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Department of The Classics, Harvard University Harvard Studies in Classical Philology
Department of The Classics, Harvard University Harvard Studies in Classical Philology
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THE PLURALITY OF IMMOVABLE MOVERS IN
ARISTOTLE AND AVERROEIS
BY HARRY A. WOLFSON
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234 Harry A. Wolfson
immovable mover there is a mover for each planetary sphere and that
the mover of each planetary sphere is moved accidentally, and, with
these assumptions in his mind, he proceeds to explain how the accidental
motion of these movers of the planetary spheres differs from the acci-
dental motion of the souls of terrestrial creatures. In the case of the
former, he says, it means being moved not by themselves but by some-
thing else, namely, the outer sphere; in the case of the latter it means
being moved by themselves, namely, through the change of the place of
their bodies.8 The evidence for the interpolative character of these
three passages is primarily linguistic.9
Finally, there is the discussion of the immovable mover in Mleta-
physics XII, 8, which in its original form did not include the passage in
I074a, 3I-38. In this chapter Aristotle assumes a plurality of immovable
movers, as many as the number of the spheres, though he presents this
view only as probable and not as necessary. All these immovable
movers, like the first immovable mover, are transcendent beings,
existing apart from the spheres which are moved by them and, according
to Jaeger, they are, unlike the "sphere-movers" in the third interpo-
lated passage in Physics VIII, 6, not moved accidentally by the first
sphere.10 But after having advanced the theory of a plurality of trans-
cendent immovable movers, Aristotle, as a sort of self-criticism, noted
down on the margin of his manuscript of chapter 8 an argument in
support of the uniqueness of the transcendent immovable mover,
which is contained in passage Io74a, 3I-38. "His faithful editors,"
says Professor Jaeger, "introduced it into the text", where it stands as
a glaring contradiction to the rest of the chapter. The evidence for the
interpolative character of this passage is not only its inconsistency with
the rest of the chapter but also the fact that it is foreign to its context
from a linguistic point of view."l
The linguistic evidence marshalled by Jaeger should be quite suffi-
cient to establish the interpolative character of the passages. Still
certain questions arise in our mind. With regard to the third interpola-
tion in Physics VIII, 6, it would seem strange that Aristotle, on intro-
ducing the unexpected movers of the planetary spheres, should not
have changed the text somewhere in order to prepare the mind of the
reader for this new piece of information. Then, with regard to the
interpolation in Metaphysics XII, 8, it would seem even stranger that
Aristotle's "faithful editors" should have introduced into the text a
statement which appears to be so glaringly contradictory to the entire
context of the chapter, without trying at least to soften down the
contradiction. While indeed editors, and even authors, in their use of
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Immovable Movers in Aristotle and Averroes 235
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236 Harry A. Wolfson
with reference to what in the other fragment, quo
alludes to as the immovable mover of the world and also that the
discussion is on the basis of Plato's as well as Aristotle's own theory of
the existence of only one world, so that the question discussed in On
Philosophy is whether on the theory of the existence of one world there
was one first principle or many. Similarly in Mfetaphysics XII, Io,
Aristotle argues against Speusippus and others who, on the theory of
the existence of only one world, " give us many governing principles ",18
and he cites against them the Homeric saying: "The rule of the many
is not good; one is the ruler."19
It is with all this in the back of his mind that Aristotle, we have
reason to believe, raises here the question whether there is one "first
immovable mover" or more than one and, if the latter, whether finite
or infinite. The question as posed by him is vague enough to apply
either to the assumption of many worlds or to that of one world. But,
inasmuch as the assumption of an infinite number of worlds has already
been disowned by him in the Physics20 and the assumption of many
worlds has already been explicitly rejected by him in De Caelo,21 he
does not discuss here the question of the plurality of immovable movers
on the assumption of more than one world; he discusses it only on the
assumption of one world. Thus assuming that there is only one world,
he first tries to show, on the basis of the facts by which the existence of
an immovable mover is demonstrated, that the assumption of more
than one immovable mover, whether infinite or finite, would be a
gratuitous assumption.22 Then, on the basis of the continuity of the
motion in this one world, he tries to show that there must be only one
first immovable mover.23
Aristotle has thus established in the first part of chapter 6 of Physics
VIII that there is only one "first immovable mover", which is the
mover of the outer sphere, and he has also indicated, by his carefully
qualifying the "immovable mover" by "first", that there are other
immovable movers, which are the movers of the planetary spheres.
