EN BANC

[A.M. No. RTJ-00-1530. March 14, 2001]

DR. EDGARDO ALDAY, MERCEDES FAVIS, MARNA

VILLAFUERTE, and CHRISTOPHER GARCIA, complainants,
vs. JUDGE ESCOLASTICO U. CRUZ, JR., Branch 58, Regional
Trial Court, Makati City, respondent.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

Complainants seek the dismissal of respondent judge allegedly for threatening them
with a gun during a traffic incident.

In their verified complaint,[1] complainants alleged that on May 6, 1999, the van they
were riding was about to exit the Cityland Condominium at Pioneer St., Mandaluyong
City. When they reached the entrance/exit ramp, respondent arrived in his car and
blocked the ramp. As a result, neither vehicle could move. Respondent alighted from his
car and went over to the van. He shouted Putang ina ninyo, anong gusto ninyo
mangyari?, while brandishing a gun and pointing it at the occupants of the van.

On June 14, 1999, the OCA required respondent to comment. [2] Respondent admitted
that there was a traffic altercation. However, he claimed that it was complainants van
which blocked the ramp. He said that he merely alighted from his car to vent his ire at the
inept security guard who did not even help them untangle the traffic snarl. He
categorically denied any gun-poking incident.

The complaint was re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and referred to

Office of the Court Administrator Consultant, Justice Romulo S. Quimbo, for
investigation, report and recommendation.[3]

During the hearing, the parties presented conflicting versions of the incident. These
are succinctly summarized by the OCA Consultant, and we present both sides for better
appreciation of the facts.

On one hand, complainants testified as follows:

1. Dr. Edgardo S. Alday, 67 years old, a physician by profession, identified

and affirmed the truth of the sworn statement (Exhibit A, Rollo, pp. 5-6) he
executed at the Eastern Police District Headquarters on May 7, 1999. Said
statement was submitted as part of his direct testimony. In said statement, Dr.
Alday declared that on May 6, 1999, and he and several companions were
aboard his Mercedes Benz van. As they were leaving the parking area of the
Cityland Condominium (Cityland for brevity) at Pioneer St., Mandaluyong
City, shortly after noon, a car with Plate No. 16 NCR 58 met them blocking
their way out. At this juncture, the security guard motioned to them to back up
so that the incoming vehicle could enter. While the van was slowly backing up,
the respondent who was driving his car was going forward almost pushing the
van and at the same time pointing a gun at them through the cars
windshield. Upon respondents car coming alongside and parallel to the van,
respondent stopped his car, alighted and with his gun pointed at the occupants
of the van, shouted three times saying Putang ina ninyo, anong gusto ninyo
mangyari. Examined further by his counsel, Dr. Alday declared that prior to the
incident, he did not know the respondent not having ever met him.

On cross-examination by respondents counsel, Dr. Alday insisted that what he

related in his statement was what actually happened. He gave a more detailed
description of the happening. Asked to specify the firearm respondent allegedly
used to point at them, Dr. Alday insisted that it was black automatic pistol not a
chrome-plated revolver which the cross-examiner suggested.

2. Ms. Marna Villafuerte-Judan, 32 years old, businesswoman, was the

second complainant to testify. She identified and affirmed Exhibit B (Rollo, pp.
9-10) as the sworn statement she gave at the Eastern Police Headquarters on
May 7, 1999. The same was offered as her direct testimony. She declared that
shortly after noon on May 6, 1999, she was in a Mercedes Benz van with Dr.
Edgardo Alday and his wife, Dr. Mercedes Favis. The said van was being
operated by Dr. Aldays driver. As the vehicle was about to leave the parking
area of Cityland on Pioneer St., Mandaluyong City, a red car driven by a man
in a business suit who they later found out was respondent Judge Escolastico
Cruz, blocked their way. The security guard on duty motioned Dr. Aldays
driver to back up. As they were backing up, the respondent was advancing and
almost pushing the van. She saw Dr. Alday, who was seated in front next to the
driver, open his window and inform the respondent, who was inside his car, that
we were just going out but the respondent berated (nagmura) Dr. Alday saying
that he did not care but he was coming in. When respondents car came
alongside their van, she saw the respondent point his firearm at them.After that
the respondent went his way. She saw that respondents car had Plate No. 16
NCR. Asked additional questions by their counsel, Ms. Judan declared that she
had not met respondent before the incident which occurred on May 6,
1999. She only found out his identity at the police station when she learned that
Plate No. 16 is issued only to judges.
Answering the undersigned, Ms. Judan stated that she was a resident at
Cityland. She admitted that although she is not related to either Dr. Alday or his
wife, she is close to them and she addresses them tito and tita.

Cross examined by respondents counsel, complainant Judan admitted that after

she boarded the van next to Dr. Favis, she was engrossed in conversation with
her that she did not notice the arrival of respondents car near the tali, which she
described as the rope slung across the driveway. She first noticed the
respondent after he had already crossed the tali. She said she did not notice
respondent alight from his car as she only became aware of the incident when
the red car was already in front of her. She stated further that there was an
exchange of words between Dr. Alday and respondent and that immediately
after they left the area, they had proceeded directly to the police. Although
there was a police station nearer Cityland than the one to which they had
repaired, it was a spot choice they made at that moment to go to the Eastern
Police District Headquarters on Meralco Avenue.

3. The third and last complainant to testify was Dr. Mercedes A. Favis, 66
years old, also a physician. She identified and affirmed the truth of the sworn
statement (Exhibit C, Rollo, pp. 7-8) she executed on May 7, 1999, at the
Eastern Police District Headquarters. Answering additional questions posed by
their counsel, she stated that she did not know nor had she ever encountered the
respondent before May 6, 1999. In Exhibit C which was submitted as her direct
testimony, Dr. Favis declared that they had gone to the police headquarters to
file a complaint against Judge Escolastico Cruz who was identified to them by
the security guard. In the same statement she declared that on May 6, 1999,
between 12:10 and 12:15 in the afternoon, she, together with her husband, a
guest and their driver were engressing from the parking area of the Cityland, at
Pioneer St., Pasig City, aboard their Mercedes Benz van when they were
suddenly confronted by a red automobile driven by a man dressed in a dark
business suit. The driver of this automobile was repeatedly shouting curses
saying Putang ina ninyong lahat, ano ba ang gusto ninyong mangyari, at the
same time pointing a firearm towards the passengers of the van. The driver of
the red car alighted and confronted her husband and their driver with a gun
which he pointed at them. After the driver of the red car had finished bad
mouthing them, he drove away. They, in turn, left and immediately went to
a police station to make a report. Their guest was able to get the plate number
of the red car which was 16 NCR 58 which she knew was issued to a judge.

