Republic of the Philippines There is no question as to the validity of the deportation decree.
It must be
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2852 June 30, 1949
VICTOR A. BOROVSKY, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION and THE DIRECTOR OF
PRISONS, respondents.
The petitioner in his own behalf.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Lucas Lacson
for respondents.
BENGZON, J.:
Victor A. Borovsky, a stateless citizen though a Russian by birth according to his
allegations, prays for release from the custody of the Director of Prisons, who
holds him for purposes of deportation.
In December, 1946, the President of the Philippines ordered petitioner's
deportation as undesirable alien, after a proper investigation by the Deportation
Board upon charges of being a vagrant and habitual drunkard, engaged in
espionage activities, whose presence and conduct endangered the public interest.
Pursuant to such order, Borovsky was placed aboard a vessel bound for
Shanghai; but the authorities there declined to admit him for lack of the proper
visa, which the Chinese Consulate in this country had refused to give. Wherefore
he was brought back to the Philippines. Thereafter he was temporarily released
pending further arrangements for his banishment. And when subsequently a
Russian boat called at Cebu, Borovsky was re-arrested and transported to Cebu
for deportation; however, the captain of the boat declined take him, explaining he
had no permission from his government to do so. Wherefore the petitioner the
petitioner is now confined in the premises of the New Bilibid Prisonnot exactly
as the prisonerwhile the Government is exerting efforts to ship him to a foreign
country.
admitted that temporary detention is a necessary step in the process of exclusion
or expulsion of undesirable aliens and that pending arrangement for his
deportation, the Government has the right to hold the undesirable alien under
confinement for a reasonable length of time. However, under established
precedents, too long a detention may justify the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus.1
The meaning of "reasonable time" depends upon the circumstances, specially the
difficulties of obtaining a passport, the availability of transportation, the diplomatic
arrangements of the government concerned and the efforts displayed to send the
deportee away.2 Considering that this Government desires to expel the alien, and
does not relish keeping him at the people's expense, we presume it is making
efforts in making efforts to carry out the decree of exclusion by the highest officer
of the land. On top of this presumption assurances were made during the oral
argument that the Government is really trying to expedite the expulsion of this
petitioner. On the other hand, the record fails to show how long he has been under
confinement since the last time he was apprehended. Neither does he indicate
neglected opportunities to send him abroad. And unless it is shown that the
deportee is being indefinitely imprisoned under the pretense of awaiting a chance
for deportation3 or unless the Government admits that it cannot deport him4 or
unless the detainee is being held for too long a period our courts will not interfere.
In the United States there were at least two instances in which courts fixed a time
limit within which the imprisoned aliens should be deported5 otherwise their
release would be ordered by writ of habeas corpus. Nevertheless, supposing such
precedents apply in this jurisdiction, still we have no sufficient data fairly to fix a
definite deadline. Petition denied. No costs.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Moran, C.J., I hereby certify that Mr. Justice Pablo voted to deny the petition.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-40177 March 15, 1934
LI SENG GIAP & CO., applicant-appellant,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-appellee.
Manly and Reyes for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
DIAZ, J.:
On August 16, 1932, Li Seng Giap & Co., a partnership composed of individuals
who are not citizens of the Philippine Islands nor of the United States, but aliens,
instituted these proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, for
the registration in its name in the registry of deeds, of the three parcels of land
described in the plans Exhibits A and B, and technical descriptions attached to its
application, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 496 and of Chapter VIII or
Title II of Act No. 2874.
The Director of Lands filed an opposition to the said application alleging as his
grounds that the three parcels of land in question were public lands belonging to
the Government of the United States under the administration and control of the
Government of the Philippine Islands, and that, being an alien, the applicant
partnership cannot invoke the benefits of the provisions of section 45 of the said
Act No. 2874. The aforecited section is contained in Chapter VIII of Title II of the
said Act invoked by the applicant. The Director of Lands has made no reference to
Act No. 496 in his opposition for the reason that the Act in question merely
prescribes, in general terms, the manner or procedure to be followed by an
applicant in the obtainment of the certificate of title applied for, or in the denial or
issuance thereof, as the case may be, by the court or by the Government
agencies therein mentioned.
After the trial, the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur rendered judgment
therein denying the application of the applicant partnership on the ground that it is
an alien, and holding, at the same time, that the parcels of land it sought to
register in its name are a portion of the public domain. The said applicant took
exception to and appealed from such judgment, claiming that the trial court
committed the following alleged errors, to wit:
I. The trial court erred in holding that the applicant, Li Seng Giap & Co.
being a partnership made up of individuals who are neither citizens of the
Philippine Islands nor of the United States, is not entitled, for this reason,
to register the land described in its application under the provisions of the
Land Registration Act.
II. The lower court also erred in declaring the land described in the
application a part of the public domain.
