THIRDDIVISION

[G.R.No.100709.November14,1997]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS,

petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSEFINA L. MORATO, SPOUSES
NENITA CO and ANTONIO QUILATAN AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
QUEZONPROVINCE,respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN,J.:

Will the lease and/or mortgage of a portion of a realty acquired through free patent constitute
sufficientgroundforthenullificationofsuchlandgrant?ShouldsuchpropertyreverttotheStateonce
itisinvadedbytheseaandthusbecomesforeshoreland?

TheCase

These are the two questions raised in the petition before us assailing the Court of Appeals[1]
DecisioninCAG.R.CVNo.02667promulgatedonJune13,1991whichansweredthesaidquestions
inthenegative.[2]RespondentCourtsDecisiondismissed[3]petitionersappealandaffirmedintotothe
decision of the RegionalTrial Court[4] of Calauag, Quezon, dated December 28, 1983 in Civil Case
No.C608.Inturn,theRegionalTrialCourtsdecisiondismissedpetitionerscomplaintforcancellation
oftheTorrensCertificateofTitleofRespondentMoratoandforreversionoftheparceloflandsubject
thereoftothepublicdomain.

TheFacts

The petition of the solicitor general, representing the Republic of the Philippines, recites the
followingfacts:[5]

SometimeinDecember,1972,respondentMoratofiledaFreePatentApplicationNo.III38186Bonaparcel
oflandwithanareaof1,265squaremeterssituatedatPinagtalleran,Calauag,Quezon.OnJanuary16,1974,the
patentwasapprovedandtheRegisterofDeedsofQuezonatLucenaCityissuedonFebruary4,1974Original
CertificateofTitleNo.P17789.Boththefreepatentandthetitlespecificallymandatethatthelandshallnotbe
alienatednorencumberedwithinfive(5)yearsfromthedateoftheissuanceofthepatent(Sections118and124
ofCANo.141,asamended).

Subsequently,theDistrictLandOfficerinLucenaCity,actinguponreportsthatrespondentMoratohad
encumberedthelandinviolationoftheconditionofthepatent,conductedaninvestigation.Thereafter,itwas
establishedthatthesubjectlandisaportionoftheCalauagBay,five(5)tosix(6)feetdeepunderwaterduring
hightideandtwo(2)feetdeepatlowtide,andnotsuitabletovegetation.Moreover,onOctober24,1974,a
portionofthelandwasmortgagedbyrespondentMoratotorespondentsNenitaCoandAntonioQuilatanfor
P10,000.00(pp.2,25,FolderofExhibits).ThespousesQuilatanconstructedahouseontheland.Another
portionofthelandwasleasedtoPerfectoAdvinculaonFebruary2,1976atP100.00amonth,wherea
warehousewasconstructed.

OnNovember5,1978,petitionerfiledanamendedcomplaintagainstrespondentsMorato,spousesNenitaCo
andAntonioQuilatan,andtheRegisterofDeedsofQuezonforthecancellationoftitleandreversionofaparcel
oflandtothepublicdomain,subjectofafreepatentinfavorofrespondentMorato,onthegroundsthattheland
isaforeshorelandandwasmortgagedandleasedwithinthefiveyearprohibitoryperiod(p.46,Records).

Aftertrial,thelowercourt,onDecember28,1983,renderedadecisiondismissingpetitionerscomplaint.In
findingforprivaterespondents,thelowercourtruledthattherewasnoviolationofthe5yearperiodbanagainst
alienatingorencumberingtheland,becausethelandwasmerelyleasedandnotalienated.Italsofoundthatthe
mortgagetoNenitaCoandAntonioQuilatancoveredonlytheimprovementandnotthelanditself.

Onappeal,theCourtofAppealsaffirmedthedecisionofthetrialcourt.Thereafter,theRepublicof
thePhilippinesfiledthepresentpetition.[6]

TheIssues

PetitionerallegesthatthefollowingerrorswerecommittedbyRespondentCourt:[7]
I

RespondentCourterredinholdingthatthepatentgrantedandcertificateoftitleissuedtoRespondentMorato
cannotbecancelledandannulledsincethecertificateoftitlebecomesindefeasibleafteroneyearfromthe
issuanceofthetitle.

