Belowistheuneditedpreprint(notaquotablefinaldraft)of:

Pinker,S.&Bloom,P.(1990).Naturallanguageandnaturalselection.Behavioral
andBrainSciences13(4):707784.
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NATURALLANGUAGEAND
NATURALSELECTION
StevenPinkerandPaulBloom
DepartmentofBrainandCognitiveSciences
MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology
pinker@alishaw.sscf.ucsb.edu

Keywords
Language,Evolution,LanguageAcquisition,NaturalSelection,GrammaticalTheory,
BiologyofLanguage,LanguageUniversals,Psycholinguistics,OriginofLanguage

Abstract
Manypeoplehavearguedthattheevolutionofthehumanlanguagefaculty
cannotbeexplainedbyDarwiniannaturalselection.ChomskyandGouldhave
suggestedthatlanguagemayhaveevolvedasthebyproductofselectionfor
otherabilitiesorasaconsequenceofasyetunknownlawsofgrowthandform.
Othershavearguedthatabiologicalspecializationforgrammarisincompatible
witheverytenetofDarwiniantheorythatitshowsnogeneticvariation,could
notexistinanyintermediateforms,confersnoselectiveadvantage,andwould
requiremoreevolutionarytimeandgenomicspacethanisavailable.Weexamine
theseargumentsandshowthattheydependoninaccurateassumptionsabout
biologyorlanguageorboth.Evolutionarytheoryoffersclearcriteriaforwhena
traitshouldbeattributedtonaturalselection:complexdesignforsomefunction,
andtheabsenceofalternativeprocessescapableofexplainingsuchcomplexity.
Humanlanguagemeetsthiscriterion:grammarisacomplexmechanismtailored
tothetransmissionofpropositionalstructuresthroughaserialinterface.
Autonomousandarbitrarygrammaticalphenomenahavebeenofferedas
counterexamplestothepositionthatlanguageisanadaptation,butthis
reasoningisunsound:communicationprotocolsdependonarbitrary
conventionsthatareadaptiveaslongastheyareshared.Consequently,language
acquisitioninthechildshouldsystematicallydifferfromlanguageevolutionin
thespeciesandattemptstoanalogizethemaremisleading.Reviewingother
argumentsanddata,weconcludethatthereiseveryreasontobelievethata
specializationforgrammarevolvedbyaconventionalneoDarwinianprocess.

Languagecouldnothavebegunintheformitwassaidtohavetakeninthefirst
recordedutteranceofThomasBabbingtonMacaulay(theinfantLordMacaulay):
oncewhenhewastakenout,hishostessaccidentlyspilledhotteaonhim.The
littleladfirstbawledhisheadoff,butwhenhehadcalmedhesaidinanswerto
hishostessconcern,ThankyouMadam,theagonyissensiblyabated.P.B.
andJ.S.Medawar

1.Introduction
Allhumansocietieshavelanguage.Asfarasweknowtheyalwaysdid;language
wasnotinventedbysomegroupsandspreadtootherslikeagricultureorthe
alphabet.Alllanguagesarecomplexcomputationalsystemsemployingthesame
basickindsofrulesandrepresentations,withnonotablecorrelationwith
technologicalprogress:thegrammarsofindustrialsocietiesarenomorecomplex
thanthegrammarsofhuntergatherers;ModernEnglishisnotanadvanceover
OldEnglish.Withinsocieties,individualhumansareproficientlanguageusers
regardlessofintelligence,socialstatus,orlevelofeducation.Childrenarefluent
speakersofcomplexgrammaticalsentencesbytheageofthree,withoutbenefit
offormalinstruction.Theyarecapableofinventinglanguagesthataremore
systematicthanthosetheyhear,showingresemblancestolanguagesthatthey
haveneverheard,andtheyobeysubtlegrammaticalprinciplesforwhichthereis
noevidenceintheirenvironments.Diseaseorinjurycanmakepeoplelinguistic
savantswhileseverelyretarded,orlinguisticallyimpairedwithnormal
intelligence.Somelanguagedisordersaregeneticallytransmitted.Aspectsof
languageskillcanbelinkedtocharacteristicregionsofthehumanbrain.The
humanvocaltractistailoredtothedemandsofspeech,compromisingother
functionssuchasbreathingandswallowing.Humanauditoryperceptionshows
complementaryspecializationstowardthedemandsofdecodingspeechsounds
intolinguisticsegments.

Thislistoffacts(seePinker,1989a)suggeststhattheabilitytouseanatural
languagebelongsmoretothestudyofhumanbiologythanhumanculture;itisa
topiclikeecholocationinbatsorstereopsisinmonkeys,notlikewritingorthe
wheel.Allmodernstudentsoflanguageagreethatatleastsomeaspectsof
languageareduetospeciesspecific,taskspecificbiologicalabilities,thoughof
coursethereareradicaldisagreementsaboutspecifics.Aprominentposition,
outlinedbyChomsky(1965,1980,1981,1986,1988a),Fodor(1983),Lenneberg
(1964,1967),andLiberman(Liberman,Cooper,Shankweiler,&Studdert
Kennedy,1967;LibermanandMattingly,1989),isthatthemindiscomposedof
autonomouscomputationalmodulesmentalfacultiesororgansandthat
theacquisitionandrepresentationoflanguageistheproductofseveralsuch
specializedmodules.

Itwouldbenatural,then,toexpecteveryonetoagreethathumanlanguageisthe
productofDarwiniannaturalselection.Theonlysuccessfulaccountoftheorigin
ofcomplexbiologicalstructureisthetheoryofnaturalselection,theviewthat
thedifferentialreproductivesuccessassociatedwithheritablevariationisthe
primaryorganizingforceintheevolutionoforganisms(Darwin,1859;see
Bendall,1983foracontemporaryperspective).Butsurprisingly,thisconclusion
iscontentious.NoamChomsky,theworldsbestknownlinguist,andStephen
JayGould,theworldsbestknownevolutionarytheorist,haverepeatedly
suggestedthatlanguagemaynotbetheproductofnaturalselection,butaside
effectofotherevolutionaryforcessuchasanincreaseinoverallbrainsizeand
constraintsofasyetunknownlawsofstructureandgrowth(e.g.,Chomsky,
1972,1982a,1982b,1988a,1988b;Gould,1987a;GouldandPiattelliPalmarini,
1987).RecentlyMassimoPiattelliPalmarini(1989),aclosecorrespondentwith
GouldandChomsky,hasdonethefieldaservicebyformulatingaparticularly
strongversionoftheirpositionsandarticulatingitinprint.Premack(1985,1986)
andMehler(1985)haveexpressedsimilarviews.

Inthispaperwewillexaminethispositionindetail,andwillcometoavery
differentconclusion.Wewillarguethatthereiseveryreasontobelievethat
languagehasbeenshapedbynaturalselectionasitisunderstoodwithinthe
orthodoxsyntheticorneoDarwiniantheoryofevolution(Mayr,1982).Inone
senseourgoalisincrediblyboring.Allweargueisthatlanguageisnodifferent
fromothercomplexabilitiessuchasecholocationorstereopsis,andthattheonly
waytoexplaintheoriginofsuchabilitiesisthroughthetheoryofnatural
selection.Onemightexpectourconclusiontobeacceptedwithoutmuch
commentbyallbutthemostenvironmentalistoflanguagescientists(asindeedit
isbysuchresearchersasBickerton,1981,LibermanandMattingly,1989,
Lieberman,1984,and,inlimitedrespects,byChomskyhimselfinsomestrands
ofhiswritings.(Note1)).Ontheotherhand,whentwosuchimportantscholars
asChomskyandGouldrepeatedlyurgeustoconsiderastartlingcontrary
position,theirargumentscanhardlybeignored.Indeedtheseargumentshave
hadastrongeffectonmanycognitivescientists,andthenonselectionistviewhas
becometheconsensusinmanycircles.

Furthermore,alotisatstakeifourboringconclusioniswrong.Wesuspectthat
manybiologistswouldbesurprisedatthefrequentsuggestionthatthe
complexityoflanguagecannotbeexplainedthroughnaturalselection.For
instance,Chomskyhasmadethefollowingstatements:

[aninnatelanguagefaculty]posesaproblemforthebiologist,since,iftrue,itis
anexampleoftrueemergencetheappearanceofaqualitativelydifferent
phenomenonataspecificstageofcomplexityoforganization.(1972:70)

Itisperfectlysafetoattributethisdevelopment[ofinnatementalstructure]to
naturalselection,solongaswerealizethatthereisnosubstancetothis
assertion,thatitamountstonothingmorethanabeliefthatthereissome
naturalisticexplanationforthesephenomena.(1972:97)

Evolutionarytheoryisinformativeaboutmanythings,butithaslittletosay,as
ofnow,ofquestionsofthisnature[e.g.,theevolutionoflanguage].Theanswers
maywelllienotsomuchinthetheoryofnaturalselectionasinmolecular
biology,inthestudyofwhatkindsofphysicalsystemscandevelopunderthe
conditionsoflifeonearthandwhy,ultimatelybecauseofphysicalprinciples.
(1988a:167)

Itdoesseemveryhardtobelievethatthespecificcharacteroforganismscanbe
accountedforpurelyintermsofrandommutationandselectionalcontrols.I
wouldimaginethatthebiologyofa100yearsfromnowisgoingtodealwiththe
evolutionoforganismsthewayitnowdealswiththeevolutionofaminoacids,
assumingthatthereisjustafairlysmallspaceofphysicallypossiblesystemsthat
canrealizecomplicatedstructures...Evolutionarytheoryappearstohavevery
littletosayaboutspeciation,oraboutanykindofinnovation.Itcanexplainhow
yougetadifferentdistributionofqualitiesthatarealreadypresent,butitdoes
notsaymuchabouthownewqualitiescanemerge.(1982a:23)
Iffindingscomingoutofthestudyoflanguageforcedbiologiststosuch
conclusions,itwouldbebignews.

Thereisanotherreasontoscrutinizethenonselectionisttheoryoflanguage.Ifa
currenttheoryoflanguageistrulyincompatiblewiththeneoDarwiniantheory
ofevolution,onecouldhardlyblamesomeoneforconcludingthatitisnotthe
theoryofevolutionthatmustbequestioned,butthetheoryoflanguage.Indeed,
thisargumenthasbeenthebasisofcritiquesofChomskystheoriesbyBates,
Thal,andMarchman(1989),Greenfield(1987),andLieberman(1984,1989),who
arenonethelessstrangebedfellowswithChomskyindoubtingwhetheraninnate
generativegrammarcouldhaveevolvedbynaturalselection.Sinceweare
impressedbothbythesynthetictheoryofevolutionandbythetheoryof
generativegrammar,wehopethatwewillnothavetochoosebetweenthetwo.

Inthispaper,wefirstexamineargumentsfromevolutionarybiologyaboutwhen
itisappropriatetoinvokenaturalselectionasanexplanationfortheevolutionof
sometrait.Wethenapplytheseteststothecaseofhumanlanguage,and
concludethatlanguagepasses.Weexaminethemotivationsforthecompeting
nonselectionistposition,andsuggestthattheyhavelittletorecommendthem.In
thefinalsection,werefutetheargumentsthathaveclaimedthataninnate
specializationforgrammarisincompatiblewiththetenetsofaDarwinian
accountandthusthatthetwoareincompatible.

2.TheRoleofNaturalSelectioninEvolutionary
Theory
Gouldhasfrequentlysuggestedthatevolutionarytheoryisinthethroesofa
scientificrevolution(e.g.,Eldredge&Gould,1977;Gould,1980).Two
cornerstonesoftheDarwiniansynthesis,adaptationismandgradualism,are,he
argues,underchallenge.ObviouslyifstrictDarwinismisfalseingeneralit
shouldnotbeusedtoexplaintheoriginoflanguage.

2.1.NonselectionistMechanismsofEvolutionaryChange

Inaclassicpaper,GouldandLewontin(1979)warnagainstnaive
adaptationism,theinappropriateuseofadaptivetheorizingtoexplaintraitsthat
haveemergedforotherreasons(seealsoKitcher,1983;Lewontin,1978).The
argumentisillustratedbyananalogywiththemosaicsonthedomeand
spandrelsoftheSanMarcobasilicainVenice:
Spandrelsthetaperingtriangularspacesformedbytheintersectionoftwo
roundedarchesatrightangles...arenecessaryarchitecturalbyproductsof
mountingadomeonroundedarches.Eachspandrelcontainsadesignadmirably
fittedintoitstaperingspace.Anevangelistsitsintheupperpartflankedbythe
heavenlycities.Below,amanrepresentingoneofthefourbiblicalrivers...pours
waterfromapitcherinthenarrowingspacebelowhisfeet.

Thedesignissoelaborate,harmonious,andpurposefulthatwearetemptedto
viewitasthestartingpointofanyanalysis,asthecauseinsomesenseofthe
surroundingarchitecture.Butthiswouldinverttheproperpathofanalysis.The
systembeginswithanarchitecturalconstraint:thenecessaryfourspandrelsand
theirtaperingtriangularform.Theyprovideaspaceinwhichthemosaicists
worked;theysetthequadripartitesymmetryofthedomeabove.

Sucharchitecturalconstraintsabound,andwefindthemeasytounderstand
becausewedonotimposeourbiologicalbiasesuponthem....Anyonewhotried
toarguethatthestructure[spandrels]existsbecauseof[thedesignslaidupon
them]wouldbeinvitingthesameridiculethatVoltaireheapedonDr.Pangloss:
Thingscannotbeotherthantheyare...Everythingismadeforthebestpurpose.
Ournosesweremadetocarryspectacles,sowehavespectacles.Legswere
clearlyintendedforbreeches,andwewearthem....Yetevolutionarybiologists,
intheirtendencytofocusexclusivelyonimmediateadaptationtolocal
conditions,dotendtoignorearchitecturalconstraintsandperformjustsuchan
inversionofexplanation.(pp.147149)

Unconvincingadaptationistexplanations,whichGouldandLewontincompare
toKiplingsJustsostories,areeasytofind.IntheScienceandTechnology
sectionoftheBostonGlobeinMarch1987,anarticlenotedthatthenumberof
teatsindifferentmammalsoughttocorrespondnottotheaveragelittersizebut
tothelargestlittersizethatcanoccurforthatspecieswithinsomeboundof
probability.Sincehumansordinarilybearsinglechildrenbutnotinfrequently
havetwins,wehaveanexplanationforwhyhumanshavetwobreasts,notone.
Theauthordidnotdiscussthepossibilitythatthebilateralsymmetrythatisso
basictothemammalianbodyplanmakestheappearanceofonebreasted
humansratherunlikely.GouldandLewontindescribeanumberof
nonadaptationistmechanismsthattheyfeelarefrequentlynottestedwithin
evolutionaryaccounts:geneticdrift,lawsofgrowthandform(suchasgeneral
allometricrelationsbetweenbrainandbodysize),directinductionofformby
environmentalforcessuchaswatercurrentsorgravity,theeffectsofaccidentsof
history(whichmaytraporganismsinlocalmaximaintheadaptivelandscape),
andexaptation(GouldandVrba,1982),wherebynewusesaremadeofparts
thatwereoriginallyadaptedtosomeotherfunctionorofspandrelsthathadno
functionatallbutwerepresentforreasonsofarchitecture,development,or
history.TheypointoutthatDarwinhimselfhadthispluralisticviewof
evolution,andthattherewasanunfairlymalignednonadaptationistapproach
toevolution,prominentincontinentalEurope,thatstressedconstraintson
Baupl@act[c]ne(architecturalplans)flowingfromphyletichistoryand
embryologicaldevelopment.Thisbodyofresearch,theysuggest,isanantidote
tothetendencytotreatanorganismasabundleoftraitsorparts,each
independentlyshapedbynaturalselection.

2.2.LimitationsonNonselectionistExplanations

TheGouldandLewontinargumentcouldbeinterpretedasstressingthatsince
theneoDarwiniantheoryofevolutionincludesnonadaptationistprocessesitis
badscientificpracticenottotestthemasalternativestonaturalselectioninany
particularinstance.However,theyareoftenreadashavingoutlinedaradical
newalternativetoDarwin,inwhichnaturalselectionisrelegatedtoaminorrole.
ThoughGouldandLewontinclearlyeschewthisviewintheirpaper,Gouldhas
madesuchsuggestionssubsequently(e.g.,Gould,1980),andPiattelliPalmarini
(1989:1)hasinterpreteditassuchwhenhetalksofDarwiniannaturalselection
beingreplacedbyabetterevolutionarytheory(onebasedonexaptation).The
reasonswhyweshouldrejectthisviewwerespelledoutclearlybyWilliams
(1966),andhavebeenamplifiedrecentlybyDawkins(1983,1986).

ThekeypointthatbluntstheGouldandLewontincritiqueofadaptationismis
thatnaturalselectionistheonlyscientificexplanationofadaptivecomplexity.
Adaptivecomplexitydescribesanysystemcomposedofmanyinteractingparts
wherethedetailsofthepartsstructureandarrangementsuggestdesigntofulfill
somefunction.Thevertebrateeyeistheclassicexample.Theeyehasa
transparentrefractingoutercover,avariablefocuslens,alightsensitivelayerof
neuraltissuelyingatthefocalplaneofthelens,adiaphragmwhosediameter
changeswithilluminationlevel,musclesthatmoveitinpreciseconjunctionand
convergencewiththoseoftheothereye,andelaborateneuralcircuitsthat
respondtopatternsdefiningedges,colors,motion,andstereoscopicdisparity.It
isimpossibletomakesenseofthestructureoftheeyewithoutnotingthatit
appearsasifitwasdesignedforthepurposeofseeingiffornootherreason
thatthemanmadetoolforimageformation,thecamera,displaysanuncanny
resemblancetotheeye.BeforeDarwin,theologians,notablyWilliamPaley,
pointedtoitsexquisitedesignasevidencefortheexistenceofadivinedesigner.
Darwinshowedhowsuchorgansofextremeperfectionandcomplicationcould
arisefromthepurelyphysicalprocessofnaturalselection.

