Senate Hearing, 107TH Congress - Weak States in Africa: U.S. Policy in Liberia

S. HRG.
107676
WEAK STATES IN AFRICA: U.S. POLICY IN LIBERIA
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JUNE 11, 2002
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota BILL FRIST, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Staff Director

PATRICIA A. MCNERNEY, Republican Staff Director
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut BILL FRIST, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
(II)
CONTENTS
Page
Amnesty International USA, statement submitted for the record ...................... 17
Anderson, Ms. Rory E., African policy specialist, World Vision U.S., Wash-
ington, DC ............................................................................................................. 29
Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 32
Frist, Hon. Bill, U.S. Senator from Tennessee, prepared statement ................... 10
Kansteiner, Hon. Walter, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,
Department of State, Washington, DC ............................................................... 2
Nowrojee, Ms. Binaifer, senior researcher, Human Rights Watch African Divi-
sion, New York, NY .............................................................................................. 19
Sannoh, Benedict F., counsellor, Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow, National
Endowment for Democracy, Washington, DC .................................................... 37
(III)
WEAK STATES IN AFRICA: U.S. POLICY IN
LIBERIA
TUESDAY, JUNE 11, 2002
U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room
SD419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russell D. Feingold
(chairman of the subcommittee), presiding.
Present: Senators Feingold and Frist.
Senator FEINGOLD. I call this hearing to order. I want to thank
all of the witnesses for being here today as the Subcommittee on
African Affairs convenes the third in a series of hearings focused
on weak states in Africa. This series is an attempt to identify some
of the characteristics of Africas weakest states that make the re-
gion attractive to terrorists and other international criminals, fo-
cusing on issues such as piracy, illicit air transport networks and
trafficking in arms, gemstones, and sometimes people. The sub-
committee hopes to identify long-term policy options for changing
the context in these states such that they are no longer so weak
and so appealing to criminal opportunists.
Earlier hearings already examined Somalia and the Democratic
Republic of Congo. Today we turn to the case of Liberia. So often
we discuss Liberia only in the context of what is happening in Si-
erra Leone or Guinea. Those discussions of Liberias role in the de-
stabilization of the region are certainly appropriate, but they rarely
create a space for considering the conditions of the Liberian people
themselves, or the state of Liberian institutions, or the extent to
which those institutions have been corrupted into private criminal
networks aimed at accumulating wealth for those in power. I be-
lieve that that is an equally important discussion, and the two are
by no means mutually exclusive.
The United States and the international community have in-
vested tremendous resources in bringing peace to Sierra Leone.
The formal end of the war and recent elections are positive signs,
but chaos in neighboring Liberia is just the opposite. Consider
thiscitizens of Sierra Leone are coming home from the countries
in which they sought refuge, Liberians are fleeing into Sierra
Leoneover 20,000 of them.
For all these reasonsbecause our post September 11 under-
standing of security threats must include international criminal
networks that operate in Africa, because allowing Liberia to dete-
riorate further without taking action is to ignore a major human
(1)
2
tragedy, and because the success or failure of a major international

intervention in the region hangs in the balanceit makes sense to
focus on Liberia today.
Let me be very clear at the outset. I think that the current Presi-
dent of Liberia is a war criminal, and I hope to see him held ac-
countable for his actions in a court of law. I strongly support our
continued efforts to isolate and pressure the Taylor regime. I think
there is nearly universal support for this policy within both parties
and both Chambers of Congress. But I also recognize that pres-
suring Taylor is not a complete policy toward this troubled and
volatile country. We must ask ourselves what will Liberia look like
in 10 years, and what will that mean for the Liberian people, for
the West African region, and for international criminal networks?
What steps can be taken today to influence that outcome?
I certainly will turn to the ranking member of the subcommittee,
Senator Frist, if he is able to make it. I know that he cares deeply
about Africa, and it is a pleasure to work with him on this sub-
committee, and I thank him for all his cooperation.
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Walter
Kansteiner is here today to testify in behalf of the administration.
It is good to have you back. I know that the Department intends
to come and provide a thorough briefing on the nature of inter-
national criminal activity and opportunities in Liberia soon, and we
look forward to that, and we appreciate the administrations desire
to be detailed and comprehensive, but I hope that what we can do
today is to hear how you would comment and that you are pre-
pared to discuss these issues in general terms today, and to share
the administrations thinking on overall policy aims and policy
tools with regard to Liberia. And with that, it is good to see you
again, and you may proceed with your testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. WALTER KANSTEINER, ASSISTANT SEC-
RETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. KANSTEINER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to
be here again, and the failed state series is a very important one
to be looking at for Africa in particular. If I could briefly review
how Liberia came to the state that it is in, and then perhaps look
at some of the questions you have raised as far as what the inter-
national community, particularly the U.S. Government, is thinking
about doing to assist.
Greed and lack of good governance are the root causes of Libe-
rias descent into its present deplorable state of affairs. Up until
the early 1980s, the government, representing primarily the inter-
ests of a privileged minority, ruled the country. One night, a group
of noncommissioned officers put an abrupt end to that government,
but unfortunately did not bring an end to narrow-interest govern-
ance. The new Liberian leader then was Sergeant Sammy Doe. He
hijacked an election and created a narrow, ethnically based govern-
ment.
Within 9 years of taking power, he, too, faced a challenge, this
time by an insurgency led by Charles Taylor. Liberia suffered a 6-
year civil war and, as we know, that war was truly devastating.
Some 750,000 persons were driven out of Liberia as refugees, and
3
another 200,000 were killed. The unprecedented regional military

intervention that ECOWAS launched did bring about a cessation of
fighting, and elections followed. Those elections were held under
the threat of a renewal of violence if Charles Taylor was not elect-
ed. Many observers believe that the people of Liberia really voted
for peace, and not necessarily for Taylor.
Doe and Taylor both had an opportunity to provide Liberia some
real leadership, but they did not. For our part, we tried to
strengthen democratic institutions and help rehabilitate the social
and economic infrastructure. When Taylor came to power, we had
USAID support in full, ready to assist to help rebuild those institu-
tions. The opportunity of this period was squandered.
Taylor devoted Liberias resources to supporting the Revolu-
tionary United Front, the RUF, next door in Sierra Leone and its
continued efforts to seize power in that country. Instead of invest-
ing in Liberia, Taylor divested Liberian assets to support his broad-
er ambitions in the region, to enrich his cronies, and to ensure the
loyalty of his hired security forces. He stopped servicing Liberias
debt and, as a result, the country is under Brooke sanctions.
To fund this regional ambition, Charles Taylor created new
sources of revenue primarily through trading illicit diamonds. He
provided the conduit and the paths through which the RUF got
their diamonds out, and by which they were marketed. Taylor also
contracted with the Oriental Timber Company and with other for-
eign logging firms that exploit the indigenous hardwood forests of
Liberia, some of the most beautiful forests on the continent, I
might add. Global Witness and others have done an excellent job
of documenting this atrocious raping of Liberias irreplaceable nat-
ural resources.
Taylor has used these revenues from both diamonds and timber
to fund his reckless exploitation of the conflicts in the neighbor-
hood. In doing so, he has clearly violated a number of U.N. embar-
goes, particularly the U.N. arms embargo, as he pumps more weap-
ons into the territory, into the neighborhood.
The international community reacted slowly to Taylors regional
destabilization and even more slowly to his malgovernance of Libe-
ria. Faced with the disengagement of ECOWAS forces, the Govern-
ment of Sierra Leone negotiated a power-sharing agreement with
the RUF. Encouraged by Taylor, the RUF repudiated the agree-
ment and took as hostages several hundred U.N. peacekeepers.
Really, only by the intervention of the British forces in May of 2000
did we see the RUF prevented from seizing Sierra Leone.
Mr. Chairman, Charles Taylor has set Liberia on a course toward
ever-greater hardship and suffering of the Liberian people and, as
you mentioned, it is that which we need to focus on in addition to
his reckless behavior in the neighborhood. The latest military chal-
lenge that he is now facing is by a group called Liberians United
for Reconciliation and Democracy, known as the LURD. I do want
to make it clear that the U.S. Government does not condone armed
insurrection in Liberia, nor do we support the LURD. In fact, we
have pressed the Government of Guinea and others not to support
the LURD.
But let me finally conclude with attempting to really get at what
you were asking earlier, and that is, how does a failed state such
4
as Liberia recover, and what role can and should the United States
play? It is important to recognize that Charles Taylors regime is
probably unlikely to change. It would be a long shot to assume he
is going to change his stripes. He might, and we need to be ready,
but it is a long shot.
I think a more important starting point is that of the widespread
Liberian desire for peace and stability. That popular will must be
given more concrete direction by leaders who are able to craft a
widespread common vision of a new Liberia. We believe that wide-
spread vision is there, and we need to help the opposition forces
and those that have that vision coalesce around that vision and
with each other. A united opposition should contest Liberias 2003
election. With the right support from the international community,
the elections can be made free and fair. If not free and fair, they
can be exposed as a sham.
The key to elections being free and fair is ensuring that the Libe-
rian people feel that their vote will be confidential, and that their
preferred candidates could run and win without the renewed risk
of violence. Securing this condition while Taylors security forces re-
main unchecked is going to be difficult, and so that is why we are
now discussing with our European allies as well as African states
perhaps looking at an outside force, or maybe ECOWAS, to ensure
that security and give that pre-election environment that is so
needed to make a free and fair election.
The Liberian people want to see some improvements in the qual-
ity of life. With few resources at its disposal, any post-failed state
government will depend on help from the international community.
Of paramount importance is ensuring an adequate food supply
until commercial mechanisms can be restored. The United States
should play a lead role here, along with other international part-
ners such as the World Bank and the European Community and
ECOWAS.
In conclusion, I might say two things are certain about Liberia:
No. 1, it is not going to recover from its present deplorable state
without some real help; and No. 2, the timing and circumstances
of any change really is not predictable. We have to remain flexible,
and with your help, and with consultations, we plan to look for op-
portunities to do just that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kansteiner follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. WALTER KANSTEINER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it gives me great pleasure to appear
before you today to pursue the topic of failed states in Africa. Today you have asked
that I focus on Liberia, West Africas most failed state. I would like to review briefly
how Liberia came to its present nadir as well as how the decline in Liberias for-
tunes has affected the sub region and created an opening for international criminal
and terrorist activities. Then I would like to address what the United States and
others in the international community are doing and I believe will need to do to
bring Liberia back into the fold of democratically well governed nations.
Greed and lack of good governance are the root causes of Liberias descent into
its present deplorable state of affairs. Up until the early 1980s, a government rep-
resenting primarily the interests of a privileged minority of Liberians pursued to ex-
cess the enrichment of a narrow class. If you wanted to send your child to school,
you had to buy textbooks imported by a relative of the president. If you wanted to
operate a taxi, you had to buy the yellow paint for it from a company owned by a
5
close associate of the president. Rice, the staple food, was imported and sold by an-
other government monopoly. One night, a group of non-commissioned officers put an
abrupt end to that government, but unfortunately, despite significant U.S. assist-
ance, did not bring about an end to narrow interest governance. The new Liberian
leader, Sergeant Doe, slowly eliminated most of his original compatriots, hijacked
an election and created a narrow ethnically based government. Within nine years
of taking power, he faced an armed insurgency led by Charles Taylor. Though Doe
lasted less than a year after Taylor launched his bid for power, Liberia suffered a
six-year civil war. That war had such tremendous humanitarian consequences, with
at least 750,000 persons driven out as refugees, one million IDPs and estimates of
up to 200,000 killed, and so threatened the stability of the sub region that the Eco-
nomic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) dispatched a military force to
try to restore order.
The unprecedented regional military intervention did bring about a cessation of
fighting, but the subsequent disarmament and demobilization program it oversaw
was far from complete and the elections that followed were held under the threat
of a renewal of violence if Charles Taylor were not elected. Many observers believe
that the people of Liberia voted for peace, not Taylor.
Like Doe before him, Taylor had an opportunity to provide Liberians the good gov-
ernance they deserve. USAID support for Liberia during the early Taylor period fo-
cused on the countrys transition from emergency assistance to sustainable develop-
ment. We tried to strengthen democratic institutions, reintegrated IDPs and in-
vested in the rehabilitation of social and economic infrastructure. The opportunity
of this period was squandered. Instead of good governance and reconstruction, Tay-
lor devoted Liberias resources to supporting the Revolutionary United Fronts
(RUF) continued efforts to seize power in neighboring Sierra Leone. After five years
in power, Liberias capital still has no reliable electric supply or running water. In-
stead of investing in Liberia, Taylor divested Liberian assets to support his broader
ambitions in the region, to enrich his cronies and to ensure the loyalty of hired secu-
rity forces. While hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally displaced per-
sons (IDPs) returned home, Taylors government made no real efforts to foster devel-
opment and recovery to build on the investments the international community made
through reintegration assistance. He stopped servicing Liberias debt and the coun-
try fell under Brooke sanctions.
To fund his regional ambitions, Taylor went beyond diverting the resources of the
Liberian state. He created new sources of revenue through trade in illicit diamonds.
He provided the conduit around international sanctions, for diamonds mined in
RUF-controlled areas of Sierra Leone to pass through middlemen based in Liberia
to world markets. The middlemen brought in by Taylor and his cronies have cer-
tainly operated outside the legitimate diamond trade and may, though we cannot
confirm the press allegations on this, have dealt in diamonds with persons affiliated
with international terrorist groups. Taylor also contracted with the Oriental Timber
Company (OTC) and other foreign logging firms that have exploit Liberias hard-
wood tropical forests. Global Witness and others have done an excellent job of docu-
menting this atrocious raping of Liberias irreplaceable natural resources. Possibly
worse, there are reports that after signing a forestry protection agreement with an
international conservation group, Taylor has allowed logging operations in the Sapo
National Park.
Taylor has used revenues from diamond smuggling and reckless exploitation of Li-
berias rain forest primarily to buy weapons, to fuel conflicts in neighboring coun-
tries, and to arm his proliferating internal security forces. To obtain these weapons,
Taylor has violated successive United Nations arms embargos (UNSCR 788 of No-
vember 19, 1992, UNSCR 1343 of March 7, 2001 and UNSCR 1408 of May 6, 2002).
He dealt with gray and black-market agents, such as Victor Butt, to procure and
transport weapons into Liberia. Thus, both on the resource generation side and on
the expenditure side, Taylor has taken up company with those on the fringe of and
outside legal operations.
The international community reacted slowly to Taylors regional destabilization
activities and even more slowly to his malgovernance of Liberia. The United States
and the rest of the international community failed initially to provide the backing
ECOWAS needed to continue its peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone. Faced
with a disengagement of ECOWAS forces, the Government of Sierra Leone nego-
tiated a power sharing agreement with the RUF. Encouraged by Taylor, the RUF
repudiated the agreement and took as hostages several hundred UN peacekeepers
who had gone to Sierra Leone to oversee its implementation. Only intervention by
British forces in May 2000 prevented the RUF from seizing power in Sierra Leone.
In July 2000, the United States gave Taylor an overdue ultimatum, cease sup-
porting the RUF and destabilizing the region or face serious consequences. In Sep-
6
tember 2000, the Taylor-supported RUF invaded Guinea. We replied with unilateral
travel sanctions on Taylor and his cronies. A few months later UN sanctions on dia-
monds, arms and travel were instituted.
Despite the RUFs reversal of fortunes at the hands of the Guinean military and
under pressure from an ever stronger and more determined UN peacekeeping force
in Sierra Leone, which led the majority of the RUF to unconditionally agree to dis-
arm and demobilize, Taylor remains recalcitrant. He has welcomed into Liberia
those elements of the RUF who refused to disarm and demobilize, and has ensured
they remain armed and dangerous. This potential threat to peace and stability in
the region led the UN Security Council to renew sanctions on Liberia last month.
The reluctance of the international community to address the internal affairs of
Liberia is beginning to crumble, as ECOWAS has begun urging the Liberian govern-
ment to talk with the rebels of the group known as Liberians United for Reconcili-
ation and Democracy (LURD). On March 1, Embassy Monrovia issued a press state-
ment that clearly laid out what we expect of the Taylor government, both in terms
of its actions in the region and within Liberia. We called on Taylor to: (1) discipline
members of the security forces who have threatened or have used violence against
political or civil society leaders; (2) to grant amnesty to all political opponents; (3)
to respect the freedom of the press, cease harassment of members of the press and
allow independent electronic media to broadcast AM, FM and shortwave throughout
Liberia; (4) to fully address the security/safety concerns of political and civil society
leaders; (5) to reach agreement with all peaceful political movements and parties
on the specific nature of guarantees and mechanisms required for the conduct of
open political debate and free, fair and inclusive elections; and (6) to respect fully
the right of peaceful assembly and freedom of speech.
Using the pretext of a threat posed by an armed group calling itself, Liberians
United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), the Taylor government re-
sponded to our calls for greater openness with a ban on public gatherings, closure
of an independent newspaper, harassment of human rights activists, and recruit-
ment of new undisciplined and unpaid militias to protect itself.
Mr. Chairman, Charles Taylor has set Liberia on a course towards ever greater
hardship and suffering of the Liberian people. He waged war to gain power, but has
failed to govern justly and wisely and now faces an armed revolt. The United States
government does not condone armed insurrection in Liberia nor do we support the
LURD. In fact, we have pressed the government of Guinea not to support the
LURD. Although Taylor blames the LURD for the rampant insecurity in the coun-
tryside, in fact, his own poorly trained and unpaid troops are mainly responsible for
the looting and fear that is generating tens of thousands of internally displaced per-
sons (IDPs). The Liberians displaced by the depredations of Liberian security forces
are resettled by Liberian government authorities in areas where they are vulnerable
to further depredations by armed forces. Taylor blames the international community
for not responding to the plight of these IDPs. The reality is that these people need
protection from their own government and humanitarian suffering will go on to
some degree as long as Taylors lack of good governance persists. Nevertheless, the
United States government will do its part in addressing the humanitarian needs of
Liberian refugees and IDPs.
ECOWAS has also recognized that the growing instability in Liberia demands an
outside response. ECOWAS, at its recent meeting in Cote dIvoire, issued a call for
cease-fire and talks between the Liberian government and the LURD. Although
Taylors spokesman initially rejected the proposal and his government has since
equivocated about how it will respond, we are encouraged that ECOWAS has asked
Nigerias President Obasanjo to pursue this. ECOWAS has also tried to facilitate
a dialogue between other political factions and the Liberian government. This is the
type of action warranted under the peer review provisions of NEPAD.
Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by attempting to address the questions I believe
most interest you: how can a failed state such as Liberia recover and what role can
and should the United States play. First, it is important to recognize that the Taylor
regime is unlikely to change its manner of governance or its ambitions. Given the
monster of undisciplined security forces it has created, it is questionable whether
the Liberian government could survive if it sought to change the way it governs.
That leads to the question of what happens next. Chaos is a possible scenario. Since
a state in anarchy is fertile ground for international criminal and terrorist activity
and since restoring order out of chaos is a tall order for the international commu-
nity, our focus must be to ensure there is a plausible alternative scenario.
A starting point is the widespread Liberian desire for peace and stability. That
popular will must be given more concrete direction by leaders who are able to craft
a widespread common vision of a new Liberia. Political and civil society leaders fo-
cused on a common vision rather than internecine squabbling is a prerequisite for
7
rebuilding a peaceful, democratic and more prosperous Liberia. Due to the historic
relationship between the United States and Liberia, many Liberians still look to the
United States to help lead the way to a better future for Liberia. As a first step
in helping Liberia recover from its current circumstances, the United States can fa-
cilitate discussion about the shape of a new Liberia, but the vision of a new Liberia
must come from Liberians themselves.
A united opposition should contest Liberias 2003 elections. With the right support
from the international community the elections can either be made free and fair or
exposed for the sham they easily could be. The key to elections being free and fair
is ensuring that the Liberian people feel they can vote for their preferred candidates
without the risk of renewed violence. Securing this condition while Taylors security
forces remain unchecked is unlikely to occur. Perhaps the answer is an outside
force, possibly an ECOWAS force to ensure security.
However change may occur, no political leadership can succeed if the armed thugs
running rampant in the countryside are unchecked. Experience in Eastern Europe,
East Timor and Sierra Leone suggest that an armed outside force, perhaps another
ECOWAS force in Liberias case, will be needed in order to protect a nascent govern-
ment, disarm and demobilize the willing, and marginalize and hunt down as crimi-
nals those who persist in living by the gun. Disarmament and demobilization can
only succeed if there is a new life for the former fighters. Some can be retrained
and reformed into a new Liberian Armed Force; most will need to be provided re-
training and real opportunities for successful integration into civilian life.
First and foremost, the Liberian people want to see peace and feel secure again.
But for urban populations in particular, they will soon want to see some improve-
ments in the quality of life. With few resources at its disposal, any post-failed state
government will depend on help from the international community. Of paramount
importance is ensuring an adequate food supply until commercial mechanisms can
be restored. Visible progress in restoring basic infrastructure and public services
such as water and electricity is likely also necessary to generate popular support
and the legitimacy such support confers. The United States should play a lead role
here along with other international partners, such as the World Bank, European
Community and ECOWAS. Efforts must begin very early to develop national con-
sensus on a new political framework, to strengthen independent media and civil so-
ciety. Technical assistance and funds to rebuild institutions from the courts to the
civil service will also be critically needed. To staff these rehabilitated institutions,
Liberia will need its best and brightest to return from abroad.
Two things are certain, Liberia will need our help recovering from its present de-
plorable state, and the timing and circumstance of any change is not predictable.
We will need to remain flexible, prepared to act quickly, boldly and generously if
Liberia is to make a success of a third opportunity to succeed.
Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Kansteiner, for your testi-

mony. You referred to the Liberians United for Reconciliation and
Democracy, and let me ask a few questions about that group. Has
the U.S. Government had any contact with the LURD?
Mr. KANSTEINER. I think we have had some very minimal con-
tact, and it is primarily through individuals in surrounding neigh-
boring countries and in the United States. We do not have a contin-
uous running dialog with them, no.
Senator FEINGOLD. Do you know if the LURD has a clear and
unified leadership structure, or do they have sort of multiple voices
that purport to speak for them?
Mr. KANSTEINER. My analysis is the latter, in fact. It is rather
disunified, and they have multiple patrons, really, supplying them
and helping them.
Senator FEINGOLD. I think I know your answer to the next one,
based upon your remarks, but let me be sure. Is negotiation with
the LURD feasible in this sense, based upon what you just said?
Mr. KANSTEINER. I think it would be very difficult.
Senator FEINGOLD. Would it be desirable?
Mr. KANSTEINER. I am not sure it would be desirable. I think it
is worth exploring that option, quite frankly. I think it is worth
8
learning more about this organization, and we in fact have asked

