G.R. No.
L-34362 November 19, 1982 On February 23, 1967, Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a petition in the
MODESTA CALIMLIM AND LAMBERTO MAGALI IN HIS CAPACITY AS
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF DOMINGO MAGALI, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PEDRO A. RAMIREZ IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN, BRANCH I, and FRANCISCO
RAMOS, respondents.
Eugenio Ramos for petitioners.
Rogelio P. Closa for respondents.
VASQUEZ, J.:
The dismissal of Civil Case No. SCC-180 filed by the herein petitioners in the
respondent Court against the private respondent is sought to be annulled and set
aside by this Petition For Review On Certiorari.
The antecedent material facts are not disputed. Sometime in 1961, a judgment
for a sum of money was rendered in favor of Independent Mercantile Corporation
against a certain Manuel Magali by the Municipal Court of Manila in Civil Case No.
85136. After said judgment became final, a writ of execution was issued on July
31, 1961. The Notice of Levy made on September 21, 1961 on a parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9138 registered in the name of
"Domingo Magali, married to Modesta Calimlim", specified that the said levy was
only against "all rights, title, action, interest and participation of the defendant
Manuel Magali over the parcel of land described in this title. " The Certificate of
Sale executed by the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan on October 17, 1961 in favor
of Independent Mercantile Corporation also stated that the sale referred only to
the rights and interest of Manuel Magali over the land described in TCT No. 9138.
Manuel Magali is one of the several children of Domingo Magali who had died in
1940 and herein petitioner Modesta Calimlim.
However, when the Sheriff issued the final Deed of Sale on January 25, 1963, it
was erroneously stated therein that the sale was with respect to "the parcel of
land described in this title" (referring to TCT No. 9138) and not only over the
rights and interest of Manuel Magali in the same. The execution of the said final
Deed of Sale was annotated at the back of said title.
respondent Court to compel Manuel Magali to surrender the owner's duplicate of
TCT No. 9138 in order that the same may be cancelled and a new one issued in
the name of the said corporation. Not being the registered owner and the title not
being in his possession, Manuel Magali failed to comply with the order of the
Court directing him to surrender the said title. On June 20, 1967, Independent
Mercantile Corporation filed an ex-parte petition to declare TCT No. 9138 as
cancelled and to issue a new title in its name. The said petition was granted by
the respondent Court and in its Order dated July 13, 1967, it directed the issuance
of a new certificate of title in the name of the Independent Mercantile Corporation
and the cancellation of TCT No. 9138. By virtue of said Order, the Register of
Deeds of Pangasinan issued a new title in the name of the corporation, Identified
as TCT No. 68568.
On November 21, 1967, petitioner Modesta Calimlim, surviving spouse of
Domingo Magali, upon learning that her husband's title over the parcel of land
had been cancelled, filed a petition with the respondent Court, sitting as a
cadastral court, praying for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568. An opposition to
the said petition was filed by Independent Mercantile Corporation. After the
parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the respondent Court issued an
Order dated June 3, 1968 dismissing the petition. (Rollo, pp. 31-38.)
The herein petitioners did not appeal the dismissal of the petition they filed in LRC
Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568. Instead, on January 11,
1971, they filed the complaint in Civil Case No. SCC-180 praying for the
cancellation of the conveyances and sales that had been made with respect to
the property, covered by TCT No. 9138 previously registered in the name of
Domingo Magali, married to Modesta Calimlim. Named as defendant in said civil
case was herein private respondent Francisco Ramos who claimed to have bought
the property from Independent Mercantile Corporation on July 25, 1967. Private
respondent Francisco Ramos, however, failed to obtain a title over the property in
his name in view of the existence of an adverse claim annotated on the title
thereof at the instance of the herein petitioners.
Private respondent Francisco Ramos filed a Motion To Dismiss Civil Case No. SCC-
180 on the ground that the same is barred by prior judgement or by statute of
limitations (Rollo. pp. 42-45). Resolving the said Motion, the respondent Court, in
its Order dated April 21, 1971, dismissed Civil Case No. SCC- 180 on the ground of
estoppel by prior judgment. (Ibid., pp, 10-13.) A Motion For Reconsideration filed
by the petitioners was denied by the respondent Judge in his Order of September
2, 1971. (Ibid., pp. 13-15.) A second Motion For Reconsideration was similarly
denied in the Order dated September 29, 197 1. (Rollo, pp. 16-17.) Hence, this
Petition.
We find merit in this appeal.
