Goffman on Power

Author(s): Mary F. Rogers

Source: The American Sociologist, Vol. 12, No. 2 (May, 1977), pp. 88-95
Published by: American Sociological Association
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 88 The American Sociologist

Nejelski, Paul and Kurt Finsterbusch Moon." Psychology Today 9 (January):

1973 "The prosecutor and the researcher: Pre 36-47.
sent and prospective variations in the Su Robbins, Thomas Dick Anthony, Madeline Doucas
preme Court's Branzburg decision." Social and Thomas Curtis
Problems 21 (summer):3-21. 1976 "The last civil religion: Reverend Moon
and the Unification Church." Sociological
Rice, Berkeley Analysis 37 (summer): 111-127.
1976 "Messiah from Korea: Honor thy father Received 7/1/76 Accepted 12/27/76

GOFFMAN ON POWER*

Mary F. Rogers
The University of West Florida

The American Sociologist 1977, Vol. 12 (April): 88-95

Erving Goffman is not generally considered a power theorist nor are there grounds for suppos
ing that he considers himself a scholar of social power. Yet implicit in his work is a relatively
coherent conceptual scheme concerning power, influence, and control.' This paper represents
an attempt to illustrate the possible utility of examining the work of 'nonpower" scholars for
insights relevant to the development of general, theoretically synthetic conceptions of power.

Introduction As suggested above, the work of any

number of scholars might have been
Insofar as power is a major sociological selected for my purposes. I have focused
concept and a fundamental element of so on Goffman for reasons above and beyond
cial life, sociologists of most, if not all, the fact that his work offers an implicit
theoretical persuasions would seem conceptual scheme regarding power and
necessarily to have addressed themselves related phenomena. (1) In his attention to
in some fashion to the matter of power. themundane, Goffman offers insights into
For example, Gouldner (1970:242ff.) has the nature of power as a pervasive fact of
indicated that structuralists tend to offer a people's everyday lives. (2) His ideas on
commentary, however implicit, on power. power are part of a more general
Ethnomethodologists who concern them framework which can be exploited for an
selves with "practical reasoning" understanding of social structure as well
(Turner, 1974a:7), the uses to which as of interaction processes. (3) I believe
available resources are put (Garfinkel, that Goffman offers a basis for demarcat
1974:17), and "... the equipment that ing what might be loosely labeled as the
enables the 'ordinary' member of society Sociology of Power.
tomake his daily way through the world"
(Turner, 1974b: 197), would also seem to
Intentionality and Power
imply a great deal about power.
Goffman's dramaturgical approach also It will be maintained in this paper that
contains significant (and unexpected) in Goffman implicitly distinguishes power
sights into power and related phenomena. from other social phenomena by his con
My major purpose in this paper is to ex sistent, explicit attention to the role of
amine some of Goffman's notions about intentionality in social life. He maintains
power in order to illustrate the utility of that individuals sometimes behave in a
looking to "nonpower" scholars for in wholly calculating fashion in order to
sights relevant to the refinement of this elicit desired responses from others, while
central sociological concept. at other times they are calculating but rel
atively unaware of it (1959:6). Moreover,
* am
I grateful to the anonymous reviewers whose an actor can be "completely taken in by
comments were helpful in the revision of this paper. his own act" (1959:17), his motives