certain of our agencies in the government to help us learn more
about it.
Senator FEINGOLD. So I take it at this point you would not be
ready to say negotiating with the LURD would be akin to negoti-
ating with the RUF?
Mr. KANSTEINER. No, I do not advocate that our policy priority
be to seek them out and negotiate with them, no.
Senator FEINGOLD. I know these are tough things to guess about,
but then how do you get to a cease-fire in Liberia, given the dif-
ficulty of trying to negotiate with the LURD?
Mr. KANSTEINER. I think a very important role can be played by
ECOWAS and by the neighboring countries. Clearly, some of the
neighboring states, Guinea in particular, seem to have some influ-
ence with the LURD and other organizations; it is perhaps through
them that we can learn more about and pressure the LURD to ne-
gotiate.
We also have to pressure the Taylor side, too, but again, I do not
think it is a policy priority. I certainly would not want to rule it
out, either. I think we need to explore it.
Senator FEINGOLD. Let me pursue the connection to the Govern-
ment of Guinea. Your comments suggest the Government of Guinea
is assisting the LURD, is that correct?
Mr. KANSTEINER. I am not sure I would characterize it as assist-
ing. I would say that they probably are aware of assistance that
is going through Guinea. If they are actually part and parcel of
that, I do not know, but they are certainly aware there is assist-
ance that is going through their country.
Senator FEINGOLD. Have we in any way in our assistance, Amer-
ican assistance to Guinea, tried to condition that assistance on an
end to support for the LURD?
Mr. KANSTEINER. We have not.
Senator FEINGOLD. Are there any plans to do so?
Mr. KANSTEINER. No, but Guinea knows exactly where we stand
on the LURD, and we have told them that we see any direct Gov-
ernment of Guinea assistance to the LURD as highly problematic
and, in fact, would jeopardize our relationship.
Senator FEINGOLD. This is something we may want to pursue
with you in further discussions. Let me talk a little bit about the
relationship which you have already talked about between the RUF
and the Liberian Government. To what extent do you believe that
the RUF is still associated with the Liberian Government?
Mr. KANSTEINER. I believe there is still a link. As you know, the
RUF stood for elections in Sierra Leone and came down in defeat
as far as the electoral outcome is concerned.
Senator FEINGOLD. Did the Government of Liberia get involved
in any of RUFs political activities that led up to the elections in
Sierra Leone?
Mr. KANSTEINER. I would not rule it out. I do not know specifi-
cally, but that would not surprise me, and recently, as recently as
10 days ago, we have seen activity going on between Liberia and
the RUF into Sierra Leone. That linkage is still there.
Senator FEINGOLD. I think you have alluded to this, but as I un-
derstand it, it is U.S. policy to support a transition to a credible
9
democratic government in Liberia and obviously to ease the suf-

fering of Liberian civilians. What precisely is the U.S. Government
doing to pursue these goals?
Mr. KANSTEINER. We have a couple of programs that are under-
way. We have a couple more we are considering. The ones that are
currently underway are assistance to authentic opposition, that is,
opposition parties helping them become better organized in the
sense of seeking this common vision we discussed. The opposition
is splintered, and the best way for them to present a viable alter-
native to Taylor is, in fact, to have some kind of coalition, some
kind of unification.
The other way, the other project we are specifically working on
is communications, AM-FM and shortwave radio transmissions.
Again, as you know, Senator, the Taylor regime has controlled the
media very tightly and become quite autocratic about it, and so
what we are trying to do there is simply get a free, independent,
objective media source that has some capability to get into Liberia
and disseminate news and information that is unbiased and objec-
tive.
Senator FEINGOLD. Let me pursue both of those for a minute.
What exactly is being done to assist what may be perceived or
hoped to be authentic opposition? What are we doing to help them?
Mr. KANSTEINER. A couple of things we are doing is actually try-
ing to bring them together, literally, physically.
Senator FEINGOLD. Hosting meetings?
Mr. KANSTEINER. Primarily meetings, getting them to under-
stand some basic party-building exercises, some grassroots organi-
zation. In the oppressive environment of Liberia, building an oppo-
sition party is hard.
Senator FEINGOLD. But there is an active effort that we are in-
volved in to do that?
Mr. KANSTEINER. There is, yes, sir.
Senator FEINGOLD. What about the radio piece again? What ex-
actly are we doing?
Mr. KANSTEINER. We have an $800,000 program that will pro-
mote independent media. It is shortwave AM and FM radio, train-
ing journalists, and the purchase of what in Africa is becoming
quite standard are these wind-up radios, so it is not necessary to
have batteries or electricity. It is actually a wind-up radio, and so
we are providing these wind-up radios, so once we get these short-
wave and FM stations up and running, people can hear them.
Senator FEINGOLD. Let me ask you a closely related question. To
what degree is the United States providing assistance to Liberian
civil society, and how well is the civil society well-developed in Li-
beria? I mean, to some extent that is governed by opposition par-
ties, but civil society is broader than that.
Mr. KANSTEINER. It is broader than that. In fact, we are includ-
ing the civil society into some of these discussions, because they
have a large role to play. So on the training of the journalists, for
instance, we are kind of broadening that out, and we would con-
sider independent journalists as a key component of that civil soci-
ety, so we are trying to be as inclusive of civil society, and as you
know it is pretty thin right now in Liberia, and they need all the
help they can get.
10
Senator FEINGOLD. Very good. Thank you.

Last year, an article in the Washington Post alleged that
Hezbollah and even al-Qaeda representatives had purchased Sierra
Leonian diamonds through Liberia. Can you speak generally about
other international actors known to be doing business in Liberia?
Mr. KANSTEINER. We also read those reports and were quite in-
terested and concerned, and we have asked for a thorough analysis
of that. So far, we cannot find any direct evidence that they were
primary buyers, but they probably were secondary buyers, though,
and certainly tertiary buyers for the second and third and fourth
transactions that clearly were taking place. These organizations
quite frankly use all the commodities, be they diamonds, oras we
know, al-Qaeda has used honeymultiple businesses and commod-
ities that they trade and buy and purchase. I have no doubt that
gemstones and diamonds somewhere along that food chain are in-
volved.
The other major source of revenue, of course, in Liberia right
now that could fall into that category, and I am not saying it is,
but could fall into that category, is timber. We see the timber sales
primarily going from the hardwood forests that Taylor licenses and
probably gets a cut of, no pun intended, directly to end users. But
there could be middle men involved in that as well.
Senator FEINGOLD. And who would be some of these other inter-
national actors?
Mr. KANSTEINER. Malaysian and Chinese timber companies have
been active in Liberia, and clearly getting licenses to cut this tim-
ber from President Taylor.
Senator FEINGOLD. Senator Frist, the ranking member of the
committee, has arrived, and what I will do at this point is call on
him for any remarks he has, as I have already taken a few minutes
to ask questions. If you wish, after you make your remarks, you
can ask your questions.
Senator FRIST. I apologize, Mr. Secretary and Mr. Chairman, for
my tardiness. I planned on being here right on time, but I apolo-
gize. Let me just sayand I will just be very, very brief, actually,
and will submit my opening statement to the record if that is OK,
Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Frist follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL FRIST
U.S. POLICY OPTIONS IN LIBERIA
Mr. Chairman, thank you. I look forward to hearing what I anticipate will be very
thoughtful testimony and policy recommendations from our witnesses here today.
There are three general issues that I hope we can explore here today. First, what
policy options do we have to place pressure on President Charles Taylor so that he
will stop engaging in behavior that undermines regional stability? Should this pres-
sure be extended to others, and if so, who? Second, I hope to hear your thoughts
on steps can we take to help relieve the plight of ordinary Liberians. And finally,
Liberia is scheduled to hold elections in October 2003. I would like to hear your
thoughts on what steps can we take to ensure that those elections are free and fair
and how can we engage Liberias civil society to encourage their participation in the
elections and their efforts to rebuild civil society over the long-term.
As our witnesses will describe here today, Liberia has suffered from a long-stand-
ing off-and-on civil war that has torn the country apart for over a decade. Fighting
between the regime of Charles Taylor and the Liberian United for Reconciliation
and Democracy (LURD) threatens not only the citizens of Liberia but the fragile
peace and stability of the region.
11
Neighboring Sierra Leone is taking the first careful steps toward reconciling its
long and brutal civil warholding free elections on May 14. Yet, I am concerned
that the Taylor regime could be undermining those efforts through his support for
RUF fighters who have refused to disarm and demobilize. I would also like to hear
from our witnesses their assessment of the other participants in this fighting, par-
ticularly the LURD and the support that Guinea might be providing to the rebels.
Mr. Chairman, not only am I concerned with the threat the fighting poses to
neighboring countries of West Africa, I am also concerned with the threat the Taylor
government poses to its own citizens. Increasingly, credible reports are showing that
the regime continues to harbor international arms strugglers, drug dealers, and
other criminal enterprises.
Special security officers and anti-terrorist units intimidate the civilian popu-
lation and harass the political opponents of the government. Human rights advo-
cates and journalists are assaulted jailed on a regular basis as independent news-
papers and radio stations are closed down. Liberians continue to live under a State
of Emergency imposed in February 2001 by President Taylor.
I am concerned for the welfare of Liberias citizens who are caught in the middle
of the ongoing hostilities. Liberias health care and education systems are collapsing.
The capital is without electricity and running water, and communication with the
outside world is mostly limited to satellite telephones. On June 10, yesterday, our
Ambassador, Bismarck Myrick, declared a disaster due to the complex emergency
in Liberia.
In October 2003, Liberia is scheduled to hold presidential elections. I am inter-
ested from hearing more from our witnesses their thoughts on steps we should take
to engage with the Liberians so that we can help them prepare for the elections.
I look forward to hearing your views on how we, as legislators, can support the
Administration and use our influence to end the violence in Liberia. Through your
testimony, I hope we can get a better understanding of how we can begin to address
these problems and a better understanding of how Liberias civil war affects the
United States own interests, so that we can further those interests and those we
share with Africa. Thank you for appearing before us today.
Senator FRIST. A couple of the issuesI will just have one ques-
tion about thatyou have already touched upon, but something
which I do not believe you have mentioned thus far is about health
care and education in Liberia, and the collapse that as I read and
study, and I have talked to people, seems to be happening. The on-
going hostilities leave the welfare of Liberian citizens in the mid-
dle.
When you look at health care, and you look at education, and you
look at infrastructure in the midst of these hostilities, the potential
for complete collapse is there, and I want you to sort of paint the
picture for me so I will understand it. The capital is without elec-
tricity and without running water, communication with the outside
world seems to be in large part limited to satellite telephones. On
June 10, Ambassador Myrick declared a disaster due to the com-
plex emergency in Liberia.
Could you take those comments and just expand upon them, and
then maybe lead into a little bit the humanitarian efforts, either
that are underway, or might potentially be underway as we look
to the future?
Mr. KANSTEINER. Thank you, Senator. The general state of af-
fairs in Liberia and Monrovia in particular is rapid decay, quite
frankly. As you say, there is no electricity. Most institutions and
buildings that have power have it because they have generators.
Hospitals are lacking medicines and power. The infrastructure of
the country is sagging, if not broken. It is in that context that some
of the political maneuvering that Taylor is doing is particularly
egregious, in the sense that he has three hearty meals a day and
12
is living quite comfortably, as are his cronies, while the country is

increasingly lawless, as well as lacking in infrastructure.
For instance, Taylor could not pay his own security forces a few
months ago, and so what he essentially did was pull out a map of
the country and allows certain units in the military to basically
take over this region of this county and go do whatever they want-
ed, which meant rape, pillage, and plunder there units what they
need to be paid, since he is not paying them. It is that kind of at-
mosphere that is prevalent throughout the country.
Senator FRIST. And education, what is education now?
Mr. KANSTEINER. The education system has suffered mightily,
and a country that had a fairly high literacy rate is now only 38
percent.
Senator FRIST. When you look at that, the potential for humani-
tarian efforts to have some impact, given the hostilities and the ap-
proach of the Taylor regime, will humanitarian efforts have an im-
pact?
Mr. KANSTEINER. Well, the humanitarian efforts do have an im-
pact in the sense that they provide food assistance, they provide
medicines, and what we are trying to do, of course, is funnel all of
those food assistance and medical, particularly those, through non-
governmental organizations [NGOs]we push it through the NGOs
that are, quite frankly, brave and bold enough to be there. I think
you are going to hear from some of them who are there today. We
make a very real effort to make sure that that assistance does not
go through the Government of Liberia, and that it does go through
independent NGOs that will disburse it not based on political lar-
gesse, but based upon true humanitarian need.
Senator FRIST. Did you talk about the elections at all, the May
14 elections?
Mr. KANSTEINER. The Sierra Leone elections? We briefly touched
on it.
Senator FRIST. Generally, the international community obviously
has recognized those as appropriate and free. As we look at the al-
leged interference by Taylor in Sierra Leone as a key source of the
charges that Taylors actions have destabilized the region, and I
speak in particular of his support for the Revolutionary United
Front in Sierra Leone, what is the current status today? Does the
Taylor government pose a threat to what is a very fragile peace of
Sierra Leone and put it in danger of collapse?
Mr. KANSTEINER. Senator, I think the good news is that Taylors
influence on the election process in Sierra Leone is pretty minimal.
I mean, the RUF did very poorly, and I have no doubt that Taylor
was somehow trying to assist the RUF in their political campaigns.
That is the good news, that it was a relatively free and fair elec-
tion, and we do have now a democratically elected government next
door in Sierra Leone.
The bad news is that Taylor is still involved in cross-border oper-
ations. They are not large-scale. They are relatively small, but they
are still occurring, and if it is just shipping a few AK47s into the
RUF territory, or if it is trying to smuggle 10 percent more dia-
monds out, whatever that activity is, it is significantly less today
than it was a year ago. It is still going on to some degree.
Senator FRIST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
13
Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Senator Frist. I will

just continue with some further questions for Mr. Kansteiner. I
would like to follow on something Senator Frist asked. Have we ac-
tually stepped up our humanitarian assistance to Liberia since the
fighting with the LURD began affecting civilians?
Mr. KANSTEINER. We have. The fiscal year 2002, which they just
handed me the numbers, we have provided $4.8 million in support
for humanitarian assistance programs. Again, most of it is food as-
sistance and medicines. A lot of it is targeted for the refugees and
the internally displaced persons. The total 2001 assistance for edu-
cation, nutrition, and refugees and IDPs was $10.7 million. That
also gives the primary vehicles the NGOs, as we mentioned, and
also UNHCR we are working with, and ICRC, and we predict that
that the fiscal year 2002 level of support will stay or increase in
2003, in fiscal year 2003.
Senator FEINGOLD. I would like to go back to another question
that I was beginning with before Senator Frist came. Are there
links between people doing business in Liberia and armed groups
that are elsewhere in Africa, political parties elsewhere in Africa?
Mr. KANSTEINER. Not that come immediately to mind.
Senator FEINGOLD. What about the relationship between Liberia
and Libya?
Mr. KANSTEINER. The Taylor-Qaddafi relationship is a long one.
Some of Taylors original training we believe in fact was in Libya,
and some of those early weapons shipments and perhaps current
weapons shipments clearly emanated from Libya.
Senator FEINGOLD. Obviously, you have no reason to believe that
relationship has softened or changed.
Mr. KANSTEINER. No, sir. I see no evidence of a lessening rela-
tionship there, and as we have seen elsewhere in Africa, when Afri-
can leaders often get in tight spots they turn to the few friends
they have, and so as the pressure on Taylor increases, we might
even anticipate a deepening of that relationship.
Senator FEINGOLD. I am pleased you mentioned the timber issue.
We have talked about this before. Many credible reports allege the
Liberian Governments logging policy is not only environmentally
disastrous, but is also characterized by abusive acts of security
forces working with logging companies. Could you talk about the
relationship between the Government of Liberia, the logging firms
operating in Liberia, and state-sponsored security forces?
Mr. KANSTEINER. Well, the Government of Liberia has entered
into negotiations and, in fact, contracts with a number of inter-
national timber companies. The OTC, Oriental Timber Company, is
probably its largest partner in the cutting of the hardwoods. We
are very pleased that the U.N. Security Council agreed with the
United States and the British in what we are calling ring-fencing
those timber revenues. It is a voluntary process where the Security
Council has demanded that the Taylor regime and Monrovia give
us a transparent and complete accounting for all timber proceeds.
If they do not give us that accounting, I would hope that the
U.N. Security Council would, in fact, move the next step forward,
which would be a mandatory cordoning off of those revenues, so we
know exactly how much those revenues are, where they are going,
and how they are being spent.
14
Senator FEINGOLD. You actually support the calls for a ban on

timber exports from Liberia because of the links between timber
revenues and illicit arms purchases?
Mr. KANSTEINER. I think that is a very viable option we ought
to look at.
Senator FEINGOLD. How would sanctions like that affect Liberian
civilians who are already suffering in a devastated economy?
Mr. KANSTEINER. We have looked at that, and we were surprised
to find how few Liberians are actually actively engaged in some of
the timbering operations. In fact, we have seen where companies
coming in from the outside, non-African companies like the Ori-
ental Timber Company, often bring in workers to provide the labor,
so the Liberians themselves are not even benefiting from the clear-
cutting of their own forest.
Senator FEINGOLD. So the impact would be negligible?
Mr. KANSTEINER. I think it would be pretty small.
Senator FEINGOLD. Let me turn to another aspect of Liberias
economy. Liberia maintains one of the largest maritime fleets in
the world. An expert report to the U.N. Security Council last au-
tumn concluded in part that the Liberian Commission of Maritime
Affairs Bureau acted at times as, little more than a cash extrac-
tion operation, offering cover to fund and organize Liberias off-
budget expenditures, including prohibited U.N. sanctions-breaking
activities.
In one particularly troubling allegation, the panel of U.N. experts
also presented evidence to suggest that the Maritime Registry
itself, which is run by a corporation in the United States, trans-
ferred funds on behalf of the Government of Liberia to suspicious
nongovernmental accounts. Some of those funds could have been
used directly to support sanctions-busting activities.
In a more recent report to the Security Council in April of this
year, that same expert panel reported that they had obtained addi-
tional documentation linking an arms dealer to the Maritime Af-
fairs Bureau in Liberia. They also reported that despite steps by
the Maritime Registry and the Ministry of Finance to provide a full
accounting for all maritime funds, as much as $2 million in recent
payments from the Maritime Registry to the Central Bank of Libe-
ria remain unaccounted for.
Given these reports, do you believe that hard currency revenues
generated by the registry are being used by the Government of Li-
beria to support arms trafficking or other sanctions-busting activi-
ties, and should the United States press the international commu-
nity to set up an international auditing mechanism to account for
the money generated by the maritime registry, thereby ring-fencing
the revenues to ensure that they are used for legitimate develop-
ment or humanitarian purposes?
Mr. KANSTEINER. I agree on all of the above. We have pretty
clear evidence that there were at least some paymentsnow, this
goes back a couple of years, but there were some payments from
the Maritime Registry to arms shippers. We have been given assur-
ances, and the fiscal data we have seen since would suggest that
that has ceased, that has not occurred since, but that does not
mean that that money is not fungible.
15
The revenue stream goes from the ship registry to the Govern-
ment of Liberia, and once it gets into the Government of Liberias
central bank system, we do not know where it all goes. So with re-
gard to the second part of your question, we are very supportive
of cordoning off that revenue stream. It is, we think, about $20 mil-
lion a year. We would like to know where that $20 million a year
goes, and how the Liberian Government spends it. The Security
Council has imposed basically a process where the Government of
Liberia would voluntarily demonstrate to us ring-fencing and ac-
countability.
There are a number of companies that could do this. Crown
Agents out of the U.K. is being considered right now as basically
an accounting mechanism. But if the Government of Liberia does
not proceed with some good intent, then I think we need to go back
to the Security Council and make it mandatory rather than vol-
untary.
Senator FEINGOLD. I appreciate that answer. Some observers, no-
tably the International Crisis Group, have suggested that the inter-
national community should focus its energies on encouraging a
genuinely free and democratic election in October of 2003. I would
like your assessment of that suggestion. Will the United States pro-
vide assistance in the months leading to the elections and, given
what you have described, the governments history and the current
state of emergency, can we really take the prospect of democratic
elections seriously?
Mr. KANSTEINER. It is going to be the policy tactic or strategy
that I think we are going to need to work most on as we approach
the third quarter 2003 election. Will there be an environment in Li-
beria that truly is going to allow for a free and fair election. Or is
there going to be intimidation? Are Taylors thugs going to run
rampant? Hence my reference in the testimony about possibly get-
ting some kind of peacekeeping operation, or certainly an outside
force like an ECOWAS to be there to provide that more open and
friendly environment where Liberians truly could have a voice and
really could vote in a reasonably free and fair environment. I think
those are the issues that are going to be confronting us in the next
15 months.
Senator FEINGOLD. With regard to ECOWAS, what is the current
ECOWAS position regarding sanctions on Liberia? Do some of the
regional actors have some clear interest on easing pressure on
President Taylor?
Mr. KANSTEINER. I think ECOWAS is walking this fine line be-
tween wanting to see Liberia go rightthat is, have a decent elec-
tion in 2003and putting the pressure on Taylor to make sure that
that happens and on the other hand are concerned that if they
push too hard, Taylor will fall but chaos may follow. They do not
want a neighbor that is fraying at the edges in every way, shape,
and form, and refugees, overwhelming their countries.
That worries them too, and so they, I think, are trying to walk
this fine line between keeping the heat on Taylor so he will, in fact,
have a free and fair election, but not pushing so hard that they
drive him over the edge prompting Liberian chaos for the next 3
years or so.
16
Senator FEINGOLD. One more question, then I will see if Senator

