UIL Borders Af

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 Part One is Protectionism
Nationalism is on the rise, boarders are closing, refugees are
dying, and Trump is president. We have barred life of the
denationalized subject in a dizzying array of ethnic
protectionist policies, culminating in the dehumanization of
the persistent Other, the foreigner who is excluded by force
of the nation state. This dooms us eternally to fascism
protection is no longer about trade but about protection from
the black or brown person, who is rendered a non-subject by
state violence.
Agamben 2K Giorgio Agamben Beyond Human Rights, This English translation of the original Italian text
(1993) was first published in: Giorgio Agamben, Means without End. Notes on Politics in: Theory Out of Bounds,
Vol. 20 (Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).

That there is no autonomous space in the political order of the nation-state for
something like the pure human in itself is evident at the very least from the fact that, even in the best of

cases, the status of refugee has always been considered a temporary

condition that ought to lead either to naturalization or to repatriation. A

stable statute for the human in itself is inconceivable in the law of the
nation-state. It is time to cease to look at all the declarations of rights from 1789 to the
present day as proclamations of eternal meta-juridical values aimed at binding the

legislator to the respect of such values; it is time, rather, to understand them according to
their real function in the modern state. Human rights, in fact, represent first of all the originary figure
for the inscription of natural naked life in the political-juridical order of the nation-state. Naked life (the
human being), which in antiquity belonged to God and in the classical world was clearly distinct (as zoe) from political life (bios),
comes to the forefront in the management of the state and becomes , so to speak,
its earthly foundation. Nation-state means a state that makes nativity or birth nascita
(that is, naked human life) the foundation of its own sovereignty. This is the meaning (and it is not even a hidden one) of
the first three articles of the 1789 Declaration: it is only because this declaration inscribed (in articles 1 and 2) the native element in the heart of any
political organization that it can firmly bind (in article 3) the principle of sovereignty to the nation (in conformity with its etymon, native nato originally
meant simply birth nascita. The fiction that is implicit here is that birth nascita comes into being immediately as nation, so that there may not be any

difference between the two moments. Rights, in other words, are attributed to the human being only to the
degree to which he or she is the immediately vanishing presupposition (and, in fact, the presupposition that must never
come to light as such) of the citizen. If the refugee represents such a disquieting

element in the order of the nation-state, this is so primarily because, by

breaking the identity between the human and the citizen and that between nativity and
nationality, it brings the originary fiction of sovereignty to crisis . Single exceptions to such a

principle, of course, have always existed. What is new in our time is that growing sections of

humankind are no longer representable inside the nation-state and this novelty
threatens the very foundations of the latter. Inasmuch as the refugee, an apparently marginal figure, unhinges the old trinity of state-nation-territory, it

We should not forget that the first

deserves instead to be regarded as the central figure of our political history.

camps were built in Europe as spaces for controlling refugees, and that the
succession of internment camps, concentration camps, and extermination camps represents a perfectly real filiation. One of the few

rules the Nazis constantly obeyed throughout the course of the final
solution was that Jews and Gypsies could be sent to extermination camps only after
having been fully denationalized (that is, after they had been stripped of even that second-class citizenship to which
they had been relegated after the Nuremberg Laws). When their rights are no longer the rights of the citizen, that is when human beings are truly sacred,

in the sense that this term used to have in the Roman law of the archaic period: doomed to death. The concept of refugee
must be resolutely separated from the concept of the human rights, and
the right of asylum (which in any case is by now in the process of being drastically restricted in the legislation of the European states)
must no longer be considered as the conceptual category in which to
inscribe the phenomenon of refugees.

Drawing from the resolution we come to a set of presupposed

assumptions about the very existence of the nation state,
never questioning the legitimacy of the demarcation between
foreign and domestic policy. When we approach the word
protectionism, we see it is a concept so interdependent on
borders and nationalism that protectionist rhetoric threatens
to draw the west into the same collapse into fascism that
caused the Holocaust and WWII.
Berenberg 16 Williams BERENBERG: Politics right now 'evokes memories of the dreadful 1930s' Oscar
Williams-Grut Nov. 14, 2016, 5:57 AM 6,967, http://www.businessinsider.com/berenberg-similarities-trump-brexit-
1930s-protectionism-populism-nationalism-2016-1

The private German bank Berenberg believes that "some aspects of Donald Trump's successful election campaign evoke memories of the dreadful 1930s."

After the Brexit vote and the

The bank's chief economist, Holger Schmieding, said in a note sent out on Monday, "

triumph of Trump, the echo of the early 1930s sounds a little less faint
than it did before." Schmieding highlights populism, rising protectionism and
nationalism, isolationism, and the erosion of the political middle ground as
key features of both the current political climate and the 1930s . "Populist"
leaders including the dictators Hitler and Mussolini came to power across Europe in the 1930s with promises
to restore glory and honor to their countries, often blaming individual races and religions for the problems. Both Britain's
Brexit proponents and Trump's 2016 presidential campaign blamed outsiders (such as the European Union, Mexicans,
and Muslims) for problems at home and had strong nationalist streaks (Take Back Control,
Make America Great Again). International trade tailed off after the 1929 Wall Street crash as the US turned inward. Schmieding said "two major policy
mistakes turned the financial crisis into a depression" the US Federal Reserve tightening monetary policy and the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, which

Both Trump and the current pro-Brexit UK government have promised to

enacted protectionist taxes on imports.

reverse the rising tide of globalism. Trump says he will do this by scrapping or significantly changing a trade deal
with Mexico and putting tariffs on imports from China. UK Prime Minister Theresa May has promised to rein in globalisation. Schmieding calls the 1930s

the Great Depression, triggered by policy mistakes, led to

"dreadful" because

widespread poverty. The potent economic and political cocktail of

depression and nationalism also led to World War II. But Schmieding adds that today's situation "is
very different in at least three key respects." These are: Rising employment: "Despite widespread anger at the establishment, we are not quite living in
pitchfork times again." Lack of ideology: "Trump and some other leading populists today come across as opportunistic self-promoters rather than
incorrigible ideologues." International cooperation: "Institutions of international co-operation and the rule of law at home are much stronger in the
developed world than they were in Europe in the 1930s." As a result, he does not think we are hurtling toward another major global conflict or serious

Trump has
economic crisis. Still, he identifies significant risks. 'Try to see it through Putin's eyes' The first is Trump's attitude to the Middle East.

will move the US to a more isolationist stance when it comes to

signaled he

international afairs and has expressed no interest in getting involved in Syria. This could create a power imbalance in the region that
creates trouble in Europe. Schmieding said: "Having intervened forcefully to tilt the balance in Europe in WWI, the US thereafter did little to stabilize the
fragile new order it had helped to establish, preferring to retreat instead. Could something similar happen again, this time in the Arab world in Europe's
immediate neighbourhood? If so, the consequences including potential further flows of refugees would be a much bigger issue for Europe than for the US
itself." The second risk is Russia. Schmieding said Trump's warm relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin and his reputation as a "wheeler dealer"
could lead to "a businessmen's deal on, say, new borders for Ukraine," which would destabalise Russia's relationship with the EU. Schmieding added,
however, that this was unlikely, however. A greater threat, he said, once again would be Trump's isolationist views and his anti-NATO stance. Schmieding
writes: "Try to see it through Putin's eyes. After Russia had invaded parts of Georgia in 2008, US President Barack Obama pushed the policy 'reset' button
upon coming to office in 2009. Putin's attack on Ukraine yielded visible gains (Crimea, Donetsk) for him in 2014 at limited Russian casualties. That boosted
his popularity and stabilised his regime despite some significant economic costs. Why not do it again, unless the economic costs seem prohibitively high?"

Trump and the Brexit are just the start.

Finally, Schmieding flagged perhaps the greatest global risk that

There is a risk of more contemporary fringe parties rising to power across Europe,
and while Schmieding does not believe France's far-right National Front party will get a Trump boost as party leader Marine Le Pen has suggested, he
wrote: "The experience that pollsters got the Brexit vote and the US elections so wrong adds to the concerns. In the same vein, the Italian risk is not
trivial." (Italy will hold a constitutional referendum shortly, and a loss could destabalise Prime Minister Matteo Renzi.) Marine le Pen and Macquarie last
week flagged the danger that a Trump victory could make the rise of populist parties like the National Front and Italy's Five Star Party more likely. And

ultimately, Schmieding said: " Populists can promise their voters the moon. But they cannot
deliver. When Trump and Brexit fails to deliver everything people hoped it would almost inevitable because the two movements meant so many
different things to so many different people there will be more anger." He adds: "Who will rustbelt voters fall for next time if
Trump does not bring back the jobs lost to China? What if Brexit results in fewer rather than more jobs in UK industry? What if curbs on immigration stoke
inflation and damage the National Health Service (NHS) in the UK instead of raising the living standards of disgruntled voters in northern England?

