CASE DIGEST:

HE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M.

NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY.

MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.

G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

PONENTE: Leonen

TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property

FACTS:

On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the
San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6) by ten feet (10) in size.
They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message
IBASURA RH Law referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The
second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading Conscience Vote and
lists candidates as either (Anti-RH) Team Buhay with a check mark, or (Pro-RH) Team Patay with an X
mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No.
10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by
petitioners as comprising Team Patay, while those who voted against it form Team Buhay.

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate.
Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of
politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political question, hence
not within the ambit of the Supreme Courts power of review.

2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as the case
was not brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.

3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.

4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated petitioners
fundamental right to freedom of expression.

5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral regulation.

6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners right to property.

7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or modesty. There is
no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this court
through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..

The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act of a constitutional
organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC
did have the discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by
abridging the fundamental right to expression.

Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue involves a truly
political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-
bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.

A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally imposed limits on
powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits
justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.

In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech. Any instance that
this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a political
question brings.

SECOND ISSUE: No.

The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in this case.

Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy is
already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or
performed by either branch or in this case, organ of government before a court may come into the picture.

Petitioners exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium, had understandable
relevance especially during the elections. COMELECs letter threatening the filing of the election offense
against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation
is enough to curtail petitioners speech.

In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in
their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.

THIRD ISSUE: No.

Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they had the
power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these provisions pertain to candidates and
political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does
not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a
non-candidate in this case.

FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that every citizens expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of
protection.

Moreover, the respondents argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being petitioners way
of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water.

The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates
and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or
posted in return for consideration by any candidate, political party, or party-list group.
 By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored messages
are covered.

The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech

Political speech refers to speech both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some
issue, fostering informed and civic minded deliberation. On the other hand, commercial speech has been
defined as speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction. The expression resulting from the
content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.

FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.

Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions based on the subject matter of the
utterance or speech. In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the
speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.

The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not easily
divorced from the size of its medium.

Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the clear
and present danger rule as measure.

Under this rule, the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high. Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear
and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming
the presumed unconstitutionality.

Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is no
compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of
the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate
petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone elses
constitutional rights.

SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains the
private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.

Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or

constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the
constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws.

The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and stickers should be
posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizens private property. Consequently, it violates Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due
process of law.

SEVENTH ISSUE: No.

The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this court.
The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the
posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of
candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences
and not religious speech.

Doctrine of benevolent neutrality

With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that take
religion specifically into account not to promote the governments favored form of religion, but to allow
individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to
remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a persons or institutions religion.
 As Justice Brennan explained, the government may take religion into account . . . to exempt, when
possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices
would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary
religious exercise may flourish.

Lemon test

A regulation is constitutional when:

1. It has a secular legislative purpose;

2. It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and

3. It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.

SORIANO VS. LA GUARDIA G.R. NO. 164785. APRIL 29, 2009

FACTS:

On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made
obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were
lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against
petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in
petitioner s remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sorianos statements during the televised Ang Dating Daan part of the religious discourse and within
the protection of Section 5, Art.III.

HELD:

No. Under the circumstances o btaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect of petitioners
utterances on the viewers fundamental rights as well as petitioners clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the
MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it cannot be
properly asserted that petitioners suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint
or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re the paramount of viewers rights, the public
trusteeship character of a broadcasters role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast media), a requirement that
indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There
are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language.

The SC ruled that Sorianos statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average child, and
thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected speech. Citing decisions from the US Supreme Court, the High
Court said that the analysis should be context based and found the utterances to be obscene after considering the use of
television broadcasting as a medium, the time of the show, and the G rating of the show, which are all factors that made
the utterances susceptible to children viewers. The Court emphasized on how the uttered words could be easily understood
by a child literally rather than in the context that they were used.

The SC also said that the suspension is not a prior restraint, but rather a form of permissible administrative
sanction or subsequent punishment. In affirming the power of the MTRCB to issue an order of suspension, the majority
said that it is a sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose under its charter without running afoul of the free speech
clause. The Court said that the suspension is not a prior restraint on the right of petitioner to continue with the broadcast of
Ang Dating Daan as a permit was already issued to him by MTRCB, rather, it was a sanction for the indecent contents
of his utterances in a G rated TV program. (Soriano v. Laguardia; GR No. 165636, April 29, 2009)

Dissenting Opinion:

PUNO, J.:

In a separate dissenting opinion, said that a single government action could be both a penalty and a prior restraint.
The Chief Magistrate pointed out that the three month suspension takes such form because it also acts as a restraint to
petitioners future speech and thus deserves a higher scrutiny than the context based approach that the majority applied.
In voting to grant Sorianos petition, the Chief Justice said that in the absence of proof and reason, he [Soriano] should
not be penalized with a three-month suspension that works as a prior restraint on his speech.

