Doctrine of processual presumption
or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine
Civil Code
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad. (9a)
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to
the law of the country where it is stipulated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both
with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found. (10a)
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other
public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the
country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the
diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities
established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their
execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have, for their object, public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated,
or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country. (11a)
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also
1
be valid in this country, except bigamous, polygamous,
law. (19a)
Art. 124. If the marriage is between a citizen of the Philippines
and a foreigner, whether celebrated in the Philippines
or abroad, the following rules shall prevail:
1. If the husband is a citizen of the Philippines while
the wife is a foreigner, the provisions of this Code
shall govern their relations;
2. If the husband is a foreigner and the wife is a citizen
of the Philippines, the laws of the husband's country
shall be followed, without prejudice to the
provisions of this Code with regard to immovable
property. (1325a)
Art. 815. When a Filipino is in a foreign country, he is authorized
to make a will in any of the forms established by the
law of the country in which he may be. Such will may be
probated in the Philippines. (n)
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by
the law of the place in which he resides, or according to
the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity
with those which this Code prescribes. (n)
Art. 818. Two or more persons cannot make a will jointly, or in
the same instrument, either for their reciprocal benefit
or for the benefit of a third person. (669)
Art. 819. Wills, prohibited by the preceding article, executed by
Filipinos in a foreign country shall not be valid in the
Philippines, even though authorized by the laws of the
country where they may have been executed. (733a)
Art. 829. A revocation done outside the Philippines, by a person
who does not have his domicile in this country, is valid
when it is done according to the law of the place where
the will was made, or according to the law of the place
in which the testator had his domicile at the time; and if
 the revocation takes place in this country, when it is in
accordance with the provisions of this Code. (n)
Art. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the
nation of the decedent. (n)
Rule 132 Sec. 25
What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of
the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if
there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the
seal of such court. (26a)
Rule 130
Section 45. Commercial lists and the like. Evidence of statements of
matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a
list, register, periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as
tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that
compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation
and is generally used and relied upon by them therein. (39)
Section 46. Learned treatises. A published treatise, periodical or
pamphlet on a subject of history, law, science, or art is admissible as
tending to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the court takes
judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies, that the
writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is
recognized in his profession or calling as expert in the subject. (40a)
How to acquire nationality
1. by birth
2. by repatriation
3. by naturalization
4. by subrogation and cession
how to lose a nationality
1. release
2. deprivation
2
3. expiration
4. renunciation
domicile
1. intent to stay
2. physical presence
3. conduct indicative of such intention
Rep. Act No. 9225
signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo on August 29, 2003
SECTION 1. Short Title.-This Act shall be known as the "Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003."
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.-It is hereby declared the policy of the State
that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.-Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking
the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
"I ___________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and
accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon
myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall
retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid
oath.
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. - The unmarried child, whether
legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years
of age, of those who reacquire Philippine citizenship upon SEC. 6. Separability Clause. - If any section or provision of this Act is
effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the held unconstitutional or invalid, any other section or provision not
Philippines. affected thereby shall remain valid and effective.

SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or SEC. 7. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and
reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and repealed or modified accordingly.
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions: SEC. 8. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15)
days following its publication in the Official Gazette or two (2)
1. Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the newspapers of general circulation.
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic
Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting ARTICLE IV
Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
2. Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the CITIZENSHIP
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
time of the adoption of this Constitution;
public officer authorized to administer an oath;
3. Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of
to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
the Philippines;
and its duly constituted authorities prior to their
assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath 3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino
of allegiance to the country where they took that oath; mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and

4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with

4. Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall
law.
apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice; and Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
5. That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in Philippines from birth without having to perform
the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who: any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
a. are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall
b. are in the active service as commissioned or noncommissioned
be deemed natural-born citizens.
officers in the armed forces of the country which they are
naturalized citizens.
Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the
manner provided by law.

3
Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall
retain their citizenship, unless by their act or
omission, they are deemed, under the law, to have
renounced it.
Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law.
Art. 99.
NCC Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad. (9a)
Art. 51. When the law creating or recognizing them, or any
other provision does not fix the domicile of juridical
persons, the same shall be understood to be the place
where their legal representation is established or
where they exercise their principal functions.
(41a)
No person shall be entitled to a legal separation who
has not resided in the Philippines for one year prior to
the filing of the petition, unless the cause for the legal
separation has taken place within the territory of this
Republic. (Sec. 2a, Act No. 2710)

Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to Art. 1251. Payment shall be made in the place designated in the
the law of the country where it is stipulated. obligation.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both
with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found. (10a)
Art. 66. When either or both of the contracting parties are
citizens or subjects of a foreign country, it shall be
necessary, before a marriage license can be obtained,
to provide themselves with a certificate of legal
capacity to contract marriage, to be issued by their
respective diplomatic or consular officials. (13a)
Art. 58.
Art. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the
nation of the decedent. (n)
Art. 50. For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil
obligations, the domicile of natural persons is the
place of their habitual residence. (40a)
Art. 829.
4
There being no express stipulation and if the
undertaking is to deliver a determinate thing, the
payment shall be made wherever the thing might be at
the moment the obligation was constituted.
In any other case the place of payment shall be the
domicile of the debtor.
If the debtor changes his domicile in bad faith or after
he has incurred in delay, the additional expenses shall
be borne by him.
These provisions are without prejudice to venue under
the Rules of Court. (1171a)
Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized
in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under Article 75,
no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first
being issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party
habitually resides. (7a)
A revocation done outside the Philippines, by a
person who does not have his domicile in this
 country, is valid when it is done according to the
law of the place where the will was made, or
according to the law of the place in which the testator
had his domicile at the time; and if the revocation
takes place in this country, when it is in accordance
with the provisions of this Code. (n)
Cases:
AASJS vs. Datumanong
G.R. No. 160869, May 11, 2007
Sec. 3, RA 9225 stayed clear of the problem of dual allegiance and
shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is
dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then Secretary
of Justice Simeon Datumanong, the official tasked to implement laws
governing citizenship in order to prevent the Justice Secretary from
implementing R. A. 9225. Petitioner argues that RA 9225
unconstitutional as it violates Sec. 5, Article VI of the Constitution which
states that dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to national interest and
shall be dealt with by law. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
claims that Section 2 merely declares as a state policy that "Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to
have lost their Philippine citizenship." The OSG further claims that the
oath in Section 3 does not allow dual allegiance since the oath taken by
the former Filipino citizen is an effective renunciation and repudiation of
his foreign citizenship. The fact that the applicant taking the oath
recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of
Philippines is an unmistakable and categorical affirmation of
his undivided loyalty to the Republic.
Issue:
Whether R.A. 9225 is unconstitutional and whether the court
Held:
R.A. 9225 is constitutional and that the Court has no jurisdiction yet to
pass upon the issue of dual allegiance. The court held that that the
intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do
away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 635 which
takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos
who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep.
Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino
citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not
recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme
authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his
foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225
stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted
the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is
is
dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens
to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.
For its part, the OSG counters that pursuant to Section 5, Article IV of
the 1987 Constitution, dual allegiance shall be dealt with by law. Thus,
until a law on dual allegiance is enacted by Congress, the Supreme
Court is without any jurisdiction to entertain issues regarding dual
allegiance.
Moreover, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a
the declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision.
The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In
Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not
5
concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was
given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of
what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be
premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on
issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
ELLIS V. REPUBLIC
7 SCRA 962
Petitioner Marvin G. Ellis, a native of San Fransisco, California and is
married to Gloria G. Ellis in Banger, Maine, United States. Both are
citizens of the United States. Baby Rose was born on September 26,
1959. Four or five days later, the mother of Rose left her with the Heart
of Mary Villa an institution for unwed mothers and their babies
stating that she (the mother) could not take of Rose without bringing
disgrace upon her (the mother's family.).
Being without issue, on November 22, 1959, Mr. and Mrs. Ellis filed a
petition with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for the adoption of
the aforementioned baby. At the time of the hearing of the petition on
January 14, 1960, petitioner Marvin G. Ellis and his wife had been in the
Philippines for three (3) years, he being assigned thereto as staff
sergeant in the United States Air Force Base, in Angeles, Pampanga
where both lived at that time. They had been in the Philippines before,
or, to exact, in 1953.
Issue:
Whether or not being permanent residents in the Philippines,
petitioners are qualified to adopt Baby Rose.
Held:
Inasmuch as petitioners herein are not domiciled in the Philippines
and, hence, non-resident aliens the Court cannot assume and exercise
6
jurisdiction over the status, under either the nationality theory or the
domiciliary theory.
Article 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, provides that:
"The following cannot adopt:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Non-resident aliens;".
xxx xxx xxx
This legal provisions is too clear to require interpretation.
Since adoption is a proceedings in rem, no court may entertain
unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of
the case and over the parties, but also over the res, which is
the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners
herein.
Art. 15 adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status
of a natural person is determined by the latters' nationality.
Pursuant to this theory, the Court has jurisdiction over the status of
Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over the
status of the petitioners, who are foreigners.
Under the Philippines political law, which is patterned after the
Anglo-American legal system, the Court have, likewise, adopted
the latter's view to the effect that personal status, in general,
is determined by and/or subject to the jurisdiction of the
domiciliary law (Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, p. 86;
The Conflict of Laws by Beale, Vol. I, p. 305, Vol. II, pp. 713-714).
This, perhaps, is the reason why our Civil Code does not permit
adoption by non-resident aliens, and we have consistently
refused to recognize the validity of foreign decrees of divorce
regardless of the grounds upon which the same are based
involving citizens of the Philippines who are not bona fide
residents of the forum, even when our laws authorized absolute
divorce in the Philippines (Ramirez v. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Gonayeb v.
Hashim, 30 Phil. 22; Cousine Hix v. Fleumer, 55 Phil. 851; Barretto
Gonzales v. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 67; Recto v. Harden, L-6897, Nov. 29,
1955)".
 Republic v. Maddela
27 SCRA 702
This is a petition to have the petitioners Miguela Tan Suat, and Chan Po
Lan, all Chinese Nationals, to be declared a Filipino citizens.
That sometime in the year 1937 Miguela was legally married to Sy Ing
Seng, a Filipino citizen; likewise, in the year 1961, Chan Po Lan was
legally married to Cu Bon Piao, a Filipino citizen; and that the
petitioners have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
to become Filipino citizens.
The court inquired from Fiscal Veluz, who represents the Solicitor
General, if he has any opposition to the petition to which the Fiscal
answered that he has no opposition. The Court had it announced to the
public if there is any opposition to the petitions of both to be declared a
Filipino citizen and nobody in the crowded courtroom registered his
opposition.
As such, the petitioners Miguela Tan Suat and Chan Po Lan were
declared a Filipino citizens by marriage and the Commissioner of
Immigration is hereby ordered to cancel the necessary alien certificate
of registration and immigrant certificate of residence of the petitioner
and to issue the corresponding identification card.
The Solicitor General filed the instant petitions instead, including the
Commissioner of Immigration as co-petitioner in view of the fact that
the dispositive parts of the decisions of the lower court are addressed
to him for compliance.
Issue:
Whether or not a person claiming to be a citizen may get a judicial
declaration of citizenship.
Held:
Under Philippine laws, there can be no action or proceeding for
the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts
7
of justice exist for the settlement of justiciable controversies, which
imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or
omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by
law, for said breach of right.
As an incident only of the adjudication of the right of the
parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a
pronouncement relative to, their status. Otherwise, such a
pronouncement is beyond judicial power. Thus, for instance, no action
or proceeding may be instituted for a declaration to the effect that
plaintiff or petitioner is married, or single, or a legitimate child,
although a finding thereon may be made as a necessary premise to
justify a given relief available only to one enjoying said status. At times,
the law permits the acquisition of a given status, such as naturalization
by judicial decree. But there is no similar legislation authorizing the
institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is a
Filipino Citizen. (Tan v. Republic, L-14159, April 18, 1960).
Burca v. Republic
51 SCRA 248
1st case: Burca not granted citizenship because such power is granted
under the executive branch.
Moya Lim Yao: alien wife deemed ipso facto Filipino citizen as long as no
disqualifications, no need to prove the qualifications;
Burca motion for reconsideration:
Petitioner seeks reconsideration of the decision in this case which
reversed that of the Court of First Instance of Leyte declaring her a
citizen of the Philippines, the said court have found her to be married to
a Filipino citizen and to possess all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to become Filipino citizen enumerated in the
Naturalization Law.
Issue:
Whether or not a court may grant a judicial declaration of citizenship.
Held:
The Court cannot grant petitioner-appellee's prayer for the affirmance
of the trial court's judgment declaring her a Filipino citizen. It must be
noted that the sole and only purpose of the petition is to have
petitioner declared a Filipino citizen. Under Philippine laws
there can be no judicial action or proceeding for the declaration
of the citizenship of an individual. It is as an incident only of
the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy,
that the courts may pass upon, and make a pronouncement
relative to, their status.
In Moy Ya Lim Yao, the Court emphasized the administrative
procedure that needs to be followed in the Bureau Immigration
regarding the steps to be taken by an alien woman married to a
Filipino for the cancellation of her alien certificate of
registration, and thus secure recognition of her status Filipino
citizen. Such a procedure could be availed of Petitioner. Judicial
recourse would be avoidable to Petitioner in case of an adverse action
by the Immigration Commissioner.
However, if the decision of an administrative agency on the
question of citizenship, is affirmed by this Court on the ground
that the same is supported by substantial evidence on the
whole record, there appears to be no valid reason why such
finding should have no conclusive effect in other cases, where
the same issue is involved. The same observation holds true with
respect to a decision of a court on the matter of citizenship as a
material matter in issue in the case before it, which is affirmed by this
Court. For the "effective operation of courts in the social and economic
scheme requires that their decision have the respect of and be
observed by the parties, the general public and the courts themselves.
According insufficient weight to prior decisions encourages disrespect
and disregard of courts and their decisions and invites litigation" (Clear,
Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 Yale Law Journal, 345).
Wherefore, the Court declared it to be a sound rule, that where
citizenship of a party in a case is definitely resolved by a court
or by an administrative agency, as a material issue in
8
controversy, after a full-blown hearing, with the act
participation of the Solicitor General or his authority
representative, and this finding on the Citizenship of the party
is affirmed by this Court, the decision on the matter shows
constitute conclusive proof of such person's citizenship, in
another case or proceeding. But it is made clear that in instance will
a decision on the question of citizenship in such cases be considered
conclusive or binding in any other case proceeding, unless obtained in
accordance with the procedure herein stated.
Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner
41 SCRA 292
Facts:
On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa
to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. In the interrogation
made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to
enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing
at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip
to the Philippines to visit her great-grand-uncle Lau Ching Ping
for a period of one month. She was permitted to come into the
Philippines on 13 March 1961, and was permitted to stay for a
period of one month which would expire on 13 April 1961. On the
date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of
P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would
actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her
authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his
discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized
representative might properly allow. After repeated extensions, Lau
Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13
February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage
with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged
Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the
Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her
arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized
stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction. At
the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it
was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either English or
Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak either English or
Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name
except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or
sisters-in-law. The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705)
denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau
Yuen Yeung appealed.
Issue:
Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her
marriage to a Filipino citizen.
Held:
Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from
and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto
Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman
marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso
facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen
of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an
alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently
naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her
husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen,
provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman
requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a
parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for
naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not
required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be
considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a
living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. This is plain
common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature
intended to treat them differently. As the laws of our country, both
substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such
procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable
the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her
own citizenship settled and established so that she may not
9
have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform
an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise a right
reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that the citizenship
is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of
citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation
obtains even as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a
person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case,
Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides
therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res
adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the
occasion may demand.
Nota bene:
There are two laws, which govern the Loss of Philippine citizenship.
These are Commonwealth Act No. 63 and Commonwealth Act No. 473.
The former applies to both natural-born and naturalized citizens and the
latter applies only to naturalized citizens.
As stated in Commonwealth Act. No. 63,
A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways
and/or events:
1. By naturalization in a foreign country;
2. By express renunciation of citizenship;
3. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-
one years of age or more: Provided, however, That a Filipino may
not divest himself of Philippine citizenship in any manner while the
Republic of the Philippines is at war with any country;
4. By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the
armed forces of a foreign country: Provided, That the
rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in,
the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of
allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine
citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present:
 a. The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive
and/or offensive pact of alliance with the said
foreign country; or
b. The said foreign country maintains armed forces on
Philippine territory with the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the
Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said
service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking
the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he
does so only in connection with his service to said
foreign country: And provided, finally, That any Filipino
citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned
in, the armed forces of a foreign country under any of
the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b),
shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any
election of the Republic of the Philippines during the
period of his service to, or commission in, the armed
forces of said foreign country. Upon his discharge from
the service of the said foreign country, he shall be
automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil
and political rights as a Filipino citizen;
5. By cancellation of the of the certificates of naturalization;
6. By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of
the Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless
subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted; and
7. In the case of a woman, upon her marriage to a foreigner if,
by virtue of the laws in force in her husband's country, she
acquires his nationality.
Commonwealth Act No. 473, Section 18 of said law provides
that:
A naturalization certificate may be cancelled by a competent judge on
any of the following grounds:
1. If it is shown that said naturalization certificate was
obtained fraudulently or illegally;
2. If the person naturalized shall, within five years next
following the issuance of said naturalization certificated,
10
return to his native country or to some foreign country
and establish his permanent residence there: Provided,
That the fact of the person naturalized remaining for more than
one year in his native country or the country of his former
nationality, or two years in any other foreign country, shall be
considered prima facie evidence of his intention of taking up his
permanent residence in the same;
3. If the petition was made on an invalid declaration of
intention
4. If it is shown that the minor children of the person
naturalized failed to graduate from a public high school
recognized by the Office of Private Education of the
Philippines, where Philippine history, government and civics are
taught as part of the school curriculum, through the fault of
their parents either by neglecting to support them or by
transferring them to another school or schools. A certified copy
of the decree of naturalization certificate shall be forwarded by
the Clerk of Court of the Department of Interior and the Bureau
of Justice.
5. If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed
himself to be used as a dummy in violation of the
constitutional provisions requiring Philippine citizenship
as a requisite for the exercise, use or enjoyment of a right,
franchise or privilege.
The main reason why a decision in a naturalization proceeding
is not res judicata is because such is not a judicial adversarial
proceeding. Similarly, estoppel or laches cannot apply to the
government in action for the cancellation of a certificate of
naturalization, since it is a known principle that the government is
never estopped by the mistakes on the part of its agents.
However, according to the Constitution, marriage to an alien
would not automatically divest a person of his citizenship,
unless he or she performs certain acts or omission which would
result to the loss of his or her citizenship. This provision, however,
is not retroactive; thus, does not repatriate those who lost their
Philippine citizenship by marriage under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions.
 Oh Hek How v. Republic
29 SCRA 94
Petitioner Oh Hek How having been granted naturalization through his
petition filed a motion alleging that he had complied with the
requirements of Republic Act No. 530 and praying that he be allowed to
take his oath of allegiance as such citizen and issued the corresponding
certificate of naturalization.
The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte issued forthwith an
order authorizing the taking of said oath. On that same date, petitioner
took it and the certificate of naturalization was issued to him.
The Government seasonably gave notice of its intention to appeal from
said order of February 9, 1966 and filed its record on appeal among the
grounds that the oath was taken prior to judgment having been final
and executor.
Issue:
Is the oath valid?
Whether or not a permission to renounce citizenship is necessary from
the Minister of the Interior of Nationalist China.
Held:
First issue:
The order of February 9, 1966 (oath-taking) had not and up
to the present has not become final and executory in view of
the appeal duly taken by the Government.
2nd Issue:
It is argued that the permission is not required by our laws and
that the naturalization of an alien, as a citizen of the
Philippines, is governed exclusively by such laws and cannot be
controlled by any foreign law. However, the question of how a
Chinese citizen may strip himself of that status is necessarily
11
governed pursuant to Articles 15 and 16 of our Civil Code
by the laws of China, not by those of the Philippines.
As a consequence, a Chinese national cannot be naturalized as a citizen
of the Philippines, unless he has complied with the laws of Nationalist
China requiring previous permission of its Minister of the Interior for the
renunciation of nationality.
Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 provides, however,
that before the naturalization certificate is issued, the petitioner
shall "solemnly swear," inter alia, that he renounces "absolutely
and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate" and particularly to the state "of which" he is "a
subject or citizen." The obvious purpose of this requirement is
to divest him of his former nationality, before acquiring
Philippine citizenship, because, otherwise, he would have two
nationalities and owe allegiance to two (2) distinct
sovereignties, which our laws do not permit, except that,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 2639, "the acquisition of
citizenship by a natural-born Filipino citizen from one of the
Iberian and any friendly democratic Ibero-American countries
shall not produce loss or forfeiture of his Philippine citizenship,
if the law of that country grants the same privilege to its
citizens and such had been agreed upon by treaty between the
Philippines and the foreign country from which citizenship is
acquired."
Tecson v. Comelec
424 SCRA 277
Facts:
On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the
Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national
elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to
be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to
be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be
20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X.
Fornier, initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition before the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to
cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth,
according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother,
Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe,
was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a
Spanish subject. And even if Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he
could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter
being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the
allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F.
Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his
marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had
existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of
FPJ.
Issue:
Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for
the offcie of the President of the Philippines.
Held:
Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be
drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years
old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870,
when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the
absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place
of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine
Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if
acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father
of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime
respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons
whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children
are legitimate or illegitimate.
12
Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa
Facts:
On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William
Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native
born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of natural mother Mariana
Gatchalian. On June 27, 1961, Willian, then twelve years old, arrives in
Manila from Hongkong together with a daughter and a son of Santiago.
They had with them certificate of registration and identity issued by the
Philippine consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the
signature of the secretary of foreign affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and
sought admission as Filipino citizens.
On August 15, 1990, the Commission on Immigration and Deportatiion
ordered the arrest of William and was released upon posting P 200,000
cash bond. Thus on the 29th of the same month, he filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the RTC of Manila. A motion to dismiss
was filed but denied.
Petitioners, claim that respondent is an alien. In support of their
position, petitioners point out that Santiago Gatchalian's marriage with
Chu Gim Tee in China as well as the marriage of Francisco (father of
William) Gatchalian to Ong Chiu Kiok, likewise in China, were not
supported by any evidence other than their own self-serving testimony
nor was there any showing what the laws of China were. It is the
postulate advanced by petitioners that for the said marriages to be
valid in this country, it should have been shown that they were valid by
the laws of China wherein the same were contracted. There being
none, petitioners conclude that the aforesaid marriages cannot
be considered valid. Hence, Santiago's children, including
Francisco, followed the citizenship of their mother, having been
born outside of a valid marriage. Similarly, the validity of the
Francisco's marriage not having been demonstrated, William and
Johnson followed the citizenship of their mother, a Chinese national.
Issue:
Whether or not William Gatchalian is to be declared as a Filipino citizen
Held:
In Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil. 867 [1924]; Lim and Lim vs. Collector of
Customs, 36 Phil. 472; Yam Ka Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46
[1915]), this Court held that in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to
be the same as those of the Philippines. In the case at bar, there
being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises
the presumption that it is the same as that of Philippine law.
The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed on
Santiago Gatchalian much more on respondent William Gatchalian who
was then a twelve-year old minor. The fact is, as records indicate,
Santiago was not pressed by the Citizenship Investigation
Board to prove the laws of China relating to marriage, having
been content with the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage
Certificate was lost or destroyed during the Japanese
occupation of China.
The testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian before
the Philippine consular and immigration authorities regarding their
marriages, birth and relationship to each other are not self-serving but
are admissible in evidence as statements or declarations regarding
family reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree (Sec. 34, Rule 130).
Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, adheres to
the rule that a marriage formally valid where celebrated is valid
everywhere. Referring to marriages contracted abroad, Art. 71 of the
Civil Code (now Art. 26 of the Family Code) provides that "all marriages
performed outside of the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country . . ."
And any doubt as to the validity of the matrimonial unity and the extent
as to how far the validity of such marriage may be extended to the
consequences of the coverture is answered by Art. 220 of the Civil Code
in this manner: "In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the
solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts
leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the
marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of
property during marriage, the authority of parents over their
children, and the validity of defense for any member of the
family in case of unlawful aggression." (Emphasis supplied).
Bearing in mind the "processual presumption" enunciated in Miciano
and other cases, he who asserts that the marriage is not valid under
our law bears the burden of proof to present the foreign law.
13
Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent
William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father
Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter. Francisco,
in turn is likewise a Filipino being the legitimate child of Santiago
Gatchalian who (the latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose
Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in
an order dated July 12, 1960.
Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino
citizens who became as such at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution. . . .
Nota bene: for Gatchalian
In Moy Ya Lim vs. Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA 292 [1971])
and in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration (supra), this Court declared
that:
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a
judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be
threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.
An exception to the above rule was laid by this Court in Burca vs.
Republic (51 SCRA 248 [1973]), viz:
We declare it to be a sound rule that where the citizenship of a
party in a case is definitely resolved by a court or by an
administrative agency, as a material issue in the controversy,
after a full-blown hearing with the active participation of the
Solicitor General or his authorized representative, and this finding
or the citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court, the
decision on the matter shall constitute conclusive proof of such
party's citizenship in any other case or proceeding. But it is made
clear that in no instance will a decision on the question of citizenship in
such cases be considered conclusive or binding in any other case or
proceeding, unless obtained in accordance with the procedure herein
stated.
Thus, in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases
of citizenship, the following must be present: 1) a person's
citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy
where said person is a party; 2) the Solicitor General or his
authorized representative took active part in the resolution
thereof, and 3) the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this
Court.
NUVAL VS. GURRAY
Facts:
This appeal was taken by the petitioner Gregorio Nuval from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of La Union, upholding
the defense of res judicata and dismissing the quo warranto
proceedings instituted by the said Gregorio Nuval against
Norbeto Guray and others, with costs against the petitioner.
Gregorio Nuval filed, in his dual capacity as a voter duly
qualified and registered in the election list of the municipality of
Luna and as a duly registered candidate for the office of
municipal president of said municipality, a petition against
Norberto Guray asking for the exclusion of his name
from the election list of said municipality, not being a
qualified voter of said municipality and he had not
resided therein for six months as required by section 431 of
the said Administrative Code.
Norbeto Guray was elected to the office of municipal
president of Luna by a plurality of votes, Gregorio Nuval
obtaining second place.
Gregorio Nuval filed the present action of quo warranto asking
that Norberto Guray be declared ineligible had a legal
residence of one year previous to the election as required
by section 2174 of the said Administrative Code in order to be
eligible to an elective municipal office.
Norberto Guray had resided in the municipality of Luna,
his birthplace, where he had married and had held the
office of municipal treasurer. On that date he was appointed
municipal treasurer of Balaoan, Province of La Union. The rules
of the provincial treasurer of La Union, to which Norberto Guray
was subject as such municipal treasurer, require that
municipality treasurers live continuously in the
municipality where they perform they official duties, in order
to be able to give an account of their acts as such treasurers at
any time. In order to qualify and be in a position to vote as an
14
elector in Balaoan in the general election of 1925, Norberto
Guray asked for the cancellation of his name in the election lists
of Luna, where he had voted in the general elections of 1922,
alleging as a ground therefore the following: "On the ground
of transfer of any residence which took place on the
28th day of June, 1922. My correct and new address is
Poblacion, Balaoan, La Union;" and in order to be registered
in the subscribed affidavit Exhibit F-1 before the board of
election inspectors of precinct No. 1 of Balaoan, by virtue of
which he was registered as an elector of the said precinct,
having made use of the right of suffrage in said municipality in
the general elections of 1925. In his cedula certificates issued
by himself as municipal treasurer of Balaoan from the year
1923 to 1928, included, he made it appear that his residence
was the residential district of Balaoan. In the year 1926, his wife
and children who, up to that time, had lived in the municipality
of Balaoan, went back to live in the town of Luna in the house of
his wife's parents, due to the high cost of living in that
municipality. Norberto Guray used to go home to Luna in the
afternoons after office hours, and there he passed the nights
with his family. His children studied in the public school of Luna.
In January, 1927, he commenced the construction of a
house of strong materials in Luna, which has not yet
been completed, and neither be nor his family has lived
in it. On February 1, 1928, Norberto Guray applied for and
obtained vacation leave to be spent in Luna, and on the 16th of
the same month he filed his resignation by telegraph, which
was accepted on the same day, also by telegraph.
Nothwithstanding that he was already provided with a cedula
by himself as municipal treasurer of Balaoan on January 31,
1928, declaring him resident of said town, he obtained another
cedula from the municipality of Luna on February 20, 1928,
which was dated January 15, 1928, in which it is presented that
he resided in the barrio of Victoria, municipality of Luna,
Province of La Union. On February 23, 1928, Norberto Guray
applied for and obtained the cancellation of his name in the
election list of the municipality of Balaoan, and on April 14,
1928, he applied for registration as a voter in Luna, alleging
 that he had been residing in said municipality for thirty years.
For this purpose he made of the cedula certificate antedated.
Issue:
Whether or not Norberto Guray had the legal residence of one year
immediately prior to the general elections of June 5, 1928, in order to
be eligible to the office of municipal president of Luna, Province of La
Union?
Ruling:
It is an established rule that "where a voter abandons his
residence in a state and acquires one in another state, he
cannot again vote in the state of his former residence until he
has qualified by a new period of residence" (20 Corpus Juris, p. 71,
par. 28). "The term 'residence' as so used is synonymous with
'domicile,' which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed
place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention." (People vs. Bender, 144 N. Y.
S., 145.)
Since Norberto Guray abandoned his first residence in the municipality
of Luna and acquired another in Balaoan, in order to vote and be a
candidate in the municipality of Luna, he needed to reacquire residence
in the latter municipality for the length of time prescribed by the law,
and for such purpose, he needed not only the intention to do so,
but his personal presence in said municipality.
VELILLA VS. POSADA
Facts:
That Arthur Graydon Moody died in Calcutta, India, on February
18, 1931.
That Arthur Graydon Moody executed in the Philippine
Islands a will, by virtue of which will, he bequeathed all
his property to his only sister, Ida M. Palmer, who then was
15
and still is a citizen and resident of the State of New York,
United States of America.
That on February 24,1931, a petition for appointment of special
administrator of the estate of the deceased Arthur Graydon
Moody was filed by W. Maxwell Thebaut with the Court of First
Instance of Manila.
That subsequently or on April 10, 1931, a petition to the will of
the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody, and the same was, after
hearing, duly probated by the court in a decree dated May 5,
1931.
That on July 14, 1931, Ida M. Palmer was declared to be
the sole and only heiress of the deceased Arthur Graydon
Moody
That the property left by the late Arthur Graydon Moody
consisted principally of bonds and shares of stock of
corporations organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands,
bank deposits and other personal properties.
That on July 22, 1931, the Bureau of Internal Revenue
prepared for the estate of the late Arthur Graydon
Moody an inheritance tax return.
That on September 9, 1931, an income tax return for the
fractional period from January 1, 1931 to June 30, 1931, was
also prepared by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the estate
of the said deceased Arthur Graydon Moody.
That on December 3, 1931, the committee on claims and
appraisals filed with the court its report.
That on November 4, 1931, and in answer to the letter
mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the Bureau of Internal
Revenue addressed to the attorney for Ida M. Palmer another
letter, copy of which marked Exhibit NN is hereto attached and
made a part hereof.
 That the estate of the late Arthur Graydon Moody paid under
protest the sum of P50,000 on July 22, 1931, and the other sum
of P40,019.75 on January 19, 1932, making assessment for
inheritance tax and the sum of P13,001.41 covers the
assessment for income tax against said estate.
That on January 21, 1932, the Collector of Internal Revenue
overruled the protest made by Ida M. Palmer through her
attorney.
The parties reserve their right to introduce additional evidence
at the hearing of the present case.
Manila, August 15, 1933.
In addition to the foregoing agreed statement of facts, both
parties introduced oral and documentary evidence from which it
appears that Arthur G. Moody, an American citizen, came to the
Philippine Islands in 1902 or 1903 and engaged actively in
business in these Islands up to the time of his death in Calcutta,
India, on February 18, 1931. He had no business elsewhere and
at the time of his death left an estate consisting principally of
bonds and shares of stock of corporations organized under the
laws of the Philippine Islands, bank deposits and other
intangibles and personal property valued by the commissioners
of appraisal and claims at P609,767.58 and by the Collector of
Internal Revenue for the purposes of inheritance tax at
P653,657.47. All of said property at the time of his death
was located and had its situs within the Philippine
Islands. So far as this record shows, he left no property
of any kind located anywhere else. In his will,he made a
statement that: Arthur G. Moody, a citizen of the United States
of America, residing in the Philippine Islands, hereby publish
and declare the following as my last Will and Testament . . ..
Ruling:
To effect the abandonment of one's domicile, there must be a
deliberate and provable choice of a new domicile, coupled with
actual residence in the place chosen, with a declared or
provable intent that it should be one's fixed and permanent
place of abode, one's home. There is a complete dearth of evidence
16
in the record that Moody ever established a new domicile in a foreign
country.
Finding no merit in any of the assignments of error of the appellant, the
court affirm the judgment of the trial court, first, because the property
in the estate of Arthur G. Moody at the time of his death was located
and had its situs within the Philippine Islands and, second, because
his legal domicile up to the time of his death was within the
Philippine Islands.
UJANO VS. REPUBLIC
Facts:
Petitioner seeks to reacquire his Philippine citizenship in a
petition filed before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur.
Petitioner was born 66 years ago of Filipino parents in Magsingal
Ilocos Sur. He is married to Maxima O. Ujano with whom he has one
son, Prospero, who is now of legal age. He left the Philippines
for the United States of America in 1927 where after a
residence of more than 20 years he acquired American
citizenship by naturalization. He returned to the Philippines on
November 10, 1960 to which he was admitted merely for a
temporary stay. He owns an agricultural land and a residential
house situated in Magsingal, Ilocos Sur. He receives a monthly
pension from the Social Security Administration of the United States
of America. He has no record of conviction and it is his intention to
renounce his allegiance to the U.S.A. After hearing, the court a quo
rendered decision denying the petition on the ground that
petitioner did not have the residence required by law six
months before he filed his petition for reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.
Ruling:
The court a quo, in denying the petition, made the following
comment: "One of the qualifications for reacquiring
 Philippine citizenship is that the applicant 'shall have
resided in the Philippines at least six months before he
applies for naturalization' [Section 3(1), Commonwealth Act No.
63]. This 'residence' requirement in cases of naturalization, has
already been interpreted to mean the actual or constructive
permanent home otherwise known as legal residence or
domicile (Wilfredo Uytengsu vs. Republic of the Philippines, 95
Phil. 890). A place in a country or state where he lives and stays
permanently, and to which he intends to return after a temporary
absence, no matter how long, is his domicile. In other words
domicile is characterized by animus manendi. So an alien who
has been admitted into this country as a temporary visitor, either
for business or pleasure, or for reasons of health, though actually
present in this country cannot be said to have established his
domicile here because the period of his stay is only temporary in
nature and must leave when the purpose of his coming is
accomplished. In the present case, petitioner, who is
presently a citizen of the United States of America, was
admitted into this country as a temporary visitor, a status
he has maintained at the time of the filing of the present
petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and which
continues up to the present. Such being the case, he has not
complied with the specific requirement of law regarding six months
residence before filing his present petition."
CAASI VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
These two cases were consolidated because they have the
same objective; the disqualification under Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code of the private respondent, Merito Miguel
for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to
which he was elected in the local elections of January 18, 1988,
on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a
permanent resident of the United States of America, not of
Bolinao.
In his answer to both petitions, Miguel admitted that he holds a
green card issued to him by the US Immigration Service, but he
17
denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States. He
allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that
he may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical
examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is
a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted in
all previous elections, including the plebiscite on February
2,1987 for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the
congressional elections on May 18,1987.
After hearing the consolidated petitions before it, the COMELEC
dismissed the petitions on the ground that: The possession of a
green card by the respondent (Miguel) does not sufficiently
establish that he has abandoned his residence in the
Philippines. On the contrary, inspite (sic) of his green card,
Respondent has sufficiently indicated his intention to
continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in
successive elections in said municipality. As the respondent
meets the basic requirements of citizenship and residence for
candidates to elective local officials (sic) as provided for in
Section 42 of the Local Government Code, there is no legal
obstacle to his candidacy for mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. (p.
12, Rollo, G.R. No. 84508).
Issues: (1) whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a
permanent resident of the United States, and
(2) whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent
resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the local elections on
January 18, 1988.
Ruling: Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the
United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and
residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the United States
merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the limited
States with the intention to have there permanently as evidenced by
his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa.
Based on that application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government
the requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently.
To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law
requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have
"waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for
elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of
his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States.
The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts
independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office
in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for
any elective office" (Sec. 68, Omnibus Election Code).
MARCOS vs COMELEC
(residence and domicile, for purposes of election laws are
synonymous)
The mischief which this provision reproduced verbatim from the 1973
Constitution seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or
newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community
and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that
community."
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy
for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the
Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995.
Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of
the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a
"Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on
Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional
requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended
that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency
requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives.
Held:
So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these
and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere
absence of an individual from his permanent residence without
the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change
of domicile.
18
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an
honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for the
residency qualification requirement. It would be plainly ridiculous for a
candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a
certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical
presence of a person in a place. A person can have two or more
residences, such as a country residence and a city residence. Residence
is acquired by living in place; on the other hand, domicile can exist
without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is
that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an
intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also
established in some other place.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are
dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts
have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and
unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election
purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, the Court held that "the term residence. . .
is synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention
to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." Larena
vs. Teves reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the
qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal
President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, held that
the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession
or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected
does not constitute loss of residence. So settled is the concept (of
domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases,
this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his
permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result
in a loss or change of domicile.
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, this Court
concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered
to the definition given to the term residence in election law, regarding
it as having the same meaning as domicile.
A Person cannot have 2 domiciles. As long as the Domicile was
not lost, it continues to be the same until replaced by a new
one. Marcos did not overtedly abandon her domicile since even
if living in Malakanyang, she constantly goes home to her
domicile.
Prior to this:
The civil code provides that the wife follows the domicile of her
husband.
JIMENEZ V. REPUBLIC
109 PHIL 273
FACTS:
1. Plaintiff Joel Jimenez filed a complaint praying of a decree
annulling his marriage with Remedios Canizares.
2. He claimed that the orifice of her genitals was too small to allow
the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation.
3. He also claimed that the condition of her genitals existed at the
time of marriage and continues to exist.
4. The wife was summoned and served with a copy of the complaint
but she did not file an answer.
5. The court entered an order requiring defendant to submit to a
physical examination by a competent lady physician to determine
her physical capacity for copulation.
6. Defendant did not submit herself to the examination and the
court entered a decree annulling the marriage.
7. The City Attorney filed a Motion for Reconsideration, among the
grounds that the defendants impotency has not been satisfactorily
established as required by law; that she had not been physically
examined because she refused to be examined.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage may be annulled on the strength only of
the lone testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his
19
wife is impotent.
HELD:
The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that must be proved
to exist by indubitable evidence to annul a marriage. In the case at bar,
the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole
testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony tending
or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and
seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have
been satisfactorily established because from the commencement of the
proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking
part therein.
Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show
indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising
out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred
because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and
would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by
competent authority.
A physical examination in this case is not self-incriminating. She is not
charged with any offense . She is not being compelled to be a witness
against herself.
Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be
presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency. The lone
testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual
intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them
together as husband and wife.
BARNUEVO V. FUSTER
29 PHIL 606
FACTS:
Gabriel and Constanza were married in Spain. Thereafter, Gabriel went
to the Philippines, settled, and acquired real and personal properties.
Constanza later followed. A few years however, both parties executed a
contract for their separation wherein the wife returned to Spain and has
agreed to be supported by the husband to be paid in Madrid, Spain.
Eventually, the wife instituted a petition for divorce here in the
Philippines against the husband. The husband opposed the petition on
the grounds that:
a. neither the trial court nor any other court in the Philippine
Islands has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint, because, as to the allowance for support, since
neither the plaintiff nor the defendant are residents of Manila,
or of any other place in the Philippine Islands, the agreement
upon the subject was neither celebrated, nor was it to
be fulfilled, in the Philippine Islands;
b. and as to the divorce, because the action therefore ought to be
tried by the ecclesiastical courts.
In deciding the case, the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila
held itself to have jurisdiction, decreed the suspension of life in
common between the plaintiff and defendant;
Issue:
Do Philippine Courts have jurisdiction over the petition for divorce?
What law should apply in construing the term pesetas?
Held:
The lower court did not commit this error attributed to him. The
defendant had not proved that he had elsewhere a legal
domicile other than that which he manifestly had in the
Philippines during the seventeen years preceding the date of
the complaint. On the contrary, it plainly appears, without proof to the
contrary, that during this not inconsiderable period, extending from the
year 1892 until a month prior to the arrival of his wife in the Philippines
in March, 1909, he had constantly resided in the said Islands, had kept
open house, and had acquired in the city of Manila quite a little real
property which is now the object of the division of the conjugal society.
It has been established that defendant is domiciled in the
Philippines.
Defendant, although a Spanish subject, was a resident of these Islands.
Article 26 of the Civil Code that he cites itself provides that
"Spaniards who change their domicile to a foreign country,
20
where they may be considered as natives without other
conditions than that of residents therein, shall be required, in
order to preserve the Spanish nationality, to state that such is
their wish before the Spanish diplomatic or consular agent, who
must record them in the registry of Spanish residents, as well
as their spouses, should they be married, and any children they
may have." From this provision, which is the exclusive and irrefutable
law governing the defendant, we are to conclude that the domicile of
the defendant and the plaintiff is fully proven, irrespective of the Treaty
of Paris.
Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure leaves to the
election of the plaintiff the bringing of a personal action like
the one at bar either in the place where the defendant may
reside or be found, or in that where the plaintiff resides.
As held by the Husband:
That by the express provision of article 80 of the Civil Code of Spain,
"jurisdiction in actions for divorce and nullification of canonical
marriages lies with ecclesiastical courts," while that of civil
tribunals is limited to civil marriages; that this being so, the action
for divorce brought by the plaintiff in the cause does not fall within
the jurisdiction of the civil courts, according to his own law of
persons, because these courts ought to apply the Spanish law in
accordance with the said article 9 of the Civil Cod of Spain, and this
Spanish law grants the jurisdiction over the present cause to the
ecclesiastical courts, in the place of which no tribunal of these Islands
con subrogate itself.
However, husband was unable to prove by any law or legal doctrine
whatever that the personal statute of a foreigner carries with it, to
whether he transfers his domicile, the authority established by the law
of his nation to decree his divorce, which was what he had to
demonstrate.
As the Court upheld:
"The jurisdiction of courts and other questions relating to procedure are
considered to be of a public nature and consequently are generally
submitted to the territorial principle. . . . All persons that have to
demand justice in a case in which foreigners intervene, since they can
gain nothing by a simple declaration, should endeavor to apply to the
tribunales of the state which have coercive means (property situated in
the territory) to enforce any decision they may render. Otherwise, one
would expose himself in the suit to making useless expenditures which,
although he won his case, would not contribute to secure his rights
because of the court's lack of means to enforce them." (Torres
Campos, "Elementos de Derecho International Privado," p. 108.)
The provisions of article 80 of the Civil Law of Spain is only
binding within the dominions of Spain. It does not accompany
the persons of the Spanish subject wherever he may go. He
could not successfully invoke it if he resided in Japan, in China, in
Hongkong or in any other territory not subject to the dominion of Spain.
Foreign Catholics domiciled in Spain, subject to the ecclesiastical courts
in actions for divorce according to the said article 80 of the Civil Code,
could not allege lack of jurisdiction by invoking, as the law of
their personal statute, a law of their nation which gives
jurisdiction in such a case to territorial courts, or to a certain
court within or without the territory of their nation.
(Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil. Rep., 34, and Ibaez vs. Ortiz, 5 Phil.
Rep., 325).
In the present action for divorce the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila did not lack jurisdiction over the persons of the litigants, for,
although Spanish Catholic subjects, they were residents of this city and
had their domicile herein.
The Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands have the power and
jurisdiction to try actions for divorce. That of the city of Manila did not
lack jurisdiction by reason of the subject matter of the litigation.
With respect to their property regime, the Foral Law presented
by the husband in an affidavit, with which conjugal partnership
is known to be inexistent, cannot apply since this affidavit was
never presented in proof, was never received by the trial judge,
and cannot seriously be considered as an effort to establish the
law of a foreign jurisdiction. Sections 300, 301 and 302 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, now in force in these islands, indicate the method by
which the law of a foreign country may be proved. The Court maintains
that the affidavit of a person not versed in the law, which was
never submitted as proof, never received by the trial court, and
which has never been subjected to any cross-examination, is
not a means of proving a foreign law on which the defendant
21
relies. Thus, since no proof has been submitted to this effect, all the
property of the marriage, says article 1407 of the Civil Code, shall be
considered as conjugal property until it is proven that it belongs
exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
ON PLAINTIFFS APPEAL
The court did not commit it in applying the rule contained in article
1287 of the Civil Code. "The usages or customs of the country
shall be taken into consideration in interpreting ambiguity in
contracts. . . ." If in the contract the word " pesetas," not being
specific, was ambiguous, then it was in harmony with this precept to
interpret it as being the peseta then in use or current when and
where the agreement was made, Mexican being then the usual and
current money in the Philippines.
QUITA V. PADLAN
GR NO. 124371, DECEMBER 22, 1998
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the
Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were not however blessed with
children. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured.
Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
and obtained a final judgment of divorce. She married thrice thereafter.
On 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. Respondent Blandina Padlan
claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis,
Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named
in the children of Arturo Padlan opposed the petition. Ruperto T. Padlan,
claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, also
intervened.
The court held that no dispute exists as to the right of the six (6) Padlan
children to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they
have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even
recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan;
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner could inherit as the surviving spouse of
Arturo?
Held:
Case remanded subject to determination of petitioners citizenship.
However, Private respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved
by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947
while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting
thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from
the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently,
she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status
presupposes a legitimate relationship.
Case remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings since the trial
court was not able to completely ascertain petitioners citizenship. The
trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once
proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of
their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner
could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
Nota bene:
Van dorn: ang bana ga laot sa wife since under Philippine law,
theyre still married.
LLORENTE V. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 124371, November 23, 2000
FACTS:
Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in
1937 in the Philippines. Lorenzo was an enlisted serviceman of
the US Navy. Soon after, he left for the US where through
naturalization, he became a US Citizen. Upon his visit to his wife,
he discovered that she was living with his brother and a child was born.
The child was registered as illegitimate but the name of the
father was left blank. Llorente filed a divorce in California in which
Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated
in the proceedings, which later on became final. He married Alicia and
they lived together for 25 years bringing 3 children. He made his last
will and testament stating that all his properties will be given to his
second marriage. He filed a petition of probate that made or appointed
Alicia his special administrator of his estate. Before the proceeding
22
could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed a letter of administration
over Llorentes estate. The trial granted the letter and denied the
motion for reconsideration. An appeal was made to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed and modified the judgment of the Trial Court
that she be declared co-owner of whatever properties, she and the
deceased, may have acquired in their 25 years of cohabitation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not national law shall apply?
RULING:
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the
law of the country where it is situated.
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law"
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general
American law. There is no such law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the union
has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the
State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of
which the decedent was a resident. Second, there is no showing
that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or
required by New York State law.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to
the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to
the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
(emphasis ours)
Likewise, Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen
when he divorced Paula. Such was also the situation when he
married Alicia and executed his will. As stated in Article 15 of the
civil code, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided that
they are valid in their National Law. Thus the divorce obtained by
Llorente is valid because the law that governs him is not Philippine Law
but his National Law since the divorce was contracted after he became
an American citizen. Furthermore, his National Law allowed divorce.
The case was remanded to the court of origin for determination of the
intrinsic validity of Lorenzo Llorentes will and determination of the
parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.
Incidental to personal status
Foreign laws regulating the persons status and capacity are to be
disregarded where they are political or penal in character;
Legislative jurisdiction authority of the state of his nationality or
domicile or where he may be physically present to promulgate laws
affecting his status;
Judicial jurisdiction the authority of the court to hear and determine
the cause of action

