Patterns of Political Opposition in Southeast Asia

Author(s): Justus M. van der Kroef

Source: Pacific Affairs, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Winter, 1978-1979), pp. 620-638
Published by: Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia
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 PatternsofPoliticalOpposition
in SoutheastAsia
JustusM. van der Kroef

URING THE PAST decade or so, governments in non-communist

SoutheastAsia have developednotablysimilarpoliciesaimed at
insuringdomesticstabilityand politicalcontrol.This has occurred
despite changes in cabinets,or even-as in the case of Thailand-
despitea generallyperceivedliberalizationof the government in its
attitudetowardpoliticaldissenters.Whetherformalmartiallaw pre-
vails (as in thePhilippines),or wide-ranging internalsecuritystatutes
are applied (as in Burma, Malaysia, and Singapore), or broadly
formulated "state ofwar and siege" policiesare used (as in Indonesia
and Thailand), the justificationforsecuritypracticesis much the
same: that subversionby communist,Islamic, or ethnic-secessionist
movements,or the possible exploitationby these of otherformsof
dissent,all necessitatetheexerciseofextensivepowers.In addition,all
countriesin the region,withthe possibleexceptionofBurma,justify
such powersas essentialfororderlyeconomicgrowthand theattrac-
tion offoreigncapital.
Executiveclaimsofsuperiorraisond'etatare rarelychallengedby
legislativeand judicial organs.A finelytuned self-censorship in the
mass media and in personalor collectivepoliticalexpressionis the
priceto be paid forlivingunderregimeswhichacknowledgeformally
theruleoflaw, butwhichperceivepoliticalrealitiesas formulated, for
example,by Lee Kuan Yew and S. Rajaratnam,respectively Premier
and Foreign Ministerof Singapore,duringtheirhighlysuccessful
December 1976 reelectioncampaign.Accordingto Lee and Rajarat-
nam, theserealitiesare (i) thatthe "real opposition"in Singaporeis
the undergroundcommunistswhich Lee's ruling Political Action
Party (PAP) "has been fightingwithoutstop foryears;" (2) that
whetherpeople in Singapore"havejobs or not dependson thepoliti-
cal stabilityin Singapore,"and particularlyon whetherpeople and
government can "convinceindustrialiststo set up in Singaporefacto-
ries withhigh skillcontent;"and (3) that Singaporeansshould not

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 Political Oppositionin SoutheastAsia
break up what theyhave built "in termsof stability,securityand
confidence,"since"once thecountrygoes downit cannotcome up."'
Mutatismutandis similarsentiments have been expressedby leadersof
othernon-communist governments in the region.
The quasi-authoritarian similaritiesof these SoutheastAsian re-
gimeshave helped to structuresimilaritiesin politicaloppositionas
well. While a formaldistinctioncan be made betweenparliamentary
and extra-parliamentary opposition,the former-withthe possible
exceptionofMalaysia-is not as significant as the latter.Indeed,it is
typical of the regionthat,despite periodic elections or popularrefer-
enda (as in the Philippines),the more effective and, froman inter-
nationalpointofview,themorevisibleformofpoliticaloppositionhas
tended to be organizedand expressedoutside parliamentand the
electoralsystem.
All thecountriesoftheregionwiththeexceptionofBurma (where
only the Burma Socialist ProgramParty is nationallyrecognized)
haveformalmulti-party systemsand provideforcompetitive elections.
(In the Philippines,the September1972 martiallaw proclamationat
firstsuspendedactivitiesby politicalparties;but the suspensionwas
modifiedby PresidentFerdinandMarcos inconnectionwiththeApril
1978 electionsforthe InterimBatasangPambansa.)Realityis different.
The pro-MarcosKilusangBagongLipunan(KBL, or Movementforthe
New Society),whichwon the electionin April 1978,is the Philippine
variantof the dominant"government party" now commonlyfound
the
throughout region, such as the Golkar (fromGolongan Karyaor
Functional Group) in Indonesia, the PAP in Singapore,and the
Burma Socialist ProgramParty (BSPP) in Burma. The degree of
internalcohesionand strength of such "government parties" varies.
Not all ofthemcan matchtheefficiency ofSingapore'srulingPAP in
thecooptionand recruitment ofpotentialantagonistsand in the near
monopolizationof public administrative skills.In Malaysia, forex-
ample,theleadershipoftherulingcoalitionofparties,BarisanNasional
(National Front),is frequently beset by internalsquabbles and rifts
among its ethnic and regional componentpolitical organizations,
which seems to endow oppositionparties withvitalityand genuine
influence.The fact remains,however,that partisanparliamentary
oppositionis generallyineffective among SoutheastAsian statesto-

1
AgenceFrance Pressedespatch[Singapore],December lo, 1976;Radio Singapore,domestic
service(in English),December i6 and i8, 1976(ForeignBroadcastInformation
Service[hereaf-
terFBIS], December i4, 20, and 22, 1976).

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 PacificAffairs
day.2 Even in the Malaysian example, party competitionis more
apparentthan real.
As a consequenceofthesedevelopments, theroleofmakingpoliti-
cal counterpointshas been largelyassumed by variousextra-parlia-
mentaryinterest-groups: (i) studentsand segments oftheintellectual
community,(2) the military,(3) religiousand ethnicgroups,and (4)
the communists.The firstgroup, by itselfor in combinationwith
others,is currentlythe most important.While studentmovements
have been closelyconnectedwiththeriseofnationalismin all South-
east Asian countries,in the post-independence periodstudentpoliti-
cal actionhas becomeless consistentin its objectives.In the past two
decades, countryaftercountryhas experiencedstudentdemonstra-
tionsand agitation.
The ebb and flow of studentoppositionmovementsand their
concernsare illustratedby the case of Indonesia. Aftertheyhelped
bring about the fall of the Sukarno regime in I966, the principal
studentleaders seemed initiallyto be co-opted by Suharto's tech-
nocratically-oriented and development-minded Orba (from Orde
Baru or New Order), and they won lucrative governmentap-
and seats in parliament.
pointments By 1970-1971, however,
rising
pricesand chargesofcorruption involving
Chineseentrepreneurs, and
themilitaryand businessmenwho formmuchofOrba's elite,sparked
the firstofincreasinglyseriousanti-Suhartogovernment demonstra-
tions. Studentssoon chargedthatthe recommendations of a special
governmentcommission,looking into corruption,and headed by
formerpremierWilopo, had been ignored,and that the resounding
victoryforGolkar in the 1971 generalelectionshad been achieved
throughintimidation and briberyand did not reflectthe electorate's
true wishes. Subsequentallegationsthat membersof PresidentSu-
harto'simmediatefamilywereinvolvedin corruptbusinesspractices,
whenthe mass ofIndonesiansseemedto benefitonlyminimallyfrom
the billionsofdollarsin creditsbeingpumpedintothecountryby an
internationalconsortium,strengthened studentconvictionsthat the
Suhartoregimewas essentiallythepreserveoffree-wheeling business