II

RespondentCourterredinholdingthatthequestionedlandispartofadisposablepubliclandandnota
foreshoreland.

TheCourtsRuling

Thepetitionismeritorious.

FirstIssue:IndefeasibilityofaFreePatentTitle

Inresolvingthefirstissueagainstpetitioner,RespondentCourtheld:[8]

xxx.AsruledinHeirsofGregorioTengcovs.HeirsofJoseAlivalas,168SCRA198.xx.Theruleiswell
settledthatanoriginalcertificateoftitleissuedonthestrengthofahomesteadpatentpartakesofthenatureofa
certificateoftitleissuedinajudicialproceeding,aslongasthelanddisposedofisreallypartofthedisposable
landofthepublicdomain,andbecomesindefeasibleandincontrovertibleupontheexpirationofoneyearfrom
thedateofpromulgationoftheorderoftheDirectorofLandsfortheissuanceofthepatent.(Republicv.Heirs
ofCarle,105Phil.1227(1959)Ingaranv.Ramelo,107Phil.498(1960)Lopezv.Padilla,(G.R.No.L27559,
May18,1972,45SCRA44).Ahomesteadpatent,oneregisteredundertheLandRegistrationAct,becomesas
indefeasibleasaTorrensTitle.(Pamintuanv.SanAgustin,43Phil.558(1982)ElHogarFilipinov.Olviga,60
Phil.17(1934)Duranv.Oliva,113Phil.144(1961)Pajomayov.Manipon,G.R.No.L33676,June30,1971,
39SCRA676).(p.203).
Again,inLopezvs.CourtofAppeals,169SCRA271,citingIglesianiCristov.Hon.Judge,CFIofNueva
Ecija,BranchI,(123SCRA516(1983)andPajomayo,etal.v.Manipon,etal.(39SCRA676(1971)heldthat
onceahomesteadpatentgrantedinaccordancewiththePublicLandActisregisteredpursuanttoSection122of
Act496,thecertificateoftitleissuedinvirtueofsaidpatenthastheforceandeffectofaTorrensTitleissued
undertheLandRegistrationAct.

Indefeasibilityofthetitle,however,maynotbartheState,thrutheSolicitorGeneral,fromfilinganactionfor
reversion,asruledinHeirsofGregorioTengov.HeirsofJoseAliwalas,(supra),asfollows:

But,ascorrectlypointedoutbytherespondentCourtofAppeals,Dr.Aliwalastitletothepropertyhaving
becomeincontrovertible,suchmaynolongerbecollaterallyattacked.Ifindeedtherehadbeenanyfraudor
misrepresentationinobtainingthetitle,anactionforreversioninstitutedbytheSolicitorGeneralwouldbethe
properremedy(Sec.101,C.A.No.141DirectorofLandsv.Jugado,G.R.No.L14702,May21,1961,2SCRA
32Lopezv.Padilla,supra).(p.204).

Petitioner contends that the grant of Free Patent (IV3) 275 and the subsequent issuance of
Original Certificate of Title No. P17789 to Respondent Josefina L. Morato were subject to the
conditions provided for in Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141.It alleges that on October 24, 1974, or
nine(9)monthsandeight(8)daysafterthegrantofthepatent,RespondentMorato,inviolationofthe
terms of the patent, mortgaged a portion of the land to Respondent Nenita Co, who thereafter
constructed a house thereon. Likewise, on February 2, 1976 and within the fiveyear prohibitory
period, Respondent Morato leased a portion of the land to Perfecto Advincula at a monthly rent of
P100.00 who, shortly thereafter, constructed a house of concrete materials on the subject land.[9]
Further, petitioner argues that the defense of indefeasibility of title is inaccurate. The original
certificate of title issued to Respondent Morato contains the seeds of its own cancellation: such
certificatespecificallystatesonitsfacethatitissubjecttotheprovisionsofSections118,119,121,
122,124ofCANo.141,asamended.[10]
RespondentMoratocountersbystatingthatalthoughaportionofthelandwaspreviouslyleased,
itresultedfromthefactthatPerfectoAdvinculabuiltawarehouseinthesubjectlandwithout[her]prior
consent.Themortgageexecutedovertheimprovementcannotbeconsideredaviolationofthesaid
grantsinceitcanneveraffecttheownership.[11]Shestatesfurther:

