Professional Documents
Culture Documents
9629 PDF
9629 PDF
by
Eric Briys
Franois de Varenne
96-29
THE WHARTON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CENTER
The Center fosters the development of a community of faculty, visiting scholars and Ph.D.
candidates whose research interests complement and support the mission of the Center. The
Center works closely with industry executives and practitioners to ensure that its research is
informed by the operating realities and competitive demands facing industry participants as
they pursue competitive excellence.
Copies of the working papers summarized here are available from the Center. If you would
like to learn more about the Center or become a member of our research community, please
let us know of your interest.
Anthony M. Santomero
Director
November 1995
1
E. Briys is Professor of Finance, Groupe HEC, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas, France. F. de Varenne is Research
Fellow, French Federation of Insurance Companies (FFSA), 26 bd Haussmann, 75009 Paris, France.
O N THE R ISK OF L IFE I NSURANCE L IABILITIES :
D EBUNKING SOME C OMMON P ITFALLS
Eric Briys
Franois de Varenne
November 1995
Salvatore R. Curiale
Superintendent of Insurance
New York State Insurance Department
he savings and loan debcle - the soaring tors and consumers. According to a recent article
nificant flow of consumers dollar into mutual funds. The objective of this paper is to contribute to a
The competition for the savings dollar became very better understanding of the driving forces of a life
fierce among financial institutions. This pressure com- insurance company. More specifically, the issues of
bined with regulatory mistakes (see White [1991]) had the duration and convexity of insurance liabilities and
a perverse consequence on many financial institutions. equity are addressed. As noted earlier, these issues
They reached for riskier assets offering higher yields deserve a careful rethinking given the recent trends
and operated with less capital per dollar of assets. In that have affected the insurance landscape. A correct
that respect, the example of life insurance companies assessment of these risk measures is critical as they
is very informative. Life insurance were forced to constitute the primary ingredients of any sound asset-
redesign their product lines and to migrate toward liability management approach. In addition, the effort
interest rate sensitive products (see Wright [1991]). toward a more detailed and more accurate risk picture
This new environment induced life company invest- of life insurance operations enables one to debunk
ment officers to mismatch assets and liabilities and to some pitfalls that are commonly encountered in the
lower quality standards by assuming higher credit insurance industry, as shown in the next section.
risks. The result was, as we know now, disastrous. In
1987, nineteen companies went bankrupt; in 1989, a
worrisome forty; in 1991, a new record of fifty-eight D EBUNKING S OME C OMMON P ITFALLS
insolvent insurance companies. Canada went through IN L IFE I NSURANCE
the same kind of turmoil. In 1992, only a year after
CompCorp, an industry-financed guarantee corpora- Most life insurers claim that their industry car-
tion, the insurance company, Les Cooprants, failed. It ries distinguishing features which makes it quite
was followed by the collapse of Sovereign Life in unique. In particular, they often reject the comparison
1993. In 1994, Confederation Life went into receiver- with the banking industry by arguing that banks and
ship. life insurance companies are significantly different
animals. To support their claim, life insurers usually
Europe has not been spared by these costly put forward three basic arguments. These arguments,
events, either. Although less publicity has been given as the story goes, are sufficient motives for their indus-
to the distresses of the major European insurance com- try to deserve a specific asset-liability management
panies, concern is growing among European regula- treatment.
