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Alec Charles
Alec Charles
Alec Charles
Alec Charles
abstract
Ulysses is a novel of immense and endless structuration, but one that resists structure
itself, which eschews the closure and determinism of stereotypically Utopian mythol-
ogization. Joyces work acknowledges that we continue to cling to our Utopian
dreams, despite all the material evidence. Yet Joyce advances a mode of Utopianism
that, in recognizing the tensions inherent to its relationship with the real, not only
self-consciously deconstructs but also therefore sustains itself. If the Utopian breaks
down upon its contact with material history, then perhaps by inscribingand, more
importantly, integratingits antithesis and its own absurdity within itself, it might
achieve a balance and a self-awareness sufficient to sustain it beyond the moment of
its conception, the revolutionary or revelatory moment, and to translate its abstrac-
tion into the very materiality that had originally threatened to extinguish it. Joyce
reveals Utopian literatures potential for self-deconstruction while at the same time
rehearsing the hypocrisy and tyranny of literalist political interpretations of that dis-
course. Ulysses explores this process at a literary-political level; but it is Finnegans
Wake that, in its dissolution of the dictatorship of the aesthetic, enacts the innate
failure of the project of perfectibility at the level of language itself.
It may be argued that Joyces work can be seen either as the defining text of a
real and historically grounded nationhood or, conversely, as the defining text
of an imaginary and ahistorical nationhood. It may in other words be viewed
as either epical or Utopianand as addressing a modernist predilection for
either of those forms. But it may also be argued that Joyces work might para-
doxically be seen as both of these things and that Joyces writing is able to
suspend and maintain such contradictory positions in a synthetic harmony
through its uses of ambiguity and irony. Indeed, it might also be argued that
Joyce herein offers the conditions of possibility of a realizable and sustain-
able mode of Utopianisma Utopianism that inscribes its own opposites (the
dystopian, the anti-Utopian, and the real) and its own impossibility within
a continuously dynamic dialectic. Yet how might this mode of Utopianism
function in relation to the traditions of the genre, and how might it afford a
reinterpretation (or even a revitalization) of those traditions?
The great works of literary modernism tend to boast something of an
epic quality. The Waste Land is the epic that elaborates the state of European
culture after World War I; la recherche du temps perdu, the epic of the bour-
geois salon; Ezra Pounds Cantos, the epic of all human civilization. It is also not
unusual to find James Joyces Ulysses depicted as an epic. Joyce himself dubbed
it an epic of the Irish and Jewish racesalthough in the same passage he also
referred to it as his damned monster-novel.1 One might note more recently,
for example, Kieran Keohanes study or the introduction to Colin McCabes
article on the centenary of Bloomsday2both of which describe Joyces work
as epic. However, this sense of epicality often seems somewhat at odds with
the more problematic and deconstructive implications of Joyces work.
Just as journalists have adopted the term biblical to describe natural disas-
ters of any significance, so the term epic tends, in critical and popular circles
alike, to be grievously misused. There is, for instance, a tendency to define
epicality as a measure of length rather than as a generic status. The phrases
epic proportions and epic scale suggest that size matters, but for once it really
does not. James Camerons Titanic (1997), for example, is certainly a lengthy
film, but it is surely not an epic. Length of text and size of boat are irrelevant:
Sergei Eisensteins Battleship Potemkin (1925) is, by contrast, not a particularly
long film (or as large a craft); but it is, it seems, an epic. Gilgamesh is a lot
shorter than The Da Vinci Codebut it is not Dan Browns text that deserves
the epithet.
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epistemology, beyond the realm, that is, of current knowledge: that part of
the South Sea was utterly unknown, writes Bacon.9
Jacques Derrida has suggested that God is that which sees everything and
yet which cannot be seen: He holds me in his gaze . . . while remaining inac-
cessible to me10for, as God explains to Moses in Exodus 33:20, no one may
see him and live. Utopias remain similarly invisible (yet envisionable); they
supersede contemporary epistemologies. Francis Bacona writer for whom
knowledge, of course, was powertherefore writes that his New Atlan-
tians know well most part of the habitable world, and are . . . unknown
they... knew much of our state . . . yet we . . . never heard of the least
inkling or glimpse of this island.11 This, adds Bacon, is a conditioner and
propriety of divine powers and beings, to be hidden and unseen to others, and
yet to have others open and as in a light to them.12 In this respect, the Utopian
mode might be seen to resemble the work, at once omnisciently encyclopedic
and frustratingly obscurantist, of James Joyce.
