Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 (1967)

J. Fernando

Facts:
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del Mar Inc. petitioned for the
prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the city of Manila.
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to regulate due to the fact that
hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also asserted that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was
unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar because it would impose
P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; there was also the
requirement that the guests would fill up a form specifying their personal information.
There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be
open for inspection from city authorites. They claimed this to be violative of due process for being vague.
The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first
class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry. The petitioners also
invoked the lack of due process on this for being arbitrary.
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours.
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.
The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of the hotels that violated
the ordinance.
The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.

Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause?

Held: No. Judgment reversed.

Ratio:
"The presumption is towards the validity of a law. However, the Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative
action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the scope of police power. As underlying questions
of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of constitutionality must
prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual
foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation
of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful
to public morals, particularly fornication and prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended
to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to
increase "the income of the city government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and
general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable
constitutional guaranties, however, the power must not be unreasonable or violative of due process.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a standard to which the governmental action
should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then
is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the
challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the
dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided.
Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental
principles of our society." Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to
form or phrase.
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinances nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process
requirement.
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and the right to exact
a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the
municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside
from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or
tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. Eg. Sale of liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the states police power.
In one case- much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount," here the license fee
of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power measure.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It was not violative
of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the
term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society
and the general well-being.
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and
personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness for all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle, unlike in the sole case of People v
Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right
of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the
standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed
affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.
On the law being vague on the issue of personal information, the maintenance of establishments, and the full
rate of payment- Holmes- We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit
but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."

Taxicab Operators vs. Board of Transportation

Facts:
Petitioners who are taxicab operators assail the constitutionality of Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 issued by the
Board of Transportation (BOT) providing for the phasing out and replacement of old and dilapidated taxicabs; as
well as Implementing Circular No. 52 issued pursuant thereto by the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT)
instructing personnel of the BLT within the National Capital Region to implement the said BOT Circular, and
formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public
conveyances.

Petitioners allege that the questioned Circulars did not afford them procedural and substantive due process, equal
protection of the law, and protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard. Among
others, they question the issuance of the Circulars without first calling them to a conference or requiring them to
submit position papers or other documents enforceability thereof only in Metro Manila; and their being applicable
only to taxicabs and not to other transportation services.

Issues:
Whether or not the constitutional guarantee of due process was denied to the taxicab operators and/or other
persons affected by the assailed Circular No. 52.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that there was no denial of due process since calling the taxicab operators or persons
who may be affected by the questioned Circulars to a conference or requiring them to submit position papers or
other documents is only one of the options open to the BOT which is given wide discretionary authority under P.D.
No. 101; and fixing a six- year ceiling for a car to be operated as taxicab is a reasonable standard adopted to
apply to all vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly.

The Court also ruled that neither has the equal protection clause been violated by initially enforcing the Circulars
only in Metro Manila since it is of common knowledge that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places,
are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use, thus making for a substantial distinction; nor by
non-application of the Circulars to other transportation services because the said Circulars satisfy the criteria
required under the equal protection clause, which is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons
under identical or similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and
the liabilities imposed.

It is clear from the provision of Section 2 of P.D. 101 aforequoted, that the leeway accorded the Board gives it a
wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program.
It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the submission of position papers or other
documents from operators or persons who maybe affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board,
which is given wide discretionary authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they were deprived
of procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty that public respondents had not availed of other
sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars. Operators of public conveyances are not the only
primary sources of the data and information that may be desired by the BOT.

Velasco vs Villegas

G.R. No. L-24153 February 14, 1983

Facts: In their own behalf and in representation of the other owners of barbershops in the City of Manila,
petitioners challenge the constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila, which prohibited the
business of massaging customers of a barber shop. They contend that it amounts to a deprivation of property of
their means of livelihood without due process of law.

Issue: Whether said ordinance was unconstitutional, and therefore an improper exercise of police power
Held: No. The attack against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed out in the brief of respondents-appellees, it
is a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment are: (1) To be able to impose payment of the
license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by Ordinance
4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to
forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of
customers.

