Professional Documents
Culture Documents
ABRC2016.Pointers in Legal and Judicial Ethics Combined
ABRC2016.Pointers in Legal and Judicial Ethics Combined
ABRC2016.Pointers in Legal and Judicial Ethics Combined
Lawyers Oath
I_______, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I
will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I
will delay no man for money or malice and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon
myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
Filipino citizen who graduated from a foreign law school may be admitted to the Philippine
Bar Examination.
Section 5 of B.M. 1153 provides that a Filipino citizen who graduated from a foreign law school
shall be admitted to the bar examination only upon submission to the Supreme Court of certifications
showing: (a) completion of all courses leading to the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent
degree; (b) recognition or accreditation of the law school by the proper authority; and (c) completion of
all fourth year subjects in the Bachelor of Laws academic program in a law school duly recognized by
the Philippine Government (Bar Matter No. 1153, Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Proposing
Reforms in the Bar Examinations through Amendments to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, March 9,
2010).
A Filipino citizen who completed and obtained his or her degree in Bachelor of Laws or its
equivalent in a foreign law school must also present proof of completion of a separate bachelors
degree.
Can Filipino lawyers practice law under the name of a foreign law firm?
No, the latter not being authorized to practice law in the Philippines. The use of the foreign law
firms name is unethical (Dacanay v. Baker & McKenzie, A.M. No. 2131, May 10, 1985).
Officials who, by express mandate of the law, are prohibited from practicing law, may not, even
with the consent of the department head, engage in the practice of law (Zeta v. Malinao, A.M. No. P-
220, December 20, 1978).
BUT if such official is authorized by the department head, he may, in an isolated case, represent
a relative or a close family friend (Noriega v. Sison, A.M. No. 2266, October 27, 1983).
Appearance of the Solicitor General for one government agency if in so doing his
representation run against the interest of another government agency.
The Solicitor General is the lawyer of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and its
officials or agents. When confronted with a situation where one government office takes an adverse
position against another government agency, the Solicitor General should not refrain from performing
his duty as the lawyer of the government. It is incumbent upon him to present to the court what he
considers would legally uphold the best interest of the government although it may run counter to a
clients position. In such instance, the government office adversely affected by the position taken by
the Solicitor General, if it still believes in the merit of its case, may appear in its own behalf through its
legal personnel or representative (Orbos v. CSC, 189 SCRA 458, September 12, 1990).
What are the proceedings in which lawyers are prohibited from appearing?
Practice of Law by Public Officials
General Rule: Only those who are licensed to practice law can appear and handle cases in court
Exceptions:
A party may conduct his case or litigation in
Before the MTC person with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him (Rule 138, Sec. 34).
A party may conduct his litigation personally.
But if he gets someone to aid him, that
Before any other court
someone must be an authorized member of the
Bar(Rule 138, Sec. 34).
In a locality where a duly licensed member of
the Bar is NOT available, the judge may
appoint a non-lawyer who is:
In a criminal case before the MTC
a. A resident of that province;
b. Of good repute for probity and ability to
defend the accused (Rule 116, Sec. 7).
A law student who has successfully completed
his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed
law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized
law schools clinical legal education program
approved by the SC may appear, without
compensation, in any civil, criminal or
administrative case before any trial court,
Student Practice Rule tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent
clients accepted by the Legal Clinic of the law
school (Rule 138-A, Sec. 1). The student shall
be under the direct supervision and control of
a member of the IBP duly accredited by the
law school if he appears in the RTC and
without such supervision if he appears in an
inferior court (Rule 138-A, Sec. 2)
Non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or
any
Labor Arbiter if they:
Before the NLRC
a. Represent themselves;
b. Represent their organization or members thereof
(LABOR CODE, Art. 222).
A non-lawyer may represent a claimant before
Before a Cadastral Court
the Cadastral Court (ACT No. 2259, Sec. 9).
No attorney shall appear in behalf of or
represent a party at the hearing, unless the
Proceedings before the Small Claims Court
attorney is the plaintiff or defendant (Rule of
Procedure for Small Claims Cases, Sec. 17)
LEGAL ETHICS
Lawyer-client relationship.
Q The lawyer and client signed a retainership agreement and he received an acceptance
fee. He was the one who prepared the complaint which was filed and he was the one who
prepared the motion to serve summons through publication. Is there a lawyer-client
relationship? Explain.
Answer: Yes, because such acts or circumstances clearly establish lawyer-client relationship. It is
sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent
to his profession. (Toledo v. Kallos, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1900, January 28, 2005, 449 SCRA 446, 457).
Further, acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship. (Amaya v. Atty.
Tecson, 491 Phil. 111, 117 [2005]; Michael Ruby v. Atty. Espejo, et al., A.C. No. 10558, February 23,
2015, Reyes, J, citing Canons 16 & 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility).
Q State the duties of lawyer the moment there is a lawyer-client relationship. Explain.
Answer: The lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of the complainant and is obliged to keep the latter
informed of the status of his case. He is likewise bound to account for all money or property collected or
received from the complainant. He may be held administratively liable for any inaptitude or negligence
he may have had committed in his dealing with the complainant.
In Del Mundo v. Capistrano, A.C. No. 6903, 669 SCRA 462, it was emphasized that indeed, when
a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the
latters rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a
family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his client and makes him answerable
not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and society. His workload does not
justify neglect in handling ones case because it is settled that a lawyer must only accept cases as
much as he can efficiently handle.
Moreover, a lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money of his client that may come to his
possession. As trustee of such funds, he is bound to keep them separate and apart from his own.
Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for the filing and processing of a case if not
utilized, must be returned immediately upon demand. Failure to return gives rise to a presumption that
he has misappropriated it in violation of the trust reposed on him. And the conversion of funds
entrusted to him constitutes gross violation of professional ethics and betrayal of public confidence in
the legal profession. (Michael Ruby v. Atty. Espejo, et al., A.C. No. 10558, February 23, 2015, Reyes, J).
Q Respondent claimed or made to appear that STEELCORP was the licensee of the
technical information and the patent on Hot Dip Coating of Ferrous Strands or Philippine
Patent No. 16269. However, an extensive investigation made by the IBPs Commission on
In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation, 529 Phil. 876 (2006), it was held that the
preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving the practice of law which is
reserved exclusively for members of the legal profession. Atty. Bancolos authority and duty to sign a
pleading are personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he
may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court, counsels signature serves as a
certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge, information and belief
DEFINITION OF TERMS
Ambulance Chasing
A solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by laymen employed by an attorney for the
purpose or by an attorney himself.
Barratry
A lawyers act of fomenting suits among individuals and offering his legal services to one of
them for monetary motives or purposes.
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
Conflict of interest.
Applying the test to determine whether conflict of interest exists, respondent would necessarily
refute Mariano Turlas claim that he is Rufina Turlas sole heir when he agreed to represent Marilu Turla.
Worse, he knew that Mariano Turla was not the only heir. (Bernardino v. Atty. Victor Rey Santos, A.C. No.
10583; Atty. Jose Caringal v. Atty. Santos, A.C. No. 10583 & 10584, February 18, 2015).
ATTORNEYS FEES
24. The spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya entered into a compromise agreement
concerning the division of the subject lot where Atty. Lacaya ultimately agreed to
acquire one half of the subject property of Cadavedos. Atty. Lacaya defrayed all of the
litigation expenses without providing for reimbursement, in exchange for a contingency
fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot. Is the contingency of his fees justified the
compromise agreement and rendered the agreed fee under the compromise agreement
reasonable?
No. First, this agreement is champertous and is contrary to public policy. Second, the contingent fee
arrangement in this case expressly transgresses the Canons of Professional Ethics and, impliedly,
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Under Rule 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, a lawyer
may not properly agree with a client that the lawyer shall pay or beat the expense of litigation.
