Acta Astronautica 61 (2007) 185 192

www.elsevier.com/locate/actaastro

The crew exploration vehicle (CEV) and the next generation of

human spaceight
Michael Raftery , Todd Fox
Space Exploration Systems, The Boeing Company, USA

Available online 10 April 2007

Abstract
Announced in January 2004, NASAs Vision for Space Exploration describes an ambitious series of missions, including a
plan to return humans to the moon before the end of the next decade as well as eventual crewed missions to Mars. To accomplish
these missions, NASA is developing Constellation Systems, a system of systems that will create the required vehicles, systems,
and infrastructure. The rst vehicle produced for Constellation Systems will be the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV).
The CEV is a spacecraft designed to affordably, reliably, and safely transfer crew from the Earths surface to destinations
beyond. Since Constellation Systems relies on a exible, modular architecture to accomplish different missions, the CEV will be
a very versatile vehicle. Initially, it will be used to transfer crew and cargo to and from the International Space Station. By the
end of the next decade, it will transfer four astronauts from the Earths surface, dock with the Earth Departure Stage for the trip
to a Lunar Orbit, then maintain itself autonomously there while the crew explores the surface below. The CEV design utilizes
experience and technology from previous programs like Apollo and the Space Shuttle, but combines that with modern materials,
manufacturing techniques, and avionics. This paper explores the requirements and design factors which drove the denition of
the vehicle conguration.
2007 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Announced in January 2004, NASAs Vision for
Space Exploration describes an ambitious series of
missions, including a plan to return humans to the moon
before the end of the next decade as well as eventual
crewed missions to Mars. The rst vehicle produced
for this system of systems will be the crew exploration
vehicle (CEV), also known as Project Orion. Orion
will join the US Space Shuttle, the Russian Soyuz, and
the Chinese Shenzhou in the eet of crewed ascent and
reentry vehicles active in the world today.
This paper will explore the factors important in the
design of these vehicles and show how these factors
Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: michael.l.raftery@boeing.com (M. Raftery),
todd.fox@boeing.com (T. Fox).
0094-5765/$ - see front matter 2007 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
doi:10.1016/j.actaastro.2007.01.037
led to the selection of the overall approach to the Orion
spacecraft shape and design. We will show that the se-
lected approach satises the performance requirements
by using mature technologies to offer the broadest and
most efcient capabilities for missions beyond low earth
orbit (LEO).
1. Requirements
Requirements form the foundation of any coherent
engineering effort. Since Project Constellation aims
to allow a human return to the moon and an eventual
crewed mission to Mars, Orion is primarily intended to
be used in missions beyond LEO. The planned retire-
ment of the Space Shuttle in 2010 creates a need for a
vehicle that can ferry crew and supplies to and from the
International Space Station, so Orions design must be
186 M. Raftery, T. Fox / Acta Astronautica 61 (2007) 185 192
exible enough to allow the efcient completion of
those objectives as well. Given the short time available
for development and the limited funds available, Orion
must also be designed to use mature, well-understood
technologies wherever practical. Mass, volume, thermal
and functional capabilities must all be balanced to pro-
duce a design that is safe and cost effective to build
and operate. Design considerations which are important
for LEO spacecraft become increasingly challenging for
missions that extend to the Moon or Mars. Orions de-
sign reects an optimization of these different consid-
erations to produce a versatile yet technically feasible
spacecraft.
2. Aerothermodynamics
The basic physics of atmospheric reentry are the same
now as they were when human spaceight was young.
Fig. 1, which was adapted from a 1968 planetary reentry
text, is still an excellent presentation of the initial factors
which must be considered in the conguration and shape
of the spacecraft [1,2].
The gure, which assumes a 7 km/s entry velocity
(corresponding to entry from LEO), shows the near lin-
ear relationship between volumetric efciency and the
hypersonic trim lift to drag (L/D) ratio. The sphere in the
upper left hand corner maximizes volume with no L/D
while winged vehicles, like the Shuttle, provide signif-
icant L/D at the expense of usable volume. The simple,
high volume spacecraft on the left are also much less
expensive to build.
Vehicles with lower L/D ratios decelerate more
rapidly, which translates into increased g-loading for
0.2
Vol2/3/Wetted Area
0.1
0 1
Hypersonic Trim L /D
Fig. 1. Effect of lift to drag ratio on volume and g-loads.
onboard crew. On the right side of Fig. 1, one can see the
effect that L/D has on the entry g-load for the different
vehicle shapes. Low L/D shapes (such as a sphere) pro-
duce large g-loads over a shorter reentry, while g-loads
from high L/D vehicles remain at relatively low levels.
NASA standards show that humans can only withstand
high-g loads for short periods of time (10 gs are allow-
able for a maximum of 40 s) but at more moderate lev-
els human tolerance increases dramatically (7 gs can be
withstood for 5 mins, and 4 gs can be withstood indef-
initely, even by injured crew) [3]. As the gure shows,
even modest lift signicantly reduces reentry g-loads,
which level out at L/D ratios above 0.5. Of course, cross-
range for landing accuracy is also a consideration and
we will discuss this later.
The L/D ratio is also a good indicator of the type of
reentry heating a vehicle will encounter. The extreme
g-loads resulting from a zero-lift (or ballistic) reentry
are due to the vehicles rapid descent into the lower,
thicker part of the atmosphere. This trajectory causes a
high overall heating rate over a relatively short period
of time. High L/D vehicles have longer reentries with
lower generalized heating rates, but the same geometry
that is used to achieve lift causes higher localized heat-
ing at the leading edges. Fig. 2, an infrared photograph
of the Shuttle on reentry, shows this localized heating
vividly. Temperatures across the underside of the or-
biter are relatively consistent, but the nose and leading
edges are signicantly hotter [4]. The net result is that
high L/D vehicles generally have higher total heat loads
than low L/D vehicles because they must withstand the
lower generalized heating rates for a longer period of
time. They must also provide a more complex thermal
Sphere
10
Gemini
9
Maximum g-Load for LEO Entry
Apollo 8
CEV 7
6
M1
5
M2 4
X-20 3
2
Shuttle
1
0
2 0 1 2
Hypersonic Trim L /D
 M. Raftery, T. Fox / Acta Astronautica 61 (2007) 185 192 187