Where therefore, within this dichotomy between the Utopian and the
epic, might Ulysses stand? Is Joyces work, published the year of the cre-
ation of the Irish Free State, the defining text of his nation, a narrative of
historical determinism, of destinytruly the created conscience of the art-
ists race? Or is it a Utopian texta text that speaks not to history but to a
posthistoricalitya text not of any nation but repeatedly and explicitly (as
for More, Morris, and even Butler) a depiction of no-place, a realm beyond the
possibilities of geopolitical and geographical integrity but also beyond the
epics sense of theological and historical determinism?
Of course, in a way, it is neither: it is a bourgeois comic novel, an unlikely
heir to the realist tradition. Yet Ulysses continues to address both epic and
Utopianist genres and, in its ironization or deconstruction of heroic and abso-
lutist idioms, reveals aporias and anomalies common to both. Ulysses invokes
an epic Everyman13an Odysseus who remains at the same time a no one,
a nomanlike Odysseus himself, to the Cyclops: my name is Nobody14a
Nayman of Noland.15 Joyces Noland might as such appear at first sight,
in its satirical self-problematization, closer to Swifts remote nations or to
Butlers Erewhon than to Morriss Nowhere or to Mores seminal domain.
( Joyces fondness for Swift is well documented, but we might also note his
interest in Butler, as reported by Richard Ellmann.)16
Yet, if no man is an island, that island may turn out, after all, to be Utopia.
Let us not forget that Mores own herald of Utopia, Raphael Nonsenso, has
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seen even more of the world than Ulysses and is said to resemble Ulysses,
or even Plato.17 Mores narrator is Raphael, an angel (a messenger) not only of
Christianity but also of Judaism (and, for that matter, of Islam)a hybrid not
unlike a Joycean Jewgreek . . . greekjew18a Christian-Platonic everyman and
nomana wandering Ulysses. This figure of allsense and of nonsense is not so
very different from Leopold Bloom himself. He, like Bloom, is a wanderer and
a dreamer, a fantasist of epic and Utopian proportions; like Bloom, he is an out-
sider, a man of mixed and uncertain provenance; his narrator, like Blooms, takes
Ulysses as his model; he is, like Bloom, interested in philosophy and quite
a scholar,19 and yet, like Bloom, he remains a vessel of nonsense, a Joycean
Noman.20 The similarities between these paragons of complexity and prob-
lematization may reveal commensurate parallels between their respective texts.
Like Joyces work, Mores Utopia exposes the ambiguities and impossi-
bilities of its own idealizations. Its promised land is both a terra incognita
and a terra nulliusa no-place of AdemusNopeopleand of Achoriorum
populus, the people of Nolandia.21 Mores Utopia is hardly, in the popular
and simplistic sense, Utopian at all: It may be the prototype of Utopia, but it
is hardly its stereotype. If Joyces work might be seen as Utopian (rather than
Utopianin the tradition, that is, of Mores work rather than of its clich), it
should be in precisely the same paradoxical fashion. Indeed, Mores imaginary
domain might recognize itself in Leopold Blooms reflections on the heavens:
a Utopia . . . a mobility of illusory forms immobilised in space ... a past
which possibly had ceased to exist as a present before its probable spectators
had entered actual present existence.22 Indeed, Blooms view of Utopia is as
provisional, as ambiguous, and therefore as dynamic as that modern Utopia
imagined by that seminal science fiction writer (and fan of Joyce) H. G. Wells,
a Utopia that is not to be a unanimous world any more, it is to have all and
more of the mental contrariety we find in the world of the real.23
To what extent, then, does Joyces work fit the Utopian model advanced by
such literary contemporaries as H. G. Wells? H. G. Wells for one understood
that his model in A Modern Utopia (1905) must shape not as a permanent state
but as a hopeful stage leading to a long ascent of stages.24 As envisaged in
A Modern Utopia, Wellss perfect world does not attempt to change the nature
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of man.25 Thus Wells argues that the Morean or Platonic imposition upon
individuals of a totalizing schematizationwhat George Orwell character-
izes as the wish to freeze history26creates an unsustainably monologistic
realm. Wellss Utopia does not negate the past; it embraces and consolidates
the dialectical process: Utopia too must have a history.27 What remains
then is a Utopia that is resolutely material, historical, and dialogical, not the
perfected state of fundamentalism but the aspirant condition of a critical
humanism.
