Pompey chose to conduct his post in
absentia, by assigning lieutenants to run
This article will focus on Caesar's initial
operations in Italy up to the Siege of
Corfinium and Caesar's subsequent
entry into Rome. It includes one very
small historical engagement and one
hypothetical battle that never occurred.
To play these small scenarios, all you
need is a copy of the "Great Battles of
Julius Caesar" and the Stone Bridge
counter included in this issue of C3I.
The Crisis
In order to grasp the nature of this
crisis, a basic point of Roman law must
be understood. A Consul or a Governor,
while in office, could not be prosecuted
or sued in court. All such actions could
and did occur after the term of office
had expired. In fact, most retiring
governors were sued by someone, with
guilt or innocence determined by the
amounts of capital (political and
monetary) that the defendant possessed
relative to his accusers. The facts were
almost irrelevant in these high profile
cases, since the jurors were usually
bribed. It was this basic fact upon which
the crisis turned.
Julius Caesar had made his share of
powerful enemies while moving to the
top of the Republican world. Caesar,
like Pompey, was attempting to main-
tain a series of Consular and Gubernato-
rial posts without interruption to make
himself proof against his enemies while
accumulating power. His intent was to
ensure that there was no interruption in
the succession of these offices, so that he
would never be accountable in court nor
vulnerable to political defeat. The 1st
Triumvirate formed in 60 B.C. between
Crassus, Pompey, and Caesar wasn't a
formal legal institution, but an informal
arrangement whereby the three most
powerful men in Rome supported each
other's political agendas. It resulted in
Caesar becoming Consul in 59 B.C. and
receiving the provinces of Cisalpine
Gaul, Illyricum, and Gallia Narbonensis
for 5 years in return for supporting
Pompey's legislative agenda. That term
of Governorship was extended by law
(Lex Pompeia Licinia) for an additional 5
years in 55 B.C., during the Consulships
of Pompey and Crassus. At the conclu-
sion of their Consulships, Pompey
received Spain and Crassus got Syria.
Spain, while he stayed in Rome. Crassus
felt that military glory was the one thing
that money couldn't buy, and set off for
the east.
The triumvirate became a duo when
Crassus got himself killed at Carrhae in
53 B.C.. Perhaps more importantly,
earlier, Caesar's only daughter Julia,
who happened to be Pompey's wife,
died in childbirth (54 B.C.), severing the
marital relationship between the two
survivors. In 52 B.C. the death of
Clodius Pulcher, an aristocrat turned
Plebeian demagogue, set off extensive
civil unrest in Rome. Pompey, who may
have created the crisis, was awarded by
the Senate a sole Consulship (sine
collega) to save the Republic, effectively
making him a Dictator.
Besides restoring order, Pompey
instituted a series of judicial reforms
that made juror bribery almost impos-
sible. Caesar realized that under these
new laws his immense wealth wouldn't
protect him from prosecution, that is, if
he allowed such an opportunity to arise.
The "constitutional" crisis that started
the Civil War was over a far more
subtle, but dangerous reform that would
have created a six month gap in Caesar's
command. We are sure this was the key
issue for Caesar, based on his statement
to Pompey's peace envoys. "Prestige",
he averred, "has always been of prime
importance to me, even outweighing life
itself; it pained me to see the privilege
conferred on me by the Roman people
being insultingly wrested from me by
my enemies, and to find that I was being
robbed of six months of my command
and dragged back to Rome, although
the will of the people had been that I
should be admitted as a candidate in
absentia at the next elections."
This was important, because holding a
province meant having an army of
Legions under your command. Caesar
was faced with a situation whereby
Pompey would have continued to
control Spain and his Legions, while
Caesar would hav^ temporarily, if not
permanently, become a private citizen
without any troops. Without those
Legions, Caesar knew that his election
to Consul in 48 B.C. might never occur.

To appreciate the subtlety and the level

at which these two individuals were
competing, we need to briefly examine
the details of the "constitutional" crisis.
