HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOC. vs.

MICHAEL DEFENSOR ET AL
Gr. No. 163980, August 3, 2006
Facts:
The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent
respondents from enforcing the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207,
otherwise known as the "National Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003."
Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners association from the
West Side of the NGC.
Named respondents are the ex-officio members of the National Government Center Administration
Committee (Committee). At the filing of the instant petition, the Committee was composed of
Secretary Michael Defensor, Chairman of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
(HUDCC), Atty. Edgardo Pamintuan, General Manager of the National Housing Authority (NHA), Mr.
Percival Chavez, Chairman of the Presidential Commission for Urban Poor (PCUP), Mayor Feliciano
Belmonte of Quezon City, Secretary Elisea Gozun of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), and Secretary Florante Soriquez of the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH).
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207. In accordance with Section 5 of R.A.
No. 9207, the Committee formulated the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9207 on
June 29, 2004. Petitioners subsequently filed the instant petition questioning its validity.
The OSG claims that the instant petition for prohibition is an improper remedy because the writ of
prohibition does not lie against the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Since in issuing the
questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
function, which is the scope of a petition for prohibition under Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, the instant prohibition should be dismissed outright, the OSG contends. For their part,
respondent Mayor of Quezon City and respondent NHA contend that petitioners violated the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts in filing the instant petition with this Court and not with the Court of Appeals, which
has concurrent jurisdiction over a petition for prohibition.
Issue:
Whether or not a petition for prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the
exercise of a quasi-legislative function.
Held:
Yes.The court ruled that a petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued
in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are
without or in excess of said entitys or persons jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of
discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or
quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within
the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels.
Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an
inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance
the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate
remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained. Where the
principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is an ordinary action for its
nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any
case, petitioners allegation that "respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions
without or in excess of their jurisdiction" may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a
writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order.
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or
administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules
and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute
and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative
agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle,
however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant
to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-
legislative power.
The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee expressly
authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the
Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it
seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation
issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular
courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.
Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by the
Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity must
follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the
Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
True, this Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly with it if
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, so warrant. A direct invocation
of the Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special
and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, the Court said that it will not entertain direct resort to it unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling
circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of
the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. A
perusal, however, of the petition for prohibition shows no compelling, special or important reasons to
warrant the Courts taking cognizance of the petition in the first instance. Petitioner also failed to state
any reason that precludes the lower courts from passing upon the validity of the questioned IRR.
Moreover, as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, the Courts power to evaluate the
validity of an implementing rule or regulation is generally appellate in nature. Thus, following the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts, the instant petition should have been initially filed with the Regional
Trial Court.

CIR vs. CA
261 SCRA 262, G.R. No. 119761, August 29, 1996
Facts:
RA 7654 was enacted by Congress on June 10, 1993 and took effect July 3, 1993. It amended partly
Sec. 142 (c) of the NIRC1. Fortune Tobacco manufactured the following cigaretter brands: Hope, More
and Champion. Prior to RA 7654, these 3 brands were considered local brands subjected to an ad
valorem tax of 20 to 45%. Applying the amendment and nothing else, the 3 brands should fall under
Sec 142 (c) (2) NIRC and be taxed at 20 to 45%.
However, on July 1, 1993, petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued Revenue Memorandum
Circular37-93 which reclassified the 3 brands as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign
brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. The reclassification was before RA 7654 took effect.
In effect, the memo circular subjected the 3 brands to the provisions of Sec 142 (c) (1) NIRC imposing
upon these brands a rate of 55% instead of just 20 to 45% under Sec 142 (c) (2) NIRC. There was no
notice and hearing. CIR argued that the memo circular was merely an interpretative ruling of the BIR
which did
not require notice and hearing.
Issue:
Whether or not RMC 37-93 was valid and enforceable.
Held:
No; lack of notice and hearing violated due process required for promulgated rules. Moreover, it
infringed on uniformity of taxation / equal protection since other local cigarettes bearing foreign brands
had
not been included within the scope of the memo circular.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the memo was not a mere interpretative rule but a legislative rule
in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the
details thereof. Promulgated legislative rules must be published.
On the other hand, interpretative rules only provide guidelines to the law which the administrative
agency is in charge of enforcing.
BIR, in reclassifying the 3 brands and raising their applicable tax rate, did not simply interpret RA 7654
but legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. BELLOSILLO separate opinion: the administrative
issuance was not quasi-legislative but quasi-judicial. Due process should still be observed of course but
use Ang Tibay v. CIR.
One of the powers of administrative agencies like the Bureau of Internal Revenue, is the power to make
rules. The necessity for vesting administrative agencies with this power stems from the impracticability
of the lawmakers providing general regulations for various and varying details pertinent to a particular
legislation.
The rules that administrative agencies may promulgate may either be legislative or interpretative. The
former is a form of subordinate legislation whereby the administrative agency is acting in a legislative
capacity, supplementing the statute, filling in the details, pursuant to a specific delegation of
legislative power.
It should be understandable that when an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its
applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real consequence more than
what the law itself has already prescribed.
When, upon the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that
can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially adds to or
increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly
affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given
the force and effect of law.

