Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro
the government and another country, and members of religious
FACTS:
The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and
other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the
Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the
provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are
said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro,
against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the
custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having
run away from the reservation.
The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board
thereof directed the Manguianes in question to take up their
habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by
the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The
action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the
Secretary of the Interior as required by said action.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected by
provincial governor. With the prior approval of the Department
Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-
Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is
deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such
inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied
public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial
board.
Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the
Administrative Code.
Villegas vs Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho (1978)
FACTS
The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537 requiring
aliens (except those employed in the diplomatic and consular
missions of foreign countries, in technical assistance programs of
orders or congregations) to procure the requisite mayors permit so
as to be employed or engage in trade in the City of Manila. The
permit fee is P50, and the penalty for the violation of the ordinance
is 3 to 6 months imprisonment or a fine of P100 to P200, or both.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE),
petitioner, vs. HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
,respondents
FACTS
Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to
PD 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily
for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other
temporary residents. The decree authorizes the School to employ
its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either
locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such
personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and
regulations attending their employment, except laws that have
been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. School
hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty,
classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-
hires. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate 25% more than local-
hires.
When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995,
petitioner ISAE, a legitimate labor union and the collective
bargaining representative of all faculty members of the School,
contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-
hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires
should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually
caused a deadlock between the parties.
ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach a
compromise in the NCMB, the matter reached the DOLE which
favored the School. Hence this petition.

Gobenciong v CA
Facts:
Dr. Pedro Gobenciong was Administrative Officer IV in Eastern
VisayasRegional Medical Center (the hospital), a public hospital.
In 1996, the hospital planned to buy a hemoanalyzer/particle
counter. A public bidding was had, where Alvez Commerical, Inc.
won. A Purchase Order was issued for 2 nebulizers and 1 particle
counter.
The nebulizers and hemoanalyzers appeared to have been
delivered, as per: Certification of Acceptance signed by Engr.
Jocano and Supply Officer Babula.
Sales Invoice signed by Supply Officer Babula acknowledging
receipt of the goods in good condition.
COA Inspection Report certified by Engr. Jocano and Gobenciongatt
esting that the goods had been inspected as to quality and
quantity.
As it turned out, the hemoanalyzer was never actually delivered.
Dr. Flora dela Pena, head of the hospitals Laboratory Unit, filed ana
dministrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman-
Visayas(Ombudsman) charging Gobenciong, Babula, Jocano, and
3 other persons with Falsification of Public Document and
Misconduct.
Upon Dela Penas motion, Ombdusman placed respondents, save
one, under a six-month preventive suspension and directed the
proper DOH Officer to immediately implement the Order.
Gobenciong sought reconsideration of this order, but without
awaiting the Ombudsmans action thereon, Gobenciong filed a
petition for certiorari in the CA.
CA denied Gobenciongs petition for certiorari on the strength of
Sec.24 in relation to Sec. 27 of RA 6770, which expressly empower
the Ombudsman, under defined conditions, to preventively
suspend, for
amaximum period of six months, all but three categories of publico
fficials and employees under investigation by his office and to
direct the immediate implementation of the corresponding
suspension order.
Ombudsman eventually found Gobenciong, et al guilty of Conduct
Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and imposed a
penalty of 1 year suspension without pay.
Gobenciong filed a motion for reconsideration, which Ombudsmand
enied, prompting Gobenciong to appeal to the CA.
CA partially granted Gobenciongs appeal and set aside theOmbuds
mans Decision in insofar as it imposed the penalty of 1
year suspension without pay. Relying on Tapiador v Office of the
Ombudsman it held that the disciplinary power of the Ombudsman
in administrative cases is limited only to recommending to the
disciplining authority the appropriate penalty to be meted out.
ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
FACTS
THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight
steward who was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the
weight standards of the airline company.
The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is
from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as
mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual of PAL.
In 1984, the weight problem started, which prompted PAL to send
him to an extended vacation until November 1985. He was allowed
to return to work once he lost all the excess weight. But the
problem recurred. He again went on leave without pay from
October 17, 1988 to February 1989.
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his
ideal weight, petitioner remained overweight. On January 3, 1990,
he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain grounded
until such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight
standards. Again, he was directed to report every two weeks for
weight checks, which he failed to comply with.
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated
refusal to report for weight check would be dealt with accordingly.
He was given another set of weight check dates, which he did not
report to.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of
Administrative Charge for violation of company standards on
weight requirements. Petitioner insists that he is being
discriminated as those similarly situated were not treated the
same.
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due
to his inability to attain his ideal weight, and considering the
utmost leniency extended to him which spanned a period
covering a total of almost five (5) years, his services were
considered terminated effective immediately.
LABOR ARBITER: held that the weight standards of PAL are
reasonable in view of the nature of the job of petitioner. However,
the weight standards need not be complied with under pain of
dismissal since his weight did not hamper the performance of his
duties.
NLRC affirmed.
CA: the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus, petitioner
was legally dismissed because he repeatedly failed to meet the
prescribed weight standards. It is obvious that the issue of
discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for purposes of
escaping the result of his dismissal for being overweight.
QUINTO vs. COMELEC
FACTS
Congress enacted RA 8436 on December 22, 1997. On January
23, 2007. it enacted RA 9369, amending theprevious act.Pursuant
to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election
laws, COMELEC issued ResolutionNo. 8678,4 the Guidelines on the
Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of
OfficialCandidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with
the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections.Sections 4 and 5 of
Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.
a)Any person holding a public appointive office or position including
active members of theArmed Forces of the Philippines, and other
officers and employees in government-owned orcontrolled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filingof his certificate of candidac
b)Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be
considered resigned upon thefiling of his certificate of candidacy for
the same or any other elective office or position.
SEC. 5. Period for filing Certificate of Candidacy.- The certificate of
candidacy shall be filed on regulardays, from November 20 to 30,
2009, during office hours, except on the last day, which shall be
untilmidnight.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their
offices the moment they file their CoCs,petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto
and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the
government and who intend to run in the coming elections,5 filed
the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari,seeking the
declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678
as null and void.

LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH
COMMISSION
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President
with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption
committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to
the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the
powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body
as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards
in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather,
collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no
power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest.
Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such
facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an
information in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to
enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the
power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate
funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because
the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize
the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and
efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new
public office which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth
Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when
it vested the Truth Commission with quasi-judicial powers
duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the
Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ
created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively
targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of
the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species
even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and
present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of
petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the
Presidents executive power and power of control necessarily
include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that
laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the
Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616
(as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize
the President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate
funds because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of
funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the
functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-
finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not
duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection
clause because it was validly created for laudable purposes.