Under the Lex Sempronia of Gaius
Gracchus (c. 123 B.C.) the Consular
provinces were picked prior to a
Consular election, at which time they
were assigned. However, the Lex
Pompeia Licinia (55 B.C.), exempted
Caesar's provinces from being allocated
for five years (until 1 March 50 B.C.).
Therefore, on 1 March 50 B.C., Caesar's
provinces would have been allocated to
one of the Consuls of 49 B.C., but under
the rules, the Consul wouldn't have
gone to his province until 48 B.C., at
which time Caesar would have been
Consul-elect, and thus immune from
prosecution. What Pompey did in 52
B.C. was to pass a Senatorial decree that
effectively canceled the Lex Sempronia,
by stating that a five year interval must
elapse before an ex-Consul (and ex-
Praetor) could hold a province. What
this did was make Caesar's provinces
immediately available for occupancy,
since there were many individuals then
eligible who wouldn't wait until 48 B.C. Ariminum. Between these two towns sure that he appeared as the aggrieved
to take over. In effect Caesar was about was the provincial boundary marked by party. Suffice to say, the war was on.
to lose his provinces and his army the Rubicon River. Any governor who
before he could become Consul elect. crossed his provincial boundary without Next, while Caesar and two cohorts
express Senatorial permission, such as remained at Ariminum, he sent Mark
Caesar got Pompey to twice extend and Nero received during the Metaurus Antony with five cohorts to occupy
exempt his provinces from the new set campaign, was an outlaw. Hence, with Arretium, and three Cohorts to garrison
of rules, but on 7 January 49 B.C. the the famous phrase alea iacta est (loosely, Pisaurum, Fanum, and Ancona. An
Senate brought the situation to a head "the die is cast"), he crossed the Rubicon analysis of what Caesar appears to have
with its Senatus consultum ultimum, and began a Civil War. been doing, since he doesn't say, is that
which ordered Caesar to surrender his he was advancing South down the
provinces and demobilize his army, After Caesar's occupation of Ariminum, Adriatic coast of Italy while sending
while assigning Gaul to Lucius a peace delegation arrived attempting to blocking forces to cover his exposed
Domitius. Caesar's counteroffer was appeal to his love of Rome, but offering Western flank. Mark Antony at
that Pompey and he should give up nothing. Caesar counteroffered with his Arretium held a strong position on the
their provinces simultaneously. This mutual de-mobilization proposal. Via Cassia while Fanum sat on the Via
counteroffer was rejected, and on 10 Caesar's text is vague on the exact Flaminia, both of which led directly to
January 49 B.C., Caesar ordered the timing of these various delegations. Rome. Upon hearing that the towns-
Xlllth Legion from Ravenna to Considering, though, that at the time he people of Iguvium, further down the
wrote this down Pompey was dead, I'm
Via Flaminia, were well disposed
toward him, he rushed forces to occupy
the town. Curio, with the two cohorts at
Ariminum and the one at Fanum,
captured the town from its five cohort
garrison under the praetor Thermus.
Thermus, upon hearing about the
advance and not liking the mood of the
townsfolk, withdrew, but his five
cohorts soon deserted.
Heartened by his early receptions,
Caesar increased his tempo of opera-
tions and advanced with 2 cohorts for
Auximum, further South. The town was
held by Attius, who received a local
delegation that encouraged him to
leave. He did. Caesar's advance guard
pursued, and after a short skirmish,
Attius' men deserted. Caesar was also
using a very enlightened policy,
whereby all prisoners, even leaders,
were freed and no pillaging was
allowed. I am sure that many a contin-
gent of just recently recruited young
legionnaires felt that it was better to
surrender than die for a cause no one
understood. The obvious question is,
"where was Pompey?"
Although Pompey had boasted that he
could stamp his foot and raise soldiers,
Caesar's rapid advance with just one
Legion seems to have caught him off
guard. The two veteran Legions under
his command were recently Caesar's, so
their loyalty must have been suspect.
Pompey never allowed those Legions to
confront their old commander in battle
during the entire Italian portion of the
war.