"What comes after the current batch of populists is a key risk to watch ." If the
a new batch of firebrand politicians could
problems Brexit and Trump campaigners highlighted are not solved,

come along and exploit public anger to rise to power. Who knows what
they may look like.

This is due to the ideological presupposition of borders.

Nation-states create boundary lines to legitimize the
destruction of the natural frontiers the continuation of post-
world war boundaries allows for western aggression, valuing
the lives of those in power above the less fortunate.
Orakhelashvili 09 (Dr. Alexander, has taught and researched public international law at four British
universities over the past 10 years. His teaching also includes criminal law and jurisprudence. He is a frequent
speaker at international conferences and seminars on developments in public international law, and has provided
legal advice regarding public international law issues in litigation before English and American courts,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GEOPOLITICS: ONE OBJECT, CONFLICTING LEGITIMACIES?*, Pg 185-187)*this has been
modified for ableist language

Geopolitics focuses on frontiers in

Contemporary international law is premised on inviolability of state boundaries.

terms of their utility in ensuring stable settlement of relevant conflicts or controversies,

with the durability of frontiers. In this sense frontiers can be motivated by economic, security or ethnic

factors, each of which can contribute to or undermine their stability and durability.
Obviously every territorial conquest is motivated by advantages following from the

resources and location of the territory. This factor cannot by itself justify territorial aspirations. But the
underlying question of geopolitics seems to go deeper and address the
fundamental needs of defense, security and economic existence. Before they
divided states, boundaries served as dividing zones between primitive
tribes. The primary purpose of having boundary zones in that context was twofold: to be an extreme limit of the
area within which the relevant tribe could obtain necessary fold supply and use resources; and if
located at the appropriate side, to prevent other tribal groups from intruding. Thus, ever since the time

immemorial, two principal functions of boundary related to economic survival and security of the relevant entities. In other words, boundaries

are necessary premises for existence and survival. Under some views, natural frontiers are
determined above all by the access to the sea, and by the language factor. As Spykman observes, The boundary is thus not

only a line of demarcation between legal systems but also a point of

contact of territorial power structures. Natural frontiers, such as deserts, swamps, forests, mountains, have historically
contributed to the defense of states but nature alone cannot create impassable barriers. The advance of
technology and communication means enables penetrating through natural obstacles; frontier fortifications can be no hindrance to aerial bombardment.
Thus, frontier has lost a good deal of its significance. Still, Even if ground must be sacrificed and advanced positions surrendered, the frontier still
performs its strategic function if it retards the first onslaught and provides a barrier zone behind which the nation can mobilise the full strength of its

Desirable
economic and military resources. Proponents of German Geopolitik had their own understanding of frontiers as temporary.

frontiers favored the nation that expands and challenges the neighbor nation
that wants to obtain strategic frontier. In other words, good frontier favours the nation attacking the existing international order. Haushofer argued that
only declining nations seek stable borders. At the same time, the concept of dynamic frontier was borrowed by Haushofer from the British geopolitical

geopolitical aspirations to revise frontiers often motivate wars,

thinking. Given that

crises and frictions, it may have been right to observe that The best political frontier is that which has ceased to matter. Few cases
can demonstrate this better than that of the Afghan-Pakistani border in the area of the Waziristan province. This case demonstrates the importance of
boundaries as signifying the limit on territorial sovereignty in the context of conflict in Afghanistan, where much of the Taliban support comes from the
neighbouring Pakistani area of Waziristan where Taliban runs its own mini-state. Yet, the existence of an international border that divides Waziristan from
Afghanistan has for a long while prevented the US and NATO intervention beyond the border line, and thus curbs their capacity in fighting Taliban. The
invasion of Waziristan in September 2008 by the United States forces have been criticised as infringement of the sovereignty of Pakistan, 102 and the
latters military has professed in having put up armed resistance to the US forces secure land boundaries have often been aspired and obtained in

the legality of boundary depends not on the security factor as such,

practice, but

but on the agreement that reflects these security needs. A comprehensive analysis of post-
First World War and post-Second World war boundary negotiations and agreements that have caused the multiple re-arrangements of European state
boundaries, has demonstrated that the predominant attitude has always been to obtain secure boundaries through concluding treaties rather than

Secure boundaries have

through unilateral determination of security claims. also been obtained in the
context of the aggressors responsibility.
 Part Two is Globalization
I advocate affirming the state of being globalized as a
deconstruction of the border view globalization of
international trade as a complex engagement that isnt just
about the economy, but about how we think of the
interconnected nature of the world. This entails rejecting
protectionism, which is a heuristic or reactionary
nationalism. This is not about directly supporting the
deconstruction of physical borders but rejecting the
geographic imaginary of the border. We must move outside the
remit of the geopolitical maponly our approach provides a
truly ethical encounter with the Other.
Shapiro 97 Professor of Political Science @ University of Hawaii at Mnoa (Michael J., 1997, Violent
Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War, pp. 174-177)

Michel Foucault was calling for such intervention when he noted that the purpose of critical analysis is to question, not deepen, existing structures of
intelligibility. Intelligibility results from aggressive, institutionalized practices that, in producing a given intelligible world, exclude alternative worlds. "We
must," Foucault said, "make the intelligible appear against a background of emptiness, and deny its necessity. We must think that what exists is far from

a recognition of practices of exclusion is a

filling all possible spaces."7 Like Foucault, Derrida claimed that

necessary condition for evoking an ethical sensibility . His insights into the instability and
contentiousness of the context of an utterance, in his critique of Austin, provides access to what is effectively the protoethics of ethical discourse, the
various contextual commitments that determine the normative implications of statements. To heed this observation, it is necessary to analyze two
particular kinds of contextual commitments that have been silent and often unreflective predicates of ethical discourses. And it is important to do so in
situations in which contending parties have something at stakethat is, by focusing on the ethics of encounter. Accordingly, in what follows, my approach
to "the ethical" locates ethics in a respect for an-Other's identity performances with special attention to both the temporal or narrative dimension and the

to produce a critical political approach to the

spatial dimension of those performances. Moreover,

ethics of the present, it is necessary to oppose the dominant stories of modernity and the
institutionalized, geopolitical versions of space , which support existing forms of global proprietary
control, for both participate unreflectively in a violence of representation. The ethical sensibility offered in the thought of Emmanuel Levinas provides an
important contribution to the ethics-as-nonviolent-encounter thematized in my analysis. Levinas regarded war, the ultimate form of violence, as the
suspension of morality; "it renders morality derisory," he said. Moreover, Levinas's thought fits the more general antiClausewitzian/antirationalist approach
to war thematized in prior chapters, for Levinas regarded a strategically oriented politics"the art of foreseeing war and of winning it by every means,"
which is "enjoined as the very essence of reason"as "opposed to morality."8 In order to oppose war and promote peace, Levinas enacted a linguistic war
on the governing assumptions of Western philosophy. He argued that philosophy from Plato through Heidegger constructed persons and peoples within
totalizing conceptions of humanity. The ethical regard, he insisted, is one that resists encompassing the Other as part of the same, that resists recognizing
the Other solely within the already spoken codes of a universalizing vision of humankind. However problematic Levinas's notion of infinite respect for an
alterity that always evades complete comprehension may be (an issue I discuss later), it nevertheless makes possible a concern with the violence of
representation, with discursive control over narratives of space and identity, which is central to my analysis. Edward Said emphasized the ethicopolitical
significance of systems of discursive control, locating the violence of imperialism in the control over stories: "The power to narrate, or to block other
narratives from forming and emerging, is very important to culture and imperialism, and constitutes one of the main connections between them."9 Indeed,

A geopolitical
contemporary neoimperialism resides in part in the dominance of a spatial story that inhibits the recognition of alternatives.

imaginary, the map of nation-states, dominates ethical discourse at a

global level. Despite an increasing instability in the geopolitical map of states, the more general discourses of "international affairs" and
"international relations" continue to dominate both ethical and political problematics. Accordingly, analyses of global violence

are most often constructed within a statecentric, geostrategic

cartography, which organizes the interpretation of enmities on the basis
of an individual and collective national subject and on cross-boundary
antagonisms. And ethical theories aimed at a normative inhibition of these antagonisms continue to presume this same geopolitical
cartography.10 To resist this discursive/representational monopoly, we must challenge the geopolitical map.
Although the interpretation of maps is usually subsumed within a scientific imagination, it is nevertheless the case that "the cartographer's categories," as