Lastly, the questioned attorneys fee should be declared void for being excessive and
unconscionable. The contingent fee of one-half of the subject lot was allegedly agreed to secure the
services of Atty. Lacaya. A large fee is only allowed in the showing that special skills and additional
work had been involved. The issue involved in that case was simple and did not require of Atty.
Lacaya extensive skill, effort and research. The issue simply dealt with the prohibition against the
sale of a homestead lot within five years from its acquisition(Cadavedo v. Lacaya, G.R. No. 173188,
January 15, 2014).
DISBARMENT
Q Is the Constitution the only basis of the power to discipline members of the Bar?
Explain.
Answer: No. The Courts authority is restated under Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which provides that a
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for
a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Sec. 27).
Q State the role of the Integrated Bar of the Phils. in the SCs power to discipline lawyers.
Explain.
Answer: In Ramirez v. Buhayang-Margallo, A.C. No. 10537 p. 8 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc], the Court
emphasized the authority of the court to impose disciplinary action on those admitted to the practice of
law, where it ruled that parenthetically, it is the SC that has the constitutionally mandated duty to
discipline lawyers. (Constitution [1987], Art. VIII, Sec. 5[5]). Under the current rules, the duty to assist
fact finding can be delegated to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The findings of the Integrated
Bar, however, can only be recommendatory, consistent with the constitutional power of the SC. Its
recommended penalties are also, by its nature, recommendatory. (A.C. No. 10537, p. 8 [Per J. Leonen,
En Banc]).
The authority given to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is based on Rule 139-B, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court, which provides that proceedings for the disbarment, suspension or discipline of
attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
upon the verified complaint of any person. However, this authority is only to assist the Court with
the investigation of the case, to determine factual findings, and to recommend, at best, the penalty
that may be imposed on the erring lawyer. (Bernardino v. Atty. Victor Rey Santos, A.C. No. 10583; Atty.
Jose Caringal v. Atty. Santos, A.C. No. 10583 & 10584, February 18, 2015).
30. The Rules of Court enumerate the grounds or causes for which an attorney may be
disbarred or suspended. May he be disciplined on other grounds in disregard of the
principle of inclusion unius est exclusion alterius?
Yes. The statutory grounds for disbarment or suspension are not to be taken as a limitation on the
general powers of the courts in this respect. The inherent powers of the court over its officers
cannot be restricted (Haliliv. Court of Industrial Relations, 130 SCRA 138).
In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be
removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct. Thus:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds.
A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in
his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. (Sps. Donato v. Atty. Asuncion, Sr., 468 Phil.
329, 335 [2004]). Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show
a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. Immoral
conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances
as to shock the communitys sense of decency. The Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme
penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct. (See
Garrido v. Attys. Garrido and Valencia, 625 Phil. 347, 358 [2010]).
From his own admission, he knew that the divorce decree he obtained from the court in the
Dominican Republic was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and his wife were both Filipino citizens
at that time. He knew that he was still validly married to his first wife; that he cannot marry anew
unless his previous marriage be properly declared a nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would
be void. This notwithstanding, he still married his best friend. The foregoing circumstances seriously
tainted his sense of social propriety and moral values. It is a blatant and purposeful disregard of our
laws on marriage.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pamintuan Devt. Co., 510 Phil. 839 [2005], the Court said that
while a lawyer is not required to present proof of his representation, when a court requires that he show
such authorization, it is imperative that he show his authority to act. Thus:
A lawyer is not even required to present a written authorization from the client. In
fact, the absence of a formal notice of entry of appearance will not invalidate the acts
performed by the counsel in his clients name. However, [a] court, on its own initiative or
on motion of the other party may require a lawyer to adduce authorization from the client.
Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to act as counsel for a person without
being retained nor may he appear in court without being employed unless by leave of court. If an
attorney appears on a clients behalf without a retainer or the requisite authority neither the litigant
whom he purports to represent nor the adverse party may be bound or affected by his appearance
unless the purported client ratifies or is estopped to deny his assumed authority. If a lawyer corruptly or
willfully appears as an attorney for a party to a case without authority, he may be disciplined or
punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transaction.
Q A lawyer was serving suspension when she represented her husband in a pending case.
May she be suspended? Explain.
Answer: Yes, because of willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
willfully appearing as an attorney of a party without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
She would have deserved a harsher penalty, but the Court recognized the fact that it is part of
the Filipino culture that amid an adversity, families will always look out and extend a helping hand to a
family member, more so, in this case, to a spouse. Thus, considering that her actuation was prompted
by her affection to her husband and that in essence, she was not representing a client but rather a
spouse, we deem it proper to mitigate the severeness of her penalty. (Feliciano v. Atty. Carmelita
Bautista-Lozada, A.C. No. 7593, March 11, 2015).
Q A lawyer defrauded a client by executing and notarizing a Deed of Sale so she could
apply for a loan in clients/complainants behalf. The document cannot be located especially
so that she did not submit her notarial register to the Clerk of Court. Hence, complainant
could not prove her claim that her signature was forged. She facilitated the sale in favor of
a third person without complainants approval. She was charged criminally, but the case
was dismissed as her guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. State the effect of her
acquittal on the disbarment case against her. Explain.
Answer: Her acquittal has no effect on the disbarment case.
A lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar
for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.
However, if the misconduct also constitutes a violation of the CPR or the lawyers oath or is of
such character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such
READMISSION
36. Nenita is the sole and exclusive legal heir of Pacita by virtue of a court order. Atty.
Madamot is the illegitimate half-cousin of Nenita administering the properties. Despite
the order of the court declaring Nenita as the successor-in-interest to all of Pacitas
properties, as well as her requests for the accounting and delivery of the dividends and
other proceeds or benefits coming from Pacitas stockholdings in various corporations
Atty. Madamot acting as the administrator, still mortgaged a commercial property in
favor of Philippine Savings Bank although there is already an existing Trust Agreement
wherein Atty. Madamot, in his capacity as President of URCI, recognized Nenita to be the
true and beneficial owner of the same. Is Atty. Madamot administratively liable for
serious misconduct?
Yes. Atty. Madamot is GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility by mortgaging the subject property, notwithstanding the apparent dispute over the
same. Regardless of the merits of his own claim as president, Atty. Madamot should have exhibited
prudent restraint becoming of a legal exemplar. He should not have exposed himself even to the
slightest risk of committing a property violation nor any action which would endanger the Bars
reputation. Verily, members of the Bar are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and
confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. By no
insignificant measure, respondent blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but also
that of the legal profession. In other words, his conduct fell short of the exacting standards
expected of him as a guardian of law and justice (Yupangco-Nakpil v. Atty. Uy, A.C. No. 9115,
September 17, 2014).
A lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but
also for gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity.
Lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and
to their clients. The fact that a lawyer obtained the loan and issued the worthless checks in her private
capacity and not as an attorney of a person is of no moment. A lawyer may be disciplined not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but also for gross misconduct outside of his professional
capacity. While the Court may not ordinarily discipline a lawyer for misconduct committed in his non-
professional or private capacity, the Court may be justified in suspending or removing him as an
attorney where his misconduct outside of the lawyers professional dealings is so gross in character as
to show him morally unfit and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer.
Further, the misconduct of the lawyer is aggravated by her unjustified refusal to obey the orders
of the IBP directing her to file an answer to the complaint and to appear at the scheduled mandatory
conference. This constitutes blatant disrespect for the IBP which amounts to conduct unbecoming a
lawyer.
Undoubtedly, a lawyers issuance of worthless checks and her blatant refusal to heed the
directives of the Quezon City Prosecutors Office and the IBP contravene Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 7,
Rule 7.03; and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. (Victoria C. Heenan v. Atty. Erlina
Espejo, A.C. No. 10050, December 3, 2013, Velasco, Jr., J)
The nature of the office of a lawyer requires that s/he shall be of good moral character. This
qualification is not only a condition precedent to the admission to the legal profession, but
its continued possession is essential to maintain ones good standing in the profession.