ECHEGARAY v. SEC. OF JUSTICE

October 26, 2012 Leave a comment

January 19, 1999 (G.R. No. 132601)

PARTIES:
Petitioner: LEO ECHEGARAY
Respondents: SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL

FACTS:
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray
scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the
TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also
encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already
been rendered that by granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve
which is an executive function.

HELD:
No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the
President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after
conviction by final judgment. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the
power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict
do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to
life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate
powers of the three branches of our government.

Fortich vs Corona 398 SCRA 685

Posted on December 6, 2012 by Sheree Tampus

Reply

100 SCAD 781

298 SCRA 685
1998

The Office of the President modified its decision which had already become final and executory.

FACTS:
On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President (OP) issued a win-win Resolution which reopened
case O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424. The said Resolution substantially modified its March 29, 1996 Decision.
The OP had long declared the said Decision final & executory after the DARs Motion for
Reconsideration was denied for having been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
The SC then struck down as void the OPs act, it being in gross disregard of the rules & basic legal
precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.
The respondents contended in their instant motion that the win-win Resolution of November 7, 1997
is not void since it seeks to correct an erroneous ruling, hence, the March 29, 1996 decisioncould
not as yet become final and executory as to be beyond modification. They further explained that the
DARs failure to file their Motion for Reconsideration on time was excusable.
ISSUE:
Was the OPs modification of the Decision void or a valid exercise of its powers and prerogatives?
1. Whether the DARs late filing of the Motion for Reconsideration is excusable.
2. Whether the respondents have shown a justifiable reason for the relaxation of rules.
3. Whether the issue is a question of technicality.

HELD:
1.
No.
Sec.7 of Administrative Order No. 18, dated February 12, 1987, mandates that
decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shallbecome final after the
lapse of 15 days from receipt of a copy therof xxx unless a Motion for Reconsideration thereof is
filed within such period.
The respondents explanation that the DARs office procedure made it impossibleto file its Motion for
Reconsideration on time since the said decision had to be referred to its different departments cannot
be considered a valid justification. While there is nothing wrong with such referral, the DAR must not
disregard the reglementary period fixed by law, rule or regulation.
The rules relating to reglementary period should not be made subservient to the internal
office procedure of an administrative body.

2.
No. The final & executory character of the OP Decision can no longer be disturbed or substantially
modified. Res judicata has set in and the adjudicated affair should forever be put to rest.
Procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due regard since they are
designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in
the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. The Constitution guarantees that
all persons shall have a right to the speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial and administrative bodies.
While a litigation is not a game of technicalities, every case must be prosecuted in accordance
with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly & speedy administration of justice. The
flexibility in the relaxation of rules was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate
the rules with impunity.
A liberal interpretation & application of the rules of procedure can only be resorted to in
proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances.

3.
No. It is a question of substance & merit.
A decision/resolution/order of an administrative body, court or tribunal which is declared void on the
ground that the same was rendered Without or in Excess of Jurisdiction, or with Grave Abuse of
Discretion, is a mere technicality of law or procedure. Jurisdiction is an essential and mandatory
requirement before a case or controversy can be acted on. Moreover, an act is still invalid if done
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
In the instant case, several fatal violations of law were committed. These grave breaches of law, rules
& settled jurisprudence are clearly substantial, not of technical nature.

When the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared final and executory, vested rights were acquired
by the petitioners, and all others who should be benefited by the said Decision.
In the words of the learned Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in Videogram Regulatory Board vs CA, et al.,
just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party
also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case.