Chris Ferns has pointed out that Wells is clearly aware of the prob-
lematic character of utopian narrative.28 Perhaps the most significant such
problem Ferns notes is that Wellss Modern Utopia is necessarily written from
a perspective of radical alterity rather than one of possible futurity. Wells
Utopia has a history, certainly, but it is an entirely different history from that
of our world. For Ferns, then, the narrators admission that such a utopia
could only have emerged from a wholly different utopian history leads us to
the conclusion that for utopia to exist . . . it must already have existed: even
while Wells attempts to imagine a society capable of change, he severs its
link with the world which utopia proposes to alter for the betterhis own.29
Thus Wellss Utopian vision falls foul of the primary criticism that, according
to Paul Ricoeur, is repeatedly leveled against the genre: utopia . . . is seen to
represent a kind of social dream without concern for the real first steps nec-
essary for movement in the direction of a new society . . . a way of escaping
the logic of action through a construct outside history.30 Whatever claims
to material historicity Wellss Modern Utopia may make, its is an alternative
historicity, one eventually irreconcilable with our own.
This may be one reason why, when Wells attempts to elaborate a Utopian
vision directly out of material human history, he ends up constructing
a world closer to the dystopias of Huxley or Orwell. Published four years
before A Modern Utopia, H. G. Wellss Anticipations (1901) advances a much
harsher perspective upon the future. Anticipations predicts that the end of
the twentieth century would witness the rise of a naturally and informally
organized, educated class . . . a New Republic dominating the world.31 Wellss
New Republic is no frozen Utopia: its founders will not conceive of it as a
millennial paradise, a blissful inconsequent stagnation, but as a world state of
active . . . human beings.32 Yet this dynamic futurity seems starkly less het-
erogeneous than Wellss Modern Utopia; his New Republics approaches to the
uneducable classes range from the eugenicist through to the genocidal: the
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New Republicwill tolerate no dark corners where the people of the Abyss
may fester. . . . [I]t is their portion to die out and disappear.33
These anticipations in many ways anticipate the unsentimental vision
of the process of the establishment of the hegemonic and homogeneous
Modern State that Wells presents in The Shape of Things to Come (1933). Here
Wells portrays the apparent inevitability of the violent, uncompromising,
and totalizing imposition of a perfected, absolutist statea pitilessly benev-
olent and oppressively puritanical regime:34 The new government meant
to rule not only the planet but the human will. . . . There was now to be one
faith only in the world, the moral expression of the one world community.35
James Joyce appears to be attempting a vision that balances the comedic
optimism of Wellss Modern Utopia with the historical realism of Anticipa-
tions and The Shape of Things to Come (while at the same time eschewing the
irretrievable fantasization of the former text and the impending dystopianism
of the latter texts). Joyce roots his Utopianism in a sense of material reality
that often inscribes a satire upon that Utopianism within the Utopianist posi-
tion. Joyce was clearly not as averse as Wells to the festering people of the
abyss and the corporeal sensuality of their lives; indeed, in response to Wellss
complaints of olfactory indulgence, Joyce wrote: There once was an author
named Wells / Who wrote about science not smells.36 Indeed, in 1928, Wells
wrote to Joyce delineating their differences: The frame of my mind is a world
wherein a big unifying and concentrating process is possible. . . . Your mental
existence is obsessed by a monstrous system of contradictions.37
If Joyces work embraces contradictions, it does so by suspending them
within a dynamic (and perhaps transitory) harmony reminiscent of Stephen
Dedaluss depiction of Aquinass notion of consonantia in A Portrait of the
Artist as a Young Man: complex, multiple, divisible, separable, made up of its
parts, the result of its parts and their sum, harmonious.38 Stephens medita-
tions upon Aquinas perhaps parallel those of his contemporary, the German
Jewish Utopianist Ernst Bloch: Thomism is eminently aesthetic, balances the
world, and only gives up the Hellenic [or, we might add, Wellsian] unisub-
stantiality of being . . . in order to replace it with a more delightful construct
of a heterogeneous harmony.39 Aquinas supposed that divine and human
goodness might raise humanity above nature40and Bloch similarly pro-
poses a Utopian transcendence of the husk-real of physical nature41but
Joyces vision remains steeped in natural materiality. Thomist idealism is
always for Joyce materialized and corporealized: the aesthetic pluralism
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people would come again and with a vengeance to vanquish a culture that