The Court found that the complainants could not have been defrauded without the
representations of respondent. He knew that his representations were false since the filing fee for a
petition for reconstitution in 2001 was only P3,145, and other expenses including the publication of the
filing of the petition could not have cost more than P20,000. It is clear that he employed deceit in
convincing complainants to part with their hard earned money and the latter could not have been
easily swayed to lend the money were it not for his misrepresentations and failed promises as a
member of the bar. He also failed to pay his just and legal obligation.
His disobedience to the directives of the IBP in failing to participate in the proceedings before it
is in reality a gross and blatant disrespect to the Court. Failing in this duty as a member of the bar
which is being supervised by the Court under the Constitution, the SC found that a heavier sanction
should fall on respondent. Thus, penalty is increased to 6 months suspension from the practice of law.
(Sps. Amador, et al. v. Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaa, A.C. No. 7434, August 23, 2007, Velasco, Jr., J)
Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-
bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its
members.
Senator Santiagos privilege speech attacking the Chief Justice and other members of the
Supreme Court was not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.
However, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court,
like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the Court and to maintain the
respect due its members. Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with
the higher degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice.
Senator Santiago should have known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her statements would
make on the peoples faith in the integrity of the courts. (Antero J. Pobre v. Sen. Miriam Defensor-
Santiago, A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009, Velasco, Jr., J)
The lawyer should not be sitting idly by and leave the rights of the client in a state of
uncertainty. The failure to file a brief resulting in the dismissal of an appeal constitutes
inexcusable negligence.
A retained counsel is expected to serve the client with competence and diligence. This duty
includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsels care and giving the client sound
legal advice, but also properly representing the client in court, attending scheduled hearings, preparing
and filing required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their
termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so. The lawyer should not
be sitting idly by and leave the rights of the client in a state of uncertainty. The failure to file a brief
resulting in the dismissal of an appeal constitutes inexcusable negligence. This default translates to a
violation of the injunction of Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
(Antonio Conlu v. Atty. Ireneo Aredonio, Jr., A.C. No. 4955, September 12, 2011, Velasco, Jr., J)
A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. As such, he is expected to respect the
courts order and processes.
Notaries public should refrain from affixing their signature and notarial seal on a document
unless the persons who signed it are the same individuals who executed and personally
appeared before the notaries public to attest to the truth of what are stated therein.
Notaries public should refrain from affixing their signature and notarial seal on a document
unless the persons who signed it are the same individuals who executed and personally appeared
before the notaries public to attest to the truth of what are stated therein. Without the appearance of
the person who actually executed the document in question, notaries public would be unable to verify
the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the
partys free act or deed. Furthermore, notaries public are required by the Notarial Law to certify that
the party to the instrument has acknowledged and presented before the notaries public the proper
residence certificate (or exemption from the residence certificate) and to enter its number, place, and
date of issue as part of certification.
The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice now requires a party to the instrument to present
competent evidence of identity: (a) at least one current identification document issued by an official
agency bearing the photograph and signature of the individual; (b) the oath or affirmation of one
credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or transaction who is personally known to the
notary public and who personally knows the individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is
privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows
to the notary public documentary identification. For failing to meet such requirements, Atty. Dimaanos
notarial commission was revoked. He was disqualified from being commission for 2 years and was
suspended from the practice of law for 1 year. (Dolores I. Dela Cruz, et al. v. Atty. Jose R. Dimaano, Jr.,
A.C. No. 7781, September 12, 2008, Velasco, Jr., J)
37. Atty. Nonnatus P. Chua claimed that ALUMCORP, a company where he was the Vice-
President and the corporate legal counsel, was the licensee of the technical information
and the patent on Cold Dip Covering of Sulfurous Strands or Philippine Patent No.
14344. However, an investigation on the matter showed that ALUMCORP only has rights
as a licensee of the technical information and not the rights as a licensee of the patent.
Did Atty. Mendoza violate the Code of Professional Responsibility?
Yes. Atty. Nonnatus P. Chua violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 10.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be misled by an artifice. In the case bar,
by making it appear that ALUMCORP has the rights as a licensee of the patent, when it fact it has no
such rights, Atty. Mendoza violated the mandate of the abovementioned Rule. As such, Atty.
Mendoza is guilty of deliberately misleading and intentionally deceiving the court, violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility (Sonic Steel Industries, Inc. vs Chua, A.C. No. 6942 July 17,
2013).
38. A lawyer consented to the submission of a falsified affidavit in order to beat the
deadline in an electoral protest. A complaint against him was filed, but he contended
that he has been discharged from all causes of action when the complainant filed a
Release Waiver and Discharge. Is his contention correct? Why?
No. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge
of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the nature of
disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance.
They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare and for preserving courts of
justice from the official administration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to
answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who
called the attention of the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has
generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice.
The lawyer was found guilty of violating the Lawyers Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility by submitting a falsified document before a court (Atty. Umaguing v.
Atty. Wallen R. De Vera, A.C. No. 10451, February 4, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J).
Lawyer may be disciplined for acts committed in his professional or private affairs.
Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct
committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to
be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether his conduct renders
him unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court(Tan, Jr. v. Gumba, A.C. No. 9000, October 5, 2011,
658 SCRA 527, 532; Roa v. Moreno, A.C. No. 8382, April 21, 2010, 618 SCRA 693, 699). Verily, Canon 7
of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and
integrity of the Legal Profession. Lawyers are similarly required under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the same
Code not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Failure to observe
these tenets of the Code of Professional Responsibility exposes the lawyer to disciplinary sanctions as
provided in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as amended, viz.:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice(Campuganv. Atty. Tolentino, Jr., A.C. No. 8261; Campugan v. Atty. Caluya,
A.C. No. 8725, March 11, 2015, Bersamin).
40. Atty. Mendoza, in her capacity as the Solicitor General, advised the Central Bank on the
procedure to liquidate GenBank and she filed a Petition for liquidation of Genbank,
which later on became Allied bank controlled by Lucio Tan. The PCGG in cases for ill-
gotten wealth against Lucio Tan and Allied Bank moved to disqualify Atty. Mendoza for
having been the counsel for Central bank before and for actively intervening in the
liquidation of GenBank. Is Atty. Mendoza disqualified from accepting employment in
connection with any matter in which she had intervened while in Government office
under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
No. Giving advice on the procedure for liquidation does not come under the term matter and
cannot disqualify Atty. Mendoza. The subject matter of the case for liquidation is different from the
sequestration of stocks involved in the PCGG cases. Intervention under Rule 6.03 means the act of
a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings or in which had participated
personally and substantially as a public officer, Also, ruling otherwise will deprive the former
government lawyer the freedom to exercise his profession (Domondon, Legal and Judicial Ethics
with Bar Questions 1920-1998 and Supreme Court Decisions up to December, 1998, 1999).
41. Dario leased from Ben a building space where she operated a bar. Meanwhile, Dario
entered a Retainer Agreement with RazSally Law Office where Atty. Raz and Atty. Sally
are partners. Ben terminated the lease for non-payment of rentals. Thereafter, one Nora
took over the operation of the bar under the latters business name. Dario filed an
MCLE
The Legislative
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;
The Judiciary
The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the SC, incumbent and retired justices of the judiciary,
incumbent members of the Judicial and Bar Council and incumbent court lawyers covered by the
Philippine Judicial Academy Program of Continuing Legal Education;
The Academe
a. Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of law who have teaching experience for at
least
10 years in accredited law schools;
b. The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of Professional Lecturers of the
Philippine Judicial Academy; and
Non-practicing lawyers
a. Those who are not in law practice, private or public.
b. Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the IBP Board of Governors.