Peak Heat Rate at ref location (q), Btu/ft2-sec

800 Design Undershoot, HR-1

Design
600

Planned Operating Regionla

400 AS-501
Manned 10 8 (Apollo 4)
16
Apollo 15 14
Flights 13 12 11
200
AS-502 (Apollo6)
AS-201 Design Overshoot, HL-1

3
0 20 25 30 35 40 45x10
Reference Heat Load (Q), Btu/ft2

Fig. 4. Apollo TPS performance.

Fig. 2. Infrared image of Shuttle on reentry.

too narrow for the navigational, guidance, and propul-
sive capabilities of the spacecraft to enter.
The actual thermal performance achieved by the
320x103 Overshoot (HL-1)
Undershoot (HR-1)
(Block 2) Apollo CM is shown in Fig. 4. The dotted line to
280
(Block 2)
Overshoot (HSE-3A) the right connects the two design trajectory limits of
(Block 1)
240 undershoot and overshoot [6,7]. This line represents
what were meant to be the design limits for the TPS
Altitude, ft

200
160
120
Undershoot (HSE-6)
80 (Bock 1)
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28
Velocity, ft/sec
Fig. 3. Apollo design entry trajectories.
protection system (TPS) to account for the wide varia-
tions in localized heating [5].
Entry trajectory design plays an important role in dic-
tating the TPS requirements. Fig. 3 shows the trajectory
envelopes for the Apollo blocks 1 and 2 command mod-
ule (CM). The block 1 conguration had a design L/D
of 0.5 while block 2 had a design L/D of 0.4.
In the end, Apollos measured performance on L/D
was 0.3. The entry corridor is dened by the lim-
its of the undershoot (steepest allowable) and overshoot
(shallowest allowable) trajectories. Undershoot trajecto-
ries result in the highest g-loads and the greatest heating
rate and often drive the selection of the TPS material.
Overshoot trajectories create the largest heat loads and
drive the required heat capacity (often thickness) of the
TPS. A too-broad entry corridor results in an unneces-
sarily over-capable TPS, but the corridor must not be
performance. The cross-thatched area in the center of
the diagram represents what was expected to be the
operational performance region. This planned oper-
ating performance region was bracketed by the two
unmanned test ights of Apollo 4 and Apollo 6. Both
test ights were intended to stress the limits of the TPS,
32 36 40x103
but a failure of the S-IVB on the Apollo 6 mission lim-
ited its entry velocity to 32,800 ft/s which signicantly
reduced its peak heat rate.
All of the manned missions required less thermal
performance than what was originally expected and
planned. In operations, the ight and ground crews in-
variably preferred the shortest down-range trajectory
which produced higher g-loads but minimized thermal
stress. Orions missions, which will require targeting
of a specic landing site, will most likely exhibit more
thermal dispersion than Apollo.
All of the factors that might lead to the selection of
a lifting capsule for LEO return are dramatically mag-
nied when considering return from Lunar or planetary
orbits. A quick comparison between Figs. 2 and 4 will
illustrate the dramatic increase in TPS requirements be-
tween LEO and Lunar return missions. This are due to
the effects of radiative heating which become more sig-
nicant at entry velocities beyond 25,000 ft/s.
Extensibility of the basic design to support the re-
turn from a Mars mission is an important considera-
tion. Analyses of hyperbolic velocity returns with the
Apollo design were done in the 1960s during the period
188
M-2 & M-1 SHAPES
(1964 Lockheed Predictions)
0.60
0.50
TOTAL VEHICLE WT
HEATSHIELD WT
0.40
M-2
0.30
0.20
. emergency. The two most threatening phases of ight
M-1
0.10
0 atures, but other systems are needed for ascent aborts
30 40 50
ENTRY VELOCITY(1000 FT/SEC)
Fig. 5. Heat-shield weight predictions.
when extensions to the Apollo contract were being
considered [8].
TPS performance at very high velocities is difcult to
predict. Many complex factors affect the actual perfor-
mance and replication of this environment in the lab has