"Morality" here emerges most

J. B. Harley has put it, "are the basis of the morality of the map."11

significantly from the boundary and naming practices that construct the
map. The nominations and territorialities that maps endorse constitute, among other things, a "topographical
amnesia."12 Effacements of older maps in contemporary namings and configurations amount to a nonrecognition of older, often violently
displaced practices of identity and space. Among the consequences of this neglected dimension of cartography, which include a morality-delegating
 radical circumspection of the
spatial unconscious and a historical amnesia with respect to alternatives, has been a

kinds of persons and groups recognized as worthy subjects of moral solicitude. State
citizenship has tended to remain the primary basis for the identities recognized in discourses such as the "ethics of international affairs."13 The
dominance and persistence of this discursive genre, an "ethics" predicated on absolute state sovereignty, is evident in a recent analysis that has
attempted to be both critical of the ethical limitations of the sovereignty system and aware that "conflict has increasingly moved away from interstate
territorial disputes."14 Despite these acknowledged sensitivities, the analysis proceeds within a discourse that reinstalls the dominance of geopolitical
thinking, for it remains within its cartography and conceptual legacy. Arguing for a humanitarianism that avoids interstate partisanship, the writers go on
to reproduce the geopolitical discourse on war, which grants recognition only to state subjects. Even as they criticize the language of "intervention" as a
reaffirmation of a sovereignty discourse, they refer to the "Persian Gulf War" on the one hand and "insurgencies" on the other. As I noted in chapter i,
Bernard Nietschmann has shown that the map of global warfare changes dramatically when one departs from the language of sovereignty. Challenging the
state-oriented language of war and unmapping the geostrategic cartography of "international relations," Nietschmann refers to the "Third World War,"
which is "hidden from view because the fighting is against peoples and countries that are often not even on the map"a war in which "only one side of the
fighting has a name." Focusing on struggles involving indigenous peoples, Nietschmann proceeds to map 120 armed struggles as part of the "war." In his

In order to think
mapping, only 4 of the struggles involve confrontations between states, while 77 involve states against nations.15

beyond the confines of the state sovereignty orientation, it is therefore

necessary to turn to ethical orientations that challenge the spatial
predicates of traditional moral thinking and thereby grant recognition
outside of modernity's dominant political identities . This must necessarily also take us outside the
primary approach that contemporary philosophy has lent to (Anglo-American) ethical theory. As applied at any level of human interaction, the familiar neo-
Kantian ethical injunction is to seek transcendent values. Applied to the interstate or sovereignty model of global space more specifically, this approach
seeks to achieve a set of universal moral imperatives based on shared values and regulative norms

My advocacy is key national identity prevents an efective

response to global problems its try or die for the af.
Smith 03 Rogers Smith, 2003. Professor of Political Science at University of Pennsylvania and PhD Harvard
University. Stories Of Peoplehood, The Politics and Morals of Political Membership, p. 166-169.

It is certainly important to oppose such evolutionary doctrines by all intellectually credible means. But many have already been widely discredited; and

today it may well prove salutary, even indispensable, to heighten awareness of

human identity as shared membership in a species engaged in an ages-long process of adapting to
often dangerous and unforgiving natural and man-made environments.20 When we see ourselves in the light of general evolutionary patterns, we become

it is genuinely possible for a species such as ourselves to sufer

aware that

massive setbacks or even to become extinct if we pursue certain

dangerous courses of action. That outcome does not seem to be in any human's interest. And when we reflect on the state
of our species today, we see or should see at least five major challenges to our collective survival, much less our collective nourishing, that are in some

respects truly unprecedented. These are all challenges of our own making, however, and so they can
all be met through suitably cooperative human eforts. The first is our ongoing

vulnerability to the extraordinary weapons of mass destruction that we have been building during the last half century. The tense anticipations of
imminent conflagration that characterized the Cold War at its worst are now behind us, but the nuclear arsenals that were so threatening are largely still

with us, and indeed the governments and, perhaps, terrorist groups possessed of some nuclear weaponry have continued to proliferate. The
second great threat is some sort of environmental disaster, brought on by the by-products of our efforts to
achieve ever-accelerating industrial and post-industrial production and distribution of an incredible range of good and services. Whether it is

global warming, the spread of toxic wastes, biospheric disruptions due to

new agricultural techniques, or some combination of these and other consequences of
human interference with the air, water, climate, and plant and animal species that sustain us, any major environmental

disaster can afect all of humanity. Third, as our economic and

technological systems have become ever more interconnected, the danger
that major economic or technological failures in one part of the world
might trigger global catastrophes may well increase. Such interdependencies can, to be sure, be a
source of strength as well as weakness, as American and European responses to the East Asian and Mexican economic crises of the 1990s indicated. Still,
if global capitalism were to collapse or a technological disaster comparable to the imagined Y2K doomsday scenario were to occur, the consequences

today would be more far-reaching than they would have been for comparable developments in previous centuries. Fourth, as advances in food
production, medical care, and other technologies have contributed to higher infant survival rates and longer lives, the world's

population has been rapidly increasing, placing intensifying pressures on

our physical and social environments in a great variety of ways. These demographic trends,
necessarily involving all of humanity, threaten to exacerbate all the preceding problems,

generating political and military conflicts, spawning chronic and acute

environmental damages, and straining the capacities of economic systems .
The final major challenge we face as a species is a more novel one, and it is one that may bring consciousness of our shared "species interests" even more
to the fore. In the upcoming century, human beings will increasingly be able to affect their own genetic endowment, in ways that might potentially alter
the very sort of organic species that we are. Here as with modern weapons, economic processes, and population growth, we face risks that our efforts to
improve our condition may go disastrously wrong, potentially endangering the entire human race. Yet the appeal of endowing our children with greater
gifts is sufficiently powerful that organized efforts to create such genetic technologies capable of "redesigning humans" are already burgeoning, both

awareness of these
among reputable academic researchers and less restrained, but well-endowed, fringe groups.21 To be sure, an

as well as other potential dangers afecting all human beings is not

enough by itself to foster moral outlooks that reject narrow and invidious
particularistic conceptions of human identity. It is perfectly possible for
leaders to feel that to save the species, policies that run roughshod over
the claims of their rivals are not simply justified but morally demanded .
Indeed, like the writers I have examined here, my own more egalitarian and cosmopolitan moral leanings probably stem originally from religious and
Kantian philosophical influences, not from any consciousness of the common "species interests" of human beings. But the ethically constitutive story
which contends that we have such interests, and that we can see them as moral interests, seems quite realistic, which is of some advantage in any such
account. And under the circumstances just sketched, it is likely that more and more people will become persuaded that today, those shared species in-

stressing our shared identity

terests face more profound challenges than they have in most of human history. If so, then

as members of an evolving species may serve as a highly credible ethically

constitutive story that can challenge particularistic accounts and foster
support for novel political arrangements. Many more people may come to
feel that it is no longer safe to conduct their political lives absorbed in
their traditional communities, with disregard for outsiders, without active concern about the
issues that affect the whole species and without practical collaborative efforts to confront those issues. That consciousness of shared interests has the
potential to promote stronger and much more inclusive senses of trust, as people come to realize that the dangers and challenges they face in common
matter more than the differences that will doubtless persist. I think this sort of awareness of a shared "species interests" also can support senses of
personal and collective worth, though I acknowledge that this is not obviously the case. Many people find the spectacle of the human species struggling
for survival amidst rival life forms and an unfeeling material world a bleak and dispiriting one. Many may still feel the need to combine acceptance of an
evolutionary constitutive story with religious or philosophical accounts that supply some stronger sense of moral purpose to human and cosmic existence.
But if people are so inclined, then nothing I am advocating here stands in the way of such combinations. Many persons, moreover, may well find a
sustaining sense of moral worth in a conception of themselves as contributors to a species that has developed unique capacities to deliberate and to act
responsibly in regard to questions no other known species can yet conceive: how should we live? What relationships should we have, individually and
collectively, to other people, other life forms, and the broader universe? In time, I hope that many more people may come to agree that humanity has
shared responsibilities of stewardship for the animate and physical worlds around us as well as ourselves, ultimately seeking to promote the flourishing of
all insofar as we are capable and the finitude of existence permits. But even short of such a grand sense of species vocation, the idea that we are part of
humanity's endeavor to strive and thrive across ever-greater expanses of space and time may be one that can inspire a deep sense of worth in many if not
most human beings. Hence it does not seem unrealistic to hope that we can encourage increased acceptance of a universalistic sense of human

In the years
peoplehood that may help rein in popular impulses to get swept up in more parochial tales of their identities and interests.

ahead, this ethical sensibility might foster acceptance of various sorts of

transnational political arrangements to deal with problems like
exploitative and wildly fluctuating international financial and labor
markets, destructive environmental and agricultural practices, population
control, and the momentous issue of human genetic modifications. These
are, after all, problems that appear to need to be dealt with on a near-global scale if

they are to be dealt with satisfactorily. Greater acceptance of such arrangements would necessarily entail
increased willingness to view existing governments at all levels as at best only "semi-sovereign," authoritative over some issues and not others, in the
manner that acceptance of multiple particularistic constitutive stories would also reinforce. In the resulting political climate, it might become easier to
construct the sorts of systems of interwoven democratic international, regional, state and local governments that theorists of "cosmopolitan democracy,"
"liberal multicultural nationalism," and "differentiated democracy" like David Held, Will Kymlicka, Iris Young, William Connolly, and Jurgen Habermas all
envision.