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 Goffman on Power 89

operating "naturally" in the course of more vulnerable to machinations of those

"being himself' or "being involved" others.Clarification(1971:106, 110) is an
(1974:346). expression of nonintentionality (i.e., in
As
Goffman uses the term "inten communicating his/her motives an actor
tional," three elements are conceptually denies the presence of intentionality as
central: (1) what is intentional involves defined earlier) and can be falsified in
some conscious awareness on the part of order to sustain others' perceptions of
the actor. The intentional is different from normal appearances. Therefore what con
the "unwitting" (1959:22) and the "un stitutes normal appearances to the
meant" (1959:52), and involves design other(s) must be used as a cover by one
(1959:4; 1963b:14, 69). (2) Intentionalitywho wants "... to be present but of no
involves interactional goals. In Goffman's concern" (1971:257) putting ". . .the au
terms when actors intend, it is typically dience in a position to be duped and mis
with a purpose such as information con led, for there are few signs that cannot be
trol, impression management, and reme used to attest to the presence of some
dial results. involves a
Intentionality thing that is not really there" (1959:58).
goal-orientedness which rests ultimately Thus intentionality can involve activation
on the proclivities of actors to assess each of ". . . the capacity and motive to mis
other and their abilities tomanipulate the represent the facts"1 (1959:58), and such
objects of such assessments. Thus an misrepresentation can appear under the
"unwitting move" (nonintentional) in guise of clarification.
volves "... behavior that is unoriented to The phenomena of intentionality, nor
the assessment an observer might be mak mal
" appearances, clarification, and mis
ing of it ... (1972:15), while a "control representation are basic to a full under
move" involves intentional effort in a a
standing of "strategic interaction,"
self-conscious and calculated process basic touchstone inGoffman's work. The
(1972:15-16). Individuals can both know concept of strategic interaction, in turn,
ingly and unknowingly make impressions serves a function in
demarcating
(1961b: 102) and that difference is crucial Goffman's work in defining the boundary
to an understanding of the meaning of in
separating what might be called "interac
tentionality in Goffman's thought. (3) tional effects" from power phenomena.
People may or may not contrivedly seek Strategic interaction is a kind of "mutual
to optimize the likelihood of preferred impingement" whereby "... each party
outcomes. The calculated, self must make a move and where every pos
conscious choice of certain modes of be sible move carries fateful implications for
havior as means of shaping interactional all parties" (1972:127). Intentionality is
outcomes is the thirdmajor component of necessarily involved insofar as strategic
intentionality in Goffman's work. The interaction is based on a consciousness of
"ultimate behavioral materials" include consequentiality (fatefulness) and an at
glances, gestures, verbal statements, and tempt to deal with it so as to derive satis
positionings, and they can be used inten factory, ifnot preferred, outcomes. From
dedly or unintendedly (1967:1). such a perspective, social life may be
Intentionality is related to normal ap viewed as consisting broadly of strategic
pearances, clarification, and misrepre and nonstrategic interaction. People
sentation; brief examinations of these routinely deal with the consequentiality of
phenomena further elucidate Goffman's their interrelationships through "continu
use of "intentional." ous corrective control" (1972:22). How
According to Goffman, "Normal ap
pearances" offer an environment inwhich 1
Goffman does not assume that all misrepresenta
"... nothing is out of the ordinary ..." tion involves intentionality. Sometimes it is expected
(Goffman, 1971:239) and others' behavior insofar as the first standard for assessing conduct is
is perceived as "natural" (1971:280, 282). "suitability." Often, then, candor and sincerity are
In such circumstances actors perceive lit deemed unnecessary, if not offensive (Goffman,
1971:168), and misrepresentation is normative. De
tle, if any, intentionality on the part of ception, though, includes intentionality by d?finition
other actors and are thereby rendered (1974:112).

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 90 The American Sociologist

ever, "... when action is unexpectedly For example, since people routinely and
blocked or deflected and special compen rather unconsciously expect to behave
satory effort is required" (1974:22), mo adaptively in social situations, they are
tive and intent assume a felt significance unlikely to respond to the effects of in
which circumscribes the taken-for teraction on their behavior as someone's
grantedness of everyday life. "fault" or to experience self as "pawn."
Goffman's work reflects a consistent, Interactional effects, contrasted with
careful distinction between the effects of changes generated by another's (appar
power and what were referred to above as ent) intentionality, are thus unlikely to in
"interactional effects." Goffman is sensi clude a sense of consequentiality and/or
tive to the inadvertent, unintended ways fatefulness.
in which people affect one another's be
havior, both in public space and in private Power, and Control
Influence,
space such as "back regions." Such ef
fects, he implies, flow from the nature of Power. Goffman's approach to power is
routine interaction itself. Such interac broad and almost entirely implicit. In gen
tional effects are the short- or long-term eral, he treats power in terms of re
changes in an individual's (or a group's) sources, being concerned foremostly with
behavior which result from copresence people's differential capacities to affect
rather than from behavior intendedly di one another's behavior.
rected at them by others.2 Like many power scholars, Goffman
Interaction effects must be distin approaches power as a capacity or poten
guished from behavioral effects caused by tial.3 He points out that retaliatory re
others' intentional efforts.While both sets sponses to others' actions require author
of effects involve observable changes in ity and resources (Goffman, 1967:222),
actors' behavior, they result from qualita which are capacities?what one "... can