The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. As far back as U.S.
v. Salaveria, 4 a 1918 decision, this Court through Justice Malcolm made clear the significance and scope of such
a clause, which delegates in statutory form the police power to a municipality. As above stated, this clause has
been given wide application by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the
case been liberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to really is the progressive view of Philippine
jurisprudence.

BAUTISTA VS. JUNIO, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 7, 2011

GR # L-50908 January 31, 1984 (Constitutional Law Police Power, LOI, No Violation of Equal Protection Clause)

FACTS: The constitutionality of Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 869, a response to protracted oil crisis, banning the
use of private motor vehicles with H (heavy) and EH (extra heavy) plates on week-ends and holidays, was assailed
for being allegedly violative of the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution.

Petitioners also contends that Memorandum Circular No. 39 issued by herein respondents imposing penalties of
fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license of owners of the above specified vehicles found
violating such LOI, is likewise unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of undue delegation of
legislative power.

Respondents denied the above allegations.

ISSUE: Whether or not Letter of Instruction 869 as implemented by Memorandum Circular No. 39 is violative of
certain constitutional rights.

HELD: No, the disputed regulatory measure is an appropriate response to a problem that presses urgently for
solution, wherein its reasonableness is immediately apparent. Thus due process is not ignored, much less
infringed. The exercise of police power may cut into the rights to liberty and property for the promotion of the
general welfare. Those adversely affected may invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show a factual
foundation for its invalidity.

Moreover, since LOI No. 869 and MC No. 39 were adopted pursuant to the Land Transportation and Traffic Code
which contains a specific provision as to penalties, the imposition of a fine or the suspension of registration under
the conditions therein set forth is valid with the exception of the impounding of a vehicle.

Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Commission (G.R. No. 75697)

Posted: July 25, 2011 in Case Digests

Facts: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely affected by

Presidential Decree No. 1987, An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board with broad powers to regulate

and supervise the videogram industry.

A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the National Internal Revenue Code

provided that:
SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback,

regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video

tapes shall be subject to sales tax.

Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the

contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case

may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or

audiovisual program.

Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent

(50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax

shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission.

The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms

including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or variation thereof, have

greatly prejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters. Such unregulated circulation have caused a

sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of

sales, contractors specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450

Million annually in government revenues.

Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and disposition

of videograms, and these earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of

approximately P180 Million in taxes each year.

The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie industry.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power.

(2) Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional.

Held: Taxation has been made the implement of the states police power. The levy of the 30% tax is for a public

purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of

the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic

video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a

valid imposition.

We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential Decree No. 1987

as unconstitutional and void. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie

industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering the unfair

competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by
the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally

violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention

the fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayors permit

and municipal license fees are required to engage in business.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

Sangalang v. IAC (G.R. No. 71169. December 22, 1988)

18AUG

FACTS:

The Mayor of Makati directed Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) to opening of several streets to the general public,
after a series of developments in zoning regulations. All but Jupiter St. was voluntarily opened. The strong
opposition later gave way when the municipal officials force-opened the gates of said street for public use. The
area ceased to be purely residential. Action for damages was brought against Ayala Corporation and BAVA for
alleged breach of contract, to maintain the purely residential status of the area. Other similarly situated also filed
their respective cases. All were dismissed in the trial court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the said dismissals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a contract between homeowners and Ayala Corporation violated in opening the Jupiter
street for public use.

HELD:

No. There was no contract to speak of in the case, hence nothing was violated.

RATIO:

Petitioners cannot successfully rely on the alleged promise by Ayala Corporation, to build a [f]ence along Jupiter
[street] with gate for entrance and/or exit as evidence of Ayalas alleged continuing obligation to maintain a wall
between the residential and commercial sections. Assuming there was a contract violated, it was still overtaken
by the passage of zoning ordinances which represent a legitimate exercise of police power. The petitioners have
not shown why Courts should hold otherwise other than for the supposed non-impairment guaranty of the
Constitution, which is secondary to the more compelling interests of general welfare. The Ordinance has not been
shown to be capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable to warrant the reversal of the judgments so appealed.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILS. VS. COMELEC [289 SCRA 337; G.R. NO.
132922; 21 APR 1998]
Monday, February 02, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an
organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be without legal
standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or
threatened injury as a result of thesubject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the requisite
standing to bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the
Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.

Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:

Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the Comelec Time
which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and
television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations
are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of campaign.

Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers
and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELECfree of charge.
Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time.

Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection
with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it
be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and
television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is
toauthorize unjust taking of private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing
free air time for one hour each day and, in this years elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of
COMELECs requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such.

Issues:

(1) Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal
protection of the laws.

(2) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process of law and
without just compensation.

Held: Petitioners argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is licensed
by the government. Airwavefrequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast
that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and televisionbroadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do
not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are
merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be
burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate
broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in
licensing and supervising them.

The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time as against
newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print space they may provide is
likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do
in the case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair
exchange for what the industry gets.

As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the
requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.

PRC vs. De Guzman

Facts: The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They
passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine (Board).
Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their names as successful examinees in the
medical licensure examination. Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine
successful examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam,
Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high.
Eleven Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-
Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in OB-Gyne.
For its part, the NBI found that the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the [1993] Physician
Examination leads to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions.

Issue: Was the act pursuant to R.A. 2382 a valid exercise of police power

Ruling: Yes, it is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or
course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. But like all
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power
of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Thus,
persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be
required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers

G.R. No. L-3491 June 24, 1983

CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch
XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents.

Facts:

Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides that at least 6% of the total area of the memorial park cemetery
shall be set aside for the charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon
City for at least 5 years prior to their death. As such, the Quezon City engineer required the respondent,
Himlayang Pilipino Inc, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where
the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial.

The then Court of First Instance and its judge, Hon. Ericta, declared Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and
void.

Petitioners argued that the taking of the respondents property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power
and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argued
that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, to make such
further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge
the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the
health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of
the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.

On the otherhand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contended that the taking or confiscation of property was
obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be
used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property.

Issue:
Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?

Held:

No. The Sec. 9 of the ordinance is not a valid exercise of the police power.

Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which states that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the other
hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property rights,
namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist independently of the
Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty.

An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any provision that would justify
the ordinance in question except the provision granting police power to the City. Section 9 cannot be justified
under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and
occupation as may be established or practised in the City. The power to regulate does not include the power to
prohibit or confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a
memorial park cemetery.

Police power is defined by Freund as the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the
use of liberty and property. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of
the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to
promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover from the government for injury
sustained in consequence thereof.

Under the provisions of municipal charters which are known as the general welfare clauses, a city, by virtue of its
police power, may adopt ordinances to the peace, safety, health, morals and the best and highest interests of the
municipality. It is a well-settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered and society, that every holder
of property, however absolute and may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious
to the rights of the community. A property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, which are
necessary to the common good and general welfare. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional
rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious,
and to such reasonable restraints and regulations, established by law, as the legislature, under the governing and
controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient. The state, under the
police power, is possessed with plenary power to deal with all matters relating to the general health, morals, and
safety of the people, so long as it does not contravene any positive inhibition of the organic law and providing that
such power is not exercised in such a manner as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent positive wrong
and oppression.

However, in the case at hand, there is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent
of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of
health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without
compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to
private cemeteries.

The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of
Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the
dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the
provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may provide for the burial of the
dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance it simply authorizes the city to provide
its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been
the law and practise in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just
compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to
set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers
of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements
which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The
beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold
to home-owners.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the respondent court is affirmed.

Ople v Torres G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998.

7/11/2010
0 Comments

Facts: Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a
usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected
zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger
barriers against further erosion.

A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23,
1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary
Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating
Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining its implementation.

Issue: Petitioner contends:

A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A
LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS,
THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
 B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS
AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS
FOR EXPENDITURE.
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL
VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION."

Held: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for being unconstitutional. SO
ORDERED.

Ratio: It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of
1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System
requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies the primacy of national security, the extent
of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr.
Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of thought.

Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.O. No. 308 is not a law because it confers no right,
imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact
business with government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the contemplated
identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with
government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and
enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty
cannot stand.

Case Digest: SURNECO v. ERC

G.R. No. 183626 : October 4, 2010

SURIGAO DEL NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (SURNECO), Petitioner,v. ENERGY REGULATORY
COMMISSION, Respondent.