Other exemptions
A member may file a verified request setting forth good cause for exemption (such as physical
disability, illness, post graduate study abroad, proven expertise in law, etc.) from compliance with
or modification of any of the requirements, including an extension of time for compliance, in
accordance with a procedure to be established by the MCLE Committee.
Effect of failure to indicate in all pleadings filed the number and date of issue of their MCLE
Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption.
The Court En Banc issued a Resolution dated January 14, 2014, which reads as follows: B.M.
No. 1922 (Re: Recommendation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education [MCLE] Board to Indicate
in All Pleadings Filed with the Courts the Counsel's MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of
Exemption). - The Court Resolved, upon the recommendation of the MCLE Governing Board, to: (a)
AMEND the June 3, 2008 resolution by repealing the phrase "Failure to disclose the required
information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the
records" and replacing it with "Failure to disclose the required information would subject the counsel to
appropriate penalty and disciplinary action"
Notary public who notarizes a document even without the presence of the party, may he be
suspended.
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are
the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and
the truth of what are stated therein. These acts of the affiants cannot be delegated because what are
stated therein are facts they have personal knowledge of and are personally sworn to. Otherwise, their
representatives names should appear in the said documents as the ones who executed the same.
The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangements. By affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, he converted the Deed of Absolute Sale,
from a private document into a public document. In doing so, he effectively proclaimed to the world
that: (a) all the parties therein personally appeared before him; (b) they are all personally known to
him; (c) they were the same persons who executed the instruments; (d) he inquired into the
voluntariness of execution of the instrument; and (e) they acknowledged personally before him that
they voluntarily and freely executed the same. A notary public is mandated to discharge his sacred
duties with faithful observance and utmost respect for the legal solemnity of an oath in an
acknowledgment or jurat. The act of certifying under oath an irregular Deed of Absolute Sale without
requiring the personal appearance of the persons executing the same constitutes gross negligence in
the performance of duty as a notary public(Salita v. Atty. Reynaldo Salve, A.C. No. 8101, February 4,
2015, Perlas-Bernabe).
JUDICIAL ETHICS
44. Judge L is assigned in Turtle Province. His brother ran for Governor in Rabbit Province.
During the election period, Judge L took a leave of absence to help his brother
conceptualize the campaign strategy. He even contributed a modest amount to the
campaign kitty and hosted lunches and dinners. Did Judge L incur administrative and/or
criminal liability? (Bar, 2010)
Yes. Judge L incurred administrative liability. Rule 5.18 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which applies
suppletorily to the New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, provides that [A] Judge is
entitled to entertain personal views on political questions, but to avoid suspicion of political
partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches, contribute to party funds, publicly endorse
candidates for political office or participate in other partisan political activities.
He may also be held criminally liable for violation of Sec. 26 (I) of the Omnibus Election Code, which
penalizes any officer or employee in the civil service who, directly or indirectly, intervenes, in any
election campaign or engages in any partisan political activity, except to vote or to preserve public
order.
Judges of the first and second level courts are allowed to receive assistance from the local
government units where they are stationed.
The Supreme Court has upheld the grant of allowances by local government units to judges,
prosecutors, public elementary and high school techers, and other national government officials
stationed in or assigned to the locality pursuant to Sections 447(a)(1)(xi), 458(a)(1)(xi) and 468(a)(1)
(xi) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code. The Supreme Court held
that to rule against the power of the LGUs to grant allowances to judges will subvert the principle of
local autonomy zealously guaranteed by the Constitution. Hence, it is not improper for judges and
justices to receive allowances from local government units, since it is allowed by law for LGUs to give
the same (Dadole v. Commission on Audit (393 SCRA 262 [2002]), and Leynes v. Commission on Audit
(418 SCRA 180 [2003]).
Exceptions to the rule that judges and members of their families cannot accept gifts, award
or benefit.
Judges may accept gifts provided that it might not reasonably be perceived as intended to
influence him/her. Section 7(d) of RA 6713 allows the following: (NST)
i Gift of Nominal value tendered and received as a souvenir or mark of courtesy;
ii Scholarship or fellowship grant or medical treatment;
iii Travel grants or expenses for travel taking place entirely outside the Philippines of more
than nominal value if such acceptance is appropriate or consistent with the interest of the
Philippines, and permitted by the head office, branch or agency to which the judge belongs.
A judge may not stay at his house to make some research, resolve motions and make
decisions during days when he does not have scheduled hearings.
A judge must report to his office even if he has no hearing on regular days. Pursuant to Circular
No. 13, dated July 1, 1987, the Supreme Court emphasized the need for punctuality and the faithful
observance of office hours with Judges being enjoined to strictly observe the requirement of eight (8)
hours of service a day. This was reiterated in Administrative Circular No. 1 of January 28, 1988. In a
decided case, it was said that the law regulating court sessions does not permit any day off from
regular office hours to enable a judge to engage exclusively in research or decision-writing, no matter
how important (Lacuron v.Atienza, A.M. No. RTJ-90-456, January 14, 1992).
45. When can judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts perform
the function of notaries public ex officio, even if the notarization of the documents is not
in connection with the exercise of their official functions and duties?
MTC and MCTC judges assigned to municipalities of circuits with no lawyers or notaries public may,
in their capacity as notary public ex officio perform any act within the competency of a regular
notary public, provide that (1) all notarial fees charged be for the account of the government and
turned over to the municipal treasurer (Lapena vs Marcos, A.M. No. 1969-MJ), and (2) certification
Judge may not be subjected to disciplinary action for mere errors of judgment.
For the liability to attach for gross negligence of the law, the assailed order, decision or
actuation of a judge must not only be found erroneous but, most importantly, it must be established
that the judge was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other like motive ( Dela Cruz v.
Concepcion, 235 SCRA 597).
Under Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, anonymous complaints may be filed against
judges, but they must be supported by public records of indubitable integrity. Courts have acted in such
instances needing no corroboration by evidence to be offered by the complainant. Thus, for anonymous
complaints, the burden of proof in administrative proceedings which usually rests with the complainant,
must be buttressed by indubitable public records and by what is sufficiently proven during the
investigation. If the burden of proof is not overcome, the respondent is under no obligation to prove his
defense (Anonymous v. Achas, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801, February 27, 2013).
48. A complaint was filed 24 years after the alleged offending act was committed, when the
judge was still a practicing lawyer prior to his appointment as judge. Will the complaint
be barred by prescription?
No. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained
of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot
escape the disciplining arm of the Court (Heck v. Santos, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657, February 23, 2004,
cited in AGUIRRE, 2014).
If a judge has already retired when an administrative case was filed against him, he is no
longer within the courts jurisdiction.
In order for the Court to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative case, the complaint must be
filed during the incumbency of the respondent. Once jurisdiction is acquired, it is not lost by reason of
respondents cessation from office. Administrative cases against judges instituted after tenure in office
effectively barred the Court from pursuing the administrative proceedings. Even if there are no
promulgated rules on the conduct of judicial audit, the absence of such rules should not serve as
license to recommend the imposition of penalties to retired judges who, during their incumbency, were
never given a chance to explain the circumstances behind the results of the judicial audit (Office of the
Court Administrator v. Andaya, A.M. NO. RTJ-09-2181, June 25, 2013).