Frist has additional questions for you. Overall, how effective has
the international community been in implementing sanctions on Li-
beria? How easy it is, really, to engage in sanctions-busting activity
in West Africa, and what can be done to improve the enforcement?
Mr. KANSTEINER. Well, I think our targeted sanctions have been
pretty effective. The U.N. has its sanctions against the Taylor
elites. We have additional sanctions on top of that. A lot of these
are travel prohibitions. That is important, and we need to maintain
that heat.
It is also important in the sense that it is a targeted sanction.
The people of Liberia do not really suffer because Taylors Cabinet
cannot come to New York to shop. These are targeted, personality-
driven specific sanctions against individuals, and in that sense I
think they are effective. I think it puts some heat on Taylor, and
I think the financial sanctions, that is, the prohibition on the dia-
monds and hopefully placing the timber and maritime proceeds in
escrow will be additional pressure.
Senator FEINGOLD. Senator Frist.
Senator FRIST. Mr. Chairman, I do not have further questions.
I just want to thank the Secretary for his outstanding work, and
I appreciate the opportunity of working with you on all of these
issues. Thank you for being with us.
Mr. KANSTEINER. Thank you, Senator.
Senator FEINGOLD. I join in thanking Secretary Kansteiner for
his fine work, for his testimony, and his patience in answering all
of our questions.
Mr. KANSTEINER. My pleasure. Thank you very, very much.
Senator FEINGOLD. We will go to the second panel now. We have
an excellent private panel before us today. They all have very dis-
tinguished backgrounds. Ms. Binaifer Nowrojee is counsel for
Human Rights Watchs Africa Division. She has been with the or-
ganization since 1993. Prior to that, Ms. Nowrojee served as staff
attorney on Africa for the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights
from 1989 to 1992. She was most recently in Liberia in April 2002,
and is coauthor of the Human Rights Report, Back to the Brink,
War Crimes by Liberian Government Rebels, published in May
2002.
Ms. Rory Anderson is government relations manager and African
policy advisor for the U.S. office of World Vision, one of the largest
privately funded humanitarian relief and development organiza-
tions. World Vision gives direct humanitarian assistance to local
populations in over 95 countries worldwide, operational in 24 coun-
tries in sub-Saharan Africa, including Liberia, Sierra Leone, An-
gola, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Ms. Anderson has
also worked as a project manager overseeing multimillion dollar de-
velopment assistance projects funded by the U.S. Agency for Inter-
national Development. In 1993 and 1994, Ms. Anderson worked in
the White House Speechwriting Office of the President, and the
Presidents National Policy Council.
Mr. Benedict Sannoh is currently a Reagan-Fassell Democracy
Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy. An attorney,
Mr. Sannoh has served as an assistant professor of law at the
Lewis Arthur Grimes School of Law at the University of Liberia,
17
and has successfully litigated several constitutional law cases be-

fore the Supreme Court of Liberia. He is the founder of the Libe-
rian Center for Law and Human Rights.
I welcome all of you. I would also note we have a very good state-
ment here from Amnesty International that I will submit for the
record without objection.
[The prepared statement of Amnesty International follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT BY AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA
HELP THE LIBERIAN PEOPLE BUILD PEACE AND JUSTICE
On behalf of the members of Amnesty International we would like to thank the

Africa subcommittee for holding these hearings on U.S. Policy toward Liberia. Am-
nesty International is the largest non-governmental human rights organization in
the world with some 1 million members, 53 sections and groups in a further 22
countries. Since 1961 Amnesty International has been monitoring the performances
of governments in terms of protecting fundamental human rights. In particular AI
monitors abuses such as arbitrary detention, extra judicial executions, torture and
restrictions on freedom of assembly, association and expression. Amnesty Inter-
national collaborates with local human rights groups to document abuses and ques-
tion and challenge the governments in question in an effort to end the abuses and
educate the general public about their rights. Amnesty International also seeks to
hold members of the security forces accountable for human rights abuses.
It is time that the United States reengage in efforts to restore the rule of law,
respect for human rights and security in Liberia. With elections scheduled for next
year, a growing military conflict with armed opposition groups and a serious hu-
manitarian crisisit is essential that efforts being made by the international com-
munity to try and end this 20-year old nightmare be vigorous, and coordinated
a critical role that can only be played by the United States.
Introduction
The current military crisis in Liberia is now 12 years old. The political and
human rights crisis and the breakdown of U.S. policy however, dates back to U.S.
support for the regime of Samuel Doe who came to power in 1980. Support for Doe,
despite a wealth of documentation showing rampant human rights abuses by the
countrys security forces was the first in a series of policy decisions that contributed
to the deterioration of the protection of fundamental human rights in Liberia and
arguably the entire region. Following the Reagan administrations endorsement of
Doe, first Bush administration and the Clinton administration declined to or play
a leadership role in military interventions to stop or limit bloodshed when opposi-
tion to Doe coalesced and a brutal seven-year war ensued that soon spilled over into
Sierra Leone. Then when the Nigerian led West African peacekeeping force known
as ECOMOG, pulled out and allowed elections that were neither free nor fair to be
stolen by Taylor, and his NPLF faction that had an appalling human rights record,
the Clinton administration and the international community did nothing arguing
that there was no alternative and no resources to do anything else. With each deci-
sion to do nothing, the Liberian people have been sold down the riverand they
continue to pay the price to this day.
Liberias political, human rights and economic crisis continues to deepen as efforts
by the international community to isolate the government of President Taylor in-
crease. While efforts to pressure the Taylor government to change its behavior are
a critical step in the right direction. Such policies and initiatives must not be used
to disengage and walk away from the crisis and the needs of the Liberian people.
In other words, while seeking to neutralize the worst of the Taylor regime the inter-
national community must also help build a viable alternative based on respect for
human rights and genuine democratic practice. Lasting peace, stability and security
in the West African region will only be achieved if conflicts like the civil wars in
Sierra Leone and Liberia are replaced by peace, security and governments that
abide by and enforce the rule of law and human rights. The Bush administrations
efforts to pressure on President Taylor and his supporters to reform should continue
and be accompanied by increased support for Liberian civil society and the Liberian
people.
Current Situation
Liberias government remains locked in a conflict with the rebel group, Liberians
United for Reconciliation and Democracy. Human rights abuses continue to be per-
18
petrated by all sides and the situation has deteriorated since President Taylor
issued a state of emergency in February. There is great concern regionally that if
unchecked and unresolved the conflict in Liberia will undermine the fragile peace
painstakingly established in Sierra Leone, and beyond that the stability of the wider
region. Reports by the United Nations and human rights groups have exposed that
Liberian security forces collaborated with Sierra Leones armed rebel group, the
Revolutionary United Front, providing military training, equipment and supplies
through the trade of rough diamonds and timber. Liberia has also had military
clashes with Guinea who it accuses of housing and supporting the LURD. In yet
another example of U.S. policy gone awry, Guinea is currently the recipient of U.S.
military assistance as part of an effort to shut down the RUF. Yes at the very same
time Guinea is supporting the LURD, a faction with an equally poor human rights
record.
Human Rights Concerns
Tens of thousands of Liberians have fled the fighting and human rights violations
such as extra judicial killings, unlawful detention, torture, rape, abduction, and
forced labor and conscription, perpetrated by all sides of the conflict. Human rights
abuses perpetrated by Liberian government forces occur frequently and with impu-
nity. Men and boys have been extra judicially executed on suspicion of backing
armed opposition groups, or illegally held as dissidents in dozens of illegal deten-
tion centers where they were held incommunicado and tortured. They are sometimes
held for weeks in holes in the ground, tear-gassed, had acid thrown on them, were
denied water and food. Several have reportedly died as a result.
Sexual violence, including rape is used as a weapon by the government forces to
instill terror among the civilian population. Hundreds of women and girls, some as
young as 12 years of age, were detained at military checkpoints and gang-raped.
Some were forced into sexual slavery in homes. Again, security forces continue to
enjoy impunity for these abuses.
Outside conflict areas government forces have attacked critics: including journal-
ists, human rights defenders, lawyers and opposition politicians, some of whom were
forced to flee the country. In April the government banned all political activity, in-
cluding public meetings, declaring a state of emergency.
LURD forces have also committed human rights abuses against civilians. They
have reportedly deliberately killed and tortured, including by raping, unarmed civil-
ians suspected of supporting government forces.
The crisis in Liberia has generated at least 40,000 internally displaced people.
Many others have crossed the border, including 4,000 who fled into Guinea, with
10,000 expected to join them, and 3,000 others trying to cross into Sierra Leone.
These people are particularly vulnerable to abuse by all armed groups in the region
and face many obstacles when trying to flee to these countries. Amnesty Inter-
national is extremely concerned with the lack of freedom of movement and the right
to seek safe refuge, as well as threatened food security for Liberian citizens along
with the other human rights abuses before mentioned.
Recommendations
The U.S. must ensure that the United Nations Peace-building Support Office
(UNOL) in Liberia is activated and substantively strengthened. UNOL must deploy
more staff to monitor the human rights situation throughout the country, including
the situation at the borders, and maintain a visible and strong international pres-
ence to try and help create the conditions for free and fair elections due next year.
Liberias conflict has been fueled by the governments ability to trade in rough
diamonds and timber, as well as the easy availability of small arms in the region.
The U.S. should support enforcement of UN sanctions and take effective measures
to prevent arms transfers, including the exploitation and trade of diamonds and tim-
ber which helps fund the weapons trade. Such measures should include: strict con-
trols and monitoring of international arms brokerage and arms transportation by
states own nationals and residents; rigorous procedures to be followed when consid-
ering applications for arms transfers to countries known to have links to Liberia;
and effective and transparent controls of the diamond industry in the region.
Adequate humanitarian aid must continue to flow into the country and the region,
to protect food security and to take steps ensure that displaced people are protected
and allowed to move freely.
Senator FEINGOLD. We will start with Ms. Nowrojee. Please pro-

ceed.
19
STATEMENT OF MS. BINAIFER NOWROJEE, SENIOR RE-
SEARCHER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH AFRICA DIVISION, NEW
YORK, NY
Ms. NOWROJEE. I have been following the human rights situation
in Liberia since before the civil war in 1989, and then through the
war looking at human rights violations by various rebel groups,
and then since the election that brought Charles Taylor to power,
and I can tell you that Charles Taylor runs his government pretty
much in the same way as he ran his rebel group, which is with
lawlessness, a lack of accountability, and without respect for
human rights or the rule of law, and so Liberia is in pretty bad
shape at this time, and it has only been 5 years since the shaky
transition to peace began, and the situation is extremely volatile.
State power is regularly used by high-ranking officials to further
political objectives of the state, to avoid accountability, and for per-
sonal enrichment, and the institutions in the state that could pro-
vide a check on the Taylor government such as the judiciary, the
legislature, the Human Rights Commission, they are all weak and
very cowed.
And then in the north of the country there is the rebel incursion,
and so the country is back at war, and LURD rebels are basically
doing hit-and-run attacks in the northwest, coming quite close to
Monrovia, and in response the government has basically been re-
militarizing the society, so what you have is a situation where ex-
combatants are being called up again, and you see a proliferation
of militia groups that are pretty shadowy, hard to know who is con-
trolling them, what their numbers are, and so what you see is a
return to war, but this time the war lord is controlling the state.
So basically what is happening is, Liberians are basically func-
tioning in an environment where there is absolutely no rule of law,
and so what I was doing in Liberia at the beginning of the year
was documenting war crimes by both Liberian Government forces
and rebels, and there are some very serious war crimes and human
rights abuses going on.
The government troops that are going up to fight the rebel incur-
sion are basically running rampant in terms of violations against
civilians. What we are seeing are executions, rapes, abductions,
lootings, burning of villages, and pretty serious violations, quite a
serious pattern, including people being put alive in houses and set
alight, civilians, so the government forces are behaving completely
without any rein, and there is no accountability at all.
And then in the face of rebel action the government of Charles
Taylor is becoming increasingly intolerant of this, and what you see
is a state of emergency imposed in February, and since then har-
assment of civil society groups and the independent media.
Additionally, the government supposedly to crack down against
the rebel incursion is also continuing its illegal flow of weapons, so
despite the U.N. arms embargo which has been in place since 1992,
the Taylor government is continuing to procure weapons, so there
is a documented network of arms brokers and transport companies
that are providing false documents and relying on lax controls in
places like Slovakia, Moldova, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan to arrange
these illegal weapons purchases, and then other countries that are
providing cover.
20
For instance, in 19992000, Burkina Faso and Cote dIvoire pro-

vided false cover for arms shipments destined for Liberia, and the
illicit flow continues to date. We have evidence that shows that a
plane that crashed outside Monrovia in February 2002 carried an
illegal military cargo for the government, and it was one of three
suspicious flights coming from Chad using planes fraudulently reg-
istered in Moldova, and filing false flight plans. When the U.N. in-
vestigators went to Liberia they were blocked from investigating
this crash.
As has already been mentioned, Liberias illicit arms purchases
are often financed through off-budget spending or by payments not
accounted for in the budget. For example, income received by the
U.S.-based Liberian International Shipping and Corporate Registry
was twice used to pay for Liberias arms purchases, and after they
refused to engage in the practice as of August 2000, other off-budg-
et outlays of maritime funds were utilized.
The U.N. has established that in 1999, a timber company paid
for an illegal arms shipment, so the recent move by the U.N. Secu-
rity Council to audit the shipping and timber revenues is a very
welcome step.
The lawlessness and chaos that is descending on Liberia is not
just detrimental to Liberia, but also to the subregion. These three
countries, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, their conflicts are
intertwined. They spill over the borders. The alliance has crossed
borders, so that the lawlessness in Liberia has the potential to up-
turn the fragile peace established in Sierra Leone.
Even now, fighters across the Liberia-Sierra Leone border are
moving hundreds of Sierra Leone ex-combatants who are crossing
into Liberia to fight as mercenaries for both sides, and LURD
rebels and Liberian Government troops cross into Sierra Leone to
loot, to escape fighting, and in some cases to abduct people for
forced labor, and Liberian Army deserters are also found on the Si-
erra Leone side of the border, where they could present an addi-
tional security threat.
LURD is also running a clandestine supply line along that bor-
der, and there is no consistent policy either on the part of the Si-
erra Leone Government or by the U.N. peacekeepers on how to ad-
dress this problem. Additionally, Guinea, is playing a very detri-
mental role in providing support, logistic, and some military sup-
port to the LURD rebels, and I think it is important to recognize
that Charles Taylor bears primary responsibility for much of the
longstanding aggression and violence in the subregion, but at this
time it is Guinea that is playing a destabilizing role, and that
needs to be addressed.
The developing crisis in Liberia, if unchecked, threatens to erode
the fragile peace and stability that is established in Sierra Leone,
and may likely destabilize Guinea and the wider region, and so it
is imperative that the international community actually remain en-
gaged in efforts to establish conditions for sustainable peace, and
here I would like to just stress the sustainable, because I think
there have been efforts to bring peace, and they are always sort of
quick and dirty, and they move in and out, but they are not sus-
tainable, and it has to be done for all three countries in the sub-
region so all of the three governments need to be called on to do
21
several things to end cross-border attacks and illicit weapons flows,

to cease support for armed rebel activity, to respect the rule of law
and human rights, to prevent and punish war crimes and other
human rights abuses, and to create state institutions that are
transparent and accountable, particularly in the state security
apparatuses.
Moving to U.S. policy, I would like to just say that U.S. pressure
on the Liberian Government to address human rights abuses has
commendably been strong and consistent, and relations between
the United States and Liberia have deteriorated, particularly as
President Taylors role in fueling the war in Sierra Leone became
more evident, and the Bush administration has continued the Clin-
ton policy of isolating Taylor politically and diplomatically, al-
though less publicly.
Other initiatives that are in the right direction include U.S. sup-
port for regional security and peacekeeping. For example, the
United States has been involved in several initiatives to address re-
gional peacekeeping efforts through training and equipping of West
African peacekeeping battalions. Additionally, the United States
has played a very constructive role in bringing peace to Sierra
Leone by concentrating its efforts on ending the Liberian Govern-
ments support for the RUF and by supporting the military actions,
peacekeeping actions in Sierra Leone, and providing humanitarian
assistance.
The pledge of $15 million over 3 years to the Special Court for
Sierra Leone was the largest of any contributing nation, so the U.S.
Government should be proud of that. The Special Court in Sierra
Leone really can play an important role not only in holding Sierra
Leonians accountable for human rights violations, but also Liberian
nationals accountable for their role in the Sierra Leone conflict, but
there are aspects of U.S. policy with regard to Liberia and the sub-
region that could better contribute to the rule of law and respect
for human rights.
Pressuring and isolating the Taylor government while turning a
blind eye to similar abuses by other regional actors will not result
in sustainable peace to the subregion, so there are three things I
would like to suggest in terms of improving U.S. policy. The first
is that U.S. assistance and support to Liberias beleaguered civil so-
ciety community could be stronger, and greater efforts should be
made to provide independent journalists, human rights activists,
and other civil society groups with assistance and support for their
important work.
The United States has also remained silent on civil rights abuses
and war crimes being committed by the LURD rebel forces. Inter-
national condemnation could pressure the LURD to address abuses
against civilians by their fighters.
The last is, the United States has been silent about condemning
Guineas flagging human rights record and its destabilization of Li-
beria. The United States now has an important role to play vis-a-
vis Guineas support for the LURD. The United States is beginning
a long-delayed training program of $3 million for the Ghanian mili-
tary, focusing on border security to assist that country in defending
its borders against Charles Taylors incursions, and we suggest
22
that our U.S. military assistance to Guinea should be conditioned

