WHY

IS THE UNITED
NATIONS SO IMPORTANT
TO LIBERALS?
THE UNIVERSITY
Discussion with reference to Collective OF EDINBURGH
Security School of Social and
Political Science

By Julio Rivera Alejo

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
IN EUROPE AND BEYOND

Edinburgh, 22nd October 2013

Introduction

Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and particularly its article 43, lays the foundations of a
collective security organization. But is the UN a truly collective security organization?

What follows is an attempt to examine the UN in terms of collective security. In this

regard, firstly we address the concept of collective security from a theoretical
perspective. We then examine the security system provided by the UN in order to
determine to what extent it provides a collective security system. Finally, we provide
some conclusions with regard to the importance of the UN in the world and particularly
to Liberals.

Collective Security: A theoretical approach

Though the collective security theory appears to be opposed to realism, in order to fully
understand the concept of collective security, it is crucial to take into account that it
starts from realistic assumptions, as Mearsheimer points out (1994/5: 28). Yet collective
security postulates that is possible to overcome the realist self-help and balance-of-
power world where conflict is always a possibility by mitigating anarchy and
security competition through a collective security system that is able to provide peace
and stability.

The idea of collective security is based on the notion of all-for-one and one-for-all
(Miller, 1999). This means that peace can be guaranteed, since in the event that one or
more states use force against any other, the remainder agree to undertake collective
action against the aggressor(s) in order to stop the aggression and maintain the common
peace under the logic that an attack on one state is considered an attack on all of them
(Gordenker and Weiss, 1993: 3-4; Naidu, 1975: 17).

Furthermore, in an effective collective security system, war can be prevented, since

potential aggressors are aware that they will face a theoretically overwhelming
opposing coalition if they aggress. And deterrence provided by collective security
makes possible that competition (self-help world) gives room for cooperation
(collective security world) and thus stability (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991: 118; Miller,
1999). Cooperation in turn is achieved through institutionalization, through a collective
security organization such as the UN?
In order to achieve an effective collective security organization, several requirements
must be fulfilled. Firstly, there must be a formal agreement among the states parties
usually an international treaty that stipulates clearly what constitutes an infringement
and what are the consequences of committing it (Miller, 1999). And since the main aim
of a collective security organization is the maintenance of peace, it is fundamental that
the resort to force in the international relations is prohibited.

In addition to this, it is necessary for an institutionalized structure to implement the

collective security system (Miller, 1999). The institutional form may vary in terms of
the number of members, the geographic extent or the degree of commitment to
collective action. However, since the UN aims to be an ideal collective security
organization, we will pay more attention to the ideal features: universal participation,
global scope and legally binding commitment to respond collectively to any aggression
(Naidu, 1975: 20-27).

Thompson (1953: 758-762) points out three more conditions: a) all the states parties
must be exposed to collective sanction; b) a common view of the international order
must be shared by the main powers of the system; c) an awareness of an international
community and the willingness of preserving it must be experienced by the major
powers.

Now, having been provided with the theoretical framework of collective security, we
proceed to examine the UN as a collective security organization.

The UN as a Collective Security Organization

In view of the above, we can conclude that the essence of collective security is
contained in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, particularly in its article 43.

The UN, in its attempt to become a collective security organization, is the first
international institution in history that explicitly prohibits the use of force (war) in
international relations (Milojevic, 2001). So, unlike its predecessor, the League of
Nations, the UN fulfils the fundamental requirement of any collective security
organization: the prohibition of force.

Also, the fundamental norm is stipulated in an international treaty the Charter (article
2, paragraph 4) as well as the possible consequences of infringing it. Besides, the UN
as an international organization has an institutionalized structure in order to effectively
implement collective security, with the Security Council being the main body
responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security and for authorising
collective military action or other collective measures such as binding sanctions when
necessary (Roberts, 1996: 313-314; Weiss et al., 2007: 9-11).

Thus, the UN fulfils the minimum requirements of a collective security organization as

set out above. Additionally, in terms of an ideal collective security organization, the
UN has global membership and geographic scope, and on paper its members are
legally bound to respond collectively to any aggression.

Nonetheless, the UN is far from being an ideal collective security organization if we

consider the conditions set out by Thompson. Firstly, not all the states are vulnerable to
collective sanctions. The veto power granted to the major powers the five permanent
members of the Security Council prevents collective action from being directed
against any of them or even against any other state under their protection, as happened
during the Cold War (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991: 121-122). However, this can be
understood, since another fundamental element for collective security is the consensus
of the great powers in the system to enforce collective actions, and one might ask
whether the UN would still exist if collective security operations could have been
directed against the major powers (Weiss et al., 2007: 8). Besides the veto problem, the
existence of a military superpower in the system the US means that not even the
most powerful coalition would be able to enforce collective action against it and so it
is not vulnerable to collective security. Furthermore, the US involvement has been
proved to be fundamental in order to effectively implement any collective security
action.