But having in mind Plato's suggestion in Laws X, 898E-899A, that the
movers of the heavenly bodies, which to Plato were bare stars, might
reside in those bodies after the analogy of souls in animals, he tries to
show that neither the first immovable mover nor the immovable movers
of the planetary spheres can be conceived after the analogy of souls in
animals. His argument falls into two parts. First, with regard to the
first immovable mover, he shows that unlike souls in animals, which are
moved accidentally, the first immovable mover must be immovable
even accidentally (259b, 1-28). Second, with regard to the immovable
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Immovable Movers in Aristotle and Averroes 237
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238 Harry A. Wolfson
The upshot of all these is that the movers of the individual spheres,
like the first mover, do not exist in the spheres of which they are the
movers. They are apart from them. They are transcendent beings. Like
the first mover, they move their respective spheres as final causes. Still
by the very nature of their fixed and constant relation toward the
spheres in which they cause their individual motions they participate
in the common circular motion round the centre of the world, caused
in all these spheres by the outer sphere. It is on this account that
Aristotle declares that in contrast to the first immovable mover all the
other immovable movers are moved accidentally by something else.
We have thus explained Physics VIII, 6. We shall now take up
Metaphysics XII, 8.
This distinction between the immovability of the first immovable
mover and the immovability of the immovable movers of the planetary
spheres, made by Aristotle in Physics VIII, 6, is assumed by him also
in his discussion of the plurality of movers in MVetapzysics XII, 8. In
this chapter, as Jaeger has clearly shown, the planetary movers, though
not expressly described as "separated", are still regarded by Aristotle
as "existing apart" and as "transcendent".26 But when we study the
phrasing in this chapter carefully we shall find that these planetary
movers, though existing apart and transcendent, are still assumed by
Aristotle to have accidental motion. In his description of the first
immovable mover under the name of "the principle (apXq) and the
first of beings"27 or "the first and immovable substance",28 he says
that it is "immovable both essentially (KcaO' cavzo) and accidentally
(KCTar avLj3efIKIos.)",29 but, when from the fact that the eternal spatial
motion of the universe requires a first immovable mover he raises the
question whether the eternal spatial motions of the planets similarly
require immovable movers, he drops the terms "accidentally" and
argues only from the existence of a "first mover" who must be "im-
movable essentially"30 to the existence of a "substance" as the mover
of each planetary sphere which is also "immovable essentially".31
Nowhere in the entire chapter does Aristotle describe the movers of the
planetary spheres as immovable accidentally. Moreover, nowhere in
the entire chapter does he describe these movers of the planetary
spheres as first movers, but, reserving the term "first" for that mover
which he has already described as "immovable both essentially and
accidentally", he describes the other immovable movers, those of
whom he did not say that they are immovable also accidentally, as
"second [and third and so on] according to the same order as the orbital
motions of the stars".32 This difference of phrasing in the description
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Immovable Movers in Aristotle and Averroes 239
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240 Harry A. Wolfson
worlds there would have to be four elements, earth, water, air, fire,
some of which would move upward toward the celestial periphery and
some downward toward the centre. But these many worlds, Aristotle
insists, would have to be "alike in nature",33 so that the various sub-
celestial elements as well as the various celestial spheres in them would
be many "in number" (&pictOi) but one "in species" (Kcar' Etfos).34
When therefore Aristotle in De Caelo refutes the existence of many
worlds and-shows that the world must be one, he means to establish
thereby that the world is one both " in number" and " in species ". Now
the arguments by which he establishes in De Caelo the oneness of the
world are all what Aristotle elsewhere calls "physical",35 based as they
all are upon considerations of motion, but in the course of his discussion
of these physical arguments he says that " the same could also be shown
with the aid of discussions which fall under First Philosophy".36 Here
in this interpolated passage in Metaphysics XII, 8, Io74a, 3I-38, we
have that argument which falls under "First Philosophy". Let us try
to unfold this argument in all the fulness in which we have reason to
believe it formulated itself in the mind of Aristotle.