xxx.theappealofthepetitionerwasdismissednotbecauseoftheprincipleofindefeasibilityoftitlebutmainly
duetofailureofthelattertosupportandprovetheallegedviolationsofrespondentMorato.Therecordsofthis
casewillreadilyshowthatalthoughpetitionerwasabletoestablishthatMoratocommittedsomeactsduringthe
prohibitoryperiodof5years,aperusalthereofwillalsoshowthatwhatpetitionerwasabletoprovenever
constitutedaviolationofthegrant.[12]

RespondentSpousesQuilatan,ontheotherhand,statethatthemortgagecontracttheyentered
intowithRespondentMoratocanneverbeconsideredas[an]alienationinasmuchastheownership
overthepropertyremainswiththeowner.[13]Besides,itisthedirectoroflandsandnottheRepublicof
thePhilippineswhoistherealpartyininterestinthiscase,contrarytotheprovisionofthePublicLand
Actwhichstatesthatactionsforreversionshouldbeinstitutedbythesolicitorgeneralinthenameof
RepublicofthePhilippines.[14]
Wefindforpetitioner.
Quoted below are relevant sections of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the
PublicLandAct:

Sec.118.ExceptinfavoroftheGovernmentoranyofitsbranches,unitsorinstitutions,orlegallyconstituted
bankingcorporations,landsacquiredunderfreepatentorhomesteadprovisionsshallnotbesubjectto
encumbranceoralienationfromthedateoftheapprovaloftheapplicationandforatermoffiveyearsfromand
afterthedateofissuanceofthepatentorgrantnorshalltheybecomeliabletothesatisfactionofanydebt
contractedpriortotheexpirationofsaidperiodbuttheimprovementsorcropsonthelandmaybemortgagedor
pledgedtoqualifiedpersons,associations,orcorporations.

Noalienation,transfer,orconveyanceofanyhomesteadafterfiveyearsandbeforetwentyfiveyearsafter
issuanceoftitleshallbevalidwithouttheapprovaloftheSecretaryofAgricultureandNaturalResources,which
approvalshallnotbedeniedexceptonconstitutionalandlegalgrounds.(AsamendedbyCom.ActNo.456,
approvedJune8,1939.)

xxxxxxxxx

Sec.121.ExceptwiththeconsentofthegranteeandtheapprovaloftheSecretaryofAgricultureandNatural
Resources,andsolelyforeducational,religious,orcharitablepurposesorforarightofway,nocorporation,
association,orpartnershipmayacquireorhaveanyright,title,interest,orpropertyrightwhatsoevertoanyland
grantedunderthefreepatent,homestead,orindividualsaleprovisionsofthisActortoanypermanent
improvementonsuchland.(AsamendedbyCom.ActNo.615,approvedMay5,1941)

Sec.122.NolandoriginallyacquiredinanymannerundertheprovisionsofthisAct,noranypermanent
improvementonsuchland,shallbeencumbered,alienatedortransferred,excepttopersons,corporations,
association,orpartnershipswhomayacquirelandsofthepublicdomainunderthisActortocorporations
organizedinthePhilippinesauthorizedthereforebytheircharters.