on an end to Guineas support to the LURD.
Thank you for this opportunity to appear today.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Nowrojee follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF BINAIFER NOWROJEE, COUNSEL, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/
AFRICA
Thank you very much for convening these hearings and inviting Human Rights
Watch to testify. My name is Binaifer Nowrojee. I serve as counsel with Human
Rights Watchs Africa Division. I have been with the organization since 1993. Prior
to that, I served as staff attorney on Africa for the Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights from 1989 to 1992. I have been involved in human rights research and advo-
cacy on West Africa since 1989.
After only five years of a shaky transition to peace, the situation in Liberia re-
mains fragile and extremely volatile. President Charles Taylors government con-
tinues to function without accountability or respect for the rule of law, exacerbating
the divisions and resentments fueled by the seven-year civil war. Due to the
misallocation of resources, the nations economy remains in tatters, with some 80
percent of the workforce unemployed and 80 percent illiteracy. Basic services such
as health care, communications, electricity, and the public supply of drinking water
remain limited. Public and private institutions continue to deteriorate amid wide-
spread corruption and fear.
Fighting has raged in the countrys northwest since the start of a rebel incursion
in 2000, the fifth serious outbreak of violence since the 1997 elections that ended
the civil war. Fighters from the rebel Liberians United for Reconciliation and De-
mocracy (LURD) continue to launch hit-and-run attacks moving steadily towards
the capital Monrovia. Both Liberian government forces and LURD are responsible
for committing war crimes and other serious human rights abuses against civilians,
including summary executions of civilians, rape of girls and women, abduction, and
looting and burning of villages. Tens of thousands of Liberians have been forced to
flee their homes. This incursion sparked the fifth serious outbreak of violence since
the national elections of 1997 that ended a seven-year civil war.
In the face of renewed rebel action, the government of Charles Taylor has become
increasingly intolerant of dissent. Since imposing a state of emergency on February
8, 2002, the government has intensified its harassment of civil society groups and
the independent media. The government is also remilitarizing the society by remobi-
lizing ex-combatants and allowing the proliferation of militia groups. The security
forces regularly commit abuses with impunity.
The spreading conflict in Liberia presents an ominous prospect. The lack of re-
spect for the rule of law and human rights by the Taylor government makes pros-
pects for sustainable peace in Liberia unlikely. A further escalation in repression
and human rights abuses against civilians can be expected as the area of fighting
widens, causing more suffering and displacement in Liberia.
Moreover, the renewal of war in Liberia threatens to further undermine prospects
for sustainable peace in the wider region, known as the Mano River Union, encom-
passing Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. Over the past decade, the governments
of these three countries have frequently harbored each others rebel groups and sup-
ported cross-border incursions, causing widespread instability. Charles Taylor, both
as leader of the former rebel group known as the National Patriotic Front of Liberia
(NPFL) and as president of Liberia since 1997, bears primary responsibility for
much of the long-standing aggression and violence in the sub-region, both in Liberia
and in particular through his support for the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in
Sierra Leone. The renewed war in Liberia could easily destabilize the fragile peace
in Sierra Leone as a result of a spillover of the Liberian war, as growing numbers
of Liberian refugees and combatants cross into neighboring countries. At this time,
the government of Guinea is also playing a destabilizing role in providing consider-
able logistical and some military support to the LURD rebels that operate from
Guinea. Guineas support to the LURD intensified after the Liberian government,
assisted by Sierra Leonean rebel fighters and Guinean dissidents, launched a series
of cross-border attacks into Guinea in late 2000 and early 2001.
The escalating conflict and repression in Liberia, and the possibility of a spillover
into neighboring countries, is a dire prospect indeed for the people of a region that
has already endured so much war, wanton abuse and human suffering over more
than a decade.
23
EXECUTIVE CONTROL, LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY, AND PERSONAL ENRICHMENT
Since taking office, President Taylor has steadily consolidated and centralized
power by rewarding loyalists and intimidating critics. One of President Taylors
often repeated statements is that Liberia is a country of laws, not of men. However,
an examination of his record illustrates the opposite. Political appointees are se-
lected on the basis of their loyalty to Charles Taylor. Ruling party officials are able
to behave with impunity as long as they are compliant to the executive. In addition
to loyalists from the war, Taylor has appointed numerous family members to key
government positions.
State power is regularly misused by high-ranking officials to further the political
objectives of the executive branch, to avoid accountability, and for personal enrich-
ment. State institutions that could provide an independent check on the Taylor ad-
ministration, such as the judiciary, the legislature, the human rights commission,
and the commission on reconciliation, remain weak and cowed. In particular, the
National Human Rights Commission, created by the government in 1997, suffers
from a lack of qualified personnel, inadequate funding and a flawed mandate. Inde-
pendent voices in the media and the human rights community are steadily being
silenced.
President Taylor has used state power to personally enrich himself and his inner
circle, and to support the state security apparatus that protects him. A Strategic
Commodities Act reportedly passed secretly in 2000 gave President Taylor the sole
power to execute, negotiate and conclude all commercial contracts or agreements
with any foreign or domestic investor for designated commodities, including timber
and diamonds.
Despite being subject to a United Nations (U.N.) arms embargo continuously since
1992, the Taylor government continues to procure weapons. In some cases, the
weapons were forwarded to RUF rebels in Sierra Leone, breaking a second embargo.
U.N. investigators have documented a network of arms brokers and transport com-
panies that provided false documents and relied on lax controls in Slovakia,
Moldova, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan to arrange illegal weapons purchases. In 1999
and 2000, respectively, Burkina Faso and Cote dIvoire knowingly provided false
cover for arms shipments destined to Liberia. The illicit flow of arms to Liberia con-
tinues. Evidence strongly suggests that a plane that crashed outside Monrovia in
February 2002 carried an illegal military cargo for the Taylor government. The
flight was one of three suspicious flights from Chad, using planes fraudulently reg-
istered in Moldova and filing false flight plans. U.N. investigators were blocked from
investigating the crash.
Liberias illicit arms purchases are often financed through off-budget spending, or
payments not accounted for in the budget. For example, income received by the
United States-based Liberian International Shipping and Corporate Registry
(LISCR) was twice used to pay for Liberias arms purchases. After LISCR refused
to engage in the practice, as of August 2000, other off-budget outlays of maritime
funds were utilized. U.N. investigations also established that in 1999 a timber com-
pany paid for an illegal arms shipment. In an important and welcome move, the
U.N. Security Council recently ordered Liberia to audit its shipping and timber rev-
enue to ensure that the funds are no longer misused.
THE STATE SECURITY APPARATUS: AN IMPEDIMENT TO PEACE
One of the major problems in Liberia under President Taylor is the complete im-
punity with which his security and police forces operate. Following his inauguration,
President Taylor rejected the peace accord provision that provided for an open and
transparent restructuring of the security forces by the West African peacekeeping
force. Instead, former Taylor faction fighters were placed in the security and police
forces without serious efforts to provide training or to meet pledges to incorporate
members from the other factions. Former Taylor fighters have also been permitted
by the government to create security firms for hire by private sector companies.
One of the most important steps for Liberias reconstruction after the seven-year-
long civil war ended in 1997 was to have been the restructuring and retraining of
the countrys armed forces and law enforcement agencies. The existing Armed
Forces of Liberia (AFL) had a long history of abusing human rights both before and
during the civil war, and there were thousands of excombatants from all sides in
the war to be demobilized and reintegrated into society.1 Under the Abuja Peace Ac-
1 The six factions of the seven-year civil war in Liberia were: the National Patriotic Front of
Liberia (NPFL) headed by Charles Taylor; the former government Armed Forces of Liberia
(AFL); two rival factions of the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO),
Continued
24
cords that signaled the end of the conflict, the restructuring was to have been con-
ducted by the Nigerian-led West African peacekeeping force ECOMOG (the Eco-
nomic Community of West African States Monitoring Group), and the newly recon-
stituted Liberian armed forces and police were to be drawn from all the disbanded
factions.
However, one of President Taylors first policy decisions was to refuse to allow
ECOMOG to be involved in this process. Instead, he reconstituted the security and
police forces using his own ex-combatants, purged and marginalized troops from the
existing AFL that had opposed him during the war, and created new security forces
that reported directly to him. Liberians began to have problems with the new secu-
rity and police forces almost immediately.
Shortly after his inauguration in 1997, President Taylor created two elite para-
military security forces, the Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU) and the Special Security
Service (SSS); these units report directly to Taylor and commit abuses with impu-
nity. Neither of these forces is established by law, nor are their operational costs
included in the state budget. There is no effective mechanism for victims of abuse
by these forces to lodge a complaint with any government structure and obtain re-
dress. Both forces have become notorious for abuses, including abuse of civilians, ex-
tortion, and looting. There have also been reports of extrajudicial killings and tor-
ture by the ATU, particularly at its base at Gbatala. Victims of torture by the ATU
have been held in water-filled holes in the ground, burned with molten plastic, beat-
en and sexually abused, and forced to drink urine and eat cigarette butts. Addition-
ally, within the Liberian National Police, headed by Paul Mulbah, an elite Special
Operations Division (SOD) was created after Taylor came into office, made up large-
ly of former Taylor-faction fighters; this police unit has also been responsible for ar-
bitrary arrests, mistreatment, and extortion.
The Ministry of Defense, headed by Daniel Chea, oversees the now marginalized
AFL, but also appears to have some measure of control over militia groups. Al-
though it has had some new recruits, the AFL still includes many soldiers who
served under the government of former president Samuel Doe (1980-1989), perhaps
to secure their loyalty to the Taylor government. For that reason, the AFL is not
fully trusted by the government, and its soldiers are neither well equipped nor regu-
larly paid. Even so, the AFL remains the largest government fighting force, and the
Taylor government has sent a large number of AFL troops to oppose the rebel incur-
sion. These soldiers are effectively given free rein to pay themselves through looting.
Since the LURD incursion began, new militia groups have been proliferating,
whose numbers, structures, and leaders remain unclear. Both the AFL command
and Ministry of Defense officials told Human Rights Watch that the Taylor govern-
ments frontline troops are drawn not only from the AFL but increasingly include
militia groups largely made up of remobilized men who fought with Charles Taylors
NPFL during the civil war. Hundreds of former combatants, many of them origi-
nally recruited as children, are being regrouped, organized, and supported by Tay-
lors former commanders. The militia groups are also believed to include former
members of Sierra Leones RUF rebel group, many of whom crossed into Liberia
during and after the disarmament process in Sierra Leone.
The various security agencies and militia groups have extensive powers, poorly
defined mandates, and overlapping functions. This situation has resulted in a jock-
eying for power between the various groups and a complete lack of accountability.
The state security apparatus as it exists today in Liberia undermines any possibility
of respect for human rights and the consolidation of peace in Liberia.
WAR CRIMES AND SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY THE STATE SECURITY FORCES
In combating the LURD incursion, Liberian government forces and militias have
committed widespread abuses against civilians, particularly in Lofa and Cape
Mount counties in the countrys northwest. These forces include the AFL, ATU, and
various militia groups. The abuses usually follow a similar pattern. After driving
LURD forces from an area, government forces hunt down and detain local people
whom they find hiding in the bush, including civilians. Those they suspect of sup-
porting the LURD are then beaten, tortured, or summarily executed, in some cases
by being confined in houses that the soldiers set on fire, burning the victims to
death. Young women and girls are often raped and forced to become wives to the
soldiers; young men are subjected to forced labor, being made to carry looted goods
and captured weapons; and villages are systematically razed to the ground. Govern-
one led by Al-Haji Kromah representing ethnic Mandingo interests, and the other headed by
Roosevelt Johnson representing ethnic Krabn interests; the Liberia Peace Council (LPC); and
the Lofa Defence Force (LDF).
25
ment forces violently round up civilians fleeing from the fighting, and separate and
conscript young men in a manner which violates human rights. Sometimes those
conscripted include boys. The conscripts are then sent to the front, often without
any proper training. In February 2002, after President Taylor accused people in cer-
tain areas of Monrovia of harboring rebels, the Special Operations Division (SOD)
police conducted house-to-house searches, systematically rounding up men. Hun-
dreds of young men, and in a few cases boys, were arbitrarily detained, beaten, and
accused of being rebel supporters. Many were given the choice of paying a bribe or
being sent to the war front. Some who could not pay were forcibly recruited.
Government soldiers and militias have also been responsible for widespread
looting, both in towns and villages that they occupied and at checkpoints on the
roads. Local residents are often forced to carry looted belongings and captured weap-
ons long distances by the army. As civilians flee conflict areas, they are repeatedly
made to pay government soldiers in order to pass through checkpoints to safety, and
in order to cross the border into Sierra Leone.
CRACKDOWN AGAINST THE INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPS
In the face of renewed rebel action, the Taylor government has become increas-
ingly intolerant of dissent. Since the imposition of a state of emergency in February
2002, the government has intensified its harassment and intimidation of the inde-
pendent press, civil society groups, and legitimate political opposition groups who
have been imprisoned, harassed, beaten and in a few cases, killed.
Journalists Stanley Seekor, J. James, and Ellis Togba from The Analyst news-
paper were threatened and briefly detained after their newspaper published an
article discussing the state of emergency.
The authorities also detained Frances Johnson Morris, director of Liberias
Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, for several hours among male inmates
at the police prison at the Police Headquarters in Monrovia ostensibly on
grounds of mistaken identity only days after she had made a public presen-
tation questioning the state of emergency.
On March 27, Nipla Wiaplah, chair of the New Deal Movement party, was held
for several days in police custody without charge as police determined whether
an article in The News that he had authored on the war posed a national secu-
rity threat. The News editor-in-chief Jerome Dalieh and acting news editor Bill
Jarkloh were also held briefly without charge for publishing the article.
After the National Human Rights Center of Liberia, an umbrella organization
comprising nine nongovernmental human rights groups, issued several press re-
leases protesting government abuses, five of its membersAloysius Toe, Tunny
Zeogar, Peter Nickoson, John Okai, and Sam Nimelywere arrested on March
28 and held without charge for several days. Although they were released after
a court order was filed, they were rearrested shortly after, and charged with
criminal malevolence and preventing arrest and discharge of other duties.
Augustine Toe of the Justice and Peace Commission was arrested on March 28
and held without charge for several hours.
On April 24, human rights lawyer Tiawan Gongloe was arrested without charge
by the police, and beaten so severely that he was unable to stand and required
hospitalization. He had been speaking out against security force abuses and
other human rights violations. The Analyst newspaper, which had just reported
on a statement recently made by Gongloe at a conference on peace in the Mano
River Union, was ordered closed.
Disturbingly, the conflict also has taken on an ethnic dimension, with the Taylor
government indiscriminately accusing ethnic Mandingo, Krahn, and Gbandi citizens
of Liberia of supporting the rebel incursion. Members of these groups, as a result,
face growing discrimination, arbitrary arrests, and violence at the hands of the gov-
ernment and its supporters, based on their ethnicity. Many LURD fighters are eth-
nic Mandingo or Krahn. As a result, other ethnic Mandingos and Krahns, as well
as ethnic Gbandis, are clearly considered suspect by the government and have been
accused of being rebel supporters. For their part, LURD forces have committed some
of their worst abuses against ethnic Kissi civilians, perhaps because the RUF rebel
group in Sierra Leone, which had a longstanding alliance with the Taylor govern-
ment, formerly had its stronghold in an ethnic Kissi area in Sierra Leone.
PROSPECTS FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN THE MANO RIVER UNION
Prospects for sustainable peace in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea remain ten-
uous as the intertwined conflicts continue to spill over the borders, offsetting gains
that are made in each country to restore calm. As Sierra Leones brutal conflict
26
comes to an end, violence and insecurity are rapidly escalating in Liberia. At this
time, Guinea is playing a destabilizing role in providing support to the Liberian
rebels.
The conflicts of the Mano River Union countries, encompassing Sierra Leone, Li-
beria and Guinea, have shown a ready potential to overflow and destabilize each
other. A long-standing web of shifting military and political alliances exists among
the three governments and the various armed opposition groups. Accountability for
serious abuses is practically nonexistent, and military impunity in all three coun-
tries remains a serious problem. The area is also awash with hundreds of ex-com-
batants willing to cross over to any side as mercenaries.
THE LIBERIAN CONFLICT AND THE IMPACT ON SIERRA LEONE
For years, Charles Taylor helped fuel the Sierra Leonean conflict through his
arming and support of the RUF rebels, as well as facilitation of illegal diamond ex-
ports from rebel-controlled areas. In return, when Taylors government came under
armed attack from Liberian dissidents in 1999, 2000 and 2001, RUF forces assisted
in expelling them from Liberia.
The escalating conflict and growing lawlessness in Liberia has the potential to up-
turn the fragile peace in Sierra Leone. Fighters from all sides are moving across
the Sierra Leonean/Liberia border: Hundreds of Sierra Leonean ex-combatants are
crossing into Liberia to fight as mercenaries. Liberian government troops and LURD
rebel soldiers are crossing into Sierra Leone to loot or escape fighting, and, in a few
cases, to abduct people for forced labor. Liberian army deserters are also to be found
on the Sierra Leone side of the border, where they could present an additional secu-
rity threat. LURD forces operating from Sierra Leone are clandestinely recruiting
and operating a supply line along the border. There appears to be no consistent pol-
icy on the part of either the Sierra Leonean government or the UNAMSIL peace-
keepers on how to address this problem.
In view of the close links between the Guinean government and the LURD rebel
forces in Liberia, the participation of Guinean troops in UNAMSIL should also give
cause for concern. The Guinea contingent of UNAMSIL is currently deployed at the
Sierra Leone/Liberia border, raising fears that this area too could become a base of
operations for the LURD. At a minimum, these Guinea battalions removed from the
border where the likelihood of their involvement in Liberian rebel support or ref-
ugee intimidation is higher. Ideally, they should be replaced completely.
There is an urgent need for border security to be strengthened, including screen-
ing to ensure that combatants are clearly distinguished and separated from civilians
seeking refugee protection in Sierra Leone. The Sierra Leonean government needs
to establish an adequate police presence along the border areas, and to establish a
status determination body to screen combatants from refugees. Additionally, there
is a need for improved policing to ensure that refugees are adequately protected and
to guarantee the civilian nature of all refugee camps. The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees should ensure as a priority the civilian nature of the ref-
ugee camps, increase the number of international protection staff, and work closely
with neighboring host governments to establish screening mechanisms at the border
to separate Liberian combatants from refugees.
THE ROLE OF GUINEA IN DESTABILIZING LIBERIA
At this time, the government of Guinea is playing a destabilizing role in providing

considerable logistical and some military support to the Liberian rebels that operate
from Guinea. Evidence indicates that this support is being given with the knowledge
and support of high-ranking Guinean officials, including the president.
Domestically, President Lansana Conte remains largely intolerant of opposition
and turns a blind eye to frequent abuses by his security forces. A November 2001
constitutional referendum that removed a two-term limit on the presidency, and vir-
tually ensures him of lifetime rule, is widely believed to have been manipulated in
his favor.
Guineas support to the LURD intensified after the Liberian government, assisted
by Sierra Leonean rebel fighters and Guinean dissidents, launched a series of cross-
border attacks into Guinea in late 2000 and early 2001. They attacked towns and
refugees camps containing Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees, causing thousands
to become further displaced and killing and wounding hundreds of refugees and
Guinean civilians. These Liberian-led incursions into Guinea were opposed by Guin-
ean government forces, backed by members of Sierra Leonean civil defense force mi-
litias and Guinea-based LURD fighters. They pushed back the Liberian and RUF
forces, and the Guinean army also carried out helicopter, artillery and ground at-
27
tacks into RUF-held areas of northern Sierra Leone, killing scores of civilians and
burning villages.
In view of the close links between the Guinean government and the LURD rebel
forces in Liberia, the participation of Guinean troops in the U.N. peacekeeping mis-
sion in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL, should give cause for concern. The Guinean contin-
gent of UNAMSIL is currently deployed in Sierra Leones Pujehun District, which
borders Liberia, raising fears that this area too could become a base of operations
for the LURD, enabling them to strike into Liberia from two directions. The Guin-
ean forces in the UNAMSIL operation in Sierra Leone should be replaced with non-
West African troops that are not implicated in the sub-regional conflict. At a min-
imum, the Guinea battalions should be removed from Pujehun District, and not be
deployed near the Sierra Leone/Liberia border where the likelihood of their involve-
ment in Liberian rebel support and/or refugee intimidation is higher.
THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
With Liberia again on the brink of collapse, it is vital that the international com-
munity make a much more concerted effort to prevent the war spreading and the
emergence of yet another human rights catastrophe in West Africa. The developing
crisis in Liberia, if unchecked and unresolved, threatens to erode the fragile peace
and stability so painstakingly established in Sierra Leone, and may likely desta-
bilize Guinea and the wider region.
During the past decade, the international communitys interventions in Liberia,
largely under the auspices of the U.N. and ECOWAS, have repeatedly focused on
restoring a short-term peace, without adequately addressing the long-term causes
of the war, including continuing impunity for gross human rights abuses and bla-
tant disregard for the rule of law in Liberia.
Examples abound, including the following: During the pre-1997 civil war,
ECOMOG forces in Liberia actively contributed to the proliferation of the anti-Tay-
lor rebel factions that were themselves responsible for serious abuses and are resur-
facing today, including among the LURD combatants; the U.N. presence in Liberia
during the war was limited to a small observer mission without adequate authority
to address regional political interference or abuses by ECOMOG or by Liberian gov-
ernment or rebel forces; the U.N. backed a peace accord that granted a blanket am-
nesty to faction fighters and did not create any international mechanism to hold vio-
lators accountable; fearful of a return to active fighting, the U.N. rushed to hold the
1997 national elections before important provisions of the peace accord were imple-
mented, including the restructuring of the security forces and the return of refugees;
since the 1997 election, the U.N. Peace-Building Support Office in Liberia (UNOL)
has remained silent on the continued erosion of the rule of law by the Taylor gov-
ernment.
International engagement and action is urgently required and should address
both the Taylor governments abusive security apparatus and domestic repression,
as well as the regional nature of the conflict. The international community must en-
gage in comprehensive efforts to establish conditions for a sustainable peace and the
protection of human rights in all three countries in the Mano River Union. All the
Mano River Union governments should be called on to: (1) End cross-border attacks
and illicit weapons flows; (2) Cease support for armed rebel activity; (3) Respect the
rule of law and human rights; (4) Prevent and punish war crimes and other human
rights abuses; and to (5) Create state institutions that are transparent and account-
able, particularly the state security apparatus.
U.S. POLICY
For the past few years, United States (U.S.) pressure on the Liberian government
to address human rights abuses has commendably been strong and consistent. Rela-
tions between the U.S. and Liberia deteriorated as President Taylors role in fueling
the war in Sierra Leone became more evident. In accordance with the U.N. sanc-
tions imposed in May 2001, the U.S. prohibited the importation of Liberian rough
diamonds. The Bush administration continued the Clinton policy of isolating Taylor
politically and diplomatically, although less publicly. Administration officials have
stressed that until Taylor ceases efforts to destabilize the sub-region, U.S. policy will
remain unchanged.
Other initiatives that are in the right direction include U.S. support for regional
security and peace-keeping efforts. In 2000, a program called Operation Focus Relief
(OFR) was initiated by former President Bill Clinton to train and equip seven bat-
talions of West African troops for peacekeeping with the U.N. in Sierra Leone. The
training was conducted by U.S. Special Forces. The first phase of the program
trained two Nigerian battalions that were deployed in January 2001 to serve with
28
UNAMSIL. The second phase, which ended in August, trained troops from Ghana
and Senegal. The third phase, involved three further Nigerian battalions. For FY
2001, OFR was budgeted at U.S. $24 million in peacekeeping funds, as well as U.S.
$32 million in Department of Defense funds for equipment and transportation. The
U.S. also deployed three military officers to work with the Sierra Leone army as
part of the British training program. These officers, as well as other U.S. Embassy
officials, had some responsibility for monitoring the performance of the U.S.-trained
troops. In addition, for fiscal year 2002, Congress approved U.S. $26 million for the
West African Stabilization Program, part of the U.S.s voluntary peacekeeping oper-
ations budget, which includes $8 million in additional training and equipment for
the troops trained for peacekeeping in Sierra Leone, known as Operation Focus Re-
lief.
Additionally, the U.S. has played a constructive role in bringing peace to Sierra
Leone by concentrating its efforts on ending Liberian government support for the
RUF, supporting the British-led military actions in Sierra Leone, and providing hu-
manitarian assistance. The pledge of U.S. $15 million over three years to the pro-
posed Special Court for Sierra Leone was the largest of any contributing nation.
However, there are three aspects to U.S. policy with regard to Liberia and the
sub-region that could contribute towards the rule of law and respect for human
rights:
U.S. assistance and support to Liberias beleaguered civil society community
could be stronger. Greater efforts should be made to provide independent jour-
nalists, human rights activists, and other civil society groups with assistance
and support for their important work;
The U.S. has remained silent on human rights abuses and war crimes being
committed by the LURD rebel forces. International condemnation could pres-
sure the LURD to address abuses against civilians by their fighters.
The U.S. has been much less consistent or vocal about condemning Guineas
flagging human rights record and its destabilization of Liberia. The U.S. now
has an important role to play vis-a-vis Guineas support for the LURD. The U.S.
is beginning a long-delayed training program of U.S. $3 million for the Guinean
military, focusing on securing border security to assist that country in defending
against the destabilizing activities of the RUF and Charles Taylor in Liberia.
In June 2001, the Bush administration notified Congress of its intention to pro-
vide U.S. $3 million in non-lethal training and equipment to the Guinean mili-
tary to assist that country in defending against the destabilizing activities of
the RUF and Charles Taylor in Liberia. Congressional concerns about abuses
by the Guinean military led to additional reporting and monitoring require-
ments. The training is designed in four six-week segments for four companies,
but will pause after the first two to conduct an impact assessment, which will
include monitoring of the troops behavior once they are deployed on the border,
as well as a human rights assessment. All U.S. military assistance to Guinea
should be conditioned on an end to Guinean support for the LURD rebels.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Human Rights Watch urges the U.S. government to bring consistent pressure
on all the Mano River Union countries to: (1) End cross-border attacks and illicit
weapons flows; (2) Cease support for armed rebel activity; (3) Respect the rule of
law and human rights; (4) Prevent and punish war crimes and other human rights
abuses; and to (5) Create state institutions that are transparent and accountable,
particularly the state security apparatus.
Continue to sustain attention on institution building that promotes respect for
the rule of law and human rights, including the Special Court in Sierra Leone that
can examine crimes committed by Liberian nationals in the context of the Sierra
Leonean civil war.
Put pressure on the LUTRD rebels to cease committing human rights abuses
and war crimes against civilians.
Provide greater support to civil society groups and the independent media in
the Mano River Union.
Condition all U.S. military assistance to Guinea, scheduled to begin in May
2002, on an end to Guinean support for the LURD rebels.
Continue to call for the maintaining and strengthening of existing U.N.-man-
dated controls on the flow of weapons that could destabilize the sub-region, and to
establish the mechanisms necessary to break the cycle of impunity. Illicit weapons
flows into the sub-region should continue to be monitored, and Guineas role in the
Liberian conflict should be investigated and ended. The U.S. should call for the U.N.
to mandate the placement of international military observers and human rights
29
monitors along the Guinea/Liberia and Sierra Leone/Liberia borders to monitor and
investigate cross-border attacks.
Advocate for the replacement of the Guinean forces in the UNAMSIL operation
in Sierra Leone with non-West African troops that are not implicated in the sub-
regional conflict. At a minimum, the Guinea battalions should not be deployed near
the Sierra Leone/Liberia border where the likelihood of their involvement in Libe-
rian rebel support and/or refugee intimidation is higher. Work to secure and get
commitments for the deployment of an adequate number of troops along the Sierra
Leone/Liberia border to prevent cross-border attacks.
Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you for that helpful testimony. We