tively distinct phenomena and, more im draw upon in his adaptations to the situa
portantly, have different social and tion" (1972:121). "Resource continuity"
Interac means that resources have "... an exis
phenomenological consequences.
tion, whether strategic or not, necessarily tence before the scene occurs and an exis
affects behavior insofar as copresence tence that continues on after the scene is
typically demands modes of behavior over" (1974:299). While discontinous
(e.g., speech) which are generally not ex and transitory, copresence itself in
hibited by solitary individuals. Thus in terplays with resource continuity in set
teraction itself affects the behavior of in ting the parameters of one's power in a
dividuals apart from any participant's in given social situation. "Locally realizable
tentions or designs. When interaction events and roles" ("realized resources")
does involve intentionality on the part of (1961:28) are critical in assessing indi
one or more interactants, it is productive viduals' power. Basically, then, Goffman
to designate that phenomenon with a suggests that one's power in a given situa
specific concept (e.g., strategic interac tion is a function of both situation-based
tion) in order to distinguish analytically and individual-based factors, what I have
the effects of copresence itself from the elsewhere discussed in terms of infra- and
effects of the designs of one or more in instrumental resources (Rogers, 1974:
teractants. Such a conceptual distinction 1425-1428).
is also meaningful since the two In terms of instrumental resources
phenomena have different consequences. Goffman mentions position and various
attributes which enable an individual to
2
Goffman's implicit acknowledgment of interac engage in bargaining (Goffman, 1959:85).
tional effects lies most pointedly in his discussions of
"role" and "self." He distinguishes between the 3 to
Goffman speaks, for example, of the "power
person (subject of a biography) and the specialized enforce" (1974:446), the "power to cause"
function the individual serves during social occa (1963a: 40), and the "... power to give the show
sions (role) (1974:128-129, 269, 279). In social set away or disrupt it.. . . "(1959:82; 1974:119-120). It
tings the expressed self is a function of both biog can be inferred that power is a capacity which exists
raphy and interactional effects. but may or may not be used.

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 Goffman on Power 91

He also considers skills, largely interper sensitive to that focus (Goffman,

sonal ones, which contribute to one's 1959:239, 244; 1961a:x, 177, 179; 1963a:5,
power. These include "character," com 132, 166-167; 1967:47-48, 113, 149;
posure, "presence of mind," and related 1971:xiv-xv, 34, 41, 93). The frequency
characteristics which can be activated with which Goffman qualifies his observa
under "perceivedly fateful circumstances" tions suggests his awareness that within
( 1967:216ff.). Knowledge is an important given subpopulations of a society or in
resource (1961a:211-212). Goffman's other societies, different sorts of skills and
concern with information control, misrep circumstances might constitute resources.
resentation, strategic secrets (1959:142) Thus Goffman implies that his concepts as
and information states (1972:121; explicated may not be widely applicable
1974:133-134, 448) shows a continuing beyond the boundaries of the social world
focus on the instrumental ways in which he has chosen as a focus.4
information can augment one's power. Influence. Influence is a behavioral
Goffman's attention to infra-resources phenomenon to Goffman. As in the case
focuses largely on perceptions and access. of power, Goffman provides no explicit
Awareness may contribute to or detract definition; his use of the term suggests its
from one's power?perceptions of oppor meaning. Behavior involves influence in
tunity and risk are a function not only of sofar as itgenerates (or is at least intended
the information available to a given actor to generate) a change in others' behavior.
but also of the past experiences the actor Influence differs from other interaction in
has had with a given other (Goffman, its intentionality and relative one-sided
1974:299). Goffman notes a close, though ness in behavioral modification (though it
incomplete, correspondence among role is ultimately bilateral since the influenced
played, information possessed and acces actor must cooperate if influence is to oc
sible regions (1959:145). Rules of exclu cur) (Goffman, 1974:112). Goffman
sion function to protect insiders from in further specifies his implicit meaning of
trusion (1963a: 145). Frequently such rules influence through his explication of
also create "evidential boundaries," "strategic interaction."5 He emphasizes
which are barriers to perception two broad types of influence strategies:
(1974:215). While Goffman is frequently (1) communication management and (2)
concerned with the matter of access vis sanctioning.
?-vis his treatment of front and back re Actors can manage impressions created
gions and in-group and out-group align and maintained about the self through fab
ments, he most pointedly indicates the re rication (1972:13), viz., intentional efforts
levance of access as an infra-resource in to generate false beliefs in others about
his remark that "... he must be there in what is going on (1974:83). Fabrication is
the flesh if the moment is to be his at all" an encompassing strategy of influence, in
(1967:166). In other words, lack of ef cluding a variety of communication tech
fective access to given people or situa niques which are available for specific
tions can severely curtail one's power rel purposes (1974:83-107). Among these
ative to those others. techniques are innuendo, strategic am
Goffman never provides an explicit de biguity, crucial omissions, lies, and im
finition of power; he uses the term to refer personations (1959:62, 64). Communica
to the capacity or potential to act effec
4
tively in social situations. Qualitatively, This awareness suggests a sensitivity to what has
this is the capacity to be intentional. Thus elsewhere been called the systemic orientation to
the study of power (Rogers, 1974:1421-1423).
power involves potential intentionality. 5
Goffman's explication of "strategic interaction"
Quantitatively and relatively, the capacity is very similar to numerous scholars' conceptualiza
to so act consists of instrumental and tions of influence (Cartwright, 1965:4; Clark, 1968:47;
infra-re sources; power is resources. Gamson, 1968:60; March, 1955:438; McFarland,
While Goffman has used illustrative data 1969:6; Parsons, 1969:266; Riker, 1969:117; Simon,
1966:123). Such treatments of influence typically in
from other cultures and classes, by and
volve attention to various strategies of influence, and
large he has focused on an Anglo, in this regard Goffman's similarity to such scholars is
middle-class, masculine world, and he is also rather clear-cut.