Theessentialpointisthatnophysicalprocessotherthannaturalselectioncan
explaintheevolutionofanorganliketheeye.Thereasonforthisisthat
structuresthatcandowhattheeyedoesareextremelylowprobability
arrangementsofmatter.Byanunimaginablylargemargin,mostobjectsdefined
bythespaceofbiologicallypossiblearrangementsofmattercannotbringan
imageintofocus,modulatetheamountofincominglight,respondtothe
presenceofedgesanddepthboundaries,andsoon.Theoddsthatgeneticdrift,
say,wouldresultinthefixationwithinapopulationofjustthosegenesthat
wouldgiverisetosuchanobjectareinfinitesimallysmall,andsuchanevent
wouldbevirtuallyamiracle.Thisisalsotrueoftheothernonselectionist
mechanismsoutlinedbyGouldandLewontin.Itisabsurdlyimprobablethat
somegenerallawofgrowthandformcouldgiverisetoafunctioningvertebrate
eyeasabyproductofsomeothertrendsuchasanincreaseinsizeofsomeother
part.Likewise,oneneednotconsiderthepossibilitythatsomeorganthatarose
asanadaptationtosomeothertask,oraspandreldefinedbyotherbodyparts,
justhappenedtohaveatransparentlenssurroundedbyamovablediaphragmin
frontofalightsensitivelayeroftissuelyingatitsfocalplane.Naturalselection
theretentionacrossgenerationsofwhateversmall,randommodificationsyield
improvementsinvisionthatincreasechancesofsurvivalandreproductionis
theonlyphysicalprocesscapableofcreatingafunctioningeye,becauseitisthe
onlyphysicalprocessinwhichthecriterionofbeinggoodatseeingcanplaya
causalrole.Assuchitistheonlyprocessthatcanleadorganismsalongthepath
intheastronomicallyvastspaceofpossiblebodiesleadingfromabodywithno
eyetoabodywithafunctioningeye.

Thisargumentisobviouslyincomplete,asitreliesonthesomewhatintuitive
notionoffunctionanddesign.Askepticmightaccusetheproponentof
circularity,askingwhyalumpofclayshouldnotbeconsideredwelldesignedto
fulfillthefunctionoftakingupexactlytheregionofspacethatitinfacttakesup.
Butthecirclecanbebrokeninatleastthreeways.First,biologistsneedpositfar
fewerfunctionsthantherearebiologicalsystems;newfunctionsarenotinvented
foreachorganofeachorganism.Furthermore,eachlegitimatefunctioncanbe
relatedviaadirectplausiblecausalchaintootherfunctionsandcriticallyto
theoverallfunctionofsurvivalandreproduction.Finally,convergentevolution
andresemblancetohumanartifactsfulfillingthesameputativefunctiongive
independentcriteriafordesign.Butregardlessofthepreciseformulationofthe
modernargumentfromdesign(see,e.g.,Cummins,1984),itisnotcontroversial
inpractice.Gouldhimselfreadilyadmitsthatnaturalselectionisthecauseof
structuressuchasthevertebrateeye,andheinvokesthecriterionofengineering
design,forexample,torescueDarwinismitselffromthechargeofcircularity
(Gould,1977a).PresumablythisiswhyGouldandLewontinconcedethatthey
agreewithDarwinthatnaturalselectionisthemostimportantofevolutionary
mechanisms.

What,then,istheproperrelationbetweenselectionistandnonselectionist
explanationsinevolution?Theleastinterestingcaseinvolvesspandrelsthatare
notinvolvedinanyfunctionorbehavior,suchastherednessofblood,theV
shapedspacebetweenapairoffingers,thehollowatthebackofaknee,thefact
thereareaprimenumberofdigitsoneachlimb,andsoon.Themerepresenceof
theseepiphenomenalspandrels,thatplaynodirectroleintheexplanationofany
speciestypicalbehaviororfunction,saysnothingaboutwhetherthestructures
thattheyareassociatedwithwereshapedbyselection.Thereareasmanyof
themastherearewaysofdescribinganorganismthatdonotcorrespondtoits
functionalparts.

Muchmoreimportantarecaseswherespandrelsaremodifiedandputtouse.
However,insuchcasesofmodifiedspandrels,selectionplaysacrucialrole.
Puttingadomeontopoffourarchesgivesyouaspandrel,butitdoesnotgive
youamosaicdepictinganevangelistandamanpouringwateroutofapitcher.
Thatwouldreallybeamiracle.Togettheactualmosaicyouneedadesigner.The
designercorrespondstonaturalselection.Spandrels,exaptations,lawsof
growth,andsooncanexplainthebasicplans,parts,andmaterialsthatnatural
selectionworkswithasJacob(1977)putit,natureisatinkerer,notanengineer
withacleandrawingboard.Thebestexamplesofstructuresproducedentirely
bynonadaptationistmechanismsaregenerallyonepartorrepetitiveshapesor
processesthatcorrespondtosimplephysicalorgeometriclaws,suchaschins,
hexagonalhoneycombs,largeheadsonlargebodies,andspiralmarkings.But,as
Darwinstressed,whensuchpartsandpatternsaremodifiedandcombinedinto
complexbiologicalmachinesfulfillingsomedelicatefunction,thesesubsequent
modificationsandarrangementsmustbeexplainedbynaturalselection.

Therealcaseofevolutionwithoutselectionconsistsoftheuseofunmodified
spandrels.Gould(1987a)describesakindofwadingbirdthatusesitswings
primarilytoblockreflectionsonthesurfaceofwaterwhilelookingforfish.The
possibilitythatsomeusefulstructureisanunmodifiedspandrelisthemost
interestingimplicationoftheGouldLewontinargument,sinceDarwinian
naturalselectionwouldreallyplaynorole.Note,though,thatunmodified
spandrelshaveseverelimitations.Awingusedasavisorisacasewherea
structuredesignedforacomplexengineeringtaskthatmostarrangementsof
matterdonotfulfill,suchascontrolledflight,isexaptedtoasimpleengineering
taskthatmanyarrangementsofmatterdofulfill,suchasscreeningout
reflections(weareremindedofthepaperweightandaquariumdepictedin101
UsesforaDeadComputer.)Whenthereversehappens,suchaswhenasolar
heatexchangerisretooledasafullyfunctioningwingintheevolutionofinsects
(KingsolverandKoehl,1985),naturalselectionmustbethecause.

Wearegoingoverthesecriteriaforinvokingnaturalselectioninsuchdetail
becausetheyaresooftenmisunderstood.Wehopewehavemadeitclearwhy
modernevolutionarybiologydoesnotlicensePiattelliPalmarinisconclusion
thatsincelanguageandcognitionprobablyrepresentthemostsalientandthe
mostnovelbiologicaltraitsofourspecies,...itisnowimportanttoshowthat
theymaywellhavearisenfromtotallyextraadaptivemechanisms.And
PiattelliPalmariniisnotalone.Inmanydiscussionswithcognitivescientistswe
havefoundthatadaptationandnaturalselectionhavebecomedirtywords.
Anyoneinvokingthemisaccusedofbeingaanaiveadaptationist,orevenof
misunderstandingevolution.Worstofall,heorsheisopentoeasyridiculeasa
Dr.PanglosstellingJustsostories!(Premacks1986replytoBickerton,1986,is
typical.)Giventheuncontroversiallycentralroleofnaturalselectioninevolution,
thisstateofaffairsisunfortunate.Wesuspectthatmanypeoplehaveacquired
muchoftheirknowledgeofevolutionarytheoryfromGouldsdeservedly
popularessays.Theseessayspresentaviewofevolutionthatisvastlymore
sophisticatedthanthe19thCenturyversionsofDarwincommonlytaughtin
highschoolsandevencolleges.ButGouldcaneasilybemisreadasfomentinga
revolutionratherthanurginggreaterbalancewithincurrentbiologicalresearch,
andhisessaysdonotemphasizethestandardargumentsforwhenitis
appropriate,indeednecessary,toinvokenaturalselection.

Alsolurkingbeneathpeoplessuspicionsofnaturalselectionisasetof
methodologicalworries.Isntadaptationismfundamentallyuntestable,hence
unscientific,becauseadaptivestoriesaresoeasytocomebythatwhenonefails,
anothercanalwaysbesubstituted?GouldandLewontinmaybecorrectin
sayingthatbiologistsandpsychologistshaveleapttooquicklytounmotivated
andimplausibleadaptationistexplanations,butthishasnothingtodowiththe
logicofadaptationistexplanationsperse.Glib,unmotivatedproposalscancome
fromallkindsoftheories.Totakeanexampleclosetohome,thestudyofthe
evolutionoflanguageattaineditspoorreputationpreciselybecauseofthelarge
numberofsillynonadaptationisthypothesesthatwereproposed.Forinstance,it
hasbeenarguedthatlanguagearosefrommimicryofanimalcalls,imitationsof
physicalsounds,orgruntsofexertion(theinfamousbowwow,dingdong,
andheavehotheories.)

Specificadaptationistproposalsaretestableinprincipleandinpractice(see
Dennett,1983;Kitcher,1983;MaynardSmith,1984,Mayr,1982;Sober,1984;
Williams,1966.)Supplementingthecriterionofcomplexdesign,onecan
determinewhetherputativelyadaptivestructuresarecorrelatedwiththe
ecologicalconditionsthatmakethemuseful,andundercertaincircumstanceone
canactuallymeasurethereproductivesuccessofindividualspossessingthemto
variousdegrees(see,e.g.,CluttonBrock,1983).Ofcourse,theentiretheoryof
naturalselectionmaybeliterallyunfalsifiableintheuninterestingsensethat
elaborationscanalwaysrescueitsempiricalfailings,butthisistrueofalllarge
scalescientifictheories.Anysuchtheoryissupportedtotheextentthatthe
individualelaborationsaremutuallyconsistent,motivatedbyindependentdata,
andfewinnumbercomparedtothephenomenatobeexplained.(Note2)

Indeedonecouldarguethatitisnonadaptationistaccountsthatareoftenin
gravedangerofvacuity.Specificadaptationistproposalsmaybeunmotivated,
buttheyarewithintherealmofbiologicalandphysicalunderstanding,andoften
theproblemissimplythatwelacktheevidencetodeterminewhichaccount
withinasetofalternativeadaptiveexplanationsisthecorrectone.
Nonadaptationistaccountsthatmerelysuggestthepossibilitythatthereissome
hithertounknownlawofphysicsorconstraintonformalawofeye
formation,totakeacaricaturedexampleare,incontrast,emptyand
nonfalsifiable.

2.3.TwoIssuesthatareIndependentofSelectionism

TherearetwootherissuesthatGouldincludesinhisdepictionofascientific
revolutioninevolutionarytheory.Itisimportanttoseethattheyarelargely
independentoftheroleofselectioninevolutionarychange.

2.3.1.Gradualism

Accordingtothetheoryofpunctuatedequilibrium(EldredgeandGould,1972;
GouldandEldredge,1977),mostevolutionarychangedoesnotoccur
continuouslywithinalineage,butisconfinedtoburstsofchangethatare
relativelybriefonthegeologicaltimescale,generallycorrespondingto
speciationevents,followedbylongperiodsofstasis.Gouldhassuggestedthat
thetheoryhassomeverygeneralandcrudeparallelswithapproachesto
evolutionthatweremadedisreputablebytheneoDarwiniansynthesis,
approachesthatgobythenamesofsaltationism,macromutations,or
hopefulmonsters.(e.g.,Gould,1981).However,heisemphaticthatpunctuated
equilibriumisatheoryaboutordinaryspeciation(takingtensofthousandsof
years)anditsabruptappearanceatlowscalesofgeologicalresolution,notabout
ecologicalcatastropheandsuddengeneticchange(Gould,1987b:234).Many
otherbiologistsseeevolutionarychangeinanevenmoreorthodoxlight.They
attributethesuddenappearanceoffullyformednewkindsoforganismsinthe
fossilrecordtothefactthatspeciationtypicallytakesplaceinsmall,
geographicallyisolatedpopulations.Thustransitionalforms,evenifevolving
oververylongtimespans,areunlikelytoappearinthefossilrecorduntilthey
reinvadetheancestralterritory;itisonlytheinvasionthatissudden(see,e.g.,
Ayala,1983;Dawkins,1986;Mayr,1982;StebbinsandAyala,1981).Inanycaseit
isclearthatevolutionarychangeisgradualfromgenerationtogeneration,infull
agreementwithDarwin.ThusPiattelliPalmarini(1989:8)expressesacommon
misunderstandingwhenheinterpretsthetheoryofpunctuatedequilibriumas
showingthatmanyincompleteseriesinthefossilrecordareincomplete,not
becausetheintermediateformshavebeenlostforus,butbecausetheysimply
neverexisted.

Onceagaintheexplanationofadaptivecomplexityisthekeyreasonwhyone
shouldrejectnongradualchangeasplayinganimportantrolewithinevolution.
AnimportantDarwinianinsight,reinforcedbyFisher(1930),isthattheonlyway
forcomplexdesigntoevolveisthroughasequenceofmutationswithsmall
effects.Althoughitmaynotliterallybeimpossibleforanorganliketheeyeto
emergeacrossonegenerationfromnoeyeatall,theoddsofthishappeningare
unimaginablylow.Arandomlargeleapinthespaceofpossibleorganicformsis
astronomicallyunlikelytolandanorganisminaregionwithafullyformed
functioningeye.Onlyahillclimbingprocess,witheachsmallstepforcedinthe
directionofformswithbettervision,canguidethelineagetosuchaminuscule
regionofthespaceofpossibleformswithinthelifetimeoftheuniverse.

Noneofthisistodenythatembryologicalprocessescanresultinquiteradical
singlegenerationmorphologicalchanges.Homeoticmutationscausingslight
changesinthetimingorpositioningofepigeneticprocessescanresultin
radicallynewkindsofoffspring,suchasfruitflieswithlegsgrowingwheretheir
antennashouldbe,anditispossiblethatsomespeciationeventsmayhave
begunwithsuchlargechangesinstructure.Howeverthereisaclearsensein
whichsuchchangesarestillgradual,sincetheyonlyinvolveagross
modificationorduplicationofexistingstructure,nottheappearanceofanew
kindofstructure(seeDawkins,1983).

2.3.2.Exaptation

Exaptationisanotherprocessthatissometimesdiscussedasifitwas
incompatiblebothwithadaptationismandwithgradualism.Peopleoften
wonderwhethereachofthenumerous,successive,slightmodificationsfrom
anancestorlackinganorgantoamoderncreatureenjoyingthefullyfunctioning
organleadstoanimprovementinthefunction,asitshouldifthenecessary
evolutionarysequenceistobecomplete.PiattelliPalmarinicitesKingsolverand
Koehls(1985)studyofqualitativeshiftsduringtheevolutionofwingsininsects,
whichareineffectiveforflightbelowacertainsize,buteffectiveassolarheat
exchangepanelspreciselywithinthatrange.(Thehomologiesamongpartsofbat
wings,sealflippers,horseforelimbs,andhumanarmsisafarolderexample).
Neverthelesssuchexaptationsarestillgradualandarestilldrivenbyselection;
theremustbeanintermediateevolutionarystageatwhichthepartcansubserve
bothfunctions(Mayr,1982),afterwhichtheprocessofnaturalselectionshapesit
specificallyforitscurrentfunction.Indeedtheveryconceptofexaptationis
essentiallysimilartowhatDarwincalledpreadaptation,andplayedan
importantroleinhisexplanationoftheincipientstagesofusefulstructures.

Furthermore,itiscrucialtounderstandthatexaptationismerelyoneempirical
possibility,notauniversallawofevolution.GouldisoftenquotedassayingWe
avoidtheexcellentquestion,Whatgoodis5percentofaneye?byarguingthat
thepossessorofsuchanincipientstructuredidnotuseitforsight.(1977b:107).
(Ofcoursenoancestortohumansliterallyhad5percentofahumaneye;the
expressionreferstoaneyethathas5percentofthecomplexityofamoderneye).
Inresponse,Dawkins(1986:81)writes:Anancientanimalwith5percentofan
eyemightindeedhaveuseditforsomethingotherthansight,butitseemstome
atleastaslikelythatituseditfor5percentvision....Visionthatis5percentas
goodasyoursormineisverymuchworthhavingincomparisonwithnovision
atall.Sois1percentvisionbetterthantotalblindness.And6percentisbetter
than5,7percentbetterthan6,andsoonupthegradual,continuousseries.
IndeedDarwin(1859)sketchedoutahypotheticalsequenceofintermediate
formsintheevolutionofthevertebrateeye,allwithcounterpartsinliving
organisms,eachusedforvision.