Nota bene: Beginning of personality conception provided subsequent birth

End death
The following are the requisites of res judicata:
1. the former judgment must be final; Other questions of status
2. the court that rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; 1. Absence a special legal status, if one is not in his domicile
3. it is a judgment on the merits; and and his whereabouts is unknown;
4. there is between the first and the second actions an When can be declared: under civil code
identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. a. Lapse of 2 years without news or since the receipt of last
news
It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can b. Lapse of 5 years if absentee has left someone in charge of
be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action the administration of his properties
between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that:
Who may declare:
1. the issue be identical; a. Spouse
2. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, b. Heirs
3. and the judgment will depend on the determination of that c. Relatives who will benefit in intestacy
particular point or question, d. Those who have rights over the properties
4. a former judgment between the same parties or their privies
will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or 2. Conflicts problems respecting an individuals name and
question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus v. extent of protection against abuse of his name
Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]).
5. Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of Right to use a title of nobility is determined in accordance with
issue. his national law

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the 3. Minority
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are CAPACITY
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad. 1. Juridical capacity the fitness to be the subject of legal
(FRDSCL) relations; considered inherent in every natural person and is
lost only through death;
Personal status legal position of an individual in a society 2. Capacity to act the power to do acts with legal effects; it is
Capacity power to acquire and exercise rights acquired and may be lost;