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 92 The American Sociologist

tion can be hinted at (and thus easily de cesses of control, implies intentionality,
nied) (1967:30). and intentionality is also involved in con
Goffman also discusses modes of con tainment, viz. y "taking others in"
cealment and covering, as well as (1974:83).
strategies of revealment (1972:18ff.). Fi Goffman also refers to control as an
nally, he observes that the body itself can effect, as when one has "control of or
be used communicatively in influence "control over" perceptions. Control of
strategies (e.g., "body gloss") (1971:128) people results from shaping their defini
and that settings and equipment can be tion of a situation (1959:3-4) or determin
employed in the interests of rendering ing what they perceive (1959:67). Fre
communication more influential (e.g., the quently, such control results from label
"front") (1959:22). ing, as when inmates of total institutions
Sanctioning receives less attention in are given "all-embracing identifications"
Goffman's writing. He does, however, (196la:84-85), or when stigmatized per
note the significance of rewards and sons are so thoroughly categorized that
punishments as strategies of influence their possibilities for autonomy are se
(1961a:80, 178-179). His concern with verely circumscribed(1963b:139). Ill fame
"situational proprieties" (1963a: 243) (1963b:70), negative labels, stereotyping,
leads to consideration of an important but and ideologies constitute mechanisms
commonly neglected mode of negative generating control. Consistent with this
sanctioning when he observes that such usage of the term, Goffman points out that
improprieties can be used to express "... we must start with the idea that a
"interpersonal defiance" (1963a:228) as particular definition is in charge of the
well as to draw individuals into conflict situation, and that as long as this control
(1967:249). Such behavior is simply com is not overtly threatened or blatantly re
municative when expressions thus given jected, much counter-activity will be pos
result primarily in a registering of discon sible" (1961b: 133). Control, then, can be
tent or resentment. However, when in effect and need not involve intention
other's moral claims are thereby under ally undertaken processes.
mined, resulting in embarrassment, nega Goffman's conceptions of self-control
tive sanctioning is involved. This type of (1971:121) and "cooperator" also identify
influence strategy, then, cuts across the control as an ongoing state of affairs; in
two broad types of strategies described. deed "personal control" is critical to
Control. Goffman uses the term "con Goffman (1971:346). Rules are effective
trol" (or "social control") in several dis because they are deemed appropriate, and
tinct ways. The problematic features of compliance with them allows people to
his usage point to a common deficiency in conceive of themselves in favorable ways
theoretical frameworks concerning power (1971:98). Moreover, people tend "volun
and influence. He discusses control as tarily" to avoid those places and occa
both a process and an effect. He refers to sions where they are not welcome, saving
the "process of social control" in terms of face by venturing nothing (1967:43). The
regulatory processes, sometimes involv "cooperator"?".
. . the
'normal', 'pro
ing sanctions, which reinforce institu grammed', or built-in member"
tional and/or situational norms (1961a:38). (1961a: 189)?is, then, a controlled
He distinguishes formal social control member of a social system, whatever the
(1971:347) from informal social control motives for his conformity.6
(1971:347), e.g., "inmate codes" in total Goffman's two distinct conceptions of
institutions (1961a:243). As a process, control represent a serious weakness in
control can involve "... tricky ways of his conceptual scheme regarding power,
sympathetically taking the other into con 6
sideration as someone who assesses the Goffman realizes that habit may underlie con