III. The lower court also erred in denying the applicant's motion for
reconsideration as well as its motion for new trial.
It is unnecessary to discuss the nature of the three parcels of land in question.
The record shows that they are agricultural lands which at present contain coconut
trees, abaca and cacao with which they have been planted for over forty years.
The coconut trees there on range from one to forty years in age. The said three
parcels had likewise been cultivated and had actually been occupied for many
years during the Spanish regime by several natives of the Province of Camarines
Sur, named Inocencio Salon, Lazaro Ceron, Margarita Labordes, Doroteo Quitales
and Cornelio Vargas. The occupation or possession thereof by the above-named
persons was under claim of ownership but neither the exact date when such
possession began nor the circumstances under which they acquired the property
in question has been determined. However, it seems certain that such occupation
began some fifty-five years ago and continued without interruption from that time
until said persons decide to sell them to Sebastian Palanca who is also an alien
like the herein applicant. Neither is there anything of record to show when the sale
was made but it also seems certain that it took place during the Spanish regime.
Sebastian Palanca continued in possession of the aforesaid three parcels of land
from the time he acquired them in the manner hereinbefore stated until July 22,
1930, when he sold them to the herein applicant-appellant. However, before
selling them and while he was in possession thereof under claim of ownership, as
alleged, he failed to obtain a gratuitous title or even a mere possessory
information therefor, which would serve to protect his claim of ownership, by taking
advantage of the benefits afforded by the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894,
which was promulgated in the Philippines and published in the Gaceta de Manila,
No. 106, of April 17th of the same year.
The pertinent parts of said decree, which are also articles 1, 19 and 21 of the
Maura Law, and which had been in force in the Philippines during the last years of
the Spanish regime and continued to be so until the enactment of the Public Land
Act and the amendments thereto, read as follows:
ARTICLE 1. All uncultivated lands, soil, earth, and mountains not included
in the following exceptions shall be considered alienable public lands:
First, those which have become subjected to private ownership and have
a legitimate owner. Second, those which belong to the forest zones which
the State deems wise to reserve for reasons of public utility.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 19. Possessors of alienable public lands under cultivation who have
not obtained nor applied for composition on the date this decree shall be
published in the Gaceta de Manila, may obtain a gratuitous title of
property, by means of a possessory information in conformity with the law
of civil procedure and the mortgage law whenever they establish any of
the following conditions:
First. Having, or having had, them under cultivation without interruption
during the preceding six years.1vvphi1.ne+
Second. Having had possession of them for twelve consecutive years,
and having had them under cultivation until the date of the information,
and for three years before that date.
Third. Having had them in possession ostensibly and without interruption,
for thirty or more years, although the land is not under cultivation.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 21. A term of one year, without grace, is granted order to perfect the
informations referred to in articles 19 and 20.
Article 80 of the regulations for the carrying out of the Royal Decree above-
mentioned provided as follows:
ART. 80. By virtue of the provision of article 21 of the Royal Decree of
February 13, 1894, the inextensible period for carrying out the
informations referred to in the two preceding articles, shall be counted as
on the 17th day of April, 1895.
Upon the expiration of this period the right of cultivator and possessors to
the obtainment of free title shall lapse, and the full property right in the
land shall revert to the State or, in a proper case, to the public domain.
Therefore, there can be no doubt but that under the last aforecited article the three
parcels of land in question reverted to the State as property of the public domain
upon the expiration of the period specified therein, by reason of negligence on the
part of the possessors thereof.
The applicant-appellant contends that under the provisions of section 54,
paragraph 6, of Act No. 926, it has necessarily acquired the right to have the
corresponding certificate of title issued to it upon registration of the said parcels of
land in its name in the registry of deeds, inasmuch as it had actually been in the
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession thereof, under claim of
ownership, not only by itself but also through Sebastian Palanca from whom it had
purchased them, for more than ten years prior to July 26, 1904, the date on which
the aforesaid Act went into effect, in accordance with the proclamation of the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands of the same date.
The section invoked by the applicant-appellant reads as follows:
SEC. 54. The following-described persons or their legal successors in
right, occupying public lands in the Philippine Islands, or claiming to own
any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles to such lands have
not been perfected, may apply to the Court of Land Registration of the
Philippine Islands for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor to wit:
1. All persons who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the
United States had fulfilled all the conditions required by the Spanish laws
and royal decrees of the Kingdom of Spain for the purchase of public
lands, including the payment of the purchase price, but who failed to
secure formal conveyance of title;
2. All persons who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the
United States, having applied for the purchase of public lands and having
secured a survey, auction, and an award, or a right to an award, of such
lands, did not receive title therefor through no default upon their part;
3. All persons who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the
United States, having applied for the purchase of public lands and having
secured a survey and award of same, did not, through negligence upon
their part, comply with the conditions of full or any payment therefor, but
who after such survey and award shall have occupied the land adversely,
except as prevented by war or force majeure until the taking effect of this
Act;
4. All persons who were entitled to apply and did apply for adjustment or
composition of title to lands against the Government under the Spanish
laws and royal decrees in force prior to the royal decree of February
thirteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, but who failed to receive title
therefor through no default upon their part;
5. All persons who were entitled to a gratuitous title to public lands by
"possessory proceedings" under the provisions of articles nineteen and
twenty of the royal decree of the King of Spain issued February thirteenth,
eighteen hundred and ninety-four, and who, having complied with all the
conditions therein required, failed to receive the title therefor through no
default upon their part; and
6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have
been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of Congress
of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of
ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years
next preceding the taking effect of this Act, except when prevented by war
or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a government grant and to have received the
same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the
provisions of this chapter.