bears no music and no art and no literature worthy of the name.88 This
vengeful awakening is hardly the rebirth of Ireland that Joyce imagines in
Finnegans Wakeone that, by contrast, embraces and indeed appropriates
cultural pluralities. The Citizens vision reaches its absurd climax in the apoc-
alyptic and infernal nightmare invoked by that same Citizencalling on God
to slit the throats of the English dogsin Ulyssess Circe chapter: Brim-
stone fires spring up. . . . Thieves rob the slain. . . . The earth trembles. The
dead of Dublin . . . arise and appear to many. A chasm opens with a noiseless
yawn.89
The latter follows eschatologically on from Leopold Blooms revelation
of his own New Bloomusalem. Bloom imagines two very different kinds of
Utopia in Ulysses: The first is this apocalyptic fantasy; the second, his rigorously
designed scheme for Flowerville. Joyce describes the former as a colossal edi-
fice with crystal roof, built in the shape of a huge pork kidney90it is a phan-
tasmagorical blend of the stately pleasure-dome of Coleridges Xanadu and
the Crystal Palace (built in London in 1851 to house the Great Exhibition)91
and one might suggest that Joyces novel itself, exuberant, exhibitionistic, and
encyclopedic as it is, is appropriately modeled by this symbolic architecture.
The fact that the New Bloomusalem is specifically constructed in the shape
of a pork kidney also reminds us of the insistent carnality and comicality of
Joyces project.
The New Bloomusalem is a resolutely physical place. Bloom offers new
worlds for old . . . weekly carnival . . . universal language92and it seems
significant that he stresses the value of the carnal alongside the linguistic.
In Blooms Utopia everyone will receive three acres of land and a cow.93 His
followers hand out sausage and, inevitably, loaves and fishes.94 Like Jona-
than Swift, Joyce realizes that you cannot create an Irish Utopia while people
are starving.95 The New Bloomusalem is a profoundly earthly Utopia or, as
Richard Ellmann has called it, a profane salvation.96
Mr. Blooms second envisioning of Utopia is a much more sober and
controlledbut similarly materialaffair. As Joyce has constructed Blooms
universe from its minutiae, so Bloom builds Flowerville out of its individual
objects: its plants, its books, its furnishings, its dinner gong and alabas-
ter lampits shrubbery and beehive arranged on humane principles.97
He imagines his own hobbies and recreations, his civic duties and schemes
of industrial and infrastructural reform. He carefully costs his project and
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of salvation might negate its weight of sacrifice, Jesuss death, for example,
is therefore valorized, in Matthew 27:46, by his loss of absolute faith: My
God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me? It is a similar rejection of total
dependence upon external forces, be they divine or historical, that heroically
shifts the Homeric epic toward Joycean humanism.
Mr. Leopold Bloom, at the end of his ruminations upon the civic Utopian
project of Flowerville, wonders why he should meditate on schemes so dif-
ficult of realisation.111 His answer is that such dreams help him to sleep. This,
then, is the corporeal extent of the consolation of Joycean philosophy. Joyce
eventually eschews the totalizing and transcendental metanarratives and
grand theories of post-Morean Utopianist literalismdespite the portentous
claims that he and others have made for his work.
Jacques Derrida, for example, tells of being asked by an American tourist
in a Tokyo hotel whether there is a single definitive book. Derrida writes that
he almost replied that there are two of them, Ulysses and Finnegans Wake.112
Derrida depicts Finnegans Wake as a hypermnesiac machineone that con-
tains all cultures, histories, languages, and literatures: you can say nothing
that is not programmed on this 1000th generation computer.113 Derrida dis-
covers divinityYahwehin Finnegans Wake; but there we might more per-
tinently also find Joyces Yahoos: truemen like yahoomen.114 If all men are
Yahooswho are, as Swift emphasizes, creatures of deceitthen true men
cannot be men of truth. Humanity no longer matches its divine self-image:
When is a man not a man? . . . [W]hen he is a . . . Sham.115 In its prag-
matic reflection of material reality, Finnegans Wake reveals its own idealiza-
tions as counterfeit. Thus Derrida comes to witness the simulacrum of this
forgery.. . the ruse of the invented word.116
At first sight, Finnegans Wake offers itself as a text of infinite cyclicity and
relentless resurrection: Finn, again117but also start againwake. As such,
it melds the finis(h) with the phoenixengendering the Phoenis118 or the
phoenish119 in a manner that is resolutely Irish (Irelands material geography
and history are recalled in these phonemes echoes of Finnegans, Fenians, and
Phoenix Park) and at the same time self-consciously linguistic: Joyces phoenix
text is primarily a phonic text.