Exceptincasesofhereditarysuccessions,nolandoranyportionthereoforiginallyacquiredunderthefree
patent,homestead,orindividualsaleprovisionsofthisAct,oranypermanentimprovementonsuchland,shall
betransferredorassignedtoanyindividual,norshallsuchlandoranypermanentimprovementthereonbe
leasedtosuchindividual,whentheareaofsaidland,addedtothatofhisown,shallexceedonehundredand
fortyfourhectares.Anytransfer,assignment,orleasemadeinviolationheretoshallbenullandvoid.(As
amendedbyCom.ActNo.615,Id.)

xxxxxxxxx

Sec.124.Anyacquisition,conveyance,alienation,transfer,orothercontractmadeorexecutedinviolationof
anyoftheprovisionsofsectionsonehundredandeighteen,onehundredandtwenty,onehundredandtwenty
one,onehundredandtwentytwo,andonehundredandtwentythreeofthisActshallbeunlawfulandnulland
voidfromitsexecutionandshallproducetheeffectofannullingandcancellingthegrant,title,patent,orpermit
originallyissued,recognizedorconfirmed,actuallyorpresumptively,andcausethereversionoftheproperty
anditsimprovementstotheState.(Underscoringsupplied.)

The foregoing legal provisions clearly proscribe the encumbrance of a parcel of land acquired
underafreepatentorhomesteadwithinfiveyearsfromthegrantofsuchpatent.Furthermore,such
encumbrance results in the cancellation of the grant and the reversion of the land to the public
domain. Encumbrance has been defined as [a]nything that impairs the use or transfer of property
anything which constitutes a burden on the title a burden or charge upon property a claim or lien
uponproperty.Itmaybealegalclaimonanestateforthedischargeofwhichtheestateisliablean
embarrassmentoftheestateorpropertysothatitcannotbedisposedofwithoutbeingsubjecttoitan
estate,interest,orrightinlands,diminishingtheirvaluetothegeneralowneraliabilityrestingupon
anestate.[15]Dothecontractsofleaseandmortgageexecutedwithinfive(5)yearsfromtheissuance
of the patent constitute an encumbrance and violate the terms and conditions of such patent?
RespondentCourtansweredinthenegative:[16]

Fromtheevidenceadducedbybothparties,ithasbeenprovedthattheareaoftheportionoftheland,subject
matteroftheleasecontract(Exh.B)executedbyandbetweenPerfectoAdvinculaandJosefinaL.Moratois
only10x12squaremeters,whereasthetotalareaofthelandgrantedtoMoratois1,265squaremeters.Itis
clearfromthisthattheportionofthelandleasedbyAdvinculadoesnotsignificantlyaffectMoratosownership
andpossession.Aboveall,thecircumstancesunderwhichtheleasewasexecuteddonotreflectavoluntaryand
blatantintenttoviolatetheconditionsprovidedforinthepatentissuedinherfavor.Onthecontrary,Moratowas
compelledtoenterintothatcontractofleaseoutofsympathyandthegoodnessofherhearttoaccommodatea
fellowman.xxx

Itisindisputable,however,thatRespondentMoratocannotfullyuseorenjoythelandduringthe
durationoftheleasecontract.Thisrestrictionontheenjoymentofherpropertysufficientlymeetsthe
definition of an encumbrance under Section 118 of the Public Land Act, because such contract
impairstheuseofthepropertybythegrantee.In a contract of lease which is consensual, bilateral,
onerousandcommutative,theownertemporarilygrantstheuseofhisorherpropertytoanotherwho
undertakestopayrenttherefor.[17]Duringthetermofthelease,thegranteeofthepatentcannotenjoy
the beneficial use of the land leased. As already observed, the Public Land Act does not permit a
granteeofafreepatentfromencumberinganyportionofsuchland.Suchencumbranceisaground
forthenullificationoftheaward.
Moratos resort to equity, i.e. that the lease was executed allegedly out of the goodness of her
heart without any intention of violating the law, cannot help her. Equity, which has been aptly
describedasjusticeoutsidelegality,isappliedonlyintheabsenceof,andneveragainst,statutorylaw
orjudicialrulesofprocedure.Positiverulesprevailoverallabstractargumentsbasedonequitycontra
legem.[18]
Respondents failed to justify their position that the mortgage should not be considered an
encumbrance.Indeed,wedonotfindanysupportforsuchcontention.Thequestionedmortgagefalls
squarelywithinthetermencumbranceproscribedbySection118ofthePublicLandAct.[19]Verily,a
mortgage constitutes a legal limitation on the estate, and the foreclosure of such mortgage would
necessarilyresultintheauctionoftheproperty.[20]
Even if only part of the property has been sold or alienated within the prohibited period of five
years from the issuance of the patent, such alienation is a sufficient cause for the reversion of the
wholeestatetotheState.Asaconditionforthegrantofafreepatenttoanapplicant,thelawrequires
thatthelandshouldnotbeencumbered,soldoralienatedwithinfiveyearsfromtheissuanceofthe
patent.Thesaleorthealienationofpartofthehomesteadviolatesthatcondition.[21]
The prohibition against the encumbrance lease and mortgage included of a homestead
which,byanalogyappliestoafreepatent,ismandatedbytherationaleforthegrant,viz.:[22]

