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7-People V Jalosjos PDF
7-People V Jalosjos PDF
Prospero Cresceni, Gancayco, Balasbas & Associates, Saguisag & Associates, Balisado
Law Office, and Lazaro Law Office for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
When the voters of his district elected accused-appellant to Congress, they did so
with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the
knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results, which he could
accomplish within the confines of prison.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public ocers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. Accused-appellant is only one of
250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of
the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function
well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby
certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
The Court found the election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classication in criminal enforcement. The functions and duties of the oce are not
substantial distinctions, which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in
their freedom and restrict in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and connement
are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same
class. The Court was constrained to rule against the accused-appellant's claim that
re-election to public oce gives priority to any other right or interest, including the
police power of the State.
SYLLABUS
2. ID.; ID.; RULING IN AGUINALDO CASE (212 SCRA 768, AT 773) DOES NOT
APPLY IN IMPRISONMENT ARISING FROM ENFORCEMENT OF CRIMINAL LAW;
CONFINEMENT PENDING APPEAL IS NOT REMOVAL. Accused-appellant's reliance
on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos, which states, inter alia, that "The Court
should never remove a public ocer for acts done prior to his present term of oce.
To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their ocers.
When a people have elected a man to oce, it must be assumed that they did this
with the knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave
his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the Court, by
reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people,"
will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the above-
quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a
public ocer for acts done prior to his present term of oce. It does not apply to
imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same
way that preventive suspension is not removal, connement pending appeal is not
removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise,
disqualified.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; PARLIAMENTARY
IMMUNITY FROM ARREST AND DETENTION; GRANTED IN A RESTRICTIVE SENSE
AND MAY NOT BE EXTENDED BY INTENDMENT, IMPLICATION OR EQUITABLE
CONSIDERATION. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and
members of the House of Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as
Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the
provision shows that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense.
The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended
beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,
implication or equitable considerations.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; SCOPE. The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the
Legislative Department: Sec. 15. The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace be
privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in
going to and returning from the same; . . .. Because of the broad coverage of felony
and breach of the peace, the exemption applied only to civil arrests. A congressman
like the accused-appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code
could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same
general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions were
pending appeal. The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as
follows: Article VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all
oenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest during his attendance at its sessions and in going to and returning from the
same. For oenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no
immunity from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of immunity and the intent to
conne it within carefully dened parameters is illustrated by the concluding
portion of the provision, to wit: . . . but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the
member involved to the custody of the law within twenty four hours after its
adjournment for a recess or for its next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease
upon its failure to do so. The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive
rule minus the obligation of Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to the
custody of the law. The requirement that he should be attending sessions or
committee meetings has also been removed. For relatively minor oenses, it is
enough that Congress is in session. cEaCTS
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCUSED IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE PRIVILEGE; REASON. The
accused-appellant, having been convicted of statutory rape which is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, an aictive penalty, is obviously not entitled to the privilege of
parliamentary immunity and, proceeding from the above stated rationale for
legislative immunity, a liberal construction of the constitutional privilege is not in
order.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J : p
Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which
apply to validly incarcerated persons in general? In answering the query, we are
called upon to balance relevant and conicting factors in the judicial interpretation
of legislative privilege in the context of penal law.
4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte wants their voice
to be heard.
7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail the duty of
accused-appellant to discharge his mandate.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states
that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him
as their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he
has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant
with his constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it
cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending
criminal cases.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise
of surage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of government and the
perpetuation of its benets. However, in spite of its importance, the privileges and
rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our
first task is to ascertain the applicable law.
We start with the incontestable proposition that all top ocials of Government
executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty of law. There is an
unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment to high
government oce, by itself, frees the ocial from the common restraints of general
law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In
fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather than
exemption. cdll
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the privilege
has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption
as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms.
It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption
applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted
under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary
immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same general laws governing all
persons still to be tried or whose convictions were pending appeal.
For oenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no
immunity from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of immunity and the intent to
conne it within carefully dened parameters is illustrated by the concluding
portion of the provision, to wit:
. . . but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved to the
custody of the law within twenty four hours after its adjournment for a
recess or for its next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its
failure to do so.