On cross examination, Dr. Favis admitted that Exhibit C was made the day after
the incident because after they went to report to the police on the day of the
incident, the latter accompanied them to the Cityland Condominium and later
they had gone to the IBP and it was already late in the afternoon when they
returned to the police station. The investigators suggested that they return the
next day to have their statements taken. She further testified that while they
were backing up, the red car driven by the respondent was jerkily pushing
them. She described how respondent was pointing the gun at them in a swaying
motion and that the weapon being brandished by the respondent was not a
revolver.[4]

On the other hand, respondent did not testify but presented his witnesses who
testified as follows:

1. Atty. Alex Tan identified and affirmed the truth of the statement he executed
before Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rizalina T. Capco-Umali of Rizal (Exhibit 1,
Rollo, pp. 58-59). The same was submitted by respondent as an annex to his
comment in this administrative matter. This sworn statement was submitted as
his direct testimony. In said statement, Atty. Tan relates that on May 6, 1999, he
had invited respondent (his classmate at San Beda College) and his wife to
lunch at the Kamayan Restaurant at EDSA. He had gone to respondents office
at Makati City at half past 11:00 oclock. They proceeded to Cityland in
Mandaluyong City with Judge Cruz driving his Honda Civic while he followed
aboard his white Corolla. When respondent judge turned right towards the
parking lot, he had to stop because his way was blocked by a Mercedes Benz
van which was parked in the middle of the driveway.Respondent sounded his
horn but the vans driver instead moved forward until the van was only a meter
away from the hood of respondents car. An old man seating beside the driver of
the van signaled to respondent to move back but respondent responded that he
could not because Atty. Tans car was right behind his and following Atty. Tans
car was a taxicab. He saw Judge Cruz alight from his car and immediately go to
the security guard on duty berating the latter saying, Ano ba ang ginagawa mo
dito, bakit hindi ka mag traffic? Ano ka dito, dekorasyon? Kung hindi mo
kayang mag traffic, mag resign ka na.

Atty. Tan continued saying that he saw the security guard approach the driver of
the Mercedes Benz van and signaled the latter to move back so respondent was
able to proceed to the parking area. He further testified that he never saw Judge
Cruz point a gun to anyone that noon of May 6, 1999, much less alight from his
car carrying any handgun. He finally stated that had he seen the respondent
point a gun at anyone, he would have been the first to prevent and/or stop him.

During his testimony, Atty. Tan identified another sworn statement (Exhibit 1-
C) where he described what happened in the afternoon of June 7, 1999, at the
Hall of Justice in Mandaluyong City where he was accosted, threatened and
cursed by three people, namely: complainant Dr. Edgardo Alday, a certain Bong
Villafuerte and their driver, Christopher Garcia. He speculated that he was
mistaken by these three people for the respondent Judge Cruz.

On cross examination, Atty. Tan admitted that he was a classmate of the

respondent in the San Beda College of Liberal Arts; that he had known the
respondent since 1968; that he was a name partner in the law firm of A. Tan,
Zoleta and Associates; that his firm was counsel for the plaintiff in Civil Case
No. 98-3064 entitled SAAG Philippines, Inc. versus Hexagon Realty Corp., et
al which was pending before Branch 58 of the Makati Regional Trial Court
presided by the present respondent; that exhibit D is a copy of the complaint in
said case; that on December 24, 1998, the respondent issued a temporary
restraining order (Exhibit E) in the said case as prayed for by them; and that the
case was terminated in January 1999.

2. Respondents second witness was Aida F. Alba, of age, married and a

resident of Cupang, Muntinglupa. She identified and affirmed the truth of the
statement (Exhibit 2, Rollo, pp. 64-65) which she jointly executed with Jose
Ignacio before Rizalina T. Capco-Umali, Rizal Asst Provincial Prosecutor.The
same statement was among those annexed to respondents comment in this
administrative matter. The same statement was offered as the direct testimony
of this witness.

In Exhibit 2, Ms. Alba declared that on May 6, 1999, she had arranged a
tripping with Anna B. Dianito to see certain units of the Cityland located on
Pioneer St., Mandaluyong City. She, together with Jose Ignacio, Anna Dianito
and one Jackielyn Sawit, arrived at the said place at past 11:00 oclock.After
making a tour of the condominium, she had seen a man dressed in a coat and tie
alight from the red Honda, walk to the security guard and berate him. The
guard then approached the Mercedes van and directed its driver to move the
van back. After the latter had done so, the Honda was able to continue on its
way towards the parking lot. She further stated that during the standstill of the
cars, she saw no person holding a gun or pointing the same at anyone. She and
her companions were right on the landing pad and had a clear and unobstructed
view of the scene.

On cross-examination, she admitted that respondent Judge Cruz contacted Anna

Dianito and the latter called her to inform her that she was needed to make an
affidavit regarding the incident. She had gone to the office of a lawyer whose
name she could not remember where she was interviewed. The lawyer then
prepared the statement which she and Jose Ignacio jointly swore to before the
investigating prosecutor.
3. Respondents third witness was Annaliza L. Dianito, a thirty-year old real
estate broker. She identified and affirmed the truth of the statement (Exhibit 4,
Rollo, pp. 62-63) which she executed before the Asst. Provincial Prosecutor
investigating the complaint of Dr. Alday.

In the said statement, the witness declared that she is a real estate broker and
that she had arranged a tripping with some of her clients on May 6, 1999; that
she had met with them at the Goldilocks Bake Shop on Shaw Blvd. and they
arrived at Cityland on Pioneer Street at 11:10 oclock in the morning; that she
had shown her clients four units in the building and as it was almost noon, she
showed them the several eateries and convenience stores among which was
Unit UG 16 which is located nearest the stairway leading either to the driveway
or the exit towards Pioneer Street; that as they approached the landing pad
leading to the stairs, their attention was called by the honking of horns from
vehicles; that she saw a red Honda Civic, a white Toyota Corolla and a taxicab
in that order; that their way was blocked by a parked Mercedes van; that they
saw a man in coat and tie who turned out be respondent Judge Cruz, alight and
approach the security guard on duty and directed the latter to ease out the traffic
snarl; that the security guard approached the Mercedes van and motioned to its
driver to move back; that the red Honda Civic of the judge was finally able to
proceed to its parking area; that during all the few minutes of traffic along the
driveway, she never saw Judge Cruz or any person for that matter, point a gun
at anyone; that it was just an ordinary day-to-day scene along the driveway of
the condominium; that at about 12:30 oclock, she parted ways with Ms. Cawit,
Ms. Alba and Mr. Ignacio.

On cross examination, the witness admitted that when she and her companions
arrived at the stair landing the four vehicles a red Honda Civic, a white Toyota
Corolla, a taxicab and the Mercedes Benz van were already on the
driveway. She further admitted that she did not leave her name or address with
anybody after the incident and that she had been interviewed by Atty.
Cabangon at an office on Panay Avenue in Quezon City. She had been brought
to Atty. Cabangons office by Atty. Tan. She declared that she had been
acquainted with Judge Cruz since 1998 when the latter wanted to buy a 3
bedroom unit; that after the incident of May 6, 1999, Judge Cruz had called her
and asked her to go to his place at Cityland; that she had gone to him and found
Atty. Tan with him; that because he had seen her at the landing pad on May 6,
1999, Judge Cruz mentioned to her that he remembered having seen her with
some companions; that she took it upon herself to notify her three companions
Jose Ignacio, Aida Alba and Jacklyn Cawit and bring them to the Judge; that
after being interviewed by the Judge, Atty. Tan brought the four of them to Atty.
Cabangon upon the request of Judge Cruz and that they were interviewed and
their affidavits were made.