ItiswellknownthatthehomesteadlawsweredesignedtodistributedisposableagriculturallotsoftheStateto
landdestitutecitizensfortheirhomeandcultivation.PursuanttosuchbenevolentintentiontheStateprohibits
thesaleorencumbranceofthehomestead(Section116)withinfiveyearsafterthegrantofthepatent.Afterthat
fiveyearperiodthelawimpliedlypermitsalienationofthehomesteadbutinlinewiththeprimordialpurposeto
favorthehomesteaderandhisfamilythestatuteprovidesthatsuchalienationorconveyance(Section117)shall
besubjecttotherightofrepurchasebythehomesteader,hiswidoworheirswithinfiveyears.Thissection117
isundoubtedlyacomplementofsection116.Itaimstopreserveandkeepinthefamilyofthehomesteaderthat
portionofpubliclandwhichtheStatehadgratuitouslygiventohim.Itwould,therefore,beinkeepingwiththis
fundamentalideatohold,aswehold,thattherighttorepurchaseexistsnotonlywhentheoriginalhomesteader
makestheconveyance,butalsowhenitismadebyhiswidoworheirs.Thisconstructionisclearlydeducible
fromthetermsofthestatute.

ByexpressprovisionofSection118ofCommonwealthAct141andinconformitywiththepolicy
ofthelaw,anytransferoralienationofafreepatentorhomesteadwithinfiveyearsfromtheissuance
of the patent is proscribed. Such transfer nullifies said alienation and constitutes a cause for the
reversionofthepropertytotheState.
Theprohibitionagainstanyalienationorencumbranceofthelandgrantisaprovisoattachedto
the approval of every application.[23] Prior to the fulfillment of the requirements of law, Respondent
Moratohadonlyaninchoaterighttothepropertysuchpropertyremainedpartofthepublicdomain
and, therefore, not susceptible to alienation or encumbrance.Conversely, when a homesteader has
complied with all the terms and conditions which entitled him to a patent for [a] particular tract of
publicland,heacquiresavestedinterestthereinandhastoberegardedanequitableownerthereof.
[24]
However,forRespondentMoratostitleofownershipoverthepatentedlandtobeperfected,she
should have complied with the requirements of the law, one of which was to keep the property for
herself and her family within the prescribed period of five (5) years. Prior to the fulfillment of all
requirements of the law, Respondent Moratos title over the property was incomplete. Accordingly, if
therequirementsarenotcompliedwith,theStateasthegrantorcouldpetitionfortheannulmentof
thepatentandthecancellationofthetitle.
Respondent Morato cannot use the doctrine of the indefeasibility of her Torrens title to bar the
state from questioning its transfer or encumbrance. The certificate of title issued to her clearly
stipulatedthatitsawardwassubjecttotheconditionsprovidedforinSections118,119,121,122and
124 of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141. Because she violated Section 118, the reversion of the
propertytothepublicdomainnecessarilyfollows,pursuanttoSection124.