The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation
of Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to the custody of the law. The
requirement that he should be attending sessions or committee meetings has also
been removed. For relatively minor oenses, it is enough that Congress is in
session.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress' function to attend
sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution which states
that
However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be
exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The
members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the
reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The connement of a Congressman
charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not
merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.
will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the above-
quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a
public ocer for acts done prior to his present term of oce. It does not apply to
imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the
same way that preventive suspension is not removal, connement pending
appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress or,
otherwise, disqualified. cdasia
One rationale behind connement, whether pending appeal or after nal conviction,
is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and
warning to others.
A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration
of justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo, 3 it is the injury to the public which
State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the complainant.
After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus
subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding. 4
The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into
oce cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual
punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular place of
confinement.
It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellant's arrest was issued, he
ed and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in the House of
Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the
authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose call he initially spurned which
accused-appellant is invoking to justify his present motion. This can not be
countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from its being contrary to well-dened
Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims of the State's penal
system.
He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the New Bilibid
Prison in Muntinlupa City, when he was likewise allowed/permitted to leave the
prison premises, to wit:
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of
Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are
allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accused-
appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for ve (5) days
or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-
appellant's status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the
purposes of the correction system. Of particular relevance in this regard are the
following observations of the Court in Martinez v. Morfe: 5
The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga
del Norte want their voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona de
member of the House of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of
government to respect his mandate. He also claims that the concept of temporary
detention does not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his mandate and that he
has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave
jail.
dctai
We remain unpersuaded.
No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other member of the
House of Representatives "[h]e is provided with a congressional oce situated at
Room N-214, North Wing Building, House of Representatives Complex, Batasan
Hills, Quezon City, manned by a full complement of sta paid for by Congress.
Through [an] inter-department coordination, he is also provided with an oce at
the Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, where he attends
to his constituents." Accused-appellant further admits that while under detention,
he has led several bills and resolutions. It also appears that he has been receiving
his salaries and other monetary benets. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has
been discharging his mandate as a member of the House of Representative
consistent with the restraints upon one who is presently under detention. Being a
detainee, accused-appellant should not even have been allowed by the prison
authorities at the National Penitentiary to perform these acts.
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did
so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with
the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could
accomplish within the connes of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters
elect a person with full knowledge that he is suering from a terminal illness, they
do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.
The Constitution guarantees: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of laws." 6 This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be
treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. 7 The organs of
government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither
partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective ocial result in a substantial distinction that allows dierent
treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial dierentiation which removes the
accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly conned
under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public ocers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the
"mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the
duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-
appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to
mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation.
Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the
President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular
duty. The importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of
a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor
with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular aiction.
An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police ocer must
maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner
into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby
certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. 9
More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of one's liberty.
As a punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or lawful tribunal, and is
personal to the accused. 12 The term refers to the restraint on the personal liberty of
another; any prevention of his movements from place to place, or of his free action
according to his own pleasure and will. 13 Imprisonment is the detention of another
against his will depriving him of his power of locomotion 14 and it "[is] something
more than mere loss of freedom. It includes the notion of restraint within limits
defined by wall or any exterior barrier." 15
It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an
individual's status in society. 16 Prison ocials have the dicult and often thankless
job of preserving the security in a potentially explosive setting, as well as of
attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-entry into the
social mainstream. Necessarily, both these demands require the curtailment and
elimination of certain rights. 17
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J ., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, JJ., concur in the main and
separate opinion.
Separate Opinions
GONZAGA-REYES, J ., concurring opinion:
For resolution in this case is a motion led by accused-appellant Romeo G. Jalosjos,
who has been convicted by the trial court of two counts of statutory rape and six
counts of acts of lasciviousness, which judgment is currently pending appeal before
this Court. As a member of the House of Representatives, accused-appellant claims
that his constituents are deprived of representation by reason of his incarceration
pending appeal of the judgment of conviction and that he should therefore be
allowed to discharge his legislative functions, including attendance of legislative
sessions and committee meetings.