2 For example,in Indonesia the formerparliamentaryspeaker,Idham Chalid, concededon

September8, I977, that the House was aware that the public was "extremelycriticaland
disappointed"withparliamentforfailingto press its rights.The new speaker,Adam Malik,
invitedstudents(amongthemostimportant extra-parliamentary opposition)to contribute
their
ideas "directly"to parliament,and promisedto hold regularmeetingswith studentleaders.
Antara despatches [Djakarta], September9 and I5, I977; Radio Djakarta, domesticservice
(in Indonesian), October io, I977; Agence France Presse despatch [Djakarta], October io,
I977 (FBIS, September
I2 and OctoberII, I977).

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 Political Oppositionin SoutheastAsia
entrepreneurs and military.The latterwereseen to be in league with
local Chinese and foreign-particularly Japanese-entrepreneurs.It
is important to notethatthen,as later,thestudentshad thesympathy of
certainhigh-ranking militaryfigures.In December 1973, forexample,
the GreaterDjakarta militarydistrictcommander,Major-General
G.H. Mantik,was quoted as sayingthatthestudents"struggle"was
"still pure and devotedto the aspirationsof the man in the street,"
and that therewere no indicationsthat the communistswere ex-
ploitingthe students'demonstrations.'
We can onlyspeculateas to howmuchstudentsweresupportedby
some Indonesianmilitaryand businesscircles,who themselveswere
adverselyaffectedbytheallianceofIndonesianChineseandJapanese
investment interests,and thus may have encouragedstudentsto be-
come pawns in an intra-elitestruggle.But in the weeks beforethe
eruptionof the anti-Tanakariotsin Djakarta on January15 and i6,
1974, University ofIndonesiacampus"panel discussions"and student
"petitions"criticising unemployment, and abuses ofpower
inflation,
by the military,swiftlyassumed a greaterimport;as one semi-official
analysis put it, such activitieswere being "directedto the estab-
lishmentitself."4In the aftermathof the Tanaka visit,riots (now
called by Indonesiansthe"Malari affair, " fromMalapetakai5 januari,
or the "I5 Januarydisaster") left13 dead, scores seriouslyinjured,
some 8oo arrestedand millionsofrupiahsworthofdamages (includ-
ing damages to Chinese-ownedenterprises).The governmentre-
sponded with new measuresfavoringthe nativeIndonesian (as op-
posed to Chinese Indonesian) businesscommunityand eliminating
theAspri,thefourhigh-ranking militarywho servedas "assistants"to
PresidentSuharto,and who werewidelyviewedas symbolsofuncon-
stitutionalpower. Characteristically, however,the government's in-
ternalsecuritycommand (Kopkamtib) also declaredthatamong Ma-
lari's "instigators" were those dedicated to "socialism" and to
topplingthe government by "radical means."' By placing new con-
trolson campus politicalactivity,increasingsurveillanceofthevola-

3AntaraDaily News Bulletin,December22, I973 (vol. 26, no. I951), p. III; PeterSimmsin Asia
ResearchBulletin(January1974), pp. 235i-6. On November27, I973, TheJakartaTimesall but
exoneratedthestudents,declaringthatthegap betweenrichand poorwas "widening," and that
"what one sees today" is the "revivalofthe old corruptpractices,abuses ofauthority, extrava-
gances by the eliteof society,"and so on.
"StudentUnrest,"Monthly Review(Djakarta: CenterforStrategicand InternationalStud-
ies), November-December I973, pp. 3-5.
5 Radio Djakarta, domesticservice(in Indonesian),February2I, I974 (FBIS, Feburary22,
I974).

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 PacificAffairs
tile studentcommunity,especiallyin WestJava, and continuingto
recruitstudent leaders into the "establishment, " the government
managed to createa relativelull in studentactivitiesformorethan
threeyears.
The wideningimpactduring1975-76 ofthe$io billionindebtedness
scandal, and maladministration ofthe state-ownedoil companyPer-
tamina, were additional manifestations of the corruptelitismthat
Suharto's Orba representedamong growingnumbersof university-
educated Indonesiansstruggling to findemployment commensurate
withtheirtraining.In February1977,Lieutenant-General Widodo,
commanderof the second regionaldefencecommand (which com-
prises Java), cautioned against the dangers of what he termeda
"Kuomintangization"processevidentin Indonesia. He noted three
"alarming" symptomsin the country:(i) an "extremelyluxurious"
upperand upper-middle class life-style,
(2) corruptionas the"norm"
in the conductof"government business,"and (3) the"misery"ofthe
villagers.6Not until the May I977 general election,however,did
political activitiespick up again. While the electionprovidedonly
limitedopportunityfor political criticism,and while the Suharto
government's carefulorchestration of the electionbroughtits Golkar
partyan expectedvictory, chargesofintimidation ofoppositioncan-
didates and ofseriousfraud votetabulations,as well as thesurpris-
in
ing strengthof some oppositioncandidates,especiallyin Djakarta,
offeredthe Suhartogovernment littlecause forcheer.7
Withindaysoftheelection,Indonesianstudentagitationresumed.
It nowfocussedparticularly on theforthcoming March 1978 sessionof
Indonesia's "People's Consultative Assembly" (Madjelis Per-
musjawaratan Rakjat,or MPR), the nation's highestpolicy-making
body, constitutionally charged with electingIndonesia's President
and Vice-President.AfterGolkar's May 1977electoralvictory,in-
cumbent PresidentSuharto had been expectedto be named as a
matterof course to his thirdterm by the MPR. Encouraged by
constitutional specialists,however,who chargedthatthecomposition
ofthe MPR was undemocraticsincesome 6o per centofits members
wereappointedby the government, University of Indonesiastudents
appealed to the "Conscience of the Indonesian People" on July 5,
1977.They urgedthat the popular outgoingDjakarta governor,Ali

6SinarHarapan[Djakarta], February 7, 1977 (FBIS, MarchI I,977).