All applicants for lands under paragraphs one, two, three, four and five of
this section must establish by proper official records or documents that
such proceedings as are therein required were taken and the necessary
conditions complied with: Provided, however, That such requirements
shall not apply to the fact of adverse possession.
It may be noted that the case of the applicant does not come under paragraph 1,
2, 3, 4 or 5 of the aforecited section, which, by the way, conclusively shows that
prior to the enactment of Act No. 926, the said Maura Law was the last law which
regulated the acquisition of alienable public lands and the issuance of the
corresponding title to those who could establish their claim that they were entitled
thereto. Being aware of this fact, the applicant has never invoked said paragraphs.
He merely confines himself to invoking the provisions of paragraph 6 thereof, in
support of which he cites the rulings of this court in the cases of Tan Yungquip
vs. Director of Lands (42 Phil., 128) and of Central Capiz vs. Ramirez (40 Phil.,
883).
In the former case, it was held that inasmuch as the applicant Tan Yungquip, who
was a Chinaman, had proven: That he had acquired the parcels of land which he
sought to register in his name, some by purchase and others by inheritance; that
he and his predecessors in interest had been in the open, peaceful, continuous
and notorious possession of the same for at least thirty years, and that such
parcels of land were agricultural lands, therefore, he was entitled to have them
registered in his name under the provisions of the aforecited section 54 of Act No.
926, for the reason that he filed his application to that effect more than one year
prior to the enactment and enforcement of Act No. 2874. It was likewise held
therein that the matter should be decided in favor of said Tan Yungquip on the
ground that no valid law could be found, at least on that occasion, which
prohibited the registration in his name in the registry of deeds, of the parcels of
land of which he claimed to be the owner.
In the latter case above cited, that is, the case of Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, it was
likewise held that lands held in private ownership constitute no part of the public
domain and cannot, therefore, come within the purview of said Act No. 2874 on
the ground that said subject (lands held in private ownership) is not embraced in
any manner in the title of the Act, and that the intent of the Legislature in enacting
the same was to limit the application thereof exclusively to lands of the public
domain.
Although nothing has been said in the decision rendered in the aforecited case
of Tan Yungquip vs. Director of Lands to the effect that the application of the
therein applicant should be granted on the ground that the provisions of section 54
of Act No. 926, which were therein under consideration and interpretation, do not
distinguish between citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States and
aliens, however, the appellant contends that the aforecited section has such scope
and that the question raised in this case should be decided under the latter
interpretation.
We do not believe that the rulings it the aforecited two cases and that in the case
of Agari vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (42 Phil., 143), are decisive and
applicable to the case under consideration, on the ground that although it is true
that Agari, who was the applicant in the last case, was an alien, it was likewise
true that the persons, from whom he had acquired the land which he sought to
register in his name in the registry of deeds during the time Act No. 926 was still in
force, were natives of the Philippine Islands, who, in turn, had acquired it through
their father, who was likewise a native of the Islands, by composition with the
State in accordance with the laws then in force; nor that, under the provisions of
the aforecited section 54 of Act No. 926, the applicant-appellant Li Seng Giap &
Co. could have succeeded in securing the certificate of title which it now seeks; in
the first place, because the three aforecited decisions refer to cases which are
different from the one now under consideration; in the second place, because said
decisions were based on the supposition that the parcels of land in question
therein were of private ownership and at that time no law was known to be in
existence, which prohibited the registration of said parcels of land in the registry of
deeds, in the name of the aforesaid applicants Tan Yungquip, Central Capiz and
Agari, and in the third place because while Act No. 926 was still in force (it is no
longer in force, having been expressly repealed by section 128 of Act No. 2874,
on December 28, 1919), it should have been interpreted in the light of the
provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, commonly known as the Organic
Law of the Philippine Islands, inasmuch as the former had been approved under
the authority of sections 13, 14, 15 and 62 of the latter Act. The very title of Act No.