49. State, with a brief explanation, whether the judge concerned may be sanctioned for the
conduct stated below.
a) Refusing to inhibit himself although one of the lawyers in the case is his second
cousin.
b) Deciding a case in accordance with a Supreme Court ruling but adding that he does
not agree with the ruling.
a) One of the mandatory grounds for inhibition of a judge is when he is related to any of the
lawyers handling a case before him within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity
(Sec. 5 [f], New Code of Judicial Conduct, Section 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court). A second cousin
of a judge is his relative within the sixth degree. Hence, he may not be sanctioned for not
inhibiting on such ground.
b) There is nothing wrong with such action. In fact, if a judge of a lower court feels that a decision
of the Supreme Court is against his way of reasoning or against his conscience, he may state his
opinion, but apply the law in accordance with the interpretation of the Supreme Court (Alberto
v. CFI of Manila, G.R. No. L-26364, May 29, 1968).
c) There is no rule prohibiting such conduct, especially in simple cases such as when an accused
pleads guilty to an Information for a minor offense. But in complex and serious cases, such
conduct may be considered inappropriate and the judge accused of arriving at hasty decisions.
In the case of Young v. De Guzman, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1365, February 18, 1999, the Supreme
Court gave this advice:
x x x (T)he judge must not sacrifice for expediencys sake the fundamental requirements of
due process nor to forget that he must conscientiously endeavor each time to seek the truth, to
know and aptly apply the law, and to dispose of the controversy objectively and impartially, all
to the end that justice is done to every party (U.P. LAW COMPLEX, Answer to the Bar
Examination Questions in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises).
In ejectment cases, the first duty of a judge is to examine the allegations in the complaint
and the evidence appended to it, and to dismiss the case outright on any of the grounds
apparent for the dismissal of a civil action. If there is a ground for dismissal existing and
apparent upon the filing of the complaint, and yet the judge allowed the case to
unnecessarily drag on, the judge is guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision.
Under the Rule on Summary Procedure, the first duty of the respondent upon the filing of the
case for ejectment was to examine the allegations in the complaint and the evidence appended to it,
and to dismiss the case outright on any of the grounds apparent for the dismissal of a civil action. In
this case, the ground for dismissing the Civil Case existed and was apparent upon the filing of the basic
complaint. The representatives lack of personality was reflected in the corporate secretary's certificate
appended to the complaint. Yet, respondent judge allowed the case to unnecessarily drag on for more
than five years. Further, respondent having allowed several and doubtless unnecessary postponements
which contributed to the delay in the resolution of what was otherwise a simple case. Undue delay in
rendering a decision or order constitutes a less serious offense for which respondent is subjected to a
fine. (Josefina Naguiat v. Judge Mario B. Capellan, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1782 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-1807-
MTJ], March 23, 2011, Velasco, Jr., J)
Gross ignorance of the law on the part of a judge presupposes an appalling lack of
familiarity with simple rules of law or procedures and well-established jurisprudence which
tends to erode the public trust in the competence and fairness of the court which he
personifies.
Gross ignorance of the law on the part of a judge presupposes an appalling lack of familiarity
with simple rules of law or procedures and well-established jurisprudence which tends to erode the
public trust in the competence and fairness of the court which he personifies. Not to know the law as
basic, almost elementary, as the Rules of Court, or acting in disregard of established rule of law as if he
were not aware of the same constitutes gross ignorance whence no one is excused, especially an RTC
judge.
Respondent judge, in granting provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr. in favor of his mother,
Eltesa, did not disregard the res judicata rule. The more appropriate description of the legal situation
engendered by the March 15, 2011 Order issued amidst the persistent plea of the child not to be
returned to his father, is that respondent judge exhibited fidelity to jurisprudential command to accord
primacy to the welfare and interest of a minor child. As it were, the matter of custody, to borrow from
Espiritu v. Court of Appeals," is not permanent and unalterable and can always be re-examined and
adjusted." And as aptly observed in a separate opinion in Dacasin v. Dacasin, a custody agreement can
never be regarded as "permanent and unbending," the simple reason being that the situation of the
parents and even of the child can change, such that sticking to the agreed arrangement would no
longer be to the latters best interest. In a very real sense, then, a judgment involving the custody of a
minor child cannot be accorded the force and effect of res judicata. (Geoffrey Beckett v. Judge Olegario
R. Sarmiento, A.M. RTJ-12-2326, January 30, 2013, Velasco, Jr., J)
No less than the 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 15(1), Article VIII, mandates lower courts
to decide or resolve all cases or matters within three (3) months from their date of submission. In
relation to this mandate, the Code of Judicial Conduct directs judges to dispose of their business
promptly and decide cases within the required period. The Court, in Administrative Circular No. 3-99
dated January 15, 1999, likewise requires judges to scrupulously observe the periods provided in the
Constitution. Failure to decide cases within the reglementary period, without strong and justifiable
reason, constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of an administrative sanction on the
defaulting judge. (Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Leodegario C. Quilatan, A.M. No. MTJ-09-
1745, September 27, 2010, Velasco, Jr., J)
Effect if a judge failed to decide 23 cases already submitted for decision within the
reglementary period.
Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution provides that lower courts have three months
within which to decide cases or resolve matters submitted to them for resolution. Moreover, Canon 3,
Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to dispose of their business promptly and
decide cases within the required period. In addition, under SC Administrative Circular No. 13 judges
shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15, of the Constitution for the
adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases or matters
must be decided or resolved within twelve months from date of submission by all lower collegiate
courts while all other lower courts are given a period of three months to do so. The Court has
reiterated this admonition in SC Administrative Circular No. 3-99 which requires all judges to
scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the Constitution for deciding cases and the failure to
comply therewith is considered a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to speedy
disposition of their cases. (Re: Submitted for Decision Before Judge Baluma, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2355,
September 2, 2013, Leonardo-de Castro, J).
Q A judge was charged administratively for having delayed the rendition of judgment in
several cases submitted before him. May he be held liable? Explain.
Answer: Yes. Decision-making, among other duties, is the primordial and most important duty of a
member of the bench. The speedy disposition of cases in the courts is a primary aim of the judiciary so
the ends of justice may not be compromised and the judiciary will be true to its commitment to provide
litigants their constitutional right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of their cases.
A judge is mandated to render a decision not more than 90 days from the time a case is
submitted for decision. Judges are to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within
the period specified in the Constitution, that is, 3 months from the filing of the last pleading, brief or
memorandum. Failure to observe said rule constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against the
defaulting judge, absent sufficient justification for his non-compliance therewith.
Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that judges should administer justice
without delay. Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 states that judges shall dispose of the courts business promptly
and decide cases within the required periods. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Javellana, the Court
held that:
A judge cannot choose his deadline for deciding cases pending before him.
Without an extension granted by this Court, the failure to decide even a single case within
the required period constitutes gross inefficiency that merits administrative sanction.
The Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically Canon3, Rule 3.05 mandates judges to
attend promptly to the business of the court and decide cases within the periods
prescribed by law and the Rules. Under the 1987 Constitution, lower court judges are also
mandated to decide cases within 90 days from submission. (OCA v. Judge Bustamante,
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1806, April 7, 2014, Leonardo-de Castro, J).
Judges must closely adhere to the Code of Judicial Conduct in order to preserve
the integrity, competence and independence of the judiciary and make the administration
of justice more efficient. Time and again, we have stressed the need to strictly observe
this duty so as not to negate our efforts to minimize, if not totally eradicate, the twin
problems of congestion and delay that have long plagued our courts.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Garcia-Blanco, the Court held that the 90-
day reglementary period is mandatory. Failure to decide cases within the reglementary
Q A judge cited a person in contempt and ordered his detention for an inadvertent
usurpation of his parking lot on the theory that there was improper conduct on his part in
doing so. May the judge be penalized? Explain.
Answer: Yes. Under the Rules, after a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the
respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by
himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
x x x.
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice.
The phrase improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice is so broad and general that it encompasses wide spectrum of acts that could
constitute indirect contempt. However, the act of complainant in parking his car in a slot allegedly
reserved for respondent judge does not fall under this category. There was no showing that he acted
with malice and/or bad faith or that he was improperly motivated to delay the proceedings of the court
by making use of the parking slot supposedly reserved for respondent judge. It cannot also be said that
act of complainant constitutes disrespect to the dignity of the court. In sum, the incident is too flimsy
and inconsequential to be the basis of an indirect contempt proceeding. (Inonong v. Judge Francisco
Ibay, A.M. No. RTC-09-2175, July 28, 2009, Leonardo-de Castro, J).