Characteristically, Caesar had seized the
initiative by starting active operations
before his other Legions could arrive.
Pompey was clearly surprised and
unready to meet that threat. Conse-
quently, Caesar was able to mass
superior forces, even though he was
outnumbered, because Pompey's forces
were spread out and still in the process
of being recruited. The combat was
characterized by quick, almost bloodless
actions, that enhanced Caesar's support
amongst the citizenry. It was that rapid
growth in Caesar's economic strength
and access to the Italian recruiting
districts that made Caesar such a serious
threat to the Senatorial forces. Had he
not been able to secure such a rapid
conquest of Italy, it is unlikely that
Caesar could have sustained and
sufficiently expanded his forces to win
the war.
If Pompey had tried to confront Caesar
early, he still might not have fared any
better in the war. That early in the
conflict, a defeat in battle would have
had a significant impact on Pompey's
future operations. So Pompey decided to
give up Italy and marshal his forces
overseas before confronting Caesar in
battle. Pompey's naval superiority gave
him a potentially war-winning advan-
tage, strongly supporting the type of
strategy he employed. He understood
that the advantage in naval mobility
could be used to recapture Italy when
Caesar pursued him into another theater
of operations. If Caesar had been more
conservative, such a battle probably
would have taken place in Italy, but
under the circumstances, Pompey seems
to have decided to temporarily defer the
main event.
The news of Caesar's rapid advance
caused panic in Rome and the suspen-
sion of recruiting in that area. The
Senate evacuated the city and moved
further south to join Pompey. Leaving
Auximum, Caesar advanced through
Picenum where he was joined by the
Xllth Legion. He then advanced on
Asculum, which was held by Lentulus
Spinther with 10 cohorts. Upon hearing
of Caesar's approach, Lentulus re-
treated, and his men deserted him on
the road. Vibullius Rufus, who had been
sent by Pompey to take control of
Picenum, rounded up many of the
deserters, besides others fleeing from
Camerinum (13 cohorts total), and
forced marched to Corfinium. At
Corfinium was Domitius Ahenorbarbus,
with 20 recently-raised cohorts.
After collecting additional corn sup-
plies, Caesar advanced with his two
Legions (Xllth and XHIth), on
Corfinium. Upon his arrival he found 5
cohorts attempting to destroy the bridge
over the Aternus river, about 3 miles
from the town. Caesar's advanced guard
attacked and drove off Ahenorbarbus'
men who retreated into the town.
/
A Bridge Too Near
(Historical)
Map:
Use the Pharsalus South Map and place
the Stone Bridge counter across the
S3217/3218 hexside. Assume Corfinium
is 3 miles off the South end of the map.
Initial Deployment:
Pompeian Forces (Set up first, within 2
hexes of the Stone Bridge, on either side
of the river)
Tribune XVIth Legion
5 Cohorts of the XVIth Legion
(pick any 5 cohorts,
except the 1st)
Caesarian Forces (Set up on North side of
river no closer than 5 hexes from the
bridge)
Tribune Xlllth Legion
3 Cohorts Xlllth Legion
(pick any 3 cohorts)
Special Rules:
Tribunes can give Legion commands
without being in range of an SC.
Retreat Direction:
Pompeian: South map edge
Caesarian: North map edge
Game Length:
4 game turns
Victory Conditions:
Caesar wins if the both hexes adjoining
the bridge are secured by the end of the \
fourth game turn. Any other result is a
Pompeian victory.
Siege of Corfinium
Caesar conducted some local operations
and then began siege operations when
the VHIth Legion arrived. Ahenobarbus
sent messengers to Pompey informing
him that 33 cohorts and many promi-
nent men were in danger unless he came
to their aid. Pompey managed to get a
message through which basically stated
he never told Ahenobarbus to go to
Corfinium and he wouldn't put his
plans in jeopardy because of that
decision. Pompey encouraged him to
escape with his forces and join him, but
Caesar's rapidly growing siege lines
made that nearly impossible.