Umberto Eco has thus suggested that Finnegans Wake synthesizes a rigid
correspondence between phonetic and semantic suggestion.120 Its portman-
teau words, by generating semantic structures out of phonetic resemblance,
appear to deconstruct the unbridgeable Saussurean gap between signifier and
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signifiedor, as Joyce himself puts it, make soundsense and sensesound kin
again.121
This phoneticsemantic relationship purports to transcend languages
failure to mean. As such it might claim to transcend (in a way we might see as
Utopian in a Thomist or Blochian sense) the inherent problems of the mate-
rial human condition. For Joyce this eventually represents a transformation
of death (which is the ultimate loss of meaning) into life (or at least into the
infinite and immortal memory that literature encompasses). The phonic turns
the finis into the phoenix; yet for Joyce this symbol of resurrection and redemp-
tion is not unproblematic in itself (or in the tension between the Utopian
ambition and the real history that it holds in suspension): It is Fiendish and
sphinxishit is a foenixa plagiarist, a parasite, a parrot.122 It is parodys
bird rather than any Utopian bird of paradise.123 As Herring has suggested,
this is a text that witnesses language at war with itself.124
Meanwhile another word underpins and undermines the finis/phoenix/
phonic suite of phonemes: that word, inevitably, is phoney. The possibility of a
positive, direct, and lucid relationship between signifier and signified is counter-
feit: Joyce herein reveals his own phoney habit . . . in his clairaudience.125 The
promise of phonic redemption proves false and even risible, not only phoney
but ineluctably funny, in Joyces tellafun book.126
As he pledged at the end of A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, Joyce has
succeeded in forging (both creating and counterfeiting) his world. Daedalus
the master architect is also his own son Icarus, the overreacher destined for
oblivion. This is the Joyce who has forged out his sentencesthe pseudo-
messianic author of a piously forged work.127 If this work is a transcendental
epic, a narrative of nationhood, then it is an epical forged chequeevery
dimmed letter of it . . . a copy . . . the last word in stolentelling.128 This indeed
is Derridas forged simulacrum: the shamwork129 that reveals that Finnegans
Wake was always, as its title announces, a massive F . . . ake.
However, it is not so much that Joyce is denouncing his own project; it is
more that he is inscribing his critics, allowing his refutations lease to disprove
his works positiongiving them enough rope to let them bind themselves
ineluctably within that position. The voices of artist and critic are bound
up into a Joycean harmony of contradiction (in Finnegans Wake chaos finds
itself harmonious): as Finn Fordham has suggested, the relation between
Shem and Shaun is like that between two parts of his own self: the visionary
artist . . . and the revisionary critic who chides, reproaches, denigrates, and
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they seem to represent a mode of that foreplay that Jacques Derrida sees
as the province of literary pleasures. But while Derrida views such textual
pleasure as null and endless,137 Joyces later work might be characterized as
endless (which is not to say directionless) and full: an inexhaustible crescendo
of Barthesian jouissance.
Louis Althusser once invoked a new philosophy, one which was no
longer an interpretation, but rather a transformation of the world.138 Yet Joyce
at times reminds us that texts are merely representational and interpreta-
tionalthey are not literally or fundamentally transformative; they do not
in the end build brave new worlds, try though they may. As Roland Barthes
would suggest, dominant meanings are privileged in the generation of such
connotative semantic structures as literatures and cultures: this process for
the most part represents an act of ideological reinforcement, one contained
within Orwells hegemonic whale. At its most radical, therefore, literature
may from this perspective advance a work of subversion or deconstruction
rather than one of intentional revolutionary constructionthe synthesis of a
satirical Laputa rather than of a realizable Utopia.