Insum,thepositionsofGould,Lewontin,andEldredgeshouldnotbeseenas
radicalrevisionsofthetheoryofevolution,butasashiftinemphasiswithinthe
orthodoxneoDarwinianframework.Assuchtheydonotinvalidategradual
naturalselectionasthedrivingforcebehindtheevolutionoflanguageonapriori
grounds.Furthermore,thereareclearcriteriaforwhenselectionistand
nonselectionistaccountsshouldbeinvokedtoexplainsomebiologicalstructure:
complexdesigntocarryoutsomereproductivelysignificantfunction,versusthe
existenceofaspecificphysical,developmentalorrandomprocesscapableof
explainingthestructuresexistence.Withthesecriteriainhand,wecanturnto
thespecificproblemathand,theevolutionoflanguage.

3.DesigninLanguage
Dothecognitivemechanismsunderlyinglanguageshowsignsofdesignfor
somefunctioninthesamewaythattheanatomicalstructuresoftheeyeshow
signsofdesignforthepurposeofvision?Thisbreaksdownintothreesmaller
questions:Whatisthefunction(ifany)oflanguage?Whataretheengineering
demandsonasystemthatmustcarryoutsuchafunction?Andarethe
mechanismsoflanguagetailoredtomeetthosedemands?Wewillsuggestthat
languageshowsignsofdesignforthecommunicationofpropositionalstructures
overaserialchannel.

3.1.AnArgumentforDesigninLanguage

Humansacquireagreatdealofinformationduringtheirlifetimes.Sincethis
acquisitionprocessoccursataratefarexceedingthatofbiologicalevolution,itis
invaluableindealingwithcausalcontingenciesoftheenvironmentthatchange
withinalifetime,andprovidesadecisiveadvantageincompetitionwithother
speciesthatcanonlydefendthemselvesagainstnewthreatsinevolutionarytime
(BrandonandHornstein,1986;ToobyanddeVore,1987).Thereisanobvious
advantageinbeingabletoacquiresuchinformationabouttheworldsecond
hand:bytappingintothevastreservoirofknowledgeaccumulatedbysome
otherindividual,onecanavoidhavingtoduplicatethepossiblytimeconsuming
anddangeroustrialanderrorprocessthatwonthatknowledge.Furthermore,
withinagroupofinterdependent,cooperatingindividuals,thestatesofother
individualsareamongthemostsignificantthingsintheworldworthknowing
about.Thuscommunicationofknowledgeandinternalstatesisusefulto
creatureswhohavealottosayandwhoareonspeakingterms.(InSection
MASTODONS,wediscussevidencethatourancestorsweresuchcreatures.)
Humanknowledgeandreasoning,ithasbeenargued,iscouchedinalanguage
ofthoughtthatisdistinctfromexternallanguagessuchasEnglishorJapanese
(Fodor,1975).Thepropositionsinthisrepresentationalmediumarerelational
structureswhosesymbolspertaintopeople,objects,andevents,thecategories
theybelongto,theirdistributioninspaceandtime,andtheircausalrelationsto
oneanother(Jackendoff,1983;Keil,1979).Thecausalrelationsgoverningthe
behaviorofotherpeopleareunderstoodasinvolvingtheirbeliefsanddesires,
whichcanbeconsideredasrelationsbetweenanindividualandtheproposition
thatrepresentsthecontentofthatbeliefordesire(Fodor,1985,1987).

Thismakesthefollowingkindsofcontentsasworthyofcommunicationamong
humans.Wewouldwanttobeabletorefertoindividualsandclasses,to
distinguishamongbasicontologicalcategories(things,events,places,times,
manners,andsoon),totalkabouteventsandstates,distinguishingthe
participantsintheeventorstateaccordingtorole(agents,patients,goals),andto
talkabouttheintentionalstatesofourselvesandothers.Also,wewouldwant
theabilitytoexpressdistinctionsoftruthvalue,modality(necessity,possibility,
probability,factivity),tocommentonthetimeofaneventorstateincludingboth
itsdistributionovertime(continuous,iterative,punctate)anditsoveralltimeof
occurrence.Onemightalsodemandtheabilitytoencodeanunlimitednumberof
predicates,arguments,andpropositions.Further,itwouldbeusefultobeableto
usethesamepropositionalcontentwithindifferentspeechacts;forinstance,asa
question,astatement,oracommand.Superimposedonallofthiswemightask
foranabilitytofocusortoputintothebackgrounddifferentpartsofa
proposition,soastotiethespeechactintoitscontextofpreviouslyconveyed
informationandpatternsofknowledgeofthelistener.

Thevocalauditorychannelhassomedesirablefeaturesasamediumof
communication:ithasahighbandwidth,itsintensitycanbemodulatedto
concealthespeakerortocoverlargedistances,anditdoesnotrequirelight,
proximity,afacetofaceorientation,ortyingupthehands.Howeveritis
essentiallyaserialinterface,lackingthefulltwodimensionalityneededto
conveygraphortreestructuresandtypographicaldevicessuchasfonts,
subscripts,andbrackets.Thebasictoolsofacodingschemeemployingitarean
inventoryofdistinguishablesymbolsandtheirconcatenation.

Thusgrammarsforspokenlanguagesmustmappropositionalstructuresontoa
serialchannel,minimizingambiguityincontext,underthefurtherconstraints
thattheencodinganddecodingbedonerapidly,bycreatureswithlimitedshort
termmemories,accordingtoacodethatissharedbyanentirecommunityof
potentialcommunicants.

Thefactthatlanguageisacomplexsystemofmanyparts,eachtailoredto
mappingacharacteristickindofsemanticorpragmaticfunctionontoa
characteristickindofsymbolsequence,issoobviousinlinguisticpracticethatit
isusuallynotseenasworthmentioning.Letuslistsomeuncontroversialfacts
aboutsubstantiveuniversals,thebuildingblocksofgrammarsthatalltheoriesof
universalgrammarposit,eitherasanexplicitinventoryorasaconsequenceof
somewhatmoreabstractmechanisms.

Grammarsarebuiltaroundsymbolsformajorlexicalcategories(noun,verb,
adjective,preposition)thatcanenterintorulesspecifyingtelltalesurface
distributions(e.g.,verbsbutnotnounsgenerallytakeunmarkeddirectobjects),
inflections,andlistsoflexicalitems.Togetherwithminorcategoriesthat
characteristicallycooccurwiththemajorones(e.g.,articleswithnouns),the
differentcategoriesarethusprovidedwiththemeansofbeingdistinguishedin
thespeechstring.Thesedistinctionsareexploitedtodistinguishbasicontological
categoriessuchasthings,eventsorstates,andqualities.(See,e.g.,Jackendoff,
1983,1988.)

Majorphrasalcategories(nounphrase,verbphrase,etc.)startoffwithamajor
lexicalitem,thehead,andallowittobecombinedwithspecifickindsofaffixes
andphrases.Theresultingconglomerateisthenusedtorefertoentitiesinour
mentalmodelsoftheworld.Thusanounlikedogdoesnotitselfdescribe
anythingbutitcancombinewitharticlesandotherpartsofspeechtomakenoun
phrases,suchasthosedogs,mydog,andthedogthatbitme,anditisthesenoun
phrasesthatareusedtodescribethings.Similarly,averblikehitismadeintoa
verbphrasebymarkingitfortenseandaspectandaddinganobject,thus
enablingittodescribeanevent.Ingeneral,wordsencodeabstractgeneral
categoriesandonlybycontributingtothestructureofmajorphrasalcategories
cantheydescribeparticularthings,events,states,locations,andproperties.This
mechanismenablesthelanguageusertorefertoanunlimitedrangeofspecific
entitieswhilepossessingonlyafinitenumberoflexicalitems(See,e.g.,Bloom,
1989;Jackendoff,1977).

Phrasestructurerules(e.g.,Xbartheoryorimmediatedominancerules)
forceconcatenationinthestringtocorrespondtosemanticconnectednessinthe
underlyingproposition,andthusprovideslinearcluesofunderlyingstructure,
distinguishing,forexample,LargetreesgrowdarkberriesfromDarktreesgrow
largeberries.(See,e.g.,Gazdar,Pullum,Klein,andSag,1985;Jackendoff,1977).

Rulesoflinearorder(e.g.,directionalparametersfororderingheads,
complements,andspecifiers,orlinearprecedencerules)allowtheorderof
wordswithintheseconcatenationstodistinguishamongtheargumentpositions
thatanentityassumeswithrespecttoapredicate,distinguishingManbitesdog
fromDogbitesman.(See,e.g.,Gazdar,etal.,1985;Travis,1984.)

Caseaffixesonnounsandadjectivescantakeoverthesefunctions,marking
nounsaccordingtoargumentroleandlinkingnounwithpredicateevenwhen
theorderisscrambled.Thisredundancycanfreeupthedeviceoflinearorder,
allowingittobeexploitedtoconveyrelationsofprominenceandfocus,which
canthusmeshwiththenecessarilytemporalflowofattentionandknowledge
acquisitioninthelistener.

Verbaffixessignalthetemporaldistributionoftheeventthattheverbrefersto
(aspect)andthetimeoftheevent(tense);whenseparateaspectandtenseaffixes
cooccur,theyareinauniversallypreferredorder(aspectclosertotheverb;
Bybee,1985).Giventhatmanmadetimekeepingdevicesplaynoroleinspecies
typicalhumanthought,someotherkindoftemporalcoordinatesmustbeused,
andlanguagesemployaningenioussystemthatcanconveythetimeofanevent
relativetothetimeofthespeechactitselfandrelativetoathird,arbitrary
referencetime(thuswecandistinguishbetweenJohnhasarrived,Johnhad
arrived(whenMarywasspeaking),Johnwillhavearrived(beforeMaryspeaks),
andsoon;Reichenbach,1947).Verbaffixesalsotypicallyagreewiththesubject
andotherarguments,andthusprovideanotherredundantmechanismthatcan
conveypredicateargumentrelationsbyitself(e.g.,inmanyNativeAmerican
languagessuchasCherokeeandNavajo)orthatcaneliminateambiguityleft
openbyothermechanisms(distinguishing,e.g.,Iknowtheboyandthegirlwho
likechocolatefromIknowtheboyandthegirlwholikeschocolate).

Auxiliaries,whichoccureitherasverbaffixes(wheretheyaredistinguished
fromtenseandaspectaffixesbyproximitytotheverb)orinoneofthree
sentenceperipheralpositions(first,second,last),conveyrelationsthathave
logicalscopeovertheentireproposition(mirroringtheirperipheralposition)
suchastruthvalue,modality,andillocutionaryforce.(SeeSteele,Akmajian,
Demers,Jelinek,Kitagawa,Oehrle,&Wasow,1981).
Languagesalsotypicallycontainasmallinventoryofphoneticallyreducible
morphemespronounsandotheranaphoricelementsthatbyvirtueof
encodingasmallsetofsemanticfeaturessuchasgenderandhumanness,and
beingrestrictedintheirdistribution,canconveypatternsofcoreferenceamong
differentparticipantsincomplexrelationswithoutthenecessityofrepeating
lengthydefinitedescriptions(e.g.,asinAboyshowedadogtoagirlandthen
he/she/ittouchedhim/her/it/himself/herself).(SeeChomsky,1981;Wexlerand
Manzini,1984).

Mechanismsofcomplementationandcontrolgoverntheexpressionof
propositionsthatareargumentsofotherpropositions,employingspecific
complementizermorphemessignalingtheperipheryoftheembedded
propositionandindicatingitsrelationtotheembeddingone,andlicensingthe
omissionofrepeatedphrasesreferringtoparticipantsplayingcertain
combinationsofroles.Thisallowstheexpressionofarichsetofpropositional
attitudeswithinabeliefdesirefolkpsychology,suchasJohntriedtocome,John
thinksthatBillwillcome,JohnhopesforBilltocome,JohnconvincedBillto
come,andsoon.(SeeBresnan,1982).

Inwhmovement(asinwhquestionsandrelativeclauses)thereisatightly
constrainedcooccurrencepatternbetweenanemptyelement(atraceorgap)
andasentenceperipheralquantifier(e.g.,whwords).Thequantifierwordcan
bespecificastoillocutionaryforce(questionversusmodification),ontological
type(time,place,purpose),feature(animate/inanimate),androle(subject/object),
andthegapcanoccuronlyinhighlyconstrainedphrasestructureconfigurations.
Thesemanticsofsuchconstructionsallowthespeakertofixthereferenceof,or
requestinformationabout,anentitybyspecifyingitsrolewithinany
proposition.OnecanrefernotjusttoanydogbuttothedogthatMarysold__to
somestudentslastyear;onecanasknotonlyforthenamesofjustanyold
interestingpersonbutspecificallyWhowasthatwomanIsawyouwith__?(See,
e.g.,Chomsky,1981;Gazdar,Pullum,Klein,andSag,1985;KaplanandBresnan,
1982).

Andthisisonlyapartiallist,focusingonsheerexpressivepower.Onecouldadd
toitthemanysyntacticconstraintsanddeviceswhosestructureenablesthemto
minimizememoryloadandthelikelihoodofpursuinglocalgardenpathsin
speechcomprehension(e.g.,BerwickandWeinberg,1984;BerwickandWexler,
1987;Bever,1970;ChomskyandLasnik,1977;Frazier,Clifton,andRandall,1983;
HawkinsandCutler,1988;Kuno,1973,1974),ortoeasethetaskofanalysisfor
thechildlearningthelanguage(e.g.,Morgan,1986;Pinker,1984;Wexlerand
Culicover,1980).Ontopofthattherearetherulesofsegmentalphonologythat
smoothoutarbitraryconcatenationsofmorphemesintoaconsistentsound
patternthatjugglesdemandsofeaseofarticulationandperceptualdistinctness;
theprosodicrulesthatdisambiguatesyntaxandcommunicatepragmaticand
illocutionaryinformation;thearticulatoryprogramsthatachieverapid
transmissionratesthroughparallelencodingofadjacentconsonantsandvowels;
andonandon.Languageseemstobeafineexampleofthatperfectionof
structureandcoadaptationwhichjustlyexcitesouradmiration(Darwin,1859:
26).

Aswewritethesewords,wecanheartheprotests:Pangloss!Justsostories!
Haventwejustthoughtupaccountsaboutfunctionsposthocafterexamining
thestructure?Howdoweknowthattheneuralmechanismswerenottherefor
otherreasons,andthatoncetheyweretheretheywerejustputtovarious
convenientusesbythefirstlanguageusers,whothenconveyedtheirinvention
tosubsequentgenerations?

3.2.IstheArgumentforLanguageDesignaJustSoStory?

Firstofall,thereisnothingparticularlyingenious,contorted,orexoticaboutour
claimsforsubstantiveuniversalsandtheirsemanticfunctions.Anyoneofthem
couldhavebeenliftedoutofthepagesoflinguisticstextbooks.Itishardlythe
theoryofevolutionthatmotivatesthesuggestionthatphrasestructurerulesare
usefulinconveyingrelationsofmodificationandpredicateargumentstructure.

Second,itisnotnecessarilyillegitimatetoinferbothspecialdesignand
adaptationistoriginsonthebasisoffunctionitself.Italldependsonthe
complexityofthefunctionfromanengineeringpointofview.Ifsomeonetold
youthatJohnusesXasasunshadeorapaperweight,youwouldcertainlybe
hardpressedtoguesswhatXisorwhereXcamefrom,becauseallsortsofthings
makegoodsunshadesorpaperweights.ButifsomeonetoldyouthatJohnusesX
todisplaytelevisionbroadcasts,itwouldbeaverygoodbetthatXisatelevision
setorissimilarinstructuretoone,andthatitwasdesignedforthatpurpose.The
reasonisthatitwouldbevanishinglyunlikelyforsomethingthatwasnot
designedasatelevisionsettodisplaytelevisionprograms;theengineering
demandsaresimplytoocomplex.

Thiskindofreasoningiscommonlyappliedinbiologywhenhightechabilities
suchasbatsonararediscovered.Wesuggestthathumanlanguageisasimilar
case.Wearenottalkingaboutnosesholdingupspectacles.Humanlanguageisa
devicecapableofcommunicatingexquisitelycomplexandsubtlemessages,from
convolutedsoapoperaplotstotheoriesoftheoriginoftheuniverse.Evenifall
weknewwasthathumanspossessedsuchadevice,wewouldexpectthatit
wouldhavetohaveratherspecialandunusualpropertiessuitedtothetaskof
mappingcomplexpropositionalstructuresontoaserialchannel,andan
examinationofgrammarconfirmsthisexpectation.

Third,argumentsthatlanguageisdesignedforcommunicationofpropositional
structuresarefarfromlogicaltruths.Itiseasytoformulate,andreject,specific
alternatives.Forexample,occasionallyitissuggestedthatlanguageevolvedasa
mediumofinternalknowledgerepresentationforuseinthecomputations
underlyingreasoning.Butwhiletheremaybealanguagelikerepresentational
mediumthelanguageofthought,ormentalese(Fodor,1975)itclearly
cannotbeEnglish,Japanese,andsoon.Naturallanguagesarehopelessforthis
function:theyareneedlesslyserial,rifewithambiguity(usuallyharmlessin
conversationalcontexts,butunsuitedforlongtermknowledgerepresentation),
complicatedbyalternationsthatarerelevantonlytodiscourse(e.g.,
topicalization),andclutteredwithdevices(suchasphonologyandmuchof
morphology)thatmakenocontributiontoreasoning.Similarly,thefactsof
grammarmakeitdifficulttoarguethatlanguageshowsdesignforthe
expressionofthoughtinanysensethatissubstantiallydistinctfrom
communication.Ifexpressionreferstothemereexternalizationofthoughts,
insomekindofmonologueorsoliloquy,itisanunexplainedfactthatlanguage
containsmechanismsthatpresupposetheexistenceofalistener,suchasrulesof
phonologyandphonetics(whichmapsentencesontosoundpatterns,enhance
confusablephoneticdistinctions,disambiguatephrasestructurewithintonation,
andsoon.)andpragmaticdevicesthatencodeconversationaltopic,illocutionary
force,discourseantecedents,andsoon.Furthermorepeopledonotexpresstheir
thoughtsinanarbitraryprivatelanguage(whichwouldbesufficientforpure
expression),buthavecomplexlearningmechanismsthatacquirealanguage
highlysimilarinalmosteverydetailtothoseofotherspeakersinthecommunity.

