[G.R. No. L-1159. January 30, 1947.

CECILIO M. LINO, Petitioner, v. VALERIANO E. FUGOSO, LAMBERTO JAVALERA, and

JOHN DOE, in their capacity as Mayor, Chief of Police and Officer in charge of
municipal jail, all of the City of Manila, respectively, Respondents.

Facts:
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in behalf of twelve persons alleged to
be unlawfully detained by respondents Valeriano E. Fugoso, Lamberto Javalera and John
Doe in their capacity as mayor, chief of police and officer in charge of the municipal jail
of the City of Manila, respectively. It is alleged in respondents return that ten of the
petitioners had already been released, no sufficient evidence having been found to
warrant their prosecution for inciting to sedition, but that the remaining two, Pascual
Montaniel and Facifico Deoduco, are being held in custody because of charges filed
against them in the municipal court unjust vexation and disobedience to police orders,
respectively.

After hearing, by minute resolution we dismissed the case with respect to the petitioners
already released and we ordered the release of the remaining two, Montaniel and
Deoduco, without prejudice to a reasoned decision which we now proceed to
render.Pascual Montaniel was arrested without warrant by the police officers of Manila on
November 8, 1946, for inciting to sedition, and Pacifico Deoduco, on November 7, 1946,
for resisting arrest and disobedience to police orders. On November 11 when this petition
for habeas corpus was filed, these two petitioners were still under arrest. They were thus
held in confinement for three and four days, respectively, without warrants and without
charges formally filed in court. The papers of their cases were not transmitted to the City
Fiscals office until late in the afternoon of November 11. Upon investigation by that
office, no sufficient evidence was found to warrant the prosecution of Pascual Montaniel
for inciting to sedition and of Pacifico Deoduco for resisting arrest, but both remained
under custody because of informations filed with minuet charging Montaniel with unjust
vexation and Deoduco with disobedience to an agent of a person in authority under the
second paragraph of article 151 of Revised Penal Code. These informations were filed on
the same day when this case was heard before this Court, that is, on November 12, 1946.
And so far, no warrants of arrest or orders of commitment are shown to have been issued
by the municipal court pursuant to the informations thus filed.

Issue: WON the continued detention of Montaniel and Deoduco was lawful even after the
order of arrest has been made and despite the filing of information against them?

Held:
In the eyes of the law, therefore, these prisoners should have been out of prison long
before the informations were filed with the municipal court, and they should not be
retained therein merely because of the filing of such informations it appearing
particularly that the offenses charged are light and are not, as a general rule, grounds for
arrest, under Rule 108, section 10. Under such circumstances, only an order of
commitment could legalize the prisoners continued confinement, and no such order has
ever been issued. Indeed, the municipal court could acquire jurisdiction over said
prisoners only by the issuance of a warrant of arrest, an order of commitment or a writ of
summons as provided in the aforementioned rule.

Assuming that P. D. and P. M. were legally arrested without warrant, their continued
detention became illegal upon the expiration of six hours without their having been
delivered to the corresponding judicial authorities. The illegality of their detention was
not cured by the filing of informations against them, since no warrants of arrest or orders
of commitment have been issued by the municipal court up to the hearing of this case
before this Court.
MA. HAZELINA A. TUJAN-MILITANTE v. RAQUEL M. CADA-DEAPERA
G.R. No. 210636; July 28, 2014

FACTS:
Raquel filed before the RTC-Caloocan a verified petition for writ of habeas corpus
directing petitioner Hazelina to produce before the court respondent's biological
daughter, minor Criselda, and to return to her the custody over the child which was
granted by the court. But, despite diligent efforts and several attempts, the Sheriff was
unsuccessful in personally serving petitioner copies of the habeas corpus petition and of
the writ.
Meanwhile, petitioner filed a Petition for Guardianship over the person of Criselda before
the RTC-Quezon City but was dismissed due to the pendency of the habeas corpus
petition before RTC-Caloocan. Thereafter, respondent filed a criminal case for kidnapping
against petitioner and her counsel.
Raquel moved for the ex parte issuance of an alias writ of habeas corpus before the RTC-
Caloocan, which was granted. The Alias Writ was served upon petitioner at the Office of
the Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City during the preliminary investigation of the
kidnapping case.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the RTC Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus petition
filed by respondent.
2. Whether the writ issued by RTC-Caloocan in Quezon City where petitioner was
served a copy is enforceable.
3. Whether or not RTC-Caloocan validly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and the
person of Criselda.

