This document tests several hypotheses about factors that may impact firm performance during a financial crisis. It finds that the presence of a wedge between cash flow and voting rights, institutional ownership, and government ownership are associated with negative performance, while family ownership and parent corporation ownership have positive impacts. It also finds that more vigilant boards, high-powered executive compensation contracts, and being located in a market-based financial system are linked to lower firm performance during a crisis.
This document tests several hypotheses about factors that may impact firm performance during a financial crisis. It finds that the presence of a wedge between cash flow and voting rights, institutional ownership, and government ownership are associated with negative performance, while family ownership and parent corporation ownership have positive impacts. It also finds that more vigilant boards, high-powered executive compensation contracts, and being located in a market-based financial system are linked to lower firm performance during a crisis.
This document tests several hypotheses about factors that may impact firm performance during a financial crisis. It finds that the presence of a wedge between cash flow and voting rights, institutional ownership, and government ownership are associated with negative performance, while family ownership and parent corporation ownership have positive impacts. It also finds that more vigilant boards, high-powered executive compensation contracts, and being located in a market-based financial system are linked to lower firm performance during a crisis.
This document tests several hypotheses about factors that may impact firm performance during a financial crisis. It finds that the presence of a wedge between cash flow and voting rights, institutional ownership, and government ownership are associated with negative performance, while family ownership and parent corporation ownership have positive impacts. It also finds that more vigilant boards, high-powered executive compensation contracts, and being located in a market-based financial system are linked to lower firm performance during a crisis.
1a The presence of a wedge between cash flow and voting
rights has a negative impact on firm performance during a financial crisis. 1b Institutional ownership has a negative impact on firm performance during a financial crisis. 1c Government ownership has a negative impact on firm performance during a financial crisis 1d Family ownership has a positive impact on firm performance during a financial crisis. 1e Parent corporation ownership has a positive impact on firm performance during a financial crisis. 2 Vigilant boards (those characterized by the separation of CEO and chair roles, a high fraction of independent directors, smaller boards, frequent meetings, and the presence and independence of functional committees) will have a negative impact on a firms financial performance during a financial crisis. 3 The employment of high-powered incentive compensation contracts for senior executives will be associated with lower firm performance during a financial crisis. 4a Companies located in countries with a more developed legal framework have better firm performance during a financial crisis. 4b Firms based in bank-based financial systems are likely to perform better during a financial crisis than firms in a market-based financial system.