926 above referred to shows that one of the purposes for which it was approved
was to carry out the provisions of sections, 13, 14, 15 and 62 of the aforecited Act
of Congress, which title reads in part:
An Act . . . providing for the determination by the Philippines Court of
Land Registration of all proceedings for completion of imperfect titles and
for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in
said Islands, as authorized by sections thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, and
sixty-two of the Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two,
entitled "An Act temporarily to provide for the administration of the affairs
of civil government in the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes".
Sections 14 and 15 of the aforesaid Act of Congress, which bear relation to the
question under consideration, provide as follows:
SEC. 14. That the government of the Philippine Islands is hereby
authorized and empowered to enact rules and regulations and to
prescribe terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their title to
public lands in said Islands, who, prior to the transfer of sovereignty from
Spain to the United States, had fulfilled all or some of the conditions
required by the Spanish laws and royal decrees of the Kingdom of Spain
for the acquisition of legal title thereto, yet failed to secure conveyance of
title; and the Philippine Commission is authorized to issue patents,
without compensation, to any native of said Islands, conveying the title to
any tract of land not more than sixteen hectares in extent, which were
public lands and had been actually occupied by such native or his
ancestors prior to and on the thirteenth of August, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight.
s. SEC. 15. That the Government of the Philippine Islands in hereby
authorized and empowered, on such terms as it may prescribe, by
general legislation, to provide for the granting or sale and conveyance to
actual occupants and settlers and other citizens of said Islands such parts
and portions of the public domain, other than timber and mineral lands, of
the United States in said Islands as it may deem wise, not exceeding
sixteen hectares to any one person and for the sale and conveyance of
not more than one thousand and twenty-four hectares to any corporation
or association of persons: Provided, that the grant or sale of such lands,
whether the purchase price be paid at once or in partial payments, shall
be conditioned upon actual and continued occupancy, improvement, and
cultivation of the premises sold for a period of not less than five years,
during which time the purchaser or grantee cannot alienate or encumber
said land or the title thereto; but such restriction shall not apply to
transfers of rights and title of inheritance under the laws for the
distribution of the estates of decedents.
It may be noted that both of the above-cited sections provide that gratuitous title to
property may be issued only to natives of the Philippine Islands who are in
possession of the necessary qualifications specified therein. It may therefore be
inferred from the foregoing that Act No. 926 could not have a different scope from
that given it by the aforecited Act of Congress and, therefore, the phrase "all
persons" employed in paragraph 6 of section 54 of the former Act should be
understood to mean only citizens of the Philippine Islands or citizens of the United
States or of any insular possession thereof.
The parcels of land involved in this case, which as hereinbefore stated, have
reverted to the State after April 17, 1895, by virtue of the Maura Law, not of private
ownership. Neither were they so on or after the aforesaid date. The applicant
herein did not show any title thereto either by possessory proceedings or
otherwise, which may be considered as having been issued by the Government.
The only basis on which it now claims the right to have them registered in its name
is its alleged possession thereof together with that of Sebastian Palanca and of
the former possessors, as if to say, that it is entitled to the registration thereof in its
name, inasmuch as the parcels of land in question already belong to it, having
acquired them by prescription through the continuous, open, exclusive and
notorious possession thereof, under claim of ownership, at least since the Spanish
regime in the Philippine Islands. However, the truth is that the law expressly
provides that no public land may be acquired by prescription, and that such mode
of acquisition does not hold as against the Government. This provision is
contained precisely in the very law invoked by the applicant, that is section 54,
paragraph 6, of Act No. 926. In the case of Ongsiaco vs. Magsilang (50 Phil., 380,
386), this court said:
however, that the constitutional guaranty that no person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws, is violated thereby, because, as this court has said in the
case of In re Patterson (1 Phil., 93, 95, 96), "Unquestionably every State has a
fundamental right to its existence and development, as also to the integrity of its
territory and the exclusive and peaceable possession of its dominions which it
may guard and defend by all possible means against any attack . . . . Superior to
the law which protects personal liberty, and the agreements which exist between
nations for their own interest and for the benefit of their respective subjects is the
supreme and fundamental right of each State to self-preservation and the integrity
of its dominion and its sovereignty." It is upon grounds of public policy that the
rights of individuals, particularly of aliens, cannot prevail against the aforesaid right
of the Government of the Philippine Islands. and more particularly when, as in the
present case, far from violating any constitutional law, it deals precisely with the
enforcement of the provisions of the first organic law of the country and those of
the Jones Law (section 9), to the effect that lands of the public domain should not
be disposed of or alienated to persons who are not inhabitants or citizens of the
Philippine Islands.
Wherefore, finding that the judgment appealed from is in accordance with the law,
it is hereby affirmed in toto, with the costs against the appellants. So ordered.