E. Briys is Professor of Finance, Groupe HEC, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas, France. F. de Varenne is Research 1
Fellow, French Federation of Insurance Companies (FFSA), 26 bd Haussmann, 75009 Paris, France
The first argument, which is also shared by The third argument is by far the most compel-
property-casualty insurers, underlines the fact that the ling one. Life insurers frequently insist upon the long
insurance production process is inverted: output prices maturity of their liabilities. This long term view stems
(read insurance premiums) have to be established from the actuarial dimension of insurance liabilities. A
before input prices and costs (read claims) are known. typical example is the life annuity which is paid until
The insured pays a known insurance premium and death which may occur very late. Until recently, as
may incur in the future some damage which will be stressed by Wright [1991], portfolio philosophy in the
then reimbursed. This situation, according to insurers, life insurance business was centered on the matching
is at odds with, say industry, where costs or input of assets and liabilities... The traditional practices of
prices are known beforehand and used to set prices. buying long-term bonds and mortgages and holding
them to maturity were based on the long duration of
The second argument stressed by insurers is liabilities. Wright hastens to add that today a
somehow a corollary of the first one. According to this rethinking of the duration of these (insurance) prod-
argument, risk-taking initially occurs on the liability ucts is essential. This rethinking is not only urged by
side of the balance sheet. Underwriters issue insurance the redesign of life insurance policies but also by the
policies which are transformed into liabilities (read pressure of competition. Insurance agents bring con-
technical reserves). Because of the time lag between siderable pressure on companies headquarters to set
the premium inflow and the indemnity outflow, the initial rates high enough to match competition and
reserves are invested on the financial marketplace and keep them high in the future even though interest rates
generate the portfolio of assets of the company. Again, might have fallen down. These interwoven effects
this is at odds with the banking industry which, challenge the long view of insurance liabilities. The
according to insurers, initially take risks on the asset duration, in other words the interest rate risk exposure
side (read loans, mortgages etc...). of insurance liabilities, is not only a matter of mortal-
ity tables and proper discounting but is also signifi-
Before turning to the third argument, the first cantly affected by the geometry of the contractual
and the second argument can be shown to be quite liabilities cash-flows. Because insurance liabilities are
dubious. They are easily debunked. Indeed, the first not traded and accounting practices tend to distort the
argument is rather astonishing when the insurance cash-flow picture, this last point is not clearly under-
contract is framed into an option setting. An insurance stood. A lot of insurance companies still manage their
contract is a put option: like the equity put option, its liabilities using a long term horizon while they should
primary function is to provide his holder with an asset be shooting at a much shorter time frame. The out-
value guarantee. The writer of any option has to fix a come of such practices is clear: an outsized mismatch
premium before he knows whether or not the option is between the durations of assets and liabilities jeopar-
going to be exercised. Bankers are familiar with dize the value of equity when interest rates increase.
options: they embed prepayment options in mortgages
(which is a way of insuring the borrower against inter-
est rate risk) without knowing whether or not the bor- M ODELLING S TAKEHOLDERS C ASH -F LOWS
rower is going to use them. Bankers, option markets
players do not however complain about a so-called In the previous section, three common pitfalls
inverted production process! have been debunked using rather qualitative argu-
ments. The purpose of the current section is to set up a
The second argument is also quite easy to dis- simple quantitative model of a life insurance company.
mantle. Bank deposits can be viewed as providing Indeed, the use of fairly standard financial tools such
liquidity insurance. A depositholder knows that, in as options, duration and convexity measures yields a
case of unexpected liquidity needs, he can totally or more accurate, not to say a more convincing, risk pic-
partially cash out his deposit. The analogy with insur- ture of life insurance liabilities. More specifically, the
ance is even stronger: because of the law of large num- outputs of this simple quantitative model reinforce the
bers, not everybody is expected to run and require views expressed in the previous section by giving
from his bank his total deposit back. The notion of risk some order of magnitude.
mutualization is precisely at the heart of the insurance
industry. To make the counterargument even more Our model is based on Mertons approach to
convincing, the case of indexed CDs issued by banks financial intermediaries [1977, 1990]. Only one type
can be referred to. Banks offer deposits whose return of life insurance policy is considered here. The closest
is composed of a fixed component and a variable com- example of such a policy on the US life insurance mar-
ponent pegged to some index. By issuing such depos- ket is the Universal Life insurance contract (UL) that
its banks are indeed taking risks: they guarantee a floor was introduced in 1979. The cash value of a UL con-
and add up a potential bonus. tract typically earns a minimum guaranteed rate of
First case :
Second case:
14. The equity duration is defined along the same lines as equation