Anotherexampleofoftheempiricalnatureofspecificargumentsforlanguage
designappearswhenweexaminethespecificexpressiveabilitiesthatare
designedintolanguage.Theyturnouttoconstituteawelldefinedset,anddo
notsimplycorrespondtoeverykindofinformationthathumansareinterested
incommunicating.Soalthoughwemayhavesomeaprioriintuitionsregarding
usefulexpressivecapacitiesofgrammar,thematterisultimatelyempirical(see,
e.g.,Jackendoff,1983,1990;Pinker,1989b;Talmy,1983,1988),andsuchresearch
yieldsresultsthatarespecificenoughtoshowthatnotjustanyintuitionis
satisfied.Grammarisanotoriouslypoormediumforconveyingsubtlepatterns
ofemotion,forexample,andfacialexpressionsandtonesofvoicearemore
informative(EkmanandFriesen,1975;Etcoff,1986).Althoughgrammars
providedevicesforconveyingroughtopologicalinformationsuchas
connectivity,contact,andcontainment,andcoarsemetriccontrastssuchas
near/farorflat/globular,theyareofverylittlehelpinconveyingprecise
Euclideanrelations:apictureisworthathousandwords.Furthermore,human
grammarclearlylacksdevicesspecificallydedicatedtoexpressinganyofthe
kindsofmessagesthatcharacterizethevocalcommunicationsystemsof
cetaceans,birds,ornonhumanprimates,suchasannouncementsofindividual
identity,predatorwarnings,andclaimsofterritory.

Finally,Williams(1966)suggeststhatconvergentevolution,resemblancetoman
madeartifacts,anddirectassessmentsofengineeringefficiencyaregoodsources
ofevidenceforadaptation.Ofcourseinthecaseofhumanlanguagethesetests
aredifficultinpractice:significantconvergentevolutionhasnotoccurred,noone
haseverinventedasystemthatduplicatesitsfunction(exceptforsystemsthat
areobviouslyparasiticonnaturallanguagessuchasEsperantoorsigned
English),andmostformsofexperimentalinterventionwouldbeunethical.
Nonetheless,sometestsarepossibleinprinciple,andthisisenoughtorefute
reflexiveaccusationsofcircularity.

Forexample,eventheartificiallanguagesthatarefocussedonverynarrow
domainsofcontentandthatarenotmeanttobeusedinanaturalonlinemanner
bypeople,suchascomputerlanguagesorsymboliclogic,showcertainobvious
parallelswithaspectsofhumangrammar.Theyhaveneededmeansof
distinguishingtypesofsymbols,predicateargumentrelations,embedding,
scope,quantification,andtruthrelations,andsolvetheseproblemswithformal
syntacticsystemsthatspecifyarbitrarypatternsofhierarchicalconcatenation,
relativelinearorder,fixedpositionswithinstrings,andclosedclassesof
privilegedsymbols.Ofcoursetherearevastdissimilaritiesbutthemerefactthat
termslikelanguage,syntax,predicate,argument,andstatementhave
clearmeaningswhenappliedtoartificialsystems,withnoconfusionor
qualification,suggeststhattherearenonaccidentalparallelsthatarereminiscent
ofthetalkofdiaphragmsandlenseswhenappliedtocamerasandeyes.Asfor
experimentalinvestigation,inprincipleonecoulddefinesetsofartificial
grammarswithandwithoutoneofthemechanismsinquestion,orwith
variationsofit.Thegrammarswouldbeprovidedortaughttopairsof
communicatorsformalautomata,computersimulations,orcollege
sophomoresactinginconsciousproblemsolvingmodewhowouldbe
requiredtoconveyspecificmessagesunderdifferentconditionsofspeed,noise,
ormemorylimitations.Theproportionofinformationsuccessfully
communicatedwouldbeassessedandexaminedasafunctionofthepresence
andversionofthegrammaticalmechanism,andofthedifferentconditions
putativelyrelevanttothefunctioninquestion.

3.3.LanguageDesignandLanguageDiversity

Amoreseriouschallengetotheclaimthatgrammarsshowevidenceofgood
designmaycomefromthediversityofhumanlanguages(Maratsos,1989).
Grammaticaldevicesandexpressivefunctionsdonotpairupinonetoone
fashion.Forexample,somelanguagesusewordordertoconveywhodidwhat
towhom;othersusecaseoragreementforthispurposeandreservetheuseof
wordordertodistinguishtopicfromcomment,ordonotsystematicallyexploit
wordorderatall.Howcanonesaythatthementaldevicesgoverningword
orderevolvedunderselectionpressureforexpressinggrammaticalrelationsif
manylanguagesdonotusethemforthatpurpose?Linguisticdiversitywould
seemtoimplythatgrammaticaldevicesareverygeneralpurposetools.Anda
generalpurposetoolwouldsurelyhaveaverygeneralizedstructure,andthus
couldbeaspandrelratherthananadaptedmachine.Webeginbyansweringthe
immediateobjectionthattheexistenceofdiversity,forwhateverreason,
invalidatesargumentsforuniversallanguagedesign;attheendofthesectionwe
offersomespeculationsastowhythereshouldbemorethanonelanguageto
beginwith.

Firstofall,theevolutionofstructuresthatservenotonebutasmallnumberof
definitefunctions,perhapstodifferentextentsindifferentenvironments,is
commoninbiology(Mayr,1982).Indeed,thoughgrammaticaldevicesareputto
differentusesindifferentlanguages,thepossiblepairingsarevery
circumscribed.Nolanguageusesnounaffixestoexpresstenseorelementswith
thesyntacticprivilegesofauxiliariestoexpresstheshapeofthedirectobject.
Suchuniversalconstraintsonstructureandfunctionareabundantlydocumented
insurveysofthelanguagesoftheworld(e.g.,Bybee,1985;Comrie,1981;
Greenberg,1966;Greenberg,Ferguson,andMoravcsik,1978;Hawkins,1988;
Keenan,1987;andShopen,1985).Moreoverlanguageuniversalsarevisiblein
languagehistory,wherechangestendtofallintoarestrictedsetofpatterns,
manyinvolvingtheintroductionofgrammaticaldevicesobeyingcharacteristic
constraints(Kiparsky,1976;Wang,1976).(Note3)
Butaccountingfortheevolutionofalanguagefacultypermittingrestricted
variationisonlyimportantonthemostpessimisticofviews.Evenasmidginof
grammaticalanalysisrevealsthatsurfacediversityisoftenamanifestationof
minordifferencesintheunderlyingmentalgrammars.Considersomeofthe
supposedlyradicaltypologicaldifferencesbetweenEnglishandotherlanguages.
Englishisarigidwordorderlanguage;intheAustralianlanguageWarlpirithe
wordsfromdifferentlogicalunitscanbethoroughlyscrambledandcasemarkers
areusedtoconveygrammaticalrelationsandnounmodification.ManyNative
Americanlanguages,suchasCherokee,usefewnounphraseswithinclausesat
all,andexpressgrammaticalrelationsbystickingstringsofagreementaffixes
ontotheverb,eachidentifyinganargumentbyasetoffeaturessuchas
humannessorshape.WhereasaccusativelanguageslikeEnglishcollapse
subjectsoftransitiveandintransitivesentences,ergativelanguagescollapse
objectsoftransitiveswithsubjectsofintransitives.WhereasEnglishsentencesare
builtaroundobligatorysubjects,languageslikeChineseareorientedarounda
positionreservedforthediscoursetopic.

However,thesevariationsalmostcertainlycorrespondtodifferencesinthe
extenttowhichthesamespecificsetofmentaldevicesisputtouse,butnotto
differencesinthekindsofdevicesthatareputtouse.Englishhasfreeconstituent
orderinstringsofprepositionalphrases(ThepackagewassentfromChicagoto
BostonbyMary;ThepackagewassentbyMarytoBostonfromChicago,andso
on).Englishhascase,bothinpronounsandinthegenitivemarkerspelleds.It
expressesinformationaboutargumentsinverbaffixesintheagreementmarker
s.ErgativitycanbeseeninverbalternationslikeJohnbroketheglassandThe
glassbroke.Thereisevenakindoftopicposition:Asforfish,Ilikesalmon.
Conversely,Warlpiriisnotwithoutphrasalsyntax.Auxiliariesgoinsecond
position(notunlikeEnglish,German,andmanyotherlanguages).The
constituentsofanounphrasemustbecontiguousiftheyarenotcasemarked;
theconstituentsofafiniteclausemustbecontiguousifthesentencecontains
morethanone.Pinker(1984)outlinesatheoryoflanguageacquisitioninwhich
thesameinnatelearningmechanismsareputtousetodifferentextentsin
childrenacquiringradicallydifferentlanguages.

Whenonelooksatmoreabstractlinguisticanalyses,theunderlyingunityof
naturallanguagesisevenmoreapparent.Chomskyhasquippedthatanything
youfindinonelanguagecanalsobefoundineveryotherlanguage,perhapsata
moreabstractlevelofrepresentation,andthisclaimcanbejustifiedwithout
resortingtoProcrusteanmeasures.InmanyversionsofhisGovernmentBinding
theory(1981),allnounphrasesmustbecasemarked;eventhosethatreceiveno
overtcasemarkingareassignedabstractcasebyanadjacentverb,preposition,
ortenseelement.Thebasicorderofmajorphrasesisdeterminedbythevalueof
alanguagevaryingparameterspecifyingthedirectioninwhichcaseassignment
maybeexecuted.SoinalanguagelikeLatin,thenounphrasesaremarkedwith
morphologicalcase(andcanappearinanyposition),whileinalanguagelike
English,theyarenotsomarked,andmustbeadjacenttoacaseassignersuchas
averb.Thusovertcasemarkinginonelanguageandwordorderinanotherare
unifiedasmanifestationsofasinglegrammaticalmodule.Andthemodulehasa
wellspecifiedfunction:intheterminologyofthetheory,itmakesnounphrases
visiblefortheassignmentofthematicrolessuchasagent,goal,orlocation.
Moreover,wordorderitselfisnotaunifiedphenomenon.Oftenwhenlanguages
usewordorderforpragmaticpurposes,theyareexploitinganunderlying
grammaticalsubsystem,suchasstylisticrules,thathasverydifferentproperties
fromthatgoverningtherelativeorderofnounphrasesandtheircaseassigners.

Whyistheremorethanonelanguageatall?Herewecanonlyofferthemost
tentativeofspeculations.Forsoundmeaningpairingswithinthelexicon,there
aretwoconsiderations.First,onemightsupposethatspeakersneedalearning
mechanismforlabelsforculturalinnovations,suchasscrewdriver.Sucha
learningdeviceisthensufficientforallvocabularyitems.Second,itmaybe
difficulttoevolveahugeinnatecode.Eachoftensofthousandsofsound
meaningcorrespondenceswouldhavetobesynchronizedacrossspeakers,but
fewwordscouldhavethenonarbitraryantecedentsthatwouldhavebeen
neededtogetthestandardizationprocessstarted(i.e.,analogoustotheway
baredfangsinpreparationforbitingevolvedintothefacialexpressionfor
anger.)Furthermorethesizeofsuchacodewouldtaxthetimeavailableto
evolveandmaintainitinthegenomeinthefaceofrandomperturbationsfrom
sexualrecombinationandotherstochasticgeneticprocesses(Williams,1966;
ToobyandCosmides,1989).Onceamechanismforlearningsoundmeaning
pairsisinplace,theinformationforacquiringanyparticularpair,suchasdog
fordogs,isreadilyavailablefromthespeechofthecommunity.Thusthe
genomecanstorethevocabularyintheenvironment,asToobyandCosmides
(1989)haveputit.

Forotheraspectsofgrammar,onemightgetmoreinsightbyinvertingthe
perspective.Insteadofpositingthattherearemultiplelanguages,leadingtothe
evolutionofamechanismtolearnthedifferencesamongthem,onemightposit
thatthereisalearningmechanism,leadingtothedevelopmentofmultiple
languages.Thatis,someaspectsofgrammarmightbeeasilylearnablefrom
environmentalinputsbycognitiveprocessesthatmayhavebeeninexistence
priortotheevolutionofgrammar,forexample,therelativeorderofapairof
sequencedelementswithinaboundedunit.Fortheseaspectstherewasnoneed
toevolveafixedvalue,andtheyarefreetovaryacrosscommunitiesofspeakers.
InSectionSHAREDwediscussasimulationofevolutionbyHintonandNowlan
(1987)thatbehavesinawaythatisconsistentwiththisconjecture.

3.4.LanguageDesignandArbitrariness

PiattelliPalmarini(1989)presentsadifferentkindofargument:grammarisnot
completelypredictableasanadaptationtocommunication,thereforeitlacks
designanddidnotevolvebyselection.Hewrites,Survivalcriteria,theneedto
communicateandplanconcertedaction,cannotaccountforourspecific
linguisticnature.Adaptationcannotevenbegintoexplainanyofthese
phenomena.Frequentlycitedexamplesofarbitraryphenomenainlanguage
includeconstraintsonmovement(suchassubjacency),irregularmorphology,
andlexicaldifferencesinpredicateargumentstructure.Forinstance,itis
acceptabletosayWhodidJohnseeMarywith?,butnotWhodidJohnseeMary
and?;JohnbroketheglassbutnotJohnbreakedtheglass;Johnfilledtheglass
withmilk,butnotJohnpouredtheglasswithmilk.Theargumentsthatlanguage
couldnotbeanadaptationtaketwoforms:(i)languagecouldbebetterthanitis,
and(ii)languagecouldbedifferentthanitis.Weshowthatneitherformofthe
argumentisvalid,andthatthefactsthatitinvokesareperfectlyconsistentwith
languagebeinganadaptationandoffernottheslightestsupporttoanyspecific
alternative.

3.4.1.InherentTradeoffs

Intheircrudestform,argumentsabouttheputativefunctionlessnessofgrammar
runasfollows:IbetyoucanttellmeafunctionforConstraintX;therefore
languageisaspandrel.Butevenifitcouldbeshownthatonepartoflanguage
hadnofunction,thatwouldnotmeanthatallpartsoflanguagehadnofunction.
RecallfromSection2.2thatmanyorganscontainmodifiedspandrelsbutthis
doesnotmeanthatnaturalselectiondidnotassembleorshapetheorgan.Worse,
ConstraintXmaynotbeagenuinepartofthelanguagefacultybutjusta
descriptionofoneaspectofit,anepiphenomenalspandrel.Noadaptiveorgan
canbeadaptiveineveryaspect,becausethereareasmanyaspectsofanorganas
therearewaysofdescribingit.Therecenthistoryoflinguisticsprovides
numerousexampleswhereanewlydiscoveredconstraintisfirstproposedasan
explicitstatementlistedaspartofagrammar,butisthenshowntobea
deductiveconsequenceofafarmorewiderangingprinciple(see,e.g.,Chomsky,
1981;Freidin,1978.)Forexample,theungrammaticalityofsentenceslikeJohnto
havewonissurprising,onceattributedtoafilterspecificallyrulingout[NPto
VP]sequences,isnowseenasaconsequenceoftheCaseFilter.Althoughone
mightlegitimatelywonderwhatgood*[NPtoVP]isdoinginagrammar,one
couldhardlydispensewithsomethingliketheCaseFilter.

Sincethemereappearanceofsomenonoptimalfeatureisinconclusive,wemust
examinespecificexplanationsforwhythefeatureexists.Inthecaseofthe
nonselectionistpositionespousedbyPiattelliPalmarini,thereisnone:notahint
ofhowanyspecificaspectofgrammarmightbeexplained,eveninprinciple,asa
specificconsequenceofsomedevelopmentalprocessorgeneticmechanismor
constraintonpossiblebrainstructure.Thepositiongainsallitssupportfromthe
supposedlackofanadaptiveexplanation.Infact,wewillshowthatthereissuch
anexplanation,wellmotivatedbothwithinevolutionarytheoryandwithin
linguistics,sothesupportdisappears.

Theideathatnaturalselectionaspirestowardperfectionhaslongbeen
discreditedwithinevolutionarytheory(Williams,1966).AsMaynardSmith
(1984:290)hasputit,Iftherewerenoconstraintsonwhatispossible,thebest
phenotypewouldliveforever,wouldbeimpregnabletopredators,wouldlay
eggsataninfiniterate,andsoon.Tradeoffsamongconflictingadaptivegoals
areaubiquitouslimitationonoptimalityinthedesignoforganisms.Itmaybe
adaptiveforamalebirdtoadvertisehishealthtofemaleswithgaudyplumage
oralongtail,butnottotheextentthatpredatorsareattractedorflightis
impossible.