On the I977 electionssee JustusM. van der Kroef,"Indonesiens'Neue Ordnung' in der
Bewahrungsprobe," I977, no. 20, pp. 742-50.
Europa-Archziv,

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 Political Oppositionin SoutheastAsia
Sadikin,be electedPresident,and thattheformer studentactivistand
civil rightsadvocate,Adnan Bujung Nasution,be made Vice-Presi-
dent.Sadikin,who at firstcautiouslypraised"youngpeople" fortheir
"courage" in expressingthemselves, soonremovedhimselfas a poten-
tial studentrallyingpoint.Studentagitationcontinued,however,even
thoughGolkar-oriented newspapersbegan warningthosewantingto
exercisetheirdemocraticrightsin Indonesianotto let themselvesbe
"used" by theunderground communistmovement.8 Thereweredem-
onstrations,protestmarchesin WestJava cities,and studentplays
satirizingthe Suhartogovernment. Indeed,Suhartohimselfbecame a
morefrequenttarget,as studentscontinuedto raise questionsabout
the speculativebusiness dealings of his wife,brotherand son, and
about the planned buildingof a luxurious,$io millionfamilymau-
soleum.
Therewas increasingconcernwithinthegovernment thatstudents
were findingsupportersnotjust among Muslim oppositiongroups,
but also among high-ranking Indonesianmilitary,particularlythose
close to MuslimpoliticalquarterslikeretiredGeneralA.H. Nasution,
seniorsoldier.On DecemberI5,
thecountry's I977, a sharply
worded
statement was issuedbyIndonesia'sDefenseMinister,GeneralMara-
den Panggabean,on behalfof top militarycommanders.While ac-
knowledginga citizen's rightto express opinions, the statement
warnedthatthe exerciseofsuch rightshad to be based on a recogni-
tion of the need for"national interestand unity,"and it threatened
drasticmeasuresif "certainelements"did not cease their"negative
activities."Troops clashed withstudents,as armyunitsweresentto
various campuses to break up new demonstrations;and some 220
studentsthroughout Java had been arrestedby earlyFebruaryI978.
An "anti-riot" exercisewas heldin Djakartaon February4, I978, with
I0,000 troops.Eightleadingdailies werebanned forabout twoweeks
because theirreporting was notconduciveto "nationalstability"and,
accordingto Information MinisterSudharmono,"could aggravate"
the domesticsituation.Afterstudentsat the Bandung Instituteof
Technology(BIT) "seized" theircampusand stageda "studystrike,"
the government dismissed"honorably"the rector(president)ofthe
institutionand began stationingtroopsat BIT. Addressingthe In-
donesian Journalists'Associationin Surakartaon February9, In-
donesia's Presidentechoed the familiarthemeofthe region's"don't
rockthe boat" policy.Suhartourgedhis audienceto "throwaway as

8 SuaraKarya[Djakarta],
November
2, I977,

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 PacificAffairs
far as possible the dream of having freedomfor freedom'ssake,
because it is too luxuriousforus." Pressfreedomhas two meanings,
Suharto said: freedomto reportan event,but also freedomnot to
publish a report.9The eightrecentlybanned dailies resumedpub-
licationaftereditorshad agreednot to publishany storiesthatcould
heightendomestictensions.Specificallyincludedwerestatementsby
a numberof seniormilitarycommanderslike Nasution,the former
Secretary-Generalof the Djakarta-based Associationof Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), GeneralH.R. Dharsono,formerGovernor
Sadikin,the poet W.S. Rendra,and others.10
Purist in their outlookand drivenby a moral zeal not always
matchedby considerationofpoliticalconsequences,Indonesia's stu-
dent activistsreflectno singleeasily describedideology.Their focus
shiftsfromrisingprices,shortagesand unemployment, to briberyand
corruptcollusionbetweenmilitaryand business,fromthe dealingsof
so-calledtjukongs (Chineseentrepreneurs and powerbrokers, in league
withhigh officialsand foreigncapital interests),to violationsoflegal
due process,curtailment ofcivilliberties,and otherabuses ofpower.
Their sympathieslean towardsDemocraticSocialismas thattermis
understoodin the West; but they have stronglynationalisticand
sometimesreligiousconvictionsas well.
It is to be notedthat,in themain,thistoo is the "thought-world"
ofmany,ifnotmost,ofthepoliticallyactivestudentgroupselsewhere
in theregion.Since a numberofUniversity ofRangoonstudentswere
killedin July i962, fourmonthsafterthe regimeofGeneralNe Win
tookpower,studentoppositionin Burmahas repeatedlybeendirected
againstpolitical"repression"(includingdenial of students'rightsto
formtheirown unions), as well as against the country'seconomic
stagnation.During the great studentuprisingin Rangoon between
June6 and i i, 1975, students andworkers marched anddemonstrated
against the lack of jobs, shortages,higherprices,and fora "demo-
cratic Burma."
In Thailand, studentshave demonstrated at varioustimesduring
the past fourdecades, in supportof the "integrity"ofThai national
territory (e.g., in 1940 againstalleged Frenchencroachment, and in
the early 1970sagainstU.S. militarybases on Thai soil), as well as in
protestagainst alleged abuses of power and attemptsto "destroy
democracy" (e.g., in the 1957 generalelectionsagainst the Pribun

9Agence,France Pressedespatch [Djakarta], February9, I978 (FBIS, February9, I978).