There cannot be many worlds, he argues, for, if there were many
worlds, they would have to have, as already shown in De Caelo, the
same species of motion, and so the many worlds would have to be many
in number but one in species, and consequently the "principle [i.e.,
the first mover] of each [world] will be one in species [with that of any
of the other worlds] but many in number", This, however, is im-
possible, for "all things which are many in number have matter"
There must therefore be only one world, one, as shown in De Caelo,
both "in species" and "in number". And consequently, he concludes,
"the first immovable mover is one both in formula and in number",
the term "formula" (Aoyos) being used here in the same sense as the
term "species" (E$Ios).37
In this passage, it will be noticed, the unity in both species and
number is established only with regard to the first immovable mover,
that first immovable mover which previously in the same chapter he
has described as being "immovable both essentially and accidentally".
But what about those immovable movers of the planetary spheres which
in the same chapter he describes neither as "first" nor as being "im-
movable both essentially and accidentally"? They are, of course, not
to be considered as one both in species and in number. They are many.
But in what sense are they many ? They cannot be many in number, for
they have no matter. They cannot be many in genus, for they all con-
stitute one genus, that of being immaterial and essentially immovable
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Immovable Movers in Aristotle and Averroes 241
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242 Harry A. Wolfson
would likewise be one in species and many in number; but, being many
in number, they would have to have matter. The movers of the plan-
etary spheres, however, can be many in species, without being many in
number, in view of the fact that they produce different species of motion
in the different planetary spheres and, acting as they do upon these
spheres as final causes, they need not be material in order to produce
these motions.
Another objection raised by Ross against his tentative solution is as
follows: "And this way of escape is not open to Aristotle; for he holds
that specific difference implies a fortiori numerical difference."41 This
statement is an inference of Aristotle's statement o& cr apLOiLO Kcal E$EL
Ev, toca -' ElSEL ou Irdcvrc pL9tx,42 in which Professor Ross evidently
takes the second part of the statement as a universal negative proposi-
tion, meaning that whatsoever things are one in species are not one in
number, whence he correctly infers that whatsoever things are many in
species are a fortiori not one but many in number. But the use of the
term 7rdvra after the negative oi shows that Aristotle did not mean the
proposition to be a universal negative. It is a particular negative propo-
sition, meaning that "whatsoever things are one in species are not all
one in number", the implication being that some things which are one
in species are also one in number. Again, the opposite of this proposition
is that whatsoever things are many in species are not all many in number,
the implication of which is, again, that some things which are many in
species are one in number. Is it not possible that the two implications
of this very statement of Aristotle, namely, (I) that there may be
single species under which there are no individuals and (2) that there
may be many species which are not many in number, refer to the
plurality of the movers of the planetary spheres?
In our interpretation of the texts of Aristotle, we have tried to show
that, even on the basis of Professor Jaeger's theory that these texts
contain later interpolations, which show a gradual development in
thought of Aristotle, in the final form of these texts as we have them
today there is no difference between Physics VIII, 6, and Metaphysics
XII, 8, and no inconsistency in the latter between the interpolated
passage and the rest of the chapter. Throughout his discussion in these
two chapters, as they now stand before us, Aristotle assumes one first
immovable mover, that is, the mover of the sphere of the fixed stars,
and it is this immovable mover which he describes as the first, but
besides this first immovable mover, he assumes also other immovable
movers, that is, the movers of the planetary spheres, which he does not
describe as first. The first mover is one and unique, because it alone is
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Immovable lMovers in Aristotle and Averroes 243
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244 Harry A. Wolfson
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Immovable Movers in Aristotle and Averroes 245
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246 Harry A. Wolfson
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Immovable Movers in Aristotle and Averroes 247
ox, by which is meant that a man and an ox are one in genus because
the term "animal" is applied to them according to univocation. By the
same token, Averroes seems to argue, two individual human beings are
one in species because the term "man" is applied to them according
to univocation. Hence, he concludes, inasmuch as the celestial bodies,
as well as the Intelligences, do not agree in species according to uni-
vocation, they are not one in species.