It is error to consider the dismissal of the petition filed by the herein petitioner in
LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 as a bar by prior
judgment against the filing of Civil Case No. SCC-180. In order to avail of the
defense of res judicata, it must be shown, among others, that the judgment in the
prior action must have been rendered by a court with the proper jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the proceeding in which the prior judgment or order was
rendered. If there is lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit or of
the parties, the judgment or order cannot operate as an adjudication of the
controversy. (2 Moran Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, p. 364.) This
essential element of the defense of bar by prior judgment or res judicata does not
exist in the case presently considered.
The petition filed by the herein petitioners in LRC Record No. 39492 was an
apparent invocation of the authority of the respondent Court sitting as a land
registration court, Although the said petition did not so state, that reliance was
apparently placed on Section 112 of the Land Registration Act. It has been settled
by consistent rulings of this Court that a court of first instance, acting as a land
registration court, is a court of limited and special jurisdiction. As such, its
proceedings are not adequate for the litigation of issues pertaining to an ordinary
civil action, such as, questions involving ownership or title to real property.
(Bareng vs. Shintoist Shrine and Japanese Charity Bureau, 83 SCRA 418; Manalo
vs. Mariano, 69 SCRA 80; In re: Nicanor T Santos, 102 SCRA 747; Santos vs.
Aquino, 101 SCRA 377.) In Hu chon Sunpongco vs. Heirs of Nicolas Ronquillo, L-
27040, December 19, 1970, 36 SCRA 395, we have held that:
Section 112 of Act 496 confers authority upon the land registration
court to order the cancellation, alteration or amendment of a
certificate of title but withdraws from the Court the power to pass
upon any question concerning ownership of the registered property,
or any incident where the issues involved have become
controversial.
It may hardly be questioned that the issues raised by the petitioners in their
petition to cancel TCT No. 68568 refer to the ownership or title over the property
covered thereby. The said petition presented before the respondent Court in the
exercise of its limited jurisdiction as a cadastral court, the question of who should
be considered the true and lawful owner of the parcel of land embraced in said
title. The petitioners alleged therein that they are the true owners of the property,
and that TCT No. 68568 which they sought to cancel was issued as a result of the
errors which were not of their own making. In short, the petition raised a highly
controversial matter which is beyond the judicial competence of a cadastral court
to pass upon or to adjudicate.
It may neither be claimed that the parties have mutually agreed to submit the
aforesaid issues for the determination by the court, it being a fact that herein
private respondent was not a party in the petition in LRC Record No. 39492.
Incidentally, although the said petition was filed by the herein petitioners on
November 21, 1967, the Opposition filed by Independent Mercantile Corporation
to the said petition made no mention of the alleged sale of the property in
question in favor of private respondent Francisco Ramos on July 5, 1967. This
circumstance places in grave doubt the sincerity of said sale and the claim that
the private respondent was an innocent purchaser for value of the property in
question.
In the order of the respondent Judge dated September 29, 1971 denying the
second motion for reconsideration, he cited the case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23
SCRA 29, to uphold the view that the petitioners are deemed estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the respondent Court in having taken cognizance of
the petition for cancellation of TCT No. 68568, they being the ones who invoked
the jurisdiction of the said Court to grant the affirmative relief prayed for therein.
We are of the opinion that the ruling laid down in Sibonghanoy may not be
applied herein. Neither its factual backdrop nor the philosophy of the doctrine
therein expounded fits the case at bar.
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions
so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of
the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement
of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent
pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case
of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had
been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The
exceptional circumstance involved inSibonghanoy which justified the departure
from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been
ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered
the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general
rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of
jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the
questioned ruling was held to be barred by estoppel by laches. It was ruled that
the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss
filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such
a plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches. As defined in said
case, laches is "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it
or declined to assert it."
The petitioners in the instant case may not be faulted with laches. When they
learned that the title to the property owned by them had erroneously and illegally
been cancelled and registered in the name of another entity or person who had
no right to the same, they filed a petition to cancel the latter's title. It is
unfortunate that in pursuing said remedy, their counsel had to invoke the
authority of the respondent Court as a cadastral court, instead of its capacity as a
court of general jurisdiction. Their petition to cancel the title in the name of
Independent Mercantile Corporation was dismissed upon a finding by the
respondent Court that the same was "without merit." No explanation was given
for such dismissal nor why the petition lacked merit. There was no hearing, and
the petition was resolved solely on the basis of memoranda filed by the parties
which do not appear of record. It is even a possibility that such dismissal was in
view of the realization of the respondent Court that, sitting as a cadastral court, it
lacked the authority to entertain the petition involving as it does a highly
controversial issue. Upon such petition being dismissed, the petitioners instituted
Civil Case No. SCC-180 on January 1, 1971, or only two and one-half years after
the dismissal of their petition in LRC Record No. 39492. Hence, we see no
unreasonable delay in the assertion by the petitioners of their right to claim the
property which rightfully belongs to them. They can hardly be presumed to have
abandoned or waived such right by inaction within an unreasonable length of time
or inexcusable negligence. In short, their filing of Civil Case No. SCC-180 which in
itself is an implied non-acceptance of the validity of the proceedings had in LRC
Record No. 39492 may not be deemed barred by estoppel by laches.