4. Respondents fourth and last witness in chief was Segundino Ellazo, the
security guard on duty at the Cityland on May 6, 1999. He identified his sworn
statement (Exhibit 5 and also marked Exhibit G for complainants, Rollo, pp.
33-34), as well as his signature (Exhibit 5-A). In said statement, Ellazo stated
that he was, on May 6, 1999, a member of the Airborne Security Service, Inc.
and was on duty at the Cityland from 8:00 oclock in the morning until evening;
that at about 12:10 oclock in the afternoon of May 6, 1999, he saw Judge Cruz,
owner of a unit in the Cityland, arrive aboard his car with Plate No. 16 NCR
58; that respondent judge was unable to immediately proceed to his parking slot
because a Mercedes Benz van was blocking the driveway; that the van backed
up slowly because there were cars parked on the side; that respondent was
forcing his way as the van was backing up; that suddenly he saw respondent
judge pull out a gun and point the same through his windshield at the van; that
when the vehicles were already parallel to each other, respondent Judge Cruz
alighted from his car and told Ellazo to assist in untangling the traffic snarl and
respondent immediately boarded his car and proceeded to his parking slot and
the van went out. He concluded his statement saying that he was not threatened
by Judge Cruz nor did he have any grudge against him.

Mr. Ellazo also identified a second statement dated July 31, 1999 (Exhibit 6) as
well as his signature (Exhibit 6-A) thereon. (The statement appears to have
been subscribed and sworn to before a Notary Public on July 31, 1999 and
resubscribed before the Assistant City Prosecutor on August 2, 1999).Ellazo
declared that he had to correct what he had stated in his statement before the
police. In Exhibit 6, the witness stated that on May 6, 1999, at about 4:18
oclock in the afternoon, he had gone to the Eastern Police District Headquarters
at Meralco Ave., Pasig City where he executed Exhibit 5 (also marked Exhibit
G); that when Judge Cruz alighted from his car, he was not carrying any
firearm and that he did not see him point the gun at anyone because if he did, it
is not possible he could not have seen it; that immediately after Judge Cruz
approached the witness and told him to arrange the traffic, he forthwith boarded
his car and proceeded to his parking slot; that at no time did Judge Cruz
approach the van when it was in front of his car.

Ellazo executed a third statement (Exhibit 7) which he signed (Exhibit 7-A) and
swore to before a Notary Public on September 9, 1999. In the latter statement
he declared that on May 6, 1999, he was forced to go to the Eastern Police
District at Meralco Ave., Pasig City in order to give a statement which was
against his will only because he was threatened by Col. Antonio B. Aguilar, Jr.,
through the Cityland Administrator that he would be charged with obstruction
of justice if he did not testify for Dr. Edgardo S. Alday and he was given only
up to 4:00 P.M. that day to comply; that because of his fear, as he was informed
that the Pasig police were looking for him, he gave a statement which was
involuntary because it was made under the fear that he might be arrested,
charged and confined; that so everyone may know and for the sake of the truth,
he declared that it was not true that Judge Cruz had drawn a gun as he did not
have a gun on that day; that his description of the gun being small and black
was based only on what Dr. Alday had said; that as a matter of fact, Dr. Alday
kept calling and calling the office where he was working in order to convince
him to testify against Judge Cruz; that he had sought advice from his family
and his relatives and he was advised to come out and tell the truth so that his
conscience would not bother him; that because of the pressure of the office
where he was working, he had to look for another job and to transfer his
residence. Ellazo further declared that on May 6, 1999, at about 12:10 oclock
P.M., when Judge Cruz entered the driveway of the Cityland he was followed
by the white car of Atty. Alex Tan; that he did note in his blotter this fact
because after Judge Cruz proceeded to the parking area, he did not allow Atty.
Tan to follow because the area was already full; that during that time there were
many persons present among whom were real estate broker Anna Liza Dianito
who was in company with some prospective buyers/tenants; that as a matter of
fact, he was embarrassed when he was berated by Judge Cruz in the presence of
Atty. Tan and Ms. Dianito.

Continuing his direct testimony, Ellazo was asked to explain the discrepancy
between his first statement (Exhibit 5) and his second and third statements
(Exhibits 6 and 7). He declared that on May 6, 1999, he had just relieved the
other security guard who had gone to eat when Judge Cruz entered driving his
red car and found his way was blocked by a Mercedes Benz van; that Ellazo
had signaled the driver of the van to move back but said driver was hardheaded
and did not immediately comply; that Judge Cruz and Dr. Alday, the passenger
of the van exchanged shouts; that Judge Cruz alighted, approached and berated
him (Ellazo); that since he was outside his guard house at the time, he
approached the van and assisted its driver to move back so that Judge Cruz was
able to proceed to his parking slot; that there were many people at the top of the
stairs one of them was Anna Dianito and companions whose names he did not
know.

On cross examination Ellazo was confronted with his answers to questions

propounded by the police investigator contained in his statement marked
Exhibit 5 (also marked Exhibit G). His attention was called to Question No. 5
(Exhibit G-2) in Exhibit 5 where he was asked to describe what had happened
and his answer was that he had seen Judge Cruz pointing his gun at the
Mercedes Benz van with Plate No. WBF 991. Ellazo stated that he did not give
that answer but the same was only put there (gawa gawa lang) by the police.

Ellazo was also asked about the answer he gave to Question No. 15 (Exhibit G-
3) in Exhibit 5 where he stated that when Judge Cruz arrived in his car with
Plate No. 16 NCR 58 he could not immediately proceed to his parking slot
because his way was blocked by a van with Plate No. WBF 991 so that he
(Ellazo) signalled the driver of the van to back up; that Judge Cruz immediately
followed the van as the latter was backing up and at that moment he saw Judge
Cruz pull out a gun which he pointed through his windshield at the van; that
when the two vehicles were side by side, Judge Cruz alighted from his vehicle
and told him to assist in arranging the flow of the traffic and after that Judge
Cruz proceeded to his parking slot. Ellazo explained that part of what was
supposed to be his answer was actually his but the rest was just told to him by
the police.

Asked by the undersigned to indicate what part of Exhibit 5-B was his and what
was not, Ellazo stated that he never said that Judge Cruz pulled out a gun and
pointed it at the Mercedes van (Exhibit 5-B-1) although the rest of the answer
was his.

On further cross examination, Ellazo admitted that he had Exhibit 6 made by

neighbor who was a lawyer, a certain Atty. Mabuti. The same affidavit was
submitted at the preliminary investigation in the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Mandaluyong at the instance of Atty. Alex Tan and Judge Cruz. He stated
that a few weeks after the happening, he had gone to Judge Cruz to apologize
for what he had said in his first statement which was taken by the police. He
also told Judge Cruz that he was willing to execute another affidavit in his
favor. After that he had voluntarily gone to Atty. Mabuti to have his second
affidavit (Exhibit 6) made and after this was made, he was accompanied by
Atty. Alex Tan to the prosecutors office in Mandaluyong to submit Exhibit 6.

The witness further admitted that besides his going to the residence of Judge
Cruz to see him, he had seen respondent several times while he was on duty at
Cityland; that it was Atty. Tan who picked him up at his house and brought him
to Mandaluyong City to submit the second affidavit (Exhibit 6) to the
prosecutor handling the preliminary investigation.

Anent his third affidavit (Exhibit 7), Ellazo admitted that he was told by Atty.
Tan to go to the office of Atty. Gayos to make the third affidavit in order to
clarify certain matters contained in Exhibit 6. He insisted that the respondent
had no gun on that date.