This constitutional provision denying the right to bail for oenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong is reiterated in Rule 114 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure, viz
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of statutory rape, which
is punishable by reclusion perpetua. In People v . Divina 2 we held that the trial
court's judgment of conviction imports that the evidence of guilt of the crime
charged is strong. Unquestionably, the continued incarceration of accused-appellant
is a valid and constitutionally mandated curtailment of his rights to provisional
liberty pending appeal of his conviction.
Unlike the present Constitution, the 1935 Constitution 4 limited the privilege from
arrests to "all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace." This provision
was taken from the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, which was in turn based upon
the American Constitution. In accordance with American precedents, the words
"treason, felony and breach of the peace" have been construed to include all
indictable oenses. 5 Thus, under the 1935 Constitution the freedom from arrest
only encompassed civil arrests.
Under the 1973 6 and 1987 Constitutions, the privilege was broadened to include
arrests for crimes punishable by imprisonment of six years or less. Despite the
expansion of the privilege, the rationale for granting members of Congress
immunity from arrest remained the same to ensure that they are not prevented
from performing their legislative duties. 7 In fact, the 1986 Constitutional
Commission rejected the proposal of one of its members to expand the scope of the
parliamentary immunity to include searches because, unlike arrests, it was not
demonstrated that the conduct of searches would prevent members of Congress
from discharging their legislative functions. 8
It was never the intention of the framers of the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions to
shield a member of Congress from the consequences of his wrongdoings. Thus,
despite the widening of its scope to include criminal oenses, the privilege from
arrest is still circumscribed by the nature or the gravity of the oense of which the
accused is charged. Hence, the commission of serious crimes, i.e., crimes punishable
by aictive penalties or with capital punishment, does not fall within the scope of
the constitutional privilege. A member of Congress could only invoke the immunity
from arrests for relatively minor oenses, punishable at most by correctional
penalties. As enunciated in Martinez v. Morfe, 10 "when it comes to freedom from
arrest, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justication in
reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal oense, they would be
considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and
returning from the same." dctai
It should also be mentioned that, under the factual circumstances of this case, the
applicability of this privilege from arrest to accused-appellant is already moot and
academic. The constitutional provision contemplates that stage of the criminal
process at which personal jurisdiction is sought to be acquired over the accused by
means of his arrest. Accused-appellant is no longer at the point of merely being
arrested. As a matter of fact, he has already been arrested, tried and convicted by
the trial court.
Penal laws are obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in Philippine territory. Since
the Constitution itself provides for the immunities from the general application of
our criminal laws which a Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
enjoy, it follows that any expansion of such immunities must similarly be based
upon an express constitutional grant. cdphil
Davide, Jr., C.J ., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
5. 44 SCRA 37 [1972].
10. See Felwa v. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966]; Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155;
Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 392 [1980]; Ceniza v. Commission
on Elections, 96 SCRA 763 [1980]; People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12.
12. 20 Words And Phrases, Permanent Ed., p. 466, citing US v. Safeway Stores
[Tex.] C.C.C.A. Kan., 140 F 2d 834, 839 and US v. Mitchell, 163 F. 1014, 1016 at p.
470.
13. Ibid., p. 470, citing Pine v. Okzewski, 170 A. 825, 827, 112 N.J.L. 429.
15. Id., citing Bird v. Jones, 4 N.Y. Leg. Obs. 158, 159.
16. Sheldon, Krantz, 1988 Supplement. The Law of Correction and Prisoners' Rights,
3rd ed., p. 121.
17. Ibid.
4. Art. VI, Sec. 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives
shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged
from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going
to and returning from the same; and for any speech and debate therein, they shall
not be questioned in any other place.
5. Martinez v. Morfe, 44 SCRA 22 (1972), citing Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S.
425.
6. Art. VIII, Sec. 9 A member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all oenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest
during his attendance at its sessions, and in going to and returning from the
same; but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved to the
custody of the law within twenty-four hours after its adjournment for a recess or
for its next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so.
A member shall not be questioned nor held liable in any other place for any speech
or debate in the Batasan or in any committee thereof.
7. 1987 Constitution, II RECORD 90.
8. Ibid., 178-185.
9. Mechem, F.R., A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers (1890), 431.
10. Supra.