Effect if a municipal court judge prepared and notarized an Extrajudicial Partition with
Sale.
SC Circular No. 1-90 prohibits judges from undertaking the preparation and acknowledgment of
private documents, contracts and other deeds of conveyance which have no direct relation to the
discharge of their official functions. In this case, respondent judge admitted that he prepared both the
document itself, entitled Extra-Judicial Partition with Simultaneous Absolute Deed of Sale and the
acknowledgment of the said document, which had no relation at all to the performance of his function
as a judge. These acts of respondent judge are clearly proscribed by the aforesaid Circular.
While it may be true that no notary public was available or residing within respondent judges
territorial jurisdiction, as shown by the certifications issued by the RTC Clerk of Court and the Municipal
Mayor of Talibon, Bohol, SC Circular No. 1-90 specifically requires that a certification attesting to the lack
of any lawyer or notary public in the said municipality or circuit be made in the notarized document.
Effect if judge did not set the preliminary conference of an ejectment suit within 30 days
after the answer was filed.
Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall dispose of the
courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. In general, courts are required
to decide cases submitted for decision within three months from the date of such submission. With
respect to cases falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure, first level court are only allowed 30 days
following the receipt of the last affidavit and position paper, or the expiration of the period for filing the
same, within which to render judgment.
Competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with
the rules, he erodes the publics confidence in the competence of our courts. It is highly imperative that
judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles. Basic legal procedures must be at the
palm of a judges hands. (Hipe v. Judge Literato, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1781, April 25, 2012, Leoanrdo-de
Castro, J).
The Court has constantly impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and
expeditiously, for it cannot be gainsaid that justice delayed is justice denied. Delay in the disposition of
cases undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary. Hence, judges are enjoined to
decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the
imposition of administrative sanction on them.
Q A judge was charged with sexual harassment by one of the employees of the court,
Allegedly, he kissed the lady-employee, rubbed his body against hers. when she pushed
him, he knelt down with one hand clasping her waist while the other was on her breast.
There was however no substantial evidence to prove the allegations. Can the judge be
penalized? Explain.
Answer: No, considering that there was no sufficient evidence to create a moral certainty that the judge
committed the act, he should be exonerated. Administrative complaints against members of the
judiciary are viewed by the Court with utmost care, for proceedings of this nature affect not only the
reputation of the respondents concerned, but the integrity of the entire judiciary as well. (Aquino v.
Acosta, 429 Phil. 498 [2002]). Considering that the complainants failed to present substantial evidence
to prove the alleged sexual advances committed against them by respondent, elementary justice
dictates that he be exonerated from the said charge. (Samahan ng mga Babae sa Hudikatura
(Samabahu) v. Judge Cesar O. Untalan, A.M. No. RTC-13-2363, February 25, 2015, Villarama, J).
Q In administrative complaints against judges who has the burden of proof? Explain.
Answer: In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in his
complaint with substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Further, it is settled that the assessment of the
credibility of witnesses is a function primarily lodged in the Investigating Justice. The finding of
investigating magistrates are generally given great weight by the Court by reason of the unmatched
opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified. The rule which concedes due
respect, and even finality, to the assessment of credibility of witnesses by trial judges in civil and
criminal cases applies a fortiori to administrative cases. However, there are some exceptions to the rule
according finality to the trial judges assessment of a witness testimony, such as when his evaluation
was reached arbitrarily or when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which would affect the result of the case. (Samahan ng mga
Babae sa Hudikatura (Samabahu) v. Judge Cesar O. Untalan, A.M. No. RTC-13-2363, February 25, 2015,
Villarama, J).
Q A complaint was filed against a judge alleging gross-ignorance of the law and gross
inefficiency. It appears that there were complaints for slight physical injuries before the
MTC. The accused filed a MTD on the ground that there was no prior referral to the Lupon
for conciliation which is prohibited under Sec. 412 of the Local Government Code. The
motion was denied, hence, the complaint. In his answer, the judge admitted and apologized
for his mistake, attributing it to pure oversight and inadvertence. He said that he had
no intention to disregard the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure or apply his own
interpretation of the rule. He explained that the inadvertence was mainly because of the
bulk of work that he had to attend to, as the case was brought to him barely a year since he
was appointed as a judge. He admitted that he erroneously thought that the certification
to file action was for Criminal Case No. 10-13570 and not Criminal Case 10-13569. Can the
judge be penalized? Explain.
Answer: Yes, because of his carelessness in disposing of the motion. His experience as a public attorney
and prosecutor should have ingrained in him well-settled doctrines and basic tenets of law. He cannot
be relieved from the consequences of his actions simply because he was newly appointed and his case
load was heavy. These circumstances are not unique to him. His carelessness disposition of the motions
is a reflection of his competency as a judge in discharging his official duties.
Judges are to be reminded that it is the height of incompetence to dispense cases callously and
in utter disregard of procedural rules. Whether the resort to the shortcuts is borne out of ignorance or
convenience is immaterial. Judges took an oath to dispense their duties with competence and integrity;
to fall short would be a disservice not only to the entire judicial system, but more importantly to the
public. Respondents failure must not be brushed aside. (Chua Keng Sin v. Judge Mangente, A.M. No.
MTJ-15-1851, February 11, 2015, Leonen, J).
Q Explain the relationship between the judge on the one hand and media and public
opinion on the other.
Answer: Media, as an institution, is undisputedly a pillar of a democratic polity. It is the main engine in
the formulation of public opinion. It can indeed influence in large measure all instrumentalities of
government sometimes, even the judiciary. This reality sometimes clashes with the doctrine of
judicial independence and this happens when media intrudes into the domain of judicial
adjudication. In such a case, judges are advised that, in furtherance of the canon of judicial
independence, they should ignore public opinion, disregard intrusive editorials and columns and brush
aside the horn in arguments and opinions of TV and radio commentators.
In Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992, the SC said:
It appears that the trial court has been moved by a desire to cater to public
opinion to the detriment of the impartial administration of justice. The petitioner as
portrayed by media is not exactly a popular person. Nevertheless, the trial court should
not have been influenced by this irrelevant consideration, remembering instead that its
only guide was the mandate of the law.
Canon 3: Impartiality
Q A party litigant moved for the inhibition of a judge but did not present evidence of
partiality. Should the judge inhibit himself? Explain.
Answer: No. Bare allegations of partially and prejudgment will not suffice in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his role to dispense
justice according to law and evidence without fear or favor. (Heirs of Juaban v. Boncale, et. al., G.R. No.
156011, July 6, 2008, 557 SCRA 1; Law Firm of Tungcol & Tibayan v. CA, G.R. No. 169298, July 9, 2008,
557 SCRA 451).
Inhibition must be for just and valid causes: mere impression of bias and partiality is not
ground for a judge to inhibit, especially when the charge is without sufficient basis. ( City of Naga v.
Asuncion, G.R. No. 174042, July 9, 2008, 528 SCRA 528).
Q A judge inhibited himself on the ground that he had personal knowledge of the disputed
evidentiary facts. Is the act proper? Why?
Answer: In Umale v. Villaluz, G.R. No. 33508, May 25, 1973, 51 SCRA 84, the Supreme Court
commended a judge who voluntarily inhibited himself on the ground that he had personal knowledge of
the case.
When a judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceedings, he should recuse from the case.
