Bettendorf HW Districts

THE CRUSADERS AC

INTRODUCTION

My partner and I affirm [the topic, Resolved: In the United States, organized political lobbying does more harm than
good.]

To clarify, we define:

Organized political lobbying as, “[an organization that] to conduct[s] activities aimed at influencing public officials and
1
esp. members of a legislative body on legislation” from Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law .

The dependent clause “in the US” modifies the independent clause “organized political lobbying does more harm than
good” while “more harm than good” is merely a result of the verb “does.” Thus we conclude that “in the US” only
modifies the noun “organized political lobbying” since it’s a gerund that performs the action of doing more harm than
good. This means even though we can only debate about lobbying in the US, ramifications outside of the US are still
relevant.

[Even if we accept it the other way, it only makes sense to talk about political lobbying in the US that could have
ramifications outside of the US. Interpreting it the other way would allow arguments about political lobbying outside
of the US affecting the US, which is less likely to happen.]

We offer three contentions:

1.

2.

3.

1
"lobbying." Def. 1a. Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law. 7th ed. 2003.
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THE CRUSADERS AC

REFORM (GENERAL)

[_________], organized political lobbying has consistently prevented reform from happening.

The journal of Rhetoric and Public Affairs2 writes in 2004:

However, agenda management requires an effective rhetoric. On the one hand, manipulating political structures in public policymaking must be legitimized, and legitimation requires symbolic action.21 When policies involve
complex issues, the legitimation may be as simple as claiming that “hollow laws” are major, substantive changes, or as precise as focusing attention on one part of a bill while obscuring other provisions that make its passage
meaningless. In addition, organizational rhetors have a number of strategies available to undermine popular pressure for reform. Opponents can contain an issue conceptually, either by defining the issue in a way that minimizes
its appeal or by drawing on culturally sanctioned assumptions to frame policy proposals in ways that make meaningful reform seem objectionable and palliatives seem adequate.22 During the 1990s conceptual

containment campaigns supported and funded by U.S. organizations became more sophisticated and more effective as opponents
learned to coordinate lobbying activities with “public issue” campaigns. The most successful efforts to undermine
public support for reform argued that socioeconomic “problems” are “private sector” concerns, not matters for
governmental policy. This argument gains its credibility from the cultural assumption that free market capitalism is inherently superior to any other economic system, and that government “interference” in
the free market system is inherently futile and perverse.23 The astonishing success of the “Harry and Louise” attacks on “Hillarycare” made it abundantly

clear that organizational rhetors, in the guise of “public interest” campaigns, can significantly influence popular
definitions of policy issues and thereby short-circuit reform.24 Five years after the demise of the Clinton health care proposal, opponents of the
McCain-Feingold bill regulating the tobacco industry were able to capitalize on advocates’ arguments that the industry long had
covered up the addictive properties of nicotine. Since the funding mechanisms in the bill relied on increased tobacco taxes, opponents successfully defined the proposal as a tax bill in disguise, one that

unfairly penalized precisely those poor and middle- class victims that the bill’s proponents had demonstrated were incapable of
shaking their addiction.

The journal elaborates on how it’s much easier to oppose reform than to require it.
For example, expensing stock options would initially have concentrated costs (on corporate executives, stockbrokers, and institutional investors) because they reduce the profits that corporations report to the general public, and

Since there are no established mechanisms through which individual investors

would have diffused benefits (primarily to individual investors).

can be informed about the issue, become connected to other individual investors, or engage in coordinated
political action, there is little chance that they will be able to influence policymakers. In short, it is much easier to
mobilize opposition to expensing options than it is to mobilize pressure to require it.19 Business elites are advantageously positioned to
dominate the decision-making process. Through fundraising and professional associations they are in constant contact with

policymakers on a variety of issues, are supported by an overwhelming number of Washington lobbyists, and are
linked to one another through communication networks that can be instantly activated.

2
Conrad, Charles. "The Illusion of Reform: Corporate Discourse and Agenda Denial in the 2002 "Corporate Meltdown"" Rhetoric & Public Affairs 7.3 (2004): 311-38. Project
MUSE. Web. 31 Jan. 2010.
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REFORM (GENERAL)

[_________], organized political lobbying can easily kill reform legislation.

The journal of Rhetoric and Public Affairs3 writes in 2004:

Political elites, including corporate rhetors, prefer that public policies be made in private. Through lobbying and political
connections to oversight agencies, elites can use established connections and relationships to dominate private
decision- making. Public policymaking is risky. It publicizes elite influence over the policy process, and may
allow non-elite groups to discover common interests and to organize in ways that create coalitions that exceed the “minimum winning size” needed to initiate
reforms that are opposed by elites.14 However, in some cases, normal processes of privatizing public policymaking do break down and issues become highly visible parts of public discourse. When that happens, opponents of

The greatest
reform must find ways to shift public attention away from the issue, or to define it in ways that minimize the possibility that meaningful reform will emerge from the policy- making process.

advantage that opponents of reform have is time. If opponents can only delay policy action until the attention and
emotional fervor underlying calls for reform subside, they can maintain the status quo. This is especially true when the media’s coverage of
an issue is “episodic”—focusing on individual instances of objectionable actions—rather than “systemic”—explaining the long-term causes of those actions.16 Because the leaders of the executive branches of governmental

, they are uniquely able to “contain” popular

agencies (presidents, prime ministers, governors, or mayors) have a superior ability to focus public and media attention to preferred topics

attention so that only those problems and proposals that they prefer to have discussed garner public attention.