10 Ibid.,Februaryio, 1978 (FBIS, February13, 1978),

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 Political Oppositionin SoutheastAsia
regime,in I968 against the martial law rule of premierThanom
Kittikachorn,and in 1973 on behalfofan acceleratedpromulgation of
a new Constitution).The 1973 studentdemonstrations, and theTha-
nom government's attemptto containthem,expandedintowidening
violence which culminatedin the fall of the government.A Thai
precursorand variantofan Indonesia-style, anti-tjukong,
anti-foreign
in
capital, studentprotesthad alreadycome the campaign against
Japanese products in November 1972, while the imageryof high-
placed corruptionfiguredprominently in the Thai studentcampaign
againstThanom's regimeduringthe October 1973 studentrising.1"
Afterthe success ofthe latterrisingone notedThai studentactiv-
ist, Seksan Prasertkul,leader of FIST ("Federationof Independent
StudentsofThailand"), could stillplace "preservationofdemocracy,
thecountry'sreligion,and theKing" at thehead ofhis program,thus
no doubt reflectinga broad range of similar Thai studentsenti-
ments.12But betweenOctober 14, 1973, whentheThanomregimefell,
and October 6, 1976, whenThai militaryleaders,underAdmiralSa-
ngad Chalawyoo, overthrewthe Seni Pramoj governmentand re-
establishedtheirauthority througha NationalAdministrative Reform
Council (NARC) aftera bloodyclash betweenstudentdemonstrators
and policeat Bangkok'sThammasatUniversity, Thai studentopinion
rapidlybecame both moreradical and polarized.In thisbriefthree-
yearperiod (1973-76),whenparliamentary government based on fre-
quent electionsin a multi-party systemexisted,an ideologicalsplit
occurredin the Thai studentmovementbetween a more radical,
egalitarianwingon theone hand,and a military-backed, conservative
and militantly anti-communist wingon the other.At the same time,
the unsettlingeffectsofthe international oil crisis,thewindingdown
of the U.S. militarycommitment in Vietnamas well as in Thailand
itself,and the waningpublic confidencein thefaction-ridden Kukrit
Pramoj and Seni Pramojcabinets,wereaccentuatedby a slackening
in the growthofThailand's economy.13
The sweepingsecuritypoliciesoftheNARC-backedgovernment of

" PrudhisanJumbala, "The Emergenceof the Thai StudentMovement,"Southeast Asian

Spectrum [Bangkok](October I975),pp. 8-I4; Ross Prizziaand NarongSinsawasdi,"Evolutionof
the Thai Student Movement, 1940-1974,"Asia Quarterly, No. X (1975), pp. 3-54; Robert F.
Zimmerman,"Student Revolutionin Thailand: The End of the Thai BureaucraticPolity?"
AsianSurvey (June1974), pp. 509-12.
12 Ruth Inge Heinze, "Ten Days in October-Students vs. the Military,"AsianSurvey (June
'974), P. 505.
13 Ben Anderson,"Withdrawal Symptoms:Social and Cultural Aspects of the October 6

Coup," BulletinofConcerned AsianScholars(July-September 1977), p. I8.

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 PacificAffairs
PremierThanin Kraivixienacceleratedthepolarizationofthestudent
movement.Even as the Thanin governmentannounced arrestsof
prominentleaders of the National Student Center of Thailand
(NSCT), the principal studentaction federationfoundedin 1969,
reportsindicatedthat otherstudents(eventuallysome 2,000 in all)
had joined thecommunistinsurgents in Thailand.14 Clashes increased
betweenarmedstudentsand theirThai "People's Army"allies on the
one hand, and Thai securityforceson the other,and studentleader
Seksan Prasertkulnow called fora Maoist-style,rural-basedrevolu-
tionaryguerilla war. Meanwhile,over the "Voice of the People of
Thailand" (VOPT), the South China-basedradio of Thailand's in-
surgentCommunistParty,statements fromtheexecutiveoftheNSCT
urgedexpansionofthe "heroicstruggleoftheyouths,schoolchildren,
studentsand the Thai people" against the "arch-feudalists, fascist
warlordsand reactionaries"of the Thanin regimeand its military
backers.15As late as August 1977, Thai militaryspokesmenstillac-
cused Thai studentsofhavinggoneto Laos and Vietnamfortraining
and returning as insurgentsto fightin Thailand.16
AfterOctober20, 1977, regimewas
whentheThaninKraivixien
replacedin a bloodlessmilitary coup,and Thai SupremeCommander
KriangsakChamanandbecamepremier,themilitantanti-communist
line was at least overtlysoftened,and an officialpromiseofamnesty
was made to "wayward"studentsiftheyabandonedtheirnewcareers
in communistinsurgency.By December 1977,Thai leaders were
reportingthatscoresofdissidentstudentswere"returning"fromthe
jungle. But in earlyJanuary1978, it was said thatothers(e.g., in the
Mae Hong Son area of Chiang Mai Province)werebeingprevented
fromreturningbecause of "Communistthreats."'7Meanwhile,the
NSCT, stillbroadcastingover the VOPT, keptpraisingand urging
the continuanceofthe "struggle"of"urban youths,studentsand the
people," thistimeagainstthe Kriangsak"warlordclique."
Even the Thai monarchyis no longerthe unassailablysacrosanct
institutionit oncewas. In a broadcastovertheVOPT on AprilI, I 977,
for example, ThirayutBunmi, a one-timeChulalongkornstudent
activist,declaredthattheThai monarchy, unliketheThai nationand
the Buddhistreligion,had become "obsolete" and was "deteriorat-

'4 [Bangkok],October I I, 1976; Daily Time[Bangkok],October24,

See, e.g., SiangPuangchon
1976; and FBIS, OctoberI3 and29, 1976.
6 See, e.g., textof VOPTbroadcast.October 6, 1977 in FBIS, October 7, 1977.
6 TheStraitsTimes,August25, 1977.
7 TheBangkok
Post,
January
7, 1978.

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 Political Oppositionin SoutheastAsia
ing," so that if "our people were to destroyit therewould be no
adverseeffects."Such contemptforthe monarchywould have been
inconceivablea fewyearsearlier.Whilegovernments throughout non-
communistSoutheastAsia readilyseem to identify studentprotest
eitherwithcommunistsubversionor withthe dangerof communist
"exploitation,"at least in Thailand thereis no denyingthat with
greateror lesser degrees of enthusiasmhundredsof Thai student
activistshave been allied withlocal communistinsurgents. Elsewhere
in SoutheastAsia itis muchmoredifficult to documentsuchalliances,
althoughevidenceofradicalstudentinitiatives in theestablishment in
i969 ofthe Maoist "New People's Army"(NPA) in the Philippinesis
persuasive.18
In only two countriesofthe region-Indonesia and Thailand-is
the militarysufficiently politicizedor drawn into variouspublic ad-
ministrative or businessventuresso as to makeit a significantlyovert
participantin movementsof dissentand opposition.No comparable
tradition,historicallysanctionedor formallyacknowledged,exists
amongthemilitaryin thePhilippines(where,ostensibly, theprinciple
ofciviliancontrolovera non-politicalmilitaryholds sway),although
throughthe mechanicsof pervasivefamilyand patron-client obliga-
tions,Philippinemilitaryauthorityhas significantly interactedwith
business and political brokeragefunctions,approachingthe Thai
style.Whereasin Singaporeand Malaysia the Britishtraditiontends
to insurea rigorously unpoliticizedmilitaryapparatus,just acrossthe
StraitsofMalacca in Indonesia,thephenomenonofthefree-wheeling
militarypoliticianand militaryentrepreneur, thoughcertainlynot
unknownin the Sukarnoera, has acquirednew scope since i966 and
the adventof Suharto'sOrba."9
As in i965-66,whensome ABRI (IndonesianArmy)commanders
tacitlyaided Djakarta studentsin the demonstrations that contrib-
uted to Sukarno'sfall,so in 1977-78 a numberofIndonesianmilitary
figureswere identifiedwith the Indonesian students' campaign
against a thirdpresidentialtermforSuharto. Particularlyproblem-
atical was thepositionofthenation'smostprestigioussoldier,former

