5 Speculating God Speculative Realism and Meillassoux’s Divine Inexistence Leon Niemoczynski Speculating God ‘The relationship between contemporary Continental the new metaphysics” (.wenty-first-century metaphysics in the Continental tra- dition, otherwise referred to as “the new metaphysics,” “the new materialism, ‘the new realisin,” of, more controversially, “speculative realism”) so far remains losophy of religion and largely an unexplored relationship, especially regarding areas of mutual concern, 4 influence, ar crossover! Despite new and exciting inroads made by philosophers seria Gran ands artclaons af to Patni Hegelan Able (@ perspective not entirely unconducive to the nature theologies of the German. | idealist), Francois Laucelle's non-philosophy and surrounding work on “non- theology” or even Bruno Latour’ explorations ofthe social roi of “factish gods” {and more recently his dialogues concerning natural religion), litle discussion has actually taken place about how the recent turn toward a new metaphysics, with its insistence on various forms of materialism and realism, is able to con- verse with contemporary Continental philosophy of religion” Indeed itis a pressing bt also dificult question to ask what directions Con- tinental philosophy of religion might take in the future, given this “return” of nd realist metaphysis in the twenty-first century, However different ranging these recent materialist and realist metaphysical perspectives wer in particular may be of especial asistance in explor- losophhy of religion’ future, given his concept of “the divine sopher is Quentin Mallassoux.* Stuated within the sm,” Meilassous is, in this author's unt, probably one of the more relev ‘where the future of Continental philosophy of what itis possible todo in Continental philosophy of rl taphysics, and to do so with fecundity: ‘The aim ofthis essay thereforeis simply to parse out what ramifications Mei- soua’s theory ofthe divineinexistence might have forthe future of Continen- Zon, Given the parameters of Meilassoux’s theory, includ Velie in creation ex nihilo, a ‘messianism” with a corresponding Christlike able toinaugurate the resurrection of the dead, an explicit is on a forthcoming World of justice afer the adven: ofthis Christike figure, wdentifeation of a God who is not now yet but “may be” in the future, and ethies of hope tied to the possibility of such a God's arrival, itis natural that the Continental philosopher of religion John Caputo and his own philosophical theclogy of mestianism and of justice, of God “to come,” be introduced as a thatural and productive conversation pariner.® As well, Caputo's own dialogue net, Richard Kearney, may be brought into the conversation due to compa: ie ontological features of Meillassoux’s God, namely the divine’ tatasas a possibility or better, asa "virtuclity” in likeness tothe virtual status Kearney’s own God “who may be.” Certainly the immense constructive poe vf Meillassoux’s theory of the divine inexistence is brought into clear view sshen comparedto the sort of God proposed by Caputo and Kearney a God “to vray" a God who neither it nor is not, bt “may be” And while Meillassoux’ ni does not now “exist” strictly speaking but someday may come to exist, in same vein at Caputo and Kearney we require explination for the belief in the realty of that nonexistence—the “virtual God”—and the immanent form of hope Jated to it n vis-a-vis the new ‘he Religious Turn and the Return to Metaphysics he postmodem “religious turn’ of Continental philosophy found in, the late twentieth century did not, in general, look favorably upon metaphysics Within Gantinental philosophy of religion especially, postive metaphysical knowledge soos essentially relegated to “onto-theology” and pitted against a more cryptic tc of “fideisn” oriented toward a theological unknown—a Godl who was said lo tre beyond positive metaphysical knowledge but whe was also claimed to be r= vealed throtigh phenomendlogical religious experience? However contemporary tinental philosophy of religion, atleast within the past half-decade, partic lupin France, has felt the mounting pressure ofthe new metaphysics critique of its methodological choice of phenomenology for describing religious experience vind the divine'® Given ths critique, one might ask whether the phenomenclogi- ul God of therecent “religious turn” has indeed fared any better than the Godof nto. theologyand scholastiism, Caputo’s and