Ahenobarbus told his men that Pompey
was marching to their relief, but his look
and demeanor gave him away. His men
negotiated a surrender and Corfinium
fell to Caesar bloodlessly. Caesar, true to
his policy, incorporated the new men
into his forces and gave free passage to
Ahenobarbus and his prominent
compatriots.
Battle of Corfinium
(Hypothetical)
Ahistorical Notes:
This battle assumes that, after hearing
the bad news, Ahenobarbus decided to
lead his forces out of Corfinium to fight
a battle with Caesar.
Map:
Use the Munda Map without the
extension. Assume the camp is the outer
Ramparts of Corfinium from which
Ahenobarbus has deployed his men to
challenge Caesar in battle.
Pompeian Forces (Set up first within
15 hexes of the camp)
Ahenobarbus OC and SC for
Pompeian forces
Use the XVIth, XVIIth, and XXX
(with Tribunes) Legions plus
Tribunes and set them up first.
Caesarian Forces (Set Up within 15 hexes
of hex 3000).
Caesar OC
Mark Antony SC for Vlllth, Xllth,
and Xlllth Legions
Use Vlllth, Xllth, and Xlllth Legions (with
Tribunes) plus Antesignani 1-6 and two
Gaul LN, plus one Praefect.
Retreat Edge:
Pompeians:
The Roman Camp - once they enter
the camp they cannot be Rallied and
are eliminated.
Caesarians:
Mapedge with hex 3000.
Victory Conditions:
The victory conditions are based on the
number of Cohorts that rout off the
map. The first side to have 15 Cohorts
rout off the map loses. In reality,
Caesar's forces would have fought
harder and longer in my estimate, but
this makes it more of a match, although
a long shot for the Pompeians.
For more balanced play, substitute the
Pompeian 1st and 3rd Legions for the
17th and 30th.
Variant:
To make things a bit more interesting
for Caesar, this variant examines what
might have happened if Pompey had
marched to the relief of Ahenobarbus.
Each turn, during the Auxiliaries Phase,
the Pompeian player rolls one die to
determine whether Pompey arrives this
turn. On a die roll of "0-2", Pompey
arrives, along with the 1st and 3rd
Legions. On any other result, he does
not arrive.
When Pompey and the Legions arrive,
they may enter the map via any vacant
hexes between 1015-1032 (inclusive),
paying normal movement costs.
Final Operations in Italy
On learning of the fall of Corfinium,
Pompey ordered all of his forces to
Brundisium. Caesar pursued him with
Six Legions (3 Veteran and 3 Recruit).
Upon Caesar's arrival at Brundisium, he
found that most of Pompey's forces had
left for Dyrrachium. Pompey remained
in the town with a small force, whether
by design or due to lack of shipping
Caesar didn't know, but he immediately
attempted to block off the harbor
entrance. After nine days of small intense
siege actions, the ships arrived to take
Pompey and the remainder of his forces
out of the town, which they successfully
accomplished. With Pompey's with-
drawal, Caesar was the master of Italy,
but he couldn't pursue Pompey until he
could assemble a fleet. While his orders
were being carried out for assembling a
navy, he entered Rome, sine collega.
Caesar's success was based on his .
intuitive grasp of the value of time. He
was able to accomplish with one Legion,
before Pompey was prepared, what it
would have taken an army to accomplish
later. Pompey's standing forces were
troops whose loyalty was suspect,
something Caesar knew. Caesar's rapid
advance through Pompey's mobilization
areas prevented his rival from raising a
new army. Caesar's offensive was one of
calculated risk, and the payoff was
Rome. Due to his conquest of Italy,
enormous monetary and human re-
sources fell under Caesar's control,
giving him a substantial base from which
to further prosecute the war. Had Caesar
failed in that strategic roll of the die,
Pompey's more extensive resources, plus
control of Italy, probably would have
changed the outcome of the war. At no
other time in his career was Caesar's
genius for rapid action and political
acumen better demonstrated than during
his nearly bloodless conquest of Italy.
(The Great Battles of Julius Caesar picks
up where this article ends, with the battles of
Dyrrachium and Lesnikia.)