26/10/16

Kiran Eyre
In aid of Euthyphro

The Euthyphro Dilemma arises from a particularly famous exchange

between Socrates and Euthyphro, as scripted by Plato. During this
conversation, Socrates questions Euthyphro on the definition of
piety. Euthyphro attempts to provide various answers to Socrates
questions, of which Socrates apparently shows the logical missteps
Euthyphro has made. As a result of this dialogue, a well-known (and
arguably most troubling) enigma Socrates teases out from
Euthyphro is the so-called (what we shall refer to as the classic
dilemma for the purposes of this essay) Euthyphro dilemma: "Is
the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious
because it is loved by the gods?"

The purposes of this essay are to provide a descriptive account,

analytical discussion and attempted answers to the Philosophical
problems raised by Platos Euthyphro. We shall explore the other,
less well-known definitions Euthyphro provides of piety. We will also
focus on the classic dilemma in full, paying detail to Platos
establishment of it and subsequent exploration via an elenchus
(Socrates famous method of cooperative, critical dialogue). We will
consider the two horns of the dilemma, and the Philosophical
problems that arise from both. We shall venture in to the underlying
logical framework employed (both explicitly or implicitly) in all of
these definitions. Finally, after these analyses, we shall see what
problems (if-any) still remain, and comment on what implications
this analysis has for metaethics more broadly.

The set-up

To begin, it is useful to provide some background to the dilemma.

This can help us to better understand the avenues through which
Socrates pushes Euthyphro, and we can use this backdrop to find
points of Philosophical contention to address later in the essay (with
the overriding aim of solving the Euthyphro dilemma). The dialogue
begins with Socrates encountering Euthyphro outside the
Magistrates court, at which Euthyphro explains to Socrates that he
is bringing preliminary charges against his father, due to his fathers
alleged manslaughter of a servant (who had himself murdered a
slave). Given the nature of Athenian law at this time, coupled with
the fact that Euthyphro is bringing charges against his own father,
Socrates expresses surprise that Euthyphro is bringing such charges
forward, questioning how Euthyphro can be so certain in his
knowledge of ethical matters in respect to divine law. Euthyphro
asserts his confidence regarding his understanding of moral cases,
claiming,
I would not be much use, Socrates, nor would Euthyphro differ in
any way from the majority of men, if I did not know all such things
as this [difficult ethical dilemmas] with strict accuracy.

With classic Socratic irony, Socrates asks for Euthyphros help is

helping him understand what piety truly is, as he himself has fallen
into trouble with the law for the charge of being impious. This leads
Euthyphro to give five different definitions (each subsequent one
arising from Socrates disregard for the previous), the third leading to
the classic dilemma.

First definition

This definition can be seen to be tautological. In Euthyphros answer

that his actions in prosecuting his father are pious he sets up a
circularity:

(1) What is pious?

(2) Prosecuting my father is pious
(3)

Second definition

Third definition (classic dilemma)

what all the gods love is holy

This dialectic takes the form of Euthyphro agreeing to some basic

sentences, the logic of which sentences forms a premise for
Socrates wider argument:

We speak of carrying and being carried, of leading and being led,

of seeing and being seen. And you understand in such cases, do you
not, that they differ from each other, and how they differ?

From these examples, Socrates goes on to make numerous divisions

(all based on the same logic), one of which being the difference
between a) the object being carried and b) the cause of said object
being carried.
Carried things are not carried in virtue of being a carried thing, but
for some other, external reason. Things are not seen because they
are seen things, but because someone decides to see them.

On Euthyphros agreement of this fact, Socrates applies this to piety

and the Gods, making the point that (based on this logic), pious
things are not pious because they are loved by the Gods (carried
things are not carried because they are carried), rather they are
loved by the Gods because they are pious (carried things are carried
because people choose to carry them). Therefore, this means that
things are not pious because they are loved by the Gods, rather the
Gods love them because they are pious.

When we examine these claims more deeply however, it appears

Socrates has conflated two concepts, that he sees as synomyous in
his above analogies, that being the loving carried out by the Gods
(in regards to pious things) and the piety of something. Let us put
the two (the carrying analogy and the piety claims) side by side:

A1) Carried things are not carried because they are carried things
(Pious things are not pious because they are pious things)

A2) (Implied) Carried things are are carried for x reason

(Pious things are pious for y reason)

(The y reason in this case would be the true definition of piety - the
real reason why pious things are pious - of which Euthyphro does
not provide by Socrates criteria).

This involves a consistent application of the two concepts. The

other, that Socrates appears to also wish to use, is as follows:

B1) Carried things are not carried because they are carried things
(Loved things are not loved because they are loved things)

B2) (Implied) Carried things are carried for x reason

(Loved things are loved for x reason)

This above sentence seems jarring. This may be because holiness

is not a verb; it is an identiy claim. If the Turin Shroud is holy, is not
because the object has been hollified, it is because
Gods love holy things not because they are holy but for xyz reason

Fourth definition

Fifth definition

What remains

Implications for metaethics

Conclusion
Nature of moral objectivity, need to have axioms, e.g. Mills
happiness axiom. Maybe that is what Euthyphro should have said