reddit.

com/r/syriancivilwar 31 January 2017 Volume 3 Issue 1

THE WEEK IN REVIEW

SYRIA'S UNREPORTED ENERGY WAR

OIL, GAS, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE HOMEFRONT

IN DEPTH UPDATES
A TIMELINE OF THE BATTLE FOR MOSUL - PART 3 2016 IN REVIEW: ALEPPO
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN 2016 SECOND PHASE OF THE RAQQA OFFENSIVE
A SUMMARY OF THE RECENT FIGHTING IN THE BARADA RIVER VALLEY
UPDATE: PALMYRA
/R/SYRIANCIVILWAR
THE WEEK IN REVIEW INDEX AND MAP REFERENCE
Our team We are LOCATION PAGE TITLE

PUBLISHER A weekly publication written and edited by Page 2 Timeline of events since the previous issue
/u/oreng the moderators and contributors Page 4 Syria's Unreported Energy War

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF of reddit.com/r/syriancivilwar Map ref 1 Page 6 2016 In Review: Aleppo

/u/AofB, @qamaamaalamriki Map ref 2 Page 7 Second phase of the Raqqa offensive
DEPUTY EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Social media Map ref 3 Page 8 A timeline of the battle for Mosul - part 3
/u/Naenil, @Naenil Page 10 American Foreign Policy in 2016
ART DIRECTOR
Visit us on social media or scan the Map ref 4 Page 12 A summary of the recent fighting in the Barada River Valley
/u/CIA_Shill, @scw_shill QR code:
Map ref 5 Page 13 Update: Palmyra
PHOTO EDITOR
/u/Status_Gruen /ScwWeekInReview
MANAGING EDITORS
Andy Jackson /r/syriancivilwar
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EDITORS /week_in_review/
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Trenton S Contact us by email at:
SOCIAL MEDIA OFFICER
contact.weekinreview@gmail.com
/u/almshouse_coffee 5
CONTRIBUTORS Ethics Statement
Andy Jackson
The editors and contributors are all members of an online community
/u/Beansareno1 that has managed - some might say against all odds - to preserve a cul-
ture of inclusiveness, civility and mutual dialogue between users ranging
4
Jcam212
from the staunchest supporters of Syrias government to supporters of
/u/Naenil, @Naenil entities as diverse as the FSA, YPG, the Islamic Front, Western states,
/u/prky008 Israel and indeed the Islamic State.
This coexistence is made possible by active, often heavy-handed
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their flairs on reddit.com/r/syriancivilwar.

