconsequently places on him the
burden of proving the supposed relationship by substantial evidence.
[22]
The sweetheart theoryhardly deserves any attention when an accused does not
present any evidence, such as love letters, gifts, pictures, and the like to show that,
indeed, he and the victim were sweethearts. [23] In the case at bar, Sajiron was
unable to present any evidence to prove their relationship. Clearly, the "sweetheart
theory" is a self-serving defense and mere fabrication of the accused to exculpate
himself and his cohorts from the charges filed against them. It bears stressing that
during her testimony before the trial court, AAA vehemently denied that she and
Sajiron were sweethearts and firmly declared that the latter never lived in their
house.[24]
More importantly, in rape cases, the credibility of the victim's testimony is almost
always the single most important factor. When the victim's testimony is credible, it
may be the sole basis for the accused's conviction.[25] This is so because, owing to
the nature of the offense, in many cases, the only evidence that can be given
regarding the matter is the testimony of the offended party.[26]
In the case at bar, the trial court found AAA's testimony credible. The trial
court held that AAA's testimony was clear, categorical and consistent. She
remained steadfast in her assertions and unfaltering in her testimony given in court
on the unfortunate incident.[27] The trial court found that AAA positively identified
Sajiron and Maron as her abductors and narrated how she was taken and thrice
raped by Sajiron in the forest. AAA recounted her sordid experience as follows:
AAA on Direct-Examination by Private Prosecutor Narrazid.
Q: On July 1, 1994 more or less at 3:30 p.m. do you remember where you were?
A: Yes maam.
Q: Where were you?

A: We fetched water on July 1, 1994.
Q: Where?
A: In a cave, maam.
Q: Was there anything unusual that happened during that time?

A: Yes maam.
Q: What was that incident?

A: I noticed that Sahiron Lajim run towards me and held me by my hair. He was
carrying a Barong and he was forcing me to go with him but I refused
maam.
Q: And what did you do if any when he forced you to go with him?
A: He threatened me to kill me if I will not go with him. What I did was to hold
the hair of Inon Dama who came to my rescue, maam.
Q: What did Sahiron Lajim do if any?

A: He hacked Inon Dama but was not hit and it was the container that was hit,
maam. And Sahiron Lajim left and I was forced to go with him telling me,
go with me if you do not want to die.
Q: When this Inon Dama left what happened next and you were left alone with
Sahiron Lajim?
A: His father suddenly appeared who was also carrying a gun.
Q: What happened next?
A: The father of Sahiron Lajim told me to go with them but I refused. What they
did was to tie my hands behind my back and my mouth was covered by
them by a piece of cloth, maam.
Q: And after that what happened next?

A: Then they brought me to the forest maam.
Q: And when you were in the forest what happened next?

A: Sahiron Lajim raped me while his father was watching maam.
Q: And how did Sahiron Lajim raped you?

A: When we reached the forest my hands were untied and my dress were removed
and only my bra was left maam.
Q: Who removed your dress?

A: Sahiron Lajim maam.
Q: And you stated that it was only your bra that was left in your body how about
your panty?
A: It was already removed.
Q: While Sahiron Lajim was undressing you what did you do, if any?
A: I pleaded to him not to pursue his intention and Sahiron Lajim threatened me
that if I will allow him to do such thing to me he will not kill me, maam.
Q: And did he hold the private parts of your body?

A: Yes maam. (witness pointing to her bust, and the lower part of her body)
Q: What other part did Sahiron Lajim touch in your body?

A: My private part, my vagina, maam.
Q: What else did he do to you?

A: He inserted his organ to my vagina. Then after raping me he required me to
wear my blouse. He repeated the act again for two times up to the
following day, maam.
Q: How long was the private part of Sahiron Lajim inside your private part?
A: A little bit long. Nearing one (1) hour.
Q: That was the first time his organ entered your private part?
A: Yes maam.
Q: Did you notice anything in your private part?

A: I have seen blood. I was even pushing him away.
Q: How did you feel at that time when his organ was inside your private part?
A: It was painful, maam.
Q: And you stated that his organ entered your private part again for the second
time, how long?
A I did not notice anymore how long was it, maam.
Q: And you stated Madam Witness that you were repeatedly raped that night, is
that correct?
A: Yes maam.
Q: Up to what time?
A: The first time that he raped me was about 7:00 oclock in the evening, the
second was midnight. And the third was 3:00 oclock in the morning.
Q: Were you able to sleep that night?

A: No maam.
Q: At the time when you were raped for the first time where was the father of
Sahiron Lajim?
A: He was guarding maam.
Q: How far was his father?

A: He was near a tree which was 10 meters away from us.
Q: Now, the place where you were brought by Sahiron Lajim is a forest?
A: Yes maam.
Q: Was there a hut in that forest?

A: None maam, we were at a place where there were big trees, maam.
Q: So, you mean to say you were raped on the ground?

A: Yes maam.
Q: Without any blanket?

A: He got some leaves of trees, maam.
Q: What did he do with that leaves of trees?

A: He secured some leaves and placed it on the ground, which served as mat,
maam.
Q: Now, the second and the third time that Sahiron Lajim raped you where was
his father?
A: He was also there, maam.[28] (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
As a rule, this Court gives great weight to the trial courts evaluation of the
testimony of a witness, because the trial court had the opportunity to observe the
facial expression, gesture, and tone of voice of a witness while testifying, thus,
putting it in a better position to determine whether a witness was lying or telling
the truth.[29]
However, the Court does not agree with the findings of the CA affirming the trial
court's judgment finding Sajiron and Maron guilty of abduction and rape in
Criminal Case No. 12281. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for
review on any question, including one not raised by the parties[30] Article 342 of the
Revised Penal Code spells out the elements of the crime of forcible abduction,
thus: (a) that the person abducted is a woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or
reputation; (b) that the abduction is against her will; and (c) that the abduction is
with lewd designs.
A reading of the Information in Criminal Case No. 12281, for abduction with rape,
would readily show that the allegations therein do not charge the accused with
forcible abduction, because the taking, as alleged, was not with lewd designs. The
only act that was alleged to have been attended with lewd design was the act of
rape. Upon further perusal of the allegations in the information, it appears that the
crime charged was actually the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention and rape, defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
Although the information does not specifically allege the term kidnap or
detain, the information specifically used the terms takeand carry
away. To kidnap is to carry away by unlawful force or fraud or to seize and detain
for the purpose of so carrying away.[31] Whereas, to take is to get into one's hand or
into one's possession, power, or control by force or strategem. [32] Thus, the
word take, plus the accompanying phrase carry away, as alleged in the
information, was sufficient to inform the accused that they were charged with
unlawfully taking and detaining AAA.
Further, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the information or from the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law which in no way
affect the legal aspects of the information, but from the actual recital of facts as
alleged in the body of the information.[33] Simply put, the crime charged is
determined by the information's accusatory portion and not by its denomination.
The accusatory portion of the information alleges that AAA was taken and carried
away by Sajiron and Maron against her will and brought to the forest; and, on the
occasion thereof, Sajiron -- by means of force, threat, violence and intimidation --
had carnal knowledge of AAA.
The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code [34] are: (1) the offender is a private
individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the
latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (4) in the
commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances are present: (a) the
kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days; or (b) it is committed by
simulating public authority; or (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon
the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person
kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.[35]
In the case at bar, Sajiron and Maron, who are private individuals, forcibly took
and dragged AAA, a minor, to the forest and held her captive against her will. The
crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a person in an
enclosure, but also of detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty.
[36]
For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going
home.[37] Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with
indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation. [38] In the
present case, although AAA was not actually confined in an enclosed place, she
was clearly restrained and deprived of her liberty, because she was tied up and her
mouth stuffed with a piece of cloth, thus, making it very easy to physically drag
her to the forest away from her home.
The crime of rape was also proven beyond reasonable doubt in this case. Sajiron
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA through the use of force and
intimidation. For fear of losing her life, AAA had no choice but to give in
to Sajiron's beastly and lustful assault.
Clearly, conspiracy between Sajiron and Maron attended the commission of
forcible abduction and the subsequent rape of AAA. Conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it.
[39]
It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during or after the
commission of the crime which, when taken together, would be enough to reveal a
community of criminal design, as the proof of conspiracy is frequently made by
evidence of a chain of circumstances. Once established, all the conspirators are
criminally liable as co-principals regardless of the degree of participation of each
of them, for in the contemplation of the law, the act of one is the act of all. [40] In the
case at bar, it was proven that Sajiron and Maron cooperated to prevent AAA from
resisting her abduction by tying her hands behind her back and putting a piece of
cloth in her mouth. Maron watched and stood guard to make sure that no one
would interrupt or prevent the bestial act perpetrated by his son against
AAA. Maron did not endeavor to prevent his son from raping AAA thrice. The
next morning, Sajiron and Maron brought AAA to the house of Egap to detain her
there.
The last paragraph of Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides that if the
victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped or subjected
to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. In People
v. Larraaga,[41] the Court explained that this provision gives rise to a special
complex crime:
This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes, the concept of 'special complex crime'
of kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the
courts between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought
by the accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but
was merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is
killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought
or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be
complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special
complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by R.A. No. 7659."
Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the
resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Some of thespecial complex crimes
under the Revised Penal Code are (1) robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with rape,
(3) kidnapping with serious physical injuries, (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide, and
(5) rape with homicide. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily
prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if
they were made the subject of separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659
amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: "When
the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to
torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed; and that this
provision gives rise to a special complex crime. (Italics in the original)
Thus, we hold that Sajiron and Maron are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape in
Criminal Case No. 12281.
In Criminal Case No. 12309, we also find Sajiron guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of serious illegal detention.
All the elements of the crime of serious illegal detention are present in the instant
case: AAA, a female and a minor, testified that on July 2, 1994, after she was raped
in the forest, she was brought to and detained at the house of Egap and forced to
cohabit with Sajiron. From the very start of her detention on July 2, 1994, Egap
directed Sajiron to guard her, and shoot her if she attempted to escape. [42] She did
not dare to escape because the accused threatened to kill her and her family if she
attempted to flee.[43]
AAA was also guarded by Egap's wife.[44] Even the two sons of Egap, upon the
latter's instruction, constantly guarded and threatened her to keep her from leaving.
[45]
In fine, the accused had successfully instilled fear in AAA's mind that escaping
would cause her not only her own life, but also the lives of her loved ones.
To give a color of legitimacy to AAA's detention, Sajiron married AAA. However,