ABAD, J.:

Issue Presented:

This dissenting opinion presents a narrow issue: whether or not the Court is justified in imposing the penalty of
three-month suspension on the television program Ang Dating Daan on the ground of host petitioner Sorianos remarks
about Iglesia ni Cristos Michael prostituting himself when he attacked Soriano in the Iglesias own television program.

The Dissent:
The Ang Dating Daan is a nationwide television ministry of a church organization officially known as Members of the
Church of God International headed by petitioner Soriano. It is a vast religious movement not so far from those of Mike
Velardes El Shadai, Eddie Villanuevas Jesus is Lord, and Apollo Quiboloys The Kingdom of Jesus Christ. These
movements have generated such tremendous following that they have been able to sustain daily television and radio
programs that reach out to their members and followers all over the country. Some of their programs are broadcast abroad.
Ang Dating Daan is aired in the United States and Canada.

The Catholic Church is of course the largest religious organization in the Philippines. If its members get their
spiritual nourishments from attending masses or novenas in their local churches, those of petitioner Sorianos church tune
in every night to listen to his televised Bible teachings and how these teachings apply to their lives. They hardly have
places of worship like the Catholic Church or the mainstream protestant movements.

Thus, suspending the Ang Dating Daan television program is the equivalent of closing down their churches to its
followers. Their inability to tune in on their Bible teaching program in the evening is for them like going to church on
Sunday morning, only to find its doors and windows heavily barred. Inside, the halls are empty.

Do they deserve this? No.

1. A tiny moment of lost temper.

Petitioner Sorianos Bible ministry has been on television continuously for 27 years since 1983 with no prior
record of use of foul language. For a 15-second outburst of its head at his bitterest critics, it seems not fair for the Court to
close down this Bible ministry to its large followers altogether for a full quarter of a year. It is like cutting the leg to cure a
smelly foot.

2. Not obscene.

Primarily, it is obscenity on television that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech does not protect. As
the Courts decision points out, the test of obscenity is whether the average person, applying contemporary standards,
would find the speech, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. A thing is prurient when it arouses lascivious
thoughts or desires or tends to arouse sexual desire. A quarter-of-a-year suspension would probably be justified when a
general patronage program intentionally sneaks in snippets of lewd, prurient materials to attract an audience to the
program. This has not been the case here.

3. Merely borders on indecent.

Actually, the Court concedes that petitioner Sorianos short outburst was not in the category of the obscene. It
was just indecent. But were his words and their meaning utterly indecent? In a scale of 10, did he use the grossest
language? He did not. First, Soriano actually exercised some restraints in the sense that he did not use the vernacular word
for the female sexual organ when referring to it, which word even the published opinions of the Court avoided despite its
adult readers. He referred to it as yung ibaba or down below. And, instead of using the patently offensive vernacular
equivalent of the word fuck that describes the sexual act in which the prostitute engages herself, he instead used the
word gumagana ang doon yung ibaba or what functions is only down below. At most, his utterance merely bordered on
the indecent.

Second, the word puta or prostitute describes a bad trade but it is not a bad word. The world needs a word to
describe it. Evil is badbut the word evil is not; the use of the words puta or evil helps people understand
the values that compete in this world.A policy that places these ordinary descriptive words beyond the hearing of children
is unrealistic and is based on groundless fear. Surely no member of the Court will recall that when yet a child his or her
hearing the word puta for the first time left him or her wounded for life.
 Third, Soriano did not tell his viewers that being a prostitute was good. He did not praise prostitutes as to make
them attractive models to his listeners. Indeed, he condemned Michael for acting like a prostitute in attacking him on the
air. The trouble is that the Court, like the MTRCB read his few lines in isolation. Actually, from the larger picture, Soriano
appears to have been provoked by Michaels resort to splicing his speeches and making it appear that he had taught
inconsistent and false doctrines to his listeners. If Michaels sin were true, Soriano was simply defending himself with
justified anger. And fourth, the Court appears to have given a literal meaning to what Soriano said.

Gago ka talaga x x x, masahol ka pa sa putang babae x x x. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung
ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba!

This was a figure of speech. Michael was a man, so he could not literally be a female prostitute. Its real meaning
is that Michael was acting like a prostitute in mouthing the ideas of anyone who cared to pay him for such service. It had
no indecent meaning. The Bible itself uses the word prostitute as a figure of speech. By their deeds they prostituted
themselves, said Psalm 106:39 of the Israelites who continued to worship idols after God had taken them out of Egyptian
slavery. Sorianos real message is that Michael prostituted himself by his calumny against him.