Nicholas Brown proposes that in a first, utopian moment, Ulysses
short-circuits the rift between subjectivity and the object-world, miraculously
imbuing the accidents of daily life with inscrutable significance. However,
as Brown adds, this Utopia fails to bear on an actuality for which it can only
compensate. But in a second moment this failure makes itself manifest.139
In Jamesons words, such manifestations of the anti-Utopian impulse as
those we appear to witness in Joyces work may afford the discovery that
our most energetic imaginative leaps into radical alternatives were little more
than the projections of our own social moment and historical or subjective
situation.140
Material history translates the soaring dreams of Daedalus into the down-
fall of his son. Joyces apparent bourgeois distrust of progressivist idealism
or Utopianismrecalls that of Edward Bellamys nineteenth-century social
skeptics: The parabola of a comet was perhaps a yet better illustration of the
career of humanity. . . . The race attained the perihelion of civilization only
to plunge downward once more to its nether goal in the regions of chaos.141
Those who share Bellamys aversion to this bourgeois skepticism might do
well to consider whether the end of the twentieth century saw Bellamys
golden future to humanity or in fact the era of corporate tyranny that
these skeptics predicted.142
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the reader can never awake, yet within which its own waking-from is already
inscribed and therefore preempted. Yet does this Viconian cyclicity refute
the possibility of Utopia? Utopian historicity is necessarily progressive and
teleological, rather than endlessly cyclic. But it seems that these two posi-
tions might be reconciled if we view the cycle itself as dynamically Utopian,
rather than any single point in that cyclethe divine, heroic, democratic, or
chaoticas a necessary end point, a stereotypically static Utopia.
This opposition between the static and the dynamicand the triumph
of the latter in Finnegans Wakeis modeled by Sheldon Brivic in terms of
Joyces symbolic uses of gender within the novel: The male story enacts
conflict and decline, but the female one may be seen as showing discovery
and development that proceed through the disintegration of the discourse of
patriarchal coherence.156 Yet one might suggest not so much that the novel
is about gender difference as that it deploys gender difference to symbolize
the dichotomy between the static and dynamic historical perspectives upon
which it reflects. Brivic admits that his feminist reading of Finnegans Wake
should not claim to reveal the novels ultimate or real meaningand if (as
he writes) the novel represents history as progress through literary work
in a way that offers freedom through the disintegration of stable identity,157
then it may be that, in order to engage with that progressive idealism, such
determining terminologies as feminismor Utopianism, for that matterand
all of the categorical polarizations they involve might no longer seem par-
ticularly relevant. A static Utopia has no need for Utopianists (perfect worlds
do not need dreamers); and a dynamic Utopiaa world populated by such
aspirantswould have no need for such deterministic, static, and outmoded
categorizations. A progressive Utopia must be unfinished; it is not a state but
a perpetual coming-into-state in which all of its subjects continue to dream,
to hope, to aspire. This work of progress is, like Finnegans Wake, an unending
work in progress. It may at first seem incongruous that this Utopia of unceas-
ing movement is also the Utopia of real, material place, but it is clear that
one of the defining characteristics of material reality is that it never stays still.
This unceasing flow is precisely what, according to Julia Kristeva, articu-
lates the semiotic function of writing in what she calls a pulsating chora158
an idea glossed by Brivic as the level of maternal pulsation in language.159
Kristeva identifies this chora as a totality formed by the [semiotic] drives...
in a motility that is as full of movement as it is regulated.160 She cites Joyces
work as representative of that rare set of literary texts that cover the infinity
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of the [signifying] process, that is, reach the semiotic chora.161 In that Joyces
writing confronts patriarchal regulation with this deconstructive, progres-
sive, and chaotic flow, its attraction to feminist theorists is clear: as Brivic
notes, Joyces experiments directly inspired two of the leading thinkers of
the criture fminine movement, Hlne Cixous and Julia Kristeva.162 Like
poststructuralist feminism, Joyces work advances a mode of Utopianism
that necessarily resists categorization. In discussing her notion of criture
fminine (a literary form in which she includes Joyces workindeed she
wrote her doctoral thesis on Joyce),163 Hlne Cixous has suggested that it
is impossible to define such modes of writing and that this is an impos-
sibility that will remain, for this practice can never be theorized, enclosed,
codedwhich doesnt mean that it doesnt exist.164 While Herbert Marcuse
may have suggested that the Utopian is validated by its categorization as
such (and thereby by its exclusion from normative, hegemonic discourse),
the mode of Utopianism expressed by Kristevas chora or Cixouss criture
fminine is validated by virtue of the fact that it cannot be so categorized.
Like Joyces word known to all men,165 Utopia is too fluid for such reduc-
tive definition.