HELD:
1. YES, the RTC-Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus proceeding. A
verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be
filed with the Family Court. However, the petition may be filed with the regular
court in the absence of the presiding judge of the Family Court, provided, however,
that the regular court shall refer the case to the Family Court as soon as its
presiding judge returns to duty. The petition may also be filed with the appropriate
regular courts in places where there are no Family Courts.
2. YES. The writ issued by the Family Court or the regular court shall be enforceable
in the judicial region where they belong. In the case at bar, respondent filed the
petition before the family court of Caloocan City. Since Caloocan City and Quezon
City both belong to the same judicial region, the writ issued by the RTC-Caloocan
can still be implemented in Quezon City. Whether petitioner resides in the former
or the latter is immaterial in view of the above rule.
3. As regards petitioners assertion that the summons was improperly served, suffice
it to state that service of summons, to begin with, is not required in a habeas
corpus petition. As held in Saulo v. Cruz, a writ of habeas corpus plays a role
somewhat comparable to a summons, in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service
of said writ, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.

Datukan Malang Salibo vs Warden, Quezon City Jail Annex

Case Digest GR 197597 April 8 2015

Facts:
Butukan S. Malang, one of the accused in the Maguindanao massacre, had a
pending warrant of arrest issued by the trial court in People vs Ampatuan Jr. et. al.
When Datukan Malang Salibo learned that the police officers of Datu Hofer Police
Station in Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang, he presented
himself to clear his name. Salibo presented to the police pertinent portions of his
passport, boarding passes and other documents tending to prove that a certain
Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi Arabia when the massacre happened. The
authorities, however, apprehended and detained him. He questioned the legality of
his detention via Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus before the CA, maintaining
that he is not the accused Batukan S. Malang. The CA issued the writ, making it
returnable to the judge of RTC Taguig. After hearing of the Return, the trial court
granted Salibos petition and ordered his immediate release from detention.

On appeal by the Warden, the CA reversed the RTC ruling. The CA held that even
assuming Salibo was not the Batukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of
Arrest, orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted
before the writ of habeas corpus may be invoked. Salibos proper remedy,
according to the CA, should have been a motion to quash information and/or
warrant of arrest.

On the other hand, Salibo believes that the Warden erred in appealing the RTC
decision before the CA. Salibo argued that although the CA delegated to the RTC
the authority to hear the Wardens Return, the RTCs ruling should be deemed as
the CA ruling, and hence, it should have been appealed directly before the SC.

Hide
Issue 1: W/N Salibo properly availed the remedy of a petition for writ of habeas
corpus

Yes. Habeas corpus is the remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken
identity. In such cases, the person is not under any lawful process and is
continuously being illegally detained.

First, it was Butukan S. Malang, not Salibo, who was charged and accused in the
Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued in the case of People vs Ampatuan.
Based on the evidences presented, Salibo sufficiently established that he could not
have been Butukan S. Malang. Therefore, Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any
warrant charging him of an offense, nor restrained under a lawful process or an
order of a court. Second, Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant. When
he was in the presence of authorities, he was neither committing nor attempting to
commit an offense, and the police officers had no personal knowledge of any
offense that he might have committed. Salibo was also not an escape prisoner.

The police officers have deprived him of his liberty without due process of law.
Therefore, Salibo correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.

In the matter of the adoption of the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza

GR No. L-22523, Sept. 29, 1967

FACTS:
1.Appeal from the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court,
dismissing the petition instituted by spouses Luis Santos Jr and Edipola Santos for
the adoption of the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza.
2.Trial Court DISMISSED the petition.
a.A critical consideration in this case is the fact that the parents of the minor to be
adopted are also the parents of the petitioner-wife. The minor therefore, is the
latters legitimate brother.
b.In this proceeding, the adoption will result in an INCONGRUOUS situation where
the minor Edwin, a legitimate brother of the petitioner-wife will also be her son. In
the opinion of the trial court that incongruity not neutralized by other
circumstances absent herein, should prevent the adoption.
c.Petitioners moved to reconsider the decision. The same was denied. Hence, this
appeal.
3.January 8, 1963: petitioners are praying that the minor Edwin, 4 years old, be
declared their son by adoption. Evidence was presented that the order setting the
case for hearing has been duly published. There having been no opposition
registered to the petition, the petitioners were permitted to adduce their evidence.
4.Both petitioners are 32 years of age, Filipinos, residing in Manila. They were
married in 1957 and have maintained a conjugal home of their own. They do not
have a child of their own by legal fiction nor has any of them been convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude
5.Edwin, is a child of Francisco Villa and Florencia Mendoza who are the common
parents of the petitioner-wife, Edipola Villa Santos and the minor.
6.Petitioner-husband is a lawyer with business interests in textile development
enterprise and IBA electric plant and is the general manager of Medry Inc. and the
secretary-treasurer of Bearen Enterprises. Petitioner-wife is a nurse by profession.
7.Edwin was born on May 2, 1958. He was a sickly child since birth. His parents
entrusted him to the petitioners due to his impairing health.
8.Deep and profound love for each other was developed between the petitioners
and the child.
9. Natural parents testified that they have VOLUNTARILY given their consent to the
adoption.

ISSUE: Whether or not an elder sister may adopt a younger brother.

HELD: The fact alone that petitioner wife and minor are siblings should not prevent
the adoption.

RATIO: The relationship established by the adoption is limited to the adopting

parents and does not extend to their other relatives, except as expressly provided
by law. Thus, the adopted child canot be considered as a relative of te ascendants
and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor f the legitimate children which they
may have after the adoption except that the law imposes certain impediments to
marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the children of the adopted considered
as descendants of the adopter. The adoption under consideration would not be
objectionable on the ground alone of the resulting relationship between the
adopter and the adopted.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: No provision in the law that expressly prohibits adopting
among relatives, petitioners ought not to be prevented.

Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Rodolfo Toledano, et. al. [G.R. No.
94147]
June 8, 1994

FACTS:
A verified petition was filed before the RTC of Iba, Zambales by spouses Alvin A.
Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse, both aliens, seeking to adopt the minor, Solomon
Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of Evelyn who has been under their care and
custody for quite a time.
Alvin is a natural born US citizen. He married Evelyn, a Filipino, who thereafter
became a naturalized American citizen. They are physically, mentally, morally, and
financially capable of adopting Solomon, a 12-year old minor.
Solomon gave his consent to the adoption, and so did his mother Nery Alcala, a
widow, due to poverty and inability to support and educate her son.
Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to conduct the Home and
Child Study, favorably recommended the granting of the petition for adoption.
Consequently, respondent judge rendered a decision granting the petition for
adoption and decreeing that said minor be considered as their child by adoption.
To this effect, the Court gives the minor the rights and duties as the legitimate
child of the petitioners. Also, it dissolves parental authority bestowed upon his
natural parents and vests parental authority to the spouses and makes him their
legal heir.
Petitioner, through the OSG appealed for relief via a petition for review on
certiorari of the decision of the lower court, contending that it erred in granting the
petition for adoption because spouses Clouse are not qualified to adopt under
Philippine law.
Both spouses are American citizens at the time of the filing of petition for adoption.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the spouses, who are both aliens, have the right or are qualified to
adopt under Philippine law.
RULING: NO.
Under Articles 184 and 185 of E.O. No. 209, otherwise known as The Family Code
of the Philippines, spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon.

Article 184, paragraph (3) of E.O. No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who
are not qualified to adopt, viz.:
(3) An alien, except:

(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;

(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her
spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.

There can be no question that Alvin is not qualified to adopt Solomon under any of
the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. Firstly, he is not a former
Filipino citizen but a natural born US citizen . Secondly, Solomon is neither his
relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. Lastly, when
spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon, Evelyn was no longer a
Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a US
citizen.

Evelyn, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of
Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her
younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her
favor alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the
husband and wife. It reads:

Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that
must be read along together with Article 184. It is all too clear and categorical and
there is no room for its interpretation. There is only room for application.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The decision of the
lower court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

G. R. No. 105308. September 25, 1998

Herbert Cang, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and Spouses Ronald V.
Clavano and Maria Clara Clavano, respondents.