18 On the NPA see Eduardo Lachica, Huk: Philippine

AgrarianSocietyin Revolt(Manila:
Solidaridad House,197I), esp.pp. 171-87.
Publishing
'9 Usefulinsightsintothe politicaland businessrolesof Indonesianmilitaryare providedin
AnthonyGoldstone,"What Was the PertaminaCrisis?" in Southeast AsianAffairsI977, Singa-
pore: InstituteofSoutheastAsian Studies,ed. (Singapore:FEP International,
1977),pp. 122-32;
and MartinRudner,"The Militaryin IndonesianDevelopmentPlanning,1969-1974," in Harold
Z. Schiffrin,ed., Militaryand Statein ModernAsia, Truman InstituteStudies, The Hebrew
Universityof JerusalemUerusalemAcademic Press, 1977),pp. 197-227.

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 PacificAffairs
Defense Ministerand formerConstituentAssembly(MPR) Chair-
man, retiredGeneral Abdul Haris Nasution. Nasution's ties with
anti-SuhartoMuslim elements,includingthe oppositionUnitedDe-
velopmentParty(PartaiPersatuan Pembangunan, or PPP) and his influ-
ence among those seniormilitaryfigures,like deputyarmed forces
chiefGeneral Surono, who also has urged "understanding"of the
have lentconsiderablesignificance
students'strivings, to his presence
at anti-Suhartostudentrallies.It was perhapsnoteworthy that,dur-
ingthewavesofarrestsofstudentdemonstrators in mid-January I978,
rumorsthat top militaryfigures(includingSurono, Nasution, and
H.R. Dharsono) also had been detained became so intensethat
DefenseMinisterMaraden Panggabean and SecurityChiefAdmiral
Sudomofeltitnecessaryto issuedenialsthatanyhigh-ranking officers
had in factbeen arrested.20
Withthere-election ofSuhartoto another
presidentialterm on March 23, 1978, it is doubtfulthat any In-
donesian militaryfigureswho sympathizewith studentdissentwill
riskan open breach.
There are indicationsofmoreenduringstudent-military alliances
in SoutheastAsia, however.DuringtheJune 1975 studentdemonstra-
tionsin RangoonagainsttheNe Win regime,studentopponentswere
reportedto have coordinatedtheiractivitywithanti-NeWin officers
in the BurmeseArmy; and one of them,General Bo Let Ya, sub-
sequentlyprovideda havento fleeingstudentleadersat theheadquar-
tersofhis shadowyoppositionorganization,the"People's Progressive
Party" in Eastern Burma.2'One can only speculateon the current
extentof the student-BoLet Ya alliance and of Burmesemilitary
oppositionto Ne Win, not least because of the changingmosaic of
ethnicand ideologicaloppositionmovementsin the countrytoday.
One need only considerneighboringThailand, however,to con-
clude thatthephenomenonofstudent-military partnership is likelyto
persistas a notable featureof SoutheastAsian politicalopposition
movements.During the three-year post-Thanom"parliamentary pe-
riod" (1973-76)in Thailand, led by the cabinetsof Kukritand Seni
Pramoj,a numberofThai military, evidentlyalarmedovertheinflu-
ence of the earlier-namedNational Student Center of Thailand
(whosedemonstrations it will be recalledhad precipitatedThanom's

20 Radio Djakarta, domesticservice(in Indonesian),January26, 1978(FBIS, January27,

1978).
21 WilliamMattera,"Burma: LiningUp againstNe Win," Far Eastern Economic
Review,
Julyi i,
1975, p. 27.

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 Political Oppositionin SoutheastAsia
fall), began fosteringa followingof theirown, particularlyamong
studentsof vocationaland technicalschools,as well as among the
politicallymore conservativemiddle and lower-middleclass popu-
lationofthe smallerurban centers.Amongthesemilitaryorganizers
were two top officers of the InternalSecurityOperationsCommand
(ISOC, Thailand's chiefanti-Communist coordinatingagency),Gen-
eral Sayud Kerdpholand Colonel Sudsai Hasadin.22Their associates
wereGeneralsWallop Rojanawisutand ChamnianPhonparroch(the
retiredand incumbentheads of Thai militaryintelligence,respec-
tively),the commanderof the Thai Border Patrol forces,General
SurapholChulapram,and othergeneralofficers. The so-called"Red
Guars," principallyrecruitedfromBangkokvocationalschools and
reportedly organizedby ColonelHasadin, becamethemilitary's"an-
swer" to thevolatileThai studentcommunity. They battledThamas-
sat Universitystudent opponents throughoutBangkok, disrupted
demonstrations, wreckedofficesof politicalparties,and, wherepos-
sible, militantly
demonstratedtheiranti-communist convictionsand
theirpatrioticfervoron behalfof King and country.23 The fullpoten-
tial of student-military
partnershipsremainsundevelopedin the re-
gion,but the "Red Gaur" case illustratesthe dimensionswhichsuch
an allianceamongSoutheastAsian oppositiongroupstodaycould still
attain.
Extra-parliamentary religiousoppositionincludes Islamic move-
ments,eithercommittedto political secession (as in the Southern
Philippinesor in the Thai-WestMalaysian frontier area) or else,like
the recentanti-SuhartoKommando Jihad ("Holy War Command")
movementin Indonesia,to the realizationofthe old dreamof many
orthodoxMuslims: a formallyIslamic Indonesianstate. Many ele-
mentsin the Roman CatholicChurchand otherChristiandenomina-
tions in the Philippineshave been vocal in theiroppositionto the
martiallaw regimeofPresidentMarcos,and, accordingto Philippine
DefenseMinisterJuan Ponce Enrile,a numberof clergyhave made
commoncause with the Maoist "New People's Army" insurgents.
Singapore's Foreign MinisterS. Rajaratnam in recent years has
voicedconcernoverthe phenomenonofthe "ChristianNew Left"as
22 Both officers previouslyserved in the CommunistSuppressionOperations Command
(CSOC) commandedby GeneralSayud,and theirconcernmayhave been heightenedwhen,in
the aftermath of the Thanom coup, the KukritPramoj government announcedit intendedto
rename,scale downand reviewthescopeofCSOC and counter-insurgency operationsgenerally.
23 David Morell,"Political Conflictin Thailand," AsianAffairs
(January-February1976),pp.
151-84;NormanPeagam, "Thailand: Rumblingsfromthe Right,"Far Eastern EconomicReview,
July 25, 1975, pp. 13-14.