23

Nota bene:
Under Philippine law, the capacity to dispose of real property is
governed by the lex situs while the capacity to succeed is governed by
the national law of the deceased.
Question:
A 16-year old Cambodian inherited real properties from the Philippines;
he died and left a will which disposes of his properties in the
Philippines; supposing, Cambodian law provides that age of majority is
16, is the will now if probated in the Philippines valid?
If an 18-year old foreigner, where in his country, the age of majority is
21 goes to the Philippines and gets married, is such marriage valid?
Family rights, duties, status, condition and legal capacity of
persons accompany a person even when he moves to a foreign
country;
MARRIAGE
Art. II Section 12, 1987 Constitution
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support
of the Government.
Art. XV, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution
24
Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.
NCC Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens
of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
(9a)
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills,
and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which
they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the
diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of
the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities
established by Philippine laws shall be observed in
their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have, for their object,
public order, public policy and good customs shall
not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a)
Art. 66. When either or both of the contracting parties are
citizens or subjects of a foreign country, it shall be
necessary, before a marriage license can be obtained,
to provide themselves with a certificate of legal
 capacity to contract marriage, to be issued by their
respective diplomatic or consular officials. (13a)
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were performed, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous,
polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined
by Philippine law. (19a)
Art. 75. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be
solemnized by consuls and vice-consuls of the
Republic of the Philippines. The duties of the local
civil registrar and of a judge or justice of the peace
or mayor with regard to the celebration of marriage
shall be performed by such consuls and vice-
consuls. (n)
FC Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by
this Code. (52a)
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
1. Any incumbent member of the judiciary
within the court's jurisdiction;
25
2. Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any
church or religious sect duly authorized by
his church or religious sect and registered
with the civil registrar general, acting
within the limits of the written authority
granted by his church or religious sect and
provided that at least one of the
contracting parties belongs to the
solemnizing officer's church or religious
sect;
3. Any ship captain or airplane chief only in
the case mentioned in Article 31;
4. Any military commander of a unit to which
a chaplain is assigned, in the absence of
the latter, during a military operation,
likewise only in the cases mentioned in
Article 32;
5. Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul
in the case provided in Article 10. (56a)
Article. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in
the chambers of the judge or in open court, in
the church, chapel or temple, or in the office
the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as
the case may be, and not elsewhere, except
in cases of marriages contracted on the point
of death or in remote places in accordance
with Article 29 of this Code, or where both of
the parties request the solemnizing officer in
writing in which case the marriage may be
solemnized at a house or place designated by
them in a sworn statement to that effect.
(57a)
FC Art. 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad
may be solemnized by a consul-general,
 consul or vice-consul of the Republic of the 3. Those solemnized without license, except
Philippines. The issuance of the marriage those covered the preceding Chapter;
license and the duties of the local civil 4. Those bigamous or polygamous marriages
registrar and of the solemnizing officer with not failing under Article 41;
regard to the celebration of marriage shall be 5. Those contracted through mistake of one
performed by said consular official. (75a) contracting party as to the identity of the
other; and
6. Those subsequent marriages that are void
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in under Article 53.
accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those the time of the celebration, was
prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage,
3637 and 38. (17a)
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a solemnization. (As amended by Executive
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is Order 227)
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Art. 37. Marriages between the following are
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under incestuous and void from the beginning,
Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order whether relationship between the parties be
227) legitimate or illegitimate:

FC Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from
the beginning:
1. Those contracted by any party below
eighteen years of age even with the
consent of parents or guardians;
2. Those solemnized by any person not
legally authorized to perform marriages
unless such marriages were contracted
with either or both parties believing in
good faith that the solemnizing officer had
the legal authority to do so;
1. Between ascendants and descendants of
any degree; and
2. Between brothers and sisters, whether of
the full or half blood. (81a)
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void
from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
1. Between collateral blood relatives
whether legitimate or illegitimate, up
to the fourth civil degree;

26
 2. Between step-parents and step-
children;
3. Between parents-in-law and children-
in-law;
4. Between the adopting parent and the
adopted child;
5. Between the surviving spouse of the
adopting parent and the adopted child;
6. Between the surviving spouse of the
adopted child and the adopter;
7. Between an adopted child and a
legitimate child of the adopter;
8. Between adopted children of the same
adopter; and
9. Between parties where one, with the
intention to marry the other, killed that
other person's spouse, or his or her
own spouse. (82)
Muslim Code PD 1083, Art. 13. Application.
(1) The provisions of this Title shall
apply to marriage and divorce
wherein both parties are Muslims,
or wherein only the male party is a
Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with
Muslim law or this Code in any part
of the Philippines.
(2) In case of marriage between a
Muslim and a non-Muslim,
solemnized not in accordance with
Muslim law or this Code, the Civil
Code of the Philippines shall
apply. .chan robles virtual law
library
27
(3) Subject to the provisions of the
preceding paragraphs, the essential
requisites and legal impediments to
marriage, divorce, paternity and
filiation, guardianship and custody
of minors, support and
maintenance, claims for customary
dower (mahr), betrothal, breach of
contract to marry, solemnization
and registration of marriage and
divorce, rights and obligations
between husband and wife parental
authority, and the properly relations
between husband and wife shall be
governed by this Code and other
applicable Muslim laws.
Art. 14. Nature. Marriage is not only a civil contract
but a social institution. Its nature,
consequences and incidents are governed by
this Code and the Shari'a and not subject to
stipulation, except that the marriage
settlements may to a certain extent fix the
property relations of the spouses.
Art. 180. Law applicable. The provisions of the
Revised Penal Code relative to the crime of
bigamy shall not apply to a person married in
accordance with the provisions of this Code
or, before its effectivity, under Muslim law.
Essential and Formal Requisites
FC Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these
essential requisites are present:
 1. Legal capacity of the contracting
parties who must be a male and a
female; and
2. Consent freely given in the presence of
the solemnizing officer. (53a)
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
1. Authority of the solemnizing officer;
2. A valid marriage license except in the
cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this
Title; and
3. A marriage ceremony which takes
place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other
as husband and wife in the presence of
not less than two witnesses of legal
age. (53a, 55a)
Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen
years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and
38, may contract marriage. (54a)
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void
from the beginning:
1. Those contracted by any party below
eighteen years of age even with the
consent of parents or guardians;
2. Those solemnized by any person not
legally authorized to perform marriages
unless such marriages were contracted
with either or both parties believing in
28
good faith that the solemnizing officer had
the legal authority to do so;
3. Those solemnized without license, except
those covered the preceding Chapter;
4. Those bigamous or polygamous marriages
not failing under Article 41;
5. Those contracted through mistake of one
contracting party as to the identity of the
other; and
6. Those subsequent marriages that are void
under Article 53.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites
shall not affect the validity of the marriage
but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable. (n)
Art. 35 (2) supra
Muslim Code, Art. 15. Essential requisites.
No marriage contract shall be perfected unless the
following essential requisites are compiled with:
a. Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
b. Mutual consent of the parties freely given;
c. Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly
witnessed by at least two competent persons
 after the proper guardian in marriage (wali)
has given his consent; and
d. Stipulation of customary dower (mahr) duly
witnessed by two competent persons.
GOITIA VS. CAMPOS RUEDA
Facts:
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7,
1915, and immediately thereafter established their residence at 115
Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month, when
the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents.
That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with
the plaintiff, demanded of her that she perform unchaste and lascivious
acts on his genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene
demands of the defendant and refused to perform any act other than
legal and valid cohabitation; that the defendant, since that date had
continually on other successive dates, made similar lewd and
indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always spurned
them, which just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated the defendant and
induce him to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon
her lips, her face and different parts of her body; and that, as the
plaintiff was unable by any means to induce the defendant to desist
from his repugnant desires and cease from maltreating her, she was
obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her
parents.
Issue: whether or not that the wife may claim for support
against her husband outside of their conjugal abode?
Ruling: marriage partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract. But it
is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights,
duties, and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of
the parties but upon the general law which defines and
prescribes those rights, duties, and obligations. Marriage is an
institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply
interested. It is a relation for life and the parties cannot terminate it at
any shorter period by virtue of any contract they may make .The
reciprocal rights arising from this relation, so long as it continues, are
such as the law determines from time to time, and none other. When
the legal existence of the parties is merged into one by marriage, the
29
new relation is regulated and controlled by the state or government
upon principles of public policy for the benefit of society as well as the
parties. And when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its
continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no
possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable. With these principles to guide us, we will inquire into the
status of the law touching and governing the question under
consideration.
The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of
the husband to support his wife. This obligation is founded not
so much on the express or implied terms of the contract of
marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an
obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the
state itself that the laws will not permit him to terminate it by his own
wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental
home. A judgment for separate maintenance is not due and payable
either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal
sense of the term, but rather a judgment calling for the performance of
a duty made specific by the mandate of the sovereign. This is done
from necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and the
purity of the wife; as where the husband makes so base demands upon
his wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting her. The pro tanto
separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not an
impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is regarded as so
sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger policy
overruling a weaker one; and except in so far only as such separation is
tolerated as a means of preserving the public peace and morals may be
considered, it does not in any respect whatever impair the marriage
contract or for any purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme
sole.
Where the wife, who is forced to leave the conjugal abode by her
husband without fault on her part, may maintain an action against the
husband for separate maintenance when she has no other remedy,
notwithstanding the provisions of article 149 of the Civil Code
giving the person who is obliged to furnish support the option
to satisfy it either by paying a fixed pension or by receiving and
maintaining in his own home the one having the right to the
same.
WONG WOO YIU VS. VIVO