The purpose of this ground for disqualification is to avoid a situation where a judge may factor
into the decisional process facts which are not borne out by evidence duly presented in and admitted
by the court in the course of trial. Thus, any kind of knowledge of a judge which he obtains
extrajudicially about a case before him should be sufficient reason for him to recuse from the case. For
example, if a judge witnessed the killing of a person, he should disqualify himself from trying a criminal
case involving such incident which is filed and raffled to his court.
Q A Municipal Trial Court judge took cognizance of a criminal complaint lodged by his
brother, and issued a warrant of arrest. May the judge be disciplined for his act? Explain.
Answer: Yes, in fact such judge was dismissed from service. The rule on compulsory disqualification of a
judge to hear a case where, as in the instant case, the respondent judge is related to either party within
the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity rests on the salutary principle that no judge should preside
in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. A judge has both the
duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as
to his fairness and integrity. The law conclusively presumes that a judge cannot objectively or
impartially sit in such a case and, for that reason, prohibits him and strikes at his authority to hear and
decide it, in the absence of written consent of all parties concerned. The purpose is to preserve the
peoples faith and confidence in the courts justice. (Garcia v. Dela Pena, A.M. No. MTJ-92-637, February
9, 1994, 229 SCRA 766).
Voluntary inhibition
A judge is allowed under the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, to
voluntary inhibit from a case for just or valid reasons other than those grounds of disqualification. The
judge should always remind himself to hear or decide cases filed or raffled to his court. In inhibition of
judges, a judge may motu proprio or on motion of a party voluntarily recuse from a case if he has good
or valid reasons which render him incapable of acting objectively on the case.
Absent any ground for disqualification, a judge should not inhibit and if a motion to that effect
is filed, he should deny it if, despite the circumstances cited by the movant, he honestly believes that
he can act on the case objectively. That notwithstanding, it may be helpful for a judge, faced with a
motion to inhibit, to consider the counsel of the Supreme Court:
A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when
suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or
with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably capable
of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should
30 |ABRC2016.Pointers in Legal and Judicial Ethics (combined)/EVSA/crys
exercise his discretion in a way that the peoples faith in the courts of justice is not
impaired.
One factor that a judge should consider in resolving a motion for voluntary inhibition is the
availability of a judge to take over the case should he decide to recuse from it. Parayno v. Meneses,
G.R. No. 112684, April 26, 1994, 231 SCRA 807, suggests that under the circumstances, the judge
should not inhibit in order that justice may not be delayed.
Competence
The Constitution prescribes that a judge, among others, must be a person of proven
competence. Antithetical to competence is gross ignorance of the law. To constitute gross ignorance of
the law, an error or irregularity on the part of a judge on the application and interpretation of the law
must not only be contrary to law and jurisprudence but should be motivated by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty, and corruption.
Administrative complaint against justices pending petition with SC is not proper; judicial
remedies should be availed.
The acts complained of in an administrative case against justices of the CA relate to the validity
of the proceedings before the CA which were done in the exercise of their judicial functions. Resort to
administrative charges against them is not proper.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that errors, if any, committed by a judge in the
exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but
should instead be assailed through available judicial remedies. (Maylas, Jr. v. Sese, 529 Phil. 594, 597
(2006); Bautista v. Abdulwahid, A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-97-CA-J, May 2, 2006, 488 SCRA 428, 434).
Disciplinary proceedings against judges do not complement, supplement or substitute judicial remedies
and, thus, cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved
by their erroneous orders or judgments. (Monticalbo v. Maraya, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-09-2197, April 13, 2011,
648 SCRA 573, 583, citing Flores v. Abesamis, 341 Phil. 299, 313 (1997)).
In Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. v. Lavia, 530 Phil. 441 (2006), it was ruled that resort to and
exhaustion of judicial remedies and a final ruling on the matter, are prerequisites for the taking of
appropriate measures against the judges concerned, whether of criminal, civil or administrative nature.
If the assailed act is subsequently found and declared to be correct, there would be no occasion to
proceed against him at all.
Resort to administrative disciplinary action prior to the final resolution of the judicial issues
involved constitutes an abuse of court processes that serves to disrupt rather than promote the orderly
administration of justice and further clog the courts dockets. Those who seek relief from the courts
must not be allowed to ignore basic legal rules and abuse court processes in their efforts to vindicate
their rights. (Re: Verified Complaint of AMA Land Inc. against Hon. Bueser, et al., A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-
202-CA-J, January 5, 2013; See also: Fernandez, et al. v. CA Associate Justice Bato, et al., A.M. OCA IPI
No. 12-201-CA-J, February 19, 2013).
Q During the hearing a case, where Mayor Villarosa was a party, stepped out of the
courtroom to take a call. He exited through the door used by the judge and the employees
of the court. According to complainants, the Mayor did not speak to anyone, not even his
lawyer, before leaving the courtroom. Thus, it came as a surprise to everyone when
respondent suddenly explained that the Mayor had to excuse himself for an important
appointment. May the judge be penalized for such action? Explain.
Answer: Yes, because of acts of impropriety. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities. (Canon 4).
The above provisions clearly enjoin judges not only from committing acts of impropriety, but
even acts that have the appearance of impropriety. This is because appearance is as important as
reality in the performance of judicial functions. A judge like Ceasar's wife must not only be pure
and faithful, but must also be above suspicion. (Dionisio v. Escao, 362 Phil. 46 [1999]).
In this case, instead of reprimanding Mayor Villarosa for not asking for the courts permission to
leave while the trial was ongoing, respondent appeared to serve as the formers advocate. He did so by
declaring in open court that the abrupt exit of the Mayor should be excused, as the latter had an
important appointment to attend. Respondent does not deny this in his Comment. It was the Mayors
lawyer, and not respondent judge, who had the duty of explaining why the mayor left the courtroom
without asking for the courts permission.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not
only maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; they must also avoid any appearance of
impropriety or partiality, which may erode the people's faith in the Judiciary. (Re: Letter of Presiding
Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. on CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 [Antonio Rosete v. Securities and Exchange
Commission], 586 Phil. 321 [2008]). Members of the Judiciary should be beyond reproach and suspicion
in their conduct, and should be free from any appearance of impropriety in the discharge of their official
duties, as well as in their personal behavior and everyday life. (Ladignon v. Garong, 584 Phil. 352
[2008]).
The actions of respondent no doubt diminished public confidence and public trust in him as a
judge. He gave petitioners reason to doubt his integrity and impartiality. Petitioners cannot be blamed
for thinking that respondent must have directly communicated with Mayor Villarosa. Otherwise, he
would not have been able to explain that the Mayor could no longer return to attend the hearing after
leaving, when not even the latters own lawyers knew that. (Ascano, Jr., et al. v. Judge Jose Jacinto, Jr.,
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2405, January 12, 2015).
CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge
and of the judiciary.
It is clear from all the foregoing that respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming a judge.
Q Petitioners claimed that during the hearings of a case that the judge argued, berated,
accused, scolded, confused and admonished petitioners without basis or
justification. They further claimed that respondent judge asked complainants confusing
and misleading questions all geared and intended to elicit answers damaging to the cause
of petitioners and favorable to the cause of their adversary. May the judge be penalized
for his actions? Explain.
Answer: Yes. The judge raised his voice and uttered abrasive and unnecessary remarks to petitioners
witness.31 Respondent failed to conduct himself in accordance with the mandate of Section 6, Canon 6
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, (A.M. NO. 03-05-01-SC [2004]) which
reads:
SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the
court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers
and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar
conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction
or control.
A Judge should be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court, (De la
Cruz v. Carretas, 559 Phil. 5 (2007) citing Retuya v. Equipilag, 180 Phil. 335 [1979]), viz:
It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness. The act
betrays lack of patience, prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times be
temperate in his language. He must choose his words, written or spoken, with utmost care
and sufficient control. The wise and just man is esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing
speech increases his persuasiveness. (Ascano, Jr., et al. v. Judge Jose Jacinto, Jr., A.M. No.