The border is an ontological division of the inside and outside

that enables the creation of the nations identity, an artificial
imposition onto the world that fuels nationalism.
Agnew 08Department of Geography @ UCLA (John, 2008, Ethics & Global Politics, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 175-
191Borders on the mind: re-framing border thinking, rmf)

A third connection with political identity is made by those who emphasize the idea of the exception in relation to border control. From this viewpoint,
associated most closely with the conservative argument of Carl Schmitt about the suspension of law to protect the essence of the state and the radical

the sovereignty of the state puts the very life of

argument of Giorgio Agamben to the effect that

people in doubt depending on their biopolitical classification, borders are absolutely central to the
definition of the state.30 They function to decide who is inside and who is
outside in an essential opposition between the friends and enemies (or
Romans and barbarians) into whom the world is divided for these theorists. The idiom of the exception has recently become extremely popular in trying
to understand various facets of the so-called War on Terror, such as the US prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and the rendition of terrorist suspects
between states to avoid writs of habeus corpus and to facilitate the use of torture to extract information and exact confessions.31 But to Agamben, in
particular, this signals the onset of something much more dramatic: the exception is everywhere becoming the rule. Citizens are now also inmates or
detainees in giant camps rather than purposeful agents. As one sympathetic interpreter puts the argument, The state maintains order not through law
but through obedience.32 The analogy of the camp (most notably, Auschwitz) can be made to border containment the world over. Unfortunately, in
departing from much by way of any empirical analysis, this approach neither explains the specific political structures associated with a Guantanamo
Bay33 nor how much the notion of the extra-legal exception adds to the understanding of military interventions, international law, or border controls.34
Agambens putative radical politics of avoidance may well point beyond actual borders as such, but his analysis of the existing world remains trapped
within them.35 In this perspective, therefore, borders are obviously key moments in the mechanics of a worldwide and thus generic territorialized political
imagination, even when claiming to move beyond them. DISABLING BORDERS To many commentators on borders, however, they are explicitly deemed
as arbitrary, contingent, or even perverse. Most importantly, international borders are not just any old boundaries. To begin with, worldwide, it is hard to
find a single international boundary that has not been inspired by the example and practices of an originally European statehood. Much of this was the
direct result of the imposition and subsequent breakup of European empires outside of Europe into state-like units, even if, as in Latin America, there was
rather more local inventiveness than there was at a later date in Asia and Africa. But it has also been more broadly the result of the spread of a model of
territorial statehood, a state-centered political economy, and the association of democracy with territorial citizenship from Europe into the rest of the

the imagination of territorial

world. At one and the same time, both a political ideal and set of socio-political practices,

statehood rests on imitation and diffusion of established political models that define what is
and what is not possible in the world at any particular time and in any particular place. European (and, later, American)
cultural hegemony has thus written the script for the growth and consolidation of a global
nation-state system. The model of statehood has had as its central geographical
moment the imposition of sharp borders between one state unit (imagined as a
nation-state, however implausible that usually may be) and its neighbors. Previously in world history, a wide range of types of polity co-
existed without any one*empire, city-state, nomadic network, dynastic state, or religious polity*serving as the singular model of best political practice. It
is only with the rise of Europe to global predominance that an idealized European territorial state became the global archetype. Part of the political tragedy
of the contemporary Middle East and Africa, for example, lies in the attempted reconciliation of the EuroAmerican style territorial state of sharp borders

Lurking behind
with ethnic and religious identities distributed geographically in ways that do not lend themselves to it.36

bordering everywhere is the efect of that nationalism which has come along with the territorial
nation-state: that being perpetually in question, national identity has to be constantly re-invented

through the mobilization of national populations (or significant segments thereof). Borders, because they are at the
edge of the national-state territory, provide the essential focus for this collective uncertainty.37 Even as defined strictly, therefore, but also by remaining

borders provide the center of attention for more generalized elite, and
in perpetual question, state

sometimes popular, anxiety about what still remains to be achieved by the state for the nation.38 The
everyday nationalism in which borders are implicated as central moments, then, is not a project that simply takes place at the border or simply between
adjacent states.39 Indeed, it is only secondarily territorial in that its origins often lie in distant centers and in scattered Diasporas where elites and activists
engage in the task of defining and defending what they understand as the nationstates borders, the better to imagine the shape or geo-body of their

borders are not,

nation. Consider, for example, the histories of Irish nationalism and Zionism with their origins in scattered Diasporas. State

are qualitatively diferent in

therefore, simply just another example of, albeit more clearly marked, boundaries. They

their capacity to both redefine other boundaries and to override more

locally-based distinctions.40 They also have a specific historical and geographical origin. If social boundaries are universal and
transcendental, if varying in their incidence and precise significance, state borders, in the sense of definitive borderlines, certainly are not. They have not
been around for time immemorial.41 Attempts to claim that bordering is historic in the sense of unequivocal and definite delimitation, or to take bordering
as a given of state formation are, therefore, empirically problematic. What is evident has been the need to give borders a deep-seated historical

There is, then, nothing at all natural*physically or socially*to

genealogy even when this is a fictive exercise.42

borders. They are literally impositions on the world. This is not to say that borders are somehow
simply metaphorical or textual, without materiality; lines on a map rather than a set of objects and practices in space.43 It is more that borders are never
transcendental objects that systematically secure spaces in which identities and interests can go unquestioned. We may today also be living in a time
when they will begin to lose their grip because they no longer match the emerging spatial ontology of a world increasingly transnational and globalized.44
In the first place, as impositions, borders frequently transgress rather than celebrate or enable cultural and political difference. For example, the US-
Mexican border cuts through historic migration fields and flows of everyday life,45 perhaps around 40 million people have US-Mexico crossborder family
relations;46 the Israel-Gaza border is a prison perimeter premised on collective punishment of a population for electing rocket-firing adherents to Hamas;
and most borders in the Middle East and Africa make no national or cultural sense whatsoever (e.g. the Somalia-Ethiopia border with more than 4 million
Somalis within Ethiopia or the Israel-Palestine border that is constantly in mutation as Israeli settlers encroach on what had been widely agreed was

The
Palestinian territory). But in every one of these cases, borders play a crucial role in focusing the aspirations of the groups on either side.

perpetual instability of the border is precisely what gives it such symbolic

power in the minds eye of the nationalists who favor/challenge it.
 Part Three is Framing
The judge is an educator, 3 warrants
A) Debate is an educational setting; we represent schools in
a school.
B) The ballot endorses a truth claim, such as I affirm, thus
the judge endorses a frame of truth, educating students
with it.
C) Despite debates game-like structure, the game is
structured by research and transfer of information it
was designed to facilitate learning think the LeapFrog
spelling games little kids play.
Thus, the Role of the Ballot is to endorse the most productive
liberation strategy for the oppressed. The academy is a site of
pedagogical responsibility engaging is key to stop the mere
consumption of knowledge and talking in circles and allow
critical thinking to help solve oppression. Schooling
institutions, like this debate round, are especially important in
this role. While obviously just signing the ballot wont make
violence disappear, voting for strategies to combat oppression
in this round makes us better activists in the future.
Giroux 13 (Henry, American scholar and cultural critic. One of the founding theorists of critical pedagogy in the United States, he is best
known for his pioneering work in public pedagogy, Public Intellectuals Against the Neoliberal University, 29 October 2013, http://www.truth-
out.org/opinion/item/19654-public-intellectuals-against-the-neoliberal-university)//ghs-VA

the call to be objective and impartial, whatever one's intentions,

Increasingly, as universities are shaped by an audit culture,

can easily echo what George Orwell called the official truth or the establishment point of view. Lacking a self-consciously
democratic political focus, teachers are often reduced, or reduce themselves, to the role of a technician or

functionary engaged in formalistic rituals, unconcerned with the

disturbing and urgent problems that confront the larger society or the consequences of one's pedagogical practices and research
undertakings. Hiding behind appeals to balance and objectivity, too many scholars refuse to recognize that being
committed to something does not cancel out what C. Wright Mills once called hard thinking. Teaching needs to be rigorous, self-reflective, and committed
not to the dead zone of instrumental rationality but to the practice of freedom, to a critical sensibility capable of advancing the parameters of knowledge,
addressing crucial social issues, and connecting private troubles and public issues. In opposition to the instrumental model of teaching, with its conceit of

academics should combine the mutually

political neutrality and its fetishization of measurement, I argue that

interdependent roles of critical educator and active citizen . This requires finding ways to connect the practice
of classroom teaching with important social problems and the operation of power in the larger society while providing the conditions for students to view
themselves as critical agents capable of making those who exercise authority and power answerable for their actions. Higher education cannot be
decoupled from what Jacques Derrida calls a democracy to come, that is, a democracy that must always "be open to the possibility of being contested, of

Within this project of possibility and

contesting itself, of criticizing and indefinitely improving itself."33

impossibility, critical pedagogy must be understood as a deliberately informed and purposeful

political and moral practice, as opposed to one that is either doctrinaire,

instrumentalized or both. Moreover, a critical pedagogy should also gain part of its
momentum in higher education among students who will go back to the schools, churches, synagogues and
workplaces to produce new ideas, concepts and critical ways of understanding the world in which young people and adults live.