Facts:
The Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision finding
petitioner to be legally married to Perfecto Blas and admitting
her into the country as a non-quota immigrant. This decision was
affirmed by the Board of Commissioners of which petitioner was duly
informed in a letter sent on the same date by the Secretary of the
Board. However, the same Board of Commissioners, but
composed entirely of a new set of members, rendered a new
decision reversing that of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3
and ordering petitioner to be excluded from the country.
Petitioner filed a motion for new trial requesting an opportunity to
clarify certain points taken in the decision, but the same was denied for
lack of merit. Whereupon, petitioner initiated the instant petition for
mandamus with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance
of Manila which incidentally was considered by it as a petition for
certiorari.
Petitioner declared that she came to the Philippines in 1961 for
the first time to join her husband Perfecto Blas to whom she
was married in Chingkang, China ;that they had several children all
of whom are not in the Philippines; that their marriage was
celebrated by one Chua Tio, a village leader; that on June 28, 1961
the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision finding, among
others, that petitioner is legally married to Perfecto Blas, a Filipino
Citizen, and admitted her into the country as a non-quota immigrant;
that this decision was affirmed by the Board of Commissioners of which
petitioner was duly notified by the Secretary of said Board in a letter
dated July 12, 1961; that in a motu proprio decision rendered by the
Board of Commissioners composed of a new set of members the latter
found that petitioner's claim that she is the lawful wife of Perfecto Blas
was without basis in evidence as it was "bereft of substantial proof of
husband-wife relationship"; that said Board further held that, it
appearing that in the entry proceedings of Perfecto Blas had on January
23, 1947 he declared that he first visited China in 1935 and married
petitioner in 1936, it could not possibly sustain her claim that she
married Perfecto Blas in 1929; that in an affidavit dated August 9, 1962
Perfecto Blas claimed that he went to China in 1929, 1935 and 1941,
although in his re-entry declaration he admitted that he first went to
China in 1935, then in 1937, then in 1939, and lastly in 1941; and that
Perfecto Blas in the same affidavit likewise claimed that he first went to
China when he was merely four years old so that computed from his
date of birth in 1908 it must have been in 1912.
30
In view of the discrepancies found in the statements made by petitioner
and her alleged husband Perfecto Blas in the several investigations
conducted by the immigration authorities concerning their alleged
marriage before a village leader in China in 1929, coupled with the fact
that the only basis in support of petitioner's claim that she is the lawful
wife of Perfecto Blas is "a mass of oral and documentary evidence
bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife relationship," the Board of
Commissioners motu proprio reviewed the record concerning the
admission of petitioner into the country resulting in its finding that she
was improperly admitted.
Issue: whether or not that the marriage is valid?
Ruling: there is no documentary evidence to support the alleged
marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas but the record is punctured with
so many inconsistencies which cannot but lead one to doubt their
veracity concerning the pretended marriage in China in 1929. This
claim cannot also be entertained under our law on family relations.
Thus, Article 15 of our new Civil Code provides that laws
relating to family rights or to the status of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad, and
it is well-known that in 1929 in order that a marriage
celebrated in the Philippines may be valid it must be
solemnized either by a judge of any court inferior to the
Supreme Court, a justice of the peace, or a priest or minister of
the gospel of any denomination duly registered in the
Philippine Library and Museum (Public Act 3412, Section 2). Even if
we assume, therefore, that the marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas
before a village leader is valid in China, the same is not one of those
authorized in our country.
A marriage contracted outside of the Philippines which is valid
under the law of the country in which it was celebrated is also
valid in the Philippines. But no validity can be given to this
contention because no proof was presented relative to the law
of marriage in China. Such being the case, we should apply the
general rule that in the absence of proof of the law of a foreign country
it should be presumed that it is the same as our own.
Since our law only recognizes a marriage celebrated before any of the
officers mentioned therein, and a village leader is not one of them, it is
clear that petitioner's marriage, even if true, cannot be recognized in
this jurisdiction.
 ADONG VS. CHAONG SENG GEE
Facts:
Cheong Boo, a native of China died in Zamboanga, Philippine
Islands on August 5, 1919 and left property worth nearly
P100,000 which is now being claimed by two parties - (1)
Cheong Seng Gee who alleged that he was a legitimate child by
marriage contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Bit in China in
1985, and (2) Mora Adong who alleged that she had been
lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan, Philippine
Islands and had two daughters with the deceased namely Payang and
Rosalia. The conflicting claims to Cheong Boos estate were ventilated
in the lower court that ruled that Cheong Seng Gee failed to
sufficiently establish the Chinese marriage through a mere
letter testifying that Cheong Boo and Tan Bit married each
other but that because Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to
the Philippine Islands as the son of the deceased, he should
share in the estate as a natural child. With reference to the
allegations of Mora Adong and her daughters, the trial court reached
the conclusion that the marriage between Adong and Cheong Boo had
been adequately proved but that under the laws of the Philippine
Islands it could not be held to be a lawful marriage and thus the
daughter Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children. The
lower court believes that Mohammedan marriages are not valid under
the Philippine Islands laws this as an Imam as a solemnizing officer and
under Quaranic laws.
ISSUES: Whether or not the Chinese marriage between Cheong Boo
and Tan Dit is valid ?
Whether or not the Mohammedan marriage between Cheong Boo and
Mora Adong is valid?
RULING: The Supreme Court found the (1) Chinese marriage not
proved and Chinaman Cheong Seng Gee has only the rights of a
natural child while (2) it found the Mohammedan marriage to be
proved and to be valid, thus giving to the widow Mora Adong and the
legitimate children Payang and Rosalia the rights accruing to them
under the law.
31
(FOR STATCON) The Supreme Court held that marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract but it is a new relation, an
instruction in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
The presumption as to marriage is that every intendment of the law
leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties
were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be
living in the constant violation of decency of the law. As to retroactive
force, marriage laws is in the nature of a curative provision intended to
safeguard society by legalizing prior marriages. Public policy should
aid acts intended to validate marriages and should retard acts
intended to invalidate marriages. This as for public policy, the
courts can properly incline the scales of their decision in favor of that
solution which will most effectively promote the public policy. That is
the true construction which will best carry legislative intention into
effect.
(FOR PERSONS) Sec. IV of the Marriage law provides that all
marriages contracted outside the islands, which would be valid by the
laws of the country in which the same were contracted, are valid in
these islands. To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to
this comity provision, it is first necessary to prove before the
courts ofthe Islands the existence of the foreign law as a
question of fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged
foreign marriage by convincing evidence. A Philippine marriage
followed by 23 years of uninterrupted marital life, should not be
impugned and discredited, after the death of the husband through an
alleged prior Chinese marriage, save upon proof so clear, strong and
unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of such
impediment. A marriage alleged to have been contracted in China and
proven mainly by a so-called matrimonial letter held not to be valid in
the Philippines.
CHING HUAT VS. CO HEONG
Facts:
It is alleged in the petition, that the said minor is his legitimate
daughter; that up to June 21, 1946, said minor had been living with
and had under the custody of petitioner; that respondent, taking
advantage of his confidential and spiritual relation with Maria
Ching as her godfather, persuaded and induced her by means of
trick, promises and cajolery, to leave the parental home and to elope
with him in the night of June 21, 1946, to Plaridel, Bulacan, where they
were married on the following day before the Justice of the Peace of
said municipality, said Maria Ching being at the time 15 years old; and
that ever since respondent has had the minor Maria Ching under his
custody in Malolos, Bulacan, and has restrained her at her liberty.
It is further alleged that respondent had been previously
married in China to Gue Min, said marriage being said to be
subsisting at the time respondent married Maria Ching. Petitioner
further avers that Gue Min has never been declared an absentee nor
generally considered as dead and believed to be so by respondent at
the time he married Maria Ching.
Respondent, in his answer, among other things, asserts that on June 21,
1946, he and Maria Ching alias Avelina Ching were legally married
before the Justice of the Peace of Plaridel, Bulacan, and alleges that the
essential requisites for such marriage were complied with.
Issue: whether or not petitioner still retains his right to the custody of
his minor daughter Maria Ching alias Avelina Ching?
Ruling: the Philippine marriage between said respondent and
Maria Ching before the Justice of the Peace of Plaridel, Bulacan,
is undisputed. It is also beyond question that marriage was contracted
by a man much over 16 years old with a girl 15 years old (Act No. 3613,
section 2), neither of whom was included in any of the exceptions
mentioned in section 28 of the same Act; nor in those stated in section
29 thereof for the reason that the alleged prior Chinese marriage has
not been established.
If the supposed prior Chinese marriage had been sufficiently proven,
then in order that the subsequent Philippine marriage could be
valid, it would have been necessary either (a) that the Chinese
marriage should have been previously annulled or dissolved: or
(b) that the first wife of respondent should have been absent
for 7 consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the respondent having news of the absentee being
32
alive; or (c) that the absentee should have been generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by respondent at the
time of contracting the subsequent marriage, in either of which
last two cases the subsequent marriage will be valid until
declared null and void by a competent court, while in the first it
will be valid without this limitation. (Act No. 3613, section 29 [a]
and [b]; section 30 [b].) But as already adverted to, the complete
absence of proof of the supposed former Chinese marriage makes
sections 29 and 30 of the Marriage Law inapplicable.
Maria Ching having been validly married on June 21, 1946, she
became emancipated on that same date (arts. 314 [1] and 315,
Civil Code). This emancipation brought about the loss by the father of
the parental authority that he claims. On the other hand, by article 48
of Chapter V of the Spanish Marriage Law of 1870, whose articles 44 to
78 were, and are now partly, in force in the Philippines (Benedicto vs.
De la Rama, 3 Phil., 34), the wife has the duty, among others, of living
in her husband's company and of following him to wherever he transfer
his domicile or residence. (Yaez de Barbuevo vs. Fuster, 29 Phil., 606,
612.)
PEOPLE V. DUMPO
62 Phil 247
Facts:
Moro Hassan and Mora Dupo have been legally married
according to the rites and practice of the Mohammedan religion.
Without this marriage being dissolved, it is alleged that Dumpo
contracted another marriage with Moro Sabdapal after which the
two lived together as husband and wife. Dumpo was prosecuted for
and convicted of the crime of bigamy.
The accused interposed an appeal. It has been established by the
defense, without the prosecution having presented any objection nor
evidence to the contrary, that the alleged second marriage of the
accused is null and void according to Mohammedan rites on the ground
that her father had not given his consent thereto.
Held:
Marriage among Moslems is a fact of which no judicial notice
may be taken and must be subject to proof in every particular
case. In the case at bar we have the uncontradicted testimony of
Tahari, an Imam or Mohammedan priest authorized to solemnize
marriages between Mohammedans, to the effect that the consent of the
bride's father or in the absence thereof, that of the chief of the tribe to
which she belongs is an indispensable requisite for the validity of such
contracts.
It is an essential element of the crime of bigamy that the
alleged second marriage, having all the essential requisites,
would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.
However, accuseds subsequent marriage was void for lack of requisites
necessary under Moslem law, she must be acquitted.
LAO AND LAO V. DEE TIM
45 Phil 739 (1924)
Facts:
Yap Siong died intestate. During the distribution of his estate, Maria Lao
and Jose Lao appeared claiming to be the legitimate spouse and son of
the deceased. Maria claims that they had been married in the
Philippines on June 24, 1903. On the other hand, Dee Tim claims to be
the legitimate widow of Yap Siong; that she and Yap Siong were joined
in holy matrimony on the 14th day of September, 1893, in accordance
with the laws of China.
Maria Lao presented marriage certificates as proof. Dee Tim likewise
presented a certificate of marriage and that it was positive proof of her
marriage and that it complied with the custom and practice in China
with reference to marriage ceremonies. To support her contention she
presented a number of witnesses. Jan Peng, a Chinaman of 52 years of
age, swore that he knew the forms of ceremonies of marriage in China,
Dee Tim also presented a witness, Ty Cong Ting, a Chinaman, 32 years
of age and a lawyer, who testified concerning the laws and customs in
China with reference to the forms of marriage ceremony. He testified
that he knew and was well acquainted with the customs and practices
of Chinamen in China with reference to marriages and the manner and
form in which they were celebrated, and the form of proof issued for the
purpose of proving that a marriage ceremony had been performed. Mr.
Ty Cong Ting was, at the time he testified as a witness, the legal
attorney of the Chinese Consul General in the City of Manila.
Issue:
33
Who is the legal wife?
Held:
It is perhaps true that Yap Siong did on various occasions, depending
upon his interest and convenience at the particular time, state that
Maria Lao was his querida and not his wife. It is also perhaps true, for
the same reason, that he stated that Dee Tim was not his wife but his
querida. Evidently he was attempting to keep the information,
which he was quite able to do, until he had passed to that
bourn from which none returns, and until a distribution of his
large accumulated earnings among his heirs became necessary.
Based on a preponderance of the evidence the Court was
convinced that both Dee Tim and Maria Lao were legally
married to Yap Siong in good faith, believing that each was his sole
and separate wife, living in absolute ignorance of the fact of his double
marriage. They were each married in good faith and in ignorance
of the existence of the other marriage. Yap Siong up to the time of
his death seems to have been successful in keeping each of his two
wives ignorant of the fact that he was married to the other.
Under the Leyes de Partidas (Law 1, title 13, partida 4), where
two women innocently and in good faith are legally united in
holy matrimony to the same man, their children born will be
regarded as legitimate children and each family will be entitled
to one-half of the estate of the husband upon distribution of his
estate. That provision of the Leyes de Partidas is a very humane and
wise law. It justly protects those who innocently have entered into the
solemn relation of marriage and their descendants. The good faith of
all the parties will be presumed until the contrary is positively
proved. (Article 69, Civil Code; Las Leyes de Matrimonio, section 96;
Gaines vs. Hennen, 65 U.S., 553.)c
YAO KEE V. GONZALES
167 SCRA 736
FACTS:
 1. Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died in Calooocan City where he
was then residing leaving behind real and personal properties
here in the Philippines.
2. Private respondents (Aida Sy-Gonzales et al.,) filed a petition for
the grant of letters or administration alleging that they were the
children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego.
3. Petition was opposed by herein petitioners (Yao Kee et al.,)
alleging that they were the legitimate family.
4. The probate court found that Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao
Kee and that their 3 offsprings were the legitimate children.
5. The court likewise ruled that respondents are the acknowledged
illegitimate offspring of Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego.
6. On appeal, the lower courts decision was set aside declaring
petitioners as the acknowledge natural children of Sy Kiat and
Asuncion Gillego.
7. Oppostiors were declared the acknowelged natural children of
the deceased since the legality of the alleged marriage of Sy
Kiat and Yao Kee in China had not been proven to be valid to
the laws of China.
ISSUE:
Was the fact of marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee in China proven as
a custom?
HELD:
Custom is defined as a rule of conduct formed by
repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social
rule, legally binding and obligatory. The law requires that a
custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of
evidence. [Article 12, Civil Code] On this score the Court had
occasion to state that a local custom as a source of right cannot be
considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly
established by competent evidence like any other fact. The same
evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a
foreign custom.
Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish
a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven, namely 1) the
existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and 2) the
alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence.
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent
evidence relative to the law and custom of China on
34
marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching (brother) cannot
be considered as proof of Chinas law or custom on marriage not
only because they are self serving evidence, but more importantly,
there is no showing that they are competent to testify on
the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom,
and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with
said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat
cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee
with Sy Kiat according to the laws of China, they cannot be
accorded the status of legitimate children but only that of
acknowledged natural children. Petitioners are natural children, it
appearing that at the time of their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat
were not disqualified by any impediment to marry one another.
[See Art. 269, Civil Code] And they are acknowledged children of
the deceased because of Sy Kiats recognition of Sze Sook Wah and
its extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen who are her sisters of
the full blood.
Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceaseds
acknowledged natural children with Asuncion Gillego , a Filipina
with whom he lived for 25 years without the benefit of marriage.
They have in their favor their fathers acknowledgment, evidence
by a compromise agreement entered into by and between their
parents and approved by the CFI wherein Sy Kiat not only
acknowledged them as his children by Asuncion Gillego but likewise
made provisions for their support and future inheritance.
REPUBLIC V. ORBECIDO
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005
Facts:
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M.
Villanueva in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage
was blessed with a son and a daughter.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing
along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered
that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had
obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent
Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live in San Gabriel,
California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for
authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the
court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration
but it was denied.
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a
valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and an alien. Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no
law that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a
matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.
Held:
Taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time
of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the
time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise
would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation
of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature,
it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding
as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be
extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as
they come within its spirit or intent.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
35
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at
the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.
VI. CONSEQUENCES OF MARRIAGE
1. PERSONAL RELATIONS
Civil Code Art. 15, supra
Family Code
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with
the other if the latter should live abroad or there are
other valid and compelling reasons for the
exemption. However, such exemption shall not
apply if the same is not compatible with the
solidarity of the family. (110a)
Art. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support
of the family. The expenses for such support and
other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the
community property and, in the absence thereof,
from the income or fruits of their separate properties.
In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or
fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from the
separate properties. (111a)
Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity
without the consent of the other. The latter
 may object only on valid, serious, and moral
grounds.
In case of disagreement, the court shall
decide whether or not:
1. The objection is proper; and
2. Benefit has occurred to the family prior to
the objection or thereafter. If the benefit
accrued prior to the objection, the
resulting obligation shall be enforced
against the separate property of the
spouse who has not obtained consent.
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice
the rights of creditors who acted in good
faith. (117a)
Muslim Code
Art. 34. Mutual rights and obligations.
1. The husband and the wife are obliged to
live together, observe mutual respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and
support in accordance with this Code.
2. When one of the spouses neglects his or
her duties to the conjugal union or brings
danger, dishonor or material injury upon
the other, the injured party may petition
the court for relief. The court may counsel
the offender to comply with his or her
duties, and take such measures as may be
proper.
36
3. The husband and the wife shall inherit
from each other in accordance with this
Code.
4. The husband and the wife shall have the
right to divorce in accordance with this
Code.
Art. 35. Rights and obligations of the husband. The
husband shall fix the residence of the family.
The court may exempt the wife from living
with her husband on any of the following
grounds:
a. Her dower is not satisfied in accordance
with the stipulations; or
b. The conjugal dwelling is not in keeping
with her social standing or is, for any
reason, not safe for the members of the
family or her property.
Art. 36. Rights and obligations of the wife.
1. The wife shall dutifully manage the affairs of
the household. She may purchase things
necessary for the maintenance of the family,
and the husband shall be bound to reimburse
the expenses, if he has not delivered the
proper sum.
2. The wife cannot, without the husband's
consent, acquire any property by gratuitous
title, except from her relatives who are within
the prohibited degrees in marriage.
3. The wife may, with her husband's consent,
exercise any profession or occupation or
 engage in lawful business which is in keeping
with Islamic modesty and virtue. However, if
the husband refuses to give his consent on
the ground that his income is sufficient for
the family according to its social standing or
his opposition is based on serious and valid
grounds, the matter shall be referred to the
Agama Arbitration Council.
4. The wife shall have the right to demand the
satisfaction of her mahr.
5. Unless otherwise stipulated in the marriage
settlements, the wife retain ownership and
administration of her exclusive property.
6. The wife shall be entitled to an equal and just
treatment by the husband.
2. PROPERTY RELATIONS
Civil Code:
Art. 15, supra
Art. 117. The wife may exercise any profession or
occupation or engage in business. However,
the husband may object, provided:
1. His income is sufficient for the
family, according to its social standing,
and
2. His opposition is founded on
serious and valid grounds.
37
In case of disagreement on this question, the
parents and grandparents as well as the
family council, if any, shall be consulted. If no
agreement is still arrived at, the court will
decide whatever may be proper and in the
best interest of the family. (n)
Art. 118. The property relations between husband and
wife shall be governed in the following order:
a. By contract executed before the marriage;
b. By the provisions of this Code; and
c. By custom. (1315a)
Art. 124. If the marriage is between a citizen of the
Philippines and a foreigner, whether
celebrated in the Philippines or abroad, the
following rules shall prevail:
1. If the husband is a citizen of the
Philippines while the wife is a foreigner,
the provisions of this Code shall govern
their relations;
2. If the husband is a foreigner and the wife
is a citizen of the Philippines, the laws of
the husband's country shall be followed,
without prejudice to the provisions of this
Code with regard to immovable property.
(1325a)
Art. 144. When a man and a woman live together as
husband and wife, but they are not married,
or their marriage is void from the beginning,
the property acquired by either or both of
them through their work or industry or their
 wages and salaries shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership. (n)
Family Code:
Art. 74. A marriage in articulo mortis may also be
solemnized by the captain of a ship or chief of an
airplane during a voyage, or by the commanding
officer of a military unit, in the absence of a
chaplain, during war. The duties mentioned in the
two preceding articles shall be complied with by the
ship captain, airplane chief or commanding officer.
(n)
Art. 75. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be
solemnized by consuls and vice-consuls of the
Republic of the Philippines. The duties of the local
civil registrar and of a judge or justice of the peace
or mayor with regard to the celebration of marriage
shall be performed by such consuls and vice-
consuls. (n)
Art. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man
and a woman who have attained the age of majority
and who, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, desire to
marry each other. The contracting parties shall state
the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The official,
priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall
also state in an affidavit that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage. (n)
38
Art. 77. In case two persons married in accordance with law
desire to ratify their union in conformity with the
regulations, rites, or practices of any church, sect, or
religion it shall no longer be necessary to comply
with the requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title and
any ratification made shall merely be considered as a
purely religious ceremony. (23)
Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void
from the beginning:
1. Those contracted under the ages of
sixteen and fourteen years by the male
and female respectively, even with the
consent of the parents;
2. Those solemnized by any person not
legally authorized to perform marriages;
3. Those solemnized without a marriage
license, save marriages of exceptional
character;
4. Bigamous or polygamous marriages not
falling under Article 83, Number 2;
5. Incestuous marriages mentioned in Article
81;
6. Those where one or both contracting
parties have been found guilty of the
killing of the spouse of either of them;
7. Those between stepbrothers and
stepsisters and other marriages specified
in Article 82. (n)
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage or under
a void marriage, their wages and salaries
shall be owned by them in equal shares and
the property acquired by both of them
through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary,
properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by
their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall
be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other
party of any property shall be deemed to
have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family and of
the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by
acts inter vivos of his or her share in the
property acquired during cohabitation and
owned in common, without the consent of the
other, until after the termination of their
cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void
marriage is in good faith, the share of the
party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be
forfeited in favor of their common children. In
case of default of or waiver by any or all of
the common children or their descendants,
each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the
39
absence of descendants, such share shall
belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon termination of
the cohabitation. (144a)
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the
preceding Article, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property,
or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be
equal. The same rule and presumption shall
apply to joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to
another, his or her share in the co-ownership
shall accrue to the absolute community or
conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith
is not validly married to another, his or her
shall be forfeited in the manner provided in
the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise
apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
(144a)
Muslim Code:
Art. 37. How governed. The property relations
between husband and wife shall be governed
in the following order:
 a. By contract before or at the time of the
celebration of marriage;
b. By the provisions of this Code; and
c. By custom.
Art. 38. Regime of property relations. The property
relations between the spouses, in the
absence of any stipulation to the contrary in
the marriage settlements or any other
contract, shall be governed by the regime of
complete separation of property in
accordance with this Code and, in a
suppletory manner, by the general principles
of Islamic law and the Civil Code of the
Philippines .
Collector vs. Fisher
Facts:
This case relates to the determination and settlement of the hereditary
estate left by the deceased Walter G. Stevenson, and the laws
applicable thereto. Walter G. Stevenson (born in the Philippines on
August 9, 1874 of British parents and married in the City of Manila on
January 23, 1909 to Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson another British
subject) died on February 22, 1951 in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A. whereto he and his wife moved and established their
permanent residence since May 10, 1945. In his will executed in San
Francisco on May 22, 1947, and which was duly probated in the
Superior Court of California on April 11, 1951, Stevenson instituted
his wife Beatrice as his sole heiress to the following real and
personal properties acquired by the spouses while residing in
the Philippines.
Ancillary administration proceedings were instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Manila for the settlement of the estate in the Philippines. In
due time Stevenson's will was duly admitted to probate by our court
and Ian Murray Statt was appointed ancillary administrator of the
estate, filed a preliminary estate and inheritance tax return with the
reservation of having the properties declared therein finally appraised
40
at their values six months after the death of Stevenson. Preliminary
return was made by the ancillary administrator in order to secure the
waiver of the Collector of Internal Revenue on the inheritance tax due
on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines Inc.
which the estate then desired to dispose in the United States. Acting
upon said return, the Collector of Internal Revenue accepted the
valuation of the personal properties declared therein, but increased the
appraisal of the two parcels of land located in Baguio City by fixing their
fair market value. After allowing the deductions claimed by the ancillary
administrator for funeral expenses in the amount of P2,000.00 and for
judicial and administration expenses in the sum of P5,500.00, the
Collector assessed the state the amount of P5,147.98 for estate tax and
P10,875,26 or inheritance tax, or a total of P16,023.23. Both of these
assessments were paid by the estate.
The ancillary administrator filed in amended estate and
inheritance tax return in pursuance of his reservation made at
the time of filing of the preliminary return and for the purpose
of availing of the right granted by section 91 of the National
Internal Revenue Code.
Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson assigned all her rights and interests in the
estate to the spouses, Douglas and Bettina Fisher, respondents herein.
The ancillary administrator filed a second amended estate and
inheritance tax return. This return declared the same assets of the
estate stated in the amended return of September 22, 1952, except
that it contained new claims for additional exemption and
deduction to wit: (1) deduction in the amount of P4,000.00
from the gross estate of the decedent as provided for in
Section 861 (4) of the U.S. Federal Internal Revenue Code
which the ancillary administrator averred was allowable by way
of the reciprocity granted by Section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as then held by the Board of Tax Appeals in
case No. 71 entitled "Housman vs. Collector," August 14, 1952; and (2)
exemption from the imposition of estate and inheritance taxes
on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode
Mines, Inc. also pursuant to the reciprocity proviso of Section
122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. In this last return, the
estate claimed that it was liable only for the amount of P525.34 for
estate tax and P238.06 for inheritance tax and that, as a
consequence, it had overpaid the government. The refund of the
amount of P15,259.83, allegedly overpaid, was accordingly requested
by the estate. The Collector denied the claim. For this reason, action
was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondents, VII. Dissolution of Marriage
as assignees of Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson, for the recovery of said
amount. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 1125, the case was forwarded to
the Court of Tax Appeals which court, after hearing, rendered decision : 1. Annulment

