12/15/2016 Bookreview:Power,OrderandChangeinWorldPolitics(editedbyJ.

Ikenberry)|PostWesternWorld

Bookreview:Power,OrderandChangeinWorld
Politics(editedbyJ.Ikenberry)
04Oct.2015/OliverStuenkel/0Comments/Bookreviews,English,Globalgovernance

Bookreview:Power,Order,andChangeinWorldPolitics.byG.JohnIkenberry,ed.Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversityPress,2014.308pp.$32.99

NewGlobalStudies.ISSN(Online)19400004,ISSN(Print)21946566,DOI:10.1515/ngs20160007,
June2016

http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/ngs.aheadofprint/ngs20160007/ngs20160007.xml

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12/15/2016 Bookreview:Power,OrderandChangeinWorldPolitics(editedbyJ.Ikenberry)|PostWesternWorld

"Arethecyclesofriseanddeclineofpowerandinternationalordersettocontinue?",G.JohnIkenberry
asksintheintroductionofthisremarkablecollectionofessaysaboutglobalorder,inwhichagroupof
scholarsbasedintheAnglospherereflectonRobertGilpin'sfamousbookWarandChangeinWorld
Politics,publishedin1981.

AccordingtoGilpin,differentialratesofgrowthamongstatesassurethatnopowerwillbeontopforever.
Thisdynamicisenhancedbythefactthatnonhegemonicpowersdonotneedtobearthecostof
internationalleadership,thushavinganotheradvantageoverthehegemon.Worldorderisthuscyclical,
markedbytheriseandfallofgreatpowers,irrespectiveofthecharacteristicsofeachorderinquestion.
Emergingpowers,oncestrongenough,willseektocreatetheirownorder.

Arewe,then,doomedtoendlesslyrepeatthecyclesofriseanddeclineofpowerandinternationalorder,
asthepastwouldsuggest?Whiletheauthorsdonotspeakwithonevoice,thebook'soverallanalysis
seemstosuggesttheansweris"probablynot".Thethreeliberalscholarsinthefirstsectionsuggestthis
isbecauseofrulesandnormsthatreducerisingpowers'urgetooverthrowthesystem.Accordingto
them,wemaybewitnessingtheperpetuationoftheUSledliberalhegemonicorder.DavidLakeandJohn
IkenberryinparticularpointtotheliberalcharacteristicsofUSledglobalorder,whichmakesitlesslikely
tobechallengedinthefuture.AfteralltheUnitedStates,theysay,areuniquelyqualifiedtolead:"Great
powerdoesnotproduceliberalismliberalismislikelytoproducegreaterinternationalauthority."

YetasNunoMonteiropointsoutinanexcellentreviewofthisbook,itishardtofindconclusiveevidence
thattheabsenceoffrequentbalancingbehavioragainstthehegemonisaresultofrulesandnorms,and
notoftheUnitedStates'vastmilitarysuperiority.TheriseofChinaislikelytoputtheirassertiontothetest:
OnlyifamilitarilyandeconomicallyverypowerfulBeijing(ascenariothatmaytakedecadestoemerge)
willstillobeytoday'srulesbasedinternationalorder,LakeandIkenberrywillbevindicated.Untilthen,the
influenceofUSsoftpowerforthefutureofglobalorderislittlemorethanspeculation,consideringthatitis
backedbyunassailablehardpower.

ThispointstoabroadermisconceptionabouttheriseofChinaamongliberalthinkers,whotendto
underestimatethedegreetowhichtheWest'ssoftpowerpreponderanceisbasedonhardpowersources.
TheUnitedStateskeyalliancesinAsiatoday(suchasJapanandIndia)arenottheproductofWestern
softpower,butsecurityguarantees.Inthesameway,asChinaandotheremergingpowersrise
economically,theywillhavethepotentialtogainmorefriendsandalliesandcreategloballypopular
policies,suchasasophisticatedcapandtradesystemtofightclimatechange(asannouncedrecently).
Whilesoftpowercaninsomeinstancesbeconvertedintohardpower(e.g.,attractingtalentedimmigrants
whohelpgrowtheeconomy),thelatterisstilldecisivewhendiscussingthefutureofglobalorder.

