Inhibiting factors of collaboration

Georgian civic sector case

Summary of proposed article
Paata Gurgenidze
Monday, February 09, 2004
Summary
Cooperation between civic organizations is the issue addressed by this article. The general
causes of cooperation ineffectiveness I tried to illustrate within analysis of so called donor driven
networks. This pattern of sustainable cooperation failure is incurred by lack of motivation of the
actors who do not confront openly for setting real goals of their mutual interest making of it a
hidden motive. This hidden motive drives the game of ineffective cooperation. To withdraw
from this game a donor could use an approach of neutral facilitator/network builder involvement.

Intro

Center for Trainings and Consultancy arranged the conference - NGO Effectiveness - Reality or
Wishful Thinking - on Monday, 10 December, 2001. At the event prevailed the idea that little
impact of Georgian NGO’s, beside other factors, was due to little collaboration among them.

For the participants it was obvious that “Creating power and synergy by cooperation among
NGOs has hardly developed beyond a very initial stage. Disinterest or distrust among NGOs,
competition for funds, unwillingness to provide insight in the own organization to others are
among the major unbinding factors. A single NGO and a splintered third sector will, however,
hardly be able to create civil power on the long run1.”

To correct this wrong, donor organizations in Georgia used a kind of symptom therapy – giving
grants to NGO aimed at empowering their collaboration. The approach seemed simplistic from
the very beginning, but no other way was obviously more promising either.

At the time I argued that the main fault, which led us to less collaboration as well as to other
shortcomings, was the wrong assessment of the whole development context in the country by
leading donor countries. Simply to say, the fundamental fact of democracy absence was the
matter. Shortly afterwards became popular the article, Shift of the Transitional Paradigm, of Dr.
Carothers2. He wrote about need for eye opening at the fact of non democratic character of the
polity in Georgia. Former concept of the Development Work here was oriented on the opposite
assumption.

Now the revolution changed the political context. It became synergic to the development work
Objectives. Nevertheless, the development intervention of the key stakeholders remains
crippling. The name of one of its illnesses is Donor Driven Networks. Fortunately this disease is
curable more easily then the former one – authoritarian political system.

Donor Driven Networks

At the first glance the panacea for effective collaboration can be suggested by donors through
setting “good” objectives for their collaboration boosting grants. The more specific, short time,
and achievable the goal the more the impact; so, it is a good idea to announce a competition for,
lets say, advocacy coalition grants. Some coalitions get the grants. Then time for evaluation

1
Matthias Valentine, Director of the CTC
2
Thomas Carothers, The End of the Transition Paradigm , Journal of Democracy 13.1 (2002) 5-21

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comes. Surprisingly the impact seems to be very limited and the collaboration ends together with
the donors funding. Among the reasons for these shortcomings appear to be the following: the
partner NGOs had not partnership experience; there was not any team work; the leader NGO
could not act flexibly and encourage others for more then merely “projected activities
implementation”.

Example: CAP advocacy coalitions grants

Citizens Advocate! Program, which is a coalition of Georgian NGOs led by the US based
international NGO (Save the Children), funded a number of coalitions aimed at advocacy of
various Target Groups. It’s too early to speak about these coalitions effectiveness, but specking
with some of them I revealed problems of sustainability and leadership. The latter, as a rule, is
not of team spirit unlike expectations.

What lessons are learned? It may be that these NGOs need to know each other better, to rely on
partners’ initiative when their own capacity appears to be irrelevant, to use resource sharing for
the group sustainability.

So the idea of networking may come up in ones mind. But networks, as such, are oriented on
NGO community internal process rather then specific intervention goals3. Network, as
collaboration structure, is suitable for sharing resources such as information, human resources,
intellectual resources, methodology, suppliers, infrastructure, etc. Then donor expected
collaboration goals come in contradiction with its proposed form: usually more impact is
expected from short time goal oriented interventions, while networks are time consuming “not-
workings”. But donors as usual can’t wait until the networks by themselves reap some successful
coalitions of visible impact.