Kearney’ main target." Accord:Speculatiny sed principle of contrast to contingency. As such, itis the tence. Contingency, understood as ground, is alse referred to as “hy} in its absolute nature (in its power to create), or 2s called elsewhe 10s" (also “Surcontingency”)-" This ultimate chaotic ground nd that produces novel events—eventscifferent than those that “are™ now ines $0 without reason) should, according to Meillassoux, be underst lity of "menacing power—capable of destroying both things and worlds, ‘aging forth monstrous absurdities, yet also of never doing anything, o= alizing every dream, but also every nightmare... tis a Time capable of ying even becoming itself, by bringing forth, perheps forever, fixity, stasis, nal death Sich a frightening statement does more than assert that there is absolutely t decidedly saysthet neces- sumn total of possibilities against which ‘occurring despite the fact that cer tain events indeed have ty occurring—for example, the fact that the physical laws of theuniverse occur with the regularity that they do (this is known as the “frequentialist implication"). Rather, what we have are unbounded pos es, s0 there can be no totalization of what is possible. According to Me soux’s theory of absolute contingency, this is stipulated by the truth of C transfinite mathematics and Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF) set theory. As Meillassoux: puts it (One cannot so totalize the set of possible worlds, secure it except the fact that such a totality of posst ‘This cannot be confirmed by experience (no one has ever seen such atotal be confirmed by pure theory’: for since Cantor we know there of cenceivable numbers. The Cantorian transfinite means that for every infinite that exi with no limit to th ultimate series of infinitudes?® everything must be able to be other than i jot, Things that now are not, that do no: now “exist ca exist in the future. lassoux states that time is the process whereby anything can arise and come ‘or cease to exist, at any moment with no reason a iven that timeis the determination of any thing's becoming what 4s some self-same thing. Yet, its to time, to a future world, and the contin- power that is present now in this world, that the hove for the appearance of rxty that does not now exist, But someday may, is ted. If a theory of absolute contingency were not strange enough, Meillassoux ‘advances an equally shocking thesis, Without the theory of absolute con xy stated inthe precise terms that Meillasoux gives us, the theory simply ‘Ml not be compelling. Meillassoux’s thesis is that we are to believe in God tse God does not “now” exist, In fact, given that God does not now exist but someday may come to exist, an ethics of hope must be tied to this God's future ‘le appearance, given the injustices of our immanent world. Typically the question of God's existence is stated as “either God exists, oF snot.” Both alternatives lead to despait according to Meillassoux, for if God ‘is then one is left with an irreconcilable problem of evil: how could an exist- God permit the injustices of this world to occurt But if God does not exist there is no redemption for those who have suffered and died horrible deaths. isis known as “the spectral dilemma’—or as Meillassoux puts it, “Ihe di- na is as follows: either to despair of another life forthe dead, or to despair of ‘who has let such deaths take place.” Thus a “spectre” is haunting us, one ‘death “weare no longer capable of mourning” as “the passage of time has sufficiently taken hold in order that ore could envisage some kind of pacific raship between dead and the living.””* Meillassoux resolves" the dilemma ing a position that is neither reli heist: God does not yet "ex: hut might exist in the future. With t nce thereis hope for 8 In other words, “A qu: Logically we are left with a very odd situation. On the one hand, for there to be radical or absolute contingency we must let go of the principle of suffici reason in favor of absolute contingency, the necessity of she principle of unrea+ son: “the absolute necessity of everything's non-necessity.”” On the other hand, the law of non-contcadiction must hold in order for there to be alternate states of changg, for there to be radical new appearances that are different from preced: ing on:s2* That is, in order for things to change, something must be able t identical to itself at least in one instant but capable (onto-logically) of becom