SecondIssue:ForeshoreLandRevertstothePublicDomain

Thereisyetanotherreasonforgrantingthispetition.
Although Respondent Court found that the subject land was foreshore land, it nevertheless
sustainedtheawardthereoftoRespondentMorato:[25]

Firstofall,theissuehereiswhetherthelandinquestion,isreallypartoftheforeshorelands.TheSupreme
CourtdefinesforeshorelandinthecaseofRepublicvs.Alagad,169SCRA455,464,asfollows:

Otherwise,wheretheriseinwaterlevelisdueto,theextraordinaryactionofnature,rainful,forinstance,the
portionsinundatedtherebyarenotconsideredpartofthebedorbasinofthebodyofwaterinquestion.Itcannot
thereforebesaidtobeforeshorelandbutlandoutsideofthepublicdominion,andlandcapableofregistrationas
privateproperty.

Aforeshoreland,ontheotherhandhasbeendefinedasfollows:

...thatpartof(theland)whichisbetweenhighandlowwaterandleftdrybythefluxandrefluxofthetidesxx
xx(Republicvs.C.A.,Nos.L43105,L43190,August31,1984,131SCRA532Governmentvs.Colegiode
SanJose,53Phil423)

Thestripoflandthatliesbetweenthehighandlowwatermarksandthatisalternativelywetanddryaccording
totheflowofthetide.(Rep.vs.CA,supra,539).

Thefactualfindingsofthelowercourtregardingthenatureoftheparceloflandinquestionreads:

Evidencedisclosethatthemarginalareaofthelandradicallychangedsometimein1937upto1955duetoa
strongearthquakefollowedbyfrequentstormseventuallyerodingtheland.From1955to1968,however,
gradualreclamationwasundertakenbythelumbercompanyownedbytheMoratos.Havingthusrestoredthe
landthrumostlyhumanhandsemployedbythelumbercompany,theareacontinuedtobeutilizedbytheowner
ofthesawmilluptothetimeofhisdeathin1965.OnoraboutMarch17,1973,thereagainwasastrong
earthquakeunfortunatelycausingdestructiontohundredsofresidentialhousesfrontingtheCalauagBay
includingtheSantiagoBuilding,acinemahouseconstructedofconcretematerials.Thecatastrophetotally
causedthesinkingofaconcretebridgeatSumulongriveralsointhemunicipalityofCalauag,Quezon.

OnNovember13,1977atyphooncodenamedUndingwroughthavocasitlashedthemainlandofCalauag,
Quezoncausingagaingreaterosionthistimethanthatwhichtheareasufferedin1937.TheCourtnotedwiththe
significanceofthenewspaperclippingentitledBaryongMangingisdaKinainngDagat(Exh.11).

xxxxxxxxx
EvidentlythiswastheconditionofthelandwhenonoraboutDecember5,1972defendantJosefinaL.Morato
filedwiththeBureauofLandsherfreepatentapplication.ThedefendantJosefinaMoratohavingtaken
possessionofthelandafterthedemiseofDonTomasMorato,sheintroducedimprovementandcontinued
developingthearea,plantedittococonuttrees.Havingappliedforafreepatent,defendanthadthelandarea
surveyedandanapprovedplan(Exh.9)basedonthecadastralsurveyasearlyas1927(Exh.10)wassecured.
TheareawasdeclaredfortaxationpurposesinthenameofdefendantJosefinaMoratodenominatedasTax
DeclarationNo.4115(Exh.8)andthecorrespondingrealtytaxesreligiouslypaidasshownbyExh.8A).(pp.
1214,DECISION).

Beingsupportedbysubstantialevidenceandforfailureoftheappellanttoshowcausewhichwouldwarrant
disturbance,theaforecitedfindingsofthelowercourt,mustberespected.

Petitioner correctly contends, however, that Private Respondent Morato cannot own foreshore
land:

Throughtheencroachmentorerosionbytheebbandflowofthetide,aportionofthesubjectlandwasinvaded
bythewavesandseaadvances.Duringhightide,atleasthalfoftheland(632.5squaremeters)is6feetdeep
underwaterandthree(3)feetdeepduringlowtide.TheCalauagBayshorehasextendeduptoaportionofthe
questionedland.