31 January 2017, The Week In Review | Page 2 31 January 2017, The Week In Review | Page 1
 1 January
Fighting in parts of Syria threatens the
shaky ceasefire as Russia and Turkey
secure unanimous passage of a UN
resolution backing their efforts to
jump-start talks to end the nearly six-
year conflict. The UN Security Council
resolution aims to pave the way for talks
in Kazakhstans capital, Astana, under
the aegis of Russia, Iran and Turkey.
2 January
Syrian rebel groups announce to
freeze any talks about their possible
participation in Syrian peace
negotiations in Kazakhstan unless the
Syrian government and its Iran-backed
allies end what they say are violations of
the ceasefire.
(The Guardian)
Fighting continues in Barada Valley
despite ceasefire truce in Syria.
Hundreds of civilians flee the
mountainous region outside the Syrian
capital where government forces battle
several insurgent groups, including
one excluded from a recent nationwide
ceasefire.
(Al Jazeera)
01/01/17
3 January
Turkey has set out its terms for
cooperation with Donald Trump, saying
it expects the new US administration
to halt the supply of weapons to Syrian
Kurdish forces which Washington has
denied it is doing.
(The Guardian)
Air strikes in northern Syria have killed
at least 25 members ofJabhat Fateh al-
Sham group, formerly known as Nusra
Front. Russia and Turkey say the group
is not included in a ceasefire deal in
Syria.
(BBC)
31 January 2017, The Week In Review | Page 2
4 January
Turkey has said the operation to retake
the Syrian town of al-Bab, Islamic
States westernmost stronghold, will
be finished soon after launching the
most intensive bombardment of the
four-month campaign in the days after
the Istanbul nightclub attack.
(The Guardian)
5 January
Syrian state media say nine people
have been killed in a car bombing in
the coastal, government-held town of
Jableh the first such explosion since a
new cease-fire last week.
(AP)
6 January
The Russian Navy is returning the
aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov and its
group from the Mediterranean Sea back
to Russia, the defense ministry reports.
(RIA Novosti)
SINCE THE PREVIOUS ISSUE
Russia and Turkey have signed an
7 January
More than 40 people have been killed
and dozens injured in a car bomb blast
in the rebel-held Syrian town of Azaz
seven kilometres from the Turkish
border, activists and rescue workers
said.
8 January
U.S. Special Operations troops carried
out a ground operation in eastern Syria
aimed at capturing an Islamic State
militant, U.S. officials says. The raid
took place near a small town along the
Euphrates River valley, in the vicinity of
the city of Deir ez-Zor.
(The Washington Post)
9 January
4 Russian Su-25 fighter jets and 4 IL-78
tankers arrive at the Hmaymim Military
Airport in southern Latakia, locals in
Jableh reported Tuesday.
(Almas Darnews )
13 January
Syrian army command has said that
Israel fired rockets at a military airport
west of Damascus, the capital, and
warned the Israeli government of
repercussions after what it called a
flagrant attack.
(The Guardian)
11 January
Syrian rebels have rejected a provincial
governor's claim that a deal has been
reached for government forces to enter
a rebel-held area near Damascus and
restore the capital's water supply.
(Al Jazeera)
12 January
agreement to "coordinate" their air
forces in Syria when conducting strikes
"on terrorist targets", the Russian
defence ministry said Thursday.
(France 24)
14 January
The Islamic State on Saturday launched
one of its fiercest assaults yet on the
besieged Syrian city of Deir ez-Zor,
leaving more than 30 Syrian government
fighters and jihadists dead.
(AFP)
16 January
The Syrian opposition says it will attend
peace talks sponsored by Turkey and
Russia in Kazakhstan next week, in a key
step in the latest attempt to end the six-
year civil war in Syria.
(The Guardian)
Militants from the Islamic State group
Syria's antiquities chief said the
tetrapylon - a group of four pillared
17 January
Islamic State fighters have broken
through government defensive lines
in the Syrian city of Deir ez-Zor,
surrounding a military airport and
cutting off food supplies for roughly
that it is no longer "realistic" to exclude
a quarter of a million civilians in what
could become a major humanitarian
solution to the country's five-year civil
disaster.
(The Guardian)
The U.S. Air Force is increasing
airdrops of weapons, ammunition
and other equipment to a growing
number of opposition forces closing
in on Raqqa said US Gen. Carlton
Everhart, commander of the Air Mobility
Command.
(USA Today)
The World Food Programme has
suspended air drops of aid to the
eastern Syrian city of Deir ez-Zor, which
is besieged by the Islamic State.
The first face-to-face meeting between
diplomatic talks quickly devolved into
18 January
In the Wadi Barada region northwest
of Damascus, fresh clashes broke out
between rebel groups and advancing
government forces.
(Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
U.S. President Donald Trump said he
19 January
Islamic State militants have beheaded
four people and shot eight dead in the
Syrian city of Palmyra.
(SOHR)
Two senior al-Qaida operatives were
killed recently in separate U.S. airstrikes
in Syria, Pentagon Press Secretary Peter
Cook said in two statements issued
today.
(US Department of Defense)
20 January
have destroyed part of the Roman
Theatre in the ancient city of Palmyra.
The Syrian military says it has regained
structures which were mainly modern
replicas - has also been ruined.
(BBC)
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
reportedly killed five Turkish soldiers
and injured several more in an attack in
northern Syria, while Turkey announced
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from a
war.
(Al Jazeera)
Russia is redeploying its forces and
31/01/17
23 January
Syrian rebel fighters and government
officials in nearly six years of civil war
ended abruptly on Monday when
harsh words and competing accusations.
(New York Times)
25 January
"will absolutely do safe zones in Syria"
for refugees fleeing violence in the war-
torn country.
(CNBC)
28 January
Damascus's main water source from
rebels. Water shortages have affected
more than five million residents in the
Damascus area since late December.
State television said the national flag
was now flying over the pumping facility
in the Wadi Barada region.
(BBC)
President Donald Trump has signed
an executive order suspending the
US refugee programme for 120 days,
specifically barring Syrian refugees until
further notice.
(Al Jazeera)
equipment to the Humeimim base after
the Astana peace talks.
(Nezavisimaya Gazeta daily newspaper)
Russian media claimed that Russia has
deployed Ka-52 advanced combat
helicopters and Su-25 attack aircraft to
assist in the liberation of Palmyra from
ISIS terrorists.
(Almasdarnews)
27 January
Syria's two most important rebel
groups Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat Fatah
al-Sham have turned on one another
this week in Idlib province. The Salafist
groups historically have had strong ties,
even as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham targeted
other rebel factions, which were
themselves divided.
(Stratfor)
26 January
The Kremlin said Thursday that a US
plan for safe zones in Syria should
be thoroughly considered. Asked
to comment on a draft executive
order that President Donald Trump is
expected to sign this week, Russian
President Vladimir Putins spokesman
said it was important to weigh all
possible consequences of the measure.
(AFP)
By /u/Status_Gruen
31 January 2017, The Week In Review | Page 3

