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The Jagged Edge of Duty - Chapter ONE
The Jagged Edge of Duty - Chapter ONE
Robert L. Richardson
STACKPOLE
BOOKS
Guilford, Connecticut
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Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Chapter 1: GUMP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Chapter 2: Squadron Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Chapter 3: Two Flyers for the Fray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Chapter 4: America with No Choice Left . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Chapter 5: Meet the Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Chapter 6: Meet the Pilots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Chapter 7: Bomber Escort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
Chapter 8: Losses Mount and the Mission to Palermo . . . . . . 206
Chapter 9: The P-38 Fighter Interceptor . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
Chapter 10: Attacks on Sardinia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
Chapter 11: When Things Go Wrong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
Chapter 12: Bombs At Their Fingertips . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
Chapter 13: Approaching Air Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
Chapter 14: Aftermath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
Chapter 15: The Search for Allan Knepper . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
Chapter 16: After Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336
Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385
too horrific, to share. Fighter pilot Bob Vrilakas noted that “everybody in
the military has a story,” but he had been reluctant to relate his experi-
ences until very late in life because he did not want to bore anyone.
This book reveals much of the Sturm und Drang of American combat
flying, focusing on one P-38 fighter squadron during the hot summer of
1943 in North Africa. It gives a broad accounting of how these young
men came to be part of an extraordinarily diverse cast of highly trained
and lethal pilots. It explains how they were selected for pilot training,
where they received their flight instruction, and what types of planes they
flew. It follows the arrival of these newly minted second lieutenants to
North Africa and records their reactions to the alien world in which they
now lived, and which some would never leave.
Volunteers to a man, most of the 49th’s cadre of fighter pilots
had joined the Army Air Corps in the days immediately following
the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor. What follows includes many
firsthand accounts by those men, all of whom are now quite aged and
most of whom would describe their service as “just doing my job.” Also
included is a careful description of the context of their service—the
military strategies adopted by President Roosevelt and his staff and
implemented by General Eisenhower and his. It relates the state of
war from the perspective of German pilots bent on resisting the Allied
advances from myriad airfields in Sicily and Italy. And it describes how
wrong a carefully planned mission can go, and how luck sometimes
favors the prepared pilot.
As with any squadron, the pilots of the 49th were of different types,
and the squadron quickly became a melting pot of ethnicities, cultures,
backgrounds, and educations. Some were naturally aggressive; for them
combat was a release of sorts. Others were surely less so. Some developed
as leaders within the squadron. A few were natural fliers; for others flight
was always a challenge. While few had planned a life in the military, all
shared a commitment to their wingman and a willingness to stand up to
their duty, to complete the dangerous task before them.
The following account explains how quickly any swagger or feeling of
privilege fell away upon reporting to their new squadron and describes the
final combat training they received from pilots who, after just a month of
xi
xii
This work will answer some of the questions long unasked and give
to many a better understanding of the war and some men’s role in it. In
the spirit of truthfulness and full disclosure, the person who posed the
myopic question to William Gregory was me. This book has become both
my penance and my reward.
xiii
GUMP
not imagine ever becoming jaded by, let alone accustomed to, what was
around him every day.
The 49th was hungry for replacement pilots: Since early May when it
began its current posting in North Africa, the 49th had flown thirty-six
combat missions and had already lost nine pilots—nearly a third of their
cadre. And with the high number of sorties, its remaining pilots were
steadily moving toward completion of their fifty-mission combat tours.
More good pilots were needed. But the squadron was on a roll; in the
ten days since Knepper had reported for duty, the squadron had not lost
any pilots.
Lieutenant Knepper was up and dressed before the squadron clerk
came around to his tent to wake him for the mission, with a curt “You’re
up, Lieutenant.” Knepper made the short walk to the mess tent, greeting
the other pilots with just a “Mornin’.” Never very much inclined to talk,
and with tension building in his chest, he preferred to listen to the quiet
exchanges between the other pilots, the experienced ones. He’d seen his
good friend Herman Kocour at breakfast, and knew that today would be
Herman’s first combat mission as well. Neither one having much of an
appetite, they left ahead of the others and made their way to the equip-
ment tent to collect parachutes, escape kits, and pistols. Catching a jeep
ride to the flight line, they located their aircraft—Kocour to plane #43,
Knepper, to #45.