Ikenberry'schapterinparticulardepictsUSledglobalorderassimplybrillianthowcouldChinaeven
considerchangingsomethingthatworksaswellastoday'sinternationalsystem?Ikenberrygoessofaras
toaffirmthat

TheBritishandAmericanledliberalordershavebeenbuiltincriticalrespectsaroundconsent.The
contemporaryEuropeanUnionisalsoapoliticalorderofthissort.

ComparingtheBritishEmpirewiththeEuropeanUnionwillmakereadersfromIndia,theMiddleEastor
practicallyeverywhereexceptEuropeandNorthAmericacringe.MarkMazowercomestomind,who
writes,

Churchill()urgednotmerelyaerialbombingbuttheuseofmustardgasagainstuncivilisedtribesin
IndiaandMesopotamia.(...)Meanwhile,whatwaseuphemisticallyknownasaircontrolremainedthe
chiefoperationalmeansofholdingdownlargeareasoftheMiddleEast.

WhatIkenberrydoesnotconsideristhatseenfromtheperiphery,globalgovernanceoftenservesto
authorizenewhierarchiesandgradationsofsovereignty,tolegitimatedepredationsofpoliticalautonomy
andselfdeterminationinnewwayswhichareworryinglyreminiscentofimperialism.Putdifferently,non
Westernreadersforexample,fromChile,Iran,Indonesia,China,Cuba,Nicaragua,Vietnam,Angolaand

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manyotherplacesarefarmorelikelytoperceivethenegativesidesofthesocalledliberalordertheir
countrieswereexposedto.

Finally,contrarytowhatIkenberrysuggests,thereisnoclearevidencetobackuphisclaimthatonlya
liberaldemocracycouldrunanopenandfunctionalorder.Howexactlywouldthelogicofglobalorder
changeiftheUnitedStateswereadictatorship?Doesitmatterfortheglobalclimatechangeregimethat
Chinaisnotademocracy?Anddoesarecipientofa$500millionloanfromtheAIIBforaninfrastructure
projectcareaboutChina'spoliticalsystem?Probablynot.TheUnitedStatespoliticalsystemismore
attractivethanthatofChina,andevendecadesfromnowChina'seliteswillsendtheirchildrentostudyin
theUnitedStates(andnotviceversa),butthereissimplynotenoughevidencethatthisdecisively
hampersChina'scapacitytobecomeaglobalhegemon.

Worlddominationcarries,ofcourse,considerabledangerforintellectualwork,particularlyforhistorians
andsocialscientists,dramaticallyincreasingtheriskoftriumphalism.Yet,itwouldbeunfairtodismiss
Ikenberry'sclaimsoutrightnotatleastbecausehisnarrativesmattertoforeignpolicymakers(orat
leasttheirrhetoric.)Indeed,hishopesthatChinacanbesocializedintotoday'sorderseemcredible.Yet
whatIkenberryseemstooverlookisthatChinawilljointoday's"liberal"ordernotasajuniorpartner,but
asasuperpowerthat,justliketheUnitedStates,willactwithoutaskingforapermissionslip.Thequestion
is,cantoday'sorderexistwithmorethanonepowerbreakingtherulesatwill?

TheambiguousmixofhierarchyandrulesmakesIkenberry'shopesthatChinawilljointoday'sorder
soundsomewhatdisingenuous,forhedoesnotspelloutwhereonwhichplaceinthepeckingorderChina
issupposedtofitit,andimpliesthattheUSwouldsomehowretainitsstewardshipyetitispreciselythis
issuewhichirkspolicymakersinBraslia,DelhiandBeijingaboutWesterncallsonemergingpowersto
become"responsiblestakeholders."

Theotherauthors,someofamorerealistbent,arelessWesterncentric,yetinterestinglyenough,they
tooarguethatitistimetoquestionGilpin'sironlawofcyclicalchange.Inthenuclearage,howcanchange

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occurintheabsenceofviolence?Howdoordersendifhegemonicwars(weregreatpowersfighteach
otherwithoutrestraint)nolongerexistasaninstrumentofglobalorder?