". . . in a controversy between private individuals, where the Government has not Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, and Butte, JJ., concur.
intervened, and where it appears that the land has ceased to be of public domain Imperial, J., concur in the result.
and has come to be of private ownership, a petitioner may obtain registration of
land upon a title acquired by adverse possession as against individual opponents.
The same rule does not maintain with respect to land claimed by the Government
and as to which the Government is opposing." In the case of Government of the
Philippine Islands vs. Abad (56 Phil., 75, 80), this court, deciding a question
similar to the one raised herein by the appellant, said as follows: "Subsection (b)
of section 45 of Act No. 2874 is not obnoxious to the constitutional provision relied
upon by the appellant, as depriving the appellant of property without due process
of law. That provision has reference to property to which the citizen has acquired a
vested right. It does not extend to privileges and inchoate rights which have never
been asserted or perfected. The contention of the appellant . . . is therefore
without merit." There is no justifiable reason for disturbing the holdings of this
court in the aforecited two cases. On the contrary, it is considered timely to
reiterate them herein inasmuch as they decide the same question.

The provisions of section 54 of Act No. 926 as well as those of section 45,
paragraph (b), of Act No. 2874 should necessarily be so construed as not to
permit aliens to obtain title to lands in their favor. It should not be understood,
 3. The coercion or duress which will render a payment involuntary must consist of
some actual or threatened exercise of power possessed, or believed to be possessed,
by the party exacting or receiving the payment over the person or property of another
from which the latter has no other means of immediate relief than by making payment.

This was an action brought by Radich against Hutchins and Wells. He alleges in his
petition that he is a subject of the Emperor of Russia, and that he was, in 1864, the
owner of four hundred and fifty bales of cotton of the value of $50,000 which he
designed to export from Texas, where he then resided, to Mexico, and which were then
in transit on their way to Matamoras; that the defendant Hutchins, claiming to be a
Radich v. Hutchins lieutenant-colonel in the army of the Confederate States, and chief of the cotton office
at Houston in that state, combining with the defendant Wells and others, had, without
95 U.S. 210 (1877) warrant of law, by a public notice, prohibited the exportation of cotton from the state
except upon written permits from his office; that such permits would not be issued
except upon condition that the person desiring to export cotton should sell to them an
Syllabus | equal amount, at a nominal and arbitrary price, for the benefit of the Confederate
States; that, being desirous to export and sell his cotton because of the risk incurred of
Case its destruction or loss during the war, and knowing that if he should attempt to send it
beyond

U.S. Supreme Court Page 95 U. S. 211

Radich v. Hutchins, 95 U.S. 210 (1877)
Radich v. Hutchins
95 U.S. 210
Syllabus
1. Carlisle v. United States, 16 Wall. 147, cited and approved.
2. A foreigner, domiciled during the year 1864 in Texas, who, in order to obtain
permission of the rebel government to export his cotton, sold at a nominal price, and
delivered to its agents or officers for its use, an equal amount of other cotton, which he
subsequently redeemed by paying a stipulated sum therefor, directly contributed to the
support of the enemy, and gave him aid and comfort. Out of such a transaction no
demand against such agents or officers can arise which will be enforced in the courts
of the United States.
the frontier of the state into Mexico, the armed forces of the Confederate States,
provided to carry out the illegal exactions of the defendants and their confederates,
would capture and confiscate it, he was compelled to submit and did submit to the
condition imposed, and accordingly delivered to the defendants one-half of his cotton --
namely two hundred and twenty-five bales -- at a nominal and arbitrary price as a
consideration for a permit to export the other half, but upon a stipulation, however,
insisted upon by himself, that he should have the privilege of redeeming the bales sold
and exporting them upon the payment of such sum as the defendants might demand;
and that afterwards he paid them $13,357 in specie and in goods, wares, and
merchandise at specie values in redemption of the bales and for a permit to export
them. He alleges that the amount thus paid was illegally and oppressively exacted, and
that he submitted to the wrong because of the armed forces to support and enforce it.
The defendants demurred. The demurrer was sustained and the petition dismissed.
Radich thereupon sued out this writ of error.
Syllabus |
Case

U.S. Supreme Court
Radich v. Hutchins, 95 U.S. 210 (1877)
Radich v. Hutchins
95 U.S. 210
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
Syllabus
1. Carlisle v. United States, 16 Wall. 147, cited and approved.
2. A foreigner, domiciled during the year 1864 in Texas, who, in order to obtain
permission of the rebel government to export his cotton, sold at a nominal price, and
delivered to its agents or officers for its use, an equal amount of other cotton, which he
subsequently redeemed by paying a stipulated sum therefor, directly contributed to the
support of the enemy, and gave him aid and comfort. Out of such a transaction no
demand against such agents or officers can arise which will be enforced in the courts
of the United States.
3. The coercion or duress which will render a payment involuntary must consist of
some actual or threatened exercise of power possessed, or believed to be possessed,
by the party exacting or receiving the payment over the person or property of another
from which the latter has no other means of immediate relief than by making payment.