not been possible. To compound the issue, little actual
ight data have been generated to date. Until January 15
2006, the highest speed entry into Earths atmosphere
was the Fire I pre-Apollo test at 37,700 ft/s in 1964.
The entry velocity for the Stardust spacecraft was near
42,000 ft/s and the performance of its advanced ablative
heat shield is still being evaluated by NASA.
Fig. 5 shows predicted TPS performance at planetary
return velocities for various geometry spacecraft. This
performance is characterized as a percentage of overall
spacecraft mass. Several different estimates are shown
for Apollo because the understanding of that designs
capabilities improved as ight data became available in
the late 1960s. It is clear from the analysis that TPS
mass will play a large role in any spacecraft designed
to return from Mars.
A capsule shape such as the Apollo CM is a
strong competitor for LEO missions but has clear
aero-thermodynamic advantages for missions beyond
LEO. The shape is volumetrically efcient resulting
in reduced weight, which for these missions is hyper-
critical. Crew g-loads and localized heating are con-
trolled within manageable limits with a geometry that
is simple to analyze and simple to manufacture. An-
other advantage of this shape is that correct placement
of the vehicles center of gravity results in a craft that
is monostablethat is, there is only one orientation
that is aerodynamically stable. This makes it possible
to accomplish a safe ballistic entry from LEO orbits
M. Raftery, T. Fox / Acta Astronautica 61 (2007) 185 192
in spite of a complete failure of the primary control
system, something which is very difcult to do with a
APOLLO SHAPE
(1962 NR Prediction) lifting body conguration.
APOLLO SHAPE
(1965/66 NR & 3. Abort and landing conguration
Lockheed P
Lo Predictions)
i
BICONIC TETRAHEDRON
Another critical aspect of the spacecraft design is the
& CONIC SEG CONFIGS method by which the crew will escape in the case of an
(1965 Lockheed Predictions)
APOLLO SHAPE are ascent and decent through the Earths atmosphere.
(1968 P ediction) A well-designed TPS can guard against reentry temper-
60 70 80 and safe landings.
The abort conguration for an Apollo shaped space-
craft is well understood and offers some distinct advan-
tages. First, since it sits atop the launch vehicle, it is
well clear of falling ice and insulation debris. Further,
since the entry heat shield is protected by the service
module and faces downward during launch, other haz-
ards are avoided such as bird strikes and exposure to
weather. Many lifting body congurations have dif-
culty matching these benets without resorting to un-
usual conguration options. One such approach, which
was studied by Boeing in the early 1990s and known
as the Personnel Launch System (PLS) [9], featured a
biconic lifting body with L/D in the range of 0.70.9.
Practical design issues included:
How to provide and attach the abort propulsive en-
gines.
Protection of the abort engines from damage due to
launch vehicle explosion.
Protection of the spacecraft during abort engine r-
ing.
Orientation of the crew seats for launch, landing, and
aborts.
Abort separation sequencing, trajectory, and mini-
mum parachute altitude requirements.
The PLS design study chose to solve some of these
issues with the conguration shown in Fig. 6.
Clearly there are other, perhaps better ways, to solve
these conguration issues, but the study serves to il-
lustrate the complications that arise as a design team
details each mission phase including all of the abort
modes. For example, care must be taken to avoid fea-
tures which require penetrations of the entry heat shield
because these features could later expose the crew to
unnecessary risk. Since these issues have all been eval-
uated and resolved with the basic Apollo conguration,
Orions designers have inherited a set of low-risk so-
lutions. This also translates into reduced program cost,
 M. Raftery, T. Fox / Acta Astronautica 61 (2007) 185 192 189