Answering questions of the undersigned, Ellazo insisted that Question No. 5

(Exhibit G-2) as well as Question No. 6 (Exhibits 5-B-2 & G-3) were never
asked of him and neither did he give the answers found in said exhibits. [5]

On June 19, 2000, respondent formally offered his evidence[6] and rested his case.
Thereafter, complainants formally offered their evidence.[7]

However, considering the apparent turnaround of Security Guard Segundino Ellazo,

Justice Quimbo allowed complainants to present rebuttal evidence. On June 19, 2000,
complainants presented Police Superintendent Antonio V. Aguilar, Jr. and SPO1 Joseph
Amuyo, whose testimonies are as follows:

Police Superintendent Antonio V. Aguilar, Jr. declared that on May 6, 1999,

he was already the Chief of the District Criminal Investigation Group, Eastern
Police District, National Capital Region. He identified the statement (Exhibit 5)
which Segundino Ellazo made at the Eastern Police District Headquarters on
May 6, 1999. He further said that he had asked Ellazo whether he had executed
it voluntarily and of his own free will and whether he swore to its truth. It was
only after Ellazo had answered affirmatively to his questions that he
administered his oath. He admitted that he had no personal knowledge of the
answers given by Ellazo to the investigator, but he insists that he would not
have allowed any one of his investigators to manufacture testimony.

SPO1 Joseph Amuyo, after taking oath, declared that on May 6, 1999, he was
a police investigator at the Eastern Police District. He was the one who took the
sworn statement of Segundino Ellazo on that date. He further declared that the
statement given to him at the investigation room of the Eastern Police District
was free and voluntary; that he was asking the questions and Ellazo was
supplying the answers which he typewrote; that all the answers written on
Exhibit 5 were of Ellazo; that as a matter of fact, Ellazo corrected the Plate No.
of the van as found in Questions No. 5 and 6; that the answer to Question No.
15 is also Ellazos.

Cross examined by respondents counsel, Amuyo declared that Dr. Alday had
reported an alleged grave threats against him; that in company with Dr. Alday,
SPO2 Emerito Escobido, PO1 Joseph Engero and PO1 Efren Tejada, he had
proceeded to the place where the alleged threats were made; that upon reaching
Cityland, they had encountered OIC Dominador Novencio; that he had told
Novencio to request Ellazo to report to their office for questioning; that he did
not make any threats against Ellazo nor did any member of the PNP; that when
Ellazo reported to them, he had taken his statement; that he took the statements
of the complainants the next day; that Ellazo gave his statement voluntarily and
that it is not true that Ellazo was at first reluctant to testify for as a matter of
fact, he had gone to the headquarters with Dr. Alday.[8]

On June 26, 1999, respondent offered the same Security Guard Segundino Ellazo as
sur-rebuttal witness, who merely repeated his testimony in chief.After the sur-rebuttal
evidence had been submitted, the parties filed their respective memoranda.

On July 19, 2000, Justice Quimbo rendered his report. He found the version of
complainants more credible, considering that they had no possible motive to make a false
accusation against respondent. He gave credence to the positive testimonies of
complainants over the negative testimonies of respondents witnesses, particularly on
whether respondent judge brandished a gun pointed at complainants. Justice Quimbo
explained that -

True they (Annaliza Dianito and Aida Alba) may not have seen respondents
actual pointing of his gun at the complainants but it is certainly possible that
when their attention was called to the incident, it was too late for them to catch
the gun poking episode as described by the complainants. Or perhaps they were
not at such a vantage point as to be able to see the entire happening. The fact,
however, that the three witnesses (Alex Tan, Annaliza Dianito and Aida Alba)
did not see the gun toting incident, is not conclusive proof that it did not
actually occur.[9]

Justice Quimbo further found Atty. Alex Tan a biased witness, being respondents
classmate at San Beda College, and having represented plaintiffs in a civil case before
respondents sala wherein Tan managed to obtain a TRO on their behalf. He also found the
testimony of Security Guard Ellazo unreliable because he recanted his original statement
that he saw respondent poke a gun at complainants. Hence, citing cases of gun-poking
incidents,[10]Judge Quimbo recommended the dismissal of respondent judge with
forfeiture of all benefits due him and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the
government or in any government-owned or controlled corporation.

The crucial issue herein pertains to the assessment of credibility of witnesses. What
exactly transpired on May 6, 1999, at the Cityland Condominium, Pioneer St.,
Mandaluyong City?

Well-settled is the rule that positive testimony prevails over negative testimony. This
is particularly true where complainants have no ill-motive in testifying against
respondent.[11] Complainants had never met respondent prior to the incident. They had no
pending cases before him. Yet they pursued this case with tenacity. They strongly
believed they had been unjustly wronged and sought redress therefor.
 Brandishing a firearm in public imperils the lives of people. The fact that this was
done by a judge outside the courtroom and during a traffic altercation does not justify
respondents gross misconduct. Judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a
judge. It imposes a number of restrictions thereon. It is but a small sacrifice to pay for
accepting and occupying an exalted position in the administration of justice.
[12]
Irresponsible or improper conduct of a judge, needless to say, erodes public confidence
in the judiciary.[13]

In Marcelino v. Singson,[14] respondent judge was similarly involved in a traffic

accident with the complainant, a fish vendor. While complainant was slowly backing his
passenger jeepney, respondents car suddenly crossed his path, resulting in a minor
impact. Respondent alighted from the car, approached complainant and boxed him twice
on the face. Respondent returned to his car, got a gun, poked it at the face of complainant,
and shouted Hayop Ka!. Respondent then tucked the gun on his waist and delivered
another blow on complainants face. He thereupon left the premises, taking with him
complainants license. Complainant filed criminal cases for Grave Oral Defamation and
Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence against respondent. He also filed an
administrative case against respondent. The criminal cases were dismissed when
complainant desisted, having apparently patched up things with respondent. Complainant
likewise desisted in the administrative case, but the Court nevertheless admonished
respondent and ordered him to pay a fine of P1,000.00.

Based on the facts of the present case, we find respondents acts of confronting
complainants and threatening them with a gun during a traffic altercation constitutive of
conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Conduct grossly prejudicial
to the best interest of the service is a grave offense under Section 46, No. 27, Chapter 6,
Subtitle A, Title I of Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292), Section
23 (t), Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292, and
Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 49-89, as incorporated in the Personnel Manual of
the Supreme Court. The penalty for conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the
service is suspension for six (6) months, one (1) day to one (1) year, for the first offense,
and the penalty of dismissal for the second offense. This being respondents first offense
for which we find him liable, we deem it proper to impose upon him the penalty of
suspension for one (1) year without pay, and a fine of P50,000.00.

The Canons of Judicial Ethics provides that [t]he assumption of office of judges casts
upon the incumbent duties in respect to his personal conduct which concerns his relations
to the State and its inhabitants, the litigants before him, the principles of law, the
practitioners of law in his court, and the witnesses and attendants who aid him in the
administration of its functions. A judges personal behavior, not only while in the
performance of official duties but also outside the court, must be beyond reproach, for he
is, as he so aptly is perceived to be, the visible personification of law and of justice.[15]

Finally, it is not amiss to remind members of the judiciary that the Constitution
exhorts that public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times
be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.[16]

WHEREFORE, we hereby find respondent judge GUILTY of conduct grossly

prejudicial to the service, and impose upon him the penalty of SUSPENSION without
pay for one (1) year and to pay a fine of P50,000.00, to take effect immediately, with a
warning that a commission of a similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez,
JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 1-4. Other complaints pending against herein respondent are A.M. No. RTJ-96-1352 (mauling);
and OCA IPI No. 99-830-RTJ (gross ignorance of the law, rendering unjust judgment and gross
negligence). Three previous complaints against him were dismissed.