It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party by the result of a suit or proceeding
which was taken cognizance of in a court which lacks jurisdiction over the same
irrespective of the attendant circumstances. The equitable defense of estoppel
requires knowledge or consciousness of the facts upon which it is based. The
same thing is true with estoppel by conduct which may be asserted only when it
is shown, among others, that the representation must have been made with
knowledge of the facts and that the party to whom it was made is ignorant of the
truth of the matter. (De Castro vs. Gineta, 27 SCRA 623.) The filing of an action or
suit in a court that does not possess jurisdiction to entertain the same may not be
presumed to be deliberate and intended to secure a ruling which could later be
annulled if not favorable to the party who filed such suit or proceeding. Instituting
such an action is not a one-sided affair. It can just as well be prejudicial to the one
who filed the action or suit in the event that he obtains a favorable judgment
therein which could also be attacked for having been rendered without
jurisdiction. The determination of the correct jurisdiction of a court is not a simple
matter. It can raise highly debatable issues of such importance that the highest
tribunal of the land is given the exclusive appellate jurisdiction to entertain the
same. The point simply is that when a party commits error in filing his suit or
proceeding in a court that lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same, such
act may not at once be deemed sufficient basis of estoppel. It could have been
the result of an honest mistake, or of divergent interpretations of doubtful legal
provisions. If any fault is to be imputed to a party taking such course of action,
part of the blame should be placed on the court which shall entertain the suit,
thereby lulling the parties into believing that they pursued their remedies in the
correct forum. Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an action
"whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter."
(Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court.) Should the court render a judgment without
jurisdiction, such judgment may be impeached or annulled for lack of jurisdiction
(Sec. 30, Rule 132, Ibid), within ten (10) years from the finality of the same. (Art.
1144, par. 3, Civil Code.)
The inequity of barring the petitioners from vindicating their right over their
property in Civil Case No. SCC-180 is rendered more acute in the face of the
undisputed fact that the property in question admittedly belonged to the
petitioners, and that the title in the name of the private respondent was the result
of an error committed by the Provincial Sheriff in issuing the deed of sale in the
execution proceeding. The justness of the relief sought by herein petitioners may
not be ignored or rendered futile by reason of a doctrine which is of highly
doubtful applicability herein.
WHEREFORE, the Orders appealed from are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Motion To Dismiss filed by the private respondent in Civil Case No. SCC-180
shall be deemed denied and the respondent Court is ordered to conduct further
proceedings in the case. With costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176492 October 20, 2014
MARIETTA N. BARRIDO, Petitioner,
vs.
LEONARDO V. NONATO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For the Court's resolution is a Petition for Review filed by petitioner Marietta N.
Barrido questioning the Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated November
16, 2006, and its Resolution2 dated January 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00235. The
CA affirmed the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofBacolod City, Branch
53, dated July 21, 2004, in Civil Case No. 03-12123, which ordered the partition of
the subject property.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows: In the course of the marriage
of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner Marietta N. Barrido,they were
able to acquire a property situated in Eroreco, Bacolod City, consisting ofa house
and lot, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-140361. On March 15,
1996, their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Since there was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership over the property,
Nonato asked Barrido for partition, but the latter refused. Thus, on January 29,
2003, Nonato filed a Complaint for partition before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City, Branch 3.
Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the subject property had
already been sold to their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo. She likewise
moved for the dismissal of the complaint because the MTCC lacked jurisdiction,
the partition case being an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The Bacolod MTCC rendered a Decision dated September 17, 2003, applying
Article 129 of the Family Code. It ruled in this wise:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the
conjugal property of the former Spouses Leonardo and Marietta Nonato, a house
and lot covered by TCT No. T-140361 located at Eroreco, Bacolod City, which was
their conjugal dwelling, adjudicated to the defendant Marietta Nonato, the spouse
with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain.
Furthermore, defendants counterclaim is hereby granted, ordering plaintiff to pay
defendant P10,000.00 as moral damages for the mental anguish and unnecessary
inconvenience brought about by this suit; and an additionalP10,000.00 as
exemplary damages to deter others from following suit; and attorneys fees
of P2,000.00 and litigation expenses of P575.00.