Thus an idea of coalition funding grants for networks participants comes up - if network
members propose a coalition for a joint intervention, media campaign, for instance, they get a
grant.
Example: DRC grants for CRINGO

The Program “Caucasus NGO Networking Initiative” was initiated by Danish Refugee Council
(DRC) in summer 2000. The goal of this program is to strengthen the cross boundary capacities of the
participating NGOs for addressing the needs of IDPs and refugees.
It includes 3 basic components, which were initiated earlier during the First Phase of the
Program:
1. Information exchange and Awareness raising (Multifunctional Info-terminal).
2. Small project fund
3. Establishment of Caucasus NGO Network on refugees and IDPs "CRINGO".
The network participants attended the CTC training on Effective Cooperation where some problems of
the CRINGO were discussed. For me two categories of the problems Became distinct. One could be
named as discrepancy between donor expectation and network members’ real needs4. Another’s name is
lack of real motivation. Most remembering were images of the network the training participants draw:
• “A jet without fuel” – symbolizes formal accuracy of the net objectives and its structure together with
lack of boosting motivation.
• “A tree in the rain with growing roots” – symbolizes need of strong roots in the ground of local
context, while perceiving the occasional rainfall of grants as needed but not sufficient.

3
further in the text we will use the term “intervention goal” in regard with NGOs target group direct service
4
Most of Georgian members of the net say the following: “they encourage cross border activities while regional
cooperation opportunities are not addressed properly through the network structure”

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What lessons are learned? The network members are lured by the “coalition grants” and purely
networking activities and goals remain neglected. These coalition projects are implemented and
sustainability is achieved neither for “coalitions” nor for the network.

“Purely networking” would be activities oriented on shared resources building such as

information sources or infrastructure. These activities give no visible impact on network
members’ clients but ease the network members’ life. If their life is healthy they are supposed to
achieve their client oriented intervention goals sooner or later.

Networking activities by themselves should enhance its member’s resources. These

enhanced resources are to be used for network members’ client oriented interventions. If this
happens then the network is effective. If a donor provides these “enhanced resources” for the
network members then we have something different from initial expectation.

Such networks I call donor networks or private networks of donors. It looks similar to a
researcher’s network of private connections. If the researcher dies the network dies. It happens
not because the people dealing with him do not know each other, but the network is serving only
the researchers objectives. Similarly the “donor networks” are created to serve donors interest –
to know whom to give the intervention grants.

Networks should have appropriate, networking, objectives. It could serve as a basement for
more strict coalitions to be born, but, by itself, networking is a process of shared resources
building. The healthier the “family process” the healthier the child, however, you should not
have very specific expectations on its gender. Even if not any coalitions are born within a
network it doe’s not mean its failure. It may well have been that each network member enhances
its own effectiveness through the net membership.

Example: Caucasus Journalists Network

Caucasus Journalists Network member journalists share infrastructure (the website) and
through it share professional sources of information. For instance, one invites “his” interviewee
(e.g. politician) and makes it available through the web for other members from neighboring
countries. Anther instance of sharing resources is the network freelancer journalists, human
resources, who are shared by the network member media outlet through the web marketplace.

Network development needs cooperation. Initially all potential collaborators have different
ideas how to share resources. If constructive discussion happens, new ideas come up in the form
of consensus. Consensus is always based on mutually acceptable interests. Is not it?

It’s also clear that not only NGOs networking but NGO-Donor cooperation process should be
robust. What I mean by robust? Here one general implication intrudes – healthy collaboration
happens when open confrontation and its constructive outcome happens. If there is no
confrontation of positions/objectives happening? Does it mean that no mutually accepted
objective can be set? No it does not mean that.

As usual, in our civil society one sets objectives, others accept it. You can’t be confused about
which one is the donor here. This is not about networks; this time I’m speaking about general
practice. Donors set overall objectives; NGOs plan more specific objectives under it. No much
confrontation is needed. Is not it? But in this process sense of ownership of the “mutually
accepted” objectives is lost on both sides. I say – if no confrontation happens, no mutual interest

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could be found. If, nevertheless, the mutual interest exists, then, probably, it remains undeclared.
But these undeclared interests trigger “games” instead of honest cooperation.

Then what? What should the donors do? Should not they set objectives of their own? Yes they
should have their point of view, but only in a form of position for a discussion with its potential
partners – NGOs. When it comes to cooperation a consensus should happen5 and this is all
about premises of cooperation effectiveness.