This is a notion of intellectual practice and responsibility that refuses the professional neutrality and privileged
isolation of the academy. It also affirms a broader vision of learning that links knowledge to the power of self-definition and to
the capacities of students to expand the scope of democratic freedoms, particularly those that address the crisis of education, politics, and the social as
part and parcel of the crisis of democracy itself. In order for critical pedagogy, dialogue and thought to have real effects, they must advocate that all
citizens, old and young, are equally entitled, if not equally empowered, to shape the society in which they live. This is a commitment we heard articulated
by the brave students who fought tuition hikes and the destruction of civil liberties and social provisions in Quebec and to a lesser degree in the Occupy
Wall Street movement. If educators are to function as public intellectuals, they need to listen to young people who are producing a new language in order
to talk about inequality and power relations, attempting to create alternative democratic public spaces, rethinking the very nature of politics, and asking
serious questions about what democracy is and why it no longer exists in many neoliberal societies. These young people who are protesting the 1%
recognize that they have been written out of the discourses of justice, equality and democracy and are not only resisting how neoliberalism has made

they are arguing for a collective future very diferent from the one that
them expendable,

is on display in the current political and economic systems in which they feel
trapped. These brave youth are insisting that the relationship between knowledge and power can be emancipatory, that their histories and
experiences matter, and that what they say and do counts in their struggle to unlearn dominating privileges, productively reconstruct their relations with
others, and transform, when necessary, the world around them.
 FW Killer
Role of the Ballot takes out T You must first know what the
ballot should reflect before you can analyze the structure of
the round extend Giroux 13 if the role of the ballot is to
combat oppression, then our discussion and your framing of
the round must be centered on that takes out their
jurisdiction and fairness claims.
C/I the topic is the subject of the discussion, but it doesnt
control the discussion. We can be a discussion of the topic
even if we dont advocate a topical advocacy.
The resolution tasks us for a motion or expression regarding it
it doesnt have to be about policy implementation.
Blacks Law Dictionary 09 (definitive legal resource for lawyers, law students and laypeople alike. Edited
by the worlds foremost legal lexicographer, Bryan A. Garner, Blacks Law Dictionary is known for its clear and precise legal
definitions, substantive accuracy, and stylistic clarity making it the most widely used law dictionary in the United States. It is the
reference of choice for definitions in legal briefs and court opinions and has been cited as a secondary legal authority in many U.S.
Supreme Court cases. The Deluxe Ninth Edition is the most recent, comprehensive, and relevant BLD today, Deluxe Ninth Edition)

resolution. (17c) 1. Parliamentary law. A main motion that formally expresses the sense,
will, or action of a deliberative assembly (esp. a legislative body). A resolution is a highly
formal kind of main motion, often containing a preamble, and one or more resolving clauses in the form, Resolved, That. concurrent resolution.
(17c) A resolution passed by one house and agreed to by the other. It expresses the legislatures opinion on a subject but does not have the force of
law. joint resolution. (17c) A legislative resolution passed by both houses. It has the force of law and is subject to executive veto. [Cases: Statutes 22,
229.] simple resolution. (18c) A resolution passed by one house only. It expresses the opinion or affects the internal affairs of the passing house, but it
does not have the force of law. 2. Formal action by a corporate board of directors or other corporate body authorizing a particular act, transaction, or
appointment. Also termed corporate resolution. shareholder resolution. A resolution by shareholders, usu. To ratify the actions of the board of directors.
3. A document containing such an expression or authorization.

Resolved is to reduce by mental analysis

Random House 11 (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolve)
5. to reduce by mental analysis (often followed by into).

USfg = the people

Howard 05 (Adam, Jeffersonian Democracy: Of the People, By the People, For the People,
http://www.byzantinecommunications.com/adamhoward/homework/highschool/jeffersonian.html, 5/27)

the government is the people, and people is the government. Therefore, if

Ideally, then, under Jeffersonian Democracy,

a particular government ceases to work for the good of the people, the people may and ought to change
that government or replace it. Governments are established to protect the people's rights using the power they get from the people.

Globalization
Merriam-Webster https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/globalization
The act or process of globalizing: the state of being globalized; especially: the
development of an increasingly integrated global economy marked especially by free trade, free flow of capital, and the tapping of cheaper foreign labor
markets
Trade
Merriam-Webster https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/trade
4a obsolete: dealings between persons or groups

International
Merriam-Webster https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/international
1: of, relating to, or affecting two or more nations
 Ofense
Case is a DA focus on policy trades of with the ACs
refocusing- Case outweighs their fairness claimscross-apply
the af impact calc.
C/I is best for activism Talking about methodologies to
combat oppressive structures makes us better advocates in
the future this is a key pre-requisite to education and
fairness claims, even if we learn from debate, that education is
useless without the ability to put it to use.
Activism means its try-or-die for the Af RotB without
activism, all of their education and fairness claims are
meaningless, no matter what we learn, unless we have the
ability to take it out of the round and use it, it is, by definition,
useless. Work on the self is what we are trying to accomplish
in debate comparatively more efective than a hubristic
fantasy that we can change the world
 Defense
This argument is a question of models for debate fairness
claims collapse because they presume one model of debate is
good which can only be judged by the external impact it has.
AC turns fairness three reasons.
A) Their claims of how to best preserve debate beg the
question. Why is the form of debate they defend one that
deserves to be preferred if I win that my methodology
is productive for combatting oppressive knowledge, this is
an external impact justifying my form of debate.
B) Utilizing fairness as a factor in decision making prioritizes
self-interest over the educational value of the public
sphere which coopts and destroys debate making flawed
ideology replicate itself causing the violent norms. Weve
mechanized debate to the point that were stuck in the
same repetitious cycle.
C) Fairness is not a voter just an internal link to education,
if I win I promote new forms of knowledge, that outweighs
fairness.
Extensions
 RotB Xt
The academy is a site of pedagogical responsibility engaging
is key to stop the mere consumption of knowledge and talking
in circles and allow critical thinking to help solve oppression.
Giroux 15 Henry, The Curse of Totalitarianism and the Challenge of Critical Pedagogy, 02 October 2015,
http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/33061-the-curse-of-totalitarianism-and-the-challenge-of-critical-pedagogy

What role might educators play as public intellectuals in light of the poisonous assaults waged on public schools by the

they can raise their collective

forces of neoliberalism and a range of other fundamentalisms? In the most immediate sense,

voices against the influence of corporations that are flooding societies

with a culture of violence, fear, anti-intellectualism, commercialism and
privatization. They can show how this culture of commodified cruelty and violence is only one part of a broader and all-embracing militarized
culture of war, the arms industry and a Darwinian survival-of the-fittest ethic that increasingly disconnects schools from public values, the common good
and democracy itself. They can bring all of their intellectual and collective resources together to critique and dismantle the imposition of high-stakes
testing and other commercially driven modes of accountability on schools. They can speak out against modes of governance that have reduced faculty to
the status of disposable, part-time employees, and they can struggle collectively to take back the governing of the university from a new class of

managers and bureaucrats that now outnumber faculty, at least in the United States. This suggests that educators must resist
those modes of corporate governance in which faculty are reduced to the status of clerks, technicians, entrepreneurs and a
subaltern class of part-time workers with little power, few benefits and excessive teaching loads. As Noam Chomsky has observed, this neoliberal mode of
austerity and precarity is part of a business model "designed to reduce labor costs and to increase labor servility" while at the same time making clear