NACHURA,J.:

FACTS:

The Association of Mindanao Rural Electric Cooperatives, as representative of SURNECO and of the other 33 rural
electric cooperatives in Mindanao, filed a petition before the then Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) for the approval
of the formula for automatic cost adjustment and adoption of the National Power Corporation (NPC) restructured
rate adjustment to comply with Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7832.

The ERB granted SURNECO and other rural electric cooperatives provisional authority to use and implement the
Purchased Power Adjustment (PPA). In the meantime, the passage of R.A. No. 9136led to the creation of the
Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), replacing and succeeding the ERB. All pending cases before the ERB were
transferred to the ERC. Thereafter, the ERC continued its review, verification, and confirmation of the electric
cooperatives implementation of the PPA formula based on the available data and information submitted by the
latter.

The ERC issued its assailed Order, mandating that the discounts earned by SURNECO from its power supplier
should be deducted from the computation of the power cost. SURNECO filed a motion for reconsideration, but it
was denied. Aggrieved, SURNECO filed a petition for review to the CA but the same was denied. Upon denial of
the motion for reconsideration, SURNECO files the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the ERC Decision

HELD: No. CA Decision Affirmed

POLITICAL LAW- The State, in its exercise of police power, can regulate the rates imposed by a public
utility such as SURNECO

The ERC was merely implementing the system loss caps in R.A. No. 7832 when it reviewed and confirmed
SURNECOS PPA charges, and ordered the refund of the amount collected in excess of the allowable system loss
caps through its continued use of the multiplier scheme. The Commission deemed it appropriate to clarify its PPA
confirmation process particularly on the treatment of the Prompt Payment Discount (PPD) granted to distribution
utilities (DUs) by their power suppliers. The foregoing clarification was intended to ensure that only the actual
costs of purchased power are recovered by the DUs.

In directing SURNECO to refund its over-recoveries based on PPA policies, which only ensured that the PPA
mechanism remains a purely cost-recovery mechanism and not a revenue-generating scheme for the electric
cooperatives, the ERC merely exercised its authority to regulate and approve the rates imposed by the electric
cooperatives on their consumers. The ERC simply performed its mandate to protect the public interest imbued in
those rates.

As held in the case of Republic v. Manila Electric Company, the regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities
is founded upon the police powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the control and regulation of
public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private property is used for a public purpose and is affected with
public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to promote
the common good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing use; but as long as
use of the property is continued, the same is subject to public regulation.

Likewise, SURNECO cannot validly assert that the caps set by R.A. No. 7832 are arbitrary, or that they violate the
non-impairment clause of the Constitution for allegedly traversing the loan agreement between NEA and ADB.
Striking down a legislative enactment, or any of its provisions, can be done only by way of a direct action, not
through a collateral attack, and more so, not for the first time on appeal in order to avoid compliance. The
challenge to the laws constitutionality should also be raised at the earliest opportunity.

Even assuming, merely for arguments sake, that the ERC issuances violated the NEA and ADB covenant, the
contract had to yield to the greater authority of the States exercise of police power. It has long been settled that
police power legislation, adopted by the State to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order,
safety, and general welfare of the people prevail not only over future contracts but even over those already in
existence, for all private contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate measures taken by the State to
promote public welfare.

POLITICAL LAW- Administrative due process simply requires an opportunity to explain ones side or to
seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

Verily, the PPA confirmation necessitated a review of the electric cooperatives monthly documentary submissions
to substantiate their PPA charges. The cooperatives were duly informed of the need for other required supporting
documents and were allowed to submit them accordingly. In fact, hearings were conducted. Moreover, the ERC
conducted exit conferences with the electric cooperatives representatives, SURNECO included, to discuss
preliminary figures and to double-check these figures for inaccuracies, if there were any. In addition, after the
issuance of the ERC Orders, the electric cooperatives were allowed to file their respective motions for
reconsideration. It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that SURNECO was not denied due process