the marriage between her and Sajiron is considered irregular under the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws (Presidential Decree No. 1083). Art. 15 (b) of said the law
provides that no marriage contract shall be perfected unless the essential requisite
of mutual consent of the parties be freely given. And under Art. 32 of the same law,
if the consent of either party is vitiated by violence, intimidation, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation, the marriage is considered irregular (fasid) from the time of its
celebration.
AAA did not give her consent to the wedding. [46] The marriage was solemnized
only upon the instruction of Egap.[47] She was also forced to sign the marriage
contract without the presence of her parents or any of her relatives. [48] She did not
want to marry Sajiron because she did not love him. [49] The Imam who solemnized
their marriage did not even ask for the consent of the parties. [50] He was merely
compelled to solemnize the marriage because he was afraid of Egap, and the latter
threatened him.[51] Clearly, the marriage ceremony was a farce, and was only
orchestrated by the accused in an attempt to exculpate themselves from criminal
responsibility.
Anent Criminal Case No. 12309, the prescribed penalty for serious illegal
detention under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
(R. A.) No. 7659, is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or
modifying circumstance in the commission of the offense, the proper penalty to be
imposed is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
As to Criminal Case No. 12281, the penalty for the special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention and rape is death. However, R.A. No.
9346, entitled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines, which was approved on June 24, 2006, prohibits the imposition of the
death penalty. Thus, the penalty of death is reduced to reclusion perpetua,
[52]
without eligibility for parole.[53]
As to accused Egap, his act of escaping from his police escort during the pendency
of his case and his subsequent unexplained absence during the promulgation of the
decision convicting him of the crime charged has divested him of the right to avail
himself of any remedy that may be available to him, including his right to appeal.
In a recent case, this Court held that once an accused jumps bail or flees to a
foreign country, or escapes from prison or confinement, he loses his standing in
court; and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is
deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from it. [54]Hence, insofar as accused
Egap is concerned, the judgment against him became final and executory upon the
lapse of fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment.
As to the award of damages.

In Criminal Case No. 12281, AAA is entitled to civil indemnity in line with
prevailing jurisprudence that civil indemnification is mandatory upon the finding
of rape.[55]
In People v. Quiachon,[56] even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed because

of the prohibition in R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is proper,
because it is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the
fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty
attended the commission of the offense. As explained in People v. Salome,[57] while
R.A. No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the fact remains that
the penalty provided for by the law for a heinous offense is still death, and the
offense is still heinous. Accordingly, the civil indemnity for AAA is P75,000.00.
In addition, AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Art. 2219 of the Civil
Code,[58] without the necessity of additional pleadings or proof other than the fact
of rape.[59] Moral damages is granted in recognition of the victim's injury
necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape. [60] Such award is separate and
distinct from the civil indemnity.[61] Therefore, the Court awards the amount
of P75,000.00 as moral damages.
In Criminal Case No. 12309, for serious illegal detention, the trial court's
award of P50,000 civil indemnity to AAA was proper,in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.[62]
We also find that AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Art. 2219 of the
Civil Code, which provides that moral damages may be recovered in cases of
illegal detention.[63] This is predicated on AAA's having suffered serious anxiety
and fright when she was detained for more than five months. Thus, the Court
awards the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.[64]
Finally, AAA was sexually abused on July 1, 1994 and gave birth on April 8, 1995.
There was no showing that AAA had previously been sexually abused or had
sexual relations with other men. Further, Dr. Ma. Rebethia Alcala, a Municipal
Health Officer of Bataraza, Palawan, testified that since AAA gave birth on April 8,
1995, the baby must have been conceived sometime in July 1994, which was at or
about the time of the commission of the rape. Therefore, it can be logically
deduced that Sajiron is the father of the child. Under Art. 345 of the Revised Penal
Code,[65] he is civilly liable for the support of his offspring. Hence, he is directed to
provide support to the victim's child born out of the rape, subject to the amount and
conditions to be determined by the trial court, after due notice and hearing, in
accordance with Art. 201 of the Family Code.[66]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00475 is AFFIRMEDwith MODIFICATIONS as follows:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 12281, accused Sajiron Lajim and Maron Lajim are
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention with rape under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and are sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and to pay jointly and
severally, the offended party AAA, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P75,000.00 as moral damages. Accused Sajiron Lajim is further ordered to
support the offspring born as a consequence of the rape. The amount of support
shall be determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing, with support in
arrears to be reckoned from the date the appealed decision was promulgated by the
trial court; and
(b) In Criminal Case No. 12309, accused Sajiron Lajim is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the amounts
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992
SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 affirming in toto the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Oroquieta City, finding him guilty of the crime of
attempted murder.
From the records, we gathered the following facts.
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to
Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with them to the
house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting
with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute
between them and that Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed
with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of
his companions, Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio
and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was
then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one
was hit by the gun fire.
Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness testified that before the five men
left the premises, they shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will
come back if (sic) you were not injured". 2
After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder. The court (RTC), as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, holding that Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder. Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the
judgment by holding him liable only for an impossible crime, citing Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code which
provides:
Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:
xxx xxx xxx