SYRIA'S UNREPORTED
ENERGY WAR
Oil, Gas, and the Battle for the Homefront
O n December 11, 2016, the Islamic State (IS) stormed the historic
city of Palmyra in eastern Homs, setting off a firestorm of media
attention.1 While the world focused on the iconic and ancient trading
city, IS was also capturing a series of large gas fields to the northwest
of Palmyra. Maher, Jihar, Shaer, and other gas fields were overrun by
IS as part of the same offensive in eastern Homs. These seizures are
significantly more important and will have a greater impact than the
fall of Palmyra.
Historically, Syria has produced gas in abundance with a
production rate in 2011 of approximately 21 million cubic meters per
day.2 Because of this high output, much of Syria's electricity grid was
geared to operate on gas.3 In addition, Syrians rely on gas for heating
during the winter and for cooking fuel throughout the year.
During the first few years of the war, from 2012 to 2014, Syria's
oil production collapsed from an average output of 400,000 barrels
per day (b/d) to a nearly negligible level.4 However, during that
same phase, gas production managed to stay surprisingly strong.5
This forced the government to increasingly rely on gas for electricity
generation. By 2013, more than 90% of Syria's remaining gas
production was being used to generate electricity.6
Given the high rate of domestic production, not many people
know that Syria has been a net importer of natural gas since 2008.7
Although Syrian gas production has declined at a slower rate than oil
due to the war, it still has declined. Shortages became apparent as
early as 2012. Supply worsened when Syrias only means of importing
gas in significant quantities, the Arab Gas Pipeline, faced interruptions
due to attacks in the Sinai. The pipeline was completely shut down
in 2012.8
31 January 2017, The Week In Review | Page 4
By
The lack of reported data makes it difficult to ascertain Syrian
production levels in 2016, but it is clear that the situation was
reaching a breaking point. Syrian government officials optimistically
It was under these circumstances that IS overran the major gas
fields in eastern Homs in the beginning of December 2016. The
Minister of Electricity, Zuheir Kharboutli, stated that over 3 million
declared gas production to be around 8 million cubic meters just cubic meters of Syria's remaining gas production had been lost with
before the IS offensive in 2016, low enough that Syria also needed to those fields, at least 40% of remaining production.16
import 800 tons of gas per day.9 Costs for importing fuel reached 800
million Syrian pounds (SYP) daily in 2016 (US$1.6 million), with some Electricity rationing tightened across Syria; Hama is officially at
projections estimating that costs in 2017 would increase to nearly three hours per day in 45 minute spurts,17 Tartous is at six hours per
one-fifth of the total national budget.10 Black market prices for gas day with some areas only getting three,18 while some areas near
cylinders in government-controlled areas climbed to 40-50% higher Damascus are only getting two hours of power per day.19 Unofficially,
than the official price. Some government officials stated that only 50- many report that rationing has worsened since electricity theft and
60% of demand was being satisfied.11 Supply was tight enough that other issues have caused problems with supply.
the delay of a single fuel ship in November caused extended power
blackouts across the country.12 Literally overnight on December 12, black market prices for cooking Pictured in IS media, demolition charges placed in Hayyan
gas shot up.20 Black market gas prices have more than doubled in
Because of these increasing some areas such as Homs where they reached 10,000 SYP/cylinder It is unlikely that the facility can be rebuilt before the end of the war,
shortages, the Syrian this week, nearly four times the official price.21,22 leaving Syrians wondering how their fuel and gas needs will be met.
government dedicated large Government officials have begun talking about securing new import
amounts of resources to bringing For average Syrians, for whom loyalist media reported poverty contracts,29 but without a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal, and
