1. G.R. No.

75042 November 29, 1988

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF LUCENA,
represented by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez, and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH LIII, LUCENA CITY, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Gilbert D. Camaligan for private respondent.

FACTS:
Background: CFI and IAC: ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena, represented
by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez, applicant vs. the Director of Lands and the Director,
Bureau of Forest Development Granted to Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena -
Evaluating the applicant's submitted proofs, the court a quo concluded, on the basis
of acquisitive prescription at the very least, that the former had adequately shown
title to the parcels of land being claimed.

LOCATION: Barrio Masin, Municipality of Candelaria, Quezon Province and Barrio

Bucal (Taguan), same municipality and province
LAND AREA: Lots 1, 2 and 3 of plan PSD-65686 and its technical descriptions, and
the parcel of land described in plan PSU-112592 and its technical description,
together with whatever improvements existing thereon, in the name of the ROMAN
CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena, Lot 4 - PSU-112592
PARTIES:
1. ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF Lucena, represented by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez,
applicant-appellee
2. Republic of the Philippines Oppositors-appellants
ON WHAT GROUNDS:
3. the applicant claimed title to the various properties through either purchase
or donation dating as far back as 1928
4. Oppositor: that the applicant did not have an imperfect title or title in fee
simple to the parcel of land being applied for. The issue raised in this case
involves the question of whether the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena, as a
corporation sole is qualified to apply for confirmation of its title to the four (4)
parcels of land subject of this case, that the Roman Catholic Church, as a
corporation, is disqualified from owning properties from the public domain
based on Art. XIV, Sec. 11 of the 1973 Constitution and that the registration
was applied after the effectivity of the 1973 constitution.
ISSUE:

1. Whether or not a corporation sole should be treated as an ordinary private

corporation, for purpose of the application of Art. XIV, Sec. 11 of the 1973
Constitution.
 2. W/N the lots are part of the public domain.

HELD
n 1980, which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive
and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law
creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite
period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be
public land and becomes' private property. DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. IAC, supra, p.
518).

No proof being admissable to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation

proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to
ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length
of time, and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a
title already vested.

We can say the following: A corporation sole is a special form of corporation usually
associated with the clergy.
A corporation sole consists of one person only, and his successors (who will always
be one at a time), Pertinent to this case is the provision of Sec. 113 Batas Pambansa
Blg. 68 which reads as follows:

Sec. 113. Acquisition and alienation of property. Any corporation

sole may purchase and hold real estate and personal property for its
church, charitable, benevolent or educational purposes, and may
receive bequests or gifts for such purposes.

2. G.R. No. 85322 April 30, 1991

ALFREDO M. ALMEDA, LEONARDO M. ALMEDA and ERNESTO M.
ALMEDA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
representative represented by THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, respondents.
Leonardo M. Almeda for petitioners.

FACTS:
Background: Petition for review based on the decision of CA reversing the decision
of the RTC. It held that private respondents had not qualified for a grant under
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141 which requires public, peaceful,
continuous, adverse possession by the applicants in the concept of an owner, for a
period of at least 30 years. They have to their credit only seventeen (17) years
possession and occupation of the land, counted from January 23, 1968, when it was
declared alienable and disposable, up to September 12, 1984, when their
application for registration was filed
June 15, 1935 - Emiliano Almeda (Father of Petitioners) and Adriano Almeda
January 13, 1968 Declared the land as disposable and alienable
September 12, 1984 Registration

LOCATION: Barrio Pampangin Pateros, Rizal, and described in Survey Plan Psu-
128539.
LAND AREA: 1,208 square meters
REGISTRATION: September 12, 1984, the Almeda brothers applied for the
registration of the land in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch CLVI (LRC Case
No. N-10771)
PARTIES:
1. Brothers - ALFREDO M. ALMEDA, LEONARDO M. ALMEDA and ERNESTO M.
ALMEDA
2. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

ON WHAT GROUNDS:
The land applied for was inalienable forest land before its release as alienable and
disposable land on January 3, 1968. The applicants' possession thereof prior to
January 3, 1968 was invalid for purposes of a grant under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act

ISSUE:
W/N the land classification on the duration of the occupation of petitioners affects
the reckoning point of the computation of the 30-year open and continuous
possession

HELD

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the private respondents had not qualified
for a grant under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act because their possession of
the land while it was still inalienable forest land, or before it was declared alienable
and disposable land of the public domain on January 13, 1968, could not ripen into
private ownership, and should be excluded from the computation of the 30-year
open and continuous possession in concept of owner required under Section 48(b)
of Com. Act 141. It accords with our ruling in Director of Lands vs.Court of Appeals,
Ibarra Bishar et al., 178 SCRA 708.