GOLDENWAY MERCHANDISING CORPORATION VS EQUITABLE PCI BANK

Nature: Redemption of Mortgage

Ponente: Villarama

Date: March 13, 2013

DOCTRINE: Section 47 did not divest juridical persons of the right to redeem their foreclosed
properties but only modified the time for the exercise of such right by reducing the one-year period
originally provided in Act No. 3135. The new redemption period commences from the date of
foreclosure sale, and expires upon registration of the certificate of sale or three months after
foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There is likewise no retroactive application of the new redemption
period because Section 47 exempts from its operation those properties foreclosed prior to its
effectivity and whose owners shall retain their redemption rights under Act No. 3135.
FACTS:

On November 29, 1985, petitioner Goldenway Merchandising Corporation executed a Real Estate Mortgage in
favor of Equitable PCI Bank over three parcels of land as security for a Php2,000,000 loan granted to the
petitioner. Petitioner eventually failed to settles its loan obligation, leading respondent to extrajudicially foreclose
the mortgage on December 13, 2000. Subsequently, a Certificate of Sale was issued to respondent on January 26,
2001.
In a letter dated March 7, 2001, petitioner offered to redeem the foreclosed properties by tendering a check.
Petitioner and respondent met on March 12, 2001. However, petitioner was told that redemption was no longer
possible since the certificate of sale had already been registered; the title to the foreclosed properties were
consolidated in favor of the respondent on March 9, 2001.
Petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and damages contending that the 1-year period of
redemption under Act 3135 should apply, and not the shorter redemption period under RA 8791 as applying RA
8791 would result in the impairment of obligations of contracts and would violate the equal protection clause
under the constitution.
The RTC dismissed the action of the petitioner ruling that redemption was made belatedly and that there was no
redemption made at all.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the redemption period should be the 1-year period provided under Act 3135, and not the shorter
period under RA 8791 as the parties expressly agreed that foreclosure would be in accordance with Act 3135

RULING: The shorter period under RA 8791 should apply.

The one-year period of redemption is counted from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale. In this
case, the parties provided in their real estate mortgage contract that upon petitioners default and the latters
entire loan obligation becoming due, respondent may immediately foreclose the mortgage judicially in accordance
with the Rules of Court, or extrajudicially in accordance with Act No. 3135, as amended.
But under Sec 47 of RA 8791, an exception is thus made in the case of juridical persons which are allowed to
exercise the right of redemption only "until, but not after, the registration of the certificate of foreclosure sale"
and in no case more than three (3) months after foreclosure, whichever comes first.
Section 47 did not divest juridical persons of the right to redeem their foreclosed properties but only modified the
time for the exercise of such right by reducing the one-year period originally provided in Act No. 3135. The new
redemption period commences from the date of foreclosure sale, and expires upon registration of the certificate of
sale or three months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There is likewise no retroactive application of the new
redemption period because Section 47 exempts from its operation those properties foreclosed prior to its
effectivity and whose owners shall retain their redemption rights under Act No. 3135.
We agree with the CA that the legislature clearly intended to shorten the period of redemption for juridical
persons whose properties were foreclosed and sold in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135.
The difference in the treatment of juridical persons and natural persons was based on the nature of the properties
foreclosed whether these are used as residence, for which the more liberal one-year redemption period is
retained, or used for industrial or commercial purposes, in which case a shorter term is deemed necessary to
reduce the period of uncertainty in the ownership of property and enable mortgagee-banks to dispose sooner of
these acquired assets. It must be underscored that the General Banking Law of 2000, crafted in the aftermath of
the 1997 Southeast Asian financial crisis, sought to reform the General Banking Act of 1949 by fashioning a legal
framework for maintaining a safe and sound banking system. In this context, the amendment introduced by
Section 47 embodied one of such safe and sound practices aimed at ensuring the solvency and liquidity of our
banks. It cannot therefore be disputed that the said provision amending the redemption period in Act 3135 was
based on a reasonable classification and germane to the purpose of the law.
The right of redemption being statutory, it must be exercised in the manner prescribed by the statute, and within
the prescribed time limit, to make it effective. Furthermore, as with other individual rights to contract and to
property, it has to give way to police power exercised for public welfare. The concept of police power is well-
established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the
exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuming the greatest benefits.
The freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the State
and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations must be
subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the community may require, or as the
circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity. Settled is the rule that the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government. The right
granted by this provision must submit to the demands and necessities of the States power of regulation. Such
authority to regulate businesses extends to the banking industry which, as this Court has time and again
emphasized, is undeniably imbued with public interest.
Having ruled that the assailed Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 is constitutional, we find no reversible error committed
by the CA in holding that petitioner can no longer exercise the right of redemption over its foreclosed properties
after the certificate of sale in favor of respondent had been registered.

Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. DSWD, 526 SCRA 130 (2007)

Post under case digests, Political Law at Wednesday, February 08, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines. Petitioners
assail the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of RA 9257, otherwise known as the Expanded Senior Citizens Act of
2003. Section 4(a) of RA 9257 grants twenty percent (20%) discount as privileges for the Senior Citizens.
Petitioner contends that said law is unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private property.

Issue: Whether or not RA 9257 is unconstitutional

Held: Petition is dismissed. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power
of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object.

Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as
it does to all the great public needs. It is the power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain,
and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penaltiesor
without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.

For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the
primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.

Manila Memorial Park v. Secretary of DSWD (December 3, 2013)

Under the original law (Republic Act No. 7492) passed on April 23, 1992, the burden was shouldered solely by the
government because the entire 20-percent discount was deemed a tax credit which the sellers (restaurants,
drugstores, funeral parlors, etc.) were allowed to deduct from their taxes. However, at the initiative of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, a new law (RA 9257) was enacted on Feb. 26, 2004, that treated the 20-percent discount
merely as a tax deduction. Which means that the sellers could only deduct the amount of the discount from
their gross income from the same taxable year that the discount is granted. Thus, the sellers were allowed to
deduct the discounted sum from their taxable income, for which they no longer paid the 32-percent corporate
income tax. Stripped of legalese, the sellers bore 68 percent of the discount, and the government, 32 percent.

Petitioners argue that the discount given to senior citizens (under R.A. 7432 as amended by R.A. 9257) will force
establishments to raise their prices in order to compensate for its impact on overall profits or income/gross sales.
The general public, or those not belonging to the senior citizen class, are, thus, made to effectively shoulder the
subsidy for senior citizens. This, in petitioners view, is unfair. Is the petitioners contention correct?

A the tax deduction scheme does not fully reimburse petitioners for the discount privilege accorded to senior
citizens. This is because the discount is treated as a deduction, a tax-deductible expense that is subtracted from
the gross income and results in a lower taxable income. Being a tax deduction, the discount does not reduce
taxes owed on a peso for peso basis but merely offers a fractional reduction in taxes owed. Theoretically, the
treatment of the discount as a deduction reduces the net income of the private establishments concerned. The
discounts given would have entered the coffers and formed part of the gross sales of the private establishments,
were it not for R.A. No. 9257. The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to
the taking of private property for public use or benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for which petitioners
would ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation.

A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As such, it would not meet the
definition of just compensation. Having said that, this raises the question of whether the State, in promoting the
health and welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden of partly
subsidizing a government program. The Court believes so.

The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of senior citizens to nation-building,
and to grant benefits and privileges to them for their improvement and well-being as the State considers them an
integral part of our society. The priority given to senior citizens finds its basis in the Constitution as set forth in the
law itself. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments extending the twenty
percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction. The law is a legitimate exercise of
police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. While the
Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the realities of business and the State, in the
exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of a business which may result in an impairment of
property rights in the process.

When we ruled that petitioners in Carlos Superdrug Carlos v. DSWD, 553 Phil. 120 (2007) failed to prove that the
20% discount is arbitrary, oppressive or confiscatory. We noted that no evidence, such as a financial report, to
establish the impact of the 20% discount on the overall profitability of petitioners was presented in order to show
that they would be operating at a loss due to the subject regulation or that the continued implementation of the
law would be unconscionably detrimental to the business operations of petitioners. Without sufficient proof that
Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 9257 is arbitrary, and that the continued implementation of the same would be
unconscionably detrimental to petitioners, the Court will refrain from quashing a legislative act.

Thus, the 20% discount as well as the tax deduction scheme is a valid exercise of the police power of the State.