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it
not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of
inadequate or ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his companions
riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.
On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not impossible. Instead, the facts
were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder. Respondent alleged that there was
intent. Further, in its Comment to the Petition, respondent pointed out that:
. . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment (Art. 4(2), Revised Penal Code), but due to a cause or accident other than
petitioner's and his accused's own spontaneous desistance (Art. 3., Ibid.) Palangpangan did not
sleep at her house at that time. Had it not been for this fact, the crime is possible, not impossible. 3
Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the Revised Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the void in the Old
Penal Code where:
. . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has been commenced, that the person conceiving
the idea should have set about doing the deed, employing appropriate means in order that his
intent might become a reality, and finally, that the result or end contemplated shall have been
physically possible. So long as these conditions were not present, the law and the courts did not
hold him criminally liable. 5
This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. 6 The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist
School, recognizes in the offender his formidability, 7and now penalizes an act which were it not aimed at
something quite impossible or carried out with means which prove inadequate, would constitute a felony
against person or against property. 8 The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies. 9
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against person or property because:
(1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment: or (2) the means employed is either (a)
inadequate or (b) ineffectual. 10
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must
be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. 11 There must be either impossibility of accomplishing the
intended act 12in order to qualify the act an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. 13 Thus:
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and
expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical
act; (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from
the intended act does not amount to a crime. 14
The impossibility of killing a person already dead 15 falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his
control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. 16One example is the man who puts his hand in the
coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty. 17
The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be, although
in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.
One American case had facts almost exactly the same as this one. In People vs. Lee Kong, 18 the accused, with
intent to kill, aimed and fired at the spot where he thought the police officer would be. It turned out,
however, that the latter was in a different place. The accused failed to hit him and to achieve his intent.
The Court convicted the accused of an attempt to kill. It held that:
The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the attacking party imagined where he was, and
where the bullet pierced the roof, renders it no less an attempt to kill. It is well settled principle of
criminal law in this country that where the criminal result of an attempt is not accomplished simply
because of an obstruction in the way of the thing to be operated upon, and these facts are
unknown to the aggressor at the time, the criminal attempt is committed.
In the case of Strokes vs. State, 19 where the accused failed to accomplish his intent to kill the victim because
the latter did not pass by the place where he was lying-in wait, the court held him liable for attempted
murder. The court explained that:
It was no fault of Strokes that the crime was not committed. . . . It only became impossible by
reason of the extraneous circumstance that Lane did not go that way; and further, that he was
arrested and prevented from committing the murder. This rule of the law has application only where
it is inherently impossible to commit the crime. It has no application to a case where it becomes
impossible for the crime to be committed, either by outside interference or because of
miscalculation as to a supposed opportunity to commit the crime which fails to materialize; in short
it has no application to the case when the impossibility grows out of extraneous acts not within the
control of the party.
In the case of Clark vs. State, 20 the court held defendant liable for attempted robbery even if there was
nothing to rob. In disposing of the case, the court quoted Mr. Justice Bishop, to wit:
It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves punishment by reason of his criminal intent, no
one can seriously doubt that the protection of the public requires the punishment to be
administered, equally whether in the unseen depths of the pocket, etc., what was supposed to exist
was really present or not. The community suffers from the mere alarm of crime. Again: Where the
thing intended (attempted) as a crime and what is done is a sort to create alarm, in other words,
excite apprehension that the evil; intention will be carried out, the incipient act which the law of
attempt takes cognizance of is in reason committed.
In State vs. Mitchell, 21 defendant, with intent to kill, fired at the window of victim's room thinking that the
latter was inside. However, at that moment, the victim was in another part of the house. The court
convicted the accused of attempted murder.
The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied upon by Respondent to make this Court sustain the
judgment of attempted murder against Petitioner. However, we cannot rely upon these decisions to resolve the issue
at hand. There is a difference between the Philippine and the American laws regarding the concept and appreciation
of impossible crimes.
In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for impossible crimes and made the
punishable. Whereas, in the United States, the Code of Crimes and Criminal Procedure is silent regarding this matter.
What it provided for were attempts of the crimes enumerated in the said Code. Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the
impossibility of committing the offense is merely a defense to an attempt charge. In this regard, commentators and
the cases generally divide the impossibility defense into two categories: legal versus factual impossibility. 22 In U.S.
vs. Wilson 23 the Court held that:
. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could have
been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is no defense
that in reality the crime was impossible of commission.
Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt.
In U.S. vs. Berrigan, 24 the accused was indicated for attempting to smuggle letters into and out of prison.
The law governing the matter made the act criminal if done without knowledge and consent of the
warden. In this case, the offender intended to send a letter without the latter's knowledge and consent and
the act was performed. However, unknown to him, the transmittal was achieved with the warden's
knowledge and consent. The lower court held the accused liable for attempt but the appellate court
reversed. It held unacceptable the contention of the state that "elimination of impossibility as a defense to
a charge of criminal attempt, as suggested by the Model Penal Code and the proposed federal legislation,
is consistent with the overwhelming modern view". In disposing of this contention, the Court held that the
federal statutes did not contain such provision, and thus, following the principle of legality, no person
could be criminally liable for an act which was not made criminal by law. Further, it said:
Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent plus act plus conduct constitutes the
offense of attempt irrespective of legal impossibility until such time as such legislative changes in
the law take place, this court will not fashion a new non-statutory law of criminal attempt.
To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible or accomplishment,
the offender cannot escape criminal liability. He can be convicted of an attempt to commit the substantive crime
where the elements of attempt are satisfied. It appears, therefore, that the act is penalized, not as an impossible
crime, but as an attempt to commit a crime. On the other hand, where the offense is legally impossible of
accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable for any crime neither for an attempt not for an impossible crime.
The only reason for this is that in American law, there is no such thing as an impossible crime. Instead, it only
recognizes impossibility as a defense to a crime charge that is, attempt.
This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of
accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase
"inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or
physical impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible
of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an
impossible crime.
To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the absence of
Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4,
which makes a person criminally liable for an act "which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not
for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances which prevented the
consummation of the offense will be treated as an accident independent of the actor's will which is an element of
attempted and frustrated felonies.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of
Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. We hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an
impossible crime as defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code,
respectively. Having in mind the social danger and degree of criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court sentences him
to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the law,
and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., is on leave
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 143468-71. January 24, 2003]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FREEDIE

LIZADA @ FREDIE LIZADA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an automatic review of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
[1]
Branch 54, finding accused-appellant Freedie Lizada guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
four (4) counts of qualified rape and meting on him the death penalty for each count.
I. The Charges
Accused-appellant was charged with four (4) counts of qualified rape under four
[2]
separate Informations. The accusatory portion of each of the four Informations reads:
That sometime in August 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
with lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means
of force, violence and intimidation upon the person of one ANALIA ORILLOSA y
AGOO, by then and there embracing her, kissing and touching her private parts,
thereafter removing her skirt and panty, placing himself on top of her and trying to
insert his penis into her vagina and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the
said ANALIA ORILLOSA y AGOO, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
XXX
That on or about November 5, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, with lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
by means of force, violence and intimidation upon the person of one ANALIA
ORILLOSA Y AGOO, by then and there embracing her, kissing and touching her
private parts, thereafter removing her skirt and panty, placing himself on top of her
and trying to insert his penis into her vagina and succeeded in having carnal
knowledge with the said ANALIA ORILLOSA Y AGOO, against her will and
consent.
Contrary to law.
XXX
That on or about October 22, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
consent.
Contrary to law.
XXX
That on or about September 15, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
consent.
Contrary to law.[3]
The four (4) Informations were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 99-171390, 99-
171391, 99-171392 and 99-171393, respectively.
Accused-appellant was arraigned on April 15, 1999, assisted by counsel de
parte and entered a plea of not guilty to each of the charges. A joint trial then ensued.
[4]
II. Evidence of the Prosecution [5]
Ricardo Orillosa and his wife, Rose Orillosa, natives of San Isidro, Bohol, had three
(3) children, namely: Analia, who was born on December 18, 1985; Jepsy, who was 11
[6]
years old, and Rossel, who was nine years old. However, the couple decided to part
ways and live separately. Rose left Bohol and settled in Manila with her young
children. She worked as a waitress to make both ends meet.
In 1994, Rose met accused-appellant. They decided to live together as husband
and wife at No. 1252 Jose Abad Santos Street, Moriones, Tondo, Manila. In 1996, Rose
resigned from her job as a waitress. She secured a loan, bought a truck and used it for
her business.
In the meantime, Rose secured a loan anew and used the proceeds thereof to put
up a video shop in her house. She sold Avon products from house to house to augment
her income. Whenever she was out of their house, Rossel and Analia took turns in
tending the video shop and attending to customers.
Sometime in 1996, Analia was in her room when accused-appellant entered. He laid
on top of her, removed her T-shirt and underwear. He then inserted his finger in her
vagina. He removed his finger and inserted his penis in her vagina. Momentarily, she
felt a sticky substance coming out from his penis. She also felt pain in her sex
organ. Satiated, accused-appellant dismounted but threatened to kill her if she divulged
to anyone what he did to her. Accused-appellant then returned to his room. The incident
lasted less than one hour. Petrified by the threats on her life, Analia kept to herself what
happened to her. [7]
Sometime in August 1997, accused-appellant entered again the room of Analia,