now turn to Ms. Anderson.
STATEMENT OF MS. RORY E. ANDERSON, AFRICA POLICY
SPECIALIST, WORLD VISION U.S., WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. ANDERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to
present testimony before the subcommittee on U.S. policy options
in Liberia. Again, World Vision is in 95 different countries, and we
have been an active relief agency in Liberia for the past 15 years.
I visited Liberia and Sierra Leone less than a year ago and trav-
eled extensively throughout each country, and much of what I will
discuss today are things I have actually witnessed myself.
As an active relief agency on the ground in Liberia, we at World
Vision see that there are direct and immediate linkages between
humanitarian crises involving large-scale population displacement
and economic collapse to political and regional instability. Fear of
violence is the most common reason why people flee their homes
to seek safety elsewhere. In a region that has seen sustained vio-
lence and instability, the rise of human displacement in Liberia re-
inforces cycles of volatility.
As of the first week of June 2000, current figures on accessible,
internally displaced persons in Liberia have reached over 176,000
people. Refugee statistics are less definitive, largely due to border
insecurity in both Guinea and Sierra Leone, but the recent and
rough estimates I have heard is that as of January of this year
there have been about 35,000 refugees which have flown to neigh-
boring countries, and in 2001 there were over 80,000 refugees, so
with the increased fighting we can imagine that there are even
greater than 35,000 refugees, along with the 80,000 that already
existed, and women and dependent children generally comprise
more than 80 percent of refugees and displaced persons.
The United Nations has said that in humanitarian disasters they
bear a disproportionate share of the suffering. Refugee women
must provide for their children in an atmosphere in which their se-
curity is threatened, and the likelihood of sexual violence is in-
creased.
The violence between government forcesthat is, the Govern-
ment of Liberia and rebel insurgents, again known as the Liberians
United for Reconciliation and Democracy, or the LURD, as was re-
ferred to earlier, has been the chief cause for the current Liberian
displacement. Population displacement of this magnitude creates
instability in the following three ways. First, it creates economic
collapse, and in an agrarian society such as Liberia, removal from
entitled land creates unemployment. That is, farmers who once cul-
tivated their own land now have no land to farm, as well as a seri-
ous food security crisis. Farmers can no longer produce food and
30
they have no gainful employment to purchase food. The production

of rice, the main staple in Liberia, has been estimated by the U.N.
Food and Agricultural Organization to meet only a third of the
countrys requirements right now.
The second cause for instability is that host communities and
displaced people compete and sometimes conflict over scarce re-
sources. Host communities that are already on the economic mar-
gins now have to compete with a large influx of outsiders. Again,
earlier, as I stated, there are over 176,000 internally displaced
within Liberia alone, so you have a large influx of outsiders
throughout the country who also need access to scarce resources of
land, health care, and education.
Tensions can be further exacerbated between host communities
and displaced populations when ethnic or political differences en-
gender conflict. With lack of adequate aid, stable communities can
quickly become part of a conflict and instability as well as a swell-
ing population competes for limited resources. Environmental de-
struction also occurs as a result of the concentrated population in
search of firewood and construction material.
A third cause for instability with large population displacement
is that combatants often infiltrate camps. The majority of displaced
persons live in camps, which should provide adequate levels of
food, shelter, health care, and protection. However, camps can be-
come another source of instability, because they often become ha-
vens for armed groups who can easily hide weapons and infiltrate
camps to receive food and medical care. The presence of combat-
ants make noncombatants targets for attacks by warring parties
outside of the camp, and their presence inside the camps also in-
creases the rate of sexual violence and forced conscription, particu-
larly of child soldiers.
The humanitarian crisis in Liberia is currently unfolding in a
cycle of violence, local economic collapse, and large displacements
of the population, as I have just described. These are symptoms of
the following six regional trends within the Mano River Union
itself, the first being displaced, unemployed, and mostly illiterate
youth are vulnerable to military recruitment both by state and
non-state actors throughout the region. These child soldiers often
become the most brutal perpetrators of violent acts, as we saw with
the RUF in Sierra Leone.
A second regional trend is that we are seeing the illegal mis-
management of natural resources, especially of diamonds and tim-
ber, which draws largely upon unemployed adult populations where
there is an absence of viable economies, or credible industries, or
viable civil service.
The third point for regional trends is, we are seeing a militariza-
tion of formerly noncombatant communities as they compete over
scarce resources. This makes them pawns for political actors ready
to capitalize on ethnic or regional differences and further widens
regional violence.
The fourth regional trend is that the trafficking of small arms in
an unstable environment becomes a guaranteed source of power
and income through banditry and further exploitation and traf-
ficking of conflict diamonds, conflict timber, and other resources.
31
A fifth regional trend that, as reflected in the rise, and in the

number and the degree of brutal acts of torture, rape, harassment,
and executions perpetrated against civilians, especially women and
children, and all of this foments instability and sews the seeds for
social discord and social and economic collapse.
Finally, a sixth regional trend that we are seeing within the
whole Mano River Union is that there is a deterioration of basic
infrastructure and services due to perpetual cycles of instability
and violence, and this makes resettlement of displaced populations
and the restoration of economic activity like trade in agriculture
very difficult. U.N. agencies such as the U.N. High Commission for
Refugees and the World Food Program are exhausting all of their
resources, and they cannot stretch their resources any further.
Now, despite the expansion of a regional humanitarian crisis and
all of these regional trends that I have just laid out in the Mano
River Union, U.S. humanitarian assistance to Liberia has actually
declined by 82 percent in just the past 5 years. In 1998, total U.S.
Government assistance to Liberia, including food aid, was $37.7
million. It has now decreased to $6.5 million in fiscal year 2002.
This drastic decline in humanitarian assistance demonstrates
two unfortunate trends, the first being that humanitarian assist-
ance in the Mano River Union is a zero-sum game, which means
that there are only winners and losers. We take from Liberia and
give to Sierra Leone, rather than having a balanced, regional ap-
proach to humanitarian assistance, and second, policymakers in
the United States and elsewhere have incorrectly politicized hu-
manitarian assistance to Liberia.
Instead, it is better to separate our humanitarian assistance
goals from our political strategy in dealing with Charles Taylor. As
the chairman just referred to, pressuring Taylor alone is not the
only policy that we need to have, but we need to separate our two
policies and be very clear about that. Humanitarian assistance, es-
pecially when it is channeled through the local international relief
agencies has proven to be a strong tool for building a strong civil
society that can democratically challenge the political establish-
ment, while rebuilding societies and economies damaged by war.
This is not a quick fix. These types of investments are long- and
medium-term, with long-term payoffs. Starving an already volatile
region or unevenly distributing aid, and again, that is investing in
Sierra Leone and not in Liberia or Guinea, simply creates a merry-
go-round of violence and displacement, shifting war from one coun-
try to the next.
Mr. Chairman, in offering concluding observations and rec-
ommendations, World Vision sees that increased violence between
the Government of Liberia and the LURD has caused severe dis-
placement in Liberia and could eventually disrupt the fragile peace
in Sierra Leone as displaced Liberians seek asylum there. Sierra
Leone itself has recently emerged from an 11-year conflict, and an
influx of Liberian refugees, as well as combatants competing for re-
sources, has the potential of widening the Liberian conflict and
sending Sierra Leone back into war. We do know that more war
in the Mano River Union is not going to resolve the existing war.
I would give, again, two recommendations, again a unified and
serious diplomatic initiative, especially led by the United States
32
and the United Kingdom, and also involving the French, as they
have significant influence with Guinea. All of these allies have al-
ready demonstrated effective diplomatic leadership in Sierra Leone,
and they should continue by initiating some sort of mechanism to
channel whatever compromises Charles Taylor and other combat-
ants may be willing to make into a process that is much more con-
structive than conflict.
Second, humanitarian assistance to the region should also in-
crease to diffuse the potential for conflict within communities and
among the Mano River Union nations.
Over the past 2 years, World Vision and other agencies have
seen an increase in aid to Sierra Leone, but there has been a rapid
decrease in aid to Liberia, which ultimately undermines the total
U.S. Government investment in the region. Again, the total U.S.
Government assistance to Liberia went from $37 million in 1998 to
$612 million in fiscal year 2002 and again, that was an 82 percent
decrease in just 5 years. The rapid decline and current restruc-
turing of U.S. Government assistance is forcing World Vision and
other international aid agencies to completely close down oper-
ations and more than likely by the end of the year World Vision
will have to pull out.
Declining humanitarian assistance does not affect political
change, but rather gives incentives for conflict and instability over
scarce resources. Sustained diplomatic leadership, coupled with in-
creased and evenly disbursed humanitarian assistance among all
three of the Mano River Union countries will bring long-term sta-
bility that will eventually give way to indigenous political change
in Liberia, which will provide a peace dividend for the entire Mano
River Union.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to present this
testimony.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Anderson follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF RORY E. ANDERSON, AFRICAN POLICY ADVISOR, WORLD
VISION U.S.
INTRODUCTION
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to present testimony to the Senate
Subcommittee on Africa on the humanitarian situation and U.S. policy options in
Liberia. My name is Rory Anderson, Africa Policy Advisor for World Vision, one of
the largest, privately-funded international relief and development organizations in
the U.S. Currently, World Vision implements more than 6,000 relief, rehabilitation
and long-term development projects in 95 countries, and we have had an active
presence in Liberia for almost 15 years.
I. BACKGROUND
Mano River Region

Since the late 1980s, sustained conflict in the Mano River basin has spread across
borders and engulfed the region, culminating in a severe humanitarian crisis and
sustained political instability. Internal wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the early
1990s led to the exodus of more than one million refugees to Cote dIvoire and Guin-
ea over the course of the decade. In addition to refugees, an estimated one to two
million people in the region have been internally displaced at the height of the var-
ious conflicts. Although Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone formed the Mano River
Union economic pact in 1973, the conflicts of the past decade have severely strained
political and economic relations between the three states. A struggle for control of
diamond fields in Sierra Leone has been central to the crisis in recent years. Several
failed peace accords and peacekeeping efforts, collapsed economies, and some of the
worst human rights atrocities in recent history has made the Mano River crisis one
33
of the worlds most severe humanitarian disasters. Although 2001 brought improved
security to Guinea and Sierra Leone,.an upsurge in fighting in Liberia continues to
threaten the stability of the entire region. The U.N. Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that 1.1 million of the 15 million inhab-
itants of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone continue to be either internally dis-
placed persons (IDPs) or refugees.
Liberia
Civil war in Liberia from 1989 to 1997 led to the collapse of its economy and left
its infrastructure destroyed. Sustained fighting and human rights abuses by war-
ring factions led to the exodus of an estimated 700,000 Liberian refugees to neigh-
boring countries and an estimated 1 million internally displaced persons during the
height of this conflict. In 1997, Charles Taylor was elected president by an ex-
hausted country and with the support of the international community. Initial steps
were taken to rebuild Liberias infrastructure and to resettle refugees. However,
since 1999, the governments of Guinea and Sierra Leone, as well as much of the
international community, have accused Charles Taylor of supporting anti-govern-
ment forces in both Guinea and Sierra Leone and exchanging diamonds for guns.
The Government of Liberia (GOL) has spent from 2001 until the present engaged
in battles of their own with anti-government factions in northern Liberia. This con-
tinued fighting has lead to the internal displacement of thousands of Liberians, and
caused many more to flee to Co te dlvoire, Guinea, and Sierra Leone.
In May 2001, the U.N. Security Council (UNSC), in response to Charles Taylors
involvement with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, main-
tained an arms embargo on Liberia and imposed sanctions on diamond exports and
international travel by GOL officials.
II. A COMPLEX HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCY
Insecurity, Internally Displaced and Refugees

Fighting in Liberia that was once confined to the northwestern county of Lofa,
which borders Guinea and Sierra Leone, has now spread further south to within 25
miles of the capital, Monrovia. Clashes in late November and December between
GOL troops and rebels identified as the Liberians United for Reconciliation and De-
mocracy (LURD) in Grand Cape Mount and Bong counties, caused the displacement
of an estimated 4,000 Liberians. Due to heightened insecurity, World Vision was
forced to withdraw relief assistance from Grand Cape Mount County. On December
20, LURD forces captured the northern Lofa County city of Zorzor.
World Vision, in collaboration with other relief agencies in Liberia currently esti-
mate that over 176,000 persons are internally displaced and have fled their homes
to other parts of Liberia. Since October 1, the movement of internally displaced per-
sons (IDPs) has remained fluid, particularly in and out of the Bopolu and Gemana
camps following the recent outbreak of violence. In late December, relief agencies
were planning on establishing transit centers for IDPs in the towns of Sawmill and
Nyomo in Bomi County. Because public services are non-existent, relief agencies
continue to provide the majority of assistance to lDPs.
The resurgence of fighting over the past year has also created an influx of Libe-
rian refugees into Co te dIvoire, Guinea, and Sierra Leone. The UN High Commis-
sion for Refugees (UNHCR) has registered an estimated 20,000 Liberian refugees
in Sierra Leone and 6,000 in Co te dIvoire since May 2001: 3,400 have fled in this
last week alone. Unconfirmed numbers of Liberian refugees have also arrived in
Guinea throughout 2001, but have yet to be registered. Prior to 2001, UNHCR esti-
mated that 80,000 Liberians were living in Guinea and 120,000 in Co te dIvoire.
UNHCR also estimates there are still 70,000 Sierra Leonean refugees living in Libe-
ria.
III. WORLD VISION IN LIBERIA
Overview
In order to address the human suffering brought by the civil war, World Vision
began the Liberia Emergency Response Program in 1988. The program was based
in Lofa, Bong, Grand Cape Mount and Bomi Counties, but has shifted out of Lofa
and Grand Cape Mount due to increasing political violence between the government
forces and the LURD. Since its inception, World Visions work has had two compo-
nents: (1) Basic healthcare delivery; Maternal/Child Health services, and (2) Agri-
culture rehabilitation of food production capacity. Both components mutually rein-
force each otherwith increased food production capacity, there is a corresponding
improvement in nutrition and health. Likewise, by improving healthcare delivery
systems through the renovation of medical clinics, and providing much needed med-
34
ical supplies and primary health care, a healthier population has the capacity for
food production and expanded economic activity.
Health
World Visions original health objectives were to provide supplies, supervision and
management to 19 health facilities located in Lofa, Grand Cape Mount, and Bomi
counties. With target beneficiaries of 128,500, World Vision catchments provided im-
munizations to 50% of pregnant and lactating women. In addition, we also helped
to:
train certified midwives at clinics and in the bush
monitor weight/age of children under 5
immunize children against childhood diseases (75 percent of children by age 3)
health education on a variety of subjects, including HIV/AIDS
treat major health problems: malaria, diarrhea, acute respiratory infection
We found that in our catchments, most people did not know how malaria or cough
was contracted; 77 percent of women delivered at home, and only 10 percent of chil-
dren were immunized. In addition, 60 percent of households drank unsafe creek or
river water, and 75 percent of households do not have a toilet, multiplying the
transmission of waterborne diseases.
Causes for Scaling Back
Although we have had good success in the past, World Vision has had to signifi-
cantly scale back its health program for two reasons: increased violence and severe
declines in U.S. government funding for health programs. Shortfalls in U.S. govern-
ment funding will force World Vision to completely close our current health program
by Sept 30, 2002.
Agriculture
World Visions agriculture program operated in the areas of Grand Cape Mount
County; CARI, which is most of Bong County; Fumah, which is in parts of Bong
and Margibi Counties; Monserrado, serving pen-urban areas outside of Monrovia;
and parts of Lofa County. The program has had to retreat from two-thirds of that
area due to violent conflict.
WVs agriculture program currently was serving 220 rural farming communities
with improved seed and technology, and 250 communities with gardening inputs
and technology. The major agricultural focus is to get area farmers back on their
feet by producing their own food for their food security, and then helping them to
sell any surplus, focusing on indigenous crops of rice, sweet potato, plantain, ba-
nana, yam, and expanded vegetable gardening. World Visions specific activities in-
cluded:
Distribution of improved seeds and tools;
Technical assistance in organizing farmer groups for (1) agricultural education
and (2) for communal production of improved seeds for distribution to the entire
community;
Developing demonstration farm plots so that farmer groups can test agricul-
tural methods for themselves (For farmers living on the margins, even improved
seeds and techniques constitute a life and death risk with their food security
and overall economic livelihood. Experimental plots give farmers verifiable as-
surances that new seeds and techniques work.);
Promotion of lowland rice production which is the most efficient, and produc-
tive, and damages the ecology the least;
Developing extensive improved seed production facilities and training selected
farmers as apprentices;
Introducing improved species of animals to breed with local stock, since most
animals were eaten by the soldiers during the civil war; and
Introducing appropriate, small-scale agricultural machinery to improve effi-
ciency and the initial processing of agricultural products for better storage, con-
sumption and sale.
Causes for Scaling Back
As with our health program, because of continued violence, WV no longer operates
in Lofa or Grand Cape Mount counties. Additionally, the CARI seed production facil-
ity, which provided seeds for World Visions target groups, was taken over by the
GOL in the Fall of 2001. Declining U.S. government funds will probably force World
Vision to lose its agriculture program by Sept. 30, 2002.
35
IV. HUMANITARIAN CRISIS AND THE LINKS TO POLITICAL AND REGIONAL INSTABILITY
Population Displacement and Instability

There are direct and immediate linkages between humanitarian crises involving
largescale population displacement and economic collapse to political and regional
instability. Fear of violence is the most common reason why people flee their homes
to seek safety elsewhere. In a region that has seen sustained violence and insta-
bility, the rise of human displacement in Liberia reinforces regional cycles of vola-
tility. As of the first week of June 2002, current figures on accessible, internally dis-
placed persons in Liberia have reached over 176,000. As mentioned above, refugee
statistics are less definitive, largely due to border insecurity in both Guinea and Si-
erra Leone, but prior to 2001, there were over 80,000 Liberian refugees; with in-
creased conflict, this number has surely increased. Women and their dependent chil-
dren generally comprise more than 80% of refugees and displaced persons. The UN
has said that, in humanitarian disasters, they bear a disproportionate share of the
suffering. Refugee women must provide for their children in an atmosphere in
which their security is threatened and the likelihood of sexual violence is increased.
Violence between government forces and the LURD has been the chief cause for
Liberian displacement. Population displacement of this level creates instability in
the following ways:
Economic collapse. In an agrarian society such as Liberia, removal from entitled
land creates unemploymentfarmers who once cultivated their own land now
have no land to farmas well as a serious food security crisisfarmers can no
longer produce food, and have no gainful employment to purchase food. The pro-
duction of rice, the main staple in Liberia, has been estimated by the UN Food
and Agriculture Organization to meet only a third of the countrys require-
ments.
Host communities and the displaced compete and sometimes conflict over scarce
resources. Host communities that are already on the economic margins, now
have to compete with a large influx of outsiders who also need access to scarce
resources of land, healthcare, and education. Tensions can be further exacer-
bated between host communities and displaced populations when ethnic or po-
litical differences engender conflict. With lack of adequate aid, stable commu-
nities can quickly become part of conflict and instability as a swelling popu-
lation competes for limited resources. Environmental destruction is also a result
of a concentrated population in search of firewood and construction materials.
Combatants infiltrating camps. The majority of displaced persons live in camps,
which should provide adequate levels of food, shelter, healthcare and education.
However camps can become another source of instability because they often be-
come havens for armed groups, who can easily hide weapons and infiltrate
camps to receive food and medical care. The presence of combatants makes non-
combatants targets for attacks by warring parties outside of the camps, and
their presence increases the rate of sexual violence and forced conscription, es-
pecially of child soldiers. Theoretically, there should be an attempt to separate
combatants from noncombatants as they enter into camps by interviewing per-
sons as they enter. But camp staff are usually out-numbered by the populations
that they are serving, often times by the thousands per every staff worker. Dis-
placed populations may or may not be able to identify combatants within their
midst, but most are all too often worried about their own security and are in-
timidated into remaining silent.
Regional Trends
The humanitarian crisis in Liberia is currently unfolding in a cycle of violence,
local economic collapse, and large displacements of the population. These are symp-
toms of the following 6 regional trends:
1. Displaced, unemployed and mostly illiterate youth are vulnerable to military re-
cruitment by state and non-state actors throughout the region. These child sol-
diers often become the most brutal perpetrators of violent acts.
2. Illegal mismanagement of natural resources, especially of diamonds and timber,
draws on a largely unemployed adult population in the absence of industries,
or a viable civil service.
3. The militarization of formerly non-combatant communities as they compete
over scarce resources, makes them pawns for political actors ready to capitalize
on ethinic or regional differences, further widening regional violence.
4. The trafficking of small arms in an unstable environment becomes a guaran-
teed source of power and income through banditry and further exploitation and
trafficking of conflict diamonds, timber and other resources.
36
4. Increasing disregard for human life by both state and non-state actors, as re-
flected in the rise in the number and the degree of brutal acts of torture, rape,
harassment and executions perpetrated against civiliansespecially women and
childrenfoments instability and sows the seeds for future discord and social
and economic collapse.
5. Deterioration of basic infrastructure and services due to perpetual cycles of in-
stability and violence makes resettlement of displaced populations and the res-
toration of economic activities like trade and agriculture very difficult. UN
agencies such as the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the
World Food Program (WFP) are exhausting their resources and cannot stretch
their resources any further.
V. DECLINING U.S. GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE
Despite the expansion of a regional humanitarian crisis in the MRU, U.S. human-
itarian assistance to Liberia has declined by 82% over the past 5 years.
Since 1998, total U.S. government assistance to Liberia, including food aid, has
declined to the following levels:
FY1998$37,786,000
FY1999$16,049,000
FY2000$17,529,000
FY2001$8,199,000
FY2002$6,519,000
This drastic decline in humanitarian assistance demonstrates unfortunate trends:
(1) humanitarian assistance in the Mano River Union is a zero sum game, which
means that there are only winners and loserswe take from Liberia and give to
Sierra Leone, rather than having a balanced, regional approach to humanitarian as-
sistance. And (2) policy makers in the U.S. have incorrectly politicized humanitarian
assistance to Liberia. Instead, it is better to separate humanitarian assistance from
our political strategy with Charles Taylor. Humanitarian assistance, especially
when it is channeled through local and international relief agencies, has proven to
be an effective tool for building strong civil society actors that can democratically
challenge the political establishment while rebuilding societies and economies dam-
aged by war. These are a long and medium-term investments, with long-term pay-
offs. Starving an already volatile region, or unevenly distributing aidi.e., investing
in Sierra Leone, and not in Liberia or Guinea, simply creates a merry-go-round of
violence and displacement, shifting war from one country to the next.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Increased violence between the GOL and the LURD has caused severe displace-
ment in Liberia and could eventually disrupt the fragile peace in Sierra Leone as
displaced Liberians seek asylum. Sierra Leone itself has recently emerged from an
11 year conflict; an influx of Liberian refugees and possible combatants competing
for resources, has the potential of widening the Liberian conflict and sending Sierra
Leone back into war. More war in the Mano River Union is not going to resolve the
existing war. Unified and serious diplomatic initiatives, especially lead by the U.S.
and the U.K. who have already demonstrated diplomatic leadership in Sierra Leone,
should continue by initiating a mechanism to channel whatever compromises that
Charles Taylor and other combatants may be willing to make into a process that
is more constructive than conflict.
Humanitarian assistance to the region should also increase to diffuse the poten-
tial for conflict within communities and among the MRU nations. Over the past 2
years, World Vision and other agencies have seen an increase in aid to Sierra Leone,
but there has been a rapid decrease in aid to Liberia, which, ultimately, undermines
the total US government investment in the region. Total US government assistance
to Liberia went from $37.7 million in FY 1998 to $6.5 million for FY 2002; an 82%
decrease in just 5 years. The rapid decline and current restructuring of U.S. govern-
ment assistance is forcing World Vision and other international aid agencies to com-
pletely close down operations by the end of this fiscal year. Declining humanitarian
assistance does not affect political change, but, rather, gives incentives for conflict
and instability over scarce public resources.
Sustained diplomatic leadership, coupled with increased and evenly dispersed hu-
manitarian assistance among the 3 countries will bring about long-term stability,
which will eventually give way to indigenous political change in Liberia, which will
provide a peace dividend for the entire Mano River Union.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to present this testimony.
37
Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Ms. Anderson, for your testimony,