[2]
Id. at 14.

[3]
Resolution dated January 31, 2000, Rollo, p. 86.

[4]
Report, pp. 2-5.

[5]
Id. at 5-14.

[6]
Exhibits 1 (affidavit of Atty. Alex Tan); 1-A (his signature on the same); 1-B (signature of the
investigating prosecutor); 1-C (another statement executed by Atty. Alex Tan); 1-D (his signature); 2 (joint
sworn statement of Jose O. Ignacio and Aida F. Alba); 2-A (signature of Alba); 3 (sketch drawn by Aida
Alba in the course of her testimony); 4 (affidavit of Annaliza B. Dianito), 4-A (her signature); 5 (Salaysay
of Segundino Ellazo dated May 6, 1999); 5-A (his signature); 5-B (bracketed portion on page 1); 6
(Sinumpaang Salaysay of Segundino Ellazo dated July 31, 1999 and sworn to before the investigating
prosecutor on August 2, 1999); 6-A (his signature); 7 (a third statement of Segundino Ellazo sworn to
before Notary Public Socrates Verayo on September 9, 1999) and 7-A (his signature).

[7]
Exhibits D (complaint in Civil Case No. 96-3064) entitled SAAG vs. Hexagon pending before
respondents court) and E (order of respondent in said case dated December 24, 1998) which were offered to
prove the bias of Atty. Alex Tan. Offered likewise was Exhibit F (the sketch drawn by Aida Alba); G H and
I (the three affidavits of Segundino Ellazo).

[8]
Report, pp. 15-16.

[9]
Id. at 19.

[10]
De la Paz v. Inutan, 64 SCRA 540, 549 (1975); Romero v. Valle, 147 SCRA 197, 203 (1987);
Saburnido v. Madrono, 209 SCRA 755, 762 (1992). See also Arban v. Borja, 143 SCRA 634, 642 (1986).
[11]
De la Paz v. Inutan, 64 SCRA 540, 545 (1975).

[12]
Galang v. Santos, 307 SCRA 582, 589-590 (1999).

[13]
Id. at 590.

[14]
243 SCRA 685 (1995).

[15]
Marcelino v. Singson, 243 SCRA 685, 688-689 (1995).

[16]
Sec. 1, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution.

SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-05-1591. July 14, 2005]

RODRIGO JING N. VIDAL, complainant, vs. JUDGE JAIME L.

DOJILLO, JR., Municipal Trial Court, Manaoag,
Pangasinan, respondent.

RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a complaint filed by complainant Rodrigo Jing N. Vidal against

Judge Jaime L. Dojillo, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
Manaoag,Pangasinan.

The antecedent facts, as accurately narrated in the report of the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA), are as follows:

The Hon. Jaime L. Dojillo, Jr., Presiding Judge of Municipal Trial Court at
Manaoag, Pangasinan is here charged with Misconduct. The charge stemmed
from an Election Protest filed by the brother of Judge Dojillo at the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court stationed at San Fabian, Pangasinan to protest the
proclamation of herein complainant as Barangay Captain in the 2002 election.

Mr. Vidal [herein complainant] alleged that during the 29 and 30 July 2003
hearings of the Election Protest, Judge Dojillo sat beside the counsel of his
brother and actively coached, aided, assisted, and guided said counsel by now
and then saying something, handing piece of writing, reminding, and or
stopping the counsel from manifesting something to the court, and other similar
acts.

Complainant continued that herein respondents assertive presence and display

of partisan activities in full public view could not have been ignored or
unnoticed by the court a quo and would give the impression and suspicion of
partiality of the said court in favor of respondents brother.

Judge Dojillo admitted that he was present during the mentioned hearings but
explained that he did not sit beside his brothers lawyer but in the area reserved
for the public; and that the main reason why he was there was to observe how
election protests are conducted as he has never conducted one. His other reason
was to give moral support to his brother.

This matter was referred for investigation and, in her report, the Hon. Tita
Rodriguez-Villarin, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 46, Urdaneta City observed
that:

From the evidence submitted by the parties, [the] undersigned noted that
although the complainant and his witness claim they saw the respondent talking
to the lawyer and respondents brother and handing notes they did not hear the
alleged conversation and they did not state what were those notes. Neither did
they see respondent do other acts to interfere with the proceedings.

Considering that the presence of the respondent during the hearings of the
election protest of his brother was admitted by both parties, the only issue left
is whether or not such presence constitutes misconduct. In this respect, [the]
undersigned further noted that the complainant, by himself or thru his lawyer,
did not call the attention of the court much less raised objection to the
respondents presence. This is an indication that during the hearings[,]
respondents presence did not stir any impression or suspicion of intention to
influence [the] courts ruling. As declared by the complainant, he became
suspicious and apprehensive he lost the case even before receiving the decision
when he was informed later that not having a brother judge he was surely a
loser.

The OCA then recommended that the complaint against respondent be

dismissed but respondent judge should be advised to be more circumspect in his
actions in the future.

We do not agree with the OCA recommendation.

 Respondent, in his defense, stated that he attended the hearing of his
brothers election protest case just to give moral support and, in the process, also
observe how election protest proceedings are conducted. Although concern for
family members is deeply ingrained in the Filipino culture, respondent, being a
judge, should bear in mind that he is also called upon to serve the higher interest
of preserving the integrity of the entire judiciary. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only impropriety but also the mere
appearance of impropriety in all activities. Even if respondent did not intend to
use his position as a judge to influence the outcome of his brothers election
protest, it cannot be denied that his presence in the courtroom during the hearing
of his brothers case would immediately give cause for the community to suspect
that his being a colleague in the judiciary would influence the judge trying the
case to favor his brother. The fact that neither complainant nor his counsel
objected to the presence of respondent during the hearing is immaterial.
Respondent himself should have refrained from publicly showing his seemingly
active interest and participation in the case, for he does not deny that he
whispered and passed notes to his brothers lawyer during the course of the
hearing. Thus, we emphasize our ruling in Caeda vs. Alaan,[1] that:

Judges are required not only to be impartial but also to appear to be so, for
appearance is an essential manifestation of reality. Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct
but even the mere appearance of impropriety.

They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for
reproach.

[Respondents] acts have been less than circumspect. He should have kept
himself free from any appearance of impropriety and endeavored to distance
himself from any act liable to create an impression of indecorum.

...

This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal trial court judges like
respondent because they are the judicial frontliners who have direct contact
with the parties. They are the embodiments of the peoples sense of justice. . . .

Indeed, respondent must always bear in mind that:

A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal

conduct, a price one has to pay for occupying an exalted position in the
judiciary, beyond which he may not freely venture. Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge to avoid not just impropriety in the
performance of judicial duties but in all his activities whether in his public
or private life. He must conduct himself in a manner that gives no ground
for reproach. (Emphasis supplied)

Verily, respondent failed to live up to the degree of propriety required of him

by the Code of Judicial Conduct.