placed himself on top of her and held her legs and arms. He then inserted his finger into
her sex organ (fininger niya ako). Satiated, accused-appellant left the room. During the
period from 1996 to 1998, accused-appellant sexually abused private complainant two
times a week.
On November 5, 1998, at about 3:00 p.m., Analia was in the sala of their house
studying her assignments. Accused-appellant was also in the sala. Rossel tended the
video shop while his mother was away. Analia went into her room and lay down in
bed. She did not lock the door of the room because her brother might enter any
time. She wanted to sleep but found it difficult to do so. Accused-appellant went to his
room next to the room of Analia. He, however, entered the room of Analia. He was
wearing a pair of short pants and was naked from waist up. Analia did not mind
accused-appellant entering her room because she knew that her brother, Rossel was
around. However, accused-appellant sat on the side of her bed, placed himself on top of
her, held her hands and legs and fondled her breasts. She struggled to extricate
herself. Accused-appellant removed her panty and touched her sex organ. Accused-
appellant inserted his finger into her vagina, extricated it and then inserted his penis into
her vagina. Accused-appellant ejaculated. Analia felt pain in her sex
organ. Momentarily, Rossel passed by the room of Analia after drinking water from the
refrigerator, and peeped through the door. He saw accused-appellant on top of
Analia. Accused-appellant saw Rossel and dismounted. Accused-appellant berated
Rossel and ordered him to go to his room and sleep. Rossel did. Accused-appellant
then left the room. Analia likewise left the room, went out of the house and stayed
outside for one hour. Rose arrived home at 6:00 p.m. However, Analia did not divulge to
her mother what accused-appellant had just done to her.
On November 9, 1998, at about 3:00 p.m., Rose left the house. Accused-appellant
was in the sala of the house watching television.Analia tended the video shop. However,
accused-appellant told Analia to go to the sala. She refused, as nobody would tend the
video shop. This infuriated accused-appellant who threatened to slap and kick her.
Analia ignored the invectives and threats of accused-appellant and stayed in the
video shop. When Rose returned, a heated argument ensued between accused-
appellant and Analia. Rose sided with her paramour and hit Analia. This prompted
Analia to shout.Ayoko na, ayoko na. Shortly thereafter, Rose and Analia left the house
on board the motorcycle driven by her mother in going to Don Bosco Street, Moriones,
Tondo, Manila, to retrieve some tapes which had not yet been returned. When Rose
inquired from her daughter what she meant by her statement, ayoko na, ayoko na, she
told her mother that accused-appellant had been touching the sensitive parts of her
body and that he had been on top of her. Rose was shocked and incensed. The two
proceeded to KagawadDanilo Santos to have accused-appellant placed under
arrest. On November 10, 1998, the two proceeded to the Western Police District where
Analia gave her Affidavit-Complaint to PO1 Carmelita Nocum in the presence of SPO2
Fe H. Avindante. She related to the police investigator that accused-appellant had
touched her breasts and arms in August, 1998, September 15, 1998, October 22, 1998
and on November 5, 1998, at 3:00 p.m. Analia then submitted herself to genitalia
examination by Dr. Armie Umil, a medico-legal officer of the NBI. The medico-legal
officer interviewed Analia, told him that she was raped in May, 1997 at 3:00 p.m. and
November 5, 1998 at 3:00 p.m. [8]
Dr. Umil prepared and signed a report on Living Case No. MO-98-1265 which
contained her findings during her examination on Analia, thus:
xxx
Fairly nourished, conscious, coherent, cooperative, ambulatory subject. Breasts,

developed, hemispherical, firm. ----, brown, 3.0 cms. in diameter. Nipples brown,
protruding, 0.7 cms. in diameter.
No extragenital physical injuries noted.
GENITAL EXAMINATION:
Pubic hair, fully grown, moderate. Labia majora and minora, coaptated. Fourchette,
tense. Vetibular mucosa, pinkish. Hymen, tall, thick, intact.Hymenal orifice measures,
1.5 cms. in diameter. Vaginal walls, tight. Rugosities, prominent.
CONCLUSIONS:
1). No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at
the time of examination.
2). Hymen, intact and its orifice small (1.5 cms. in diameter) as to preclude complete
penetration by an average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection without
producing any genital injury. [9]
Subsequently, Analia told her mother that mabuti na lang iyong panghihipo lang ang
sinabi ko. When Rose inquired from her daughter what she meant by her statement,
Analia revealed to her mother that accused-appellant had sexually abused her. On
December 15, 1998, Analia executed a Dagdag na Salaysay ng Paghahabla and
charged accused-appellant with rape. [10]
III. The Defenses and Evidence of Accused-Appellant
Accused-appellant testified in his defense. He declared that after a month of