SO ORDERED.4
Nonato appealed the MTCC Decision before the RTC. On July 21, 2004, the
Bacolod RTC reversed the ruling of the MTCC. It found that even though the MTCC
aptly applied Article 129 of the Family Code, it nevertheless made a reversible
error in adjudicating the subject property to Barrido. Its dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated September 17, 2003 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the parties:
(1) to equitably partition the house and lot covered by TCT No. T-140361;
(2) to reimburse Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo Nonato of the amount
advanced by them in payment of the debts and obligation of TCT No. T-
140361 with Philippine National Bank;
(3) to deliver the presumptive legitimes of Joseph Raymund and Joseph
Leo Nonato pursuant to Article 51 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.5
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision on November 16, 2006. It held
that since the propertys assessed value was only P8,080.00, it clearly fell within
the MTCCs jurisdiction. Also, although the RTC erred in relying on Article 129 of
the FamilyCode, instead of Article 147, the dispositive portion of its decision still
correctly ordered the equitable partition of the property. Barrido filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was, however, denied for lack of merit.
Hence, Barrido brought the case to the Court via a Petition for Review. She
assigned the following errors in the CA Decision:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MTCC HAD
JURISDICTION TO TRY THE PRESENT CASE.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE LOT
COVERED BY TCT NO. T-140361 IS CONJUGAL AFTER BEING SOLD TO THE
CHILDREN, JOSEPH LEO NONATO AND JOSEPH RAYMUND NONATO.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ARTICLE 129 OF
THE FAMILY CODE HAS NO APPLICATION IN THE PRESENT CASE, ON THE
ASSUMPTION
THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.6
The petition lacks merit.
Contrary to Barridos contention, the MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of
real actions or those affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of
possession, or for the partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage
on real property.7 Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 1298 provides:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of
the propertyor interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00)or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does
not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value
of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
(as amended by R.A. No. 7691)9
Here, the subject propertys assessed value was merely P8,080.00, an amount
which certainly does not exceed the required limit of P20,000.00 for civil actions
outside Metro Manila tofall within the jurisdiction of the MTCC. Therefore, the
lower court correctly took cognizance of the instant case.
The records reveal that Nonatoand Barridos marriage had been declared void for
psychological incapacity under Article 3610 of the Family Code. During their
marriage, however, the conjugal partnership regime governed their property
relations. Although Article 12911 provides for the
procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, Article 147
specifically covers the effects of void marriages on the spouses property
relations. Article 147 reads:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in
equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or
industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed tohave been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall beowned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if
the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of
the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in
the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the
consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the
party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or
their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party.1wphi1 In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon
termination of the cohabitation.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering
no illegal impedimentto marry each other, exclusively live together as husband
and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. 12 It is clear,
therefore, that for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be
capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is
void. Here, all these elements are present.13 The term "capacitated" inthe first
paragraph of the provision pertains to the legal capacity of a party to contract
marriage.14 Any impediment to marry has not been shown to have existed on the
part of either Nonato or Barrido. They lived exclusively with each other as
husband and wife. However, their marriage was found to be void under Article 36
of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. 15
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work
and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal coownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima faciepresumed to have been obtained through
their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property
shall be considered as having contributed to the same jointly if said party's efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household. 16 Efforts in the
care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions
to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or
work or industry.17
In the analogous case of Valdez,18 it was likewise averred that the trial court failed
to apply the correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in
a situation where a marriage is declared void ab initiobecause of psychological
incapacity on the part of either or both parties in the contract of marriage.The
Court held that the court a quodid not commit a reversible error in utilizing Article
147 of the Family Code and in ruling that the former spouses own the family
home and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding
that, in the liquidation and partition of the property that they owned in common,
the provisions on coownership under the Civil Code should aptly prevail. 19 The
rules which are set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community
or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid
and voidable marriages, are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that
exists between common-law spousesor spouses of void marriages.20
Here, the former spouses both agree that they acquired the subject property
during the subsistence of their marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by
them in equal shares. Barrido, however, claims that the ownership over the
property in question is already vested on their children, by virtue of a Deed of
Sale. But aside from the title to the property still being registered in the names of
the former spouses, said document of safe does not bear a notarization of a
notary public. It must be noted that without the notarial seal, a document remains
to be private and cannot be converted into a public document, 21 making it
inadmissible in evidence unless properly authenticated. 22 Unfortunately, Barrido
failed to prove its due execution and authenticity. In fact, she merely annexed
said Deed of Sale to her position paper. Therefore, the subject property remains to
be owned in common by Nonato and Barrido, which should be divided in
accordance with the rules on co-ownership.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated November 16, 2006, as well as its Resolution dated
January 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00235, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.