Thereisnoquestionthattheexistenceofnuclearweaponsaffectsthelogicofchangeandorder,as
Deudneyarguesinhischapter.ButonecouldthinkofmanypossiblescenariosinwhichChinawouldtake
overandprofoundlychangeglobalorderwithoutanylargeconfrontationbetweenBeijingandWashington.
Whileadmittedlyunlikelyatthispoint,Chinacouldsucceedinconvincingitsneighborstobandwagonand
acceptChinesesecurityguarantees.Undersuchcircumstances,eventheannouncementofaChinese
MonroeDoctrinewouldhardlyleadtoaconflict.WhileIdonotconsideritlikelyinthecomingdecades,the
AIIBcouldsubstitutetheWorldBankastheworld'sleadinglendernotbyforce,butbyhavingmember
countriesvotewiththeirfeetandsimplypreferthenewinstitution.Chinacould,intheory,startproviding
securityguaranteestocountriesaroundtheworld,withouteverraisingthespectreofhegemonicwar.The
authorsdonotseemtoconsiderthatChinawouldembraceanddominateitfromwithin,andeventually
assumeleadershipwithoutfiringasingleshot.

Inaveryinterestingchapter,Kirshnerarguesthat"itistrueforhegemonsattheapogeeoftheirpower,
overconfidentandutterlyunpreparedtoprocessthefactthattheystandattheprecipiceofrelative
decline."DoesthisapplytotheUnitedStates?Possibly.Vietnam,IraqandevenAfghanistan(awarthat
hadamplesupportaroundtheworld)canallbeseenasillconceivedandhopelessadventures,where,to
quoteThucidydes,thehegemon"confusedstrengthsandhopes."Theyarealso,astheauthornicely
shows,proofthathyperrationalistversionsofrealismaremisguided,asthecostofthesewars
dramaticallyexceededtheirbenefits:"Hegemonsaretooarroganttomakeconcessionswhentheyshould
andtoofrightenedtomakethemwhentheymust."

MichaelMastanduno'schapteralongwiththatofKirshnerstruckmeasthemostbalanced.Froma
USperspective,onemaycallMastandunoapessimist,buthemerelypointstotheobvious:Chinano
longeracceptsa"grandbargain"withtheUnitedStatessimilartotheagreementstheUShadinplacewith
GermanyandJapanafterWorldWarII.Bilateraltieswillbecomemorecomplicated,andtheeraof'good
feelings'betweenWashingtonandBeijingisover.Andyet,thatdoesnotmeanwarinevitable.

Onecannothelpbutwondertowhatextenttheauthors'UScentricworldviews(onlyoneauthorofnineis
basedinEurope)affecttheirjudgment.Afterthousandsofyearsorriseanddecline,istoday'sWestern
ledordersospecialthatitwillinterrupttheironlawthatmarkedpoliticalhistory?Whilethebookisofficially
aboutglobalorder,thewaythatitiswrittenmakesitmoreofananalysisofUSforeignpolicy(althoughit
hasitsfairshareoftheorizing).Ifthegoalwastoproduceabroadanalysisonglobalorder,thebook
wouldneedtohaveincludedatleastoneortwoChinesescholarshowtotheycharacterizetoday's
globalorder,anddotheythinkprofoundchangeisnolongerintheoffing?

Ultimately,theentiredebateaboutthefutureofglobalorderislimitedbecausewecanneverbesureabout
whenourpredictionscometrue.AroundtheendoftheColdWar,threeleadingscholarsFrancis
Fukuyama(TheEndofHistory),SamuelHuntington(TheClashofCivilizations)andJohnMeasheimer
(TheTragedyofGreatPowerPolitics)madedifferingpredictionsaboutwhatwastocome.Atfirst,when
countriesaroundtheworlddemocratizedintheaftermathoftheSovietUnion'scollapse,Fukuyama
seemedtoberight,eventhoughtheriseofpoliticalIslaminthe1990ssupportedHuntington'sclaims.
Huntington'sthesesseemedprescientafterSeptember11andthedecadethatfollowed,markedbythe
WaronTerror.Yettoday,JohnMearsheimerseemstobeahead,astheriseofChinaandrenewedgreat
powerpoliticsissettoshapeglobalorderforthenextdecades.In2025,however,thatmaynolongerbe
thecase.Thecontinuouslychangingsituationallowseveryonetosticktotheirownargumentbysimply
pointingoutthatcurrenteventsaremerelytheresultoflowerlevelsofhistoricaldevelopment.Thereis
neverafinaldayofreckoningwherewecanassesswhowasrightandwhowaswrong.

Allinall,Power,OrderandChangeinWorldPoliticsisathoughtprovokingcontributiontoadebatethat
willdominateInternationalRelationsfordecadestocome.

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