Expendable Launch Fairing

Expendable
Radiator &
OMS

PLS Manned Capsule

Launch
Expendable Configuration
LES Engine

Landing
Configuration

Fig. 6. Personnel Launch System.

since ight qualication of the abort system requires
extensive testing and the expense of this testing must
be considered by designers.
Landing accuracy and cross-range are important con-
siderations for crewed vehicle design. Increased cross-
range capability allows spacecraft to reach a wider num-
ber of potential landing sites, and landing accuracy helps
ensure a safe landing (and ease of recovery) once a site
is chosen. Of course, both nominal and abort case land-
ings must be accommodated.
For vehicles with an Apollo-like conguration, the
jettison of the Service Module (SM) just before reen-
try presents another challenge. The crewed vehicle must
develop enough lift to be able to reach its desired land-
ing site while the SM, which reenters on virtually the
same trajectory, falls harmlessly into an unpopulated
area. For Orion, a natural solution to this problem is
to target the SM into the Pacic Ocean and land the
Crew Module (CM) in one of several possible sites in
the western United States. In their Exploration Systems
Architecture Study (ESAS), NASA determined that the
L/D required to reliably reach these sites from a typical
ISS return trajectory was 0.4well within the range of
L/D values for Apollo-type craft [10].
While orbital inclination and cross-range capability
dene the possible landing sites, a number of other tech-
nologies dictate exactly how the landing occurs. After
the initial reentry burn is complete, the remainder of the
mission can be divided into a descent phase (signicant
reduction in vertical velocity) and a landing phase (nal
deceleration and dissipation of the impact forces). How
the design challenges of these two phases are answered
will further restrict the types of landing sites that can
be used.
Vehicles with high L/D congurations (such as
winged craft and some lifting bodies) are able to glide
or y into their landing site with very small remaining
vertical speed. This provides for a very soft landing,
but it limits candidate landing sites to places with large
runways and requires either a highly trained pilot or
a complex automated landing system. This type of
landing occurs with relatively high horizontal speeds
at touchdown, so vehicles of this type are required to
have wheels (such as those on the Space Shuttle), with
the resultant penalties in safety, weight, and complex-
ity. Abort cases are also very difcult to accommodate
since they require the ability to reach a runway no mat-
ter when the abort occurs. Wheels-up water landings
190 M. Raftery, T. Fox / Acta Astronautica 61 (2007) 185 192
Fig. 7. Gemini parafoil conguration.
might be attempted, but success would require substan-
tial structural margins of safety leading to large weight
growth.
Lower L/D vehicles also typically use aerodynamic
means to reduce their velocities on descent, often using
parachutes or parafoils. Parachutes result in landings
with higher descent rates (typically around 2030 ft/s)
and relatively low horizontal speeds. Parachutes have
limited controllability, so candidate landing areas have
to be relatively large and unobstructed. Parafoils offer
similar performance to parachutes with the added ad-
vantage of increased controllability, since they glide
into their landing. One drawback of this descent method
is that vehicles using it still retain a modest horizontal
speed at touchdownenough that wheels or skids must
be deployed to control the vehicle and dissipate the re-
maining velocity. While less than those of winged ve-
hicles, these horizontal velocities can be signicant. In
development tests performed by North American Rock-
well for NASA in the 1960s, a Gemini-type capsule
was outtted with a parafoil and skids and dropped into
a desert test area (see Fig. 7) [11]. Even performing a
are maneuver just before landing to minimize impact
velocity, the craft slid 200 ft on its skids. As a result,
parafoils still require a large, open area for a success-