WhileatthetimeofthegrantoffreepatenttorespondentMorato,thelandwasnotreachedbythewater,
however,duetogradualsinkingofthelandcausedbynaturalcalamities,theseaadvanceshadpermanently
invadedaportionofsubjectland.Asdisclosedatthetrial,throughthetestimonyofthecourtappointed
commissioner,Engr.AbrahamB.Pili,thelandwasunderwaterduringhightideinthemonthofAugust1978.
Thewatermargincovershalfoftheproperty,butduringlowtide,thewaterisaboutakilometer(TSN,July19,
1979,p.12).Also,in1974,afterthegrantofthepatent,thelandwascoveredwithvegetation,butitdisappeared
in1978whenthelandwasreachedbythetides(Exhs.E1E14).Infact,initsdecisiondatedDecember28,
1983,thelowercourtobservedthattheerosionofthelandwascausedbynaturalcalamitiesthatstrucktheplace
in1977(Cf.Decision,pp.1718).[26]

RespondentSpousesQuilatanargue,however,thatitisunfairandunjustifJosefinaMoratowill
bedeprivedofthewholepropertyjustbecauseaportionthereofwasimmersedinwaterforreasons
notherowndoing.[27]
Asageneralrule,findingsoffactsoftheCourtofAppealsarebindingandconclusiveuponthis
Court,unlesssuchfactualfindingsarepalpablyunsupportedbytheevidenceonrecordorunlessthe
judgmentitselfisbasedonamisapprehensionoffacts.[28]Theapplicationforafreepatentwasmade
in1972.From the undisputed factual findings of the Court of Appeals, however, the land has since
becomeforeshore.Accordingly,itcannolongerbesubjectofafreepatentunderthePublicLandAct.
GovernmentofthePhilippineIslandsvs.Cabagis[29]explainedtherationaleforthisproscription:

Article339,subsection1,oftheCivilCode,reads:

Art.339.Propertyofpublicownershipis

1.Thatdevotedtopublicuse,suchasroads,canals,rivers,torrents,portsandbridgesconstructedbytheState,
riverbanks,shores,roadsteads,andthatofasimilarcharacter.

********

Article1,case3,oftheLawofWatersofAugust3,1866,providesasfollows:

ARTICLE1.Thefollowingarepartofthenationaldomainopentopublicuse:

********
3.TheShores.Bytheshoreisunderstoodthatspacecoveredanduncoveredbythemovementofthetide.Its
interiororterrestriallimitisthelinereachedbythehighestequinoctaltides.Wherethetidesarenotappreciable,
theshorebeginsonthelandsideatthelinereachedbytheseaduringordinarystormsortempests.

InthecaseofAragonvs.InsularGovernment(19Phil.223),withreferencetoarticle339oftheCivilCodejust
quoted,thisCourtsaid:

Weshouldnotbeunderstood,bythisdecision,toholdthatinacaseofgradualencroachmentorerosionbythe
ebbandflowofthetide,privatepropertymaynotbecomepropertyofpublicownership.asdefinedinarticle
339ofthecode,whereitappearthattheownerhastoallintentsandpurposesabandoneditandpermitteditto
betotallydestroyed,soastobecomeapartoftheplaya(shoreofthesea),rada(roadstead),orthelike.***

IntheEnciclopediaJurdicaEspaola,volumeXII,page558,wereadthefollowing:

Withrelativefrequencytheoppositephenomenonoccursthatis,theseaadvancesandprivatepropertiesare
permanentlyinvadedbythewaves,andinthiscasetheybecomepartoftheshoreorbeach.Theythenpassto
thepublicdomain,buttheownerthusdispossesseddoesnotretainanyrighttothenaturalproductsresulting
fromtheirnewnatureitisadefactocaseofeminentdomain,andnotsubjecttoindemnity.