Facts: Petitioner and Ana Marie Clavano were married and begot three children.
Ana Marie upon learning of her husband's illicit liaison file a petition for legal
separation with alimony pendente lite which was approved. Petitioner then left for
the United States where he sought a divorce from Ana Marie. He was issued a
divorce decree and granted sole custody of the children to Ana Marie, reserving
rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places to petitioner. Private
respondents who were the brother and sister-in-law of Ana Marie filed a petition for
adoption of the three minor Cang children. The trial court granted the petition for
adoption. Ana Marie was the only parent who gives consent to the adoption of
their children. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Issue: Whether petitioner has abandoned his children, thereby making his consent
to the adoption necessary.
Ruling: The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the
child only for a valid reason. No such reason was established in the legal
separation case. Deprivation of parental authority is one of the effects of a decree
of adoption. But there cannot be a valid decree of adoption in this case precisely
because the findings of the lower courts on the issue of abandonment of facts on
record. The petition for adoption must be denied as it was filed without the
required consent of their father who, by law and under the facts of the case at bar,
has not abandoned them.

HERBERT CANG VS CA
G.R. No. 105308, September 25 1998

FACTS:
Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation upon learning of her husband's
extramarital affairs, which the trial court approved the petition. Herbert sought a
divorce from Anna Marie in the United States. The court granted sole custody of
the 3 minor children to Anna, reserving the rights of visitation to Herbert.
The brother and sister-in-law of Anna filed for the adoption of the 3 minor children.
Herbert contest the adoption, but the petition was already granted by the court.
CA affirmed the decree of adoption, holding that Art. 188 of the FC requires the
written consent of the natural parents of the children to be adopted, but the
consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary. It held that
Herbert failed to pay monthly support to his children. Herbert elevated the case to
the Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 3 minor children be legally adopted without the written consent
of a natural parent on the ground that Herbert has abandoned them.
RULING:

Yes.
Article 188 amended the statutory provision on consent for adoption, the written
consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its
validity. Rule 99 of the Rules of the Court requires a written consent to the
adoption signed by the child, xxx and by each of its known living parents who is
not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned the child.
Article 256 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parent
for the decree of adoption to be valid unless the parent has abandoned the child or
that the parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate."
In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment
imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or
refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which
parents owe their children."

In this case, however, Herbert did not manifest any conduct that would forego his
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute
abandonment. Physical abandonment alone, without financial and moral desertion,
is not tantamount to abandonment. While Herbert was physically absent, he was
not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his
children. The Court find pieces of documentary evidence that he maintained
regular communications with his wife and children through letters and telephone,
and send them packages catered to their whims.

JONATHAN LANDOIL INTERNATIONAL CO., INC., petitioner, vs. Spouses

SUHARTO MANGUDADATU and MIRIAM SANGKI MANGUDADATU,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 155010. August 16, 2004]

Facts:
Lawyers must be careful in handling cases, because their negligence in the
performance of their duties binds their clients. The issues in the instant case stem
from the failure of the counsels and their client to attend the pretrial. Their non-
appearance was compounded by their subsequent inaction, which resulted in the
eventual finality and execution of the default judgment.
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the June 6, 2002 Decision[2] and the September 2, 2002 Resolution[3] of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 69556. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
[4]
The challenged Resolution denied reconsideration.
Respondent-Spouses Suharto and Miriam Sangki Mangudadatu filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the 12th Judicial Region in Tacurong City, Sultan
Kudarat, a Complaint for damages against Petitioner Jonathan Landoil International
Co., Inc. (JLI). The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 537 and raffled to
Branch 20.[5] Initially, petitioner had countered with a Motion to Dismiss; but when
this was denied, it filed its Answer dated November 23, 1999.[6]
Thereafter, the parties submitted their respective Pretrial Briefs.[7] Trial proceeded
without the participation of petitioner, whose absence during the pretrial on
August 8, 2000, had led the trial court to declare it in default.[8]
On July 3, 2001, petitioner received a copy of the RTCs Decision dated June 19,
2001.[9] On July 18, 2001, it filed an Omnibus Motion for New Trial and Change of
Venue.[10] This Motion was deemed submitted for resolution on August 7, 2001,
[11] but was eventually denied by the trial court in an Order dated September 12,
2001.[12]
On December 12, 2001, petitioner received a copy of a Writ of Execution dated
December 4, 2001. Alleging that it had yet to receive a copy of an Order resolving
the Omnibus Motion for New Trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of
Execution on December 14, 2001.[13]
On January 7, 2002, its counsels -- Attys. Jaime L. Mario Jr. and Dioscoro G. Peligro
-- submitted separate withdrawals of appearance.[14] On the same date, the law
firm Ong Abad Santos & Meneses filed an Entry of Appearance with Supplement to
Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution.[15] To its Supplement, petitioner
attached the Affidavits of Attys. Mario and Peligro attesting that they had not yet
received a copy of the Order resolving the Omnibus Motion for New Trial.[16]