This was an action brought by Radich against Hutchins and Wells. He alleges in his
petition that he is a subject of the Emperor of Russia, and that he was, in 1864, the
owner of four hundred and fifty bales of cotton of the value of $50,000 which he
designed to export from Texas, where he then resided, to Mexico, and which were then
in transit on their way to Matamoras; that the defendant Hutchins, claiming to be a
lieutenant-colonel in the army of the Confederate States, and chief of the cotton office
at Houston in that state, combining with the defendant Wells and others, had, without
warrant of law, by a public notice, prohibited the exportation of cotton from the state
except upon written permits from his office; that such permits would not be issued
except upon condition that the person desiring to export cotton should sell to them an
equal amount, at a nominal and arbitrary price, for the benefit of the Confederate
States; that, being desirous to export and sell his cotton because of the risk incurred of
its destruction or loss during the war, and knowing that if he should attempt to send it
beyond
Page 95 U. S. 211
the frontier of the state into Mexico, the armed forces of the Confederate States,
provided to carry out the illegal exactions of the defendants and their confederates,
would capture and confiscate it, he was compelled to submit and did submit to the
condition imposed, and accordingly delivered to the defendants one-half of his cotton --
namely two hundred and twenty-five bales -- at a nominal and arbitrary price as a
consideration for a permit to export the other half, but upon a stipulation, however,
insisted upon by himself, that he should have the privilege of redeeming the bales sold
and exporting them upon the payment of such sum as the defendants might demand;
and that afterwards he paid them $13,357 in specie and in goods, wares, and
merchandise at specie values in redemption of the bales and for a permit to export
them. He alleges that the amount thus paid was illegally and oppressively exacted, and
that he submitted to the wrong because of the armed forces to support and enforce it.
The defendants demurred. The demurrer was sustained and the petition dismissed.
Radich thereupon sued out this writ of error.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
If at the time the transaction took place which has given rise to the present action, the
plaintiff was a subject of the Emperor of Russia, as he alleges, that fact cannot affect
the decision of the case or any question presented for our consideration. He was then
a resident of the State of Texas and engaged in business there. As a foreigner
domiciled in the country, he was bound to obey all the laws of the United States not
immediately relating to citizenship, and was equally amenable with citizens to the
penalties prescribed for their infraction. He owed allegiance to the government of the
country so long as he resided within its limits, and can claim
Page 95 U. S. 212
no exemption from the statutes passed to punish treason, or the giving of aid and
comfort to the insurgent states. The law on this subject is well settled and universally
recognized. Carlisle v. United States, 16 Wall. 147.
The case presented by the petition is without merit.
The substance of the complaint is that the defendants, as officers of the Confederate
government, by a public notice, had prohibited the exportation of cotton from the State
of Texas to Mexico except upon condition that the exporter should sell to them an
equal amount for the benefit of the Confederate government, and that the plaintiff,
being the owner of cotton which he desired to export and fearing that if he attempted to
export it without such permit, it would be seized and confiscated by the armed forces of
that government, complied with the condition, and obtained a permit from the officers
to export two hundred and twenty-five bales, and sold to them an equal amount for the
Confederate government, obtaining at the same time the privilege of redeeming the
cotton sold, and receiving a permit to export it, upon payment of such sum as they
might demand; that he took advantage of this privilege and redeemed the cotton,
paying in money and goods the sum mentioned in the petition.
There is nothing in these allegations showing that the defendants subjected the plaintiff
to any coercion or duress, which would justify an action against them, either for the
return of the money paid or for the value of the goods delivered in place of the money,
or for damages of any kind. There is no averment that either of the defendants ever
made, or attempted to make, any seizure of the cotton, or that either of them was an
impressing or other officer, exercising or claiming to exercise any power for its seizure,
or had any thing to do with the command or operations of the armed forces of the
insurgents in the state of Texas. All that is directly charged against them is the
publication of a notice that the exportation of cotton was forbidden, except on permits
from the cotton office. The armed force is not stated to have been under the direction
of that office. The whole proceeding set forth in the petition was a voluntary one by the
plaintiff. He applied to the cotton office, and sold the cotton subsequently redeemed. It
is not
Page 95 U. S. 213
pretended that either of the defendants made any application for its purchase.
To constitute the coercion or duress which will be regarded as sufficient to make a
payment involuntary -- treating now the redemption of the cotton as made in money,
goods being taken as equivalent for a part of the amount -- there must be some actual
or threatened exercise of power possessed, or believed to be possessed, by the party
exacting or receiving the payment over the person or property of another, from which
the latter has no other means of immediate relief than by making the payment. As
stated by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, the doctrine established by the authorities
is, that
"a payment is not to be regarded as compulsory unless made to emancipate the
person or property from an actual and existing duress imposed upon it by the party to
whom the money is paid."