more gas production on-line in rates reaching 83% in 2016,23 these price increases have been with the sole pipeline suitable for gas importation out of operation,
the east Homs fields and was devastating. Many Syrians are simply going without or resorting to Syria will struggle to import gas cheaply. Since LNG importation
meeting increasing success burning what they can for heating and cooking, including animal requires either pipelines or LNG terminals, Syria is instead forced to
through the end of 2016.13 feces. To try to ease the burden, the Ministry of Oil and Resources import compressed natural gas or propane at higher costs and with
This expansion was considered announced that they would increase the production of gas cylinders greater difficulty. Syria is already running record deficits. With their
essential, as the economic from 100,000 cylinders per day to 135,000, although how they plan reserves depleted, and without additional Russian or Iranian financing
outlook for 2017 was already to do so remains uncertain.24 Shortly after, Loyalist media in Tartous or cutting elsewhere, Syria will not be able to afford an increase in
Syrian President Bashar
bleak.14 The importance of these published complaints that new cylinders were being underfilled.25 imports.30 Perhaps even more worrying is the prospect of further
al-Assad waves as he attends
gas fields is likely the reason why IS advances in Homs. Syria's only remaining major gas field, Rabah
the inauguration ceremony of a
government forces continuously Through the end of December, Syrian forces and their allies built (including its vital remaining energy infrastructure such as the Ebla
new gas plant in Homs
launched offensives in east up around Tiyas airbase, seemingly positioned to retake the gas fields processing plant), is now dangerously close to the front lines. 31
Homs through the summer and fall of 2016, aiming at securing more and help relax the ongoing shortages.26 However, hopes were dashed
of the fields in spite of the heavy and important fighting that garnered when IS detonated the Hayyan gas processing plant,27 a facility that
international attention in Aleppo and near Hama.15 had cost nearly 300 million Euro to construct. At its peak, the plant By Jcam212
produced nearly 3.7 million cubic meters of gas daily and accounted
for one third of Syrias electricity supply.28
31 January 2017, The Week In Review | Page 5
2016 IN REVIEW: SECOND PHASE OF
ALEPPO THE RAQQA OFFENSIVE
On July 17th, pro-government forces took control of Castello Over the past year, Over the next week Jaabars surrounding area experienced intense
Road and placed East Aleppo under siege.5 The YPG also attacked the Syrian Democratic clashes, causing the villages in the vicinity to undergo a tug of war.
the rebels defending Castello Road against the governments siege.6 Forces (SDF) have Territory rapidly changed hands multiple times during running battles
On July 31st, the Islamist rebel coalition Jaysh al-Fateh launched an continued their between the two antagonists, with IS heavily utilizing car bombs to
offensive on southern Aleppo, leading to the capture of Ramouseh advance towards break SDF positions.18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25 During these clashes, Coalition
district and the end of the siege on East Aleppo by August 6th.7 Raqqa in the first air strikes successfully targeted the convoy of ISs Raqqa commander
Jaysh al-Fateh defended the Ramouseh district until September 8th phase of an offensive Abu Jandal al-Kuwaiti, killing him and most of his entourage.26 Once
when pro-government forces fully recaptured it and placed East to take the city. the situation stabilized, SDF forces advanced southwest from Til
Aleppo under siege once again.8 After the ceasefire agreement Heavy air cover Samin on New Years Day, facing intense resistance for three days
between the US and Russia failed in September, government and SDF fighters shelter from the winter in
Rebel held Aleppo pictured under heavy bombardment a loader bucket has expedited SDF along the Tishrin front. Shortly thereafter the SDF captured the town
Russian air forces advances as Coalition of Mahmudli, the largest in the area.27