On the same day, January 7, 2002, petitioner received a Sheriffs Notice dated
December 26, 2001, regarding the public auction sale of its properties.[17] By
reason of the immediate threat to implement the Writ of Execution, it filed with the
CA on January 14, 2002, a Petition for Prohibition seeking to enjoin the
enforcement of the Writ until the resolution of the Motion to Quash.[18] The
Petition was docketed as CA-GR SP No. 68483.[19]

On January 9, 2002, the RTC issued an Order directing respondents to file their
written comment on the Motion to Quash and scheduled the hearing thereon for
February 1, 2002.[20]

On January 23, 2002, petitioner received a copy of respondents Vigorous

Opposition (Re: Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution, and its Supplement)
dated January 16, 2001. Attached to this pleading were two separate Certifications
supposedly issued by the postmaster of Tacurong City, affirming that the Order
denying the Motion for New Trial had been received by petitioners two previous
counsels of record.[21] The Certification pertaining to Atty. Peligro alleged that a
certain Michelle Viquira had received on October 19, 2001, a copy of the Order
intended for him.[22] The Certification as regards Atty. Mario stated that he had
personally received his copy on December 21, 2001.[23]

On January 24, 2002, petitioner personally served counsel for respondents a Notice
to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Attys. Mario and Peligro.[24] The
Deposition was intended to prove that petitioner had not received a copy of the
Order denying the Omnibus Motion for New Trial. [25]

At 9:30 a.m. on January 28, 2002, the deposition-taking proceeded as scheduled --

at the Business Center Conference Room of the Mandarin Oriental Hotel in Makati
City -- before Atty. Ana Peralta-Nazareno, a notary public acting as deposition
officer.[26] At 12:00 noon of the same day, respondents sent petitioner a fax
message via JRS Express, advising it that they had filed a Motion to Strike Off from
the records the Notice to Take Deposition; and asking it not to proceed until the
RTC would have resolved the Motion,[27] a copy of which it eventually received
later in the day, at 3:10 p.m.

On January 29, 2002, separate Notices were sent by Atty. Nazareno to Attys. Mario
and Peligro, as witnesses, for them to examine the transcript of their testimonies.
[28] On the same date, Atty. Nazareno filed via registered mail a Submission to the
RTC attaching (1) a Certification that the witnesses had been present and duly
sworn to by her; (2) a transcript bearing their signatures, attesting that it was a
true record of their testimonies; (3) a copy of the Notice to Take Deposition
delivered to her; and (4) a copy of the Notice signed by respondents counsel.[29]

During the February 1, 2002 hearing on the Motion to Quash, petitioner submitted
its (1) Formal Offer of Exhibits, together with the documentary exhibits marked
during the deposition-taking; (2) Reply to respondents Vigorous Opposition to the
Motion to Quash; and (3) Opposition ad Cautelam to respondents Motion to Strike
Off the Notice to Take Deposition.[30]

Meanwhile, on February 26, 2002, the CA issued a Resolution denying the Petition
for Prohibition in CA-GR SP No. 68483.

On March 6, 2002, petitioner received a copy of the RTCs Resolution dated

February 21, 2002, denying the Motion to Quash.[31] On March 8, 2002, it
received a copy of respondents Motion to Set Auction Sale of Defendants Levied
Properties.

On March 11, 2002, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition,[32] seeking to hold in abeyance the February 21, 2002 RTC Resolution
and the December 4, 2001 Writ of Execution. Petitioner alleged that since it had
not received the Order denying its Motion for New Trial, the period to appeal had
not yet lapsed.[33] It thus concluded that the judgment, not being final, could not
be the subject of a writ of execution.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On June 6, 2002, the CA issued the assailed Decision denying JLIs Petition. It ruled
that petitioner could no longer avail itself of a deposition under Rule 23 of Rules of
Court, since trial had already been terminated.[34] The appellate court also opined
that the alleged error committed by the trial court -- when the latter disregarded
two witnesses oral depositions -- was an error of judgment not reviewable by
certiorari or prohibition.[35] Finally, it ruled that between the denial of a lawyer
and the certification of a postmaster, the latter would prevail.[36]
Hence, this Petition.[37]

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred and decided a question of
substance in a way not in accord with law and applicable decisions of this
Honorable Court, when it ruled that petitioner can no longer avail of the taking of
oral depositions under Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Held:
The appellate court supposedly erred, too, in declaring that the taking of the
depositions of petitioners witnesses was improper. We agree with this contention.