courtship, he and Rose agreed in 1994 to live together as husband and wife. He was
then a utility worker with the Navotas Branch of the Philippine Banking
Corporation. Rose, on the other hand, was a waitress at the Golden Bird beer house at
Rizal Avenue, Manila.
Accused-appellant denied having raped Analia. He claimed that he loved the
children of Rose as if they were his own children. He took care of them, as in fact he
cooked and prepared their food before they arrived home from school. At times, he
ironed their school uniforms and bathed them, except Analia who was already
big. Analia was hard-headed because she disobeyed him whenever he ordered her to
do some errands. Because of Analias misbehavior, accused-appellant and Rose
oftentimes quarreled. Rose even demanded that accused-appellant leave their
house. Another irritant in his and Roses lives were the frequent visits of the relatives of
her husband.
Sometime in 1997, accused-appellant was retrenched from his employment and
received a separation pay of P9,000.00 which he used to put up the VHS Rental and
Karaoke from which he earned a monthly income of P25,000.00. While living together,
accused-appellant and Rose acquired two colored television sets, two VHS Hi-fi
recorders, one VHS player, one washing machine, one scooter motor, two VHS
rewinders, one sala set, one compact disc player and many other properties.
Accused-appellant ventured that Rose coached her children Analia and Rossel to
testify against him and used them to fabricate charges against him because Rose
wanted to manage their business and take control of all the properties they acquired
during their coverture. Also, Rose was so exasperated because he had no job.
IV. The Verdict
On May 29, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment against accused-appellant
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of rape, defined and
penalized in the seventh paragraph, no. 1, Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and
meted on him the death penalty for each count. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
From all the evidence submitted by the prosecution, the Court concludes that the
accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged against him in these
four (4) cases, convicts him thereof, and sentences him to DEATH PENALTY in each
and every case as provided for in the seventh paragraph, no. 1, Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED. [11]
V. Assigned Errors of the Trial Court
Accused-appellant assailed the decision of the court a quo and averred in his brief
that:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MAKING A FINDING OF FACT IN ITS
DECISION AND SUCH FAILURE IS A REVERSIBLE ERROR.[12]
XXX
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
FOUR (4) COUNTS OF RAPE DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[13]
VI. Findings of the Court
On the first assignment of error, accused-appellant contends that the decision of the
trial court is null and void as it failed to comply with the requirements of Section 14,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and Section 1, Rule 36 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended. He avers that the court a quo made no findings of facts in its
decision. The trial court merely summarized the testimonies of the witnesses of the
prosecution and those of accused-appellant and his witnesses, and forthwith set forth
the decretal portion of said decision. The trial court even failed to state in said decision
the factual and legal basis for the imposition of the supreme penalty of death on
him. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that there should be no
mechanical reliance on the constitutional provision. Trial courts may well-nigh
synthesize and simplify their decisions considering that courts are harassed by crowded
dockets and time constraints. Even if the trial court did not elucidate the grounds as the
legal basis for the penalties imposed, nevertheless the decision is valid. In any event,
the Solicitor General contends that despite the infirmity of the decision, there is no need
to remand the case to the trial court for compliance with the constitutional requirement
as the Court may resolve the case on its merits to avoid delay in the final disposition of
the case and afford accused-appellant his right to a speedy trial.
The contention of accused-appellant is well-taken. Article VIII, paragraph 14 of the
1987 Constitution provides that no decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. This
requirement is reiterated and implemented by Rule 120, Section 2 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, which reads:
SEC. 2. Form and contents of judgment.The judgment must be written in the official
language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall
contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the
accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.
If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the legal qualification of the offense
constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances attending the commission thereof, if there are any; (b) the participation
of the accused in the commission of the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or
accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (d) the civil
liability or damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from the accused by
the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a
separate action has been reserved or waived. [14]
The purpose of the provision is to inform the parties and the person reading the
decision on how it was reached by the court after consideration of the evidence of the
parties and the relevant facts, of the opinion it has formed on the issues, and of the
applicable laws. The parties must be assured from a reading of the decision of the trial
court that they were accorded their rights to be heard by an impartial and responsible
judge. More substantial reasons for the requirement are:
[15]
For one thing, the losing party must be given an opportunity to analyze the decision so
that, if permitted, he may elevate what he may consider its errors for review by a
higher tribunal. For another, the decision if well-presented and reasoned, may
convince the losing party of its merits and persuade it to accept the verdict in good
grace instead of prolonging the litigation with a useless appeal. A third reason is that
decisions with a full exposition of the facts and the law on which they are based,
especially those coming from the Supreme Court, will constitute a valuable body of
case law that can serve as useful references and even as precedents in the resolution of
future controversies.[16]
The trial court is mandated to set out in its decision the facts which had been proved
and its conclusions culled therefrom, as well as its resolution on the issues and the
factual and legal basis for its resolution. Trial courts should not merely reproduce the
[17]
respective testimonies of witnesses of both parties and come out with its decretal
conclusion.
In this case, the trial court failed to comply with the requirements under the
Constitution and the Rules on Criminal Procedure. It merely summarized the
testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution and of accused-appellant on direct and
cross examinations and merely made referral to the documentary evidence of the
parties then concluded that, on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution, accused-
appellant is guilty of four (4) counts of rape and sentenced him to death, on each count.
The trial court even failed to specifically state the facts proven by the prosecution
based on their evidence, the issues raised by the parties and its resolution of the factual
and legal issues, as well as the legal and factual bases for convicting accused-appellant
of each of the crimes charged. The trial court rendered judgment against accused-
appellant with the curt declaration in the decretal portion of its decision that it did so
based on the evidence of the prosecution. The trial court swallowed hook, line and
sinker the evidence of the prosecution. It failed to explain in its decision why it believed
and gave probative weight to the evidence of the prosecution. Reading the decision of
the trial court, one is apt to conclude that the trial court ignored the evidence of
accused-appellant. The trial court did not even bother specifying the factual and legal
bases for its imposition of the supreme penalty of death on accused-appellant for each
count of rape. The trial court merely cited seventh paragraph, no. 1, Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code. The decision of the trial court is a good example of what a
decision, envisaged in the Constitution and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
should not be.
The Court would normally remand the case to the trial court because of the infirmity
of the decision of the trial court, for compliance with the constitutional
provision. However, to avert further delay in the disposition of the cases, the Court
decided to resolve the cases on their merits considering that all the records as well as
the evidence adduced during the trial had been elevated to the Court. The parties filed
[18]
their respective briefs articulating their respective stances on the factual and legal
issues.
In reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided by the following principles: (1) to
accuse a man of rape is easy but to disprove it is difficult though the accused may be
innocent; (2) considering the nature of things, and only two persons are usually involved
in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great
caution; (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and not
be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense. By the
[19]
very nature of the crime of rape, conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely on the
credibility of the complainants testimony because of the fact that usually only the
participants can testify as to its occurrence. However, if the accused raises a sufficient
doubt as to any material element of the crime, and the prosecution is unable to
overcome it with its evidence, the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of
proving the guilt of the accused beyond cavil of doubt and hence, the accused is entitled
to an acquittal.
Anent the second assignment of error, we will resolve the same for convenience, as
follows:
Re: CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 99-171392 and 99-171393 (covering the crime of rape
committed on or about October 22, 1998 and on or about September 15, 1998)
Accused-appellant avers that the prosecution failed to adduce the requisite

quantum of evidence that he raped the private complainant precisely on September 15,
1998 and October 22, 1998. Moreover, the medical findings of Dr. Armie Umil show that
the hymen of the private complainant was intact and its orifice so small as to preclude
complete penetration by an average size adult Filipino male organ in full erection
without producing any genital injury. The physical evidence belies private complainants
claim of having been deflowered by accused-appellant on four different occasions. The
Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, contends that the prosecution through the
private complainant proved the guilt of accused-appellant for the crime charged on both
counts.
The contention of accused-appellant does not persuade the Court. The private
complainant testified that since 1996, when she was only eleven years old, until 1998,
for two times a week, accused-appellant used to place himself on top of her and despite
her tenacious resistance, touched her arms, legs and sex organ and inserted his finger
and penis into her vagina. In the process, he ejaculated. Accused-appellant threatened
to kill her if she divulged to anyone what he did to her. Although private complainant
[20]
did not testify that she was raped on September 15, 1998 and October 22, 1998,
nevertheless accused-appellant may be convicted for two counts of rape, in light of the
testimony of private complainant.
It bears stressing that under the two Informations, the rape incidents are alleged to
have been committed on or about September 15, 1998 and on or about October 22,
1998. The words on or about envisage a period, months or even two or four years
before September 15, 1998 or October 22, 1998. The prosecution may prove that the
crime charged was committed on or about September 15, 1998 and on or about
October 22, 1998.
In People vs. Gianan, this Court affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant of
[21]
five (5) counts of rape, four of which were committed in December 1992 (two counts)
and one each in March and April, 1993 and in November, 1995 and one count of acts of
lasciviousness committed in December 1992, on a criminal complaint for multiple
rape, viz:
That sometime in November 1995, and some occasions prior and/or subsequent
thereto, in the Municipality of Dasmarias, Province of Cavite, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs,
taking advantage of his superior strength over the person of his own twelve (12) year
old daughter, and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have repeated carnal knowledge of Myra M.
Gianan, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice. [22]
On the contention of accused-appellant in said case that his conviction for rape in
December 1992 was so remote from the date (November 1995) alleged in the
Information, so that the latter could no longer be considered as being as near to the
actual date at which the offense was committed as provided under Section 11, Rule 110
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, this Court held:
Accused-appellant nevertheless argues that his conviction for rape in December 1992
is so remote from the date (November 1995) alleged in the information, so that the
latter could no longer be considered as being as near to the actual date at which the
offense was committed as provided under Rule 110, 11.
This contention is also untenable. In People v. Garcia, this Court upheld a conviction
for ten counts of rape based on an information which alleged that the accused
committed multiple rape from November 1990 up to July 21, 1994, a time difference
of almost four years which is longer than that involved in the case at bar. In any case,
as earlier stated, accused-appellants failure to raise a timely objection based on this
ground constitutes a waiver of his right to object.
[23]
Moreover, when the private complainant testified on how accused-appellant defiled