With a wave and tight smile Knepper turned and began a quiet walk-
around of his plane. The aircraft showed wear, and he knew that it had
already seen a lot of combat. It was the favorite mount for Lieutenant
Bob Riley, who had flown it on ten missions since early May. Four other
49th squadron pilots had also flown #45 into combat, and it had proven
to be a very reliable and well-maintained aircraft.
Kocour had been assigned to aircraft #43—another well-used air-
craft that had been flown by seven other pilots prior to this mission,
including six sorties by the squadron commander, Captain Trollope.
The aircraft had experienced mechanical issues recently and had been
forced to return early on its two previous missions. On top of every-
thing else he had to think about, Lieutenant Kocour also looked at his
mount with some misgivings.1
settings, tested the gun sight light, and checked the fuel gauges. While
keeping the engines at 1,400 rpm, he made a last check on fuel and
hydraulic pressure.
Glancing back, he moved the yoke forward and back to check eleva-
tor movement, then checked the aileron and flap travel. One last check
of the gauges.
With his plane fully prepared in its hardstand, Lieutenant Knepper
waited for the telltale aileron waggle from the flight leader, knowing
that he and his plane were equipped for this, his first combat mission.
His engines were “galloping” at idle, the sound each P-38 pilot instantly
recognized and would never forget. He was ready.
In checking the mission board the evening before, he had learned
that he’d been assigned to Red flight, in number-two position as wing-
man to Capt. Henry Trollope, the squadron commander—a normal
assignment for a new pilot’s first combat flight. He knew that all of his
fellow replacement pilots would undergo the same close scrutiny in their
first few combat assignments, always being assigned as wingman to one
of the squadron’s more experienced pilots.
As Trollope’s wingman, Knepper knew that his job would be to stay
on his leader’s wing no matter what. Head on a swivel, always knowing
where the captain’s wingtip was, covering Trollope’s blind spot—his tail.
He had done quite a lot of formation flying and was comfortable flying
4 feet away from another P-38 at 300 mph.
At 9:24 Captain Trollope flexed his ailerons and began moving
from his hardstand to the flight line. Knepper, second in line for takeoff,
eased his brakes and gave a bit of throttle to move from his own hard-
stand and take up formation behind Trollope. With a final sweep of the
instruments, a last tug on his safety belt and harness, he ran the engines
up to 2,300 rpm and, with the rest of the flight forming up behind him,
Knepper pointed the plane for takeoff.
As Trollope’s plane started rollout, Knepper brought his engines to
3,000 rpm, braked to keep the plane motionless, then released to start
rolling. With a surge of power, it thundered down the runway. Airborne
in fourteen seconds, he soon reached an airspeed of 130 mph. At this
speed, he knew that if one engine failed, he could maintain control on
just the remaining engine. He retracted his landing gear, switched fuel
feed to a belly tank, and settled into position off Trollope’s left wing.
Trollope eased his airspeed slightly to allow the others to catch
up. As the squadron advanced to flight speed, assuming the standard
“four-finger” configuration, Lieutenant Knepper had this thought: Please
don’t let me screw this up . . .
After a year of flight training, including a few weeks in North Africa
doing combat training and a few days with the squadron learning its own
unique set of procedures, Knepper’s head told him he was ready for the
mission. They’d been ordered to escort P-38s from their sister squadron,
the 37th, on a dive-bombing mission to the Axis aerodrome at Milo, near
Trapani, on the northwestern corner of Sicily. As escort, Knepper and his
fellow 49th pilots would counter any attack by German or Italian fighters,
giving the bomb-carrying aircraft of the 37th an unimpeded bomb run.
Milo aerodrome.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES
Milo was an important airfield for both the Italian and the German
air forces in the summer of 1943 and had been used extensively in sup-
port of the failed Axis campaign in North Africa in the preceding year.
The airfield was high on the list of priority targets for the Army Air
Forces. Achieving air superiority over the Mediterranean Theater was the
number-one priority for military planners, and knocking out German Air
Force (GAF) assets, like aerodromes, was a critical part of the battle plan.
Even before the Axis surrender in Tripoli in mid-May, the air force had
sent bombing missions to Trapani/Milo. The airfield had been given a
respite during the intensive Allied bombing campaign against the island
of Pantelleria—Operation Corkscrew. But with Pantelleria’s surrender on
June 11, the Allied air forces had turned to Sicilian and Sardinian targets
with fresh energy.
