Beginnings of the Siberian Colonial Administration

George V. Lantzeff

The Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 9, No. 1. (Mar., 1940), pp. 47-52.

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Beginnings of the Siberian Colonial Administration*

GEORGE V LANTZEFF

LIKESO MANY other colonial enterprises, the conquest of Siberia started

as a result of private initiative.' T h e part of Pizarro and Almagro was
played by the cossack leader and former Volga pirate Ermak, and the part
of Fernando de Luque in supplying funds was assumed in the Russian
case by the wealthy merchants, the Stroganovs. I n both Peru and Siberia,
what at first had been merely a predatory raid subsequently developed
into an enterprise of vast importance to the state.
T h e Stroganovs were the proprietors of a chartered colony on the west-
ern side of the Urals. Here they cultivated land, operated salt works, and
carried on an extensive trade in furs with the natives. As protectors of the
Russian eastern frontier they were allowed to maintain their own armed
forces. I n 158 1 the Stroganovs equipped an expedition of cossacks under
the leadership of Ermak and sent it across the mountains against the small
Tatar Kingdom or Khanate of Sibir, which dominated the river systems
of the Ob' and Irtysh.
T h e Muscovite government, fearing hostile invasions of the Siberian
natives in retaliation, at first strongly disapproved of the expedition, de-
manded that the Stroganovs call their men back and even threatened the
execution of the cossack leaders in case of disobedience. Ermak, however,
owing largely to the superiority of his firearms over the bows and arrows
of the natives, was singularly successful; he occupied the capital of Sibir,
and received the homage of several native chiefs who had formerly been
the subjects of the Tatar Khan, Kuchum. I n spite of his military achieve-
ments Errnak found himself in a precarious position because of the short-
age of food and other supplies. He sent an enormous booty in furs to
Moscow with a request for assistance. T h e news of easy victories over
what had been considered a dangerous enemy, together with the realiza-
tion of a possibility of fabulous profits in furs at a time when there was
an increased demand for them in the western European markets, changed
the attitude of the Tsar's government toward the expedition. T h e sending
of aid to Ermak was decided upon, but it proved to be insufficient and
+ A paper read at the meeting of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Asso-
ciation at Los Angeles, California, December 28, 1939 [EDITOR].
This paper is based on sources used by the author in preparation of an extensive study of
the Russian Colonial Administration in the seventeenth century.
48 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW

poorly organized. Before long the Russians had to retreat from Siberia,
leaving behind Ermak who was killed in battle. Nevertheless, the Musco-
vite government now resolved to undertake the conquest of Siberia in
all earnestness."
I n 1586 a new expedition under the command of two officers, Sukin
and Miasnoi, was started. Profiting by experience, the Russian forces
advanced cautiously and, after reaching the river Tura, they stopped and
built there a fortified town, Tiumen. From Tiumen the Russians spread
their authority over the population along the Tura, Pyshma, Iset, Tavda
and Tobol rivers.' Thus the cornerstone of the Russian Empire in Asia
was laid. T h e Russians by rivers and portages continued their eastward
advance from this region and in less than fifty years, by the middle of the
seventeenth century, they reached the shores of the Pacific.
I n open battle with the natives the Russians were usually victorious,
but they were handicapped by their inferiority in numbers and by the
fact that they had to scatter their forces over such a vast territory. These
unfavorable circumstances the Russians overcame by developing a net-
work of forts and blockhouses, generally referred to as ostrogs.
T h e sites for the ostrogs were chosen along the important waterways,
because rivers were the chief means of communication and transporta-
tion. They were so placed as to obstruct any organized hostile action on
the part of the natives in whose territory they were erected. In time of
peace, the ostrogs were the administrative centers; in time of war, they
became the bases for military. operations.
-
T h e main feature of an ostrog was a stockade made of large timber;
the tops of the stocks were sharpened and along the stockade, at certain
intervals from each other, embrasures for marksmen were located. At the
corners of the stockade and above the gates towers equipped with artil-
lery were constructed. Sometimes there were two stockades, one within
another; in other cases inside the stockade there was a wooden citadel
which contained the government buildings and storehouses. Special care
was taken to safeguard the landing place on the river, so that during the
siege communication with other ostrogs would not be interrupted.'
S. V. Bakhrushin, Ocherki Po istorii kolonizatsii Sibiri v XVI i XVII vv. (Moscow, 1928),
91-99> '5*54.
G. E Miiller, Istoriia Sibiri (Moscow-Leningrad, 1937), 27234.
For the interpretation of the significance of rivers, portages, ostrogs, and furs, see the forth-
coming publication of Professor Robert J. Kerner: T h e Course of Russian History (almost
ready for the press). Instructions to Pelym, 1595 and 1597, Instructions to Verkhoturie, 1624,
Description of Mangazeiia, Arkheograficheskaia Kommissiia, Russkaia Istoricheskaia Biblio-
teka (39 vols., St. Petersburg, 1875-igq), 11, 121, 138, 428, 431-33.
 SIBERIAN COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION 49
Once an ostrog was established, its voevoda or commandant proceeded
to subdue the natives within the vicinity of the ostrog. For sucha purpose
military prowess alone was not sufficient; the voevodas had to be diplo-
mats as well as warriors. T h e time-honored method of "Divide et im-
pera" was employed again and again. It seemed to be a deliberate policy
of the Russians to isolate different groups of the natives by fomenting
intertribal hostility, and such a policy bore plentiful fruit contributing
to the safety of the conquerors."
While playing one chief against another, the voevodas at the same time
tried to win them over to the Russian side. T h e Russians came to Siberia
with the aim of imposing upon the natives the fur tribute, or iasak, and to
insure its regular and uninterrupted delivery the good will and coopera-
tion of the native chiefs were indispensable. For this reason the govern-
ment treated even captive hostile chiefs generously. A relative of the
defeated Khan Kuchum became an officer in the Russian army, some
prisoners were given estates in European Russia, others were granted
freedom and allowed to return to their tribes. Those native chiefs who
early became Russian allies received particular consideration in the
form of special privileges and the retention of a degree of independence
from the Russian administration."
An illustration of the means employed to maintain friendly relations
with the native aristocracy can be found in social functions held at the
ostrog in honor of the natives. Every two or three years, when a new voe-
voda arrived at the ostrog (they were appointed for very short terms), a
solemn reception was arranged, calculated to appeal to the natives' imag-
ination. T h e voevoda and his men, garbed in gala "colored coats:' met the
guests. T h e chiefs passed between the ranks of the Russian garrison, who
stood in military formation while the cannon and muskets were dis-
charged in salute. T h e voevoda delivered a speech emphasizing the
power and benevolence of the government, enumerating injustices from
which the natives suffered in the past and promising in the future new
favors and elimination of evil practices. T h e procedure ended with a
feast, where the natives were given opportunity to gorge themselves with
food and drink. Strong drinks were especially popular: a petition has
been preserved in which the natives complained that they had been
served with beer instead of strong- liquor. Similar feasts were held when
5 A . I. Trotskii (comp.), "Kolonial'naia politika moskovskogo gosudarstva v Iakutii XVII
v:' Trudy istoriko-arkheograficheskogoinstituta akademii nauk S.S.S.R., XIV, vypusk 5 (Lenin-
grad, 1936),X; J. E. Fischer, Sibirskaia istoriia (St. Petersburg, 17;4), "1, 249.
Miiller, o p , cit., 254;Fischer, op. cit., 243.
5O PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW

the chiefs arrived at the ostrog with the iasak from their subjects and
were rewarded for their loyalty with various gifts in the form of cloth,
metal tools, and brightly colored beads.'
There were native chiefs, however, who failed to respond to the in-
ducements offered by the Russians and remained stubborn in their resist-
ance to the invaders. Toward them the government used ruthless and
unscrupulous methods, quite in keeping with the times. There was no
room for sentimentality, and enticing an enemy by false promises of
safety to the feast at the ostrog in order to kill him there, was considered
a praiseworthy sample of diplomatic finesse."
As a sign of their submission the natives had to take an oath of allegi-
ance and to deliver hostages. T h e oath usually contained an appeal to
the supernatural agencies revered by the tribe, invoking a terrible fate
and destruction on those who broke their promises. T h e natives, how-
ever, sometimes resorted to a childish trick to deceive the Russians. Tak-
ing advantage of the Russians' ignorance of the local superstitions, they
sometimes prepared a "fake oath" which they believed had no power
behind it."
Another method of assuring- the obedience of the natives, much more
reliable than that of exacting the oath of loyalty, was the practice of tak-
ing hostages. T h e more important the hostage, the more numerous the
tribe he represented, the greater was the guarantee of good behavior
by the natives. T h e hostages, who were usually exchanged for new ones
at intervals of from one month to a year, were kept at the ostrogs. When
the natives came there with the furs, the hostages were shown to them
to dispel any doubts as to their fate."
As soon as the natives in the newly acquired territory became more or
less reconciled to the Russian domination and furnished hostages - whom
the officials safely locked in the ostrog, the voevodas could proceed with
their main task, namely the collection of the already mentioned iasak
or fur tribute. T h e principles of the assessment of iasak, its amount, and
the technique of its collection varied according to the time, the place,
and the habits of the natives. I n earlier times furs were demanded from
7 N. N. Ogloblin, Obozrenie stolbtsov i knig Sibirskago plikaza (4 vols., Moscow, 1895-igoo),
111, 158; directions for the reception are found practically in every instruction to the Siberian
voevoda given to him at the time of his appointment.
Miiller, op. cit., 275-76, 348.
Ogloblin, op. cit., 111, 98; Decree of 1606, Arkhiv Inostrannoi Kollegii, Sobranie gosudar-
stvennykh gramot i dogovorov (5 vols., Moscotv, 1813-18g4), 11, 306.
lo V. I. Ogorodnikov, "Russkaia gosudarstvennaia vlast' i sibirskie inorodtsy v XVII-XVIII
v.v:: Sbornik Zrkutskogo Uniuersiteta (Irkutsk, 1921), 73.
 SIBERIAN COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION 5I
a group of natives as a whole, without regard to its individual numbers.
Such a method convenient in dealing with the nomadic natives, who
often refused information regarding their names or number, was also
used, especially in the beginning of the conquest, in assessment of the
sedentary tribes. T h e most common method, however, consisted in tak-
ing a census of all natives in a given locality. This census was checked
from time to time, and a certain quota of sables was assigned to each man
from eighteen to fifty years old. It is worth noting that while government
regulations exempted the "old, crippled, blind and dead:' the zealous
local officials often tried to collect iasak from all these categories, includ-
ing even the dead. T h e yearly quota assigned to an individual varied with
circumstances. Sometimes it was as low as two or three sables, in excep-
tional cases the natives had to bring from eighteen to twenty sables, but
the average quota seems to have been five sables for a single man and ten
sables for a married man."
T h e iasak collected from the natives constituted from sixty-five to
eighty per cent of the total amount of Siberian furs received by the Treas-
ury of the Tsar. Under such circumstances every native was a valuable
item in the eyes of the government. Extermination or migration of the
natives would have been utterly unprofitable, and therefore Moscow
adopted a benevolent and paternalistic attitude toward the natives in
general.
This attitude explains the position of the government in regard to two
issues which figure prominently in the histories of transatlantic colonies
of western European countries, namely Christianization and enslavement
of the conquered peoples. Political leaders in Moscow realized that the
compulsory introduction of Christianity might antagonize the natives.
Consequently the government instructed its local officials and clergy
never to use any coercion in converting the natives. Christianity had to
prevail "through love and not through cruelty:' Noninterference in mat-
ters of religion was pursued in spite of some advantages which might have
been gained by the Christianization of natives. Baptized men, alienated
from their kinsmen by the change of religion, might be enlisted to
strengthen the Russian garrisons, while the baptized women could re-
lieve the shortage of women in Siberia by providing wives for the Russian
colonists. These advantages, however, were overbalanced by the fact that
'I Decrees of the Tsar Fedor Ivanovich, 1586,1596, decree of the Tsar Boris Fedorovich, 1600,
Reports from Verkhoturie, 1601, Miiller, op. czt., 344, 372-74, 3go-g1, 405-6. Ogorodnikov,
op. cit., 75-76.
52 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW

the baptized natives were thus lost as payers of the iasak, and the fur-
tribute was, after all, the state's prime concern in Siberia.'"
Desiring to keep the number of the natives paying the iasak as large as
possible, the Muscovite government tried also to prevent the enslavement
of natives. Trade and traffic in natives were explicitly forbidden and sub-
ject to "strict punishment and the death penalty:""
Unfortunately for the natives, the intentions of the Muscovite gov-
ernment were often thwarted by the greedy local officials and the unruly
men under their command. T h e government instructions were not prop-
erly enforced, and the natives suffered a great deal from the duties im-
posed upon them and from the extortion and inhuman treatment of the
conquerors.
Thus, the acquisition of Siberia, started as a private undertaking, soon
became a colonial enterprise controlled by the Muscovite state. T h e local
administration, military in character, sought alliance with the native
upper classes as a guarantee of security and regular delivery of the fur
tribute. For utilitarian reasons the Muscovite government adopted a
benevolent attitude toward the natives, and tried to prevent their en-
slavement and compulsory baptism, but it had considerable difficulty in
carrying out its policies through its local agents.
V LANTZEFF
GEORGE
University of California

* Ogorodnikov, op. cit., 84;Trotskii, 06. cit., 164;Ogloblin, o p , cit., 111, I 10-1 I, 21 1; Report
from Tomsk, 1609,Russkaia Istoricheskaia Biblioteka, 11, 184.
15 Instructions to Surgut and Tobolsk, 1599,Ogloblin, op. cit., 111, 221, IV, 132.