her two times a week from 1996 until 1998, accused-appellant raised nary a whimper of
protest. Accused-appellant even rigorously cross-examined the private complainant on
her testimony on direct examination. The presentation by the prosecution, without
objection on the part of accused-appellant, of evidence of rape committed two times a
week from 1996 until 1998 (which includes September 15, 1998 and October 22, 1998)
to prove the charges lodged against him constituted a waiver by accused-appellant of
his right to object to any perceived infirmity in, and in the amendment of, the aforesaid
Informations to conform to the evidence adduced by the prosecution.
The barefaced fact that private complainant remained a virgin up to 1998 does not
preclude her having been repeatedly sexually abused by accused-appellant. The private
complainant being of tender age, it is possible that the penetration of the male organ
went only as deep as her labia. Whether or not the hymen of private complainant was
still intact has no substantial bearing on accused-appellants commission of the crime.
Even the slightest penetration of the labia by the male organ or the mere entry of the
[24]
penis into the aperture constitutes consummated rape. It is sufficient that there be
entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum. In People vs. Baculi,
[25]
cited in People vs. Gabayron, we held that there could be a finding of rape even if
[26]
despite repeated intercourse over a period of four years, the complainant still retained
an intact hymen without injury. In these cases, the private complainant testified that the
penis of accused-appellant gained entry into her vagina:
Fiscal Carisma
(continuing)
After your underwear was removed by the accused, what happened next?
Witness:
He laid himself on top of me, sir.
Q What did he do while he was on top of you?
A He inserted his finger (Finenger nya ako, ipinatong nya yong ano nya)
Q Can you please describe more specifically what is this and I quote Pinatong nya
yong ano nya and where did he place it?
A His organ, sir.
Q Where did he place his organ?
A In my organ, sir. (sa ari ko po.)
Q At this very juncture madam witness, what did you feel?
A I felt pain, sir, and I also felt that there was a sticky substance that was coming out,
sir.[27] (Underlining supplied)
We agree with accused-appellant that he is guilty only of two counts of simple rape,
instead of qualified rape. The evidence on record shows that accused-appellant is the
common-law husband of Rose, the mother of private complainant. The private
complainant, as of October 1998, was still 13 years old, and under Article 335 as
amended by Republic Act 7659, the minority of the private complainant, concurring with
the fact that accused-appellant is the common-law husband of the victims mother, is a
special qualifying circumstance warranting the imposition of the death penalty.
However, said circumstance was not alleged in the Informations as required by
[28]
Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which was given
retroactive effect by this Court because it is favorable to the accused. Hence, even if
[29]
the prosecution proved the special qualifying circumstance of minority of private