environment and might profitably be led formity: "... conventional persons often maintain
the rules consistently enough to remain unaware of
into a wrong assessment" (1969:17). The the situational their conduct sustains"
obligations
"trickiness," sometimes intrinsic to pro (1963a:226).

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 Goffman on Power 93

influence, and control. That Goffman has zation seriously lacking in theoretical util
used the same termwith reference to qual ity.
itatively different phenomena is problem Nonetheless it is in his treatment of
enough. Perhaps more problematic, control as a routinized, ongoing effect that
though, is his marked failure to specify Goffman moves toward a transcendence
precisely what each conception of control of most current conceptualizations of
is designed to encompass. Conceived as a power. Most power scholars deal nearly
process, control seems hardly, if at all, exclusively with power, strategies of in
distinguishable from influence. That the fluence, and/or decision-making pro
control processes which regulate behavior cesses, constructing frameworks which fail
sometimes involve sanctions, that they to account explictly for the day-to-day,
may focus on situational as well as institu routine conformity which generally corre
tional norms, that theymay be informal as sponds to the preferences of the more
well as formal, and covert ("tricky") as powerful, influential members of a social
well as overt, clearly suggest that all con system. In his treatment of control,
trol processes involve influence. Goffman provides not only conceptual
Goffman's introduction and use of "con grounds for attending to that phenomenon
trol" in the processual sense suggest that but also bases for identifying the rele
in some instances he may be trying to get vance of labeling belief systems, and the
at a subset of influence processes which like, to power. Most importantly, he es
are significantly formal and overt and fo tablishes grounds for treating the cir
cused on institutional norms, i.e., "im cumscription of intentionality in social
personal" influence. His work, though, life. Specifically, his insights point to
renders that judgment only a speculation ways in which those with power can
since the conceptual ambiguities regard exploit dominant belief and value systems
ing control are indeed real, tending tomili to maximize their preferred outcomes
tate against the derivation of any precise without engaging in influence as fre
idea of why he uses control in this sense at quently or pointedly as would otherwise
all. be the case.
Conceived as an effect or ongoing state
of affairs, control is similarly problematic. Conclusion
The controlled (and self-controlled) indi
vidual seems to be little more than the Goffman offers a relatively integrated,
socialized individual whose secondary though mostly implicit, conceptual
socialization is ongoing as s/he partici scheme with reference to power
pates in a given sociocultural system (with phenomena. Briefly, he conceives of
its available labels, ideologies, predomi power as a potential or capacity com
nant beliefs, etc.) and interacts with some prised of resources, importantly including
of its members (who label, manipulate, infra-resources. The intended activation
and otherwise enact and personify the cul or invocation of one's resources is influ
tural elements relevant to the situation at ence, an interactional phenomenon. Con
hand and/or their own identities). As an formity to a given person's or group's
effect, then, control appears to represent preferences in the absence of direct influ
the internalized content of primary ence is the empirical referent of control.
socialization plus overlays on that content Goffman elaborates this basic concep
which result from ongoing membership, tualization through attention to (1) key re
participation, and interaction within a sources inmiddle-class American society
given social system. From this perspec (e.g., access and information); (2) specific
tive, control is, to some degree, a "condi strategies of influence (e.g., misrepre
tion of interaction" as well as an effect of sentation, sanctioning); and (3) those
past interaction, including influence. Thus phenomena which tend to generate be
the effect termed "control" encompasses havior conducive to the interests of the
a complex configuration of phenomena, powerful vis-?-vis their effects on per
tending to render Goffman's conceptuali ceptions and beliefs (e.g., labels, ideol