particularly in terms of the long-term perspective.
Mr. Sannoh.
STATEMENT OF BENEDICT F. SANNOH, COUNSELLOR,
REAGAN-FASSELL DEMOCRACY FELLOW, NATIONAL ENDOW-
MENT FOR DEMOCRACY, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. SANNOH. Mr. Chairman, members of this committee, I am
pleased to be here this afternoon upon your invitation to share my
views on Liberia as a free state, and I want to thank you for the
invitation.
Mr. Chairman, today Liberia has been described as a failed state.
Some have even referred to it as a rogue state, a state that has dis-
integrated. In 1997, the Liberian people, after a brutal and dev-
astating civil war, went to the polls to elect a government. Presi-
dent Taylor won that election by an overwhelming majority of the
vote, but elections, Mr. Chairman, is not an end in itself but a proc-
ess toward democratization, and this process has been very bumpy
for Liberia.
Notwithstanding the end of the civil war, peace and stability in
Liberia still remains elusive. Crucial elements for democratization
have not been nurtured. The government is at war with the rebel
faction, LURD, and also at war with its own people. A third of the
country is in the state of war, a war that has the propensity of de-
stabilizing the entire Mano River Union region.
Thousands of our people are displaced either internally or exter-
nally as refugees. The brain drain of professionals and capable Li-
berians who otherwise would be in Liberia to contribute to the de-
mocratization process is alarming, so I have come here today to ap-
peal to the U.S. Government to take a leadership role in Liberia.
This is the time we need you, because when you needed us we
stood by your side.
History tells us of the rule of Liberia during the cold war in sup-
port of your own ideological struggle. The Voice of America, VOA,
in Liberia covered the entire continent of Africa. You installed a
communication relay station in Liberia that served as a transit
point for all communications between the State Department in
Washington, DC and U.S. Embassies in sub-Saharan Africa. You
installed the Omega Navigation Station on Liberian soil that picks
up signals from all vessels on the high seas in Africa, and directs
the vessels navigation. You constructed the free Port of Liberia and
the international airport for you to use during the Second World
War.
As a result of all of these efforts, Mr. Chairman, we assisted you
with all of our might, and you won the ideological war. Now that
you have won, you seem to have abandoned us. Today, the United
States is a world leader, and Liberia remains in chaos and insta-
bility. Maybe except for Mr. Taylor and those of his government,
the bulk of the Liberian people are living in abject poverty.
There is no electricity, there is no running water or health care
facilities, inadequate schools, only two universities, and most of the
time these universities are closed. There is massive internal and
external displacement, posing an increasing burden on the sub-
region. If the United States fails to take such a leadership role in
38
Liberia, no other country would, and Liberia risks slipping gradu-

ally into anarchy and chaos.
The question is, Mr. Chairman, why is Liberia slipping into anar-
chy? If Liberia is today characterized as a failed state necessitating
these hearings on Liberia, I would like to say up-front that the di-
lemma has been occasioned by the entirety of circumstances, in-
cluding many factors, the abandonment of Liberia by the United
States, the civil war, the transition from war to elected government
through elections, and the conduct of the constitutionally elected
government of Mr. Taylor himself, since he took control of our
country in 1997.
For the purpose of this hearing and because of the brevity of
time I would like to limit my testimony to three of these areas. The
first is the transition from war to peace, and perhaps what hap-
pened in Sierra Leone is born from the experience of what hap-
pened in Liberia.
A crucial element of the EC, even the political parties, who con-
tribute to the democratization process. The Liberian national tran-
sitional government and the parties to the conflict failed to imple-
ment the restructuring aspect of Abuja and went to the polls, and
the international community knew very well the impact of that fail-
ure on the reconstitution of peace in Liberia.
Now, the conduct of the elected government. President Taylor
upon his inauguration in 1997 was faced with two immediate chal-
lenges. One was how to protect the security of the state, and to
maintain peace and order throughout the length and breadth of Li-
beria, because that responsibility has been had by ECOMOG.
Second, how to foster general reconciliation between and among
the Liberian people in a manner that would induce peace, stability,
and national unification, and I want to submit, Mr. Chairman, that
the manner in which Taylor addresses these two issues is in a way
responsible for the state of affairs in Liberia today.
So I address the issue of peace, or national unification. The gov-
ernment established two commissions, one on human rights and
one on reconciliation and reunification. These commissions remain
mere institutions on paper. They have been dormant, and they
have not really done any effective work. As a result, the Liberian
people still remain at odds on many, many issues.
To address the question of security and the maintenance of peace
throughout the length of Liberia, Taylor immediately after the elec-
tions occasioned the early departure of ECOMOG. He did not se-
cure any agreement for ECOWAS, for ECOMOG to stay so as to
supervise the issue of the problem of security during his regime.
With the departure of ECOMOG, Mr. Chairman, the government
exacerbated the problem when it did not restructure the security
apparatus of the country. Rather, it went on to use the former
rebels of the National Patriotic Party to fill in the ranks of the Li-
berian National Police, and he also went on to create a para-
military force, the ATU, comprising again mostly former fighters in
the NPFL.
Now, compounding these two issues, the issues of security, the
issue of national conciliation, the country suddenly found itself en-
tangled in two other problems, first, the imposition of sanctions by
the international community, and second, the attack by LURD, Li-
39
berians United for Reconciliation and Democracy. Those remain

problems in Liberia today.
We have another issue of good governance, human rights and the
rule of law. The issue of violation of human rights remains a cru-
cial issue. Sometimes in African countries efforts are made with re-
spect to national sovereignty. While individuals do have a sov-
ereignty, the respect for our sovereignty has been incorporated in
many international instruments, human rights documents in which
Liberia is a signatory.
Most of these documents have not been worked out. The increas-
ing violation of human rights are fundamentally practiced in Libe-
ria with impunity, lack of respect for the rule of law, and the lack
of accountability and transparency in government, and increasingly
as evidenced by events over the past 2 weeks, the government
seems to be closing the political space for civil society organizations
and activities, including human rights advocates and the press.
On the issue of U.N. sanctions, there is a prevailing view that
the sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council is primarily di-
rected at President Taylor and his government, and it has indirect
repercussions on the lives of the Liberian people. There has been
a chilling effect on the level of bilateral assistance to Liberia since
the imposition of sanctions.
Many of those who would impose sanctions have been major do-
nors of assistance to Liberia, and they have scaled down their bilat-
eral assistance to Liberia, and that is why when I listened to the
question that was posed to the representative from the State De-
partment as to the level of U.S. involvement toward the civil soci-
ety sector of Liberia so as to ameliorate the effects of sanctions,
those responses do not actually reflect the reality on the ground.
The reality on the ground is that the efforts of assistance from the
U.S. Government to the civil society in Liberia is at a very low
level.
What are the combined impacts of sanctions and LURD on the
democratization process in Liberia? Continued LURD attacks
against the government, coupled with sanctions and the economic
conditions in Liberia, would obviously affect the timetable for gen-
eral Presidential elections and the entire process of democratiza-
tion in Liberia. There are a number of legal constitutional hurdles
that must be overcome if we are going to have elections in Liberia.
This includes the issue of national census.
The government does not have the resources to even conduct a
national census. No national census has been conducted in Liberia
since 1985. The demarcation of constituencies for the voting popu-
lation and the determination of the number of representatives for
the legislature, these issues have not been discussed, the issue of
security and the state of emergency recently declared by the Presi-
dent.
Let me move a little bit to the dilemma of ordinary Liberians. A
couple of questions were raised with respect to this issue. Mr.
Chairman, I would like to submit that the people of Liberia, the
ordinary Liberians are in a dilemma. In 1997, after a bloody and
devastating civil war, we went to the polls to elect a government.
Charles Taylor won the elections. There now seems to be a con-
sensus among most Liberians that the best way to exercise, to
40
move forward is through a democratic process by means of the bal-

lot box and not by violence.
This dilemma is obvious. On the one hand, Liberians have a
President and a government that they are stuck with for the next
18 months, and perhaps even longer, in spite of the questions of
security, national reconciliation, and the lack of resources to ad-
dress the myriad of social and economic problems confronting the
Liberian people today.
On the other hand, Liberians are faced with rebel incursions the
consequences of which have relegated them to internal and exter-
nal displacement, suffering, and deprivation. Still on that front Li-
berians are faced with sanctions and the resultant effect of reduced
bilateral assistance, as a result of which, post conflict reconstruc-
tion and development in Liberia never got off the ground, but in
spite of all of these concerns the international community seems to
forget the view that once sanctions have been imposed on Liberia
because of the alleged conduct of their President, the fate of the Li-
berian public have become irrelevant and immaterial.
This is a very serious problem, Mr. Chairman. It is tough for
one of the committees succinctly put this to me when I tried to talk
to many people here in the states, that the fate of ordinary Libe-
rians is linked to the fate of Charles Taylor. I do not want to be-
lieve that. The isolation of Liberia by the international community
is also not limited to the trivialization of the plight of the Liberian
people who have seen the focus on bringing peace to Sierra Leone.
We see U.S. involvement in Guinea, while Liberia remains a 10-
foot pole that nobody wants to touch. This has the potential of de-
stabilizing the subregion.
On the role of the international community, Mr. Chairman, if Li-
beria is a failed state today, some of the causes emanate from the
actions taken or not taken by the international community at the
appropriate times or periods. For instance, I briefly talk about the
failure to implement the relevant provisions of the Abuja agree-
ment under international supervision.
We are also seeing the failure of the international community to
condemn LURD, to intercede in the Liberian conflict so as to bring
about a lasting cease-fire, while at the same time we are imposing
a ban on the importation of arms by the government to defend
itself and the people of Liberia, which is a constitutional duty im-
posed upon that government.
And second, there is a lack of U.S. interest and leadership role
in Liberia. The insistence on the policy of containment, believing
that with increasing sanctions and international isolation there
would be a change in Liberia has not achieved the desired results.
This policy trivializes the impact of containment on the lives of or-
dinary Liberians, and links the fate of ordinary Liberians to that
of the government.
What recommendations do I have to address some of these
issues? Mr. Chairman, there are some key initiatives that can dra-
matically turn around the turn of events in Liberia and put it on
a path toward democratization and sustained peace.
First, the Government of the United States must not rely solely
on the policy of containment and the increasing isolation of Liberia
as the only avenue toward bringing political change in Liberia.
41
Second, efforts at bringing a durable peace, stability, and secu-

rity to Liberia cannot be left to ECOWAS alone. Growing out of our
experience with ECOWAS intervention during the Liberian civil
war, regional politics, combined with tribal and ethnic affiliations
will continue to have a negative impact on ECOWAS initiatives.
Accordingly, we recommend, Mr. Chairman, that the United States
take a leadership role in Liberia just as the British did in Sierra
Leone, and help evolve a process that will bring Liberia back to-
ward the cause of democratization.
The first step in evolving such a process is to help create an ena-
bling environment in Liberia for security, stability, and sustained
peace. There are several elements in this step. First, the United
States must take a leadership role in creating a contact group, as
suggested by the International Crisis Group and Human Rights
Watch, to supervise the process.
Second, the contact group, once created, should call upon the gov-
ernment and LURD to declare an immediate cease-fire and enter
into a dialog and negotiations with a view on resolving the conflict.
These discussions must also include representations from the polit-
ical leadership of Liberia, including political parties, or leaders of
political parties outside Liberia.
Third, one of the crucial items for discussion in Liberia by this
contact group that we are recommending for the United States to
take a leadership role in its creation is the issue of security. There
will be no lasting peace in Liberia, Mr. Chairman, if the security
apparatus of the government remains intact. Hence, the contact
group must obtain consensus from all parties to deploy an inter-
national force on the ground in Liberia to monitor the cease-fire,
to take over the entire security of the country, to disarm all com-
batants, including the police, the ATU, and all security apparatus.
The composition of the force must again not be limited to ECOWAS
alone, and the emergency imposed by the government must be lift-
ed upon the arrival of the intervention force.
Fourth, the question of governance and the status of democratic
institutions in Liberia between now and the period of general elec-
tions must be discussed. This includes the elections commission,
the judiciary, the prosecutorial arm of government, and the control
over the nations resources and finances.
And fifth, the contact group must visit the question of general
Presidential elections and obtain a consensus on such crucial issues
such as census, representation, number of constituencies, and pro-
vide resources to facilitate the process in Liberia.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, the U.S. Government must strengthen
civil society in Liberia to enable them to make informed and rea-
soned decisions about the democratization process in Liberia. The
level of illiteracy in Liberia is very high. When you combine the
high level of illiteracy and the high level of poverty amidst the war
that is going on, it is very, very possible that youll have elections
producing results that may not reflect the views of the Liberian
people. Crucial areas are support for the press, human rights insti-
tutions, human rights advocates, and pro-democratic organizations.
We recommend support for the strengthening of political parties
and the reactivation of the Human Rights Commission.
42
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we agree with the report of the

State Department, the analysis that Liberia is not likely to change
right now, and without a U.S. leadership role and international in-
volvement the country will slip into chaos and potentially desta-
bilize the subregion, and again, as I said, we disagree with the
analysis of the State Department that there is a good level of sup-
port by the U.S. Government to the civil society at this time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sannoh follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF COUNSELLOR BENEDICT F. SANNOH, REAGAN-FASCELL
DEMOCRACY FELLOW, NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY (NED)
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am pleased to be here this after-
noon upon your invitation to share my views on Liberia as a failed state. Thank
you for the invitation.
My name is Benedict F. Sannoh. I am a Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow at the
National Endowment for Democracy here in Washington, D.C. Prior to that I served
as Executive Director of the Center For Law and Human Rights, a non-profit, non-
governmental human rights and pro-democracy organization operating in Monrovia,
Liberia. I also serve as Assistant Professor of Law, Louis Arthur Grimes School of
Law, University of Liberia. For the past ten years, I have been involved in human
rights, the peace process during the course of the civil war, and the process of de-
mocratization since the 1997 General and Presidential elections.
Mr. Chairman, today Liberia has been described as a failed state. Some have re-
ferred to it even as pariah state, a rogue state or a state that has disintegrated.
In 1997, the Liberian people, after a brutal and devastating civil war went to the
polls to elect a Government. President Charles Taylor won the election by an over-
whelming majority. But elections, Mr. Chairman, is not an end in itself, but a proc-
ess toward a democratization. Notwithstanding the end of the civil war, peace and
stability in Liberia still remains elusive, but crucial elements necessary for democra-
tization have not been nurtured. The Government is at war with a rebel faction,
LURD, and at war with its own people. A third of the country is in a state of war,
a war that has the propensity of destabilizing the entire Mano River subregion.
Thousands of our people are displaced either internally or externally as refugees.
The brain drain of professional and capable Liberians who would otherwise be con-
tributing to the democratization process in Liberia is alarming.
So we have come here today to ask the United States Government to take a lead-
ership role in Liberia. This is the time we need you because when you needed us,
we stood by your side. History tells us of the role of Liberia during the cold war
in support of your ideological struggle.
You erected the Voice of America (VOA) in Liberia, that covered the entire con-
tinent of Africa;
You installed a communications relay station in Liberia that served as the tran-
sit point for all communication between the State Department in Washington
and U.S. embassies in sub-Sahara Africa;
You installed the Omega Navigation Station on Liberian soil that picked up sig-
nals from all vessels on the high seas in Africa and also directed vessels during
navigation;
You constructed the Freeport of Monrovia and the Roberts International Airport
(RIA) for use during the second World War.
As a result of these efforts, we assisted you with all our might, and you won the
ideological war. Now that you have won, you seem to have abandoned us. Today,
the United States is a world leader, and Liberia remains in chaos and instability.
If the United States fails to take such a leadership role in Liberia, no other country
would, and Liberia risks slipping gradually into anarchy and state collapse.
If Liberia is today characterized as a failed state, necessitating the convening of
these hearings, I would like to state up front that the dilemma has been occasioned
by the tyranny of circumstances, including among others, the abandonment of Libe-
ria by the United States, the civil war, the transition from war to a democratically
elected Government through elections, and the conduct of the constitutionally elect-
ed Government since it took over control of the Country in August 1997, and the
role of the international community. For the purpose of this hearing, and because
of the brevity of time, I would like to limit my testimony to these three areas.
43
THE CIVIL WAR AND THE TRANSITION TO A DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT: 1
When the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervened in