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 PacificAffairs
an oppositionmovement,not only in his own island Republic but
throughoutthe region.24There have also been reportsof Buddhist
clericalsupportforBurmesestudentopposition,forexample,during
theJune I975 demonstrations. But comparedto the activitiesoftheir
Vietnamesecounterparts in recentyears,anti-government opposition
among Buddhistclergyin Burma and Thailand has been morelim-
ited and far more circumspect.Finally,thereis a religiousnativist
component,illustratedbytheroleofprominent practitionersofkebati-
nan (the traditionallore ofJavanesemysticism, prophesyand mille-
narianism)in recentpolitical oppositionto the Suharto regimein
Indonesia.
Islamic oppositionhas mostfullycrystallizedin open armedresis-
tance and, whereit has occurred,thereare significant causal similar-
ities. In Mindanao and the Sulu archipelagoin the southernpart of
the Philippine Republic, a "Moro National Liberation Front"
(MNLF) reflects the longhistoricantagonismbetweenthe3.5 million
PhilippineIslamic communityand the 40 millionRoman Catholic
Philippinemajority,includingMuslim grievancesover theiralleged
"second class" status,overneglectby a distantnationalgovernment
in Manila, and over land expropriations by Christiansettlers.The
decade-old MNLF movementwas givena powerfulimpetusby the
currentstruggleof the Palestinian LiberationOrganizationfor a
homeland of their own. As a one-timeCommissionerof National
Integrationofthe Philippinegovernment has put it:

The mostimportant post-warphenomenon intheMiddleEastisthebirthof

the Israelstate.The sad condition
of Philippinerefugeesdramatizedto
PhilippineMuslimshowa peoplecanbe gradually outoftheirlands.
driven
Manyofthosenowwiththe BangsaMoro [the"MuslimNation,"more
theMNLF] havelivedas students
particularly intheMiddleEast andhave
"jumpedthegun"so to speak,in orderto prevent theirpeoplefrom
falling
intothesamefateas thePalestinians.25

The extentofthe "independence"soughtfora separateMuslimstate

in the SouthernPhilippinesappears to be a matterof controversy
amongMNLF leaders.But PresidentFerdinandMarcos's proclama-
tionon March 26, 1977, ofan "autonomous"regioncomprisingthir-

24 For detailson Roman Catholicopposition in the Philippinesand the"ChristianNew Left"

see JustusM. van der Kroef,"Religion,Ethnicityand CommunistTactics in SoutheastAsia's
(Winter1976),pp. 3-26.
Plural Societies,"PluralSocieties
25 Mamintal A. Tamano, "The Expectationsof Muslims as PhilippineCitizens," Solidarity

[Manila] (Special Muslim issue,July-August1975),p. 32.

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 Political Oppositionin SoutheastAsia
teenSouthernPhilippineprovincesappears to have satisfiedno one.
Some 4,000 MNLF insurgentsremain active, and effortsat truce
negotiationshave repeatedlyfailedor producedonlyveryshort-lived
results.In thepast fiveyears,Philippinegovernment sourcesestimate,
some 30,000 insurgents,civiliansand Philippinemilitaryhave lost
theirlivesin the "Moro" war.26It has been reportedthatthe support
giventhe MNLF by Libya, includingfunds,weaponsand trainingof
cadres,has beena powerful factorin keepingMuslimresistancealive.
In the SouthernThailand provincesofYala, Pattani,and Narath-
wat and environs,a similar"center-periphery" confrontation exists.
Amongthe 8oo,oooor so Thai Muslimsin theseprovincesthesenseof
estrangement, long-standinggrievancesover demeaningtreatment
(also in Islamic religiousmatters)and neglectby Bangkok,by the
strongly Buddhist-influenced Thai polityin general,and by theThai
bureaucracyin particular,as well as religiousand historicidentities
with Muslim Malays across the Thai-Malaysian border,have all
contributedduringthe past decade to the emergenceof secessionist
organizationssuch as the "National LiberationFrontofthe Pattani
Republic,"withitsown 300-man"liberationarmy."27 There has also
been periodicbut uneasycooperationwiththeguerillainsurgent force
oftheCommunistPartyofMalaya, whoseunitshavein themainbeen
stationedon Thai soil near the Malaysian border.
Only in the Philippineshave Christiandenominationsbecome
formally identifiedwithanti-government opposition.By 1974 the Na-
tional Council of Churchesof the Philippines,as well as prominent
Roman Catholicprelates,wereurgingPresidentMarcos to liftmar-
tial law, restorepolitical freedoms,and provideswifttrials to the
estimated2,000 prisonersheld on chargesofpoliticalsubversion.28 In
JanuaryI977, a pastoral lettersigned by sixty-sixRoman Catholic
bishopsin the Philippinesagain tookthe Marcos regimeto task for
perpetuatingits martiallaw policies,and moreparticularlyforthe
recentarrestsof clergyand the ban on certainreligiousmedia. As
early as August I974, there had been arrestsof "subversive-s" at a
Jesuit novitiatenear Manila, and by December of that year the
government had apprehendedtwo priestson the basis ofallegations
26 TheStraitsTimes,October 28, I977.
27 NantawanHaemindra,"The ProblemoftheThai Muslimsin theFour SouthernProvinces
ofThailand," JournalofSoutheast AsianStudies(March 1977), pp. 86-9.
28 Cirilo A. Rigos, "The Postureof the Church in the Philippinesunder Martial Law," in

SoutheastAsianAffairs i975 (Singapore: Instituteof SoutheastAsian Studies, 1975), pp. 127-32.

The estimateof 2,000 politicalprisonersappears in Amnesty International
ReportI977 (London:
AmnestyInternationalPublications,1977),p. 210.