Academics can work with social movements, write

that "what matters is the bottom line." (19)

policy papers, publish op-eds and call for young people and others to defend education
as a public good by advocating for policies that invest in schools rather
than in the military-industrial complex and its massive and expensive weapons of death. In addition, such
intellectuals can develop modes of pedagogy along with a broader comprehensive vision of education and schooling that is capable of waging a war
against those who would deny education its critical function, and this applies to all forms of dogmatism and political purity, across the ideological

educators have a responsibility to not only

spectrum. As my friend, the late Paulo Freire, once argued,

develop a critical consciousness in students but to provide the conditions for students to be
engaged individuals and social agents. This is not a call to shape students in the manner of Pygmalion but to
encourage human agency rather than to mold it. Since human life is conditioned rather than determined, educators cannot

escape the ethical responsibility of addressing education as an act of intervention with the purpose of
providing the conditions for students to become the subjects and makers of history

rather than function as simply passive, disconnected objects or, what might be called, mere consumers rather than
producers of knowledge, values and ideas. (20) This is a pedagogy in which educators are neither afraid of controversy nor the willingness to make
connections that are otherwise hidden, nor are they afraid of making clear the connection between private troubles and broader social problems. One of
the most important tasks for educators engaged in critical pedagogy is to teach students how to translate private issues into public considerations. One
measure of the demise of vibrant democracy and the corresponding impoverishment of political life can be found in the increasing inability of a society to
make private issues public, and to translate individual problems into larger social issues. As the public collapses into the personal, the personal becomes
"the only politics there is, the only politics with a tangible referent or emotional valence." (21) This is a central feature of neoliberalism as an educative
tool and can be termed the individualization of the social. Under such circumstances, the language of the social is either devalued or ignored, as public life
is often reduced to a form of pathology or deficit (as in public schools, public transportation, public welfare), and all dreams of the future are modeled
increasingly around the narcissistic, privatized and self-indulgent needs of consumer culture and the dictates of the alleged free market. Similarly, all
problems, regardless of whether they are structural or caused by larger social forces, are now attributed to individual failings, matters of character or
individual ignorance. In this case, poverty is reduced to matters concerning lifestyle, individual responsibility, bad choices or flawed character. Critical
Pedagogy as a Project of Insurrectional Democracy In opposition to dominant views of education and pedagogy, I want to argue for a notion of pedagogy
as a practice of freedom - rooted in a broader project of a resurgent and insurrectional democracy - one that relentlessly questions the kinds of labor,
practices and forms of production that are enacted in public and higher education. While such a pedagogy does not offer guarantees, it does recognize
that its own position is grounded in particular modes of authority, values and ethical principles that must be constantly debated for the ways in which they

such a project should be

both open up and close down democratic relations, values and identities. Needless to say,

principled, relational and contextual, as well as self-reflective and theoretically rigorous. By relational, I mean that the
current crisis of schooling must be understood in relation to the broader assault that is being waged against all aspects of democratic public life. At the
same time, any critical comprehension of those wider forces that shape public and higher education must also be supplemented by an attentiveness to
the historical and conditional nature of pedagogy itself. This suggests that pedagogy can never be treated as a fixed set of principles and practices that
can be applied indiscriminately across a variety of pedagogical sites. On the contrary, it must always be attentive to the specificity of different contexts
and the different conditions, formations and problems that arise in various sites in which education takes place. Such a project suggests recasting
pedagogy as a practice that is indeterminate, open to constant revision and constantly in dialogue with its own assumptions. The notion of a

neutral, objective education is an oxymoron. Education and pedagogy do not exist

outside of relations of power, values and politics. Ethics on the
pedagogical front demand an openness to the other, and a
willingness to engage a "politics of possibility" through a continual
critical engagement with texts, images, events and other registers
of meaning as they are transformed into pedagogical practices both
within and outside of the classroom. (22) Pedagogy is never innocent and if it is to be understood and
problematized as a form of academic labor, educators have the opportunity not only to

critically question and register their own subjective involvement in

how and what they teach, but also resist all calls to depoliticize
pedagogy through appeals to either scientific objectivity or
ideological dogmatism. This suggests the need for educators to rethink the cultural and ideological
baggage they bring to each educational encounter ; it also highlights the necessity of making educators ethically
and politically accountable and self-reflective for the stories they produce, the claims they make upon public
memory and the images of the future they deem legitimate . Hence, crucial to any viable notion of critical pedagogy is the necessity
for critical educators to be attentive to the ethical dimensions of their own practice. Critical Pedagogy and the Promise of a Democracy to Come As a
practice of freedom, critical pedagogy needs to be grounded in a project that not only problematizes its own location, mechanisms of transmission and
effects, but also functions as part of a wider project to help students think critically about how existing social, political and economic arrangements might
be better suited to address the promise of a democracy to come. Understood as a form of educated hope, pedagogy in this sense is not an antidote to
politics, or a nostalgic yearning for a better time or some "inconceivably alternative future." Instead, it is an "attempt to find a bridge between the present
and future in those forces within the present which are potentially able to transform it." (23) What has become clear in this current climate of casino
capitalism is that the corporatization of education functions so as to cancel out the teaching of democratic values, impulses and practices of a civil society
Educators need a critical language to address these challenges
by either devaluing or absorbing them within the logic of the market.
to public and higher education. But they also need to join with other groups outside of the spheres of public and higher education in order to
create broad national and international social movements that share a willingness to defend education as a civic value and public good and to engage in a
broader struggle to deepen the imperatives of democratic public life. The quality of educational reform can, in part, be gauged by the caliber of public
discourse concerning the role that education plays in furthering, not the market-driven agenda of corporate interests, but the imperatives of critical
agency, social justice and an operational democracy.Defining pedagogy as a moral and political exercise, education can
highlight the performative character of schooling and civic pedagogy as a practice that moves beyond simple
matters of critique and understanding. Pedagogy is not simply about competency or teaching young people the great books, established
knowledge, predefined skills and values; it is also about the possibility of interpretation as an act of intervention in the world.
Such a pedagogy should challenge common sense and take on the task as the poet Robert Hass once put it, "to refresh the idea of justice going dead in us
critical pedagogy foregrounds the diverse conditions under which authority,
all the time." (24) Within this perspective,
knowledge, values and subject positions are produced and interact within unequal relations of power . Pedagogy in this
view also stresses the labor conditions necessary for teacher autonomy, cooperation, decent working conditions and the relations of power necessary to
give teachers and students the capacity to restage power in productive ways - ways that point to self-development, self-determination and social agency.
Any analysis of critical pedagogy needs to address the
Making Pedagogy Meaningful in Order to Make It Critical and Transformative
importance that affect, meaning and emotion play in the formation of individual identity and social agency . Any viable
approach to critical pedagogy suggests taking seriously those maps of meaning, affective investments and sedimented desires
that enable students to connect their own lives and everyday experiences to what they learn . Pedagogy in this sense
becomes more than a mere transfer of received knowledge, an inscription of a unified and static identity, or a rigid methodology; it presupposes that
students are moved by their passions and motivated, in part, by the identifications, range of experiences and commitments they bring to the learning
process. In part, this suggests connecting what is taught in classrooms to the cultural capital and worlds that young people inhabit.

Our re-envisioning of the debate space introduces radical

abolitionist pedagogy as a praxis for learning, calling into
question those common-sense truths that underlie that
modern. Only this opening activates the agency and
challenging necessary for any viable pedagogy.
Rodriguez 10 Dylan (University of California at Riverside). The Disorientation of the Teaching Act:
Abolition as Pedagogical Position Radical Teacher, Number 88, Summer 2010, pp. 7-19 University of Illinois Press,
Project Muse.

the horizon of the possible is only constrained by ones pedagogical

Finally,

willingness to locate a struggle within the living history of

particular political (here, prison abolition) long and

liberation movements . In this context, Prison abolition can be understood as one important strain within a continuously unfurling fabric of liberationist political horizons, in which the
imagination of the possible and the practical is shaped but not limited by the specific material and institutional conditions within which one lives. It is useful to continually ask: on whose shoulders does one sit, when undertaking the

There is something profoundly

audacious identifications and political practices endemic to an abolitionist pedagogy? indelible and

emboldening in realizing that ones own political struggle is deeply

connected to a legacy of collective imagination and social
vibrant, robust, creative, and beautiful creative

labor (and of course, there are crucial ways of comprehending historical liberation struggles in all their forms, from guerilla warfare to dance). While I do not expect to arrive at a wholly satisfactory pedagogical endpoint
anytime soon, and am therefore hesitant to offer prescriptive examples of how to teach within an abolitionist framework, I also believe that rigorous experimentation and creative pedagogical radicalism is the very soul of This
 There is
praxis. no pedagogical system that finally fulfills the
, in the end, teaching formula or

abolitionist vision only a desire that understands the immediacy of

social , there is political

struggling for liberation from institutionalized

human precisely those forms of systemic violence and

dehumanization that are sanctioned within ones own most culturally and politically , valorized, and taken for granted

pedagogical moment . To refuse or resist this desire is to be unaccountable to the historical truth of our moment, in which the structural logic and physiological technologies of social
liquidation (removal from or effective neutralization within civil society) have merged with historys greatest experiment in punitive human captivity, a linkage that increasingly lays bare racisms logical outcome in genocide.
Abolitionist Position and Praxis Given the historical context I have briefly outlined, and the practical-theoretical need for situating an abolitionist praxis within a longer tradition of freedom struggle, I contend that There can be no

conceptualiz[e]
liberatory teaching act, nor can there be an adequately critical pedagogical practice, that does not also attempt to become an abolitionist one. Provisionally, I am ing

abolition as a praxis of liberation that is creative and experimental rather than formulaic

a radical position as well as a

and rigidly programmatic. Abolition is pedagogy political , perpetually creative and experimental ,

because formulaic approaches cannot apprehend the biopolitics adequately , dynamic statecraft,

and internalized violence of genocidal and proto-genocidal systems of

human domination this conception of abolition posits the
. As a productive and creative praxis,