the Liberian Civil War, it had two principal objectives: (1) To prevent the war from
spilling beyond the borders of Liberia and from threatening the peace and security
of the West African subregion, and (2) to forge ways and means to achieve a political
settlement of the conflict through dialogue. To achieve these objectives, ECOWAS
evolved what became known as the ECOWAS Peace Plan, which essentially pro-
vided for a two prong approach to the settlement of the war; one military and the
other political.
On the political front, ECOWAS created the enabling environment for Liberians
themselves to establish a frame work for an Interim Governance of the Country dur-
ing the conflict, and in collaboration with the United Nations, facilitated several
conferences between the parties geared toward the cessation of hostilities and ob-
taining a consensus on the holding of a free elections to put into place a democrat-
ically elected Government.
On the military front, ECOWAS deployed a multinational peace keeping force,
ECOMOG, in Liberia to separate the warring factions, protect the Interim Govern-
ment, and assist it in maintaining law and order. The ECOWAS Peace Plan called
for a cease-fire, disarmament, encampment, demobilization and reintegration of all
former fighters. To enhance the success of the military approach, ECOWAS imposed
a ban on the importation of arms and ammunition into Liberia by any of the war-
ring factions, and called for the restructuring of the security apparatus of the coun-
try prior to the hosting of general elections. Within the contemplation of ECOWAS,
the restructuring of the security forces would have facilitated the creation of an ena-
bling environment substantial enough to:
Induce all political presidential aspirants, including heads of warring factions,
to participate in the elections, by canvassing freely for votes throughout the
length and breadth of Liberia, without fear of intimidation and molestation, ac-
tual or perceived from the various warring factions;
1. induce Liberian refugees in the subregion and elsewhere to return home;
2. induce confidence among all the warring factions to submit to the demo-
cratic process, with the expectation that their interests, individual and collec-
tive, will be subjected to fair opportunity and equal treatment; this in the mind
of the authority of ECOWAS, would have enhanced and facilitated disar-
mament, encampment, demobilization, and the process of reintegration of all
combatants; and.
3. consolidate peace, stability, and the democratization process in Liberia
after elections in a manner that would have induced not only those who lost
the elections to remain in Liberia, but also other Liberians living abroad to re-
turn home after the elections and contribute to the development of the nation.
Unfortunately, the Liberia National Transitional Government (LNTG), and the
parties to the conflict, failed to muster the political fortitude to restructure the secu-
rity apparatus of Liberia as mandated by ECOWAS. Notwithstanding, and with full
knowledge of the potential implications of this situation, ECOWAS and the inter-
national community, perhaps out of fatigue with the failure of the parties to the con-
flict to adhere to successive peace agreements, urged the Liberian people to go to
the polls, as the only way forward to bring the conflict to an end, in spite of opposi-
tion from some political parties and human rights groups. In an election that was
internationally certified as free and transparent, Charles Ghangay Taylor, then
leader of the erstwhile National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) was elected as
President with over 74% of the votes.
THE CONDUCT OF THE ELECTED GOVERNMENT: 2
Upon his inauguration in August 1997, the Government of President Taylor was
faced with two immediate challenges:
(1) How to protect the security of the state and to maintain peace and order
throughout the length and breath of Liberia; and
(2) How to foster genuine reconciliation between and among the Liberia peo-
ple in a manner that would induce peace, stability and national unification in
a country that has been torn apart by seven years of civil war with ethnic and
tribal underpinnings.
1 See Liberian Dilemma: Remaining Engaged in the Face of Sanctions, a paper delivered by
Benedict F. Sannoh at the National Endowment for Democracy, April 9, 2002.
2 Ibid.
44
The manner in which the Taylor led Government responded to these challenges
continues to be the reasons for the current political climate in Liberia and for the
characterization of Liberia as a failed state.
THE ISSUE OF PEACE AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION:
To address the issue of peace and national reconciliation, the Taylor led Govern-
ment established two Commissions: The National Commission on Human Rights
(NCHR); and the Liberia National Reconciliation and Re-unification Commission
(LNRRC). Unfortunately, however, these institutions either by design, or by default,
have failed to rise up to the task. The National Commission on Human Rights has
up to date not been fully constituted and without Government support, has re-
mained dormant since its creation nearly four years ago.
The National Reconciliation and Re-unification Commission, although fully con-
stituted, has not made any meaningful inroads in healing the wounds of the war,
in reconciling the Liberian people, or preventing ethnic or tribal conflicts such as
those between the Gios, Manos and Mandingoes. Hence the challenge of fostering
genuine reconciliation between and among the Liberian people in a manner that
would induce peace, stability and national unification still remains elusive.
To address the question of security and the maintenance of peace and order
throughout the length and breath of Liberia, the Taylor led Government started on
the wrong foot. Firstly, through its failure to obtain an agreement from the author-
ity of ECOWAS, or the member states thereof, the Government precipitated the
early departure from Liberia, of the West African Peace Keeping Force, ECOMOG,
who had up to the elections and the inauguration of the Government, been respon-
sible for the security of the Country.
With the departure of ECOMOG, the Government exacerbated the problem when
it elected not to restructure the security apparatus of the Country, particularly its
national army; the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), it having lost its legitimacy as
such when it allowed itself to become factionalized during the conflict. In opting not
to restructure the national army, the Government advanced the argument that the
Abuja agreement, which had mandated the restructuring, was not binding on the
Government, it having lapsed upon the inauguration of an elected Government and
the reaffirmation of the Liberian Constitution which had been suspended in 1990.
Instead of restructuring the security apparatus as mandated by Abuja, the Taylor
led Government created a paramilitaiy force, the Anti Terrorist Unit (ATU), com-
prised mostly of former combatants of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia
(NPFL). The Government also swelled the ranks of the Liberia National Police
(LNP) with former combatants of the NPFL. It is these two factional institutions
that the Government relies upon for the defense of the nation, for national security,
and for the maintenance of law and order, leaving the Armed Forces of Liberia
(AFL) marginalized and demoralized with over 4000 of its soldiers retired or dis-
charged. It was only when the Government came under increasing attack by the dis-
sident forces that the Government was constrained to recall most of these soldiers
to duty.
Compounding the failure of the Taylor Government to properly address the chal-
lenges of security and national reconciliation, the country suddenly found itself en-
tangled in two developments. Firstly, the International Community accused the
Government of President Taylor of engaging in conduct that allegedly posed a threat
to the peace and stability of the West African subregion. Specifically, the President
was accused of fueling the war in neighboring Sierra Leone through the supply of
arms to the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in exchange of diamonds. Led by the
United States and Great Britain, the Security Council of the United Nations im-
posed sanctions on Liberiaa ban on the importation of arms into Liberia (note that
the ban imposed by the ECOWAS as part of its Peace Plan for Liberia was never
lifted); a ban on the exportation of diamonds from Liberia, and the imposition of
travel restrictions on key officials of the Government.
Secondly, the country came under armed attack by a rebel group, the Liberians
United For Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), with the professed goal of desta-
bilizing and overthrowing the Government of President Taylor. As the attacks shift-
ed from the Bopolu and Kolahun areas of Lofa County, (where the rebels were held
by government forces for a considerable period), to lower Lofa, and Klay, Bomi
County, less than forty miles from the Capital City of Monrovia, the Government
declared a state of Emergency on February 8, 2002. Fighting intensified, notwith-
standing. The LURD rebels took over Klay, a strategic town located about 25 kilo-
meters from Monrovia, and subsequently Gbamga, the provincial capital of Bong
County, on the major trunk route to Ivory Coast, which necessitated a counter at-
tack by the Government. The rebels were dislodged, but at the expense of lives and
45
a massive humanitarian crisis. As I speak, sporadic fighting is still going on in di-
verse parts of Liberia between LURD and forces loyal to the Government.
Fearing that continued instability in Liberia may spill over into the neighboring
countries, and potentially undermine the peace and security of the subregion, remi-
niscent of the civil war years, the Heads of State and Governments of ECOWAS re-
cently called upon the Government of Liberia and LURD to declare an immediate
cease-fire and enter into dialogue with the view of ending the conflict. ECOWAS
also cautioned that if the parties do not adhere to this call, it will be constrained
to deploy an intervention force into Liberia. Initially, the Government frowned on
the call for cease-fire, noting that it is poised for an all out offensive to get rid of
LURD once and for all, and that a cease-fire will give them an opportunity to re-
group. Further, the Government characterized LURD as a terrorist group, and ad-
vancing the position that it cannot negotiate with terrorists. LURD on the other
hand, in a press release issued about three weeks ago, has declared a unilateral
cease-fire, stating that it will not attack any new positions, but will hold those areas
under its control and defend them when attacked. Notwithstanding, war is still
being waged in Liberia. Hence the political climate in Liberia is very grim and is
deteriorating with a potential of posing yet another threat to the peace and stability
of the West African subregion.
GOOD GOVERNANCE, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW: 3
Exacerbating the problem of security and reconciliation, are the increasing con-
cerns over the internal governance of the country. Increasingly, questions are been
raised of the growing violations of human rights and fundamental liberties in Libe-
ria with impunity, of the lack of respect for the rule of law, and the lack of account-
ability and transparency in government. Increasingly, the Government seems to be
closing the political space for civil society organizations and activists, including
human rights advocates and the press. The arrest and detention of Counsellor
Frances Johnson Morris, former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and director of
the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, the arrest of Counsellor Tiawon
Gongloe, a human rights lawyer, the closure of the Analyst newspapers, the sum-
moning of the Manager of the Catholic Radio program Radio Veritas and the con-
fiscation of the stations cassette of a recorded program, all without due process of
law, demonstrates the low level of political space and tolerance for divergent opin-
ions and viewpoints.
U.N. SANCTIONS: 4
With the failure of the Taylor Government to properly address the challenges of
security and national reconciliation, the country suddenly found itself entangled in
two developments. Firstly, the International Community accused the Government of
President Taylor of engaging in conduct that allegedly posed a threat to the peace
and stability of the West African subregion. Specifically, the President was accused
of fueling the war in neighboring Sierra Leone through the supply of arms to the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in exchange of diamonds. Led by the United
States and the Great Britain, the Security Council of the United Nations imposed
sanctions on Liberiaa ban on the importation of arms into Liberia (note that the
ban imposed by the ECOWAS as part of its Peace Plan for Liberia was never lifted);
a ban on the exportation of diamonds from Liberia; and the imposition of travel re-
strictions on key officials of the Government.
While it is true that the sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council is pri-
marily directed at President Taylor and his Government, it has indirect repercus-
sions on the lives of ordinaty Liberians. The imposition of sanctions have had a
chilling and negative impact on the bilateral relations between Liberia and several
other countries from which it traditional receives economic and development aid. It
is through these bilateral programs that Liberia had in the past addressed its eco-
nomic and social development agenda, such as light, safe drinking water, schools,
health care, roads and communication among others. Such economic aid is all the
more imperative for a country emerging war, with most of its infrastructure, econ-
omy and institutions virtually destroyed.
The development indicators for Liberia are very grim: A United Nations Develop-
ment Programs (UNDP) human development index ranks Liberia at 174th out of
177 developing countries; the literacy rate is less than 35%; the life expectancy at
birth is pegged at 43 years; and with over 85% of its population living in abject pov-
erty. It appears to me that with the imposition of sanctions, many of Liberias tradi-
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
46
tional partners have scaled down and in some cases cut off all bilateral assistance
to Liberia that would have otherwise inured to the benefit of the masses.
THE LURD ATTACKS 5
The second proximate result of the failure of the Taylor Government to properly
address the challenges of security and national reconciliation, was the emergence
of LURD attacks, whatever way one may want to characterize it, is inherently bru-
tal and violent. Those against whom the war is directed are the least to face the
brunt of the suffering. Instead, Innocent people, the elderly, women and children are
the real victims; some get killed by the bullets or by the starvation, deprivation and
denial occasioned by the conflict, while others are injured and maimed. Properties
are destroyed, and the inhabitants are forced to flee from the only place they know
as home, either internally as displaced persons or externally as refugees. The con-
sequences of a rebel war cannot all be placed squarely at the foot of the rebels.
Sometimes, more damage ensues out of Governments counter attack to repel a rebel
attack. What ever the cause is, as between the rebels and the Government, a stage
is set for a massive humanitarian crisis. So is the case with the LURD incursion
into Liberia. The LURD dissident attacks have been going on for nearly three years
now, during which hundreds of people have died, while thousands have been inter-
nally displaced or forced to flee from their homes into neighboring countries as refu-
gees. According to UNHCR sources, over 18,000 Liberians have crossed into Sierra
Leone as refugees since the Lofa and the Bomi attacks. The level of starvation and
deprivations in the areas affected by the conflict is reminiscent of the 1990 civil war.
One may ask the question therefore, as to whether or not, it is productive for
LURD to keep launching sporadic attacks on innocent civilians, in areas far re-
moved from the seat of Government, causing deaths and massive humanitarian suf-
fering of innocent civilians, especially the elderly, women and children, without any
real military gains. Broadcasts over BBC of military attacks and gains by LURD,
only to be reversed in less than twenty four hours by the government, at the ex-
pense of lives and properties, is in my mind, counterproductive, inhumane and po-
litically incorrect. Liberia cannot go through such a cycle of violence, while her coun-
terparts in the subregion are consolidating democratic gains at the polls and devel-
oping their respective countries.
COMBINED IMPACT OF SANCTIONS AND LURD ATTACKS ON THE DEMOCRATIZATION
PROCESS IN LIBERIA: 6
Continued LURD attacks against the Government coupled with sanctions and the
deteriorating economic conditions in Liberia will adversely affect the time table for
general and presidential elections and the process of democratization in Liberia.
Under the Constitution and laws of Liberia, the President shall hold office for a pe-
riod of six years, and shall leave unless re-elected through a general election. Hence
the next general and Presidential election is slated for October 2003. However, there
are a number of legal and constitutional hurdles in the path leading to the 2003
general and presidential elections. These include the question of: (1) a national cen-
sus; (2) the demarcation of constituencies for voting purposes and the determination
of the number of representatives to the Legislature from each county, (3) security;
and (4) the state of emergency recently declared by the government.
(1) National census and the determination of the number of representatives:
The the Constitution of Liberia requires the taking of a national census so as to
determine the numerical population for the demarcation of constituencies and the
determination of the number of representatives from each county for the Legisla-
ture. This is all the more crucial when taken against the background that: (1) no
census has been taken in Liberia since the seventies; (2) when the 1997 elections,
dubbed as special elections, reverted to the allocations in the Legislature obtained
from the 1986 general elections, with no regard for population increases, decreases,
or movements; (3) two new counties have been created since the 1997 elections by
the Taylor Government, resulting in a concomitant decrease in the population of the
counties from which these new counties were carved. The Constitution requires that
for each 20,000 people, there shall be one representative. The Elections Commission
determines the number of constituencies based on a national census. While it is also
true that the National legislature can increase or decrease the number or the ratio
of people in a constituency to a representative, the power to do so is triggered only
upon the results of a national census. In the absence of a national census therefore,
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
47
how can a determination be made of the allocation of representatives for the new
counties, as well as other counties where there have been substantial population
movements.
Of further concern is the political utility of a national census considering the de-
mographic landscape of Liberia since the civil war. Assume for instance, that a na-
tional census is taken prior to elections; is it politically correct to use the figures
obtained therefrom as a basis for the allocation of seats in the Legislature, espe-
cially where it results to a reduction in the existing allocations, when there has been
massive population movements occasioned by the civil war, the recent rebel incur-
sions and dissident attacks, as for example in Lofa, Gbarpolu, Grand Cape Mount
and Bomi Counties? These issues require a national evolving from participation of
all the stakeholders, especially opposition political parties, the leaders of some of
which are currently out of the country.
(2) Question of Security:
As indicated elsewhere in this paper, one of the reasons why the ECOWAS Peace
Plan called for the restructuring of the security apparatus of Liberia was not only
to create the enabling environment for all Liberians to participate in the elections,
without fear of intimidation and molestation, but also to consolidate peace, stability,
and the democratization process in Liberia after elections in a manner that would
have induced those who lost the elections to remain in Liberia, as well as Liberian
in the subregion and abroad to return home after the elections and contribute to
the development of the nation. Since this was not done, and a paramilitary force
dominated by former fighters of President Taylor formed instead, thousands of Libe-
rians both in the subregion and diverse other parts, refused to return home for the
1997 elections, and many have remained abroad since then. Since the 1997 elec-
tions, thousands of Liberians have again left the country, out of fear and insecurity.
More recently, there has been additional exodus of Liberians into the subregion, as
result of the LURD attacks in lower Lofa, and Bomi Counties.
That the enforcement competence of Abuja seized with the inauguration of the
Taylor Government in 1997 and the reaffirmation of the Liberian Constitution by
the National legislature, is not legally debatable. However, it is necessaly to recog-
nize that the underlying objectives of Abuja not having being achieved, and peace
and stability at home still remaining elusive as a consequence thereof, there is a
need to implement what all the parties to the Liberian conflict had agreed upon
under Abuja to create the enabling environment for the 2003 elections. It is incon-
ceivable to expect opposition politicians living abroad, or anyone aspiring to the
presidency, including heads of former factions, and indeed thousands of Liberians
living abroad, to have any level of confidence in the existing security institutions
established by the government, substantial enough to induce them to return to Libe-
ria either to mount a meaningful challenge to President Taylor in the ensuing elec-
tions, or to effectively participate in the electoral process, without an overhaul of
the security apparatus.
(3) State of Emergency:
The February 8, 2002 declaration of a state of emergency in Liberia by the Gov-
ernment has a chilling effect on Liberias democratic and economic future. Firstly,
if the LURD rebel attacks persist, the state of emergency declared by the Govern-
ment will remain in place as long as it is necessary to contain the attacks and re-
move the threat it poses to the peace and stability of Liberia. Such a situation will
either reduce the period available for aspiring politicians to return to Liberia and
to canvass and participate in the elections, or it may lead to the postponement of
the 2002 elections. Secondly, the declaration of the states of emergency, has occa-
sioned a new wave of violations of human rights and other fundamental liberties,
especially freedom of expression and of the press, thereby undermining democratic
values and potentially creating a condition of fear and insecurity.
Governments Action: Over the past few months, the Government has made sev-
eral overtures, and stressed on each occasion that the action was demonstrative of
its commitment to peace, national reconciliation and the holding of a free and fair
elections in 2003. Firstly, the Government granted a general amnesty to all Liberian
opposition leaders living abroad and encouraged them to return home to contribute
to the political process. Secondly, the Government ordered the re-opening of the
Radio Veritas, a shortwave station, owned and operated by the Catholic diocese of
Liberia. It also ordered the Star Radio, put in place during the 1997 elections,
opened so as to facilitate the creation of a plain level field during the 2003 elections.
Both Radio Veritas and Star Radio have been closed for a protracted period as a
result of allegations that their broadcasts were anti-government. Thirdly, the Gov-
ernment released all political prisoners who were serving jail sentences without any
48
pre-conditions, and mandated its Ministry of Justice to drop charges against those
indicted for treason or other political offences, including those charged but not yet
arrested, all without pre-conditions. In addition, the Government has resolved to
host a national reconciliation conference in June 2003 in Monrovia so as to resolve
those vexing political issues that pose obstacles to national reconciliation peace and
stability in Liberia. The Government, realizing the linkage between security at
home, and peace and stability, have also called for international assistance in re-
structuring the national army, the Armed Forces of Liberia.
Notwithstanding, the Government consistently undermines and negates its own
progress by engaging in conduct unbecoming of a government committed to democ-
racy and respect for the rule of law. The arrest and detention of Counsellor Frances
Johnson Morris, former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and director of the
Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, the arrest of Counsellor Tiawon Gongloe,
a human rights lawyer, the closure of the Analyst newspaper, the summoning of the
Manager of the Catholic Radio program Radio Veritas Redgewood Rennie, and the
confiscation of the stations cassette of a recorded program of an opposition figure,
all without due process of law, demonstrates the low level of political space and tol-
erance for divergent opinions and viewpoints. These latest conduct have cast a dark
cloud on the capacity of the Government to even attract a broad based participation
in the ensuing national reconciliation conference scheduled for July, 2002. The Gov-
ernment is yet to address the vexing concerns over the egregious and persistent vio-
lations of human rights in Liberia and the muzzling of human rights and pro de-
mocracy advocates, and to commit itself to ensuring that such excesses will stop;
and that those involved are investigated, tried and punished if found guilty.
THE DILEMMA OF ORDINARY LIBERIANS AND THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE: 7
The people of Liberia are in a dilemma. In 1997 after a devastating and bloody
civil war, they went to the polls, under international supervision, and elected
Charles Ghangay Taylor as President. Under the Constitution of Liberia, power is
inherent in the people, and the people have the right to change their government
whenever their safety and happiness requires it. There now seems to be a consensus
among most Liberians that the best way to exercise this constitutional power is
through a democratic process by means of the ballot box. That opportunity will not
come until October 2003, or it may not come at all until years after, depending on
the Liberian people themselves and the position of the international community on
Liberia. The dilemma is obvious.
On the one hand, Liberians have a President and a Government that they are
stuck with for the next eighteen months and perhaps even longer in spite of the
vexing questions of security, national reconciliation, and the lack of resources to ad-
dress the myriad of social and economic problems confronting them; on the other,
Liberians are faced with a rebel incursions, the consequences of which have rel-
egated them to internal and external displacement, suffering and deprivation. Still
on another front, Liberians are faced with sanctions and the resultant effect of re-
duced bilateral assistance, as a result of which post conflict reconstruction and de-
velopment never took off ground. In spite of this dilemma, the international commu-
nity seems to project the view that once sanctions have been imposed on Liberia
because of the alleged conduct of their president, the fate of the Liberian people
have become irrelevant and immaterial. As a staffer on the House International Re-
lations Subcommittee succinctly put it, the fate of the ordinary Liberians is linked
to the fate of Charles Taylor.
The isolation of Liberia by the international community is not only limited to the
trivialization of the plight of the Liberian peoples. It has affected Liberias position
in the subregion. In spite of the recognized fact that the peace and stability in the
Mano River subregion is interlinked, and that instability in any one of the three
countries, has the potential of destabilizing the others, the international community
has elected to approach the re-establishment of peace and security within the sub-
region from a pocket approach, as opposed to a comprehensive approach. Led by
Great Britain, the international community has become fully engaged in Sierra
Leone, and under its supervision, successful disarmament, encampment, demobiliza-
tion and reintegration of former fighters have taken place. In less than two months
the people of Sierra Leone will be going to the polls to put into place yet another
democratically elected government. In Guinea, with a government notorious for its
human rights violations and anti democratic tendencies, the United States is en-
gaged with the training of the national army. Liberia, on the other hand, remains
a ten foot pole, which neither Great Britain nor the United States wants to do
7 Ibid.
49
business with. The international community even seems oblivious to efforts by the
leaders of the three countries to normalize relations and bring peace to the sub-
region as is evidenced by the recent meeting in Rabat, Morocco and by the follow
up meetings of their respective Ministers of foreign affairs. Considering the porous
nature of the borders of the Mano River states, the tribal and ethnic affiliations,
and the immediate past relationships between the warring factions operating in
these countries, the desirability of turning a blind eye on instability in Liberia, and
focusing on Sierra Leone and Guinea, is at best specious, and remains troubling,
for it has the potential of unraveling achievements made once the international com-
munity departs.
THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY:
If Liberia is a failed state today, some of the causes emanate from actions taken
or not taken by the international community at the appropriate times or period.
Perhaps out of fatigue with the intractile peace process under the supervision of
ECOWAS during the Liberian civil war, those things that would have induced peace
and guaranty security and security in Liberia were not addressed fully.
1. There was no effective disarmament, encampment and demobilization in
Liberia prior to the 1997 general and presidential elections. Hence there were
over 60,000 former combatants, traumatized and poorly integrated into the po-
litical and democratic process in Liberia. With no skills, no opportunities, these
former combatants are easy targets for recruitment back into the bush either
by the Government or by LURD. They also account for substantial percentage
of the human rights violations in Liberia.
2. The international community failed to ensure the implementation of a vital
provision of the Abuja agreement calling for the restructuring of the army and
the security apparatus, prior to the internationally supervised 1997 elections.
As a result, the elected Government went ahead and constituted the security
apparatus in a manner that they have not created the necessary security envi-
ronment appreciable enough to induce opposition political leaders, trained tech-
nocrats, and diverse groups of Liberians to return home to contribute to the de-
mocratization process in Liberia.
3. The international community has in a way abandoned Liberia. There has
been very little international support for Liberias post conflict reconstruction
and development, especially so when the countrys infrastructure, economy and
institutions were virtually destroyed. Hence the Government the economic and
social development agenda of Liberia, such as light, safe drinking water,
schools, health care, roads and communication among others remain in sham-
bles even as I speak.
4. The failure to condemn LURD, or to intercede in the conflict so as to bring
about a lasting cease-fire, especially in the face of the massive humanitarian
crisis its war efforts is generating in Liberia against a democratically elected
government, while at the same time imposing a ban on the importation of arms
by the Government to defend itself and the people of Liberia, a constitutional
imposed duty.
5. Lack of U.S. interest and leadership role in Liberia. The insistence on a
policy of containment, believing that with increasing sanctions and inter-
national isolation, there will be a change in Liberia has not achieved the desired
results. This policy trivializes the impact of containment on the plight of ordi-
nary Liberians, and links the fate of ordinary to that of the Government.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
There are some key initiatives that can dramatically turn around the trend of
events in Liberia and put it on a path toward democratization and sustained peace.
1. The Government of the United States must not rely solely on the policy of con-
tainment and increasing isolation of Liberia as the only avenue toward bringing
change in the political direction of the Country. Secondly, efforts at bringing durable
peace, stability and security in Liberia cannot be left to ECOWAS entirely. Growing
out of our experiences with ECOWAS intervention in the Liberia civil war, regional
politics combined with tribal and ethnic affiliations, will continue to have negative
impact and effectively undermine actions by ECOWAS.
Accordingly, we recommend that the United States Government take a leadership
role in Liberia, just as the British did in Sierra Leone, and help evolve a process
that will bring Liberia back to a course of democratization.
50
2. The first step in evolving such a process is to help create the enabling environ-
ment in Liberia for security, stability, and sustained peace. There are several ele-
ments in this step:
a. The United States must take a leadership role in creating a contact group
as suggested by the International Crisis Group (ICG) and Human Rights Watch
to supervise this process.
b. The contact group, once created, should call upon the Government and
LURD to declare an immediate cease-fire, and enter into immediate dialogue or
negotiations with the view of resolving the conflict. These discussions must in-
clude representation from political both at home and from abroad. We urge the
international community to deploy an intervention force into Liberia, if the Gov-
ernment and LURD or either of them, refuse to adhere to this call.
c. One of the crucial agenda items for discussions on Liberia by the contact
group is the issue of security. There will be no lasting peace in Liberia if the
security apparatus of the Government is not dismantled. Hence the contact
group must obtain consensus from all parties to deploy an international force
on the ground in Liberia, with a mandate to:
monitor the cease-fire;
take over the entire security apparatus of the country;
disarm all combatants including the Police, the Army, the ATU and other
security apparatus.
The composition of the force must not be limited to ECOWAS, and the state of
emergency imposed by the Government must be lifted upon arrival of the inter-
vention force.
d. The question of governance and the status of democratic institutions in Li-
beria between now and the period of general elections must be discussed. These
include the Elections Commission, the Judiciary, the prosecutorial arm of Gov-
ernment, and the control over the nations resources and finances.
e. Finally the contact group must visit the question of the General and Presi-
dential elections and obtain a consensus on such crucial hurdles such as census,
representation, and number of constituencies, and provide resources to facilitate
the process.
3. The United States Government must strengthen civil society in Liberia to en-
able them make informed and reasoned decisions about the democratization process
in Liberia. Crucial areas are support for the press, human rights institutions and
advocates, and other pro democracy organizations. We recommend support for these
organizations as well as the strengthening of political parties, and the re-activation
of the Human Rights Commission.
Thank you.
Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you for your well-informed, candid tes-