Tradeoffsofutilitywithinlanguagearealsounavoidable(Bolinger,1980;Slobin,
1977).Forexample,thereisaconflictofinterestbetweenspeakerandhearer.
Speakerswanttominimizearticulatoryeffortandhencetendtowardsbrevity
andphonologicalreduction.Hearerswanttominimizetheeffortof
understandingandhencedesireexplicitnessandclarity.Thisconflictofinterest
isinherenttothecommunicationprocessandoperatesatmanylevels.Editors
badgerauthorsintoexpandingellipticalpassages;parsimoniousheadlinewriters
unwittinglyproduceSquadHelpsDogBiteVictimandStudTiresOut.Similarly
thereisaconflictofinterestbetweenspeakerandlearner.Alargevocabulary
allowsforconciseandpreciseexpression.Butitisonlyusefulifeverypotential
listenerhashadtheopportunitytolearneachitem.Again,thistradeoffis
inherenttocommunication;onemansjargontermisanothersmotjuste.
Clearly,anysharedsystemofcommunicationisgoingtohavetoadoptacode
thatisacompromiseamongthesedemands,andsowillappeartobearbitrary
fromthepointofviewofanyonecriterion.Thereisalwaysalargerangeof
solutionstothecombineddemandsofcommunicationthatreachslightly
differentequilibriumpointsinthismultidimensionalspace.Slobin(1977)points
outthattheSerboCroatianinflectionalsystemisaclassicIndoEuropean
syntheticmuddle,suffixingeachnounwithasingleaffixfromaparadigmfull
ofirregularity,homophony,andzeromorphemes.Asaresultthesystemis
perfectedlateandwithconsiderabledifficulty.IncontrasttheTurkish
inflectionalsystemissemanticallytransparent,withstringsofclearly
demarcatedregularsuffixes,andismasteredbytheageoftwo.Whenitcomesto
productionbyanadultwhohasoverlearnedthesystem,however,Serbo
Croatiandoeshaveanadvantageinminimizingthesheernumberofsyllables
thatmustbearticulated.Furthermore,Slobinpointsoutthatsuchtradeoffscan
bedocumentedinstudiesofhistoricalchangeandborrowing.Forexample
changesthatservetoenhancebrevitywillproceeduntilcomprehensionbecomes
impaired,atwhichpointnewaffixesordistinctionsareintroducedtorestorethe
balance(seealsoSamuels,1972).Agivenfeatureoflanguagemaybearbitraryin
thesensethattherearealternativesolutionsthatarebetterfromthestandpoint
ofsomesinglecriterion.Butthisdoesnotmeanthatitisgoodfornothingatall!

Subjacencytheprohibitionagainstdependenciesbetweenagapandits
antecedentthatspanscertaincombinationsofphrasalnodesisaclassic
exampleofanarbitraryconstraint(seeFreidin&Quicoli,1989).InEnglishyou
cansayWhatdoeshebelievetheyclaimedthatIsaid?butnotthesemantically
parallel*WhatdoeshebelievetheclaimthatIsaid?.Onemightaskwhy
languagesbehavethisway.Whynotallowextractionanywhere,ornowhere?
Theconstraintmayexistbecauseparsingsentenceswithgapsisanotoriously
difficultproblemandasystemthathastobepreparedforthepossibilityof
inaudibleelementsanywhereinthesentenceisindangerofboggingdownby
positingthemeverywhere.Subjacencyhasbeenheldtoassistparsingbecauseit
cutsdownonthesetofstructuresthattheparserhastokeeptrackofwhen
findinggaps(BerwickandWeinberg,1984).Thisbonustolistenersisoftena
hindrancetospeakers,whostrugglewithresumptivepronounsinclumsy
sentencessuchasThatstheguythatyouheardtherumorabouthiswifeleaving
him.ThereisnothingnecessaryaboutthepreciseEnglishversionofthe
constraintoraboutthesmallsampleofalternativesallowedwithinnatural
language.Butbysettlinginonaparticularsubsetoftherangeofpossible
compromisesbetweenthedemandsofexpressivenessandparsability,the
evolutionaryprocessmayhaveconvergedonasatisfactorysetofsolutionsto
oneproblemwithinlanguageprocessing.

3.4.2.ParityinCommunicationsProtocols

Thefactthatonecanconceiveofabiologicalsystembeingdifferentthanitis
saysnothingaboutwhetheritisanadaptation(seeMayr,1983).Noonewould
arguethatselectionwasnotthekeyorganizingforceintheevolutionofthe
vertebrateeyejustbecausethecompoundeyesofarthropodsaredifferent.
Similarly,pointingoutthatahypotheticalMartianlanguagecoulddo
passivizationdifferentlyisinconclusive.Wemustaskhowwellsupported
specificexplanationsare.

Inthecaseoffeaturesofhumanlanguagestructurethatcouldhavebeen
different,againPiattelliPalmarinipresentsnoexplanationsatallandrelies
entirelyontheputativeinabilityofnaturalselectiontoprovideanysortof
motivatedaccount.Butinfactthereissuchanaccount:thenatureoflanguage
makesarbitrarinessofgrammaritselfpartoftheadaptivesolutionofeffective
communicationinprinciple.

Anycommunicativesystemrequiresacodingprotocolwhichcanbearbitraryas
longasitisshared.LibermanandMattingly(1989)callthistherequirementof
parity,andwecanillustrateitwiththe(coincidentallynamed)paritysettings
inelectroniccommunicationprotocols.Thereisnothingparticularlylogical
aboutsettingyourprintersserialinterfacetotheeven,asopposedtotheodd,
paritysetting.Noristhereanymotivationtosetyourcomputertooddas
opposedtoevenparity.Butthereiseveryreasontosetthecomputerandprinter
tothesameparity,whateveritis,becauseifyoudont,theycannotcommunicate.
Indeed,standardizationitselfisfarmoreimportantthananyotheradaptive
featurepossessedbyoneparty.Manypersonalcomputermanufacturersinthe
1980sboastedofthesuperiorengineeringanddesignoftheirproductcompared
totheIBMPC.ButwhenthesemachineswerenotIBMcompatible,theresults
arewellknown.

Intheevolutionofthelanguagefacultymanyarbitraryconstraintsmayhave
beenselectedsimplybecausetheydefinedpartsofastandardized
communicativecodeinthebrainsofsomecriticalmassofspeakers.Piattelli
Palmarinimaybecorrectinclaimingthatthereisnothingadaptiveabout
formingyesnoquestionsbyinvertingthesubjectandauxiliaryasopposedto
reversingtheorderofwordsinthesentence.Butgiventhatlanguagemustdo
oneortheother,itishighlyadaptiveforeachmemberofacommunityof
speakerstobeforcedtolearntodoitthesamewayasalltheothermembers.To
besure,somecombinationofhistoricalaccidents,epiphenomenaofother
cognitiveprocesses,andneurodevelopmentalconstraintsmusthaveplayeda
largeroleinthebreakingofsymmetrythatwasneededtogetthefixation
processrunningawayinonedirectionoranother.Butitstillmusthavebeen
selectionthatresultedintheconventionthenbecominginnatelyentrenched.

Therequirementofparityoperatesatalllevelsofacommunicationsprotocol.
Withinindividuallanguagestheutilityofarbitrarybutsharedfeaturesismost
obviousinthechoiceofindividualwords:thereisnoreasonforyoutocalladog
dogratherthancatexceptforthefactthateveryoneelseisdoingit,butthatis
reasonenough.Saussure(1959)calledthisinherentfeatureoflanguage
larbitrairedusigne,andHurford(1989),usingevolutionarygametheory,
demonstratestheevolutionarystabilityofsuchaSaussureanstrategywhereby
eachlearnerusesthesamearbitrarysignsinproductionthatitusesin
comprehension(i.e.,thatotherspeakersuseinproduction).Moregenerally,
theseconsiderationssuggestthatapreferenceforarbitrarinessisbuiltintothe
languageacquisitiondeviceattwolevels.Itonlyhypothesizesrulesthatfall
withinthe(possiblyarbitrary)setdefinedbyuniversalgrammar,andwithinthat
set,ittriestochooserulesthatmatchthoseusedbythecommunity,whatever
theyare.

Thebenefitsofalearningmechanismdesignedtoassessandadoptthe
prevailingparitysettingsbecomeespeciallyclearwhenweconsideralternatives,
suchastryingtogeteachspeakertoconvergeonthesamestandardby
endogenouslyapplyingsomerationaletopredictformfrommeaning.Thereare
manypossiblerationalesforanyformmeaningpairing,andthatisexactlythe
problemdifferentrationalescanimpressdifferentspeakers,orthesame
speakersondifferentoccasions,todifferentdegrees.Butsuchdifferencesin
cognitivestyle,personalhistory,ormomentaryinterestsmustbesetasideif
peoplearetocommunicate.Asmentioned,nogrammaticaldevicecan
simultaneouslyoptimizethedemandsoftalkersandhearers,butitwillnotdoto
talkinSerboCroatiananddemandthatoneslistenersreplyinTurkish.
Furthermore,whenevercognitionisflexibleenoughtoconstrueasituationin
morethanoneway,nosimplecorrespondencebetweensyntaxandsemantics
canbeusedpredictivelybyacommunityofspeakerstodeducethemost
logicalgrammaticalstructure.Forexample,thereisasimpleanduniversal
principledictatingthatthesurfacedirectobjectofacausativeverbreferstoan
entitythatisaffectedbytheaction.Buttheprinciplebyitselfisunusable.When
agirlputsboxesinbasketssheisliterallyaffectingboth:theboxesarechanging
location,andthebasketsarechangingstatefromemptytofull.Onewouldnot
wantoneperceiverinterestedintheboxestosaythatsheisfillingboxeswhile
anotherinterestedinthebasketstodescribethesameeventasfillingbaskets;no
onewouldknowwhatwentwhere.Howeverbylettingdifferentverbs
idiosyncraticallyselectdifferentkindsofentitiesasaffected(e.g.,placethe
box/*basketversusfillthebasket/*box),andforcinglearnerstorespecttheverbs
wishes,grammarcanallowspeakerstospecifydifferentkindsofentitiesas
affectedbyputtingtheminthedirectobjectpositionofdifferentverbs,with
minimalambiguity.Presumablythisiswhydifferentverbshavedifferent
arbitrarysyntacticprivileges(Pinker,1989b),aphenomenonthatPiattelli
Palmarini(1989)describesatlength.Eveniconicityandonomatopoeiaareinthe
eyeandearofthebeholder.TheASLsignfortreeresemblesthemotionofa
treewavinginthewind,butinChineseSignLanguageitisthemotionof
sketchingthetrunk(Newport&Meier,1985).IntheUnitedStates,pigsgo
oink;inJapan,theygobooboo.

3.4.3.ArbitrarinessandtheRelationBetweenLanguageEvolutionand
Language

Acquisition

Theneedforarbitrarinesshasprofoundconsequencesforunderstandingtherole
ofcommunicativefunctioninlanguageacquisitionandlanguageevolution.
Manypsychologistsandartificialintelligenceresearchershavesuggestedthatthe
structureofgrammarissimplythesolutionthateverychildarrivesatinsolving
theproblemofhowtocommunicatewithothers.Skinnersreinforcementtheory
isthestrongestversionofthishypothesis(Skinner,1957),butversionsthatavoid
hisbehaviorismandrelyinsteadongeneralcognitiveproblemsolvingabilities
havealwaysbeenpopularwithinpsychology.BothSkinnerandcognitive
theoristssuchasBatesetal.(1989)explicitlydrawparallelsbetweentheroleof
functioninlearningandevolution.Chomskyandmanyotherlinguistsand
psycholinguistshavearguedagainstfunctionalisminontogeny,showingthat
manyaspectsofgrammarcannotbereducedtobeingtheoptimalsolutiontoa
communicativeproblem;rather,humangrammarhasauniversalidiosyncratic
logicofitsown.Moregenerally,Chomskyhasemphasizedthatpeoplesuseof
languagedoesnottightlyserveutilitariangoalsofcommunicationbutisan
autonomouscompetencetoexpressthought(see,e.g.,Chomsky,1975).If
communicativefunctiondoesnotshapelanguageintheindividual,onemight
conclude,itprobablydidnotshapelanguageinthespecies.
Wesuggestthattheanalogythatunderpinsthisdebateismisleading.Itisnot
justthatlearningandevolutionneednotfollowidenticallaws,selectionistor
otherwise.(Forexample,asChomskyhimselfhasstressed,theissuenevereven
comesupinclearercaseslikevision,wherenobodysuggeststhatallinfants
visualdevelopmentisrelatedtotheirdesiretoseeorthatvisualsystemsdevelop
withrandomvariationsthatareselectedbyvirtueoftheirabilitytoattainthe
childsgoals.)Inthecaseoflanguagetheargumentsofsection3.4suggestthat
languageevolutionandlanguageacquisitionnotonlycandifferbutthatthey
mustdiffer.Evolutionhashadawidevarietyofequivalentcommunicative
standardstochoosefrom;thereisnoreasonforittohavefavoredtheclassof
languagesthatincludesApacheandYiddish,butnotOldHighMartianorEarly
Vulcan.Butthisflexibilityhasbeenusedupbythetimeachildisborn;the
speciesandthelanguagecommunityhavealreadymadetheirchoices.Thechild
cannotlearnjustanyusefulcommunicativesystem;norcanheorshelearnjust
anynaturallanguage.Heorsheisstuckwithhavingtolearntheparticularkind
oflanguagethespecieseventuallyconvergeduponandtheparticularvarietythe
communityhaschosen.Whateverrationalesmayhaveinfluencedthesechoices
areburiedinhistoryandcannotberecapitulatedindevelopment.

Moreover,anycodeascomplexandpreciseasagrammarforanaturallanguage
willnotwearitsprotocolonitssleeve.Nomortalcomputerusercaninducean
entirecommunicationsprotocolorprogramminglanguagefromexamples;thats
whywehavemanuals.Thisisbecauseanyparticularinstanceoftheuseofsuch
aprotocolisauniqueeventaccompaniedbyahugesetofidiosyncratic
circumstances,somerelevanttohowthecodemustbeused,mostirrelevant,and
thereisnowayofdecidingwhichiswhich.Forthechild,anysentenceorsetof
sentencesiscompatiblewithawidevarietyofverydifferentgrammars,onlyone
ofthemcorrect(Chomsky,1965,1975,1980,1981;Pinker,1979,1984;Wexlerand
Culicover,1980).Forexample,withoutpriorconstraints,itwouldbenaturalto
generalizefrominputsentenceslikeWhodidyouseeherwith?to*Whodidyou
seeherand?,fromteethmarksto*clawsmarks,fromYoubetterbegoodto
*Betteryoubegood?.Thechildhasnomanualtoconsult,andpresumablythatis
whyheorsheneedsinnateconstraints.

Soweseeareasonwhyfunctionalisttheoriesoftheevolutionoflanguagecanbe
truewhilefunctionalisttheoriesoftheacquisitionoflanguagecanbefalse.From
theverystartoflanguageacquisition,childrenobeygrammaticalconstraintsthat
affordthemnoimmediatecommunicativeadvantage.Totakejustoneexample,
1and2yearoldsacquiringEnglishobeyaformalconstraintonphrasestructure
configurationsconcerningthedistinctionbetweenlexicalcategoriesandphrasal
categoriesandasaresultavoidplacingdeterminersandadjectivesbefore
pronounsandpropernames.Theywillusephraseslikebigdogtoexpressthe
beliefthataparticulardogisbig,buttheywillneverusephraseslikebigFredor
bighetoexpressthebeliefthataparticularpersonisbig(Bloom,inpress).
Childrenrespectthisconstraintdespitethelimitsitputsontheirexpressive
range.

Furthermore,despiteunsupportedsuggestionstothecontraryamong
developmentalpsychologists,manystridesinlanguagedevelopmentaffordthe
childnolocallydiscernibleincrementincommunicativeability(Maratsos,1983,
1989).Whenchildrensaybreakedandcomed,theyareusingasystemthatisfar
simplerandmorelogicalthantheadultcombinationofaregularruleand150
irregularmemorizedexceptions.Sucherrorsdonotreliablyelicitparental
correctionsorotherconversationalfeedback(BrownandHanlon,1970;Morgan
andTravis,inpress).Thereisnodeficitincomprehensibility;themeaningof
comedisperfectlyclear.Infactthechildssystemhasgreaterexpressivepower
thattheadults.Whenchildrensayhittedandcutted,theyaredistinguishing
betweenpastandnonpastformsinamannerthatisunavailabletoadults,who
mustusehitandcutacrosstheboard.Whydochildreneventuallyabandonthis
simple,logical,expressivesystem?Theymustbeprogrammedsothatthemere
requirementofconformitytotheadultcode,assubtleandarbitraryasitis,wins
overotherdesiderata.

Therequirementthatacommunicativecodehaveaninnatearbitraryfoundation
(universalgrammar,inthecaseofhumans)mayhaveanalogueselsewherein
biology.Mayr(1982:612)notesthat

Behaviorthatservesascommunication,forinstancecourtshipbehavior,mustbe
stereotypedinordernottobemisunderstood.Thegeneticprogramcontrolling
suchbehaviormustbeclosed,thatis,itmustbereasonablyresistanttoany
changesduringtheindividuallifecycle.Otherbehaviors,forinstancethosethat
controlthechoiceoffoodorhabitat,musthaveacertainamountofflexibilityin
ordertopermittheincorporationofnewexperiences;suchbehaviorsmustbe
controlledbyanopenprogram.