that: (a) the one-half () share of the surviving spouse in the Civil Code:
conjugal partnership property as diminished by the obligations properly
chargeable to such property should be deducted from the net estate
of the deceased Walter G. Stevenson, pursuant to Section 89-C of the Art. 66. When either or both of the contracting parties
National Internal Revenue Code; (b) the intangible personal are citizens or subjects of a foreign country, it
property belonging to the estate of said Stevenson is exempt shall be necessary, before a marriage license
from inheritance tax, pursuant to the provision of section 122 of the
National Internal Revenue Code in relation to the California Inheritance
can be obtained, to provide themselves with
Tax Law but decedent's estate is not entitled to an exemption of a certificate of legal capacity to contract
P4,000.00 in the computation of the estate tax; (c) for purposes of marriage, to be issued by their respective
estate and inheritance taxation the Baguio real estate of the spouses diplomatic or consular officials. (13a)
should be valued at P52,200.00, and 210,000 shares of stock in the
Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. should be appraised at P0.38 per
share; and (d) the estate shall be entitled to a deduction of P2,000.00 Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the
for funeral expenses and judicial expenses of P8,604.39. Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were
Issue: whether or not foreign law needs to be proved in our jurisdiction? performed, and valid there as such, shall also
Ruling: be valid in this country, except bigamous,
polygamous, or incestuous marriages as
It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in determined by Philippine law. (19a)
our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved. Section 41, Rule 123 of our Rules of Court prescribes the Family Code
manner of proving foreign laws before our tribunals. However, although
we believe it desirable that these laws be proved in accordance with Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the
said rule, we held in the case of Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. following causes, existing at the time of the
Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471, that "a reading of sections 300 and 301 of our
Code of Civil Procedure (now section 41, Rule 123) will convince one
marriage:
that these sections do not exclude the presentation of other competent
evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law." In that case, we 1. That the party in whose behalf it is sought
considered the testimony of an attorney-at-law of San to have the marriage annulled was
Francisco, California who quoted verbatim a section of
California Civil Code and who stated that the same was in force
eighteen years of age or over but below
at the time the obligations were contracted, as sufficient twenty-one, and the marriage was
evidence to establish the existence of said law. In line with this solemnized without the consent of the
view, we find no error, therefore, on the part of the Tax Court in parents, guardian or person having
considering the pertinent California law as proved by respondents' substitute parental authority over the
witness.
party, in that order, unless after attaining
41
 the age of twenty-one, such party freely
cohabited with the other and both lived
together as husband and wife;
2. That either party was of unsound mind,
unless such party after coming to reason,
freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
3. That the consent of either party was
obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards, with full knowledge of the
facts constituting the fraud, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and
wife;
4. That the consent of either party was
obtained by force, intimidation or undue
influence, unless the same having
disappeared or ceased, such party
thereafter freely cohabited with the other
as husband and wife;
5. That either party was physically incapable
of consummating the marriage with the
other, and such incapacity continues and
appears to be incurable; or
6. That either party was afflicted with a
sexually-transmissible disease found to be
serious and appears to be incurable. (85a)
Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances shall
constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of
the preceding Article:
42
1. Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by
final judgment of the other party of a
crime involving moral turpitude;
2. Concealment by the wife of the fact that
at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her
husband;
3. Concealment of sexually transmissible
disease, regardless of its nature, existing
at the time of the marriage; or
4. Concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism
existing at the time of the marriage.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to
character, health, rank, fortune or chastity
shall constitute such fraud as will give
grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage. (86a)
Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must
be filed by the following persons and within
the periods indicated herein:
1. For causes mentioned in number 1 of
Article 45 by the party whose parent or
guardian did not give his or her consent,
within five years after attaining the age of
twenty-one, or by the parent or guardian
or person having legal charge of the
minor, at any time before such party has
reached the age of twenty-one;
2. For causes mentioned in number 2 of
Article 45, by the same spouse, who had
 no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by
any relative or guardian or person having
legal charge of the insane, at any time
before the death of either party, or by the
insane spouse during a lucid interval or
after regaining sanity;
3. For causes mentioned in number 3 of
Article 45, by the injured party, within five
years after the discovery of the fraud;
4. For causes mentioned in number 4 of
Article 45, by the injured party, within five
years from the time the force, intimidation
or undue influence disappeared or ceased;
5. For causes mentioned in number 5 and 6
of Article 45, by the injured party, within
five years after the marriage. (87a)
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State
to take steps to prevent collusion between
the parties and to take care that evidence is
not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding
paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon
a stipulation of facts or confession of
judgment. (88a)
Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the
absence of adequate provisions in a written
agreement between the spouses, the Court
shall provide for the support of the spouses
43
and the custody and support of their common
children. The Court shall give paramount
consideration to the moral and material
welfare of said children and their choice of
the parent with whom they wish to remain as
provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for
appropriate visitation rights of the other
parent. (n)
Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2),
(3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44
shall also apply in the proper cases to
marriages which are declared ab initio or
annulled by final judgment under Articles 40
and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall
provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses,
the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of third
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters
had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the
absolute community or the conjugal
partnership shall be notified of the
proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the
lot on which it is situated, shall be
adjudicated in accordance with the provisions
of Articles 102 and 129.
Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive
legitimes of all common children, computed
as of the date of the final judgment of the
trial court, shall be delivered in cash,
property or sound securities, unless the
parties, by mutual agreement judicially
approved, had already provided for such
matters.
The children or their guardian or the trustee
of their property may ask for the enforcement
of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes
herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice
the ultimate successional rights of the
children accruing upon the death of either of
both of the parents; but the value of the
properties already received under the decree
of annulment or absolute nullity shall be
considered as advances on their legitime. (n)
Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute
nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses
and the delivery of the children's presumptive
legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate
civil registry and registries of property;
otherwise, the same shall not affect third
persons. (n)
Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again
after compliance with the requirements of the
immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the
subsequent marriage shall be null and
void.chan robles virtual law library
44
Art. 54. Children conceived or born before the
judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of
the marriage under Article 36 has become
final and executory shall be considered
legitimate. Children conceived or born of the
subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall
likewise be legitimate.
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be
filed on any of the following grounds:
1. Repeated physical violence or grossly
abusive conduct directed against the
petitioner, a common child, or a child
of the petitioner;
2. Physical violence or moral pressure to
compel the petitioner to change
religious or political affiliation;
3. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or
induce the petitioner, a common child,
or a child of the petitioner, to engage
in prostitution, or connivance in such
corruption or inducement;
4. Final judgment sentencing the
respondent to imprisonment of more
than six years, even if pardoned;
5. Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism
of the respondent;
6. Lesbianism or homosexuality of the
respondent;
 7. Contracting by the respondent of a 1. The husband and the wife are obliged to
subsequent bigamous marriage, live together, observe mutual respect and
whether in the Philippines or abroad; fidelity, and render mutual help and
support in accordance with this Code.
8. Sexual infidelity or perversion; 2. When one of the spouses neglects his or
her duties to the conjugal union or brings
9. Attempt by the respondent against the
danger, dishonor or material injury upon
life of the petitioner; or
the other, the injured party may petition
10.Abandonment of petitioner by the court for relief. The court may counsel
respondent without justifiable cause the offender to comply with his or her
for more than one year. duties, and take such measures as may be
proper. .chan robles virtual law library
For purposes of this Article, the term "child" 3. The husband and the wife shall inherit
shall include a child by nature or by adoption. from each other in accordance with this
(9a) Code.
2. Absolute Divorce
4. The husband and the wife shall have the
Civil Code: right to divorce in accordance with this
Code.
Art. 15, supra
ROEHR VS. RODRIGUEZ
Art. 17, Supra
Facts:
Muslim Code:
Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr, a German citizen, married a Filipina, Carmen
Rodriguez in Germany. The marriage was ratified in Tayasan, Negros
45-55 supra Oriental. Private respondent filed a petition for the declaration of nullity
of marriage before the RTC of Makati. Petitioner filed a motion to
Art. 27. By a husband. Notwithstanding the rule of dismiss but was denied by the trial court. The petitioner obtained a
Islamic law permitting a Muslim to have more decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg -
Blankenese and granting the custody of the children to the father.
than one wife but one wife unless he can deal
with them with equal companionship and just Issue:
treatment as enjoined by Islamic law and only
in exceptional cases. Whether or not the legal effects of a divorce obtained from a foreign
country such as support and custody of the children can be determined
in our courts?
Art. 34. Mutual rights and obligations.
45
Held:
Yes. In order to take effect, a foreign judgement must clearly
show that the opposing party has been given ample
opportunity to do so under the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Accordingly, the respondent was not given the opportunity to challenge
the judgement of the German Court, therefore, legal effects of divorce
must be determined in our courts. The court held that the trial court has
jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has the
parental custody.
RECTO VS. HARDEN
100 Phil 427
Facts:
Recto and Harden entered into a contract for professional
services wherein the latter engaged the services of the former as her
counsel against her husband for a claim in their conjugal property. Mr.
Harden previously filed for divorce against the Mrs. The Court awarded
Mrs. Harden an amount totaling to almost 4 million pesos plus litis
expensae.
Subsequently however, Mrs. Harden ordered her counsel to vacate
all orders and judgments rendered therein, and abandon and nullify
all her claims to the conjugal partnership existing between her and Mr.
Harden. Later, she entered into an amicable settlement with Mr. Harden
agreeing to a share of a lesser amount.
Appellee counsel for Mrs. Harden alleged that the purpose of
the said instruments, executed by Mr. and Mrs. Harden, was to
defeat the claim of the former for attorneys fees, for which reason, he
prayed that the court grant him the necessary fees.
Appellants assail the contract for professional services as void, mainly,
upon the grounds that:
1. that Mrs. Harden cannot bind the conjugal partnership without
her husbands consent; c
2. that Article 1491 of the Civil Code of the Philippines in effect
prohibits contingent fees; c
46
3. that the contract in question has for its purpose to secure a
decree of divorce, allegedly in violation of Articles 1305, 1352
and 1409 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;
4. that the terms of said contract are harsh, inequitable and
oppressive.
Held:
The first objection has no foundation in fact, for the contract in
dispute does not seek to bind the conjugal partnership. By virtue
of said contract, Mrs. Harden merely bound herself or assumed the
personal obligation to pay, by way of contingent fees, 20% of her
share in said partnership. The contract neither gives, nor purports to
give, to the Appellee any right whatsoever, personal or real, in and to
her aforesaid share. The amount thereof is simply a basis for the
computation of said fees.
For the same reason, the second objection is, likewise, untenable.
Moreover, it has already been held that contingent fees are not
prohibited in the Philippines and are impliedly sanctioned by
our Cannons (No. 13) of Professional Ethics. (see, also, Ulanday vs.
Manila Railroad Co., 45 Phil., 540, 554.) Such is, likewise, the rule in the
United States (Legal Ethics by Henry S. Drinker, p. 176).
in the United States, the great weight of authority recognizes the
validity of contracts for contingent fees, provided such contracts are not
in contravention of public policy, and it is only when the attorney
has taken an unfair or unreasonable advantage of his client
that such a claim is condemned. (See 5 Am. Jur. 359 et seq;
Ballentine, Law Dictionary, 2nd ed., p. 276.)
The third objection is not borne out, either by the language of the
contract between them, or by the intent of the parties thereto. Its
purpose was not to secure a divorce, or to facilitate or promote
the procurement of a divorce. It merely sought to protect the
interest of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal partnership, during the
pendency of a divorce suit she intended to file in the United States.
What is more, inasmuch as Mr. and Mrs. Harden are admittedly
citizens of the United States, their status and the dissolution
thereof are governed pursuant to Article 9 of the Civil Code
of Spain (which was in force in the Philippines at the time of
the execution of the contract in question) and Article 15 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines by the laws of the United States,
which sanction divorce. In short, the contract of services, between
Mrs. Harden and herein Appellee, is not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy.
It is a basic principle that status, once established by the
personal law of the party, is given universal recognition.
Therefore, aliens can sue and be sued in our courts subject to
Philippine procedural law even on matters relating to their
status and capacity. However, the law to be applied by
Philippine courts in determining their capacity and status is
their personal law.
The last objection is based upon principles of equity, but, pursuant
thereto, one who seeks equity must come with clean hands (Bastida, et
al., vs. Dy Buncio & Co., 93 Phil., 195; 30 C.J. S. 475), and Appellants
have not done so, for the circumstances surrounding the case show, to
our satisfaction, that their aforementioned agreements, ostensibly for
the settlement of the differences between husband and wife, were
made for the purpose of circumventing or defeating the rights of herein
Appellee, under his above-quoted contract of services with Mrs. Harden.
TENCHAVEZ V. ESCANO 15 SCRA 355
Facts:
Pastor Tenchavez married Vicenta Escano on Feb. 24, 1948 in
Cebu City. As of June 1948, the newly-weds were already
estranged. Vicenta left for the US and filed a verified complaint
for divorce against the Pastor in the State of Nevada on the
ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character."
A decree of divorce was issued by the Nevada Court. Later on,
Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran in Nevada.
She now lives with him in California and has begotten children.
She acquired American citizenship on August 8, 1958. On July
30, 1955, Pastor filed a complaint for legal separation and
damages against Vicenta and her parents in the CFI-Cebu.
HELD:
47
At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta, like her
husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject to
Philippine laws under Art. 15 of the New Civil Code. Philippine
law, under the NCC then now in force, does not admit absolute
divorce but only provides for legal separation.
For Philippine courts to recognize foreign divorce decrees
between Filipino citizens would be a patent violation of the
declared policy of the State, especially in view of the 3rd par. of
Art. 17, of the New Civil Code which reads: Prohibitive laws
concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have, for their object, public order, public policy and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon
in a foreign country. Moreover, recognition would give rise to
scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens to the
detriment of those members of our society whose means do not
permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorce
outside the Philippines.
Therefore, a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought
and decreed after the effectivity of the NCC, is not entitled to
recognition as valid in this jurisdiction.
SIKAT V. CANSON
67 PHIL 207
Hilaria Sikat and John Canson contracted marriage and
lived together as husband and wife until 1911 when
they separated.
During the same year the wife commenced divorce
proceedings against her spouses, but the case was
dismissed without the court passing upon the merits
thereof.
 At the time of their marriage in 1904, John Canson was
an Italian citizen but on February 27, 1922, he became
a naturalized Filipino citizen.
In 1929, he went to Reno, Nevada, United States of
America, and on October 8, of that year, he obtained
an absolute decree of divorce on the ground of
desertion.
Hilaria, in 1933, filed another action, civil case No.
5398 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, wherein she
sought to compel the defendant to pay her a monthly
pension of P500 as alimony or support.
Canson interposed three defenses: (1) adultery on the
part of the plaintiff: (2) absolute divorce obtained by
the defendant as decreed by the court in Reno,
Nevada, United States of America; and (3) that the
defendant did not have the means to pay the
allowance sought. The lower court dismissed the
complaint and declined to accord validity to the divorce
obtained in Reno but found that Hilaria Sikat had
forfeited her right to support because she had
committed adultery.
This judgment was not appealed and it became final.
On June 1, 1934, the present action was instituted by
the plaintiff-appellant to obtain the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership. The action is predicated on the
existence of a final decree of absolute divorce rendered
by the court of Reno, Nevada, since 1929.
Held:
It is not, however, the citizenship of the plaintiff for
divorce which confers jurisdiction upon a court, but his
legal residence within the State (Cousins Hix vs.
Fluemer, 55 Phil. 851 ). And assuming that John
Canson acquired legal residence in the State of Nevada
48
through the approval of his citizenship papers, this did
not confer jurisdiction on the Nevada court to grant a
divorce that would be valid in this jurisdiction nor
jurisdiction that could determine their matrimonial
status, because the wife was still domiciled in the
Philippines. The Nevada court never acquired
jurisdiction over her person. (Gorayeb vs. Hashim, 50
Phil. 26 , and Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, supra.) This was
not a proceeding in rem to justify a court in entering a
decree as to the res or marriage relation entitled to be
enforced outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the
court.
Plaintiff-appellant had made her choice of two
inconsistent remedies afforded her by law: (1) to
impugn the divorce and file an action for support, or (2)
uphold the validity of the divorce and sue for a
liquidation of conjugal partnership. She chose the first
remedy when she filed her action for support. She lost
the case and should take the consequences.
The courts in the Philippines can grant a divorce only
on the ground of "adultery on the part of the wife or
concubinage on the part of the husband" as provided
for under section 1 of Act No. 2710. The divorce decree
in question was granted on the ground of desertion,
clearly not a cause for divorce under our laws.
That our divorce law, Act No. 2710, is too strict or too
liberal is not for this court to decide. (Barretto Gonzalez
vs. Gonzalez, supra.)
The allotment of powers between the different
governmental agencies restricts the judiciary within the
confines of interpretation, not of legislation. The
legislative policy on the matter of divorce in this
jurisdiction is clearly set forth in Act No. 2710 and has
been upheld by this court;
ARCA V. JAVIER
 95 PHIL 579
Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cavite ordering him to give a monthly
allowance of P60 to plaintiffs beginning March 31,
1953, and to pay them attorney's fees in the amount of
P150 defendant took the case directly to this Court
attributing five errors to the court below. The facts are
not disputed.
Javier and Arca got married in Manila. Javier, an
enlisted US Navy personnel left for the States 7 years
after the birth of their first born. At such time, Arca
lived with Javiers parents. However, due to strained
relations with the latter, she left and transferred to her
hometown. Thereafter, Javier filed a case for divorce in
Alabama against Arca alleging abandonment. Arca
made her reply claiming among other things that she
never abandoned her husband and that their
separation was due to a physical impossibility which
justifies her separation if the husband moves to ultra-
marine colonies. The divorce however was granted.
Javier got married the 2nd time but was subsequently
divorced. After a few years, he went back to the
Philippines, and believing that the first two divorces
were valid, remarried the 3rd time.
Issue:
Did the Circuit Court of Mobile County acquire jurisdiction
of both spouses and effectively rendered a judgment in
rem when it granted divorce to Javier?
Held:
49
No, one of the essential conditions for the validity of a
decree of divorce is that the court must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter and in order that
this may be acquired, plaintiff must be domiciled in
good faith in the State in which it is granted (Cousins
Hix vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851, 856).
While it is true that Salud R. Arca filed an answer in the
divorce case instituted at the Mobile County in view of
the summons served upon her in this jurisdiction, but
this action cannot be interpreted as placing her under
the jurisdiction of the court because its only purpose
was to impugn the claim of appellant that his domicile
or legal residence at that time was Mobile County, and
to show that the ground of desertion imputed to her
was baseless and false. Such answer should be
considered as a special appearance the purpose of
which is to impugn the jurisdiction of the court over the
case.
It is established by the great weight of authority that
the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is
domiciled and to which one or both of them may resort
merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce has no
jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial status; and
a divorce granted by such a court is not entitled to
recognition elsewhere. (See Note to Succession of
Benton, 59 L. R. A., 143) The voluntary appearance of
the defendant before such a tribunal does not invest
the court with jurisdiction. (Andrews vs. Andrews, 188
U. S., 14; 47 L. ed., 366.)
It follows that, to give a court jurisdiction on the ground
of the plaintiff's residence in the State or country of the
judicial forum, his residence must be bona fide. If a
spouse leaves the family domicile and goes to another
State for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce, and
with no intention of remaining, his residence there is
 not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the courts of the
State. (Ramirez vs. Gmur, 82 Phil., 855.)
But even if his residence had been taken up is good
faith, and the court had acquired jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the divorce suit, the decree issued in his
favor is not binding upon the appellant; for the
matrimonial domicile of the spouses being the City of
Manila;
Ramirez v. Gmur
42 Phil 855
Leona Castro was the natural daughter of decedent Samuel Bischoff.
Whereas Ana Ramirez was the latter's widow to which they had no
children. Leona was married to Kauffman. They had 3 children, Elena,
Federico, and Ernesto. Later, Kauffman brought Leona to Switzerland to
recuperate her health. A few years later, she fell for a Dr. Mory to whom
she had a child, Leontina. She informed Kauffman that she no longer
wished to stay with him to which the latter obtained a divorce in France
where Leona was in default. Leona, after the divorce got married in
London, and after which bore two children from which the last childbirth
caused Leona her life. The heirs of Leona from the first marriage and
the second now claims the Estate of Samuel to which Ana Ramirez
opposed since Leona is not a recognized natural child.
Held:
The status of Leona Castro as recognized natural daughter of Samuel
Bischoff is fully and satisfactorily shown.
With reference to the right of the von Kauffman children, it is
enough to say that they are legitimate children, born to their
parents in lawful wedlock; and they are therefore entitled to
participate in the inheritance which would have devolved upon their
mother, if she had survived the testator.
The Court is of the opinion that the decree of divorce upon
which reliance is placed by the representation of the Mory
children cannot be recognized as valid in the courts of the
Philippine Islands. The French tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain
an action for the dissolution of a marriage contracted in these Islands
50
by person domiciled here, such marriage being indissoluble under the
laws then prevailing in this country.
The evidence shows that the decree was entered against the defendant
in default, for failure to answer, and there is nothing to show that she
had acquired, or had attempted to acquire, a permanent domicile in the
City of Paris. It is evident of course that the presence of both the
spouses in that city was due merely to the mutual desire to procure a
divorce from each other.
It is established by the great weight of authority that the court
of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and to
which one or both of them may resort merely for the purpose of
obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their
matrimonial status; and a divorce granted by such a court is not
entitled to recognition elsewhere.
It follows that, to give a court jurisdiction on the ground of the
plaintiff's residence in the State or country of the judicial
forum, his residence must be bona fide. If a spouse leaves the
family domicile and goes to another State for the sole purpose of
obtaining a divorce, and with no intention of remaining, his residence
there is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the courts of that State.
This is especially true where the cause of divorce is one not recognized
by the laws of the State of his own domicile.
MANILA SURETY & FIDELITY VS. TEODORO
FACTS:
Jose Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares were married in Iloilo on January 5,
1935. On November 29,1954, a decree of divorce was granted by the
Court of the State of Nevada dissolving the bonds of matrimony
between Sonia Lizares and Jose Corominas, Jr. . . .
Trinidad Teodoro met Jose Corominas, Jr. in Hongkong on October 30,
1955. . . . On March 26, 1956, they went through a Buddhist wedding
ceremony in Hongkong. Upon their return to the Philippines they took
up residence in a rented house at No. 2305 Agno Street . . . Manila. On
September 5, 1961, plaintiff and Jose Corominas, Jr. were married for a
second time on Washoe County, Nevada. U.S.A.
Additional Pertinent facts, also mentioned in the decision under review
and controverted by the parties, are that Sonia Lizares is still living and
that the conjugal partnership formed by her marriage to Corominas was
dissolved by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila upon
their joint petition, the decree of dissolution having been issued on
October 21, 1957. Trinidad questioned the levy on the property since
the property in question was her paraphernal property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the properties in question are conjugal?
RULING:
There is no doubt that the decree of divorce granted by the
Court of Nevada in 1954 is not valid under Philippine law, which
has outlawed divorce altogether; that the matrimonial bonds
between Jose Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares have not been dissolved,
although their conjugal partnership was terminated in 1957; and that
the former's subsequent marriage in Hongkong to Trinidad Teodoro is
bigamous and void.
In the present case, however, we find no need to pass on this question.
The particular properties involved here which were admittedly acquired
by respondent Teodoro, cannot be deemed to belong to such co-
ownership because, as found by the trial court and confirmed by the
Court of Appeals, the funds used in acquiring said properties
were fruits of respondent's paraphernal investments which
accrued before her "marriage" to Corominas. In other words they
were not acquired by either or both of the partners in the void marriage
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries, and hence
cannot be the subject of co-ownership under Article 144. They remain
respondent's exclusive properties, beyond the reach of execution to
satisfy the judgment debt of Corominas.
VAN DORN V. ROMILLO
139 SCRA 139
Facts:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines
while private respondent Richard Upton is a US citizen; they
51
were married in Hong Kong in 1972; after the marriage, they
established their residence in the Philippines and begot 2
children; Alicia filed for divorce in Nevada; the parties were
divorced in Nevada, US, in 1982; and petitioner has remarried
also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
On June 18, 1983 Upton filed a suit against petitioner in the
RTC-Pasay, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila
(the Galleon Shop), is conjugal property and asking that
petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business,
and that Upton be declared as having the right to manage the
conjugal property.
Held:
Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Art. 13, NCC,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorce the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines provided they are valid according to their national
law.
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondents
from the marriage from the standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Court said that Ours is not only a court of law but also a court
of equity. The Court could not turn its back on its citizen when
the foreign national itself benefited from such divorce decree;
Thus, pursuant to his national law, Upton is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the
case below as petitioner's husband who is entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets.
 To maintain, as Upton does, that under our laws, petitioner has
to be considered still married to him and still subject to a wife's
obligations under the NCC cannot be just. Petitioner should not
be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity,
and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs w/ possible rights to conjugal
properties. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be observed.
PILAPIL V. IBAY-SOMERA
174 SCRA 653
Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were
married in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started
auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in
Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was
born on April 20, 1980.
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations
between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto between
them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, private respondent
initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. He
claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had
been living apart since April, 1982. Petitioner, on the other hand,
filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of
property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Thereafter a decree of divorce was promulgated. The records show
that under German law said court was locally and internationally
competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of
said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the
applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce
decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before
52
the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said
respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chua as
early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua
sometime in 1983".
Issue:
WON the adultery case be sustained even though there has already
been a finality of a divorce decree.
Held:
The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and
concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should
be the offended spouse, and nobody else.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended
spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that
such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal
representation to do so at the time of the filing of the
criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions;
in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to
dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint
or petition. In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the
status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be
definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or
capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the
action.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent
obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic
of Germany, it is deemed admitted. Said divorce and its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our
civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Therefore, private respondent, being no longer the husband
of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the
adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended
spouse at the time he filed suit.
 LLORENTE V. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 124371, November 23, 2000
FACTS:
Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in
1937 in the Philippines. Lorenzo was an enlisted serviceman of
the US Navy. Soon after, he left for the US where through
naturalization, he became a US Citizen. Upon his visit to his wife,
he discovered that she was living with his brother and a child was born.
The child was registered as illegitimate but the name of the
father was left blank. Llorente filed a divorce in California in which
Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated
in the proceedings, which later on became final. He married Alicia and
they lived together for 25 years bringing 3 children. He made his last
will and testament stating that all his properties will be given to his
second marriage. He filed a petition of probate that made or appointed
Alicia his special administrator of his estate. Before the proceeding
could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed a letter of administration
over Llorentes estate. The trial granted the letter and denied the
motion for reconsideration. An appeal was made to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed and modified the judgment of the Trial Court
that she be declared co-owner of whatever properties, she and the
deceased, may have acquired in their 25 years of cohabitation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not national law shall apply?
RULING:
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the
law of the country where it is situated.
53
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law"
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general
American law. There is no such law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the union
has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the
State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of
which the decedent was a resident. Second, there is no showing
that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or
required by New York State law.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to
the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to
the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
(emphasis ours)
Likewise, Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen
when he divorced Paula. Such was also the situation when he
married Alicia and executed his will. As stated in Article 15 of the
civil code, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided that
they are valid in their National Law. Thus the divorce obtained by
Llorente is valid because the law that governs him is not Philippine Law
but his National Law since the divorce was contracted after he became
an American citizen. Furthermore, his National Law allowed divorce.
The case was remanded to the court of origin for determination of the
intrinsic validity of Lorenzo Llorentes will and determination of the
parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.
GARCIA V. RECIO
October 2, 2001
Rederick Recio, a Filipino, married Editha Samson, an Australian in
Malabon Rizal. However, on 1989, they got divorced in an
Australian family court.
On 1992, Rederick became an Australian Citizen. He later married
Petitioner in 1994 in Cabanatuan City.
Thereafter, the two separated and petitioner filed a complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy.
 While the suit was pending, Rederick was able to obtain a divorce
decree in Australia. Trial Court declared the marriage dissolved
based on the subsequent divorce decree obtained by the
respondent.
Issues:
Whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was
proven;
Whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry
petitioner;
Held:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law
of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing
personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must
be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the
national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our
law on evidence.
Was the first divorce validly obtained and binding?
At the outset, the Court lays the following basic legal principles;
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, Philippine
courts cannot grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be
dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 1522
and 1723 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino
and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former
to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
"validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry." A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are
both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
consistent with their respective national laws.
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient. In the case at
bar, Respondent only presented the divorce decree;
54
Likewise, before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and
admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the
divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the
judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an
act of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign country.
However, under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by
the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record
is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine Foreign Service stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to
be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However,
appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules
on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent, this matter was not objected to by
the petitioner, thus by virtue of such waiver, is deemed
admitted as evidence.
Who has the burden of proving a foreign law?
Respondent has the burden of proof; The burden of proof lies
with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." It is a
well-settled that courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like
any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital
laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by
reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be
exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject
should be resolved in the negative.
2nd Issue: Is Respondent legally capacitated to remarry?
Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising
after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic
ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2)
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the
marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force. There is no showing in the case at bar which type of
divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree a
conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same
as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute
divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period
during which no reconciliation is effected.
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction
that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree
becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits
the offence of bigamy."
This quotation bolsters the Courts contention that the divorce obtained
by respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish
his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of
the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the
Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity
of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence
of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for
a marriage license.
In the case at bar, there is absolutely no evidence that proves
respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner.
Based on the above records, the Court cannot conclude that
respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. The court a quo
erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed
respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring
him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal
law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity
to contract the second marriage.
55
Neither can the Court grant petitioner's prayer to declare her
marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy.
After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really
capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree.
Hence, case was remanded to the court a quo for further determination
of legal capacity and to receive evidence to determine if bigamy has
been committed;
Zamoranos vs People
Facts:
These are three (3) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari
under Rule 45, assailing the Decision dated July 30, 2010 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), dismissing the petition for certiorari filed
by petitioner Atty. Marietta D. Zamoranos (Zamoranos), thus,
affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Lanao del
Norte for Bigamy filed by petitioner Samson R. Pacasum, Sr.
On May 3, 1982, Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim
convert, in Islamic rites. Prior thereto, Zamoranos was a Roman
Catholic who had converted to Islam on April 28, 1982.
Subsequently, on July 30, 1982, the two wed again, this time, in
civil rites before Judge Perfecto Laguio (Laguio) of the RTC,
Quezon City.
A little after a year, on December 18, 1983, Zamoranos and De
Guzman obtained a divorce by talaq. The court held that after
evaluating the testimonies of the parties, it is fully convinced that
both the complainant and the respondent have been duly converted
to the faith of Islam prior to their Muslim wedding and finding that
there is no more possibility of reconciliation by and between them,
hereby issues this decree of divorce. Consequently, the marriage
between Marietta (Mariam) D. Zamoranos de Guzman and Jesus
(Mohamad) de Guzman was dissolved by the Sharia Circuit
District Court in Isabela, Basilan.
Zamoranos married anew on December 20, 1989. As she had
previously done in her first nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed
Samson Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum), her subordinate at the Bureau of
Customs where she worked, under Islamic rites and in order to
strengthen the ties of their marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum
renewed their marriage vows in a civil ceremony.
Zamoranos and Pacasum were then de facto separated. Pacasum
filed cases for the annulment of their marriage, criminal case for
bigamy and an administrative case for disbarment against
Zamoranos. Pacasum contracted a second marriage. The
prosecutor found prima facie evidence to hold Zamoranos liable for
Bigamy but the same was thereafter dismissed upon a motion for
reconsideration filed by Zamboranos.
Pacasum filed a Petition for Review before the Office of the
Secretary of Justice assailing the dismissal of the complaint for
bigamy. The DOJ Secretary granted the petition and reversed the
dismissal. Zamoranos immediately filed an Omnibus Motion and
Supplement to the Urgent Omnibus Motion: (1) for
Reconsideration; (2) to Hold in Abeyance Filing of the Instant
Case; and (3) to Hold in Abeyance or Quash Warrant of Arrest
before the Secretary of Justice. Unfortunately for Zamoranos, her
twin motions were denied by the Secretary of Justice in a
resolution. Zamoranos second motion for reconsideration, as with
her previous motions, was likewise denied.
On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void
Marriage, the lower court rendered a decision in favor of
Zamoranos, dismissing the petition of Pacasum for lack of
jurisdiction. The court found that Zamoranos and De Guzman are
56
Muslims, and were such at the time of their marriage, whose
marital relationship was governed by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of
the Philippines, which provides that the Sharia Circuit Courts shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over the same. And any divorce
proceeding undertaken before the Shari[a] Court is valid,
recognized, binding and sufficient divorce proceedings.
The court held that the affirmative defenses which are in the nature
of motion to dismiss is hereby granted. The CA and the SC
affirmed the dismissal and the same became final and executory
and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.
The RTC of Iligan, upon motion of Pacasum, issued an Order
reinstating criminal case for Bigamy against Zamoranos.
Zamoranos filed a Motion to Quash the Information, arguing that
the RTC had no jurisdiction over her person and over the offense
charged. Zamoranos asseverated, in the main, that the decision of
the RTC categorically declared her and Pacasum as Muslims,
resulting in the mootness and the inapplicability of the RPC
provision on Bigamy to her marriage to Pacasum and prayed for the
dismissal of the case.
The motion to quash and motion for reconsideration filed by
Zamoranos was denied. She then filed a petition for certiorari for
the nullification and reversal of the order of the RTC. The CA
dismissed Zamoranos petition. The CA dwelt on the propriety of a
petition for certiorari to assail the denial of a Motion to Quash the
Information. She now comes to the SC in a petition for certiorari
alleging grave abuse of discretion.
Issue:
Whether or not an appeal is a legally permissible remedy in an
order denying a motion to quash.
Held:
No. The Court granted the petition for certiorari and granted the
motion to quash filed by Zamoranos. The denial of a motion to
quash, as in the case at bar, is not appealable. It is an interlocutory
order which cannot be the subject of an appeal.
Moreover, it is settled that a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion
to quash an information. The established rule is that, when such an
adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort
forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case
in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to
take an appeal in the manner authorized by law.
However, on a number of occasions, we have recognized that in
certain situations, certiorari is considered an appropriate remedy to
assail an interlocutory order, specifically the denial of a motion to
quash. We have recognized the propriety of the following
exceptions: (a) when the court issued the order without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the
interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal
would not afford adequate and expeditious relief; (c) in the interest
of a "more enlightened and substantial justice"; (d) to promote
public welfare and public policy; and (e) when the cases "have
attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with
dispatch in the consideration thereof." The first four of the
foregoing exceptions occur in this instance.
Contrary to the asseverations of the CA, the RTC, Branch
6, Iligan City, committed an error of jurisdiction, not simply
57
an error of judgment, in denying Zamoranos motion to
quash.
As a rule, certiorari lies when: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer
exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board,
or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The writ of certiorari serves to keep an inferior court within the
bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courtsacts
which courts have no power or authority in law to perform.
True, the Sharia Circuit Court is not vested with jurisdiction over
offenses penalized under the RPC. Certainly, the RTC, Branch 6,
Iligan City, is correct when it declared that:
The Regional Trial Courts are vested the exclusive and original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or body. [Sec. 20 (b), BP Blg.
129] The Code of Muslim Personal Laws (PD 1083) created the
Sharia District Courts and Sharia Circuit Courts with limited
jurisdiction. Neither court was vested jurisdiction over criminal
prosecution of violations of the Revised Penal Code. There is
nothing in PD 1083 that divested the Regional Trial Courts of its
jurisdiction to try and decide cases of bigamy. Hence, this Court has
jurisdiction over this case.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases, the
trial court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
offense. In this case, the charge of Bigamy hinges on Pacasums
claim that Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her marriage to De
Guzman was governed by civil law. This is obviously far from the
truth, and the fact of Zamoranos Muslim status should have been
apparent to both lower courts, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, and
the CA.
The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused
contracting a second marriage while a prior valid one still subsists
and has yet to be dissolved. At the very least, the RTC, Branch 6,
Iligan City, should have suspended the proceedings until Pacasum
had litigated the validity of Zamoranos and De Guzmans marriage
before the Sharia Circuit Court and had successfully shown that it
had not been dissolved despite the divorce by talaq entered into by
Zamoranos and De Guzman.
Zamoranos was correct in filing the petition for certiorari before the
CA when her liberty was already in jeopardy with the continuation
of the criminal proceedings against her.
In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the Philippines,
P.D. No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, was enacted
to "promote the advancement and effective participation of the
National Cultural Communities x x x, [and] the State shall consider
their customs, traditions, beliefs and interests in the formulation
and implementation of its policies."
Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular criminal
courts have jurisdiction over the offense defeats the purpose for the
enactment of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws and the equal
recognition bestowed by the State on Muslim Filipinos.
If both parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that the Muslim
Code or Muslim law is complied with. If together with it or in
58
addition to it, the marriage is likewise solemnized in accordance
with the Civil Code of the Philippines, in a so-called combined
Muslim-Civil marriage rites whichever comes first is the validating
rite and the second rite is merely ceremonial one. But, in this case,
as long as both parties are Muslims, this Muslim Code will apply.
In effect, two situations will arise, in the application of this Muslim
Code or Muslim law, that is, when both parties are Muslims and
when the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim Code or Muslim law. A third situation
occur[s] when the Civil Code of the Philippines will govern the
marriage and divorce of the parties, if the male party is a Muslim
and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code.
One of the effects of irrevocable talaq, as well as other kinds of
divorce, refers to severance of matrimonial bond, entitling one to
remarry. It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos divorce from
De Guzman, as confirmed by an Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the
Sharia Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge Usman, was valid,
and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989. Consequently,
the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is without jurisdiction to try
Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy.
CORPUZ vs. STO. TOMAS
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a direct
appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Laoag City. Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpus is a naturalized
Canadian citizen who married respondent Daisylyn Tirol
Sto. Tomas but subsequently left for Canada due to work
and other professional commitments. When he returned to
the Philippines, he discovered that Sto. Tomas was already
romantically involved with another man. This brought HELD:
about the filing of a petition for divorce by Corpuz in
Canada which was eventually granted by the Court Justice Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.
of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. A month later, the divorce
decree took effect. Two years later, Corpuz has fallen in The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence
love with another Filipina and wished to marry her. He of a right that clothes the party with legal interest
went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to register the to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
Canadian divorce decree of his marriage certificate with
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second
Sto. Tomas. However, despite the registration, an official of
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows
National Statistics Office informed Corpuz that the former
no rights in favor of aliens with the
marriage still subsists under the Philippine law until there
complementary statement that this conclusion is
has been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce by
not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition
a competent judicial court in view of NSO Circular No. 4,
before the RTC.In other words, the unavailability of
series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of
dissolution of marriage with the RTC. However, the RTC
legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition
denied the petition reasoning out that Corpuz cannot
of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce
institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign
decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity
divorce decree because he is a naturalized Canadian
with the aliens national law have been duly proven
citizen. It was provided further that Sto. Tomas was the
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
proper party who can institute an action under the
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,
principle of Article 26 of the Family Code which capacitates
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
a Filipino citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse
Court which provides for the effect of foreign
obtains a foreign divorce decree.
judgments.
ISSUE:
A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested
parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a
Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving
Family Code grants aliens like Corpuz the right to institute
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion,
a petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state,
decree.
every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with
59
our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign
judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res
judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
3. Legal Separation
Civil Code:
Art. 97. A petition for legal separation may be filed:
1. For adultery on the part of the wife and for
concubinage on the part of the husband as defined
in the Penal Code; or
2. An attempt by one spouse against the life of the
other. (n)
Art. 99. No person shall be entitled to a legal separation who
has not resided in the Philippines for one year prior to
the filing of the petition, unless the cause for the legal
separation has taken place within the territory of this
Republic. (Sec. 2a, Act No. 2710)
TITLE II
LEGAL SEPARATION
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the
following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct
directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of
the petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner
to change religious or political affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in
prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
60
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment
of more than six years, even if pardoned;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous
marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner;
or
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without
justifiable cause for more than one year.
For purposes of this Article, the term "child" shall include a child by
nature or by adoption. (9a)
Art. 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the
following grounds:
(1) Where the aggrieved party has condoned the offense or act
complained of;
(2) Where the aggrieved party has consented to the
commission of the offense or act complained of;
(3) Where there is connivance between the parties in the
commission of the offense or act constituting the ground for
legal separation;
(4) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation;
(5) Where there is collusion between the parties to obtain
decree of legal separation; or
(6) Where the action is barred by prescription. (100a)
Art. 57. An action for legal separation shall be filed within five years
from the time of the occurrence of the cause. (102)
Art. 58. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before
six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition. (103)
Art. 59. No legal separation may be decreed unless the Court has taken
steps toward the reconciliation of the spouses and is fully satisfied,
despite such efforts, that reconciliation is highly improbable. (n)
Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation
of facts or a confession of judgment.
In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
(101a)
Art. 61. After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses
shall be entitled to live separately from each other.
The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses,
shall designate either of them or a third person to administer the
absolute community or conjugal partnership property. The administrator
appointed by the court shall have the same powers and duties as those
of a guardian under the Rules of Court. (104a)
Art. 62. During the pendency of the action for legal separation, the
provisions of Article 49 shall likewise apply to the support of the
spouses and the custody and support of the common children. (105a)
Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each
other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed;
(2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall
be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have
no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited
in accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2);
61
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the
innocent spouse, subject to the provisions of Article 213 of this
Code; and
(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting
from the innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover,
provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of
the innocent spouse shall be revoked by operation of law.
(106a)
Art. 64. After the finality of the decree of legal separation, the innocent
spouse may revoke the donations made by him or by her in favor of the
offending spouse, as well as the designation of the latter as beneficiary
in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as
irrevocable. The revocation of the donations shall be recorded in the
registries of property in the places where the properties are located.
Alienations, liens and encumbrances registered in good faith before the
recording of the complaint for revocation in the registries of property
shall be respected. The revocation of or change in the designation of
the insurance beneficiary shall take effect upon written notification
thereof to the insured.
The action to revoke the donation under this Article must be brought
within five years from the time the decree of legal separation become
final. (107a)
Art. 65. If the spouses should reconcile, a corresponding joint
manifestation under oath duly signed by them shall be filed with the
court in the same proceeding for legal separation. (n)
Art. 66. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall
have the following consequences:
(1) The legal separation proceedings, if still pending, shall
thereby be terminated at whatever stage; and
(2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but
the separation of property and any forfeiture of the share of the
guilty spouse already effected shall subsist, unless the spouses
agree to revive their former property regime.
The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive
proper civil registries. (108a) Order 227)