Deposition Pending Action

A deposition may be taken with leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained
over any defendant or over property that is the subject of the action; or, without
such leave, after an answer has been served.[60] Deposition is chiefly a mode of
discovery, the primary function of which is to supplement the pleadings for the
purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and affording
an adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial.[61] The liberty of a party
to avail itself of this procedure, as an attribute of discovery, is well-nigh
unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged,
and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of the law.[62]

Limitations would arise, though, if the examination is conducted in bad faith; or in

such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person who is the subject of
the inquiry; or when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon
the recognized domains of privilege.[63]

As a mode of discovery resorted to before trial, deposition has advantages, as

follows:

1. It is of great assistance in ascertaining the truth and in checking and preventing

perjury. x x x

2. It is an effective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent, and sham

claims and defenses.

3. It makes available in a simple, convenient, and often inexpensive way facts

which otherwise could not have been proved, except with great difficulty and
sometimes not at all.

4. It educates the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and
defenses, thereby encouraging settlements out of court.

5. It expedites the disposal of litigation, saves the time of the courts, and clears
the docket of many cases by settlements and dismissals which otherwise would
have to be tried.

6. It safeguards against surprise at the trial, prevents delays, and narrows and
simplifies the issues to be tried, thereby expediting the trial.

7. It facilitates both the preparation and the trial of cases.[64]

The Rules of Court[65] and jurisprudence, however, do not restrict a deposition to

the sole function of being a mode of discovery before trial. Under certain
conditions and for certain limited purposes, it may be taken even after trial has
commenced and may be used without the deponent being actually called to the
witness stand. In Dasmarias Garments v. Reyes,[66] we allowed the taking of the
witnesses testimonies through deposition, in lieu of their actual presence at the
trial.

Thus, [d]epositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action,
whenever necessary or convenient. There is no rule that limits deposition-taking
only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition against the taking of
depositions after pre-trial.[67] There can be no valid objection to allowing them
during the process of executing final and executory judgments, when the material
issues of fact have become numerous or complicated.[68]

In keeping with the principle of promoting the just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding,[69] depositions are allowed as a
departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining
witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial
judge.[70] Depositions are allowed, provided they are taken in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Court (that is, with leave of court if the summons have
been served, without leave of court if an answer has been submitted); and
provided, further, that a circumstance for their admissibility exists (Section 4, Rule
23, Rules of Court).

The Rules of Court vests in the trial court the discretion to order whether a
deposition may be taken or not under specified circumstances that may even differ
from those the proponents have intended.[71] However, it is well-settled that this
discretion is not unlimited. It must be exercised -- not arbitrarily, capriciously or
oppressively -- but in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the
law, to the end that its purpose may be attained.[72]

When a deposition does not conform to the essential requirements of law and may
reasonably cause material injury to the adverse party, its taking should not be
allowed. This was the primary concern in Northwest Airlines v. Cruz.[73] In that
case, the ends of justice would be better served if the witness was to be brought to
the trial court to testify. The locus of the oral deposition therein was not within the
reach of ordinary citizens, as there were time constraints; and the trip required a
travel visa, bookings, and a substantial travel fare.[74] In People v. Webb,[75] the
taking of depositions was unnecessary, since the trial court had already admitted
the Exhibits on which the witnesses would have testified.

The present case involved a circumstance that fell under the above-cited Section
4(c)(2) of Rule 23 -- the witnesses of petitioner in Metro Manila resided beyond 100
kilometers from Sultan Kudarat, the place of hearing. Petitioner offered the
depositions in support of its Motion to Quash (the Writ of Execution) and for the
purpose of proving that the trial courts Decision was not yet final. As previously
explained, despite the fact that trial has already been terminated, a deposition can
still be properly taken.

We note, however, that the RTC did not totally disregard petitioners depositions. In
its February 21, 2001 Resolution, the trial court considered and weighed -- against
all other evidence -- that its Order denying the Motion for New Trial filed by
petitioner had not been received by the latters counsels. Despite their depositions,
petitioner failed to prove convincingly its denial of receipt.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.