Insum,therequirementforstandardizationofcommunicationprotocolsdictates
thatitisbetterfornaturetobuildalanguageacquisitiondevicethatpicksupthe
codeoftheambientlanguagethanonethatinventsacodethatisusefulfroma
childseyeview.Acquiringsuchacodefromexamplesisnomeanfeat,andso
manygrammaticalprinciplesandconstraintsmustbehardwiredintothedevice.
Thusevenifthefunctionsofgrammaticaldevicesplayanimportantrolein
evolution,theymayplaynoroleinacquisition.

4.ArgumentsforLanguageBeingaSpandrel
Giventhatthecriteriaforbeinganadaptationappeartobesatisfiedinthecaseof
language,wecanexaminethestrengthofthecompetingexplanationsthat
languageisaspandrelsuggestedbyGould,Chomsky,andPiattelliPalmarini.

4.1.TheMindasaMultipurposeLearningDevice

ThemainmotivationforGouldsspecificsuggestionthatlanguageisaspandrel
ishisfrequentlystatedpositionthatthemindisasinglegeneralpurpose
computer.Forexample,aspartofacritiqueofatheoryoftheoriginoflanguage,
Gould(1979:386)writes:

Idontdoubtforamomentthatthebrainsenlargementinhumanevolutionhad
anadaptivebasismediatedbyselection.ButIwouldbemorethanmildly
surprisedifmanyofthespecificthingsitnowcandoaretheproductofdirect
selectionforthatparticularbehavior.Onceyoubuildacomplexmachine,itcan
performsomanyunanticipatedtasks.Buildacomputerforprocessingmonthly
checksattheplant,anditcanalsoperformfactoranalysesonhumanskeletal
measures,playRogeriananalyst,andwhipanyonesass(oratleasttiethem
perpetually)intictactoe.

Theanalogyissomewhatmisleading.Itisjustnottruethatyoucantakea
computerthatprocessesmonthlychecksanduseittoplayRogeriananalyst;
someonehastoreprogramitfirst.Languagelearningisnotprogramming:
parentsprovidetheirchildrenwithsentencesofEnglish,notrulesofEnglish.We
suggestthatnaturalselectionwastheprogrammer.

Theanalogycouldbemodifiedbyimaginingsomemachineequippedwitha
singleprogramthatcanlearnfromexamplestocalculatemonthlychecks,
performfactoranalyses,andplayRogeriananalyst,allwithoutexplicit
programming.Suchadevicedoesnotnowexistinartificialintelligenceanditis
unlikelytoexistinbiologicalintelligence.Thereisnopsychologicallyrealistic
multipurposelearningprogramthatcanacquirelanguageasaspecialcase,
becausethekindsofgeneralizationsthatmustbemadetoacquireagrammarare
atcrosspurposeswiththosethatareusefulinacquiringothersystemsof
knowledgefromexamples(Chomsky,1982;Pinker,1979,1984;Wexlerand
Culicover,1980).Thegrossfactsaboutthedissociabilityoflanguageandother
learnedculturalsystems,listedinthefirstparagraphofthispaper,alsobeliethe
suggestionthatlanguageisaspandrelofanygeneralcognitivelearningability.

4.2.ConstraintsonPossibleForms

Thetheorythatthemindisanallpurposelearningdeviceisofcourseanathema
toChomsky(andtoPiattelliPalmarini),makingitapuzzlethattheyshouldfind
themselvesingeneralagreementwithGould.Recently,Gould(1989)has
describedsomecommonground.Chomsky,hesuggests,isintheContinental
traditionoftryingtoexplainevolutionbystructurallawsconstrainingpossible
organicforms.Forexample,Chomskywrites:

Instudyingtheevolutionofmind,wecannotguesstowhatextentthereare
physicallypossiblealternativesto,say,transformationalgenerativegrammar,for
anorganismmeetingcertainotherphysicalconditionscharacteristicofhumans.
Conceivably,therearenoneorveryfewinwhichcasetalkaboutevolution
ofthelanguagecapacityisbesidethepoint.(1972:9798).

Theseskills[e.g.,learningagrammar]maywellhavearisenasaconcomitantof
structuralpropertiesofthebrainthatdevelopedforotherreasons.Supposethat
therewasselectionforbiggerbrains,morecorticalsurface,hemispheric
specializationforanalyticprocessing,ormanyotherstructuralpropertiesthat
canbeimagined.Thebrainthatevolvedmightwellhaveallsortsofspecial
propertiesthatarenotindividuallyselected;therewouldbenomiracleinthis,
butonlythenormalworkingsofevolution.Wehavenoidea,atpresent,how

10physicallawsapplywhen10neuronsareplacedinanobjectthesizeofa
basketball,underthespecialconditionsthataroseduringhumanevolution.
(1982:321)

Inthisregard[theevolutionofinfinitedigitalsystems],speculationsabout
naturalselectionarenomoreplausiblethanmanyothers;perhapstheseare
simplyemergentphysicalpropertiesofabrainthatreachesacertainlevelof
complexityunderthespecificconditionsofhumanevolution.(1988b:22inms.)

AlthoughChomskydoesnotliterallyargueforanyspecificevolutionary
hypothesis,herepeatedlyurgesustoconsiderphysicallawsaspossible
alternativestonaturalselection.Butitisnoteasytoseeexactlywhatweshould
beconsidering.Itiscertainlytruethatnaturalselectioncannotexplainallaspects
oftheevolutionoflanguage.Butisthereanyreasontobelievethatthereareas
yetundiscoveredtheoremsofphysicsthatcanaccountfortheintricatedesignof
naturallanguage?Ofcoursehumanbrainsobeythelawsofphysics,andalways
did,butthatdoesnotmeanthattheirspecificstructurecanbeexplainedbysuch
laws.

Moreplausibly,wemightlooktoconstraintsonthepossibleneuralbasisfor
languageanditsepigeneticgrowth.Butneuraltissueiswiredupby
developmentalprocessesthatactinsimilarwaysalloverthecortexandtoa
lesserdegreeacrosstheanimalkingdom(DoddandJessell,1988;Harrelsonand
Goodman,1988).Indifferentorganismsithasevolvedtheabilitytoperformthe
computationsnecessaryforpollensourcecommunication,celestialnavigation,
Dopplershiftecholocation,stereopsis,controlledflight,dambuilding,sound
mimicry,andfacerecognition.Thespaceofphysicallypossibleneuralsystems
thuscantbeallthatsmall,asfarasspecificcomputationalabilitiesare
concerned.Anditismostunlikelythatlawsactingatthelevelofsubstrate
adhesionmoleculesandsynapticcompetition,whentheireffectsareprojected
upwardthroughmanylevelsofscaleandhierarchicalorganization,would
automaticallyresultinsystemsthataccomplishinterestingengineeringtasksina
worldofmediumsizedobjects.

Changesinbrainquantitycouldleadtochangesinbrainquality.Butmere
largenessofbrainisneitheranecessarynorasufficientconditionforlanguage,
asLennebergs(1967)studiesofnanencephalyandcraniometricstudiesof
individualvariationhaveshown.Noristherereasontothinkthatifyousimply
pilemoreandmoreneuronsintoacircuitormoreandmorecircuitsintoabrain
thatcomputationallyinterestingabilitieswouldjustemerge.Itseemsmorelikely
thatyouwouldendupwithaverybigrandompatterngenerator.Neural
networkmodelingeffortshavesuggestedthatcomplexcomputationalabilities
requireeitherextrinsicallyimposeddesignornumerousrichlystructuredinputs
duringlearningorboth(Pinker&Prince,1988;Lachter&Bever,1988),anyof
whichwouldbeinconsistentwithChomskyssuggestions.

Finally,theremaybedirectevidenceagainstthespeculationthatlanguageisa
necessaryphysicalconsequenceofhowhumanbrainscangrow.Gopnik(1990a,
b)describesasyndromeofdevelopmentaldysphasiawhosesuffererslack
controlofmorphologicalfeaturessuchasnumber,gender,tense,andcase.
Otherwisetheyareintellectuallynormal.One10yearoldboyearnedthetop
gradeinhismathematicsclassandisarespectablecomputerprogrammer.This
showsthatahumanbrainlackingcomponentsofgrammar,perhapsevenabrain
withthecapacityofdiscreteinfinity,isphysicallyandneurodevelopmentally
possible.

Insum,thereisnosupportforthehypothesisthatlanguageemergesfrom
physicallawsactinginunknownwaysinalargebrain.Whiletherearenodoubt
aspectsofthesystemthatcanonlybeexplainedbyhistorical,developmental,or
randomprocesses,themostlikelyexplanationforthecomplexstructureofthe
languagefacultyisthatitisadesignimposedonneuralcircuitryasaresponseto
evolutionarypressures.

5.TheProcessofLanguageEvolution

ForuniversalgrammartohaveevolvedbyDarwiniannaturalselection,itisnot
enoughthatitbeusefulinsomegeneralsense.Theremusthavebeengenetic
variationamongindividualsintheirgrammaticalcompetence.Theremusthave
beenaseriesofstepsleadingfromnolanguageatalltolanguageaswenowfind
it,eachstepsmallenoughtohavebeenproducedbyarandommutationor
recombination,andeachintermediategrammarusefultoitspossessor.Every
detailofgrammaticalcompetencethatwewishtoascribetoselectionmusthave
conferredareproductiveadvantageonitsspeakers,andthisadvantagemustbe
largeenoughtohavebecomefixedintheancestralpopulation.Andtheremust
beenoughevolutionarytimeandgenomicspaceseparatingourspeciesfrom
nonlinguisticprimateancestors.

Therearenoconclusivedataonanyoftheseissues.Howeverthishasnot
preventedvariouspeoplefromclaimingthateachofthenecessarypostulatesis
false!Wearguethatwhatwedoknowfromthebiologyoflanguageand
evolutionmakeseachofthepostulatesquiteplausible.

5.1.GeneticVariation

Lieberman(1984,1989)claimsthattheChomskyanuniversalgrammarcouldnot
haveevolved.Hewrites:

Thepremisesthatunderliecurrentnativistlinguistictheory

...areoutoftouchwithmodernbiology.ErnstMayr(1982),inhisdefinitive
work,TheGrowthofBiologicalThought,discussesthesebasicprinciplesthat
muststructureanybiologicallymeaningfulnativisttheory....[oneofthe
principlesis:]Essentialisticthinking(e.g.,characterizinghumanlinguisticability
intermsofauniformhypotheticaluniversalgrammar)isinappropriatefor
describingthebiologicalendowmentoflivingorganisms.(1989:203205)

Atruenativisttheorymustaccommodategeneticvariation.Adetailed
geneticallytransmitteduniversalgrammarthatisidenticalforeveryhumanon
theplanetisoutsidetherangeofbiologicalplausibility.(1989:223)

ThisispartofLiebermansargumentthatsyntaxisacquiredbygeneralpurpose
learningabilities,notbyadedicatedmoduleorsetofmodules.Butthepassages
quotedabovecontainavarietyofmisunderstandingsanddistortions.
ChomskianlinguisticsistheantithesisofthekindofessentialismthatMayr
decries.IttreatssuchdisembodiedinterindividualentitiesasTheEnglish
Languageasunrealepiphenomena.Theonlyscientificallygenuineentitiesare
individualgrammarssituatedintheheadsofindividualspeakers(seeChomsky,
1986,forextendeddiscussion).True,grammarsforparticularlanguages,and
universalgrammar,areoftenprovisionallyidealizedasasinglekindofsystem.
Butthisiscommonplaceinsystemslevelphysiologyandanatomy;forexample
thestructureofthehumaneyeisalwaysdescribedasifallindividualssharedit
andindividualvariationandpathologyarediscussedasdeviationsfromanorm.
Thisisbecausenaturalselection,whilefeedingonvariation,usesitup(Ridley,
1986;Sober,1984).Inadaptivelycomplexstructuresinparticular,thevariation
weseedoesnotconsistofqualitativedifferencesinbasicdesign,andthissurely
appliestocomplexmentalstructuresaswell(ToobyandCosmides,1989).

Also,contrarytowhatLiebermanimplies,theredoesexistvariationin
grammaticalability.Withintherangethatwewouldcallnormalweallknow
someindividualswhohabituallyusetangledsyntaxandotherswhospeakwith
elegance,somewhoarelinguisticallycreativeandotherswholeanoncliches,
somewhoarefastidiousconformistsandotherswhobendandstretchthe
languageinvariousways.Atleastsomeofthisvariationisprobablyrelatedto
thestrengthoraccessibilityofdifferentgrammaticalsubsystems,andatleast
some,wesuspect,isgenetic,thekindofthingthatwouldbesharedbyidentical
twinsrearedapart.Morespecifically,Bever,Carrithers,Cowart,andTownsend
(1989)haveextensiveexperimentaldatashowingthatrighthanderswitha
familyhistoryoflefthandednessshowlessrelianceonsyntacticanalysisand
morerelianceonlexicalassociationthandopeoplewithoutsuchagenetic
background.

Moreover,beyondthenormalrangetherearedocumentedgenetically
transmittedsyndromesofgrammaticaldeficits.Lenneberg(1967)notesthat
specificlanguagedisabilityisadominantpartiallysexlinkedtraitwithalmost
completepenetrance(seealsoLudlowandCooper,1983,foraliteraturereview).
Morestrikingly,Gopnik(1990b)hasfoundafamilialselectivedeficitintheuseof
morphologicalfeatures(gender,number,tense,etc.)thatactsasifitiscontrolled
byadominantgene.

Thisdoesnotmeanthatweshouldeasilyfindcasesofinheritedsubjacency
deficiencyoranaphorblindness.Pleiotropysinglegenechangesthatcause
apparentlyunrelatedphenotypiceffectsisubiquitous,sothereisnoreasonto
thinkthateveryaspectofgrammarthathasageneticbasismustbecontrolledby
asinglegene.Havingarighthandhasageneticbasisbutgeneticdeficitsdonot
leadtobabiesbeingbornwithexactlyonehandmissing.Moreover,evenifthere
wasapurelackofsomegrammaticaldeviceamongsomepeople,itmaynotbe
easilydiscoveredwithoutintensiveanalysisofthepersonsperceptionsof
carefullyconstructedlinguisticexamples.Differentgrammaticalsubsystemscan
generatesuperficiallysimilarconstructionsandahypotheticalvictimofadeficit
maycompensateinwaysthatwouldbedifficulttodetect.Indeedcasesof
divergentunderlyinganalysesofasingleconstructionarefrequentcausesof
historicalchange.

5.2.IntermediateSteps

Somepeoplehavedoubtedthatanevolutionarysequenceofincreasingly
complexandspecializeduniversalgrammarsispossible.Theintermediatelinks,
ithasbeensuggested,wouldnothavebeenviablecommunicationsystems.
Theseargumentsfallintothreeclasses.

5.2.1.NonsharedInnovations.

Geschwind(1980),amongothers,haswonderedhowahypotheticalbeneficial
grammaticalmutationcouldreallyhavebenefiteditspossessor,giventhatnone
ofthepersonslessevolvedcompatriotscouldhaveunderstoodhimorher.One
possibleansweristhatanysuchmutationislikelytobesharedbyindividuals
whoaregeneticallyrelated.Sincemuchcommunicationisamongkin,a
linguisticmutantwillbeunderstoodbysomeofhisorherrelativesandthe
resultingenhancementsininformationsharingwillbenefiteachoneofthem
relativetootherswhoarenotrelated.

Butwethinkthereisamoregeneralanswer.Comprehensionabilitiesdonot
havetobeinperfectsynchronywithproductionabilities.Comprehensioncan
usecognitiveheuristicsbasedonprobableeventstodecodewordsequences
evenintheabsenceofgrammaticalknowledge.Ungrammaticalstringslikeskid
crashhospitalarequiteunderstandable,andwefindwecandoareasonably
goodjobunderstandingItaliannewspaperstoriesbasedonafewcognatesand
generalexpectancies.Atthesametimegrammaticalsophisticationinsuch
sourcesdoesnotgounappreciated.WeareunabletoduplicateShakespeares
complexearlyModernEnglishbutwecanappreciatethesubtletiesofhis
expressions.Whensomeindividualsaremakingimportantdistinctionsthatcan
bedecodedwithcognitiveeffort,itcouldsetupapressurefortheevolutionof
neuralmechanismsthatwouldmakethisdecodingprocessbecomeincreasingly
automatic,unconscious,andundistractedbyirrelevantaspectsofworld
knowledge.Thesearesomeofthehallmarksofaninnategrammaticalmodule
(Fodor,1983).Theprocesswherebyenvironmentallyinducedresponsessetup
selectionpressuresforsuchresponsestobecomeinnate,triggeringconventional
DarwinianevolutionthatsuperficiallymimicsaLamarckiansequence,is
sometimesknownastheBaldwinEffect.