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 PacificAffairs
madebya capturedofficer oftheMaoistPhilippineCommunist Party
thattheyhad been"consorting" withNPA activists.
Sincethattime
PhilippineConstabulary havetoldtheauthorthatinthepast
officials
threeyearsa dozenormoreotherclergy havehadNPAconnections.
The syncreticthought-world oftraditional
mysticism,prophesy,
and millenarian sometimes
expectations, combinedwithtenetsof
majorreligions,has oftenbeena harbingerofimpending changein
thepoliticalpowerstructuresofSoutheastAsia.In OctoberI977 one
SawitoKartowibowo, a former IndonesianAgricultureDepartment
official
and practitioner wenton trialin Djakartaon
of kebatinan,
chargesofsubversion.Sawitoclaimedtohavehada specialrevelation
to lead his nationto a new "independence " He
and prosperity.
succeeded,apparentlythrougha ruse,in obtainingthe signaturesof
fiveprominentIndonesian religiousand political leaders (among
themformer Vice-President MohammadHatta) on documentscharg-
ing that the "rule of law" had seriouslydecayed, that President
Suharto had failed,and thathis authorityshould be transferred to
Hatta. Sawito's claimsfoundlittlecredenceamongDjakarta's skepti-
Yet his heavilyattendedtrialbecamea newfocusforthe
cal citizenry.
anti-Suhartoopposition,and sensationaltestimony regardingofficial
corruptionand alleged involvement by Mme. Suharto in a multi-
milliondollarsmugglingschemedid theSuhartoregimelittlegood.29
Of all the extra-parliamentarysourcesofanti-governmentopposi-
tionin theSoutheastAsian region,thoseinvolving unappeasedethnic
nationalismsare, at present,the most stable and least immediately
threatening to nationalregimes.In onlytwo areas-Irian Jaya (West
New Guinea) and upland Burma-do significantorganizedmove-
mentsofa distinctively ethniccharacterconfrontnationgovernments
today. A few hundred guerillas belongingto the OrganisasiPapua
Merdeka(Free Papua Organization)haverebelledagainstIndonesian
controlin Irian Jaya formore than fifteenyears. While militarily
not a great threat,the guerillasare buttressedby the covertbut
quite strongsentimentsforan independent"West Papua" among
many urban Papuans of Irian Jaya. There is also the supportof
exiled Papuans in adjoiningindependentPapua New Guinea, where
the anti-Indonesian"West Papua" freedomstrugglehas increasingly

29 The IndonesiaTimes,January 3, I978. The Suharto governmenthas tried to placate the

followersof Kebatinan suggesting,as a
and othernativesectsand beliefsystems(Kepertjajaan),
matterof officialpolicy,a religiousequalitybetweenthemand the more formalfollowersof
Islam. This, in turn,has deepened anti-Suhartoantagonismin the PPP and otherMuslim
Indonesiancircles.

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 Political Oppositionin SoutheastAsia
become a domesticpoliticalissue (as it has also to a degreein the
Netherlands)30
In Burmathegovernment continuesto be confronted by a rangeof
variousethnic"liberationarmies" and local governments claiming
independence,such as in theShan State and Kayah (Karenni) State.
In the Shan State,forexample,a well-equipped,20,000-man"libera-
tionarmy"and local villageguardsprotectthe"liberatedzone" ofan
openlyfunctioning Shan counter-government, withits own officials.
in
There is trading rice and contraband merchandise,including
opium,and the collectingofShan "customs" taxes fromcontinuous
commercialtraffic.31 The Shan counter-government operatesits own
schoolswherethe Shan language is the mediumof instruction. The
politicalsurvivaloftheUnionofBurmalies in thepragmatic,de facto
accommodationof such ethnicnationalism,whetherit concernsthe
Shans (8 per cent of Burma's 32 millionpopulation),Karens (i i per
cent),Kachins (4 per cent), or others.
The problemin Burmais complicatedby theintrusionintoethnic
oppositionmovementsof the Peking-oriented "White Flag" Burma
CommunistParty(BCP), whoseestimatedio,ooo-maninsurgent "lib-
erationarmy" operatesbetweenthe Salween Riverand the Chinese
border,particularlyin the Shan and Wa states. Neithercounter-
insurgencycampaigns by the Burmesearmy,nor periodicvisitsby
Burma's PresidentNe Win to China (whichis generallyassumed to
be supplyingthe BCP witharms and cadres) appears to be able to
breakthe communist"people's war." Thus, variousBurmeseethnic
nationalistmovementsare obliged to enterinto shifting and uneasy
allianceswiththe BCP.
Communistpartiesin the regionwhichtend to relyon minority
interestsand grievanceshavein recentyearsredoubledtheirefforts to
createinter-ethnicclass-orientedalliancesofdifferent interestgroups.
In Malaysia, forexample,the 2,500-member undergroundMalayan
CommunistParty (CPM), which experiencedserious splits of dis-
sident factionsin I970 and I974, has placed a new emphasis on
developmentofunitedfronttactics.32 It has made a special appeal to
30JustusM. van der Kroef,"The Papuans ofIrianJaya," in WillemA. Veenhoven,ed., Case
StudiesonHumanRightsandFundamental Freedoms:
A WorldSurvey, Vol. II (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff,I975), pp. 22I-46; Ralph R. Premdas, "Papua New Guinea in I977: Elections and
RelationswithIndonesia," AsianSurvey (JanuaryI978), pp. 65-7;Nonie Sharp, The Ruleofthe
Sword:The Storyof WestIrian (Malmsbury,Victoria: Kibble Books, I977).
31 See the articles by Catherine Lamour in Le SozrBrussels,December 27 and 30, I975,

reprintedas "Asia's BurmeseTimebomb,"AtlasWorldPressReview(New York,April I976),pp.

I3-I5.
32JustusM. van der Kroef,"New Trendsin Malaysian Communism, " Issues
andStudies
(June
I977), pp. 43-74.