something radicaly else in another instant. This is why Meillassoux introduces necessery characterization of absolute contingency (thus After Finitude’s subti “the necessity of contingency”). On the other hand, if like Hume, we look for reason why anything is the case (or is not the case), Meillassoux states that the is no answers there is no real explanation other than the advent. Again, we canno} rely on “probabilistic reasoning” (Hume) as that is valid only on the conditio what be "thinkable in terms of numerical totality” Thus Meillassoux abolishe the principle of sufficient reason altogether, and we are let with the necessity ‘contingency and itsprinciple of non-contradiction (understood as the creation of new events, Time): anything is truly possible, and this isthe one ultimate grow or prirciple2” ssourx titles “figures,” or “neces ® Here Meillassoux adopts an argument from classi s itself therefore necessary because it must serve as the re98 | Leon Niemoczynski resurrection of the dead and the creation of a Word of justice. This God would qerve as the advent required to institute a collective justice, the “reparation of an extreme wrong” where itled to begin again so as to overcome the does not guarantee a reign of just power, the grourd of ™® And soa hope for j is does not mean that one can at God and a World ‘fabricated telos awaiting to unfold, and one just “hopes” that God ‘sooner rather than later. It also does not mean that God and a Ws are prefabricated possibilities awaiting actualization (part of a divine plan Understanding the divine inthese ways sort of radical hope that Meillassoux advocates, As the ted set of possibles” anything can the unconditional mark of power “What remains now is the virtual state of our present res the possibiliy—the inexistence—of a God who is a God of the future who is capable of ice reigns and the injustices of the past are reconciled ‘virtual God Meillassoux states an eschatology may find assoux summarizes: "We must revive the extreme hope of eschatology der resolutely to act—and right away—in view ofan unconditional equality for ion no longer depends on us but on an om God is what Meillassous titles “the divin hie yout reason at: owe sys claim to us through its lack of necessity, a “weakness.” Weakness isthe state that conceals the possibility “ofa God y tarkof a sovereign unconditional power capable of bringing about anew absolute contingency. the radical nature of hope under discussion here is madi ferent from the “possibl ‘ex nihilo and what Meillassoux call vy and possibility is one of miraculous advent ical laws that have bound the world unt As Me , “Surchaos can also give rise to snform to the physical laws of a world, I call such events as advents ex the disasters of the world and in whom one could hope for the power to grant spectets something besides death." y:Justice, Messianism, and an Ethics of Hope 1a to ask if Meillassoua’s metaphysics of contingency w (perhaps even an ethics demanding law, dare even n ‘Have a lawless theory this being does not in fact now “exist”? What of divine law forthe fut ince they proceed neither fram an actually existing world nor of justice? Moreover, what of the “immanent hop 9 nor from some totality of possible world, for a future world of justice to come? Meillassoux’s spectral dilemma, the chol of possibls, from the untotalizable abyss of the 2" The divine inex: aly a “miraculous” as its inauguration ly new world di {though related to) prior worlds variables and constraints, Human beings may hope for the between a God who per attention “onto-theological God of necessity and absolute sovereignty. ere samething “uncon¢ without ‘sovereignty without laying claim to unconditional force of power thor be somethingt”?” While considering what may come toe, mnction between what can be virtually or what can be pos respec! to contingency in its own sovereign power, AS a gency exhibits sovereignty a it does weaknet « specifically, the sovereignty o capable of creating [may be] strong affirmed or “totalized.” Caputo 2x} tual violence, a merely destructive and tanding, arises froma a failure to see what de- ‘to see that every deconstructive analysis is under-100 | Leon Niemoczynski 4 future “alWways-to-come:"* The messianic futureis an absolute future, ery structure ofthe future,” which is not parked by adeterminate Messiah, Sy someone who has as « matter of but rather a figure” in the futural sense of a “structure