Notalllinguisticinnovationsneedbeginwithageneticchangeinthelinguistic
abilitiesofspeakers.FormerSecretaryofStateAlexanderHaigachieved
notorietywithexpressionssuchasLetmecaveatthatorThatstatementhastobe
properlynuanced.Aslistenerswecringeattheungrammaticalitybutwehave
notroubleunderstandinghimandwouldbehardpressedtocomeupwitha
concisegrammaticalalternative.ThedoublestandardexemplifiedbyHaigspeak
isfairlycommoninspeech(Pinker,1989b).Mostlikelythiswasalwaystrue,and
innovationsdrivenbycognitiveprocessesexploitinganalogy,metaphor,
iconicity,consciousfolketymology,andsoon,ifusefulenough,couldsetup
pressuresforbothspeakersandhearerstogrammaticizethoseinnovations.Note
aswellthatifasinglementaldatabaseisusedinproductionandcomprehension
(BresnanandKaplan,1982)evolutionarychangesinresponsetopressureonone
performancewouldautomaticallytransfertotheother.

5.2.2.CategoricalRules.

Manylinguisticrulesarecategorical,allornoneoperationsonsymbols(see,e.g.,
PinkerandPrince,1988,1989).Howcouldsuchstructuresevolveinagradual
sequence?Batesetal.(1989),presumablyechoingGoulds5%ofaneye,(1989)
write:

Whatprotoformcanwepossiblyenvisionthatcouldhavegivenbirthto
constraintsontheextractionofnounphrasesfromanembeddedclause?What
coulditconceivablymeanforanorganismtopossesshalfasymbol,orthree
quartersofarule?(p.3)...monadicsymbols,absoluterulesandmodularsystems
mustbeacquiredasawhole,onayesornobasisaprocessthatcriesoutfora
Creationistexplanation.(p.30)

However,twoissuesarebeingcollapsedhere.Whileonemightjustifiablyargue
thatanentiresystemofgrammarmustevolveinagradualcontinuoussequence,
thatdoesnotmeanthateveryaspectofeveryrulemustevolveinagradual
continuoussequence.Asmentioned,mutantfruitfliescanhaveafullleg
growingwhereanantennashouldbeandtheevolutionofnewtaxawith
differentnumbersofappendagesfromtheirancestorsisoftenattributedtosuch
homeoticmutations.Nosinglemutationorrecombinationcouldhaveledtoan
entireuniversalgrammar,butitcouldhaveledaparentwithannrulegrammar
tohaveanoffspringwithann+1rulegrammar,oraparentwithanmsymbol
ruletohaveanoffspringwithanm+1symbolrule.Itcouldalsoleadtoaparent
withnogrammaticalrulesatallandjustroteassociationstohaveanoffspring
withasinglerule.Grammaticalrulesaresymbolmanipulationswhoseskeletal
formissharedbymanyothermentalsystems.Indeeddiscretesymbol
manipulations,freefromgradedapplicationbasedonsimilaritytomemorized
cases,ishighlyusefulinmanydomainsofcognition,especiallythoseinvolving
sociallysharedinformation(Freyd,1983;PinkerandPrince,1989;Smolensky,
1988).Ifageneticchangecausedgenericcopiesofanonlinguisticsymbol
replacementoperationtopopupwithintheneuralsystemunderlying
communication,suchprotorulescouldbeputtouseaspartsofencodingand
decodingschemes,whereupontheycouldbesubjecttoselectiveforcestailoring
themtospecificdemandsoflanguage.Rozin(1976)andShepard(1986)have
arguedthattheevolutionofintelligencewasmadepossiblebyjustsuch
sequences.

5.2.3.PerturbationsofFormalGrammars.

Grammarsarethoughttobecomplexcomputationalsystemswithmany
interactingrulesandconditions.Chomsky(1981)hasemphasizedhow
grammarshavearichdeductivestructureinwhichaminorchangetoasingle
principlecanhavedramaticeffectsonthelanguageasawholeasitseffects
cascadethroughgrammaticalderivations.Thisraisesthequestionofhowthe
entiresystemcouldbeviableunderthefarmoremajorperturbationsthatcould
beexpectedduringevolutionaryhistory.Doesgrammardegradegracefullyas
weextrapolatebackwardsintime?Wouldauniversalgrammarwithanaltered
ormissingversionofsomecomponentbegoodforanything,orwoulditresultin
nothingbutblockedderivations,filteredconstructions,andpartialstructures?
Lieberman(1989:200)claimsthatTheonlymodelofhumanevolutionthat
wouldbeconsistentwiththecurrentstandardlinguistictheoryisasudden
saltationthatfurnishedhumanbeingswiththeneuralbasesforlanguage.
Similarly,Bates,etal.(1989:23)claimthatIfthebasicstructuralprinciplesof
languagecannotbelearned(bottomup)orderived(topdown),thereareonly
twopossibleexplanationsfortheirexistence:eitherUniversalGrammarwas
endowedtousdirectlybytheCreator,orelseourspecieshasundergonea
mutationofunprecedentedmagnitude,acognitiveequivalentoftheBigBang.

Butsuchargumentsarebasedonaconfusion.Whileagrammarforanexisting
languagecannottolerateminorperturbationsandstillbeagrammarfora
languagethatamodernlinguistwouldrecognize,thatdoesnotmeanthatit
cannotbeagrammaratall.Toputitcrudely,thereisnorequirementthatthe
languagesofHomoErectusfallintotheclassofpossibleHomoSapiens
languages.Furthermorelanguageabilitiesconsistofnotjustformalgrammarbut
alsosuchnonlinguisticcognitiveprocessesasanalogy,rotememory,and
Haigspeak.Chomsky(1981)referstosuchprocessesasconstitutingthe
peripheryofgrammarbutabettermetaphormayputthemintheinterstices,
wheretheywouldfunctionasakindofjerryriggingthatcouldallowformally
incompletegrammarstobeusedingeneratingandcomprehendingsentences.

Theassertionthatanaturallanguagegrammareitherfunctionsasawholeornot
atallissurprisinglycommon.Butithasnomoremeritthansimilarclaimsabout
eyes,wings,andwebsthatfrequentlypopupintheantiDarwinianliterature
(seeDawkins,1986,forexamples),andwhichoccasionallytriggerhastyleapsto
claimsaboutexaptation.Pidgins,contactlanguages,BasicEnglish,andthe
languageofchildren,immigrants,tourists,aphasics,telegrams,andheadlines
provideampleproofthatthereisavastcontinuumofviablecommunicative
systemsdisplayingacontinuousgradationofefficiencyandexpressivepower
(seeBickerton,1986).Thisisexactlywhatthetheoryofnaturalselectionrequires.

Oursuggestionsaboutinteractionsbetweenlearningandinnatestructurein
evolutionaresupportedbyaninterestingsimulationoftheBaldwineffectby
HintonandNowlan(1987).Theyconsidertheworstimaginablescenariofor
evolutionbysmallsteps:aneuralnetworkwith20connections(whichcanbe
eitherexcitatoryorinhibitory)thatconveysnofitnessadvantageunlessall20are
correctlyset.Sonotonlyisitnogoodtohave5%ofthenetwork;itsnogoodto
have95%.Inapopulationoforganismswhoseconnectionsaredeterminedby
randommutationsafittermutantarisesatarateofonlyaboutonceeverymillion
(2)geneticallydistinctorganisms,anditsadvantagesareimmediatelylostifthe
organismreproducessexually.Butnowconsideranorganismwherethe
connectionsareeithergeneticallyfixedtooneortheothervalueoraresettable
bylearning,determinedbyrandommutationwithanaverageof10connections
fixed.Theorganismtriesoutrandomsettingsforthemodifiableconnections
untilithitsuponthecombinationthatisadvantageous;thisisrecognizabletothe
organismandcausesittoretainthosesettings.Havingattainedthatstatethe
organismenjoysahigherrateofreproduction;thesooneritattainsit,thegreater
thebenefit.Insuchapopulationthereisanadvantagetohavinglessthan100%
ofthecorrectnetwork.Amongtheorganismswith,say,10innateconnections,
theoneineverythousand(2)thathastherightoneswillhavesomeprobability
ofattainingtheentirenetwork;inathousandlearningtrials,thisprobabilityis
fairlyhigh.Fortheoffspringofthatorganism,thereareincreasingadvantagesto
havingmoreandmoreofthecorrectconnectionsinnatelydetermined,because
withmorecorrectconnectionstobeginwith,ittakeslesstimetolearntherest,
andthechancesofgoingthroughlifewithouthavinglearnedthemgetsmaller.

HintonandNowlanconfirmedtheseintuitionsinacomputersimulation,
demonstratingnicelythatlearningcanguideevolution,astheargumentinthis
sectionrequires,byturningaspikeinfitnessspaceintoagradient.Moreover
theymadeaninterestingdiscovery.Thoughthereisalwaysaselectionpressure
tomakelearnableconnectionsinnate,thispressurediminishessharplyasmostof
theconnectionscometobeinnatelyset,becauseitbecomesincreasinglyunlikely
thatlearningwillfailfortherest.Thisisconsistentwiththespeculationthatthe
multiplicityofhumanlanguagesisinpartaconsequenceoflearning
mechanismsexistingpriorto(oratleastindependentof)themechanisms
specificallydedicatedtolanguage.Suchlearningdevicesmayhavebeenthe
sectionsoftheladderthatevolutionhadnoneedtokickaway.

5.3.ReproductiveAdvantagesofBetterGrammars

DavidPremack(1985:281282)writes:
Ichallengethereadertoreconstructthescenariothatwouldconferselective
fitnessonrecursiveness.Languageevolved,itisconjectured,atatimewhen
humansorprotohumanswerehuntingmastodons....Woulditbeagreat
advantageforoneofourancestorssquattingalongsidetheembers,tobeableto
remark:BewareoftheshortbeastwhosefronthoofBobcrackedwhen,having
forgottenhisownspearbackatcamp,hegotinaglancingblowwiththedull
spearheborrowedfromJack?
Humanlanguageisanembarrassmentforevolutionarytheorybecauseitis
vastlymorepowerfulthanonecanaccountforintermsofselectivefitness.A
semanticlanguagewithsimplemappingrules,ofakindonemightsupposethat
thechimpanzeewouldhave,appearstoconferalltheadvantagesonenormally
associateswithdiscussionsofmastodonhuntingorthelike.Fordiscussionsof
thatkind,syntacticclasses,structuredependentrules,recursionandtherest,are
overlypowerfuldevices,absurdlyso.

Premacksrhetoricalchallengecapturesaconvictionthatmanypeoplefind
compelling,perhapsevenselfevident,anditisworthconsideringwhy.Itisa
goodexampleofwhatDawkins(1986)callstheArgumentfromPersonal
Incredulity.Theargumentdrawsonpeoplespoorintuitivegraspofprobabilistic
processes,especiallythosethatoperateovertheimmensitiesoftimeavailablefor
evolution.Thepassagealsogainsintuitiveforcebecauseofthewidespread
stereotypeofprehistorichumansasgruntingcavemenwhosemainreproductive
challengewasrunningawayfromtigersorhuntingmastodons.Thecorollary
wouldseemtobethatonlyhumansinmodernindustrialsocietiesandmaybe
onlyacademics,itissometimesimpliedneedtousesophisticatedmental
machinery.Butcompellingasthesecommonsenseintuitionsare,theymustbe
resisted.

5.3.1.Effectsofsmallselectiveadvantages.

Firstonemustberemindedofthefactthattinyselectiveadvantagesare
sufficientforevolutionarychange.AccordingtoHaldanes(1924)classic
calculations,forexample,avariantthatproducesonaverage1percentmore
offspringthanitsalternativeallelewouldincreaseinfrequencyfrom0.1percent
to99.9percentofthepopulationinjustover4,000generations.Eveninlong
livedhumansthisfitscomfortablyintotheevolutionarytimetable.(Needlessto
sayfixationsofdifferentgenescangooninparallel.)Furthermorethe
phenotypiceffectsofabeneficialgeneticchangeneednotbeobservableinany
singlegeneration.Stebbins(1982)constructsamathematicalscenarioinwhicha
mouselikeanimalissubjecttoselectionpressureforincreasedsize.Thepressure
issosmallthatitcannotbemeasuredbyhumanobservers,andtheactual
increaseinsizefromonegenerationtothenextisalsososmallthatitcannotbe
measuredagainstthenoiseofindividualvariation.Nonethelessthismouse
wouldevolvetothesizeofanelephantin12,000generations,asliceoftimethat
isgeologicallyinstantaneous.Finally,verysmalladvantagescanalsoplaya
roleinmacroevolutionarysuccessionsamongcompetingpopulationsofsimilar
organisms.Zubrow(1987)calculatesthata1%differenceinmortalityrates
amonggeographicallyoverlappingNeanderthalandmodernpopulationscould
haveledtotheextinctionoftheformerwithin30generations,orasingle
millennium.

5.3.2.Grammaticalcomplexityandtechnology.

Ithasoftenbeenpointedoutthatourspeciesischaracterizedbytwofeatures
technologyandsocialrelationsamongnonkinthathaveattainedlevelsof
complexityunprecedentedintheanimalkingdom.Toolmakingisthemost
widelyadvertisedability,buttheknowledgeunderlyingitisonlyapartof
humantechnologicalcompetence.Modernhuntergatherers,whoselifestyleis
ourbestsourceofevidenceforthatofourancestors,haveafolkbiology
encompassingknowledgeofthelifecycles,ecology,andbehaviorofwildplants
andanimalsthatisdetailedandthoroughenoughtoastonishandinform
professionalbotanistsandzoologists(Konner,1982:5).Thisabilityallowsthe
modern!KungSan,forexample,toenjoyanutritionallycompletedietwithsmall
amountsofeffortinwhatappearstoustobeabarrendesert.Isaacs(1983)
interpretsfossilremainsofhomebasesusedasevidenceforalifestyledepending
heavilyonacquiredknowledgeoftheenvironmentasfarbackastwomillion
yearsagoinHomoHabilis.Anoftnotedspecialfeatureofhumansisthatsuch
knowledgecanaccumulateacrossgenerations.Premack(1985)reviewsevidence
thatpedagogyisauniversalandspeciesspecifichumantrait,andtheusefulness
oflanguageinpedagogyisnotsomethingthatcanbereasonablydoubted.As
BrandonandHornstein(1986)emphasize,presumablythereisalargeselective
advantageconferredbybeingabletolearninawaythatisessentiallystimulus
free(Williams,1966,madeasimilarpoint.)Childrencanlearnfromaparentthat
afoodispoisonousoraparticularanimalisdangerous;theydonothaveto
observeorexperiencethisbythemselves.

Withregardtoadulttoadultpedagogy,Konner(1982:171)notesthatthe!Kung
discuss

everythingfromthelocationoffoodsourcestothebehaviorofpredatorstothe
movementsofmigratorygame.Notonlystories,butgreatstoresofknowledge
areexchangedaroundthefireamongthe!Kungandthedramatizations
perhapsbestofallbearknowledgecriticaltosurvival.Awayoflifethatis
difficultenoughwould,withoutsuchknowledge,becomesimplyimpossible.

Devicesdesignedforcommunicatingpreciseinformationabouttime,space,
predicateargumentrelations,restrictivemodification,andmodalityarenot
wastedinsuchefforts.Recursioninparticularisextraordinarilyuseful.Premack
repeatsacommonmisconceptionwhenheusestortuousphrasesasan
exemplificationofrecursivesyntax;withoutrecursionyoucantsaythemans
hatorIthinkheleft.Allyouneedforrecursionisanabilitytoembedaphrase
containinganounphrasewithinanothernounphraseoraclausewithinanother
clause,whichfallsoutofpairsofrulesassimpleasNP>detNPPandPP>P
NP.Givensuchacapacityonecannowspecifyreferencetoanobjecttoan
arbitrarilyfinelevelofprecision.Theseabilitiescanmakeabigdifference.For
example,itmakesabigdifferencewhetherafaroffregionisreachedbytaking
thetrailthatisinfrontofthelargetreeorthetrailthatthelargetreeisinfrontof.
Itmakesadifferencewhetherthatregionhasanimalsthatyoucaneatoranimals
thatcaneatyou.Itmakesadifferencewhetherithasfruitthatisripeorfruitthat
wasripeorfruitthatwillberipe.Itmakesadifferencewhetheryoucangetthere
ifyouwalkforthreedaysorwhetheryoucangetthereandwalkforthreedays.

5.3.3.Grammaticalcomplexityandsocialinteractions.

Whatislessgenerallyappreciatedishowimportantlinguisticallysupported
socialinteractionsaretoahuntergathererwayoflife.Humanseverywhere
dependoncooperativeeffortsforsurvival.Isaac(1983)reviewsevidencethata
lifestyledependingonsocialinteractionsamongnonkinwaspresentinHomo
Habilismorethantwomillionyearsago.Languageinparticularwouldseemto
bedeeplywovenintosuchinteractions,inamannerthatisnotqualitatively
differentfromthatofourownadvancedculture.Konner(1982)writes:

Warisunknown.Conflictswithinthegroupareresolvedbytalking,sometimes
halforallthenight,fornights,weeksonend.AftertwoyearswiththeSan,I
cametothinkofthePleistoceneepochofhumanhistory(thethreemillionyears
duringwhichweevolved)asoneinterminablemarathonencountergroup.When
wesleptinagrasshutinoneoftheirvillages,thereweremanynightswhenits
flimsywallsleakedchargedexchangesfromthecirclearoundthefire,frank
expressionsoffeelingandcontentionbeginningwhentheduskfireswerelitand
runningonuntilthedawn.(p.7)

Ifwhatlawyersandjudgesdoiswork,thenwhenthe!Kungsitupallnightata
meetingdiscussingahotlycontesteddivorce,thatisalsowork.Ifwhat
psychotherapistsandministersdoiswork,thenwhena!Kungmanorwoman
spendshoursinanenervatingtrancetryingtocurepeople,thatisalsowork(p.
371).
Relianceonsuchexchangesputsapremiumontheabilitytoconveysocially
relevantabstractinformationsuchastime,possession,beliefs,desires,
tendencies,obligations,truth,probability,hypotheticals,andcounterfactuals.
Onceagain,recursionisfarfrombeinganoverlypowerfuldevice.Thecapacity
toembedpropositionswithinotherpropositions,asin[HethinksthatS]or[She
saidthat[hethinksthatS]],isessentialtotheexpressionofbeliefsaboutthe
intentionalstatesofothers.