3
Conrad, Charles. "The Illusion of Reform: Corporate Discourse and Agenda Denial in the 2002 "Corporate Meltdown"" Rhetoric & Public Affairs 7.3 (2004): 311-38. Project
MUSE. Web. 31 Jan. 2010.
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THE CRUSADERS AC

LOBBYING REGULATIONS FAIL

[_________], trying to regulate lobbyists forces them to work “underground.”

The National Journal4 writes in November of 2009:

Constraints on lobbyists actually reduce transparency, some argue, by encouraging lobbyists to "deregister." "What we want to do is try and shift the focus from federally registered lobbyists to money and influence in the
administration," said Lee Mason, director of nonprofit speech rights for OMB Watch. "That's where the focus ought to be." Plenty of lobbyists already agree. Frustration has been growing on K Street ever since President Obama
announced in January that most lobbyists would be barred from serving in the administration. The White House has also imposed limits on lobbyists seeking stimulus funds, and most recently took steps to bar registered lobbyists
from serving on federal advisory panels. "There will be challenges, but we see it as an opportunity," Trupo said. Administration officials, including Norm Eisen, the White House counsel on ethics and government reform, recently
met with concerned lobbyists and ITAC chairs but announced that the administration is standing pat. Many reform advocates have applauded the administration's lobbying restrictions and regard the blowback from K Street as

almost laughable. Certainly the health care, energy and financial reform debates on Capitol Hill suggest that lobbyists and
moneyed interests are, if anything, more powerful than ever. But even some in the public interest community wonder whether the White House's lobbying edicts will
really do much to change Washington. Constraints on lobbyists actually reduce transparency, some argue, by encouraging lobbyists to

"deregister" and stop reporting their activities. A joint study by the Center for Responsive Politics and OMB
Watch recently found that lobbyists terminated their registrations in the first quarter of this year at "significantly
higher levels than usual." Officials from the two organizations stressed that it's not clear why lobbyists are "deregistering," just that the total number of registrations is down.

4
The National Journal, November 16, 2009, Lobbyists: Obama's Rules Bring Pain But No Gain
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CORRUPTION

[_________], lobbying makes corruption a lot worse.

Nauro Campos and Francesco Giovannoni5 from the political journal, Public Choice, explain in 2006:
A second contribution that studies the relationship between corruption and lobbying is that by Damania et al. (2004). The crucial distinction with the Harstad and Svesson (2006) approach is that here corruption and lobbying are

viewed as complements, not substitutes. More specifically, the idea is that lobbying is not done in order to change the rules favorably, thus making bribing unnecessary, but it is done to persuade
politicians to underinvest in law enforcement, thus making bribing easier. This means that, contrary to the previous framework, firms that
choose to bribe bureaucrats are also more likely to exercise influence through lobbying. With respect to stability, the prediction is again very
different. Here, unstable political systems are more likely to generate lobbying. The mechanism is that firms feel more threatened by instability as they worry that future governments will be keener to enforce the law. Since

law enforcement requires significant investments, lobbying for underinvestment today will significantly
undermine any future government’s law enforcement efforts.

5
Campos, Nauro F., and Francesco Giovannoni. "Lobbying, corruption and political influence." Public Choice 131 (2006): 1-21. Print.
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IMBALANCED INFLUENCE

[_________], lobbying creates an unfair influence of public officials. The deep connections that lobbyists have with
politicians undermine the public’s ability to be heard.

Maureen Glabman6, the 2000 Columbia University Reuters Fellow in Medical Journalism, writes in a 2010 article:

[Association of Trial Lawyers of America] is uniformly preventing any, even minor,

Albertine of the American League of Lobbyists adds: "ATLA

revision in the tort reform laws because it is a bread-and-butter issue for them."

ATLA is No. 5 in Fortune magazine's 2001 "Power 25" list of Washington's most powerful lobbying groups, while the AMA
is 12 and the AHA 13. ATLA's lobbying expenses were $3 million in 2000. But, then, ATLA doesn't need a big lobbying

budget: It has power in numbers — of bodies. There are only nine physicians in Congress, but there are 218 representatives and senators
with law degrees.

6
Glabman, Maureen. "Lobbyists That the Founders Just Never Dreamed of." Managed Care Magazine. MediMedia USA, Aug. 2002. Web. 30 Jan. 2010.
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