complainant and relationship, the accused-appellant being the common-law husband of
her mother, accused-appellant is guilty only of simple rape. Under the given law, the
penalty for simple rape is reclusion perpetua. Conformably with current jurisprudence,
accused-appellant is liable to private complainant for civil indemnity in the amount
of P50,000.00 and moral damages in the amount ofP50,000.00 for each count of rape,
or a total of P200,000.00.
Re: Criminal Cases Nos. 99-171390 and 99-171391 (covering the crime committed on
or about August 1998 and November 5, 1998)
Accused-appellant avers that (a) the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-
171390 is defective because the date of the offense on or about August 1998 alleged
therein is too indefinite, in violation of Rule 110, Section 11 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure which reads:
Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense.It is not necessary to state in the complaint
or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material
ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a
date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. (11a) [30]
Accused-appellant further asserts that the prosecution failed to prove that he raped
private complainant in August 1998. Hence, he argues, he should be acquitted of said
charge. The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, argued that the date on or about
August 1998 is sufficiently definite. After all, the date of the commission of the crime of
rape is not an essential element of the crime. The prosecution adduced conclusive proof
that accused-appellant raped private complainant on or about August 1998, as gleaned
from her testimony during the trial.
The Court does not agree with accused-appellant. It bears stressing that the precise
date of the commission of the crime of rape is not an essential element of the
crime. Failure to specify the exact date when the rape was committed does not render
the Information defective. The reason for this is that the gravamen of the crime of rape
is carnal knowledge of the private complainant under any of the circumstances
enumerated under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Significantly,
accused-appellant did not even bother to file a motion for a bill of particulars under
Rule 116, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure before he was
arraigned. Indeed, accused-appellant was duly arraigned under the Information and
entered a plea of not guilty to the charge without any plaint on the sufficiency of the
Information. Accused-appellant even adduced his evidence after the prosecution had
rested its case. It was only on appeal to this Court that accused-appellant questioned
for the first time the sufficiency of the Information filed against him. It is now too late
in the day for him to do so. Moreover, in People vs. Salalima, this Court held that:
[31]
Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso
facto make the information defective on its face. The reason is obvious. The precise
date or time when the victim was raped is not an element of the offense. The
gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances
enumerated under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. As long as it is alleged that
the offense was committed at any time as near to the actual date when the offense was
committed an information is sufficient. In previous cases, we ruled that allegations
that rapes were committed before and until October 15, 1994, sometime in the year
1991 and the days thereafter, sometime in November 1995 and some occasions prior
and/or subsequent thereto and on or about and sometime in the year 1988 constitute
sufficient compliance with Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
In this case, although the indictments did not state with particularity the dates when
the sexual assaults took place, we believe that the allegations therein that the acts were
committed sometime during the month of March 1996 or thereabout, sometime during
the month of April 1996 or thereabout, sometime during the month of May 1996 or
thereabout substantially apprised appellant of the crimes he was charged with since all
the elements of rape were stated in the informations. As such, appellant cannot
complain that he was deprived of the right to be informed of the nature of the cases
filed against him. Accordingly, appellants assertion that he was deprived of the
opportunity to prepare for his defense has no leg to stand on.
The prosecution proved through the testimony of private complainant that accused-
appellant raped her two times a week in 1998.As in Criminal Cases Nos. 99-171392
and 99-171393, accused-appellant is guilty only of simple rape.
As to the crime of rape subject of Criminal Case No. 99-171391, accused-appellant
avers that he is not criminally liable of rape. We agree with accused-appellant. The
collective testimony of private complainant and her younger brother Rossel was that on
November 5, 1998, accused-appellant who was wearing a pair of short pants but naked
from waist up, entered the bedroom of private complainant, went on top of her, held her
hands, removed her panty, mashed her breasts and touched her sex organ. However,
accused-appellant saw Rossel peeping through the door and dismounted. He berated
Rossel for peeping and ordered him to go back to his room and to sleep. Accused-
appellant then left the room of the private complainant. The testimony of private
complainant on direct examination reads:
Fiscal Carisma:
Q In between 1996 and August 1997?
A Yes, sir, sometimes two (2) times a week.
Q In November of 1998, do you recall of any unusual experience that happened to you
again?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was this unusual experience of yours?
A He laid himself on top of me, sir.
Q You said he whom are you referring to?
A Freedie Lizada Jakosalem, sir.
Q The same person you pointed to earlier?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said he placed himself on top of you in November, 1998, what did he do while
he was on top of you?
A Hes smashing my breast and he was also touching my arms and my legs, sir.
Q What else if any madam witness?
A He was also touching my sex organ, sir.
Q What else, if any?
Atty. Estorco:
May we take note of the same objection your honor, the prosecution - - -
Court:
Same ruling. Let the complainant continue considering that she is crying and still
young.
Witness:
None else, sir.
Fiscal Carisma:
With what part of his body did he touch your sex organ?
Atty. Estorco:
Your Honor, that is - - -
Court:
May answer.
Fiscal Carisma:
I will re-propound the question, your honor.
You said that he touched your sex organ, will you tell the court with what part of his
body, did he touch your sex organ?
Witness:
With his hands, sir.
Q What about after November 1998 - - -was this the last incident, this unusual thing
that you experienced from the hands of the accused was this that last time, the
one you narrated in November 1998?
A Yes, sir.[32]
On cross-examination, the private complainant testified, thus:
Atty. Balaba:
Q Who was that somebody who entered the room?
A My stepfather Freedie Lizada, sir.
Q He was fully dressed at that time, during the time, is that correct?
A Yes, sir, he was dressed then, sir.
Q And he had his pants on, is that correct?
A He was wearing a short pants, sir.
Q Was it a T-shirt that he had, at that time or a polo shirt?
A He was not wearing any shirt then, sir, he was naked.
Q When you realized that somebody was entering the room were you not afraid?
A No, sir, I was not afraid.
Q What happened when you realized that somebody entered the room, and the one
who entered was your stepfather, Freedie Lizada?
A I did not mind him entering the room because I know that my brother was around but
suddenly I felt that somebody was holding me.
Q He was holding you, where were you when he held you?
A I was in the bed, sir, lying down.
Q You were lying down?
A Yes, sir.
Q What part of the body did the accused Freedie Lizada touched you?
A My two arms, my legs and my breast, sir.
Q Do you mean to tell us that he was holding your two arms and at the same time your
legs, is that what you are trying to tell us?
A He held me first in my arms and then my legs, sir.
Q He held you first by your arms, is that what you are trying to tell us?
Fiscal Carisma:
Already answered your honor, he held the arms and then the legs.
Court:
Already answered.
Atty. Balaba:
Q Your honor, I am just trying to - -
Court:
Proceed.
Atty. Balaba:
Q He held your arms with his two hands?
A Only with one hand, sir.
Q Which hand were you touched?
A I do not know which hand, sir.
Q Which arm of yours was held by Freedie Lizada?
A I could not recall, sir.
Q Which side of your body was Freedie Lizada at that time?
A I cannot recall, sir.
Q What was the position of Freedie Lizada when he held your arms?
A He was sitting on our bed, sir.
Q Which side of your bed was Freedie Lizada sitting on?
A I do not know, sir. I cannot recall.
Atty. Balaba:
Can we take a recess your honor?
Court:
How long will it take you to finish your cross?
Atty. Balaba:
We will confront the witness with so many things your honor.
Court:
Yes, thats why I am asking you how long will it take you to finish your cross?
Atty. Balaba:
About another hour, sir.
Court:
So we will be finished by 11:15, proceed.
Atty. Balaba:
You cannot also remember which leg was held by Freedie Lizada?
A I cannot recall, sir.
Q When this happened, did you not shout for help?
A I did not ask for help, I was motioning to resist him, so that he would go out, sir. I was
struggling to free myself from him, sir.
Q And you were not able to extricate yourself from him?
A I was not able to extricate myself, sir.
Q You were struggling with one arm of Lizada holding your arm, and the other hand
was holding your leg, is that what you are trying to tell us?
A No, sir, its not like that.
Q Could you tell us, what happened, you did not shout for help and you were trying to
extricate yourself, what happened?
A He suddenly went out of the room, sir.
Q Now, he went - - -
Court:
You did not shout during that time?
A No, your honor.[33]
Rossel, the nine-year old brother of the private complainant corroborated in part his
sisters testimony. He testified on direct examination, thus:
Fiscal Carisma: (continuing)
Q Now, on November 2, 1998 do you recall where you were at about 3:00 oclock?
A I was outside our house, sir.
Q Where was your house again, Mr. witness, at that time? Where was your house at
that date, time and place? At that date and time?
A 1252 Jose Abad Santos, Tondo, Manila, sir.
Court:
Q The same address?
A Yes, sir.
Fiscal Carisma:
Q On that date, time and place, do your recall where your sister Anna Lea Orillosa
was?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where was she?
A She was sleeping, sir.
Q Now, on that date, time and place you said you were outside your house, did you
stay the whole afternoon outside your house?
A No, sir.
Q Where did you go next?
A Inside, sir.
Q For what purpose did you get inside your house?
A Because I was thirsty, sir.
Q So you went to the fridge to get some water?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what happened as you went inside your house to get some water?
A I saw my stepfather removing the panty of my sister and he touched her and then he
laid on top of her, sir.
Q Do you see your stepfather inside the courtroom now?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you point to him?
A He is the one, sir.
Court Interpreter:
Witness pointing to a male person who when asked answers to the name Freedie
Lizada.
Fiscal Carisma:
Q This thing that your father was that your stepfather did to your elder sister, did you
see this before or after you went to the fridge to get some water?
A I already got water then, sir.
Q What did you do as you saw this thing being done by your stepfather to your elder
sister?
A I was just looking at them when he saw me, sir.
Q Who, you saw who? You are referring to the accused Freedie Lizada?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, what did you do as you were seen by your stepfather?
A He scolded me, he shouted at me, he told me something and after that he went to
the other room and slept, sir.[34]
Rossel testified on cross-examination, thus:
Q So you got thirsty, is that correct, and went inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you took a glass of water from the refrigerator?
A Yes, sir.
Q And it was at this time that you saw the accused Freedie Lizada touching your
sister?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where was this refrigerator located?
A In front of the room where my sister sleeps, sir.
Q So the door of your sisters room was open?
A Yes, sir.
Q And --- okay, you said your sister was sleeping. What was the position of your sister
when you said the accused removed her panty?
A She was lying straight, but she was resisting, sir.
Q Were you noticed by your sister at that time?
A No, sir.
Q And your sister did not call for help at that time?
A No, sir.
Q And all this time you saw the accused doing this, from the refrigerator where you
were taking a glass of water?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you not say something to the accused?
A No, sir, I was just looking.
Q So your sister was lying down when the accused removed her panty, is that what you
are trying to tell us?
A Yes, sir.
Q And where was the - - - and the accused saw you when he was removing the panty
of your sister?
A Not yet, sir, but after a while he looked at the refrigerator because he might be thirsty.
Q So---you said the accused was touching your sister. What part of her body was
touched by the accused?
A Here, sir.
Court Interpreter:
Witness pointing at the lower portion of the body.
Atty. Balaba:
Q You saw with what hand was the accused touching your sister?
A Yes, sir.
Q What hand was he touching your sister?
A This hand, sir.
Court Interpreter:
Witness raising his right hand.
Atty. Balaba:
Q And which part of your sisters body was the accused touching with his right hand?
Your sisters body was the accused touching with his right hand?
A Her right leg, sir.
Q How about his left hand, what was the accused doing with his left hand?
A Removing her panty, sir.
Q Removing her?
A Panty, sir.
Q Which hand of your sister was being removed with the left hand of the accused?
Court:
Which?
Atty. Balaba:
Which hand, which hand?
Fiscal Carisma:
The question is vague, your honor.
Atty. Balaba:
Because he said that removing the hand ---
Fiscal Carisma:
He said removing the panty.
Atty. Balaba:
Is that panty? Im sorry.
Q So, the accused was touching with his right hand the left thigh of your sister ---
Fiscal Carisma:
The right thigh.
Atty. Balaba:
Q Rather the right thigh of your sister and with his left hand removing the panty, is that
what you are telling to tell us?
A Yes, sir.
Q And your sister all the time was trying to ---was struggling to get free, is that not
correct?
A Yes, sir, she was resisting. (witness demonstrating)
Q She was struggling --- was the accused able to remove the panty?
A Yes, sir.
Q And all the time you were there looking with the glass of water in your hand?
A Yes, sir.[35]
In light of the evidence of the prosecution, there was no introduction of the penis of
accused-appellant into the aperture or within the pudendum of the vagina of private
complainant. Hence, accused-appellant is not criminally liable for consummated rape. [36]
The issue that now comes to fore is whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of
consummated acts of lasciviousness defined in Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code
or attempted rape under Article 335 of the said Code, as amended in relation to the last
paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code. In light of the evidence on record, we
believe that accused-appellant is guilty of attempted rape and not of acts of
lasciviousness.
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 336. Acts of Lasciviousness.Any person who shall commit any act of
lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances
mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prision correccional. [37]
For an accused to be convicted of acts of lasciviousness, the prosecution is

burdened to prove the confluence of the following essential elements:
1. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness.
2. That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age. [38]
Lewd is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous. It signifies that form of

immorality which has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton
manner. [39]
The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance.
The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
3. The offenders act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other
than his spontaneous desistance. [40]
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:
(1) That there be external acts;