ofthe to come that exposes the 'y and deconstruetibility of the present. ty"—-things can be radically otherwise than what they are—Caputo Eis tat “the messianic future, the unformable figure ofthe Messiah in decon has to-do with something absolutely unpresentable and unrepresent- le that comprises the prestige of the prese 3 present construction tion, no no thru If the virtual ground renders any possibility as equal hen this is not to say that there is no point in hoping for some tality) over another: namely the advent of an inct enough from theadvent of any pri to come, agift to comé sianism with respect te the prayer when orientating ourselves to the pos Come" as prayer could solicit the messi come,” given the sovereignty of the virtual, given its power of whi Caputo tels us that “the messianic is the structure of the to come that expose) expoting the alterability He clarifies the natur 1a and openi vursued."” lassoux, the divine inexistence and the Messiah to come (for him is or her own sovereignty 3g to the future 1, "The most important task for philosophy—its final challenge—-is not ay being’ For the may-be unites within itself the true heart of every “absolateness of factual possibility) and the deepest aspirations of Iment of justice)... Ifthe fourth world (of justice] can 1nd 50 only in the case of an escha~ for universal that isto say one na {tracted by the vector of the emancipat 2° Not only ‘we hope, we ought to hope. struction. Caputo writes, “What right—what a nerve to speak oF a bad temper)” of course.” Likewise say ask with Caputo, does speculative philosophy, the “new metaphysics” to speak of God—of a promise related toa deity who does not now exis? Hov could justice even be possible? We finda similar structure of query that animates ‘ag God and speculating justice, both undeconstructible in their very je nature, both whose arrival i tied “Anatheism, Dynamatology, Divinology h Caputo's “weak theology” nd a theology of the event (or Meil- is Kearney’s “anatheism.” Our concern here is to develop ‘ours of Kearney’s anatheism—a position part ofthe “reli nental philosophy”—to see hows if at that Meillassoux critiques, wher I be requited. On the other hand, it possible to read Kearney with Mé ch Caputo as outlined such that Meillassoux’s divine inexistence and its corresponding ethics of may appear more clearly. I hope to we Kearney's own approach to a God inay be” as an avenue of closure in the sense that *he meaning of "the not a weak and a sovereign nature, It "keeps yet” and “to come,” When one prays to God one also prays for j nal reign of resurtectig the dead and recor properly mourned. Speculation (for Me therefore both seem to serve one and the same goal: to debver the ce, by sustaining an “absolute .* ey both hald open |yet" can be isolated and clarified with respect to human knowledge of sibility, in turn saving Kearney and Caput alike from Meillassoux’s cri fideism, For Kearney and Caputo alike, the factthat God “may be” is nota ‘of human ignorance tut is rather part of a determinate ontological structur indeterminacy. The indeterminateness of Kearney’s virtual God is not epistemological ontological. This is most evident in looking at the definition of Kearney’ p posed outlook, which he calls “anatheism.” In Kearney’s own words: ‘The ana {of “anatheism”]... marksa reopening of that space where we are fg to choose between faith or nonfaith.... It operates beforeas well as aftr the division between theism and athelsm, and it makes both possible. ism differs from degmatic atheism in that it resists absolutst pe the divine, just as it differs from the absolutistpostions of dogmatic theism fof the divine, It sa movement-—nota state: ‘Anatheism relates to Kearney's concept of “the God-who-may-be”outlin in his 2001 book, The God Who May Be. Kearney, like Caputo is not satisfied the death of God announced by Nietzsche and chooses to go further than st denying (or afirming} the God of classical onto-theology. Kearny, like Cap ties hs ethics tan onolgy ofthe posse. or bot, the death of Go pi ily meant that the absolute Centr had shifed ts residence fom transcen to immanence by means of metaphysics of keno by which the fll pe ofa transcendent Godvwas transperted tothe pane of immanence.. (Wem observe the undeciabl futuation ofthe event that stirs within the nam God" Ia The God Who May Be, Kearney bilson this God of the posit God whois yet “tobe” ater the death ofthe God of casi onto-thedo