IN VIEW OF THE ALL THE FOREGOING, Judge Jaime L. Dojillo, Jr., is

found GUILTY of violation of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and is
hereby REPRIMANDED with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
acts would be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

[1]
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1376, January 23, 2002, 374 SCRA 225, 230-231.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-03-1501. March 14, 2005

JAIME LIM CO, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE RUBEN R. PLATA, MTCC, BRANCH 1, SANTIAGO CITY, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Jaime Lim Co filed before this Court a Complaint,1 dated 13 May 2002, against Hon.
Ruben R. Plata, the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Branch 1 of Santiago City, Isabela, for gross partiality, serious misconduct, and
inefficiency in office. Respondent Judge filed his Comment2 and Additional Comment3 on
the said Complaint, dated 11 September 2002 and 2 April 2003, respectively.

On 09 July 2003, this Court resolved to re-docket the case as a regular administrative
matter4 and to refer the administrative matter to Executive Judge Fe Albano Madrid of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City, Isabela, for investigation, report, and
recommendation.5 Counsel for the respondent Judge, Atty. Emerito Agcaoili, however,
moved for the inhibition of Executive Judge Madrid from hearing the administrative
matter since she was supposedly a bosom friend of Eva T. Co, the wife of complainant
Co.6 Executive Judge Madrid decided to grant the motion and inhibit herself because she
believed that it would be hard to dispel the suspicion that she might be prejudiced
against the respondent Judge just because his counsel, Atty. Agcaoili, filed a previous
administrative case against her.7 Thus, this Court designated Executive Judge Bonifacio
T. Ong of RTC, Branch 24 of Echague, Isabela, to investigate the administrative matter
in place of Executive Judge Madrid.8
In his Report,9 dated 19 May 2004, the investigating Judge made the following findings
and recommendations on the administrative matter: (1) respondent Judge was guilty of
negligence rather than partiality, and should be meted a fine of P1,000; (2) respondent
Judge was culpable of simple misconduct, instead of gross misconduct, and should pay
a fine of P1,000; and (3) the charge of inefficiency against respondent Judge should be
dismissed for lack of merit.

After reviewing the Report of the investigating Judge, dated 19 May 2004, the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) made its own findings and recommendations in its
Memorandum,10 dated 12 October 2004, summarized as follows: (1) adopting the
recommendation of the investigating Judge that respondent Judge was not guilty of
partiality, but of simple negligence, and imposing the penalty of censure; (2) finding that
although respondent Judge was not guilty of gross misconduct, he still failed to avoid the
appearance of impropriety, for which he should be reprimanded with a warning that a
repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely; and (3) dismissing the charge of
inefficiency in office for lack of merit.

The Charge of Gross Partiality

Complainant Co was the private offended party in Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No. 1-
4211, filed against spouses Milagros and Jose Villaceran, respectively, for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law. The accused
Villacerans, in the said criminal cases, allegedly issued separately two postdated
checks, each for the amount of P1,000,000, payable to complainant Co, which were
subsequently dishonored by the drawee banks.

The two criminal cases were raffled to Santiago City, MTCC, Br. I, presided over by the
respondent Judge. Respondent Judge issued a Warrant of Arrest for the accused
Villacerans and fixed their bail at P100,000 each, as recommended by the Office of the
City Prosecutor.

Before the warrant of arrest could be served upon them, the accused Villacerans
voluntarily appeared before the respondent Judge and separately filed Applications for
Bail. Respondent Judge granted bail to the accused Villacerans in the reduced amount
of P50,000 each. By virtue of the property bonds posted by the accused Villacerans,
respondent Judge recalled the Warrant of Arrest issued against them.

Complainant Co charged respondent Judge with gross partiality by pointing out the
following irregularities in the Applications for Bail filed by the accused Villacerans, and
the grant thereof by the respondent Judge, which allegedly demonstrated respondent
Judges gross partiality for the said accused:

1. The Applications for Bail failed to state the amount of bail applied for and the exact
date of application.

2. A duplicate of the Application for Bail of accused Milagros Villaceran was signed by
respondent Judge himself.
3. The Applications for Bail were not properly received by the Santiago City MTCC Br. I.

4. Respondent Judge signed an undated Order, reducing the amount of bail from the
original amount of P100,000 each to P50,000 each, even though the accused
Villacerans did not file any Application to Reduce Bail.

5. The Order signed by the respondent Judge for the recall of the Warrant of Arrest for
the accused Villacerans again failed to state important information such as the values of
the property bonds posted, and the time and date of approval of the said property bonds.

According to complainant Co, respondent Judge purposely left blank the values of the
property bonds in the above-mentioned documents because he was aware of the
insufficiency of the property bonds posted by the accused Villacerans. The property
bonds posted by the accused Villacerans, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCTs) No. 263647 and No. 264847, had assessed values of only P6,200 and P6,900,
respectively. The values of the said property bonds failed to comply even with the
reduced amount of bail, fixed by respondent Judge himself, at P50,000 for each of the
accused.

6. Only upon the insistence of complainant Co did respondent Judge order the accused
Villacerans to post additional bail bonds. The accused Villacerans complied with the
order by posting Surety Bonds No. 25746 and No. 25747, dated 20 June 2000, in the
amount of P40,000 each, and issued by Wellington Insurance Company, Inc. (WICI).
Said surety bonds, however, were good for only one year. During the joint hearing
conducted on 06 December 2001 of Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211, the
private prosecutor, Atty. Dionisio E. Bala, Jr., informed the respondent Judge that the
said surety bonds had already expired. He also questioned the present standing of WICI
as a bonding company duly accredited by the Supreme Court, considering that the
certification submitted before the Santiago City MTCC Br. I was dated 1999. Atty. Bala
thus requested the respondent Judge to order the arrest of the accused Villacerans until
they were able to post new bonds. Respondent Judge refused to order the arrest of the
accused Villacerans and merely said that, "[t]he Court will look into that."

7. Complainant Co observed that accused Milagros Villaceran would often go in and out
of the respondent Judges chambers before and after court hearing.

Convinced that the respondent Judge was biased and sympathetic to the accused
Villacerans, complainant Co filed a motion11 for the respondent Judge to inhibit himself
from Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211. In his Order,12 dated 21 February 2002,
the respondent Judge granted complainant Cos Motion to Inhibit "[s]o as not to erode
the publics faith in the capability of the Court to render fair and impartial justice without
the element of suspicion or bias."

Despite having inhibited himself from Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211,
respondent Judge maintained that he had not been partial and biased in favor of the
accused Villacerans to the detriment of complainant Co, who was the private offended
party in the said criminal cases.

According to the respondent Judge, the accused Villacerans appeared at the Santiago
City, MTCC, Br. I, before the Warrant of Arrest could be served upon them. The accused
Villacerans manifested that they came to learn about the criminal cases filed against
them and they wanted to post bail.

The accused Villacerans pleaded with the respondent Judge for the reduction of the
amount of bail bond, which respondent Judge approved. The bail bond for each of the
accused was originally fixed at P100,000. Respondent Judge agreed to reduce the bail
bond to P50,000 each. Since the accused Villacerans did not have enough cash, they
instead offered two pieces of their real property, located in the Municipality of Echague,
Isabela, as property bonds.