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 94 The American Sociologist

ogy). Thus within his dramaturgical have to be undertaken in systematizing

framework Goffman offers a rather far Goffman's and others' power-relevant in
reaching, intentionality-based commen sights, it seems that theoretical develop
tary on power and related phenomena.7 ment in the Sociology of Power could be
In addition, Goffman has explicitly enhanced by such efforts; boundaries de
treated both social structure (e.g., lineating the Sociology of Power might be
1963a:4, 8, 22; 1967:33-34; 1971:xff.) and clarified in the process. Goffman's work
self (e.g., 1971:40ff; 1974:373ff.) within suggests, for example, that the Sociology
the embracing framework which provides of Power is perhaps most rudimentarily
meaning and potential utility for his the "sociology of intentionality." That
power-relevant notions. Indeed, his work possibility would seem to merit serious,
provides definite possibilities for a careful consideration.
power-based theory of social structure.
references
Were his work drawn upon heavily for
such theoretical purposes, though, the Cartwright, Dorwin
of his 1965 "Influence, leadership, control." Pp. 1-47
implications conceptualizations
in James G. March (ed.), Studies in Social
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Power. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.
extending his micro-sociological emphasis Clark, Terry N.
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might be asked "How is it;what are the Terry N. Clark (ed.), Community Structure
reasons that a dramaturgical analysis is and Decision-Making. San Francisco:
Chandler.
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Gamson, William
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analyses, then the ahistorical thrust of Garfinkel, Harold

1974 "The origins of the term 'ethnomethodol
Goffman's work will seem to represent a "
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edition of a performance," for example, Goffman, Erving
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those aiming at general macro-level

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power perspective demonstrates the util
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7 1970 The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology.
Some scholars might question the political rele
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March, James G.
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here to provide a lullaby but merely to sneak in 1969 Power and Leadership in Pluralist Systems.
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 From the Loins of Leviathan 95

Parsons, Talcott The Government of Associations. Totowa,

1969 "On the concept of political power." N.J.: Bedminster.
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Riker, William H. Penguin.

1969 "Some ambiguities in the notion of
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n.d. "The .
A macro
Rogers, Mary F. dramaturgical society:
to dramaturgical anal
1974 "Instrumental and infra-resources: The analytic approach
of power." American Journal of ysis." Unpublished paper, The Red
bases
79 (May): 1418-1433. Feather Institute, Colorado State Univer
Sociology
Simon, Herbert A. sity.
1966 "The nature of authority." Pp. 123-127 in
William A. Glaser and David L. Sills (eds.),
Received 2/4/76 Accepted 2/15/77

NOTE

FROM THE LOINS OF LEVIATHAN:

A SHANDEAN POSTSCRIPT (OF SORTS)*

Vito Signorile
University of Windsor, Canada

The American Sociologist 1977, Vol. 12 (April): 95-98

There is a widespread conviction friends and foes of the functionalist ap

among social scientists that "func proach. In his pr?cis of functionalism,
tionalism" was a perspecive bor Jarvie (1973) sees the "metaphor of the
rowed from biology and physiology. For as fundamental to
living organism"
example, in his treatise on manifest and functional doctrines.
latent functions, Merton (1957) noted The danger for social science of
Radcliffe-Brown's explicit use of such an wholesale importation from the concep
(cf., in particular, Radcliffe tual apparatus of physiology is a well
analogy
Brown, 1935). The identification of taken caveat. Nevertheless, since the
functionalism as a point of view that days of Worms arid Schaeffle no serious
seizes upon the likeness of social pro theoretician has suggested that the anal
cesses to organic processes comes up time ogy held in very great detail. The
and again, and is alluded to by both functionalist would simply feel he must
acknowledge that there is some similarity
*
In making this allusion to Robert Merton's On to be found between the spheres of the
the Shoulders of Giants (1965), it is hoped that atten social and the organic. An inquiry into the
tion may be drawn to a neglected mode of sociologi
etymological roots of the terms function
inquiry. The relevance?and excitement?of
cal and organ suggests a reason for this per
what Merton rather mysteriously refers to as a
"Shandean" method is thoroughly exemplified by ception of similarity. What emerges from
his own search for the origin of the idea that knowl an investigation of the semantic history of
edge accumulates through the historical process of both these words is the fact that they
building on foundations laid by one's predecessors.
I am
evolved, not out of primitive biological
thus inspired by Merton's treatise,
usage, but rather from originally social
Being
pleased to render the otsog due him. A fuller otsog
would dictate my footnoting the shoulders of my applications.
unidentified reviewers. The earliest use of the wordfunctionem

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