In mid-June, Milo was base of operations for Jagdgeschwader 77 ( JG
77)—the German Herz As (“Ace of Hearts”) command. For JG 77—one
of the most storied, and perhaps the most experienced, of the German
fighter commands—Trapani was their latest posting after having seen
years of combat in Western Europe, Russia, and North Africa. Within
JG 77 were some of the most experienced combat pilots the world would
ever see. With two groups plus a headquarters flight operating out of
Milo, and with extensive flak batteries, there was every reason to expect
a strong German defense on this mission.3
Adding to Knepper’s anxiety was the buzz that he’d picked up around
camp regarding the German aircraft they were likely to encounter on this
mission. The squadron referred to them as the “yellow-nosed squadron,”
and had first encountered them during the mission on May 19 when two
of the 49th’s pilots had been shot down. The “yellow-nosed squadron”
was from JG 77—a German fighter wing based at Trapani that had been
in combat since 1939, had thousands of sorties to its credit, with hun-
dreds of air victories, and which never showed the slightest reluctance to
engage American aircraft.4
Pilot William Gregory would later recount: “The yellow-nosed squad-
ron—we knew about those; at least, some of us did. Neely, DeMoss, and
myself always talked about them. It was an elite squadron. We could see
those yellow noses on some of our early flights. We knew they were good.
We called them ‘yellow-nosed kids,’ and they were really good with the
109.5 They were seasoned pilots, they had been flying for two years, and
they had a lot of time in their airplane. They were the best of the best.”6
Just three days earlier, the 49th squadron had escorted B-26s from
the 320th Bomb Group on a bombing mission to Milo. On that mis-
sion, no enemy aircraft were engaged, but the Intelligence officer had
cautioned them to be watchful for Axis flights. And even without enemy
interceptors, they were advised that the 88mm flak could be intense. But
with a bit of luck, the mission might catch a few GAF aircraft on the
ground, and not encounter a swarm of enemy fighters already in flight.
Lieutenant Knepper’s flight included fourteen aircraft: twelve for the
mission, and two “spares” that accompanied the formation to the vicinity
of the target, but would only be used if one or more of the primary pilots
reported aircraft problems and were forced to return to base.
choice but to follow his element leader back to base. Glancing over his
shoulder as Kocour flew on and wishing him good hunting, he knew all
too well the first rule of aerial combat, drilled into him over the prior
six months: Never allow a fellow pilot to fly unescorted. An hour after
takeoff, Trollope and Knepper were back at Telergma.
“Early returns” were a problem for the squadron, and during the
summer of 1943, roughly 6 percent of all aircraft who took off for a
combat mission were forced to return due to mechanical issues. On some
missions, the number of early returns exceeded the number of “spares”
that were available for the mission, resulting in fewer aircraft executing
the mission, and with possibly less-favorable results.8
After landing and taxiing back to the hardstands, Knepper “sweated
out” the return of the mission, along with Captain Trollope, the crew
chiefs for the mission’s pilots, squadron Intelligence officer, Capt. How-
ard Wilson, and squadron operations officer, Capt. Richard Decker.
It was an anxious wait. The combat risks were well understood by all.
The entire squadron had worked hard in the intense desert heat to prepare
the aircraft for this moment—taking the war to the Germans. They’d all
heard the roar of the engines at takeoff, and everyone—armorers, mechan-
ics, cooks, clerks, carpenters, medical assistants—were aware of the losses
as they mounted. They’d been there many times before and knew that there
was a strong likelihood that some of the fliers they saw that morning might
not return from this mission. The chaplain hoped that it would not be his
duty to write yet another letter to a family, or to clear a pilot’s effects from
his tent under the troubled eyes of his tentmates.
The wait was maybe hardest for the crew chiefs. Some had come to
know their pilots, and in some cases had forged a solid regard, possibly
even friendship. They’d grown an “internal clock,” keeping time with the
mission. With the combined formation formed up by 10:00 a.m., Neely
would alert all pilots to prepare for combat. Pilots would turn drop-tank
switches on, along with gun heaters and sight switches, and increase rpm
and manifold pressure to maximum cruise. Still flying on-the-deck, by
10:30 the formation would be nearing the coast and forming up for the
attack. A bit before 11:00 a.m. the P-38s would take less than a minute
to make their jump to 5,000 feet; then, the bomb-laden P-38s from the
37th would, one by one, wing over to make the steep dive on the target.