ful landing. Fig. 8 shows a conceptual design for use
of this approach with an Apollo conguration, which
would involve much greater reentry mass and velocity
than the Gemini implementation [12].
More recently, the X-38 program conducted an ex-
tensive series of drop tests using a parafoil designed
for a LEO rescue vehicle. While parafoils may be of-
fer promising options for future vehicles, the costs and
time required to certify this technology for Orion make
it problematic.
Forward
Shroud
Stabilization &
Extract Chute
Parachutes Parachute
(3 Bags) Mortar
Parasail
Fig. 8. Appolo parasail conguration.
Vehicles using parachutes during the descent phase
require a different technique to handle the landing im-
pact forces. For the rst US crewed space programs
(Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo) these impact forces
were mitigated through the use of water landings.
While this technique yields the maximum number of
potential landing sites, the costs required for crew and
vehicle recovery are large and the effects of seawa-
ter on the potential reusability of the spacecraft make
refurbishment much more difcult. Both the Russian
Soyuz and Chinese Shenzhou capsules reduce landing
impact forces by using retro-rockets. These vehicles
jettison their TPS heat shields as they drift under their
parachutes, ring the retro-rockets at an altitude of
about 5 ft to soften the nal touchdown. Other vehicles,
such as the Mars Pathnder probes, have used airbags
to absorb the landing impact.
Land based landing offers signicant advantages for
reduced recovery costs and re-usability, but potential
abort modes will require that the system be capable of
impact attenuation on a water landing. Tests and analy-
sis are still underway to determine the optimum method
for mitigating landing impact shocks for the Orion pro-
gram but current studies favor airbags as the safest
solution.
 M. Raftery, T. Fox / Acta Astronautica 61 (2007) 185 192
Fig. 9. Wind tunnel testing of CEV shape.
4. Leveraging experience
In the past 40 years, the commercial airplane indus-
try has improved safety and efciency through careful
evolution of their basic design. One look at a modern
airliner will show the design features which have been
stable for years and most improvements have happened
below the skin. In a similar way, the well charac-
terized and robust conguration from Apollo will al-
low NASA to focus on taking safety and operational
efciency to the next level. As the second generation
of manned Lunar spacecraft, Orion will benet both
in cost and schedule from all of the previous lessons
learned.
The extensive Apollo database will allow the CEV
program to progress more rapidly than would otherwise
be possible. Modern computer-based tools, calibrated
with actual ight and test data will allow the design team
to rapidly and accurately make the right decisions. As
an example, Fig. 9 shows wind tunnel test models used
in 2005 to explore different CEV body and heat shield
shape options. The tests were also used to calibrate our
modern computational uid dynamics (CFD) models
against actual Apollo ight data [13].
5. Conclusions
While there are many alternative solutions to the en-
gineering challenges posed to reentry vehicles, the tech-
niques chosen for Orion represent the set that takes
best advantage of established technologies applied in
new ways. Aerothermodynamic constraints from Lunar
or Martian missions drive the design toward a lower
191
L/D capsule, but advances in materials and design tech-
niques allow that capsule to be signicantly larger than
its Apollo predecessors. The parachute/airbag combi-
nation allows Orion to safely land on land or sea, giv-
ing the largest number of contingency landing sites. Fi-
nally, the similarities to the Apollo conguration allow
NASA to focus their time and development resources
on enhancements to safety and performance, rather than
the certication of new technologies. This conguration
results in an Orion vehicle that can satisfy the require-
ments of the Vision for Space Exploration with a mini-
mal amount of cost and risk.
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