If at all, petitioner Sorianos breach of the rule of decency is slight, one on a scale of 10. Still, the Court would
deprive the Ang Dating Daan followers of their nightly bible teachings for a quarter of a year because their head teacher
had used figures of speech to make his message vivid.

4. The average child as listener

The Court claims that, since Ang Dating Daan carried a general patronage rating, Sorianos speech no doubt
caused harm to the children who watched the show. This statement is much too sweeping. The Court relies on the United
States case of Federal Communications Commission (FCC) v. Pacifica Foundation, a 1978 landmark case. Here are
snatches of the challenged monologue that was aired on radio: The srcinal seven words were, shit, piss, fuck, cunt,
cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits. Those are the ones that will curve your spine, grow hair on your hands and maybe,
even bring us, God help us, peace without honor and bourbonAlso cocksucker is a compound word and neither half of
that is really dirtyAnd the cock crowed three times, the cockthree times. Its in the Bible, cock in the BibleHot
shit, holy shit, tough shit, eat shit, shit -eating grinIts a great word, fuck, nice word, easy word, cute word, kind of.
Easy word to say. One syllable, short u. FuckA little something for everyone. Fuck.

Good word. x x x Imagine how the above would sound if translated into any of the Filipino vernaculars. The U.S.
Supreme Court held that the above is not protected speech and that the FCC could regulate its airing on radio. The U.S.
Supreme Court was of course correct. Here, however, there is no question that Soriano attacked Michael, using figure of
speech, at past 10:00 in the evening, not at 2:00 in the afternoon. The average Filipino child would have been long in bed
by the time Ang Dating Daan appeared on the television screen. What is more, Bible teaching and interpretation is not the
stuff of kids. It is not likely that they would give up programs of interest to them just to listen to Soriano drawing a
distinction between faith and work or action.

The Court has stretched the child angle beyond realistic proportions. The MTRCB probably gave the program
a general patronage rating simply because Ang Dating Daan had never before been involved in any questionable broadcast
in the previous 27 years that it had been on the air. The monologue in the FCC case that was broadcast at 2 in the
afternoon was pure indecent and gross language, uttered for its own sake with no social value at all. It cannot compare to
Sorianos speech where the indecent words were slight and spoken as mere figure of speech to defend himself from what
he perceived as malicious criticism.

5. Disproportionate penalty

The Court applied the balancing of interest test in justifying the imposition of the penalty of suspension against
Ang Dating Daan. Under this test, when particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order and the regulation
results in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgment of speech, the duty of the courts is to determine which of the two
conflicting interests demands the greater protection under the particular circumstances presented.

An example of this is where an ordinance prohibits the making of loud noises from 9:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. Can
this ordinance be applied to prevent vehicles circling the neighborhood at such hours of night, playing campaign jingles
on their loudspeakers to win votes for candidates in the election? Here, there is a tension between the rights of candidates
to address their constituents and the interest of the people in healthy undisturbed sleep. The Court would probably uphold
the ordinance since public interest demands a quiet nights rest for all and since the restraint on the freedom of speech is
indirect, conditional, and partial. The candidate is free to make his broadcast during daytime when people are normally
awake and can appreciate what he is saying.

But here, the abridgment of speech three months total suspension of the Ang Dating Daan television bible
teaching program cannot be regarded as indirect, conditional, or partial. It is a direct, unconditional, and total abridgment
of the freedom of speech, to which a religious organization is entitled, for a whole quarter of a year.
IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS. CA (1996)

FACTS:
Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on
Channel 13 every Sunday.
The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in
comparative studies with other religions.
Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its
TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on
the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law."
It appealed to the Office of the President the classification of its TV Series No. 128 which allowed it through a
letter of former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the
decision of the respondent Board.
According to the letter the episode in it is protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression
and no indication that the episode poses any clear and present danger.
Petitioner also filed Civil Case. Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them. It
cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128.
In their Answer, respondent Board invoked its power under PD No. 19861 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible and says that our (Catholic) veneration of the
Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible. The board contended that it outrages
Catholic and Protestant's beliefs. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA however reversed it hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is not constitutionally protected as a form of religious exercise and
expression.

HELD:
Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity.
It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of
censorship will be struck down. This is true in this case.
So-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. RTCs
ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion.
attack is different from offend any race or religion.
The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse
to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be.
Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an
attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their
followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State
from leaning towards any religion.
Respondent board cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other
religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country.
The basis of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of
dueling ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the
security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the
smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.
There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and
imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by
hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil.
It is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar because the issue involves
the content of speech and not the time, place or manner of speech. Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed,
its impact cannot be measured, and the causal connection between the speech and the evil apprehended cannot
be established.
 The determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or
lies outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot be arrogated by
an administrative body such as a Board of Censors." A system of prior restraint may only be validly administered
by judges and not left to administrative agencies.