Professional Documents
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5.hagosojos Vs CA
5.hagosojos Vs CA
SARMIENTO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal and setting aside of
the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR No. 63307-R, entitled Luis
Hagosojos vs. Araceli Vda. de Hagasojos, et al., which set aside the
decision dated December 5, 1975, and the order dated July 12, 1976 of the
then Court of First Instance of Sorsogon in Civil Case No. 363 2 approving
the Compromise Agreement entered into by the parties.
The facts that gave rise to the present controversy are as follows:
Anastacio Hagosojos contracted two marriages during his lifetime. His first
marriage on February 14, 1920 with Jacinta Jaucian (according to the
Petition, while the Compromise Agreement copied in the Decision and
quoted in the Record On Appeal states the surname of Jacinta as
"Guardian") produced three off-springs, namely: the petitioner, Luis
Hagosojos, and the two other private respondents, Araceli Hagosojos-
Alindogan and Lourdes Hagosojos-Nicolas. More than five years after the
demise of Jacinta Jaucian on April 4, 1959, but without the conjugal
partnership assets of the first marriage having been partitioned and
distributed, he got married a second time on December 21, 1965, to Araceli
Hian Out of the second marriage were born the other private respondents,
Fred, Heidi, and Henry, all surnamed Hagosojos. On January 22, 1973,
Anastacio donated to Henry, who was then only seven years young, Lot
No. 2736, containing an area of 15,529 square meters, a portion of the
property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-740 which was part of
the conjugal partnership assets of the first marriage. The donation was
accepted on behalf of Henry by his mother, Araceli. There is nothing in the
records of this case as to whether or not the deed of donation was
registered.
On May 29, 1974, to compel the partition and distribution of the conjugal
partnership assets of the first marriage, the petitioner, together with his two
sisters, private respondents Araceli Hagosojos-Alindogan and Lourdes
Hagosojos-Nicolas, filed the corresponding complaint against their father,
Anastacio. While the case was still pending however, Anastacio died on
August 21, 1974, which compelled Luis to file an amended complaint
substituting as defendant Araceli Vda. de Hagosojos in her personal
capacity and as guardian of the minors Fred, Heidi, and Henry Hagosojos.
For one reason or another, Araceli Hagosojos - Alindogan and Lourdes
Hagosojos - Nicolas surprisingly refused to side with their brother of full
blood, petitioner Luis Hagosojos, in the amended complaint, and were thus
impleaded as defendants.
The parties tried to settle their conflict amicably during the course of the
proceedings in the trial court. As a result, Araceli Vda de Hagosojos,
assisted by her counsel, drew up a compromise agreement which she
presented to the petitioner for approval. When Luis agreed, he and his
stepmother, Araceli, together with their lawyers, signed the Compromise
Agreement. On December 4, 1975, they submitted the same to the trial
court for approval. Accordingly, the trial court, on December 5, 1975,
rendered a decision providing inter alia that the whole property covered by
original Certificate of Title No. P-740 shall pertain to the children of the first
marriage, as stipulated in the Compromise Agreement.
On April 5, 1976, after the judgment had long become final, the private
respondents Araceli Vda. de Hagosojos and her children Fred, Heidi, and
Henry, filed a "Motion to Amend Decision Based On Mistake" wherein they
alleged, among others.
They claimed that Lot No. 2736 consisting of 15,529 square meters could
no longer be validly given to the children of the first marriage, In lieu of Lot
No. 2736, the private respondents then offered to the petitioner as property
pertaining to the children of the first marriage, several parcels of land which
were among the properties originally assigned in the Compromise
Agreement to the heirs of the second marriage. The trial court, on June 18,
1976, denied the private respondents motion and ruled that, "the court
arrived at the unalterable conclusion that it has no power or authority to
amend, alter or modify the judgment entered on December 5, 1975 based
on a compromise agreement dated December 4, 1975, signed not only by
the opposing parties but by their respective counsels. 4
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the instant petition and assigned four errors
allegedly committed by the respondent appellate court, to wit:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED SERIOUSLY IN HOLDING
THAT THE JUDICIAL AGREEMENT MAY STILL BE SET ASIDE ON
GROUND OF MISTAKE AFTER IT HAS BECOME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY.
III.
IV.