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Lefferman, 4 Gill (Md.) 425; Brumagim v.
Tillinghast, 18 Cal. 265; Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 268.
Tested by these cases, the allegation of coercion or duress becomes frivolous. It is
plain that the plaintiff entered voluntarily upon the negotiation with the defendants, and
subsequently paid the redemption money without any constraint which would in law
change the voluntary character of the payment. Such being the case, the transaction is
one which is fatally tainted. The sale of the cotton was to the Confederate States; the
money paid and goods delivered for its redemption were for the benefit of those states,
to assist them in their war against the government and authority of the United States.
The money paid and the goods delivered constituted therefore nothing less than a
direct contribution to the support of the insurgents: they gave aid and comfort to the
enemy. No demand arising out of such a transaction can have any standing in the
courts of the Union.
At this time, also, it was the declared policy of the United States to prevent all
intercourse between the insurgent states and the loyal states, and also between them
and foreign countries, and thus to cut off from the insurgents the means of prolonging
the existing war. In pursuance of this policy, the ports and coasts of those states were
blockaded, commerce
Page 95 U. S. 214
with their inhabitants was prohibited, except as specially authorized under regulations
of the Treasury Department, and property which eluded the blockade was subject to
seizure and condemnation. The attention of the authorities was specially directed to
prevent the exportation of cotton, upon which the insurgents chiefly relied to obtain the
means for the continuance of their struggle. The plaintiff alleges that he paid money
and delivered goods to the defendants for the use of the Confederate government, in
order to obtain permission to violate this policy and legislation, and now he modestly
asks that he should be allowed in the courts of the United States to recover damages
from them because they took what he offered for the permission.
The demurrer was properly sustained.
Judgment affirmed.

Summary of the Summary of the Judgment of 19 May 1953
AMBATIELOS CASE (MERITS)
Judgment of 19 May 1953
The proceedings in the Ambatielos case (Merits: Obligation to Arbitrate), between
Greece and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland had been
instituted by an Application by the Hellenic Government, which, having taken up the
case of one of its nationals, the shipowner Ambatielos, prayed the Court to declare that
the claim which the latter had made against the Government of the United Kingdom
should be submitted to arbitration in accordance with Anglo-Greek Agreements
concluded in 1886 (Treaty and Protocol) and in 1926 (Declaration). Following a
Preliminary Objection lodged by the United Kingdom, the Court found that it had
jurisdiction to adjudicate on this question by a Judgment delivered on July 1st, 1952.
In its Judgment on the merits the Court found by ten votes to four that the United
Kingdom was under an obligation to submit to arbitration, in accordance with the
Declaration of 1926, the difference as to the validity, under the Treaty of 1886, of the
Ambatielos claim.
Sir Arnold McNair, President, Judges Basdevant, Klaestad and Road appended to the
Judgment a joint statement of their dissenting opinion.
**
In its Judgment, the Court begins by defining the question before it: is the United
Kingdom under an obligation to accept arbitration of the difference between that
Government and the Hellenic Government concerning the validity of the Ambatielos
claim, in so far as this claim is based on the Treaty of 1886? The distinctive character
of this case is that quite unlike the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions decided by the
Permanent Court of International Justice in 1924 the Court is called upon to decide,
not its own jurisdiction, but whether a dispute should be referred to another tribunal for
arbitration.
The Parties have rested their case on the Declaration of 1926 and the Judgment of the
Court of July 1st, 1952. The Declaration was agreed upon for the purpose of
safeguarding the interests of the Parties with respect to claims on behalf of private
persons based on the Treaty of 1886, for which, on the termination of that Treaty, there
would have been no remedy in the event of the failure of the Parties to arrive at
amicable settlements. The Agreement of 1926 relates to a limited category of
differences which the Agreement of 1886 provided should be settled by arbitration,
namely differences as to the validity of claims on behalf of private persons based on
the Treaty of 1886. But in both cases the Parties were prompted by the same motives
and adopted the same method of arbitration. By the Judgment of July 1st, 1952, the
merits of the Ambatielos claim were found to be outside the jurisdiction of the Court
which consists solely of deciding whether the United Kingdom is under an obligation to
accept arbitration. The limited jurisdiction of the Court is to be clearly distinguished
from the jurisdiction of the Commission of Arbitration. The Court must refrain from
pronouncing final judgment upon any question of fact or law falling within the merits; its
task will have been completed when it has decided whether the difference with regard
to the Ambatielos claim is a difference as to the validity of a claim on behalf of a private
person based on the provisions of the Treaty of 1886 and whether, in consequence,
there is an obligation binding the United Kingdom to accept arbitration.