Art. 67. The agreement to revive the former property regime referred to Nota bene:
in the preceding Article shall be executed under oath and shall specify:
Formal validity law of the place of celebration; lex loci contractus
rule
(1) The properties to be contributed anew to the restored Substantial validity governed by:
regime;
1. Personal law: status/legal capacity National law of the parties
(2) Those to be retained as separated properties of each 2. lex loci celebrationis:
spouse; and exceptions:
Family Code Art. 26, paragraph 1
(3) The names of all their known creditors, their addresses and Consular Marriages consul granted by the accepting
the amounts owing to each. country where such consular office was located to
solemnize marriage
The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval shall be filed
with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation, with copies
of both furnished to the creditors named therein. After due hearing, the GARCIA V. RECIO
court shall, in its order, take measure to protect the interest of creditors October 2, 2001
and such order shall be recorded in the proper registries of properties.
Rederick Recio, a Filipino, married Editha Samson, an Australian in
Malabon Rizal. However, on 1989, they got divorced in an
The recording of the ordering in the registries of property shall not Australian family court.
prejudice any creditor not listed or not notified, unless the debtor-
On 1992, Rederick became an Australian Citizen. He later married
spouse has sufficient separate properties to satisfy the creditor's claim.
Petitioner in 1994 in Cabanatuan City.
(195a, 108a)
Thereafter, the two separated and petitioner filed a complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy.
While the suit was pending, Rederick was able to obtain a divorce
Capacity to Remarry
decree in Australia. Trial Court declared the marriage dissolved
based on the subsequent divorce decree obtained by the
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
respondent.
accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
Issues:
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38.
Whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was
(17a)
proven;
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
Whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
petitioner;
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Held:
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry

62
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law
of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing
personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must
be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the
national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our
law on evidence.
Was the first divorce validly obtained and binding?
At the outset, the Court lays the following basic legal principles;
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, Philippine
courts cannot grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be
dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 1522
and 1723 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino
and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former
to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
"validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry." A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are
both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
consistent with their respective national laws.
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient. In the case at
bar, Respondent only presented the divorce decree;
Likewise, before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and
admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the
divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the
judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an
act of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign country.
However, under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by
the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record
is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine Foreign Service stationed in
63
the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to
be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However,
appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules
on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent, this matter was not objected to by
the petitioner, thus by virtue of such waiver, is deemed
admitted as evidence.
Who has the burden of proving a foreign law?
Respondent has the burden of proof; The burden of proof lies
with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." It is a
well-settled that courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like
any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital
laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by
reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be
exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject
should be resolved in the negative.
2nd Issue: Is Respondent legally capacitated to remarry?
Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising
after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic
ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2)
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the
marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force. There is no showing in the case at bar which type of
divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree a
conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same
as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute
divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period
during which no reconciliation is effected.
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction
that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree
becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits
the offence of bigamy."
This quotation bolsters the Courts contention that the divorce obtained
by respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish
his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of
the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the
Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity
of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence
of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for
a marriage license.
In the case at bar, there is absolutely no evidence that proves
respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner.
Based on the above records, the Court cannot conclude that
respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. The court a quo
erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed
respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring
him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal
law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity
to contract the second marriage.
Neither can the Court grant petitioner's prayer to declare her
marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy.
After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really
capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree.
Hence, case was remanded to the court a quo for further determination
of legal capacity and to receive evidence to determine if bigamy has
been committed;
REPUBLIC V. ORBECIDO
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005
Facts:
64
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M.
Villanueva in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage
was blessed with a son and a daughter.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing
along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered
that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had
obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent
Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live in San Gabriel,
California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for
authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the
court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration
but it was denied.
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a
valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and an alien. Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no
law that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a
matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.
Held:
Taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time
of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the
time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise
would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation
of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature,
it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as
far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be
extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as
they come within its spirit or intent.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

4. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated

between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
5. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the

time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at
the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.

65