God was and then died according death of God theology this means th now i not Therefore, God's inexidence (or posible future existence) canal the posit of human ignorance or error ad instead involves a deter ontological reality that of the possilty of God (or more deeply virtual) isa God who possiblizes out ofthe future, and our orientation toward si God is fundamentally speculative. : Kearneys God ofthe possble—which he calls poss, to borrow the of that term from Nicholas of Custis “a God who promis to bring ie to bring t more abundantly. A God who even promises 1 complying dit ofits purported power presene." Like Milasoux's dvi big centered onthe diviaeinxitence and afture kenotic mel ty or potency)~a “movement” rather than a “state. movement there tal for justice as much as there is the power of wide, pose, such tat «God ould resurrect the dead. This a Tg ofthe sizing possible’ —a metaphysics of speculating the power ofthe posible, oF vrar st come” that arses fom the depths of vitwal word that has 1a "beneath the grid of symbolic and imaginary expression, back into some trial zero-point of unnameability."** Kearney reminds us that what seems sible is only seemingly so, for “once transfigured by God all things are made ‘again"—hether a World of justice or the resurrection of the dead. Thus “keeps us open to hope in spite of injustice and despair.” IMy brief discussion of Kearney in this final concluding section has been © level to farther illustrate the ethics of hope latent within Meillassouxs own = Jivinology by exploring the various senses of the possible for an ethics cen- ped on justice. Kearney’s notion of the God who may be opens up precisely {he transformative nature of this hope. Despite Meillassoux’s admonition of the {oligos turn in Continental philosophy and its corresponding fideism (faith in nknown God who is capable of being described only through some form of romenological description}, the truth ofthe matter is that by way of « meta sof contingency Meillassoux has opened the way aso forthe posible ap- race ofa being powerful enough to inaugurate a new World where justice “feigns, and where the injustices ofthe past have been reconciled. fee is much, much more that could be stated regarding this common mnie of the divine and the possible as shared by Meillassoux, Caputo, and 4, Certainly there is religious value to a radical metaphysics centered on. = {he necessity of contingency and the possitle appearance of a divine being, The © iestion becomes, what shall we then do, those of us who gaze toward efuture of _fttice, but those of us, too, who are without a deity who as of yet has to possibly | fppeu? Before the advent of justice has occurred, Meillassoux offers his readers nt regarding the inroads of ethical transformation and attraction: roel beyond wa, vilence and sxe —even in word a an vio ead chet wats a sak nthe tate rnsfrmation of S Glopea sje. It sont worktowards embracing tis sod tent ithecse—at have sleady insted—that his wood ‘sed in way to hope (emphasis mine] that there will be a recommencement ie106 | Leon Niemoczynski 23. Quentin Meillasscux, “Potentialty and Vi 24. Mellassoux, AferFinitude 92. nx, "Immanence ofthe World Beyond” 449. 26. Mellassoux, Afer Finitude, 104 27 Tic, 62,8 28. bic, 61. Here, other than Bergor ment toa ralorzation of contingency in emergence and cre (2007) 63-107 For Me Beyond.” 247 CColtapse (2007) 1 intellectual intuition, Meilassoux’s con 1 follows the Bergsonian commitment soux, “Subtraction ion.” Cola ess, 2005) “he God Who May Be (Bloomington: Indiana Univenity Press, gency, a+ well as some of ts apparent flaws re “After Certtade: On Meilessoux' Logical Fl {ng modal metaphysis, neces ‘Thibaut Giraud and Raphael “spectral Dilemma? 265 34. Meflassous, “immanence ofthe World Beyond” 4 38, John Caputo, Deconstruction in a Ni 1997), 15. 38, Jon Caputo, "Without Soverel and Derride's Democracy to Come,” Journal for Culture and Religion: Theory 4, 00.3 (Aug 2003): 9. j “40, SeeCaputo’s The Weakness of od. 41. Caputo, "Without Sovereignty.” 42, Meilassoux, “Immanence of the World Beyond” 458 8. P77. 44, Thi 7. 45. Medlassoux, 46, Thid, 455, 7, Caputo, Deconstrection in a Nutihel 128, 48. Ibid 98. Bid 50. Meilsssous, “immancnce ofthe Woeld Beyond” 4. 5. Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell 56 52, bid, 163. 53 54 5s 56 ranence ofthe World Beyond,” 46, immanence of the World Beyond. 444 ofthe World Beyond” 472. a Nutshell, 6a