Lewis thinks actuality is relative: an indexical concept: of course we think the

world we inhabit is actual, just as someone in the past was correct in their
ideas of I and Now. The actual at relation between worlds is simply
identity. There is no metaphysical or ontological difference between actual
and possible worlds; They differ, not absolutely, but in how they relate to us.

1. What objections does Lewis give to an absolute account of

actuality?

Lewis argues that the Leibnizian realist cannot explain why skepticism about
one's own actuality is absurd

This objection involves a skeptical problem around our knowledge that we

our actual: if there are many possible worlds, how can we know that this is
the actual world? On an indexical account of actuality, this skeptical problem
dissolves and an epistemological objection to modal realism can be set
aside. How would we ever know we were in the uniquely actual world? How is
certain knowledge that our world is actual the same as knowledge that ours
is the only actual world?

Lewis argues that the Leibnizian realist cannot account for the contingency
of actuality.

wouldnt my elder sister have an immediate acquaintance with absolute

actuality if I had an elder sister? Why is her knowledge any less reliable than
mine? Surely it is a contingent matter which world is actual. So at one
world, one world is actual; and at another, another. How can this be absolute
actuality? - This is relativity manifest.

Actuality cannot itself be any sort of qualitative property. There is no

fundamental, absolute property that actual things have and merely possible
things lack.

2. Do you think they are good objections? Do they apply to all

absolute accounts of actuality?

Lewis objections to Leibnizian realism are good insofar as we accept the

existence of concrete possible worlds, he is right to reject questions as to
how one can confirm their absolute actuality experientially. However, on an
account of actuality which denies concreteness to merely possible worlds his
objections carry little weight: they succeed only insofar as we grant equal
ontological status to worlds other than our own.

Bricker claims actuality is absolute: concrete possible worlds are not actual.
This 'Leibnizian realism', holds that actuality is an absolute property that
marks a distinction in ontological status
 1. What might be some of the reasons for positing absolute
actuality?

It seems intuitively difficult to grant the same ontological status to infinite

variations of myself, even if each of these variations would experience the
same intuition. Most people understand actuality as making a claim about
ontological categories. If possibility is a criteria for ontological existence then
this seems to dilute the impact of our discussions of the world we inhabit.

2. What are some of Brickers reasons? Are they good reasons?

Actuality is a categorical notion: whatever belongs to the same fundamental

ontological category as something actual is itself actual. If actuality is
absolute the hypothesis of island universes is coherent: something could be
actual even though entirely disconnected from the part of actuality, we
inhabit. If actuality is relative the island universes hypothesis is analytically
false: how can something which does not have spatiotemporal/causal
relation to us be correctly describes as actual/this worldly?

A lewisian can accept absolute actuality without falling victim to the

skpetical problem. Both predicates and their associated concepts can be
called indexical or relative. Lewis presupooses both are relative. Bricker
claims however that indexical concepts can be associated with predicates
that express either relative or absolute properties. Is a neighbour vs is
nutritious. The property of the indexical predicate is a neighbour is relative
while the property of the indexical predicate is nutritious is absolute.

On Lewis analysis of actuality, the concept associated with the predicate is

actual is indexical, while the property expressd by the predicate is relative.
Is there a way of analysing actuality so the concept is indexical but the
property is absolute? i.e is actual expresses the property belonging to the
same fundamental ontological category as me. This holds a categorical
reading of actuality while avoiding the skpetical problem. I know that I am
simply in virtue of knowing that I belong to the same ontological category as
myself. Thus we can reject Lewis indexical account, even if absolute
actuality is less parsimonious.

If we can embrace the mystery of sets, why not do the same in the case of
absolutely actual possibilia? The answer depends on whether it is easier to
accept the existence of possibilia if they belong to separate ontological
category.

Brickers reasons are good to the extent that they produce a more inclusive
version of modal realism. He is right to reject Lewis pragmatic reasoning
that indexical actuality is true on the basis of its serviceability.