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Part One: Theory Chapter 1. Justice As Fairness 1. The Role of Justice
Part One: Theory Chapter 1. Justice As Fairness 1. The Role of Justice
There is an important distinction between the concept of justice and the conception of justice. The
concept of justice is defined by the role different conceptions of justice have in common i.e. a
conception of justice is one interpretation of the role of the concept of justice. In general, everyone can
agree institutions are just when no arbitrary distinctions are made between persons in the assigning of
basic rights and duties and when the rules determine a proper balance between competing claims to the
advantages of social life. A conception of justice should also be efficient and stable, and should lead to
ends and consequences that are broadly desirable.
This theory begins by developing the structure of a society that is isolated from other societies. It
assumes a perfectly just society in which everyone acts justly and upholds institutions (strict compliance
theory); there is no civil disobedience. This provides a standard to assess the distributive aspects of the
basic structure of society.
To understand the difference between justice applied to actions and social justice, we can look at
Aristotle. Aristotle talks about justice as refraining from gaining personal advantage by taking one belongs
to someone else (property, etc.) or denying a person what is due to him (repayment of debt, respect,
etc.). However, what belongs to a person and what is owed to him must be derived from social
institutions, so Aristotle must have a conception of social justice to account for these claims.
Rawls argues that persons in this original position would choose two principles:
(1) Equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties
(2) Social and economic inequalities (ex; wealth, authority) are just only if they result in compensating
benefits for everyone, in particular the least advantaged members of society
He argues that people in the original situation would not choose institutions where hardships are some
are offset by good in the aggregate (utilitarianism), but they would allow greater benefits for the few as
long as this also improves the situation of the least fortunate.
5. Classical Utilitarianism
Classic utilitarianism (Sedgwick) believes that a society is rightly ordered (just) when its major institutions
are arranged so as to achieve the greatest net satisfaction summed over all the individuals belonging to it.
Utilitarianism is a teleological theory in which a judgment is made about what is good (hedonism good is
defined as pleasure; classical utility good is defined as satisfaction of rational desire), and then the right
is defined as that which maximizes the good. In the utilitarian view, it doesnt matter how the sum of
satisfactions is distributed among individuals, only the overall maximization of the good is important.
These principles apply to the basic structure of society; they govern the assignments of rights and duties
and regulate the distribution of social and economic advantages. The first principle requires equality of
basic liberties, including political liberty (the right to vote and to be eligible for public office) together with
freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person
along with the right to hold (personal) property; and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined
by the concept of the rule of law. The principles are serially ordered breaking the first principle cannot
be justified by reference to the second principle.
With regard to the principles, we can imagine a basic structure of society which distributes certain primary
goods (things every rational man is presumed to want). This includes social primary goods, such as rights
and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth, as well as natural primary goods: health and
vigor, intelligence and imagination. The benchmark situation is one in which primary goods are evenly
shared. Then inequities are only allowed to the extent that they can make everyone better off than this
starting position.
One should keep in mind that when the principles mention persons, or require everyone to gain from an
inequality, the reference is to representative persons holding the various social positions established by
the basic structure, not to particular individuals.
In this chart, the principle of efficiency is Pareto optimality a configuration is efficient whenever it is
impossible to change it so as to make some persons (at least one) better off without at the same time
making other persons (at least one) worse off. Applied to representative men, this suggests that an
arrangement of rights and duties in the basic structure is efficient if and only if it is impossible to change
the rules, to redefine the scheme of rights and duties, so as to raise the expectations of any
representative man (at least one) without at the same time lowering the expectations of some (at least
one) other representative man. Whether or not a system is efficient depends on its starting position. (e.g.
Serfdom may not be significantly reformed without lowering expectations of landowners, so this may be
considered efficient if it is the starting position.)
The system of natural liberty asserts that a basic structure that satisfies the principle of efficiency and in
which positions are open to those able and willing to strive to them will lead to a just distribution. The
initial position is regulated by the conception of careers open to talents, and since talents are based on
natural and social contingencies, the distribution of factors would seem arbitrary from a moral point of
view.
The liberal interpretation tries to correct this by adding the requirement of fair equality of opportunity. To
ensure that people with similar life skills have similar life chances, free market arrangements must be set
in political and legal institutions. This situation is preferable to natural liberty, but the distribution of wealth
will still be based on the distribution of natural abilities and talents, because the principle of fair
opportunity can only be imperfectly carried out in the real world do to family influences. This leads, again,
to an arbitrary situation from a moral point of view.
In a natural aristocracy, no effort is made to provide fair equality of opportunity, but the advantages of
persons with greater endowments are limited to those that also further the good of the poorer sections in
society. This also seems arbitrary because of the role of natural and social contingencies in determining
social shares.
The difference principle is compatible with the principle of efficiency when former is satisfied, it is
impossible to make any one representative man better off without making another worse off (namely, the
least advantaged representative man). However, because justice more important than efficiency, we may
not reach the perfectly efficient stage.
If the difference principle is satisfied, other people must also benefit, based on the assumption that
inequalities in expectations are chain-connected. If an advantage has the effect of raising the
expectations of the lowest position, it raises expectations of all positions in between (e.g. If raising
expectations of entrepreneur benefits the unskilled laborer, it benefits the skilled laborer as well.) We can
also assume that expectations are close-knit i.e. it is impossible to raise or lower the expectation of any
representative man without raising or lowering the expectation of every other representative man,
especially that of the least advantaged.
The Second Principle now reads: Second Principle now reads: Social and economic inequalities are to be
arranged so that they are both:
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity
To apply pure procedural justice to distributive shares, we must set up and administer impartially a just
system of institutions. Just procedure requires just political constitution and just arrangement of economic
and social institutions. For example, the law and government may act effectively to keep markets
competitive, resources fully employed, property and wealth widely distributed by appropriate forms of
taxation, and guarantee a social minimum with fair equality of opportunity ensured through free education
for all. The principle of fair opportunity ensures that system of cooperation is one of pure procedural
justice; without it, distributive justice could not be left to take care of itself.
Utilitarianism is not based on pure procedural justice. It has an independent standard for judging all
distributions i.e. whether they produce the greatest net benefit of satisfaction. Utilitarians would set up
institutions to best approximate these ends (imperfect procedural justice).
Original position can be simulated at any time by reasoning in accordance with proper restrictions; to say
that a certain conception of justice would be chosen in the original position is equivalent to saying that
rational deliberation satisfying certain conditions and restrictions would reach a certain conclusion.
It is important to remember that distributive justice is not the opposite of retributive justice. Retributive
justice involves punishing people for breaking laws. This only occurs in a partial compliance theory.
Distributive justice aims to attract individuals to places where they are most needed from a social point of
view. The economic and social advantages are not given as rewards to moral worth. Distributive justice
can occur within a strict compliance theory.