material possibility and historical necessity of a social capacity for human

freedom based on a cultural-economic infrastructure that supports the transformation of oppressive relations that are the legacy of genocidal conquest, settler colonialism, racial slavery/capitalism, compulsory
hetero-patriarchies, and global white supremacy. In this sense, Abolitionist praxis does not singularly concern itself with the abolition of the prison industrial complex, although it fundamentally and strategically prioritizes the prison
as a central site for catalyzing broader, radical social transformations. In significant part, this suggests envisioning and ultimately constructing a constellation of alternative strategies and institutions, with the ultimate aim of
removing the prison from the social and ideological landscape of our society. In locating abolitionist praxis within a longer political genealogy that anticipates the task of remaking the world under transformed material
circumstances, This position refracts the most radical and revolutionary dimensions of a historical Black freedom struggle that positioned the abolition of slavery as the condition of possibility for Blackhence humanfreedom.
To situate contemporary abolitionism as such is also to recall the U.S. racist states (and its liberal allies) displacement and effective political criminalization of Black radical abolitionism through the 13th Amendments 1865
recodification of the slave relation through the juridical reinvention of a racial-carceral relation: Given the institutional elaborations of racial criminalization, policing, and massive imprisonment that have prevailed on the 13th
Amendments essential authorization to replace a regime of racist chattel slavery with racist carceral state violence, it is incumbent on the radical teacher to assess the density of her/his entanglement in this historically layered
condition of End Page 15 violence, immobilization, and capture. Prior to the work of formulating an effective curriculum and teaching strategy for critically engaging the prison industrial complex, in other words, is the even more
difficult work of examining the assumptive limitations of any radical pedagogy that does not attempt to displace an epistemological and cultural common sense in which the relative order and peace of the classroom is perpetually
reproduced by the systemic disorder and deep violence of the prison regime. In relation to the radical challenging of common sense discussed above, another critical analytical tool for building an abolitionist pedagogy entails the
rigorous, scholarly dismantling of the presentist and deeply ahistorical understanding of policing and prisons. Students (and many teachers) frequently enter such dialogues with an utterly mystified conception of the policing and
prison apparatus, and do not generally understand that 1) these apparatuses in their current form are very recent creations, and have not been around forever; and 2) the rise of these institutional forms of criminalization, domestic
war, and mass-scale imprisonment forms one link in a historical chain of genocidal and proto-genocidal mobilizations of the racist state that regularly take place as part of the deadly global process of U.S. nation-building. In other
words, not only is the prison regime a very recent invention of the state (and therefore is neither a permanent nor indestructible institutional assemblage), but it is institutionally and historically inseparable from the precedent and
contemporaneous structures of large-scale racist state violence. Asserting the above as part of the core analytical framework of the pedagogical structure can greatly enable a discussion of abolitionist possibility that thinks of the
critical dialogue as a necessary continuation of long historical struggles against land conquest, slavery, racial colonialism, and imperialist war. This also means that our discussions take place within a longer temporal community with
those liberation struggles, such that we are neither crazy nor isolated. I have seen students and teachers speak radical truth to power under difficult and vulnerable circumstances based on this understanding that they are part
of a historical record. I have had little trouble convincing most studentsacross distinctions of race, class, gender, age, sexuality, and geographyof the gravity and emergency of our historical moment. It is the analytical, political,
and practical move toward an abolitionist positionality that is (perhaps predictably) far more challenging. This is in part due to The fraudulent and stubborn default position of centrist-to-progressive liberalism/reformism (including
assertions of civil and human rights) as the only feasible or legible response to reactionary, violent, racist forms of state power. Perhaps more troublesome, however, is that this Resistance to engaging with abolitionist praxis
seems to also of the political imagination that makes liberationist dreams unspeakable. This disciplining is most overtly produced through hegemonic state and cultural apparatuses and their representatives (including elected
officials, popular political pundits and public intellectuals, schools, family units, religious institutions, etc.), but is also compounded through the pragmatic imperatives of many liberal and progressive nonprofit organizations and social
movements that reproduce the political limitations of the End Page 16 nonprofit industrial complex.22 In this context, the liberationist historical identifications hailed by an abolitionist social imagination also require that such
repression of political-intellectual imagination be fought, demystified, and displaced. Perhaps, then, there is no viable or defensible pedagogical position other than an abolitionist one. To live and work, learn and teach, and survive
and thrive in a time defined by the capacity and political willingness to eliminate and neutralize populations through a culturally valorized, state sanctioned nexus of institutional violence, is to better understand why abolitionist
praxis in this historical moment is primarily pedagogical, within and against the system in which it occurs. While it is conceivable that in future moments, abolitionist praxis can focus more centrally on matters of (creating and not
simply opposing) public policy, infrastructure building, and economic reorganization, The present moment clearly demands a convening of radical pedagogical energies that can build the collective human power, epistemic and
knowledge apparatuses, and material sites of learning that are the precondition of authentic and liberatory social transformations. The prison regime is the institutionalization and systemic expansion of massive human misery. It is
the production of bodily and psychic disarticulation on multiple scales, across different physiological capacities. The prison industrial complex is, in its logic of organization and its production of common sense, at least proto-
genocidal. Finally, the prison regime is inseparable fromthat is, present inthe schooling regime in which teachers are entangled. Prison is not simply a place to which one is displaced and where ones physiological being is
disarticulated, at the rule and whim of the state and its designated representatives (police, parole officers, school teachers). The prison regime is the assumptive premise of classroom teaching generally. While many of us must live in
labored denial of this fact in order to teach as we must about American democracy, freedom, and (civil) rights, there are opportune moments in which it is useful to come clean: the vast majority of what occurs in U.S.
classroomsfrom preschool to graduate schoolcannot accommodate the bare truth of the proto-genocidal prison regime as a violent ordering of the world, a primary component of civil society/school, and a material presence in
our everyday teaching acts. As teachers, we are institutionally hailed to the service of genocide management, in which our pedagogical labor is variously engaged in mitigating, valorizing, critiquing, redeeming, justifying, lamenting,

As radical teachers, we are

and otherwise reproducing or tolerating the profound and systemic violence of the global-historical U.S. nation building project.

politically hailed to betray genocide management in order to embrace the

urgent challenge of genocide abolition. The short-term survival of those
populations rendered most immediately vulnerable to the mundane and
spectacular violence of this system, and the long-term survival of most of
the planets human population is (particularly those descended from survivors of enslavement, colonization, conquest, and economic exploitation),

significantly dependent on our willingness to embrace this form of

pedagogical audacity.

The judge has the primary obligation to deconstruct

oppressive regimes. Schooling institutions, like this debate
round, are especially important in this role.
Kerry and Davies 08 Robinson, Kerry, and Cristyn Davies. "Docile bodies and heteronormative
moral subjects: Constructing the child and sexual knowledge in schooling." Sexuality and Culture 12.4 (2008): 221-
239.

Schools, as a discursive field, are sites where technologies of power produce

regimes of truth that uphold the hegemonic social, political and moral values of
dominant and powerful groups (Foucault 1977). This is obvious within the syllabi
that we examine in this discussion, in which children are constructed as
heteronormative subjects. Schooling as a disciplining state apparatus has a
compulsory captive audiencedocile bodiesthrough which to constructs
knowledge and discipline heternormative moral subjects. Foucaults concept of the
powerknowledge nexus operates through hegemonic discourses that are
perpetuated through curricula, rules and regulations, philosophies, policies, and
pedagogical practices that prevail in schooling (Foucault 1977). The regulative and
repetitive practices of schooling become part of childrens habitus as they tap into
the cultural, social and economic capital valued in schooling (Bourdieu 1991).
Habitus refers to the dispositions, perceptions, and attitudes generated throughout
an individuals cultural history that can enable or prohibit effective exchange or
accumulation of ones capital (Robinson and Jones-Diaz 2006). However, it is
important to point out that part of the way that education is transformed is through
teachers critical approach towards pedagogy and the curriculum. Some teachers
question what constitutes official knowledge within the mainstream curriculum to
reshape and contest the power of dominant groups. Syllabi are also interpreted by
individual teachers, who can include perspectives that challenge regimes of truth
operating in schools. So despite our critique of educational syllabi in this paper, we
need to acknowledge that some teachers would have challenged the representation
of knowledge about health and its presentation. It is also important to acknowledge
that even though we critique the lack of specific Docile Bodies and Heteronormative
Moral Subjects 123 detail in the syllabi on sexual identity, we do so with an
awareness that some teachers may have used this space (marked by an absence of
definition around sexual identity) to address issues of non-heterosexuality. However,
this potential queer space may also be counteracted by other forms of regulation,
including students surveillance of heteronormative values, or the introduction of
additional policies, such as the Controversial Issues Policy that has operated along
side the syllabi in NSW schools since the 1970s.
Old Shite
 Old Solvency Mech
I advocate affirming globalization as a deconstruction of the
border view globalization as a complex engagement that isnt
just about the economy, but about how we think of the
interconnected nature of the world. This entails rejecting
protectionism, which is a heuristic or reactionary
nationalism. This is not about directly supporting the
deconstruction of physical borders but destroying the mental
constructs of borders that create the mindsets that make
borders necessary.
Schlee 03 (Gunther Schlee Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, Vol. 73, No. 3 (2003)
REDRAWING THE MAP OF THE HORN: THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE)