Flak would start to hit the formation, and the pilots would be working
hard to maintain position. Over the target, flak now intense, bombs away.
P-38s from the 49th would be holding position outside of flak range and
reconnecting with the bombers as they emerged from the target. If the
Germans were going to make a fight of it, their fighters would be hitting
the bomber formation about now. By 11:30 a.m., the formation, or what
might be left of it, would be headed to base, with the P-38s providing
cover for any damaged bombers who were lagging behind.
Best expressed in the words of one North African crew chief, the
anxious ritual repeated on every mission, on every base, and in every
theater of the war:
Ninety minutes after his own landing, Knepper and the waiting
squadron spotted a lone returning P-38. Too early for the mission to
return, the approaching aircraft had to be another early return. Lieu-
tenant Kocour, with another mechanical problem, was forced to turn
around just minutes before reaching the target. Apparently the mechan-
ical problem that had plagued #43 had not yet been diagnosed, or it had
been diagnosed but not corrected, or else other problems had developed
on the seemingly snake-bit aircraft.
Another thirty minutes passed, and groups of aircraft began to
appear. Just nine; two pilots were missing.
The returning pilots reported that the mission had been a success.10
The 37th had dropped their bombs on target, including three direct hits
on the aerodrome’s administration building, and seven more within the
target area. The formation had received intense flak, the Germans hav-
ing concealed heavy 88mm flak and lighter 30- to 40mm guns in the
woods near the edge of the aerodrome. As the flight turned for home,
flak was everywhere.
10
11
chApter one
1. Much of the information related to pilot assignments and aircraft is taken from
the squadron mission reports. For this chapter, see Mission Report, 49th Fighter Squad-
ron, Mission #31, 18 June 1943. Also see “The Building of a Fighter Squadron,” Marshall
Cloke, Major, Air Corps, Merriam Press, Military Reprint 2, 2012, and Personal Corre-
spondence, Robert Vrilakas, Dec. 5, 2015.
2. Pilot Training Manual for the P-38 Lightning, Headquarters, AAF Manual
51-127-1.
3. German Air Force (GAF) data sources: www.cgsc.edu/CARL/nafziger/943GG
AB.pdf and www.ww2.dk/air/jadg/jg77.htm.
4. Authors Steve Blake and John Stanaway take a different view in their book,
Adorimini (Up and at ’Em): A History of the 82nd Fighter Group in World War II (Marce-
line, MO: Walsworth Publishing, 1992). They posit that “Many American pilots and air
crewmen were convinced that an elite German fighter unit was based at Gabes and that
it could be identified by its Me 109s’ distinctive white or yellow noses. This unit was often
referred to as ‘Göring’s elite yellow-nosed squadron,’ or by some similar appellation. In
reality, none of the German fighter Gruppen in the MTO at that time were any more
‘elite’ than the others. Most of them had been in action almost continuously since the
beginning of the war in Europe, and had been credited with the destruction of hundreds
of Allied aircraft on various fronts. In truth, all the Luftwaffe fighter units then stationed
in the Mediterranean could be considered elite.”
5. The Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighters were designed by Willy Messerschmitt in the
early 1930s. After the original manufacturer Bayerische Flugzeugwerke was renamed to
Messerschmitt AG, later production of these fighters carried the designation Me 109,
though this designation was used in only a few official Luftwaffe documents. The British
also referred to them as Bf 109s; “By 1945, we were drowning in Bf 109 nameplates,”
said British aviation expert Bill Gunston, referring to the nameplates of numerous Bf 109
fighters shot down over Britain, “[T]here’s no excuse for not referring to the aircraft by
its right name.” To the Americans, however, aircraft of this model were known as Me 109
since the start; “It will always be the Me 109 to me,” said retired U.S. Air Force colonel
James L. McWhorter, who fought against them as a pilot of the U.S. Army Air Forces
365th Fighter Group during World War II from the Normandy Campaign until the end
of the European War. See: ww2db.com/aircraft_spec.php?aircraft_model_id=F18.
363
Notes