Furthermore,inagroupofcommunicatorscompetingforattentionand
sympathiesthereisapremiumontheabilitytoengage,interest,andpersuade
listeners.Thisinturnencouragesthedevelopmentofdiscourseandrhetorical
skillsandthepragmaticallyrelevantgrammaticaldevicesthatsupportthem.
Symons(1979)observationthattribalchiefsareoftenbothgiftedoratorsand
highlypolygynousisasplendidprodtoanyimaginationthatcannotconceiveof
howlinguisticskillscouldmakeaDarwiniandifference.

5.3.4.Socialuseoflanguageandevolutionaryacceleration.

Thesocialvalueofcomplexlanguageprobablyplayedaprofoundroleinhuman
evolutionthatisbestappreciatedbyexaminingthedynamicsofcooperative
interactionsamongindividuals.Asmentioned,humans,probablyearlyon,fell
intoalifestylethatdependedonextendedcooperationforfood,safety,
nurturance,andreproductiveopportunities.Thislifestylepresentsextraordinary
opportunitiesforevolutionarygainsandlosses.Ontheonehanditbenefitsall
participantsbysurmountingprisonersdilemmas.Ontheotherhanditis
vulnerabletoinvasionbycheaterswhoreapthebenefitswithoutpayingthe
costs(AxelrodandHamilton,1981;Cosmides,1989;Hamilton,1964;Maynard
Smith,1974;Trivers,1971).Theminimumcognitiveapparatusneededtosustain
thislifestyleismemoryforindividualsandtheabilitytoenforcesocialcontracts
oftheformIfyoutakeabenefitthenyoumustpayacost(Cosmides,1989).
Thisaloneputsademandonthelinguisticexpressionofrathersubtlesemantic
distinctions.Itmakesadifferencewhetheryouunderstandmeassayingthatif
yougivemesomeofyourfruitIwillsharemeatthatIwillget,orthatyou
shouldgivemesomefruitbecauseIsharedmeatthatIgot,orthatifyoudont
givemesomefruitIwilltakebackthemeatthatIgot.

Butthisisonlyabeginning.Cooperationopensthedoortoadvancesinthe
abilityofcheaterstofoolpeopleintobelievingthattheyhavepaidacostorthat
theyhavenottakenabenefit.Thisinturnputspressureontheabilitytodetect
subtlesignsofsuchcheating,whichputspressureontheabilitytocheatinless
detectableways,andsoon.Ithasbeennotedthatthissetsthestagefora
cognitivearmsrace(e.g.,CosmidesandTooby,1989;Dawkins,1976;Tooby
andDeVore,1987;Trivers,1971).Elsewhereinevolutionsuchcompetitive
feedbackloops,suchasinthestrugglebetweencheetahsandgazelles,haveled
totherapidevolutionofspectacularstructuresandabilities(Dawkins,1982).The
unusuallyrapidenlargementofthehumanbrain,especiallythefrontallobes,has
beenattributedtosuchanarmsrace(Alexander,1987;Rose,1980).Afterall,it
doesnttakeallthatmuchbrainpowertomastertheinsandoutsofarockorto
getthebetterofaberry.Butinteractingwithanorganismofapproximatelyequal
mentalabilitieswhosemotivesareattimesoutrightmalevolentmakes
formidableandeverescalatingdemandsoncognition.Thiscompetitionisnot
reservedforobviousadversaries.Partialconflictsofreproductiveinterest
betweenmaleandfemale,siblingandsibling,andparentandoffspringare
inherenttothehumancondition(Symons,1979;ToobyandDeVore,1987;
Trivers,1974).

Itshouldnottakemuchimaginationtoappreciatetheroleoflanguageina
cognitivearmsrace.Inallcultureshumaninteractionsaremediatedbyattempts
atpersuasionandargument.Howachoiceisframedplaysahugerolein
determiningwhichalternativepeoplechoose(TverskyandKahneman,1981).
Theabilitytoframeanoffersothatitappearstopresentmaximalbenefitand
minimumcosttothebuyer,andtheabilitytoseethroughsuchattemptsandto
formulatepersuasivecounterproposals,wouldhavebeenaskillofinestimable
valueinprimitivenegotiations,asitistoday.Soistheabilitytolearnofother
peoplesdesiresandobligationsthroughgossip,anapparentlyuniversalhuman
vice(CosmidesandTooby,1989;Symons,1979).

Insum,primitivehumanslivedinaworldinwhichlanguagewaswoveninto
theintriguesofpolitics,economics,technology,family,sex,andfriendshipand
thatplayedkeyrolesinindividualreproductivesuccess.Theycouldnomore
livewithaMeTarzanyouJanelevelofgrammarthanwecould.

5.4.PhyleticContinuity

Batesetal.(1989),Greenfield(1988),Lieberman(1976,1984)arguethatif
languageevolvedinhumansbynaturalselection,itmusthaveantecedentsin
closelyrelatedspeciessuchaschimpanzees,whichshare99%oftheirgenetic
materialwithusandmayhavedivergedfromacommonancestorasrecentlyas
57millionyearsago(KingandWilson,1975;Miyamoto,Slightom,and
Goodman,1987).Similarly,sincenobiologicalabilitycanevolveoutofnothing,
theyclaim,weshouldfindevidenceofnonlinguisticabilitiesinhumansthatare
continuouswithgrammar.Liebermanclaimsthatmotorprogramsare
preadaptationsforsyntacticruleswhileBates(1976)andGreenfield(Greenfield
andSmith,1976)suggestthatcommunicativegesturesflowintolinguistic
naming.AsBatesetal.(1989:8)putit,...wehavetoabandonanystrong
versionofthediscontinuityclaimthathascharacterizedgenerativegrammarfor
thirtyyears.Wehavetofindsomewaytogroundsymbolsandsyntaxinthe
mentalmaterialthatwesharewithotherspecies.

Thespecificempiricalclaimshavebeendisputed.SeidenbergandPetitto
(Seidenberg,1986;SeidenbergandPetitto,1979,1987)havereviewedthe
evidenceofthesigningabilitiesofapesandconcludedthattheyshowno
significantresemblancetohumanlanguageortotheprocessofacquiringit.Ina
studyoftheacquisitionofsignlanguageindeafchildren,Petitto(1987)argues
thatnonlinguisticgesturesandtruelinguisticnames,evenwhenbothsharethe
manualvisualchannel,arecompletelydissociable.Theseconclusionscouldbe
fodderfortheclaimthatnaturallanguagerepresentsadiscontinuityfromother
primateabilitiesandsocouldnothaveevolvedbynaturalselection.

WefindtheSeidenbergandPetittodemonstrationsconvincing,butour
argumentisnotbasedonwhethertheyaretrue.Ratherwecompletelydisagree
withthepremise(nottheirs)thatthedebateoverapesigningshouldbetreated
asareferendumonwhetherhumanlanguageevolvedbynaturalselection.Of
coursehumanlanguage,likeothercomplexadaptations,couldnothaveevolved
overnight.Butthenthereisnolawofbiologythatsaysthatscientistsareblessed
withthegoodfortuneofbeingabletofindevolutionaryantecedentstoany
modernstructureinsomeotherlivingspecies.Thefirstrecognizablydistinct
mentalsystemthatconstitutedanantecedenttomodernhumanlanguagemay
haveappearedinaspeciesthatdivergedfromthechimphumancommon
ancestor,suchasAustralopithecusAfarensisoranyofthesubsequenthominid
groupsthatledtoourspecies.Moreoverchimpanzeesthemselvesarenot
generalizedcommonancestorsbutpresumablyhavedonesomeevolvingoftheir
ownsincethesplit.Wemustbepreparedforthepossiblebadnewsthatthere
justarentanylivingcreatureswithhomologuesofhumanlanguage,andletthe
chimpsigningdebatecomedownasitwill.

Asfarasweknowthiswouldstillleaveplentyoftimeforlanguagetohave
evolved:3.55millionyears,ifearlyAustralopithecineswerethefirsttalkers,or,
asanabsoluteminimum,severalhundredthousandyears(Stringerand
Andrews,1988),intheunlikelyeventthatearlyHomoSapienswasthefirst.(For
whatitsworth,Brocasareaissaidtobevisibleincranialendocastsoftwo
millionyearoldfossilhominids;Falk,1983;Tobias,1981.)Thereisalsono
justificationintryingtosqueezeconclusionsoutofthegeneticdata.Ontheorder
offortymillionbasepairsdifferbetweenchimpanzeesandhumans,andwesee
noreasontodoubtthatuniversalgrammarwouldfitintothese10megabytes
withlotsofroomleftover,especiallyifprovisionsfortheelementaryoperations
ofasymbolmanipulationarchitecturearespecifiedinthetheremaining99%of
thegenome(seeSeidenberg,1986,fordiscussion).

Infactthereisevenmorescopefordesigndifferencesthanthegrossamountof
nonsharedgeneticmaterialsuggests.The1%differencebetweenchimpsand
humansrepresentsthefractionofbasepairsthataredifferent.Butgenesarelong
stretchesofbasepairsandifevenonepairisdifferent,theentirefunctioning
productofthatgenecouldbedifferent.Justasreplacingonebitineverybyte
leadstotextthatis100%different,not12.5%different,itispossibleforthe
differingbasepairstobeapportionedsothat100%ofthegenesofhumansand
chimpsaredifferentinfunction.Thoughthisextremepossibilityis,ofcourse,
unlikely,itwarnsusnottodrawanyconclusionsaboutphenotypicsimilarity
fromdegreeofgenomicoverlap.(Note4)

Asforcontinuitybetweenlanguageandnonlinguisticneuralmechanisms,we
finditironicthatargumentsthataretoutedasbeingbiologicaldonottakeeven
themostelementarystepstodistinguishbetweenanalogyandhomology.
Liebermansclaimthatsyntacticrulesmustberetooledmotorprograms,a
putativecaseofpreadaptation,isagoodexample.Itmayberight,butthereisno
reasontobelieveit.Liebermansevidenceisonlythatmotorprogramsare
hierarchicallyorganizedandseriallyordered,andsoissyntax.Buthierarchical
organizationcharacterizesmanyneuralsystems,perhapsanysystem,livingor
nonliving,thatwewouldwanttocallcomplex(Simon,1969).Andanorganism
thatlivesinrealtimeisgoingtoneedavarietyofperceptual,motor,andcentral
mechanismsthatkeeptrackofserialorder.Hierarchyandserialityaresouseful
thatforallweknowtheymayhaveevolvedmanytimesinneuralsystems
(Bickerton,1984,1986,alsomakesthispoint).Todistinguishtruehomologyfrom
mereanalogyitisnecessarytofindsomeuniquederivednonadaptivecharacter
sharedbytherelevantsystems,forexample,somequirkofgrammarthatcanbe
seeninanothersystem.Notonlyhasnosuchsharedcharacterbeenshown,but
thedissimilaritiesbetweensyntaxandmotorcontrolareratherstriking.Motor
controlisagameofinchessoitscontrolprogramsmusthaveopencontinuous
parametersfortimeandspaceateveryleveloforganization.Syntaxhasnosuch
analogueparameters.Afarbettercasecouldbemadethatgrammarexploited
mechanismsoriginallyusedfortheconceptualizationoftopologyand
antagonisticforces(Jackendoff,1983;Pinker,1989b;Talmy,1983,1988),butthat
isanotherstory.

6.Conclusion
Aswewarned,thethrustofthispaperhasbeenentirelyconventional.Allwe
havearguedisthathumanlanguage,likeotherspecializedbiologicalsystems,
evolvedbynaturalselection.Ourconclusionisbasedontwofactsthatwewould
thinkwouldbeentirelyuncontroversial:languageshowssignsofcomplex
designforthecommunicationofpropositionalstructures,andtheonly
explanationfortheoriginoforganswithcomplexdesignistheprocessofnatural
selection.Althoughdistinguishedscientistsfromawidevarietyoffieldsand
ideologieshavetriedtocastdoubtonanorthodoxDarwinianaccountofthe
evolutionofabiologicalspecializationforgrammar,uponcloseexamination
noneoftheargumentsiscompelling.

Butwehopewehavedonemorethantryandsettherecordstraight.Skepticism
aboutthepossibilityofsayinganythingofscientificvalueaboutlanguage
evolutionhasalonghistory,beginningintheprohibitionagainstdiscussingthe
topicbytheSoci@act[h]t@act[h]deLinguistiquedeParisin1866andculminating
inthetheencyclopedicvolumeeditedbyHarnad,Steklis,andLancaster(1976)
thatpittedafewdaringspeculatorsagainstanarmyofdoubters.Asuspicious
attitudeisnotentirelyunwarrantedwhenonereadsaboutTheAgeofModifiers,
PithecanthropusAlalus(Apemanwithoutspeech),andtheHeavehotheory.
Butsuchskepticismshouldnotleadtoequallyunsupportedassertionsaboutthe
necessityofspandrelsandsaltations.

Amajorproblemamongeventhemoreresponsibleattemptstospeculateabout
theoriginsoflanguagehasbeenthattheyignorethewealthofspecific
knowledgeaboutthestructureofgrammardiscoveredduringthepast30years.
Asaresultlanguagecompetencehasbeenequatedwithcognitivedevelopment,
leadingtoconfusionsbetweentheevolutionoflanguageandtheevolutionof
thought,orhasbeenexpedientlyequatedwithactivitiesthatleavetangible
remnants,suchastoolmanufacture,art,andconquest.

Wethinkthereisawealthofrespectablenewscientificinformationrelevantto
theevolutionoflanguagethathasneverbeenproperlysynthesized.The
computationaltheoryofmind,generativegrammar,articulatoryandacoustic
phonetics,developmentalpsycholinguistics,andthestudyofdynamicsof
diachronicchangecouldprofitablybecombinedwithrecentmolecular,
archeological,andcomparativeneuroanatomicaldiscoveriesandwithstrategic
modelingofevolutionusinginsightsfromevolutionarytheoryandanthropology
(see,e.g.,Bickerton,1981;BrandonandHornstein,1986;Barkow,Cosmides,and
Tooby,inpress;Hurford,1989a,1989b;Tooby&DeVore,1987;Hintonand
Nowlan,1987).Itiscertaintheremanyquestionsabouttheevolutionoflanguage
thatwewillneveranswer.Butweareoptimisticthatthereareinsightstobe
gained,ifonlytheproblemsareproperlyposed.

Acknowledgements
ThispaperhasbeengreatlyinfluencedbydiscussionswithLedaCosmidesand
JohnTooby.WealsothankNedBlock,SusanCarey,NoamChomsky,Leda
Cosmides,RobertFreidin,JaneGrimshaw,JamesHurford,MassimoPiattelli
Palmarini,AlanPrince,JerrySamet,DonaldSymons,JohnTooby,andseveral
BBSreviewersfortheirhelpfulcommentsonearlierdrafts.Needlesstosayall
deficienciesanderrorsareours.PreparationofthispaperwassupportedbyNIH
GrantHD18381;thesecondauthorwassupportedbyaSurdnaPredoctoral
Fellowship.RequestsforreprintsshouldbedirectedtoE10016,MIT,Cambridge
MA02139,ortosteve@psyche.mit.eduandbloom@psyche.mit.edu.

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Notes
(1)Forexample,hesaysthatLanguagemustsurelyconferenormousselective
advantages(Chomsky,1980:239;seealsoChomsky,1975:252),andarguesthat,
..supposethatsomeoneproposesaprinciplewhichsays:Theformofalanguage
issuchandsuchbecausehavingthatformpermitsafunctiontobefulfilleda
proposalofthissortwouldbeappropriateatthelevelofevolution(ofthe
species,oroflanguage),notatthelevelofacquisitionoflanguagebyan
individual(Chomsky,1977:8687).
(2)Interestingly,Dennett(1983)arguesthatGouldandLewontinscritiqueis
remarkablysimilarinlogictocritiquesofanotherlargescaletheory,the
representationaltheoryofmindincognitivescience,bybehaviorists.Dennett
seescommonflawsinthecritiques:bothfailtoaccountforcasesofadaptive
complexitythatarenotdirectconsequencesofanylawofphysics,andboth
applythecriterionoffalsifiabilityintooliteralmindedaway.

(3)Notealsothathistoricalchangeinlanguagesoccursveryrapidlybybiological
standards.Wang(1976)pointsout,forexample,thatonecycleoftheprocess
wherebyalanguagealternatesbetweenrelianceonwordorderandrelianceon
affixationtypicallytakesathousandyears.Ahominidpopulationevolving
languagecouldbeexposedtothefullrangeoflinguisticdiversityduringasingle
tickoftheevolutionaryclock,evenifnosinglegenerationwasfacedwithall
humanlypossiblestructures.

(4)WethankJohnToobyforpointingthisouttous.