Respondent Judge asked the accused Villacerans to file Applications for Bail so that he
could act on them officially. When the accused Villacerans informed him that they did not
yet have a lawyer, respondent Judge instructed them to request for the usual form of an
Application for Bail from his own staff. The accused Villacerans, however, prevailed upon
respondent Judges staff to do more than just provide the required form, but also to help
the accused Villacerans prepare their Applications for Bail, the Property Bond Form, and
other supporting documents. The respondent Judges staff immediately submitted the
prepared documents to respondent Judge for his signature.

Addressing the alleged irregularities in the Applications for Bail of the accused
Villacerans and his grant thereof, respondent Judge explained in his Comment, dated 11
September 2002, that:

1.10. Upon verifying that the accused have accomplished all the necessary documents
in relation to their property bond and have submitted the originals of the Transfer
Certificate of Title to their properties, Judge Plata approved the bail for property bond
at P50,000.00 each.

a. Judge Plata then signed the order for the recall of their warrant of arrest and
accordingly returned the papers to his staff for further processing and promulgation, as it
is the usual job of the clerical staff.

b. Judge Plata was not aware that one of the papers that he had signed was one of the
applications for bail of Milagros Villaceran until he received a copy of the complaint of
Mr. Jaime Lim Co.

c. Judge Plata was likewise not aware that his staff failed to completely fill up all the
necessary data in the forms in accordance with his instructions prior to filing them.

d. Judge Plata had to contend with the volume of work as presiding/executive judge of
MTCC Br. 1 and Br. 2 of Santiago City and that of the MTC Cordon, Isabela.13

This Court upholds the findings of both the investigating Judge and the OCA that the
above-stated facts demonstrated the negligence of the respondent Judge rather than his
gross partiality.

As stated in the OCA Memorandum, dated 12 October 2004:

We find that respondent Judge was remiss in scrutinizing the documents which he
signed. We agree with the investigating Judges observation that respondent was
negligent in this aspect. That his signature above the printed name of the accused was
made inadvertently is credible as it would be the height of folly if he deliberately signed
the bail for and in behalf of the accused.14

Given that the documents herein had been prepared by his staff, respondent Judge had
the responsibility of reviewing the said documents when submitted to him, before affixing
his signature thereon. Respondent Judges signature carried a lot of weight and could
turn an ordinary piece of paper into an official act of the court, thus, he should have
checked, and if necessary, double-checked, whether the forms were properly filled-out
and the information therein were correct, in order to avoid similar controversies in the
future.

Respondent Judge defended his decision to reduce the bail bond from P100,000
to P50,000 for each of the accused Villacerans as a legitimate exercise of his judicial
discretion. According to respondent Judge, Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
allowed the reduction of the amount of bail upon certain overriding considerations, i.e.,
(a) financial ability of the accused to give bail; (b) nature and circumstance of the
offense; (c) penalty of the offense charged; and (d) character and reputation of the
accused.

Respondent Judge also invoked paragraph 2(o) of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
Circular No. 89, dated 29 August 2000, otherwise known as The 2000 Bail Bond Guide,
which stated that:

For violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, bail shall be P2,000.00 for the first P40,000.00
face value of the check and an additional P1,000.00 for every P10,000.00 in excess of
P40,000.00, but bail shall not exceed P30,000.00.

The two checks involved in Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211, allegedly issued
by the accused Villacerans, each had a face value of P1,000,000. Respondent Judge
argued that the reduced amount of bail bond, amounting to P50,000 for each of the
accused Villacerans, was still substantial, considering that he could have further reduced
the said amount to P30,000, as provided under The 2000 Bail Bond Guide.

Worth reiterating herein is the finding of the OCA, in its Memorandum, dated 12 October
2004, which reads as follows

As reported by the Investigating Judge, respondent was negligent in reducing motu

proprio the bail recommended by the public prosecutor not because the accused are
not entitled to it but because respondent failed to comply with the time tested safeguard
against arbitrariness. As held in AM No. MTJ-00-1286 (21 January 2002), "[I]n all cases,
whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation."

Respondents infraction is procedural in nature, that is, reducing the bail without the
benefit of hearing. The court in AM No. RTJ-03-1767, 3-28-03 enunciated that under the
present rules, a hearing is required in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or
discretion15
The rights of the accused Villacerans to bail and to the reduction thereof to a reasonable
amount were not questioned herein; rather, at issue was the manner the reduction of the
bail was granted. In the cases of Te v. Perez16 and Docena-Caspe v. Bugtas,17 referred to
by the OCA in its Memorandum, dated 12 October 2004, this Court held that there
should be a hearing before granting bail, whether bail was a matter of right or discretion;
and the Judge should notify the prosecutor of the date of the hearing or require the
prosecutor to submit his recommendation.

Such procedural requirements were laid down by jurisprudence precisely to avoid

accusations of arbitrariness against the Judges in fixing the amount of the bail for the
accused, as what happened herein. Respondent Judge was negligent for failing to
comply with a very elementary rule of criminal procedure, and this Court believes that
such negligence actually merits a stiffer penalty than those recommended by the
investigating Judge (a fine of P1,000) and OCA (censure). This Court therefore imposes
upon respondent Judge a fine of P2,000.

Respondent Judge approved the provisional release of the accused Villacerans upon
acceptance of their property bonds because respondent Judge believed that,
notwithstanding the assessed values stated in their respective Tax Declarations, the two
pieces of agricultural lands covered by TCTs No. 263647 and No. 264847 had an area of
1.0014 and 1.0127 hectares, respectively, which were actually worth more than
the P100,000 bail bond for both of the accused Villacerans. At any rate, respondent
Judge, upon the insistence of complainant Co, required the accused Villacerans to post
additional bail bonds. The accused Villacerans complied with the said order by posting
the WICI surety bonds.

As for the respondent Judges refusal to order the arrest of the accused Villacerans after
the expiration of the WICI surety bonds, respondent Judge was of the opinion that once
a surety bond was posted by an accused, the same remained effective until it was
ordered released by the court. He further maintained that in case of nonpayment of the
premium on the surety bond, it was up to the bondsmen to complain and to request for
the release of the bond upon surrendering the body of the accused. Nonetheless, in
order to address the concerns of the private prosecutor, Atty. Bala, respondent Judge
issued an Order,18 dated 20 December 2001, directing WICI, the bonding company, to
submit an updated certification of good standing from the Supreme Court.

However, even before WICI could comply with the said Order, dated 20 December 2001,
complainant Co already filed a Motion to Inhibit Presiding Judge19 on 21 January 2002.
Respondent Judge, in his Order,20 dated 21 February 2002, granted the said Motion.
Respondent Judge, therefore, had no more opportunity to resolve the issue concerning
the expiration of the WICI surety bonds. In the words used by the investigating Judge
and the OCA, the said issue was "overtaken" by the filing of the Motion to Inhibit.
Respondent Judge cannot be held accountable when his failure to fully resolve the
matter was impeded by subsequent events in the criminal cases, instigated by
complainant Co himself.

II

The Charge of Grave Misconduct

Complainant Co also accused respondent Judge of grave misconduct because the
respondent Judge had allegedly demanded tikoy from complainant Co in consideration
for respondent Judges voluntary inhibition from Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No. 1-
4211; and when complainant Co was unable to give tikoy, respondent Judge asked
for P500 instead.