Instead of this the conflict happens in a form of the game – “We did all you wanted”. What is
the feature, which makes difference between a game and open confrontation/discussion? This is
a hidden motive6, which is the same what we mentioned here as non declared mutual interest.

In this game donor says – “I fund better projects”, and NGO’s say – “My project is better”. The
first half of the game is usually won by a donor. It achieves that its position (overall
objectives, trends) are accepted / acknowledged. The second round is usually won by NGOs –
they spend money ineffectively, inefficiently, and donors are dissatisfied by the impact. But
nothing is surprising here – no plan could be implemented effectively if no strong interest of
implementer backs it.

Hidden motive in this game is money spending, i.e. utilizing the funds. It is one of the ways
of their own existence justification. Presumably donors want to spend money as well as NGOs.

If it was not a game then either funding should stop or the implementers should stop accepting
donor strategies. In most cases the winners as well as losers conceive the process as a game and
repeat everything again and again.

There are occasional attempts to withdraw from this game.

From the donor side antitheses to this game could be the two:
• Awarding successful networks instead of subsidizing them. Then the NGO’s should say
– “Our products became better” instead of “my project is better”
Awarding is not widespread practice in development world. Its effect could not be measured
precisely. It doesn’t allow massive intervention aimed at development. Its usage is based on
assumption that there are other, independent from the donor, resources of development.
Nevertheless, there are examples of this approach application for urging achievements within
civil societies.
Example: MCIC and FAO

The Macedonian Center for International Cooperation established and granted the Award for
Civil Society and Democracy in 2000 for the first time. The grounds for giving this Award
include support of the citizens and the organizations that contribute in local and international
initiatives for development of civic society and democracy in Macedonia. It can be awarded for
long-term contribution, for achievements accomplished during the previous year, and for
transparency and information, or cooperation.

The FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) awards the Edouard
Saouma Award to recognise national or regional institutions that have implemented with
particular efficiency a project funded by the Technical Cooperation Program (TCP) of FAO.

5
David Losaberidze, Donor Policies in Georgia, 2002, 10 December, NGO Effectiveness, conference, CTC
6
Eric Bern, The Games People Play

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 • Giving paid assignment to the neutral, professional, service providing NGO’s
(consultancies) for a network building instead of networking grants to the network
members. Then the donors should say – “I encourage better achievements” instead of “I
fund better projects”
This approach enables to concentrate effort on purely network effects. Its effect is measurable.
Responsibility is clear. However, it is difficult to plan the expected outcome very precisely in
terms of impact on the network members target group (clients)
Example: GIP and Caucasus Journalists Net

Geneva Initiative for Psychiatry builds network of local NGOs involved in mental health care. It
is an example of neutral consultancy I talked about. It does not lure NGOs in the network by any
grant funding. It facilitates intellectual resource sharing among the network members who have
expressed joint interest in particular objectives of the countries healthcare system reformation.

Caucasus Journalists Network is a coalition of professional service providing NGOs from South
Caucasus countries who build a network for Journalists and Media outlets in the region for
strengthening independent media in the region.

From the NGO side antitheses are also available:

• NGOs develop “Private Networks”. Instead of saying “I have a better project for a
network development” an NGO develops its own network of experts or/and
organizations. Then it submits application to a donor, who says “I fund the best projects,
but, please no subcontractors”, where all the needed skills of this “private network”
members are present in a proposed project. In fact, the “Private Network” serves for ad
hoc coalitions building in line with the “network’s owner” interest.

• NGO collaborates with more then one donor. When one project is supported by
number of different donors then nobody plays role of ultimate judge and constructive
discussion happens. This is not only

Conclusion

There could be numerous objections to the usage of these antitheses. But,

really, this article doesn’t pretend on preaching the ultimate truth. It only
tries to emphasize some major finding of its author, which need further
testing and elaboration to become useful as practical recommendations:
1) No preceding open confrontation, no mutual interest discovery, no
effective cooperation.
2) If you are ready for open cooperation and real development, doesn’t
mix up network goals with coalition goals. Both of the forms of
cooperation have their typical structures and goals. It helps
3) If you are a donor, don’t lure NGOs in a network by grants. Instead of
this hire neutral professional facilitator who will build the shared
resources on the basis of existing own ones. If this does not work, then
the NGOs are wrong, not the approach.