Secondly, the precondition of a shared view of the international system among the great
powers was not fulfilled, at least during the Cold War. The incompatible visions of the
international order together with veto power brought to a standstill the UN collective
security system1 (Bennett and Lepgold, 1993: 214). However, the end of the Cold War
made collective security possible, as the 1991 Gulf War intervention initially proved,

1
With the exception of the Korean intervention, possible just because of the temporary absence of
the USSR from the Security Council, collective security did not work during the War.
despite being more an exception than the rule in subsequent years.

Finally, a global awareness of the international community is a hard condition to fulfil.

UN global membership and scope poses a problem, since the existence of major and
minor powers, strategic allies and defined enemies, different national interests and
values among others make political cohesion and agreement difficult to achieve,
especially when it comes time to take collective action. And even when there is
agreement, achieving coordination and effective action is difficult (Kupchan and
Kupchan, 1991: 121-122). Perhaps the rationale of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter is
to facilitate collective security action through regional organizations such as NATO,
since a truly collective security action undertaken by the whole international
community would seem rather impossible.

Also, it should be noted that despite the prohibition of the use of force, by legitimizing
self-defence the Charter paved the way for the inevitable weakening of the UN security
system (Naidu, 1975: 32) as proved later (see Bush doctrine of pre-emptive self-
defence and its consequences).

Thus, since ideal collective security seems not to be feasible, the UN would have
developed variations of it in order to maintain international peace and security (Roberts,
1996: 317-331): the authorization of military enforcement by states or regional security
organizations, peacekeeping operations and international economic sanctions. The first
one entails missions authorized by the Security Council but undertaken by certain states
or alliances, not under the direct authority of the Security Council and so not truly
collective security action. The Korean War (1950-3) and the Persian Gulf War (1990-
1) are the most remarkable cases of this, always presented as perfect examples of
collective security action. However, they have been more an exception than a rule in
the UN action. In turn, peacekeeping entailed an innovation in collective security, since
it goes beyond the simplified vision of collective action only in the event of aggression
and seeks to stabilise and resolve conflicts (international and internal) primarily by the
monitoring or enforcement of ceasefires or by interposing between belligerents. Finally,
international economic sanctions constitute a collective security tool against acts of
aggression or threats to the peace that have proved to be effective in several occasions.
Conclusions: The importance of the UN

We know by now that the UN is not an ideal collective security organization. However,
it is unquestionable that it has achieved the establishment of a security system that is
able, although not always, to tackle conflict and to promote cooperation in security
issues.

From the liberal perspective, the importance of the UN lies in its ability to
institutionalize cooperation. As an international institution, the UN sets principles,
norms, rules and decision-making procedures that promote cooperative behaviour and

convergence of expectations in our case in the security field. Thus, states

expectations about other states behaviour are altered (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985:
234), and so it determines their future behaviour. In this regard, a potential aggressive
state should be deterred from infringing the Charter provisions by the prospect of facing
collective security action such as sanctions or even military force. That is, the UN
establishes punishment mechanisms that increase the cost of defection and hence
encourage states to behave peacefully and to cooperate (Keohane, 1984: 89-97). In turn,
cooperation is achieved by providing information in order to diminish uncertainty about
other states intentions and capabilities. Furthermore, the UN lays the foundations of
shared values and a normative basis through interstate socialization, providing an arena
that facilitates the reach of agreements and the resolution of disputes (Ikenberry and
Kupchan, 1990). In this regard, examples of cooperation promoted by the UN would
range from arms control agreements to international trade regimes, by way of
environmental protection agreements or responses to humanitarian crises.

Therefore, the UN allows amelioration of the security dilemma,2 thus reducing the
likelihood of conflict, since suspicion and competitiveness make room for cooperation
based on shared values and interests (Jervis, 1976: 82-83), overcoming the realists
obstacles. This is its importance to Liberals.

Finally, note that since UNs birth, interstate conflicts have diminished significantly,
and nowadays most conflicts are intrastate ones (Themnr and Wallensteen 2012: 568).

2
The inherently anarchic international system creates uncertainty, so states can never fully know
about the others intentions, which leads them to maximize their security. However, many of the
means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others (Jervis 1978: 46),
leading to the security dilemma.
In order to cope with these new conflicts, the UN went beyond the Charter, adopting a
broader interpretation of the maintenance of international peace when considering
intrastate conflict as a potential threat to peace and so opening the door to peacekeeping
and humanitarian intervention under the Responsibility to Protect principle. All this
enlightens the UN influence in the security field and its ability to adapt to the reality of
a changing international system.

Besides, despite its various failures in adequately maintaining international peace and
security, the importance of the UN lies in its ability to promote security cooperation
and to institute a common vision of the international order and the game rules generally
accepted by all. Of course, the UN does not always succeed in its mission, but the fact
that the US a superpower that can be and sometimes has been above the international
system and its norms tried to justify the 2003 Iraq invasion by resorting to UN
resolutions reflects the key role of the UN in the international system as a source of
legitimacy.
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