Incomparison,Article420oftheCivilCodeprovides:

Art.420.Thefollowingthingsarepropertyofpublicdominion:

(1)Thoseintendedforpublicuse,suchasroads,canals,rivers,torrents,portsandbridgesconstructed
bytheState,banks,shores,roadsteads,andothersofsimilarcharacter
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
serviceorforthedevelopmentofthenationalwealth.
When the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property became
foreshore land and passed to the realm of the public domain. In fact, the Court in Government vs.
Cabangis[30] annulled the registration of land subject of cadastral proceedings when the parcel
subsequentlybecameforeshoreland.[31]Inanothercase,theCourtvoidedtheregistrationdecreeofa
trialcourtandheldthatsaidcourthadnojurisdictiontoawardforeshorelandtoanyprivatepersonor
entity.[32]Thesubjectlandinthiscase,beingforeshoreland,shouldthereforebereturnedtothepublic
domain.
WHEREFORE,thepetitionisGRANTED.This Court hereby REVERSES and SETSASIDE the
assailedDecisionofRespondentCourtandORDERStheCANCELLATIONofFreePatentNo.(IV3)
275issuedtoRespondentMoratoandthesubsequentOriginalCertificateofTitleNo.P17789. The
subjectlandthereforeREVERTStotheState.Nocosts.
SOORDERED.
Romero,Melo,andFrancisco,JJ.,concur.
Narvasa,C.J.,(Chairman),onleave.

[1]FirstDivisioncomposedofJ.AsaaliS.Isnani,ponenteandJJ.RodolfoA.NoconandAntonioM.Martinez,concurring.

[2]Rollo,pp.2532.

[3]Ibid.,p.32.

[4]Branch63.

[5]Petition,pp.35Rollo,pp.911.

[6]ThecasewasdeemedsubmittedforresolutionuponreceiptbytheCourtofPrivateRespondentQuilatansMemorandum,
datedJuly19,1996,onFebruary16,1996.(Rollo,p.143.)
[7]Ibid.,p.5Rollo,p.11.

[8]Decision,p.3Rollo,p.27.

[9]Petition,pp.67Rollo,pp.1213.

[10]Ibid.,pp.1112Rollo,pp.1718.

[11]RespondentMoratosComment,p.2Rollo,p.44.

[12]Ibid.,pp.34Rollo,pp.4546.

[13]RespondentsQuilatansComment,p.1Rollo,p.64.

[14]Ibid.,p.2Rollo,p.65.

[15]Moreno,PhilippineLawDictionary,secondedition,1972,pp.207208.

[16]CADecision,p.6Rollo,p.30.

[17]LimSivs.Lim,98Phil.868,870,April25,1956.

[18]Causapinvs.CourtofAppeals,233SCRA615,625,July4,1994,citingZabatvs.CourtofAppeals,No.L36958,July
10,1986,142SCRA587.
[19]Siyvs.TanGunGa,etal.,119Phil.676,February29,1964.

[20]PrudentialBankvs.Panis,153SCRA390,397,August31,1987.

[21]RepublicofthePhilippinesvs.Garcia,etal.,105Phil.826,May27,1959.

[22]Pascuavs.Talens,80Phil792,793794,April30,1948,perBengzon,J.

[23]Republicvs.Ruiz,23SCRA348,353354,April29,1968.

[24]Vda. de Delizo vs. Delizo, 69 SCRA 216, 229, January 30, 1976 citing Juanico vs. American Land Commercial
Company,Inc.,97Phil.221,Simmonsvs.Wagner,10U.S.260,68C.J.S.875Balboavs.Farrales,51Phil.498Fiel,et
al.vs.Wagas,48O.G.,195,January9,1950.SEEUyUnvs.PerezandVillaplana,71Phil.508.
[25]CADecision,pp.45Rollo,pp.2829.

[26]Petition,pp.1213Rollo,pp.1819.

[27]RespondentsQuilatansComment,p.2Rollo,p.65.

[28]Valenzuelavs.CourtofAppeals,253SCRA303,313,February7,1996.

[29]53Phil.112,115116,March27,1929,perVillaReal,J.

[30]Supra.

[31]Ibid.,p.119.

[32]Republicvs.Lozada,90SCRA503,510,May31,1979.