RTJ-15-2405, January 12, 2015).
IMPEACHMENT
All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment.
51. Atty. Cuenco filed a complaint for the disbarment alleging that Justice Fernan appeared
as counsel for the instituted heirs in the Vito Borromeo intestate estate proceedings,
and despite having already accepted his appointment as an Associate Justice of the
Court, continues to be counsel for the instituted heirs. He also alleged that Justice
Fernan exerted personal efforts to take away the Vito Borromeo proceedings from the
Supreme Court en banc, the First and Second Divisions, to his Office to enable him to
influence the decision or the outcome. The records, however, reveal that Justice Fernan
withdrew as counsel as early as February 19, 1968, long before his appointment to the
Court in April 1986. An annotation appears beside his signature, which states: No part
I appeared as counsel for one of the parties. Will the complaint for disbarment
prosper?
No. Members of the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the Constitution, be members
of the Philippine Bar and may be removed from office only by impeachment (Article XI [2],
Constitution). To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member's
incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence to ran afoul of the constitutional mandate
that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction of
certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution (Cuenco v.Fernan, A.M. No. 3135,
February 17, 1988).
52. In the case for Xs impeachment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, X admitted that
he has P80 Million in 3 Peso accounts and US$2.4 Million in 4 US Dollar accounts, but
that he had purposely not declared these assets for 2 reasons: (1) That his Peso
accounts represented "co-mingled funds" with the funds belonging to other parties such
as the Basa Guidote Enterprises, Inc. (BGEI) or his children, and (2) That he was not
required to report or declare his foreign currency deposits in his SALN because they
were absolutely confidential under R.A. 6426. Is he correct?
No. If, indeed, any of the Respondents cash deposits were co-mingled with the funds belonging to
other parties, the Respondent was still duty-bound to declare these deposits in his SALN, they being
admittedly under his name. Assuming that any part of such deposits in truth belonged to third
parties, the Respondent could have indicated such third-party funds as corresponding liabilities in
his SALN. That would have reflected his real net worth.
As regards the second contention, the Respondent Chief Justice's reliance on the absolute
confidentiality accorded to foreign currency deposits under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426 is
grossly misplaced. The Constitution, in Article XI, Sec. 17, provides that "A public officer or
employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often as may be required by law, submit a
declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities and net worth. x x x "
The provisions of R.A. 6426 cannot be interpreted as an exception to the unequivocal command and
tenor of Article XI, Sec. 17, of the 1987 Constitution. x x x The so-called conflict of laws between
R.A. Nos. 6713 and 6426 is more illusory than real. Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 merely prohibits the
examination, inquiry or looking into a foreign currency deposit account by an entity or person other
than the depositor himself. But there is nothing in R.A. No. 6426 which prohibits the depositor from
making a declaration on his own of such foreign currency funds, especially in this case where the
Constitution mandates the depositor who is a public officer to declare all assets under oath (The
vote of the Senate President HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, On Article II of the Articles of Impeachment
against Hon. Chief Justice Renato C. Corona).
Sec. 1. Courts always open; justice to be promptly and impartially administered, for the
following:
1. Filing of any pleading, motion or other papers;
2. The trial of cases;
3. Hearing of motions; and
4. Issuance of orders or rendition of judgments.
Exception: Legal holidays
As to publicity of records
General Rule: The records of every court of justice shall be public records, available for the
inspection of any interested person, at all proper business hours, under the supervision of the
clerk having custody of such records,
Exception: Any special case, have forbidden their publicity, in the interest of morality or
decency.
Writs of execution issued by inferior courts may be enforced in any part of the part of the
Philippines without any previous approval of the judge of first instance.
Criminal process may be issued by a justice of the peace or other inferior court, to be served
outside his province, when the district judge, or in his absence the provincial fiscal, shall certify that
in his opinion the interest of justice require such service.
Grounds for Disqualification and Inhibition of Judges under the Rules of Court:
1. Mandatory or Compulsory Disqualification (RULES OF COURT, Rule 137)(PREP)
a. When he, or his wife, or child is Pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise;
b. When he is Related to either party within the sixth (6 th) degree of consanguinity or affinity or
to counsel within the fourth (4th) civil degree;
c. When he has been an Executor, guardian, administrator, trustee or counsel; or
d. When he has Presided in an inferior court where his ruling or decision is subject to review.
2. Voluntary Inhibition: A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself,
for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned above (Rule 137, Sec. 1).
Rationale: No judge should handle a case in which he might be perceived, rightly or wrongly,
to be susceptible to bias and partiality (Ubanes v. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 72, 1994).
53. Rebeccas complaint was raffled to the sala of Judge A. Rebecca is a daughter of Judge
As wife by a previous marriage. This is known to the defendant who does not, however,
file a motion to inhibit the Judge. Is the Judge justified in not inhibiting himself from the
case?
No. The judge is not justified in not inhibiting himself. It is mandatory for him to inhibit if he is
related to any of the parties bv consanguinity or affinity within the sixth civil. Judge A, being the
stepfather of Rebecca, is related to her by affinity by just one degree. Judges shall disqualify
themselves from participating in any proceeding in which they are unable to decide the matter
impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the
matter impartially. The fact that Rebecca is a daughter of Judge As wife is enough to make a
reasonable observer doubt him impartiality (U.P. LAW COMPLEX, Answer to the Bar Examination
Questions in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises)
54. In a criminal case for falsification and use of falsified document, the judge was charged
with impartiality for having failed to inhibit himself despite the fact that he was related
to the accused within the fourth degree of affinity, the wife of the accused being the
first cousin of the judge. Was the act of the judge proper? Explain.
No. Under Rule 137, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, a judge who is related within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity to a party in a case is disqualified from sitting in the case without the
consent of all parties, expressed in writing, signed by them, and entered upon the record. This
prohibition is not limited to cases in which he acts by resolving motions and issuing orders as
respondent judge has done in the subject criminal case. The purpose of the prohibition is to prevent
not only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of the judge. A
judge should take no part in a proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned
(Canon 3, Rule 3.12) and he should administer justice impartially and without delay (Canon 1, Rule
1.02; Lazo v. Judge Antonio Tiong, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1173, December 15, 1998, 101 SCAD 692).
55. RTC Judge Q is a deacon in the Iglesia ni Kristo church in San Francisco del Monte,
Quezon City. R, a member of the same religious sect belonging to the same INK
community in San Francisco del Monte, filed a case against S who belongs to the El
Shaddai charismatic group. The case was raffled to Judge Qs sala. The lawyer of S filed
a motion to disqualify Judge Q on the ground that since he and the plaintiff belonged to
the same religious sect and community in San Francisco del Monte, Judge Q would not
possess the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Judge Q denied the motion on the
ground that the reason invoked for his disqualification was not among the grounds for
disqualification under the Rules of Court and the Code of Judicial Conduct. Was Judge
Qs denial of the motion for inhibition well-founded?
Yes. The fact that Judge Q and Litigant R both belong to the INK while Litigant S belongs to the El
Shaddai group, is not a mandatory ground for disqualifying Judge Q from presiding over the case.
The motion for his inhibition is addressed to his sound discretion and he should exercise the same
in a way the peoples faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. He should reflect on the
56. A judge, in order to ease his clogged docket, would exert efforts to compel the accused
in criminal cases to plead guilty to a lesser offense and advise party litigants in civil
cases, whose petitions appear weak, to accept the compromise offered by the opposing
party. Is the practice legally acceptable?
Yes. The practice is legally acceptable as long as the judge does not exert pressure on the parties
and takes care that he does not appear to have prejudged the case. Where a judge has told a party
that his case is weak before the latter was fully heard, such was considered as a ground for his
disqualification (Castillo v. Juan, 62 SCRA 124).