We find the alleged mistake of respondent Araceli and of her lawyer not a
mistake at all. It is more of negligence, which is inexcusable, and certainly
can not be inflicted on the petitioner and his sisters of the full blood. It is
inexcusable because the Compromise Agreement was prepared by the
private respondents' lawyer without any intervention whatsoever on the part
of the petitioner or his counsel. Moreover, the deed evidencing the alleged
donation of Lot No. 2736 to private respondent Henry Hagosojos, was an
the while in the possession of his mother. There is no gain-saying the
conclusion that had she and her counsel exercised, in the preparation of
the Compromise Agreement, the standard of care required of an ordinarily
prudent man to bestow upon his important business, 9 then the entire
controversy would have been obviated.
In the instant case, while the decision of the trial court was received by the
respondents as early as December 5, 1975, the private respondents filed
their "Motion To Amend Decision Based On Mistake" only on April 5, 1976,
or one hundred twenty one (121) days after they learned of the assailed
judgment, or sixty one (61) days late.Likewise, their "Motion To Set Aside
Compromise Agreement" was filed on June 23, 1976, or two hundred (200)
days after they learned of the judgment, or one hundred forty (140) days
way out of time. Clearly then, both motions, even if we are to treat them as
petitions for relief from judgment, were filed unseasonably. The decision
affirming the Compromise Agreement has become final and executory. (As
a matter of law, a judgment on compromise becomes final and immediately
executory upon approval thereof by the proper court). 11
In a recent case 12 where the Petition For Relief was denied although filed
only one (1) day late, or sixty-one (61) days from receipt of the notice of
dismissal (in fact the private respondent learned of the dismissal on the
same day), we also denied the petition for review on certiorari. Speaking
through Justice Paras, this Court said:
It is undisputed that the Petition for Relief in this case was filed
61 days from receipt of the notice of dismissal or one day late.
In fact, the records show that counsel for private respondent
learned of the dismissal on the same day, April 29, 1967, when
he arrived late for the hearing so that the Petition for Relief was
at least eight (8) days late. The records further show that
counsel for private respondent did not move for reconsideration
of the Order of dismissal, nor for new trial. Neither did he
appeal, thereby allowing the decision to become final and
executory. As a last-resort, he could have availed of the sixty
day period provided for by Rule 38 to file a Petition for Relief
from Judgment but again he allowed this opportunity to lapse.
Indeed, to him is applicable, the well known maxim that "equity
aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. (Henson
v. Director of Lands, 55 Phil. 586).
Even in the unlikely event that the statement regarding the liquidation and
partition on February 15, 1967 would be found to be a mistake, still
Anastacio could not have validly donated Lot No. 2736 to Henry.
Considering that all the properties specified in the Compromise Agreement
were described conjugal partnership properties of the first marriage, it
follows that upon the death of Jacinta, the conjugal partnership evolved into
a co-ownership between her surviving spouse Anastacio, and her three
children, the petitioner and the two other private respondents, Araceli
Hagosojos-Alindogan and Lourdes Hagosojos-Nicolas. Anastacio became
the owner of 5/8 of the mass of properties while each of the three children,
of 1/8. Thus, even in such a situation, and pending the partition of the
properties owned in common and the adjudication in his favor Lot No.
2736, Anastacio could not validly donate the same at that time he claimed
he did within the purview of the law on co-ownership.
IV. In view of the foregoing, there is no need to be labor the fourth assigned
error. We find the trial court's decision approving the Compromise
Agreement sufficient protection to the interests and welfare of the two other
children of the first marriage, private respondents Araceli Hagosojos-
Alindogan and Lourdes Hagosojos-Nicolas.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the Decision dated April 30, 1981
of the Court of Appeals is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the
Decision dated December 5, 1975 and the Order of July 12, 1976 of the
then Court of First Instance of Sorsogon in Civil Case No. 363 approving
the Compromise Agreement, are hereby REINSTATED. Costs against the
private respondent Araceli H. Vda. de Hagosojos.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
7 Rollo, 59.
13 Palomares vs. Jimenez, 90 Phil 773; J.M. Tuason & Co. vs.
De la Cruz, No. L-4883, March 25,1953; Samonte vs.
SAmonte supra Ong Tiao Seng vs. C.A., No. L-41192-93,
January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 417 (1978); Concepcion vs.
Presiding Judge, Br. V, CFI of Bulacan, No. L-35489, December
15, 1982, 119 SCRA 222 (1982); Director of Lands vs.
Romamban No. L-36948, August 28,1984,131 SCRA 431
(1984); Arcilla vs. Arcilla. No. L-46674, September 16, 1985,
138 SCRA 560 (1985).
15 Id