(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed.
[41]
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the
intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which
if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator,
will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison detre for the law
[42]
requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused
consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is
necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal
that must be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a
commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment
of the crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the
equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused
is. It is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the
[43]
consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the first or some subsequent step in
a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are
made. The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is
[44]
necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime.
In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation
[45]
to the offense. [46]
Acts constitutive of an attempt to commit a felony should be distinguished from

preparatory acts which consist of devising means or measures necessary for
accomplishment of a desired object or end. One perpetrating preparatory acts is not
[47]
guilty of an attempt to commit a felony. However, if the preparatory acts constitute a

consummated felony under the law, the malefactor is guilty of such consummated
offense. The Supreme Court of Spain, in its decision of March 21, 1892, declared that
[48]
for overt acts to constitute an attempted offense, it is necessary that their objective be
known and established or such that acts be of such nature that they themselves should
obviously disclose the criminal objective necessarily intended, said objective and finality
to serve as ground for designation of the offense. [49]
There is persuasive authority that in offenses not consummated as the material

damage is wanting, the nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be
ascertained but the same must be inferred from the nature of the acts executed (accion
medio). Hence, it is necessary that the acts of the accused must be such that, by their
[50]
nature, by the facts to which they are related, by circumstances of the persons
performing the same, and by the things connected therewith, that they are aimed at the
consummation of the offense. This Court emphasized in People vs. Lamahang that: [51]
The relation existing between the facts submitted for appreciation and the offense
which said facts are supposed to produce must be direct; the intention must be
ascertained from the facts and therefore it is necessary, in order to avoid regrettable
instances of injustice, that the mind be able to cause a particular injury.
[52]
If the malefactor does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of his
spontaneous desistance, he is not guilty of an attempted felony. The law does not
[53]
punish him for his attempt to commit a felony. The rationale of the law, as explained by
[54]
Viada:
La Ley, en efecto, no hiere sino a pesar suyo; prefiere impedir el crimen que
castigarlo. Si el autor de la tentativa, despues de haber comenzado a ejecutar el delito
por actos exteriores, se detiene, por un sentimiento libre y espontaneo, en el borde del
abismo, salvo esta. Es un llamamiento al remordimiento, a la conciencia, una gracia
un perdon que concede la Ley al arrepentimiento voluntario. [55]
As aptly elaborated on by Wharton:
First, the character of an attempt is lost when its execution is voluntarily

abandoned. There is no conceivable overt act to which the abandoned purpose could
be attached. Secondly, the policy of the law requires that the offender, so long as he is
capable of arresting an evil plan, should be encouraged to do so, by saving him
harmless in case of such retreat before it is possible for any evil consequences to
ensue. Neither society, nor any private person, has been injured by his act. There is no
damage, therefore, to redress. To punish him after retreat and abandonment would be
to destroy the motive for retreat and abandonment. [56]
It must be borne in mind, however, that the spontaneous desistance of a malefactor

exempts him from criminal liability for the intended crime but it does not exempt him
from the crime committed by him before his desistance. [57]
In light of the facts established by the prosecution, we believe that accused-

appellant intended to have carnal knowledge of private complainant. The overt acts of
accused-appellant proven by the prosecution were not mere preparatory acts. By the
series of his overt acts, accused-appellant had commenced the execution of rape
which, if not for his spontaneous desistance, will ripen into the crime of rape. Although
accused-appellant desisted from performing all the acts of execution however his
desistance was not spontaneous as he was impelled to do so only because of the
sudden and unexpected arrival of Rossel. Hence, accused-appellant is guilty only of
attempted rape. In a case of similar factual backdrop as this case, we held:
[58]
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence and taking into account Article 6 of the Revised
Penal Code, the appellant can only be convicted of attempted rape. He commenced
the commission of rape by removing his clothes, undressing and kissing his victim
and lying on top of her. However, he failed to perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the crime of rape by reason of a cause other than his own spontaneous
desistance, i.e., by the timely arrival of the victims brother. Thus, his penis merely
touched Mary Joys private organ. Accordingly, as the crime committed by the
appellant is attempted rape, the penalty to be imposed on him should be an
indeterminate prison term of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to
twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum.
The penalty for attempted rape is prision mayor which is two degrees lower
than reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant should be meted an indeterminate penalty
[59]
the minimum of which should be taken from prision correccional which has a range of
from six months and one day to six years and the maximum of which shall be taken
from the medium period of prision mayor which has a range of from eight years and one
day to ten years, without any modifying circumstance. Accused-appellant is also liable
to private complainant for moral damages in the amount of P25,000.00.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 54, is SET ASIDE. Another judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 99-171390, accused-appellant is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of simple rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
as amended and is hereby meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant
is also hereby ordered to pay private complainant Analia Orillosa the amounts
of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity and P50,000.00 by way of moral damages;
2. In Criminal Case No. 99-171391, accused-appellant is hereby found guilty of
attempted rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended in relation to
Article 6 of the said Code and is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty of from six
years ofprision correccional in its maximum period, as minimum to ten years of prision
mayor in its medium period, as maximum. Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay
private complainant Analia Orillosa the amount of P25,000.00 by way of moral
damages; and,
3. In Criminal Cases Nos. 99-171392 and 99-171393, accused-appellant is hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of simple rape, defined in Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended and is hereby meted the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count. Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay to
private complainant Analia Orillosa the amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity
and the amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages for each count, or a total
amount of P200,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-
Morales, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., on leave.

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LEXOTERICA: A PHILIPPINE BLAWG

Updates and Articles on Philippine Law and Jurisprudence

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NewLex: Laws-15th Congress

o NewLex: Laws-14th Congress (Republic Act Nos. 9496 to 10146)

o Laws-13th Congress (Republic Act Nos. 9333 to 9482)

o Laws-12th Congress (Republic Act Nos. 9160 to 9332)

o Laws-11th Congress (Republic Act Nos. 8745 to 9159)

o Laws-10th Congress (Republic Act Nos. 8172 to 8744)

o Laws-9th Congress (Republic Act Nos. 7639 to 8171)

o Laws-8th Congress (Republic Act Nos. 6636 to7638)

April 2012 Philippine Supreme Court

1. REVISED PENAL CODE

Criminal liability; effect of death pending appeal. On 29 July 2009, a Notice of

Criminal liability; extinguishment by death. In a Decision dated May 9, 2006, the

Murder; treachery. The stabbing of Alfredo by Samson was qualified by treachery.

Qualifying circumstance; treachery. The essence of treachery is the sudden and

2. SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

Dangerous Drugs; chain of custody and prescribed procedures. Non-compliance with

Evidence; circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence may prove the guilt of

Preliminary investigation; no vested right to file a reply. According to petitioner, he

Preliminary investigation; no vested right to file a reply. There is no provision in Rule

Preliminary investigation; non-receipt of counter-affidavit. The procedural defect of

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 168050

The facts of this case were aptly summarized by the CA as follows:

The undersigned 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses Bernardino

CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 15, Records)

Upon preliminary investigation, where appellant Gaffud, Jr. failed to appear

When arraigned on June 6, 1995, accused-appellant Gaffud, Jr. entered a plea of

-Cremated charcoaled, about 3 ft. long, stomach and intestine (Large)

-Presence of semi-burned rattan about 1 inch long about 1 cm. in diameter

-Presence of a peculiar hole from the thoracic cavity directed downward to

REMARKS: Cannot be identified if male or female

The appellants defense was corroborated on its material points by the

a) Death penalty - for the death of Manuel Salvador;

b) Another death penalty - for the death of Analyn Salvador;

c) To pay the legal heirs of the victims:

c-1) SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00) for each

c-3) TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000) for each count

c-4) TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as nominal damages;

On the second assigned error, we uphold the finding of both courts a

It is well-settled that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if

In this case, the following facts or circumstances were proven:

(ii) Accused-appellant, together with two unidentified persons, was near

(iii) Accused-appellant was in a hurry to leave the place of the incident

(iv) Accused-appellant had a motive to kill the victims because of the

These circumstances, when taken together, are enough to produce the

We now go to whether or not accused-appellant should be held liable for two

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, reads:

The underlying philosophy of complex crimes in the Revised Penal Code,

The single act by appellant of detonating a hand grenade may

Anent the award of damages, we increase the award of civil indemnity by

As to the deletion of exemplary damages by the CA, we reinstate the award

By and of itself, nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance. It becomes

We sustain the award by the CA of moral damages in the amount

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hereby AFFIRM the March 31, 2005 decision

(1) the penalty of death imposed on accused-appellant is REDUCED