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 PacificAffairs
the moreorthodoxMalay Muslim community(alreadysympathetic
to the strivings ofThai Muslimsin Pattaniand otherSouthernThai
provinces),and has foundeda CPM front,the "Islamic Fraternal
Party" (Partai Persaudaraan Islam, or Paperi). Though Paperi was
foundedin I965, accordingto the CPM, littlewas heardofit untilthe
early I970s, whenthe CPM's unitedfronttacticsreachedout to new
potentialsupporters.Paperi has charged Malaysia's Hussein Onn
government with"exploitingthe Moslem faithforits own interests,"
and urgedMalay Muslimsto identify themselves withthe"Moslems'
strugglein the internationalarena," includingthe "Moslems' just
struggle"in theirbattle against "the Marcos militaryregime,"the
"armedstrugglewaged bythePalestinianpeople" againstthe"Israeli
Zionistregime,"and so on.33
In conclusion,two distinctivefeaturesof political oppositionin
SoutheastAsia shouldbe noted:on theone hand,itssymbioticaspect,
on the other, its internaldivision. The communistguerilla con-
frontationin Malaysia, forexample, has been going on formany
years,and is far frombeing an immediatethreatto the survivalof
Malaysia's parliamentarygovernment.On the contrary,one may
suggestthat thereis a mutual,almost symbiotic,advantageto the
Malaysian government in the presentstageofcommunistinsurgency
withintheirborders.This is trueforothernon-communist Southeast
Asian governmentsas well. The patternof periodic guerilla am-
bushes,the muchpublicizedoccasional arrestsof"subversives,"the
seizuresofallegedlycommunistpropagandamaterials,thediscoveries
of allegedlysubversiveconspiracies,all serveto maintainthe highly
security-conscious kindofpoliciesthatwerenotedat thebeginningof
thispaper. In otherwords,SoutheastAsian regimeshave a stakein
maintainingtheircommunistopposition.This is not true forother
oppositiongroupsin the region,forno othergroup is perceivedto
have the same ubiquity,the same similarity of ideology,tacticsand
objectives,as do the communists.
Whencommunistoppositionis minimal,as currently in Indonesia,
officialpolicyis notjust to pointcontinuouslyto its"latent"potential,
but also to warn otheroppositionelementsthattheiractivitiesafford
tacticalopeningsto the Communistunderground.Wherearmed in-
surgencydoes exist,prevailingSoutheastAsian regimestend to de-

messageofthe CentralCommitteeofPaperi to "Malay PeninsulaMoslems,"

33 Anniversary

"Voice oftheMalayan Revolution,"

broadcastin Malay overtheclandestineCPM transmitter,
November22, 1977(FBIS, December 2, 1977).

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 PoliticalOppositionin SoutheastAsia
scribeit as somehowindestructible. For example,fornearlya decade
now,the 4,ooo-mannetworkofMaoist guerillasofthe"New People's
Army"in the Philippineshas been battlinggovernment forces.Like
theirCMP colleagues in West Malaysia, who have been similarly
engaged forthree times as long, not only are they far fromany
politicalor military
break-through, butalso theirprincipalcommand-
ers and seniorcadreshavebeen graduallyapprehendedby Philippine
constabularyand othersecurityforces.On Novemberio, 1977, the
NPA sustained its most serious blow to date: the capture in San
Fernando,La Union province,ofJose Maria Sison ("Amado Guer-
rero"), ChairmanoftheCPP-ML and organizerand chieftacticianof
the NPA. To many it seemed that the capture of Sison was the
culminationofa stringofreversesfromwhichtheNPA and CPP-ML
could not recover.But not in the officialPhilippineview. Philippine
PresidentMarcos's reactionto Sison's capturewas revealing:notonly
did he emphasizethat expectationsof the NPA's declineor demise
would be inappropriate,but he hastenedto pointout thatthe CPP-
ML was only "temporarilycrippled" and would "revive"as "such
movementsusuallydo. " In theweeksafterSison's arrest,government
spokesmenwentto greatlengthsto notethe"resurgent"NPA activity
in Pampanga and Nueva Ecija provinces.
The SoutheastAsian communistoppositionalso gains fromthe
presentsituation.The reactionsthat its insurgencyprovokesfrom
establishedgovernments have tendedto alienate manysectorsofthe
population.In theeyesofmany,government anti-insurgencypolicies
are closelylinkedto theheavyinfluxofWesternandJapanesecapital,
and perpetuatethe influenceof domesticmilitaryand businessele-
mentsand theirpoliticalallies. Thus, what Indonesia's GeneralWi-
dodo has called "Kuomintangization"has becomean imagethathas
galvanizedstudentdissidentsfromBangkokto Djakarta, as theyrail
against"politicalrepression"by regimesofallegedlycorruptmilitary
and business tjukongs and power brokersin league withJapanese
capital. To thedegreethattheconstitutional oftheseregimes,
frailties
especiallyin the area of "human rights,"become targetsof broad
opposition-whetherit is a matterof "controlled"and fraudulent
elections,oflegal due processforthosedescribedas "politicalprison-
ers," or of the rightsofMuslims or ethnicnationalists-thepolitical
situationis workingprimarily in favorofall oppositiongroups,includ-
ing the communists.
Beyondthe questionofthesymbioticrelationshipbetweenvarious
regimesand theircommunistoppositions,thereis yetanothercom-

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 PacificAffairs
mon featureto oppositionmovementsin Southeast Asia: the fre-
quently deep internaldivisions.Certain groups express profound
dissentfromthe verynationalstructureof the state (e.g., the seces-
sionismof ethnicor religiousgroupslikethe Shans in Burma or the
"Pattani Republic" movementof Muslims in SouthernThailand);
othersdirecttheirprotestagainsttheconstitutional and publicpolicy-
making machinery(e.g., Indonesia's studentdissidentsand their
militarysympathizers).The two typesof dissentdo not necessarily
intersectand, evenwithineach type,elementsare frequently at odds.
The anti-SuhartoDjakarta studentswho issued a "Declaration of
Conscience of the Indonesian People" on July 5, I977, urgingthe
electionof Ali Sadikin as President,neitherendorsednor,one sus-
pects,evencared about the Papuan independencemovementin Irian
Jaya.The indignation ofUniversityofMalaya studentsovertheplight
ofJohoresquattersand Kedah smallholdersis not necessarilycon-
gruent with the aims of Paperi. And among opposition parlia-
mentariansin Thailand, who have littlelikingforthe past author-
itarianregimesofThanom Kittikachorn and Thanin Kraivixien,the
author has found equally little appreciationfor the NSCT. The
avowed supportof some high-ranking militaryforthe anti-Suharto
Indonesian studentmovementis certainlysignificant. But withSu-
harto'sre-electionas Presidentby the MPR, it is uncertainthatsuch
supportwill necessarilyremainforlong.
Apart fromcommunistunitedfrontefforts, therefore,thereis a
question as to whetherdurable inter-groupoppositionalalliances
can be developed in SoutheastAsia. Meanwhile,it is evidentthat
generationsafter the emergenceof their nationalistmovements,
and sometimesdecades after their attainmentof national inde-
pendence, Southeast Asian states are still searchingfor the ma-
chineryof politicalstabilityand consensus.

University
ofBridgeport,
June1978

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