Still he is opposed to their being described as diverse in species.
Evidently what he means to say is that they are not as diverse in species
as, say, " man" and "ox", who though they are the same in genus, are
diverse in species. And the reason given by him for this is that they
agree in species. Still this agreement in species is not according to
univocation, that is to say, it is not a sameness in species. Whence he
concludes that, while they are not diverse in species, they are many in
species.
Behind this seemingly verbal quibbling there lurks Aristotle's dis-
cussion of the fine distinctions between the terms " same" (raV76o, idem,
Arabic: hu hu), "diverse", (Erepov, diversum, Arabic: ghair), and
"different" (8&idopov, differens, Arabic: muhalif).67 "Same" means
"one"; "diverse" is the opposite of "same"; "different" is between
"same" and "diverse", and, in Averroes' own words, it means that
which "differs in one thing but agrees in another thing".68 Conse-
quently, since the planetary spheres, as well as the Intelligences, agree
in species but, within that species, they differ according to prior and
posterior, they are to be described not as diverse in species but only as
differing in species; and, as differing in species, which means being
neither the "same" in species nor "diverse" in species, they can be
described as many in species. What really Averroes means to say is that
the spheres as well as the Intelligences are what Porphyry, and after
him also Averroes, calls the "last species" (eaXa-rov ElSos, species
ultima) or "most special species" (eiS&KcCrarov etsos, species specia-
lissima),69 or what are generally known as the "lowest species" (species
infima). But of these lowest species each species consists of only one
member, and hence the spheres, as well as the Intelligences, are many
not in number but only in species.
This conception of the spheres and hence also of the Intelligences as
being neither the "same in species" nor "diverse in species" but only
"many in species", which we have interpreted to mean that they are
lowest species, may be derived also from a passage in Averroes' Epitome
of the Metaphysics. In that passage Averroes tries to show how each one
of the Intelligences can be described as "one in number" and that,
+ c.P.
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248 Harry A. Wolfson
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Immovable Movers in Aristotle and Averroes 249
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250 Harry A. Wolfson
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Immovable Movers in Aristotle and Averroes 25I
NOTES
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252 Harry A. Wolfson
49. Ibid., p. I.
50. Cf. my discussion in The Philosophy of The Church Fathers, I (I956),
pp. 287-298 and 202-204.
51. Moreh Nebukin II, Introduction, Prop. XVI.
52. Categ. 12, I4b, I0-I3; Metaph. V, I , Io9ga, I-14.
53. Categ. 12, 14b, 4-5.
54. Categ. 13, i4b, 24-26.
55. Latin translation of al-Shifd', in Avicenna's Opera (Venice, I508),
JMetaph. IX, 4, fol. o04 vb, 11. 60-62; corresponding passage in al-Najdt
(Cairo, 133i A.H.), p. 454, 11. 12-13, and Latin translation in Avicenntae lMeta-
physices Compendium by N. Carame (Rome, 1926), p. 194, 11. 17-18.
56. VMetaph. XII, 8, I073b, I-3.
57. Latin translation of Averroes' Long Commentary on lMetaphysics XII,
Comm. 44, fol. 327F; cf. G.
58. Cf. Averrois: Tafsir ma ba'd at-tabi'at (ed. M. Bouyges, Vol. III, 1948),
p. I647, 1. 3; cf. II. 14-I5.
59. Cf. Averroes: Talkhic. kitab al-nmaqoulat (ed. MI. Bouyges, 1932), p. 112,
1. 64I, on Categ. 12, i4b, 7.
60. Tahdfut al-Tahdfut III (Tahafot at-Tahafot, ed. M. Bouyges, I930),
? 8i, p. i86, 1. 6-p. 187, 1. 3.
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Immovable lMovers in Aristotle and Averroes 253
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