What meaning is to be attributed to the word "based" on the Treaty of 1886? In the
opinion of the Greek Government it would suffice that the claim should not prima facie
appear to be unconnected with the Treaty. In the view of the United Kingdom, it is
necessary for the Court to determine, as a substantive issue, whether the claim is
actually or genuinely based on the Treaty. The Court is unable to accept either of these
views. The first would constitute an insufficient reason; the second would lead to the
substitution of the Court for the Commission of Arbitration in passing on a point which
constitutes one of the principal elements of the claim The Commission alone has
jurisdiction to adjudicate on the merits and it cannot be assumed that the Agreement of
1926 contemplates that the verification of the allegations of fact should be the duty of
the Commission, while the determination of the question whether the facts alleged
constitute a violation of the Treaty of 1886 should form the task of another tribunal.
At the time of the signature of the Declaration of 1926, the British and Greek
Governments never intended that one of them alone or some other organ should
decide whether a claim was genuinely based on the Treaty of 1886,it must have been
their intention that the genuineness of the Treaty basis of any claim, if contested,
should be authoritatively decided by the Commission of Arbitration, together with any
other questions relating to the merits.
the facts alleged are true, it is contended that Mr. Ambatielos did not have "free
access" to English courts.
Having regard to these contentions, as well as the divergence of views which give rise
to them, and bearing in mind especially the possible interpretation put forward by the
Hellenic Government of the provisions of the Treaty of 1886 which it invokes, the Court
must conclude that this is a case in which the Hellenic Government is presenting a
claim on behalf of a private person based on the Treaty of 1886, and that the
difference between the Parties is the kind of difference which, according to the
Agreement of 1926, should be submitted to arbitration.

For the purpose of determining the obligation of the United Kingdom to accept
arbitration, the expression claims based on the Treaty of 1886 cannot be understood
as meaning claims actually supportable under that Treaty. Of course it is not enough
that a claim should have a remote connection with the Treaty for it to be based on it; on
the other hand it is not necessary that an unassailable legal basis should be shown for
an alleged Treaty violation. In its context, the expression means claims depending for
support on the provisions of the Treaty of 1886, so that the claims will eventually stand
or fall according as the provisions of the Treaty are construed in one way or another.
Consequently, in respect of the Ambatielos claim, it is not necessary for the Court to
find that the Hellenic Government's interpretation of the Treaty is the only correct
interpretation: it is enough to determine whether the arguments advanced by the
Hellenic Government in support of its interpretation are of a sufficiently plausible
character to warrant a conclusion that the claim is based on the Treaty. In other words,
if an interpretation appears to be an arguable one, whether or not it ultimately prevails,
then there are reasonable grounds for concluding that the claim is based on the Treaty.
The validity of the respective arguments would be determined by the Commission of
Arbitration in passing upon the merits of the difference.

The Court then proceeds to deal with two of the contentions put forward by Greece
and contested by the United Kingdom. One is based on the most-favoured-nation
clause in Article X of the Treaty of 1886 which would permit Greece to invoke the
benefits of Treaties concluded by the United Kingdom with third states and obtain
redress for a denial of justice Mr. Ambatielos would have suffered - if the facts alleged
were true.

The other contention, based on Article XV, rests on an interpretation of the words "free
access to the Courts of Justice" appearing in that Article; again on the assumption that

THE PANEVEZYS CASE (ESTONIA V. LITHUANIA)
Forum: Permanent Court of International Justice
Year: 1939
Citation: Series A/B, No. 76 (February 28, 1939)
Link to the Original Text of the Decision
municipal law, before taking proceedings before an international
tribunal.
The court joined the objections to the merits, indicating that
Lithuanias first objection could not be decided without ruling on the
merits. Although such an objection was in principle of a preliminary
nature, the Court considered that that was not so in the present
case. The grounds of the objection, namely that the claim lacked
national character, could not be separated from those on which the
Lithuanian Government disputed the companys right to the
ownership of the railway. After considering the second objection, the
Court found that it was common ground that the Estonian Company
had not instituted any legal proceedings before the Lithuanian
courts in order to establish its title to the railway. For those reasons,
the Court declared that the claim presented by the Estonian
Government could not be entertained.

The Government of Estonia filed an application with the court with a

request for a judgment to declare that Lithuania had wrongfully
refused to recognise the rights of an Estonian company with respect
to a railway situated in the former Russian territory which had now
become Lithuanian, following the independence of the Baltic
Republics. It required that Lithuania make good the prejudice that
the company suffered. Estonia contended that the company in
question had become the owner of the railway, having continued, or
succeeded to, a former Russian company.
Lithuania raised two preliminary objections one being that Estonia
had not observed the rule of law that Lithuania claimed existed, to
the effect that any claim made by a State must be a national claim
not only at the time of its presentation, but also at the time when the
injury to which it refers was suffered; the second objection related to
the failure to exhaust national means of redress afforded by