timony. I thank all of you, and I will have some questions now,
starting with Ms. Nowrojee. Your testimony notes the recent pro-
liferation of militia forces in Liberia with relationships to the rul-
ing party. What might be the motive for privatizing some of the
states use of force? Does the Government of Liberia want to dis-
associate itself from some policies that it still finds expedient, and
what are some of the human rights consequences of this?
Ms. NOWROJEE. I think it is a combination of a number of things.
I think first of all the militia groups are being headed by very
trusted former NPFL, former Charles Taylor rebel affiliates who
are now businessmen, or they are not particularly in government,
and so they are being called up to organize the boys that were
under them previously.
Another thing is, I think that since the sanctions have come into
effect the Taylor governments revenues have been squeezed be-
cause they no longer have access to Sierra Leonian diamonds, so
if you proliferate your formal armed forces you have to pay them,
and even that he is not currently doing, so what is being done now
51
is basically giving militia groups a green light to basically loot and

support themselves.
We interviewed three former child soldiers who were under train-
ing just outside of Monrovia who were going to be redeployed to the
field, and they were basically being given $250 cash as a sign-up,
and then what they looted was theirs to keep, and that seems to
be the terms of the agreement, whereas if you enroll them in the
armed forces you have to do a little more than that.
Senator FEINGOLD. And in terms of the human rights con-
sequences?
Ms. NOWROJEE. The human rights consequences are extremely
detrimental for a number of reasons. First of all, a lot of these are
former child soldiers who have a history of committing atrocities
from the war. They are also receiving little training. There is also
no accountability for their actions, and there is no ability for civil-
ians to lodge complaints or to file any mechanism to actually keep
them in check, so it is very dangerous, and then above and beyond
that, they are so shadowy it is close to impossiblewe tried to get
a sense of what the military command was, or if there was any co-
ordination or cooperation. It is much harder for human rights
groups to get a handle on the military structure.
Senator FEINGOLD. Fair enough. For you as well as for Mr.
Sannoh, what role should accountability for human rights abuses
play in Liberias political future? You addressed some of this, but
I am wondering, is the issue prominent in discussion among mem-
bers of civil society and the political opposition? Do you expect that
average Liberians will demand some degree of justice and account-
ability in a post conflict democratically governed Liberia?
I will start with you Ms. Nowrojee.
Ms. NOWROJEE. I think most Liberians unfortunately are busy
with the day-to-day struggles of survival, so you do not see an over-
whelming call for accountability, but clearly the lack of justice is
on peoples minds. It does not take long being in Liberia to just see
how peoples hopes have been whittled away, people who have been
refugees once, who have come back, have rebuilt their houses, been
chased away again, so justice would be a very welcome thing.
On the other hand, it is not something, a rallying point around
which the society is crying for. However, I think it is the key to
beginning to put a check on the cycle of violence we are seeing re-
peating itself again and again. I see this special court for Sierra
Leone as being a very important actor now in beginning to provide
an out for the sort of checkmate that we are in now, because I do
not hold out much hope for the elections.
I hope what happens in the next election is not what happened
in the last elections, where the international community descends
on the place in large numbers, observes a quote-unquote fair and
free election because there is no ballot-stuffing, but does not take
into consideration the context within which such an election is
being held, so I do not hold out much hope for the next election.
I do not hold out much hope for LURD offering any future that
is any different, if you look at some of the characters that are in
LURD, particularly, for instance, somebody like Charles Julu, who
was the commander-in-chief of the armed forces under the Doe ad-
52
ministration. You see a history of equal atrocities, you know, people

with checkered records on either side.
The special court provides an out, because if there is an indict-
ment for Liberian officials who have played a detrimental role in
Sierra Leone, you can, through the rule of law and through an
international institution, begin to remove some of those faces and
create a space for the opposition, which is currently divided and
very cowed, to begin to move in, and that might be the beginning
of a brighter future.
Senator FEINGOLD. I appreciate what you said about the special
court in Sierra Leone. I have devoted a fair amount of effort to urg-
ing it along both in terms of what it would mean with regard to
Sierra Leone, but also some of the things you are talking about, the
larger accountability, and I appreciate that very much.
Mr. Sannoh, would you like to comment on that issue?
Mr. SANNOH. Yes, Mr. Chairman. It would be an understatement
to say that the Liberian people are not as active as they should be
in the process of democratization. Those who observed the process
in Liberia, especially up to the elections, there was a high level of
civil society involvement in the process in Liberia. Since 1997 there
has been a decrease in the level of civil society activity, and some
of this decrease has been attributed to fear, intimidation, arrest of
human rights advocates. We had up to 14 human rights organiza-
tions operating in Liberia up to the elections. After the elections,
it has come down to about three or four human rights organiza-
tions working on the ground.
Now, on the issue of accountability, that was a position that was
disclosed immediately after the elections. When the Liberian
Human Rights Commission was constituted, one of the questions
we had faced, because I happened to have come up with an original
draft of that particular provision, one of our concerns was, where
do we go from here?
Do we go back and begin to review all of the atrocities that are
being committed and give that responsibility to this Human Rights
Commission, or shall we establish a Human Rights Commission
and give it a mandate so that it can move forward from today, and
not to be bogged down with what happened in the past, and let the
political decisions be made as to what Liberia is going to do with
the atrocities that have been committed in Liberia?
Mr. Chairman, the problem here is, if President Taylor had not
emerged in the 1997 elections, then the issue of accountability
would have been on the fore of the agenda in Liberia, but because
Taylor led a rebel group, along with several other groups in Libe-
ria, there have been no incentive for a government that had a rebel
group imagined as winning the elections to spearhead a process of
accountability, and the international community has not pressed on
that issue, so that is a problem of accountability. It is like throwing
it under the rock, and we are faced with that.
That still remains under the rock, but the Liberian people are
yearning for peace, they are yearning for democracy, and that is
why we keep stressing the call to empower the civil society so that
Liberians can be well-informed to make good decisions about their
own country.
53
Senator FEINGOLD. Let me follow that with a couple of questions

for you, Mr. Sannoh, about the elections. There is some skepticism
or some pessimism expressed here about the next round of elec-
tions. I think Ms. Nowrojee just suggested that. How would you as-
sess the current pre-election climate in Liberia? Is there any
chance at all of a reasonably free and fair election in 2003? For ex-
ample, do you think citizens will have regular access to inde-
pendent sources of information? Any comments?
Mr. SANNOH. In my presentation I identified one of the key
issues to having elections in 2003, and that is the issue of security.
If we do not establish the enabling environment in Liberia, then of
course the road to 2003 is going to remain bumpy. There is a state
of emergency in place, and the more we go into the period for elec-
tions from now until 2003 is about a year and some few months.
There has to be adequate time for political parties to regroup, to
converse in Liberia. Many of these political parties are outside Li-
beria, the leaders are outside Liberia. They cannot come back to Li-
beria because of the security situation.
Now, if we get up one morning and we say, well, let us go to elec-
tions tomorrow, and we do not have the participation of those polit-
ical parties or leaders who are in exile because they cannot go back
to Liberia as a result of the security situation, then you are going
to have a problem, and that is why I keep stressing on, if we want
to proceed with the process of democratization in Liberia, the first
step should be to ensure that an enabling environment is created,
that we induce Liberians to go back home and participate in the
process.
Senator FEINGOLD. I think that answer is closely related to my
next question, which was to be, what is to stop a repeat of the elec-
tion scenario from 1997? I am told that many Liberians felt their
choice was to vote for Mr. Taylor or endure more conflict. Would
you talk about security? Are you really saying that there is still a
fear of the consequences that might follow should President Taylor
fail to win reelection?
Mr. SANNOH. Assuming Mr. Taylor remains as President up to
elections, and elections are conducted and he loses the election, if
the security apparatus remains as it is, I cannot predict what
would happen, but I do not see it as a beautiful situation.
If you have an international force on the ground and Taylor loses
the election, it is more likely that he would abide by the results,
and when you talk about in 1997 elections, I have heard people say
that if we have elections tomorrow Taylor would win, that may be
true, but as the State Department representative testified, when
the Liberian people went to the polls in 1997 it was immediately
after the war. As a matter of fact, in many, many areas there were
still rebels roaming through the villages and everything, and so
these people voted for peace.
It is true, Taylor won the elections. It was a free election, Taylor
won the elections, but there is no guaranteeI cannot say that if
elections are held in Liberia tomorrow, in light of all of the prob-
lems that the country has been through, in light of the fact that
many Liberians are beginning to believe that the problems they are
having is because of Mr. Taylor, that the results would be the
same.
54
As to what is required to make the process happen, to make it

free and fair so that Liberians can make a decision for themselves
as to who they are going to vote for, eventually it has to be left to
the Liberian people to decide who they want to be their President.
Senator FEINGOLD. The way this is usually presented to me is
that Mr. Taylor won in the previous election because people were
afraid that if he did not win, that terrible things would be done to
them by Mr. Taylor. Is that accurate history?
Mr. SANNOH. Well, let me just go back. If you have followed the
Liberian situation, in 1996 there was a civil disturbance in Liberia
because of problems that came out of the Abuja agreements. Prior
to that, Liberia was divided, fractionalized among the various fac-
tions, and each of these factions had territories that they were con-
trolling. With the composition of the LNTG, all of these areas,
many of the warring factions or rebels deserted these areas.
As a result of the April 1996 crisis, when the fighting was going
on in Liberia, Taylor went around and tried to recapture, to have
his forces in most of the areas he had lost. Now, there was a fear
that if elections did not proceed and another round of fighting en-
sued in Liberia, Taylor would have been at a better footing in that
process, and so during the course of the elections and again, from
their own experience, when people say they were afraid that if Tay-
lor does not win the election he will go right back to fighting, that
is why we have fears. That is why we have fears. We cannot say
it is imaginary.
Second, most people believe that if we can see this young man
to launch in Liberia and fight for several years, he must have an
agenda for Liberia, so perhaps let us give him an opportunity to
see what he can do.
Now that the Liberian people have seen what he has done, that
is why we say, let them be the determinants of their own future,
whether they are actually going to vote for Mr. Taylor the second
time around, but the 2003 elections will be entirely different elec-
tions from 1997 if the process is free and fair and it is given the
type of international support and money that it needs.
Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you for that interesting answer. Let
me go to Ms. Anderson. I recently read about the destruction of a
hospital in Bong County, a casualty of fighting between the Libe-
rian Armed Forces and the LURD. In this kind of situation, or in
this situation, are humanitarian and civilian institutions like hos-
pitals and schools being targeted in the conflict, or is this kind of
a circumstance more incidental, a consequence of what happened?
Ms. ANDERSON. I would probably say a combination of the two.
As my other colleagues alluded to, oftentimes fighters are able to
sort of pick out portions of the country to loot and to raid, so that
means including the looting and raiding hospitals for medical sup-
plies and also storehouses for food. So yes, sometimes, hospitals
and other humanitarian sites including and especially food ware-
houses can be targeted.
We ourselves have experienced, at different times, attacks on our
own facilities, particularly our agriculture sites, and our food ware-
houses. But oftentimes a lot of this is often a casualty of just cross-
fire, and so what happens usually is that somebody hears a shot
or you hear a lot of skirmishes perhaps 10 miles awayyou imme-
55
diately evacuate and clear out your staff and as much equipment
and supplies as possible. But human beings are more important
than commodities. Usually, what happens is that people leave, and
then the supplies the soldiers would like are right there ready for
them, so it is a combination of the two.
Senator FEINGOLD. Again for you, what role does the Liberian
Refugees Repatriation and Resettlement Commission play in caring
for the internally displaced in Liberia? It is a politicized organiza-
tion? Is the information accurate, and does it act in the interest of
the displaced, or in the interest of the government?
Ms. ANDERSON. The LRRRC we have found has been a very coop-
erative and collaborative partner in Liberia. I met with several of
those officials myself, and found that they were members of the
government who had a genuine and sincere concern for the people
of Liberia. They also were not in the inner circle of Charles Taylor
as well. Nevertheless, their hands are tied because of declining
international assistance to them.
When I had visited Liberia a couple of months back that, some
international officials claimed that their numbers were inflated,
but what I found most often when I talked with a variety of inter-
national officials was that nobody really wanted to admit the sever-
ity of the displacement and the severity of the crisis because of the
lack of international political will, so LRRRC might have high
numbers, but the numbers are really not necessarily that far off.
Again, they were genuinely, sincerely concerned about the plight
of the Liberian people because they themselves were suffering. The
majority of the civil servants in Liberia have not been paid for the
past 14 months, and that is a report I got recently from our na-
tional director. As of yesterday they have not been paid, so they
themselves are suffering.
And again, LRRRC, they were sincerely and genuinely supportive
in trying to work with NGOs to coordinate assistance that was
going throughout Liberia. Nevertheless, instability as well as de-
clining international assistance has made it difficult.
Senator FEINGOLD. I appreciate all of your patience. I just want
to ask one final question for whichever of you would like to answer,
and we have already talked about, and I appreciate your candor
with regard to the fact that some of you feel that certainly the
American efforts with regard to supporting civil society are not
adequate at this point, and I suspect that is true.
And so often when we examine states with truly abusive and cor-
rupt governments, we have to pin our hopes on civil society as we
search for partners in an effort to improve conditions for civilians
and strengthen institutions and bolster the rule of law. But this re-
quires a civil society capable of working together, rather than one
that is full of opposing camps that are just competing for power.
So I guess I would like you to comment on how politicized the Libe-
rian civil society is in its current state.
Mr. SANNOH. Let me start. Let me just say something briefly
about even the present level of assistance. The U.S. policy is right
now, instead of providing assistance directly to the government,
they would like to do it through UCIT. UCIT is on the ground.
UCIT has a policy where they cannot deal directly with local NGOs
56
on the ground. They would like to use international NGOs as im-

plementing partners.
Now, when you come to the issue of civil society and the process
of democratization in Liberia, there is no international NGO on the
ground in Liberia. NGI was there and they left. AFROS was there
for the elections. They left. So in other words, if UCIT has money
for civil society development and democratization, then the money
sits down, and last year alone UCIT was left with about $574,000
that would have been used for civil society development that was
never implemented, so that is a problem that really supersedes the
issue of politicization of the civil society, and again, perhaps the
problem is the lack of inertia because of the political stance of the
United States toward Liberia.
Perhaps those overtures are extending to UCIT so that UCIT is
factoring a political position in determining how to proceed with
the civil society movement or development, and also the lack of in-
terest in international NGOs, those involving democracy, to go back
to Liberia and begin to work.
Now, on the issue of politics between NGOs, nongovernmental or-
ganizations on the ground in Liberia, that is not really a factor in
Liberia. There has been a lot of collaboration among the various
NGOs. There is collaboration within the human rights community.
We have the human rights center all of the human rights organiza-
tions are a part of, even though we operate individual organiza-
tions, but when it comes to major issues there is a high level of col-
laboration on that, as collaboration on the level of religious groups,
the Interfaith Mediation Committee. They have been very, very ac-
tive for peace in Liberia. They have been involved in reconciliation
efforts, so these institutions are there, they just need to be empow-
ered.
You look at the press, we have a very powerful press union. The
only problem they have is that a couple of times the press is closed
and thrown into jail and somebody needs to stand up there to give
them a type of moral support and assistance.
So the question of politics and the internal wrangling between
the NGOs is not a problem in Liberia in my own view.
Ms. ANDERSON. I might also just add, in terms of the comment
on NGOs, both international NGOs, of which World Vision is one,
as well as local NGOs, I think that if you do increase humanitarian
assistance, electoral NGOs like NDI will go. They will go, but what
we are finding is that you have diminishing amounts of money ac-
tually being channeled toward democracy and governance, so there-
fore NGOs cannot necessarily make their costs, both their own in-
ternal costs and being able to work and facilitate civil society orga-
nizations on the ground, and then it is very difficult to run an oper-
ation there.
So we ourselves are finding from a humanitarian standpoint that
it is very difficult to run an operation when you are only given a
limited amount of funds, so you eventually do have to fold up and
leave, and because of the declining U.S. Government assistance,
particularly in democratization and governanceI talked with aid
officials whilst I was in Liberia. They basically said, well, there is
no free press so we cannot really sponsor press unions, and I found
when I interviewed and talked with journalists while I was there
57
that people were willing to put their lives on the line, but they
were not being supported, so it is sort of a chicken and egg. Do you
provide the funding or not?
I would say you provide the funding and the international NGOs
as well as local Liberian NGOs will step up to the plate, because
I also found that people were very united, because the suffering is
universal.
Ms. NOWROJEE. I would just add to that and say that the types
of support should not only be financial. I mean, I think the civil
society groups range from sort of very sort of nascent and emerging
groups, the few corrupt groups, and then some excellent and really
active work going on, and what some of these Liberian groups lack
in terms of experience or exposure, they make up for in courage
and bravery, and I am always amazed at how much they are will-
ing to take in terms of being tossed into prison, being interrogated,
being tortured, being forced to flee the country, and they continue.
These human rights groups basically started around the time of
the war, and it is interesting in the safe haven created by the West
African peacekeepers in that regard, Dave Peterson from National
Endowment for Democracy is a real unsung hero in this, because
he took a chance on a lot of these people at a time when nobody
really knew who they were, what they were doing, and what has
emerged now is a really vibrant community of human rights activ-
ists and independent media people.
And I think that when we talk about greater support for civil so-
ciety, it should not only be financial. It is not just an issue of
money. It is also an issue of providing them with protection, pro-
viding them with exposure, providing them with protection, the
whole idea of providing them with radios, access to the public to
be able to hear their message. It should be multifaceted, and then
it will sift out, the sort of genuine and very active ones will come
to the fore, and others will sift down.
Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. I want to thank all of you for
your help today. Liberia was the first African country that I ever
visited in 1994, when I was a new member of this subcommittee,
with Chairman Paul Simon, and it was a difficult situation then.
Obviously it is very difficult now, but the purpose of these hear-
ings, when we refer to certain countries as failed states, or weak
states, is not to suggest that that is their permanent status.
In fact, I believe it would be an immoral policy for this country
to regard any nation, particularly an old friend of the United
States like Liberia, as a permanently failed state. The purpose of
that kind of a label and the purpose of these hearings is to awaken
Members of Congress and policymakers to the fact that to allow
such situations to persist is not only immoral but dangerous for the
United States, and I believe we have seen some of that in our anal-
ysis of what happened on September 11, and so that is the purpose
of these hearings, and I think this was an extremely good one, and
I assure you that as long as I am a member of this subcommittee,
certainly, whether as chairman or otherwise, I will continue to
want to work with each of you on the future of Liberia, and I con-
gratulate you on your efforts.
This concludes the hearing.
58
[Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to recon-

vene subject to the call of the Chair]


Senate Hearing, 107TH Congress - Weak States in Africa: U.S. Policy in Liberia

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Senate Hearing, 107TH Congress - Weak States in Africa: U.S. Policy in Liberia

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S. HRG.

WEAK STATES IN AFRICA: U.S. POLICY IN LIBERIA

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JUNE 11, 2002

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

TUESDAY, JUNE 11, 2002

tragedy, and because the success or failure of a major international

another 200,000 were killed. The unprecedented regional military

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Kansteiner, for your testi-

learning more about this organization, and we in fact have asked

democratic government in Liberia and obviously to ease the suf-

Senator FEINGOLD. Very good. Thank you.

is living quite comfortably, as are his cronies, while the country is

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Senator Frist. I will

Senator FEINGOLD. You actually support the calls for a ban on

Senator FEINGOLD. One more question, then I will see if Senator

and has successfully litigated several constitutional law cases be-

On behalf of the members of Amnesty International we would like to thank the

Senator FEINGOLD. We will start with Ms. Nowrojee. Please pro-

For instance, in 19992000, Burkina Faso and Cote dIvoire pro-

several things to end cross-border attacks and illicit weapons flows,

that our U.S. military assistance to Guinea should be conditioned

At this time, the government of Guinea is playing a destabilizing role in providing

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you for that helpful testimony. We

they have no gainful employment to purchase food. The production

A fifth regional trend that, as reflected in the rise, and in the

Mano River Region

Insecurity, Internally Displaced and Refugees

Population Displacement and Instability

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Ms. Anderson, for your testimony,

Liberia, no other country would, and Liberia risks slipping gradu-

berians United for Reconciliation and Democracy. Those remain

move forward is through a democratic process by means of the bal-

Second, efforts at bringing a durable peace, stability, and secu-

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we agree with the report of the

When the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervened in

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you for your well-informed, candid tes-

is basically giving militia groups a green light to basically loot and

ministration. You see a history of equal atrocities, you know, people

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me follow that with a couple of questions

As to what is required to make the process happen, to make it

on the ground. They would like to use international NGOs as im-

[Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to recon-

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