Facts:

Angel Lorenzo was a leper. He was confined in San Lazaro Hospital in Manila in conformity with the provisions of
Section 1058 of the Administrative Code, authorizing the segregation of lepers. Lorenzo filed petition for a writ
of habeas corpus with the Court of First Instance of Manila, alleging that his confinement in said hospital was in
violation of his constitutional rights. He alleged that human beings are not incurable with leprosy and that the
disease may not be communicated by contact. The trial court sustained the law and denied the petition
for habeas corpus. Lorenzo appealed.

Issue:

1. Whether the Administrative Code provision on the confinement of lepers is violative of one's constitutional
right.

2. May the court resolve the question whether or not leprosy is a contagious disease?

Held:

1. No. Section 1058 of the Administrative Code was enacted by the legislative body in the legitimate exercise of
the police power which extends to the preservation of the public health. It was place on the statute books in
recognition of leprosy as a grave health problem. The methods provided for the control of leprosy plainly
constitute due process of law. Judicial notice will be taken of the fact that leprosy is commonly believed to be an
infectious disease tending to cause one afflicted with it to be shunned and excluded from society, and that
compulsory segregation of lepers as a means of preventing the spread of the disease of supported by high
scientific authority. Upon this view, laws for the segregation of lepers have been provided the world over.
Similarly, the local legislature has regarded leprosy as a contagious disease and has authorized measures to
control the dread scourge. To that forum must the petitioner go to reopen the question.

2. The assumption must be that if evidence was required to establish the necessity for the law, that it was before
the legislature when the act was passed. In the case of a statute purporting the have been enacted in the interest
of the public health, all questions relating to the determination of matters of fact are for the legislature. If there is
probable basis for sustaining the conclusion reached, its findings are not subject to judicial review. Debatable
questions are for the Legislature to decide. The courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting
theories. (Lorenzo vs Director of Health, No. 27484 September 1, 1927)

Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court

GR No. L-74457, March 20, 1987

FACTS:

In 1980 President Marcos amended Executive Order No. 626-A which orders that no carabao and carabeef
shall be transported from one province to another; such violation shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by
the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit for the carabeef and to deserving farmers through dispersal as
the Director of Animal Industry may see fit in the case of the carabaos.

On January 13, 1984, Petitioners 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac
Nuevo, Iloilo for having been transported from Masbate to Iloilo in violation of EO 626-A. He issued a writ for
replevin, challenging the constitutionality of said EO. The trial court sustained the confiscation of the animals and
declined to rule on the validity of the law on the ground that it lacked authority to do so. Its decision was affirmed
by the IAC. Hence, this petition for review filed by Petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not police power is properly enforced

HELD:

NO. The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both
restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State
to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. As long as the activity or the property
has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary.
In the case at bar, E.O. 626-A has the same lawful subject as the original executive order (E.O. 626 as cited in
Toribio case) but NOT the same lawful method. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the
purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing. The challenged measure is an invalid
exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary
to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.

G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.

Facts:

On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled An
Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels,
Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila (the Ordinance).
The ordinance sanctions any person or corporation who will allow the admission and charging of room rates for
less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a day.

The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development
Corporation (STDC), who own and operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene
and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the ordinance will affect their business
interests as operators. The respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police
power.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed
and jealously guarded by the Constitution. Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging
private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises.
Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be
consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to
Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities the power to regulate the establishment,
operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging
houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. Also, they contended that under
Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they have the power to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and
proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace,
good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to fix penalties for the
violation of ordinances.

Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and
freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive interference
in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance. First, it held that the
ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or
operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of
police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective
of the ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the
establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-
being of its constituents in general.

Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.

Issue:

Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State.

Held:

No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police power, and as such, it is
unconstitutional.

The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila v Laguio Jr ruling, but the 1967 decision
in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. The common thread
that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered under
the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals including
particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle case, wherein
there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by these establishments have been
severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the extent to which the State can intrude into and
regulate the lives of its citizens

The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for
an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact
and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive
requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3)
must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and
consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.

The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions and
renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as
conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through such implements as the general
welfare clause.

Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and
its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State.

The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit
sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the
ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for
their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution.

SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its
effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law that they were
capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners. Yet, they also recognized the
capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons those persons who would be
deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question. The rights at
stake herein fell within the same fundamental rights to liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was
defined by Justice Malcolm to include the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or
servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but
is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator,
subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare,

Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized and the invasion of it should be justified
by a compelling state interest. Jurisprudence accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should
stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.

An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of
lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the ordinance as a police
power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other
alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining
to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into
private rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished
simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug
dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict
enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have
minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that
the ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those
engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect wash rates from their
clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.

SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from
needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-intentioned the ordinance may be, it is in effect
an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The ordinance
needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their
patrons without sufficient justification. The ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than
twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.

Eminent Domain Definition and Scope

The Office of the Solicitor General, petitioner

vs. Ayala Land Incorporated, Robinsons Land Corporation, Shangri-La-Plaza Corporation and SM
Prime Holdings, respondents.

Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal and setting aside of the decision of the court
of appeals which affirmed the decision of the Makati RTC in two civil cases and the resolution of the appellate
court in the same case which denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the OSG.

Respondents herein are operators of shopping malls in various locations in Metro Manila that have parking
facilities (inside the main buildings, in separate buildings and/or in adjacent lots solely provided for parking use).
The respondents are also the one which maintains the parking spaces and in turn, they collect parking fees
subject to their imposed parking rates.

The Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce and on Justice and Human Rights conducted a joint investigation
to inquire on the legality of the parking fees and to find out the basis and reasonableness of the parking rates.
More importantly, to determine the legality of the policy of the shopping malls denying liability in cases of theft,
robbery or carnapping by invoking the waiver clause at the back of the parking tickets.

After the public hearings, the Senate Committees jointly concluded that the collection parking fee is contrary to
the National Building Code and that the reasonable interpretation of the code is that the parking spaces are for
free; thus, the Committee recommended that the Office of the Solicitor General should institute the necessary
action to enjoin the collection of parking fees as well as to enforce the penal sanctions of the National Building
Code.

Two civil cases arise and by being of the same subject matter, the RTC Makati issued an order to consolidate the
cases. The court ruled that the respondents are not obligated to provide parking spaces that are free of charge,
compelling them to do so would be an unlawful taking of property right without just compensation. The petitioners
sought for relief by filing a Motion for Reconsideration in the Court of Appeals but the appellate court denied the
appeal and affirmed the joint decision by the RTC.

Hence, this present petition with a single assignment of error that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
ruling of the lower court.
Issue: Whether or not the property right of the respondents can be taken so as to provide free parking spaces for
the general public welfare.

Held: The court affirmed the previous decision that the respondents are not obliged to provide free parking
spaces. There is no pertaining provision in the National Building Code that expressly provides the same. The law is
clear and unequivocal that it needs no further interpretation, it only provides for measurement requirements of
the parking spaces. The OSG cannot rely on their invoked provisions; they even failed to consider the substantial
differences and legal backgrounds on the jurisprudence they are insisting.

Wherefore, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. Previous ruling AFFIRMED. No Costs.

Fernando vs St. Scholasticas College

GR 1611107, 12 March 2013

Facts: Respondent SSCs property is enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence. Marikina City enacted an
ordinance which provides that walls and fences shall not be built within a five-meter allowance between the front
monument line and the building line of an establishment.
The City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to demolish, replace, and
move back the fence. As a response, the respondents filed a petition for prohibition with an application for a writ
of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of Marikina. The RTC
granted the petition and the CA affirmed. Hence, this certiorari.

Issue: Is Marikina Ordinance No. 192, imposing a five-meter setback, a valid exercise of police power?

Ruling: No. Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. Two tests
have been used by the Court the rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny test:
Under the rational relationship test, an ordinance must pass the following requisites:
(1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise; and
(2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.
The real intent of the setback requirement was to make the parking space free for use by the public and
not for the exclusive use of respondents. This would be tantamount to a taking of private property for public use
without just compensation. Anent the objectives of prevention of concealment of unlawful acts and un-
neighborliness due to the walls and fences, the parking area is not reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of these goals. The Court, thus, finds Section 5 of the Ordinance to be unreasonable and oppressive. Hence, the
exercise of police power is not valid.