Leopold Bloom, in Ulysses, expansively describes the Utopian as afford-
ing no known method from the known to the unknown.166 Utopia is a place
that is impossible to arrive at by any known route, in that it is not really a
place at all. It is therefore essential that, in order to reach Utopia, one takes
an unknown and unknowable route, a path determined by its indeterminacy,
a passage that deconstructs its own rationalistic epistemological foundations.
It is only in its paradoxical nature that such a route, beyond sense (which
forbids entry into the unreal), might discover the reality of that unreality.
For, in the end, despite its fantastical absurditiesits self-conscious nowhere-
nessJoyces Dublin, like Butlers Erewhon, is the opposite of nowhere: it is
somewhere. It is by inscribing the material (the somewhere) within the dream
(the nowhere) that the dream might be sustained; and it is also by inscribing
the dream within the real that material existence can continue.
Ruth Levitas has suggested that in the move beyond modernism, the
Utopian method needs to be seen as provisional . . . dialogic . . . and . . .
reflexive.167 Joyce himself makes this move: his work does not engage in the
theoretical absolutism of so much classical modernisman absolute faith in
the transcendental authority of theoretical ideals that so often led toward
a political fundamentalism of the Left or of the Right. By contrast, Joyces
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Notes
1. Selected Letters of James Joyce, ed. Richard Ellmann (London: Faber and Faber, 1975),
27071.
2. Kieran Keohane, The Revitalization of the City and the Demise of Joyces Utopian
Modern Subject, Theory, Culture, and Society 19, no. 3 (2002): 33; Colin McCabe, James
Joyces Ulysses: The End of Masculine Heroism, OpenDemocracy, July 1, 2004.
3. The Critical Writings of James Joyce, ed. Ellsworth Mason and Richard Ellmann
(New York: Cornell University Press, 1989), 145.
4. Cited in Robert Stam, Film Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 32.
5. James Joyce, Ulysses (London: Penguin, 1986), 272.
6. Wolfgang Wicht, Utopianism in James Joyces Ulysses (Heidelberg: Winter, 2000), 165.
7. Jean Baudrillard, The Intelligence of Evil or the Lucidity Pact, trans. Chris Turner
(Oxford: Berg, 2005), 34.
498
8. Francis Bacon, The New Atlantis (London: Dodo Press, 2006), 23; Thomas More,
Utopia, trans. Paul Turner (London: Penguin, 1965), 103.
9. William Morris, News from Nowhere (London: Penguin, 1984), 207; More, Utopia,
3031, 34; Bacon, New Atlantis, 1.
10. Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, trans. David Willis (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1995), 33.
11. Bacon, New Atlantis, 7, 10.
12. Ibid., 10.
13. Joyce, Ulysses, 598.
14. Homer, The Odyssey, trans. E. V. Rieu (London: Penguin, 1946), 149.
15. James Joyce, Finnegans Wake (London: Faber and Faber, 1939), 187.
16. See Richard Ellmann, James Joyce (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 148.
17. More, Utopia, 33, 38.
18. Joyce, Ulysses, 411.
19. More, Utopia, 38.
20. Joyce, Ulysses, 598.
21. More, Utopia, 78, 58.
22. Joyce, Ulysses, 575.
23. H. G. Wells, A Modern Utopia (London: Penguin, 2005), 87.
24. Ibid., 11.
25. Ibid., 12.
26. George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (London: Penguin, 1954), 172.
27. Wells, Modern Utopia, 81.
28. Chris Ferns, Narrating Utopia (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999), 89.
29. Ibid., 98.
30. Paul Ricoeur, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, ed. George Taylor (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1986), 12.
31. H. G. Wells, Anticipations (Charleston: BiblioBazaar, 2007), 163.
32. Ibid., 182.
33. Ibid., 194.
34. H. G. Wells, The Shape of Things to Come (London: Penguin, 2005), 361, 415.
35. Ibid., 34647.
36. See Ellmann, James Joyce, 414.
37. See ibid., 608.
38. James Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (London: Panther, 1977), 192.
39. Ernst Bloch, The Spirit of Utopia, trans. Anthony Nassar (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2000), 20.
40. Thomas Aquinas, Selected Philosophical Writings, trans. Timothy McDermott
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 424.
41. Bloch, Spirit of Utopia, 3.
42. Joyce, Finnegans Wake, 120, 53.
43. See Jeri Johnson, Composition and Publication History, in Ulysses, by James Joyce
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), xl.
499
502
503