According to complainant Co, he never received a copy of the respondent Judges

Order, dated 21 February 2002, granting his Motion to Inhibit, so on 07 March 2002, he
went to see the respondent Judge at Santiago City, MTCC, Br. I, to personally follow-up
on the status of the said Motion. He did not find respondent Judge at the office of
Santiago City, MTCC, Br. I, but instead, saw him at the adjoining office of Santiago City,
MTCC, Br. II.21

Respondent Judge informed him that the Motion had already been approved. Thereafter,
respondent Judge allegedly told complainant Co, "Magkaibigan pa tayo And to prove
that you still love me, give me tikoy." When complainant Co replied that he did not know
where to buy tikoy, respondent Judge supposedly said, "Magbigay ka ng pera, kami na
ang bibili." Complainant Co then handed P500 to respondent Judge.22

Respondent Judge disputed the charge of gross misconduct against him. According to
the respondent Judge, he had already issued the Order inhibiting himself from hearing
Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211 on 21 February 2002, or almost two weeks
before he saw complainant Co on 07 March 2002; hence, he did not need to demand for
anything from complainant Co in exchange for granting the latters Motion to Inhibit.
Records of Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211 were transferred to Santiago
City, MTCC, Br. II, the very same day.

Respondent Judge submitted affidavits and oral testimonies of several witnesses,

including court officers and staff members of Santiago City, MTCC, Br. I and Br. II, to
support his version of the events that transpired on 07 March 2002, during complainant
Cos visit.

Among respondent Judges witnesses was Mr. Roger Ruma, the former Branch Clerk of
Court of Santiago City, MTCC, Br. II. On 07 March 2002, respondent Judge was at
Santiago City, MTCC, Br. II, talking to Mr. Ruma, when complainant Co intruded to
inquire about his Motion to Inhibit. Mr. Ruma recounted the exchange between
respondent Judge and complainant Co as follows:

Jaime Co Judge, anong nangyari sa Motion ko?

Judge Plata : Nandon na sa Branch 2, napirmahan ko na, matagal

na.

Jaime Co : Nandon na pala, sige. He looks glad.

Judge Plata : Oh Jaime trabaho lang yan; Magkaibigan pa ba tayo?

Jaime Co : Oo naman!
Judge Plata : Papaano ko malaman kung mahal mo kami?

Jaime Co : Eh di magpabili ako ng tikoy!

Judge Plata : Huwag! Bawal, nagbibiro lang ako.23

The conversation was interrupted at this point by a court staff member who informed the
respondent Judge that there was a telephone call for him. After respondent Judge left
the room to answer the telephone call, complainant Co gave P500 to another court staff
member who used the money to buy pizza when he could not find any tikoy. The court
staff and student trainees shared the pizza among themselves.

Respondent Judge also discredited the two witnesses presented by complainant Co,
namely Eugenio Taguba and Maripi A. Apolonio, both employees of Santiago City,
MTCC, Br. II. Respondent Judge alleged that Mr. Taguba and Ms. Apolonio had an ax to
grind against him. Respondent Judge complained to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) that staff members of Santiago City, MTCC, Br. II, were gambling in the court
premises during office hours, instigating the NBI to conduct a raid of Santiago City,
MTCC, Br. II. In the raid, which happened at around 3:00 p.m., the NBI actually caught
several staff members, including Mr. Taguba and Ms. Apolonio, in the act of gambling. An
administrative case was filed against the staff members caught in the raid, wherein they
were subsequently found guilty by this Court of simple misconduct, and were meted the
penalty of suspension for one month and one day, without pay.24

Respondent Judge, in addition, presented evidence that during the time he was talking
to complainant Co, there was an on-going session at Santiago City, MTCC, Br. II, and
Mr. Taguba and Ms. Apolonio were in the courtroom attending to their duties. Thus, they
could not have been present in the office of Mr. Ruma where complainant Co and
respondent Judge were talking.

Furthermore, it could be expected that Ms. Apolonio would support complainant Co

because he was her Ninong or godfather at her wedding.25

Evidence on the issue of gross misconduct weighs heavily in favor of the innocence of
the respondent Judge. The respondent Judges version of the events that transpired on
07 March 2002 was corroborated by a greater number of witnesses whose characters
were not put into question. They generally appeared to be disinterested parties to the
case with no reason or motive to protect respondent Judge. Respondent Judge was also
able to present documentary evidence to further support the affidavits and oral
testimonies of his witnesses.

Moreover, this Court agrees in the findings of the OCA in its Memorandum dated 12
October 2004, that:

It is hard to believe that respondent would risk his reputation and position as a judge by
asking tikoy in front of other people. Besides, the case had already ceased to be in his
sala and had already been transferred to the other branch long before complainant had
a talk with respondent.
Also, it must be considered that said conversation was cut short when respondent was
called to answer a phone call, that ceased him to control (sic) the events that later on
ensued.26

This Court, however, also agrees with the OCA that respondent Judge committed an
indiscretion when he commented to complainant Co, "Papaano ko malaman kung mahal
mo kami?" Although respondent Judge made the comment jokingly, it was also very
understandable how complainant Co had construed it as an insinuation to do some act
or to give something to prove that he had no hard feelings towards respondent Judge.

For making such a comment, respondent Judge violated Canon 2 of the then Code of
Judicial Ethics, which provided that, "A Judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities."27 Since respondent Judge occupied an
exalted position in the administration of justice, he should pay a high price for the honor
bestowed upon him; and his private, as well as his official, conduct must at all times be
free from the appearance of impropriety.28

Although respondent Judge cannot be enjoined from sharing jokes, he must be more
prudent in this regard. As a Judge, respondent herein is the subject of constant scrutiny.
He must freely and willingly impose upon himself certain restrictions, which might be
viewed as burdensome on an ordinary citizen, because he must conduct himself in a
way that is consistent with the dignity of his judicial office.29

III

The Charge of Inefficiency in Office

As to his charge of inefficiency in office, complainant Co alleged that Criminal Cases No.
1-4210 and No. 1-4211 had been pending for a long time before Santiago City, MTCC,
Br. I. Respondent Judge did not assert his authority to try and resolve these cases as
soon as possible. The cases were often called at 11:30 a.m., just to be reset for lack of
material time to hear the cases.

This Court finds no basis for this charge of inefficiency against respondent Judge.
Respondent Judge had satisfactorily explained in his Memorandum,30 dated 04 May
2004, that the delay in the resolution of Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211 were
attributable to reasons other than respondent Judges alleged inefficiency.

Respondent Judge was present during all the scheduled hearings of the said criminal
cases. The records of the criminal cases supported respondent Judges claim that
hearings of the cases were reset three times because of the absence of the private
prosecutor; five times because of the absence of the public prosecutor; and two times
because of the absence of the counsel for the accused.31

At other times, respondent Judge was unable to hear the said criminal cases since there
were at least 30 criminal cases set for hearing on every hearing date. Due to the sheer
number of cases, there was barely enough time to call all the cases in the calendar,
much less, to hear the testimony of the witnesses in all of the cases scheduled.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds that: (1) the respondent Judge is guilty
of simple negligence for his failure to scrutinize the documents he had signed and to
follow the proper procedure for fixing the amount of bail, for which he is meted a fine
of P2,000.00; (2) the respondent Judge is guilty of violating Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Ethics for his failure to avoid the appearance of impropriety, for which he is
reprimanded with a warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more
severely; and (3) the charge of inefficiency in office against respondent Judge to be
without basis and is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.