3. G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs.
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS:
Public Estates Authority ("PEA" for brevity) to disclose all facts on PEA's then on-
going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation
("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay.
The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to
undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling
functions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands
are concerned.

PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34
hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of
submerged areas of Manila Bay to AMARI
LOCATION: Manila Bay, Freedom Islands
LAND AREA: 367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands and submerged areas of
Manila Bay, 157.841 hectares, 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding these
islands
REGISTRATION:
PARTIES:
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ
PEA
AMARI

ON WHAT GROUNDS:
Finally, PEA theorizes that the "act of conveying the ownership of the reclaimed
lands to public respondent PEA transformed such lands of the public domain to
private lands." This theory is echoed by AMARI which maintains that the "issuance
of the special patent leading to the eventual issuance of title takes the subject land
away from the land of public domain and converts the property into patrimonial or
private property." In short, PEA and AMARI contend that with the issuance of Special
Patent No. 3517 and the corresponding certificates of titles, the 157.84 hectares
comprising the Freedom Islands have become private lands of PEA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.

HELD
Private lands taken by the Government for public use under its power of eminent
domain become unquestionably part of the public domain. Nevertheless, Section 85
of PD No. 1529 authorizes the Register of Deeds to issue in the name of the National
Government new certificates of title covering such expropriated lands
Alienable lands of the public domain "granted, donated, or transferred to a province,
municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government," as provided in Section 60
of CA No. 141, may be registered under the Torrens System pursuant to Section 103
of PD No. 1529. Such registration, however, is expressly subject to the condition in
Section 60 of CA No. 141 that the land "shall not be alienated, encumbered or
otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized
by Congress." This provision refers to government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy lands of the public domain that have been titled but still cannot be
alienated or encumbered unless expressly authorized by Congress. The need for
legislative authority prevents the registered land of the public domain from
becoming private land that can be disposed of to qualified private parties.

This scheme, if allowed, can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the
public domain since PEA can "acquire x x x any and all kinds of lands." This will
open the floodgates to corporations and even individuals acquiring hundreds of
hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the guise that in the hands of
PEA these lands are private lands. This will result in corporations amassing huge
landholdings never before seen in this country - creating the very evil that the
constitutional ban was designed to prevent. This will completely reverse the clear
direction of constitutional development in this country.
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or
transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these
lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987
Constitution and existing laws.

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open
to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government
can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these
submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the
public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In
their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and
outside the commerce of man.

3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,

ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for
being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify
the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer
needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.

4. G.R. No. L-630 November 15, 1947

ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent and appellee.
Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha of petitioner-appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Carreon for
respondent-appellee.
Marcelino Lontok appeared as amicus curies.

FACTS: Alenxander A. Kriventor is an alien (foreigner) who bought a residential lot

from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of 1941. The registration of which
was interrupted by the war.

In May 1945, he registered the lot but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila
on the ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction.
Krivenko then brought the case to the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of
Manila by means of a consulta, and that court rendered judgment sustaining the
refusal of the register of deeds, from which Krivenko appealed to this Court.
LOCATION: residential lot from the Magdalena Estate
LAND AREA:
REGISTRATION:
PARTIES:
ON WHAT GROUNDS:
The constitution does not bar aliens from owning residential lands, as being not part
of private agricultural lands.

ISSUE: whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land.

HELD
we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public
agricultural lands, including residential lands, and, accordingly
It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in these section refers to all
private lands, whether strictly agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being
practically no private land which had not been acquired by any of the means
provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained in these two
provisions was, in effect, that no private land could be transferred to aliens except
"upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of Philippine
Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate
land." In other words, aliens were granted the right to acquire private land merely
by way of reciprocity