The other day' Donald Donham showed me his draft introduction to a collected volume entitled Remapping Ethiopia. In this introduction Donald expresses
some ideas which are dear also to me, pointing out that in the case of Ethiopia 'the very shape of the country-the iconic outline that symbolizes the nation-
has changed as Eritrea has become its own country.' The present contribution will have a yet clearer geographical focus than that planned volume (since

published as James et al., 2002) in which the term 'mapping' is taken up sometimes literally but
also in various metaphorical senses. Of course, I am aware of the difference between the surface of the earth and a
map. And also a boundary is not a simple given but a mental construct . Some boundaries

are visible-the German/German one consisted of a fence and other fortifications, and the Kenyan/Ethiopian one is a straight cut-line, which
undulates like a white ribbon across the hilltops. But most boundaries are not visible in most places and in social

reality might amount more to a transitional zone than to well-defined

lines. But apart from this necessary caution I want to speak about maps and boundaries at the lowest possible level of abstraction. The
shape of a national territory can never be seen. From a spacecraft we see continents and mountain
ranges but no boundaries, and if we come close enough to see cut-lines or other boundary markers, we can no longer see a surface large enough to cover

Nevertheless from weather forecast maps, advertisements and other forms of visual representations, we are
the whole territory.

all so familiar with the territorial shape of the nation-state we live in-and
those of many other such units-that these shapes have come to stand as
emblems for the respective national identities.
 Old Impacts/Mapping Stuf
Maps are tools for the state they legitimize the state to take
land and erase people to create its own area, creating refugee
crisis and ceding all power to the state. Our advocacy disrupts
the power of state control.
Wood 12 (Denis, is an artist, author, cartographer and a former professor of Design at North Carolina State
University, The Anthropology of Cartography, Pg 297 http://www.deniswood.net/content/Anthro20Cart.pdf)

But I don't Insist on it here because where I really want to go is to the performance of the state and we're almost there. By the time Fels and I came to

maps laboured extensively in the service of the

write 'Designs on Signs' it had become obvious that

state. Or maybe this understates It, for certainly it was one of the principal assertions of the critical
cartography that was then being born - the assertion that most enflamed the ire of the old guard - that maps had
political agendas, that they were tools of the state. The papers given at the 1985 Nebenza hl Lectu
res at the Newberry Library and later collected under the title MOllarcl/s, Ministers, and Maps: The Emergence of Cartography as a Tool of Government ill
Early Modem Europe began to sketch something of the range of the map's labours for the state; Fels and I something of their inwardness; and Brian
Harley's 'Maps, Knowledge, and Power' of 1988 and later papers something of their penetration and ... grip (Buisseret 1992; Wood and Fels 1986; Harley

the map was a

1988, 2(01). In the lecture I gave to inaugurate the Power of Maps exhibition I simply took it for granted that

weapon in the arsenal of state control, discussing the map under the
headings of subjugation, intimidation and legitimation. But the state had
many tools at its disposal: what was it about the map that the state found SO valuable, especially the state emerging in early
modern China, Europe, Japan and elsewhere? It is important to observe that all the bureaucratic

functions fulfilled by maps during this period could have been handled without maps, as
they had been during the later Middle Ages. The historians of cadastral mapping, Roger Ka in and Elizabeth Baigent, remind us that maps are

not indispensable even for cadastral; and this leads them to wonder why so many states adopted cadastral mapping during the early
modern period. 'Conviction of the merits of mapping was a precondition for mapping itself', they argue (1992: 343). This is a theme in much contemporary

scholarship where a particularly significant merit was the ability of the map to figure the
new state itself, to perform lite shape of statehood, to give the state what the
historian Thongchai Winichakul calls a geo-body. The early modern state was in the opening

phase of an evolution from an older structure in which loyalty had been offered to one's lord, one's
immediate community and one's family (typified by a powerful sense of mutual obligations among face-to-face acquaintances), to a novel political

This impersonal state required new

organization with increasingly impersonal institutions and abstract character.

forms for its embodiment. Contemporary scholarship is unanimous that the map possessed an all
but unique power to give the elusive idea of this new state concrete form,
both for those living within it and for those contemplating it from without ;
and has documented this for Japan, China, Russia, France, the United States, Mexico, Siam, British Guyana, Israel and elsewhere. The most striking feature

the map was an artifact that constructed the

about all these assertions is their persuasion that

state, that literally helped to bring the state into being, that brought it into focus.
It's almost as though it were the map that in a graphic performance of statehood conjured

the state as such into existence: out of the territories of the recently warring daimyo of Japan, out of the far-flung
possessions of Chinese emperors out of the disjointed rabble of the American colonies

My advocacy is key European imposed borders result in

massive ethnic wars and genocide only by understanding the
world as interconnected and fluid can we solve.
Amadife and Warhola 93 (Emmanuel N. Amadife associate prof at KSU and James W. Warhola
prof at University of Maine, Africa's Political Boundaries: Colonial Cartography, the OAU, and the Advisability of
Ethno-National Adjustment International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer, 1993)

Examples of ethnic diferences reflecting serious national conflicts abound

in post-colonial Africa; they appear to be the rule rather than the exception. The full-scale civil wars
largely along ethnic lines in Sudan (1956-1972; resumed in 1989-present); Rwanda (1959-1964, and since intermittently);
Ethiopia; and Nigeria (1967-1970) illustrate the point. Equally significant, many intra-country civil

conflicts, which on the surface appeared as ideological or factionally-

based wars, were in fact ethnic conflicts carried on under a non-ethnic or
ostensibly supra-ethnic banner. The civil conflicts in Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, Uganda, and Sudan are cases in point.
The existence and ready diagnosis of the problem nonetheless produced a muted
acknowledgement from most African leaders, who frequently argued that
recognizing the claims of diferent ethnic groups could precipitate
secessionist wars analogous, perhaps, to the chain of military coups d'etat beginning in the mid-1960s, or could start a
process of 'Balkanization' in Africa that would be impossible to halt without
massive amounts of blood being shed. Ignoring the existing and unfolding patterns is
no viable solution, given the social conditions in which they originate; and repressing potential ethnic
conflicts is likely to provide as implausible a long-term civic peace as the
USSR's "Leninist nationality policy" did in purportedly resolving that country's
simmering ethnic troubles. Although the two regions (Africa and former USSR) differ profoundly, the sobering and unavoidable
point is that many of the same social forces giving rise to ethnic conflict in the

former USSR and Eastern Europe are operating as powerfully, though

somewhat diferentially, in Africa. Since these forces are so powerful, and far from displaying signs of abating into the
21st century, we turn now to a closer examination of what they imply for Africa's political framework.

Map-making is a political process aimed at altering our

understanding of the world around us, the political figures
standing behind geopolitical cartography use it to further the
patriarchal, state-driven oppression of the lower class.
Moore and Perdue 14 (Anna, Nicholas; members of the Department of Geography at the
University of Oregon, Imagining a Critical Geopolitical Cartography, Geography Compass, 892-901, 8/12/14, print)

Map-making is an inherently political process. Maps and the cartographers

that make them shape how we understand the world around us,
simplifying myriad and complex processes and power arrangements into
planar visualizations. While maps most often reflect dominant political narratives
and classify territory in a manner that appears natural and self-
evident(Crampton 2011), one specific mapping effort, geopolitical cartography, has long served
to illustrate existing or potential balances of power in a particular region
(Boria 2008, p. 280).We use the terms geopolitical map and geopolitical cartography deliberately in this paper to signal a type of cartographic product

Geopolitical maps are powerful tools that have

that seeks to visualize global or world-regional trends.

been used to advance specific geostrategic agendas and influence the

sway of global politics since the late nineteenth century. Heffernans(2002) piece on early 20th
century cartography traces the emergence of the geopolitical map. He writes, The map, it would seem, not only reflected

geopolitical circumstances; if carefully and intelligently created, the map

might also help to shape these conditions (p. 208). These products have been associated with some of
classical geopolitics defining scholarsamong them Halford Mackinder, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Isaiah Bowman, and Nicholas Spykmanand helped propel
the study of political geography well into the twentieth century. Even as maps have proven hugely significant to the intellectual roots of political

scholars have noted a marked decrease in the number of

geography, in recent decades

maps, geopolitical or otherwise, appearing in major work coming out of

political geography and its subfields. And when maps are present, they
are often conventional, state-based products that do little to advance
contemporary scholarship. Simultaneously, scholars have gathered around critical
geopolitics to move beyond the elite-driven, statecraft-centered, and
male-dominated tradition of political geography. This intellectual project recognizes classical
geopolitical work and associated cartographies as forms of situated knowledge that cannot be divorced from the political motivations and positionality of
their makers.