U p until the end of 2016, Aleppo was a central battleground in
the Syrian civil war. Aleppo was the largest city in Syria with a
pre-war population of over 2 million; consequently, control over the
city is coveted by both the Syrian government and the rebels. By
December of 2016, the entire city fell under full government control
once again.
The city was divided between government held West Aleppo,
rebel held East Aleppo, and the predominantly Kurdish Sheikh
Maqsoud district controlled by the Peoples Protection Units (YPG),
making it a microcosm of the civil war. Before the war, western
Aleppo was the
affluent part of the
city while eastern
Aleppo was home
to the poor and the
working class.1 West
Aleppo generally
experienced less
violence throughout
the war while East
Children delivering water to residents in
Aleppo was subject
rebel held Aleppo
to widespread
destruction and devastation from clashes between the government
and rebels, heavy bombardments by the Syrian Arab Air Force
(SyAAF) and Russian Air Force (RuAF), and infighting between rebel
groups.
While the YPG in Sheikh Maqsoud sometimes collaborated
with the rebels in previous years, they fought against each other
throughout 2016. The rebels support from Turkey and the YPGs
ties to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) put them at political odds.
Additionally, Sheikh Maqsouds proximity to Castello Road, the only
supply route into East Aleppo, was a primary cause for contention.
Between February and April of 2016, rebel groups launched
indiscriminate attacks on Sheikh Maqsoud, which killed at least 83
civilians and injured over 700 according to Amnesty International.2
There were also allegations that the rebels used chlorine gas in
attacks on April 5th.3 Jaysh al-Islam subsequently made a statement
admitting that they used forbidden weapons in Sheikh Maqsoud.4
intensified bombings warplanes relentlessly bombarded and beat back Islamic State (IS)
throughout East fighters who in turn countered with Improvised Explosive Devices
Aleppo.9 Infighting (IEDs), snipers and car bombs.
between rebel
groups harmed their Despite fierce resistance, SDF forces have repeatedly pushed back
ability to defend IS lines, advancing in fits and starts along the banks of the Euphrates,
against government- south across the sun-bitten desert and through olive groves that
Pro-gov forces erect government led advances.10 By cling to the minor tributaries. Raqqa, the de-facto capital and
propaganda in recaptured Aleppo December 15th, second-largest stronghold of IS, is the jewel in the crown of a 21st
the government century caliphate that spans a vast swath of land across Iraq and
controlled over 90 percent of Eastern Aleppo. Turkey, Russia, and Syria. Capturing the city is a monumental task and resistance from
the Syrian government brokered a ceasefire allowing rebels and both IS and the supporting populace is likely to increase as the SDF
civilians to evacuate East Aleppo to Idlib.11 closes in on its target.
The fall of East Aleppo poses many questions for the future of the The first phase of the SDFs offensive on Raqqa consisted of
Syrian civil war. While isolating the city from the northern section of its hinterland. The
it marks a major second phase of the offensive began on December 10th, 2016, with
victory for the Syrian the goal of securing the western and north-eastern countryside of
government, a total Al Raqqa province. The SDF also aimed to capture the Tabqa Dam
victory over all of (aka Euphrates Dam), a Soviet-era structure that stands 60m high on
Syria is still far from an earth-filled base 4.5 km wide and the largest of its kind in Syria.1
guaranteed. The rest
With support from the international Coalition, the advance started
of the country is still
south of the Tishrin dam, 90 km east of Aleppo, where the village of
An upended T-55 tank near the Great fractured between al-Kiradi was captured.2
Mosque of Aleppo has become an the government, the
unlikely attraction opposition, Islamic SDF forces continued their advance south for the next eight days,
State (IS), and the capturing a staggering 40 villages en route to the rocky shores of
YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Additionally, the the man-made Lake Assad, whose waters glimmered beneath the
fate of Sheikh Maqsoud remains to be seen. While he is willing to winter sun. This cut off 54 IS-held villages between their position
tolerate the YPG momentarily, Bashar al-Assad does not recognize and the east shore of Lake Assad.3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12
the YPGs authority in Sheikh Maqsoud and rejects its vision for an
autonomous federation in northern Syria. In turn, the YPG is unlikely IS forces launched a fierce counterattack on December 19th,
to relinquish control over Sheikh Maqsoud. however the SDF forces stubbornly held their ground during a
battle that raged for hours.13 With pressing manpower requirements
elsewhere and having fought a delaying action, IS retreated in the
By /u/solidus_snake night. The pocket was swallowed.14,15,16 The next day SDF forces
continued their advance towards the Tabqa Dam. On December
21st they captured the town of Jaabar, a strategic IS logistical point
that housed the main center for weapons storage and distribution
for the region.17
Grinding onwards and facing a limited defense from IS, the SDF
captured the 12th
century Ja'bar Castle
on January 6th, giving
the attackers a clear
view of the Euphrates
valley stretched out
before them. They
Ja'bar castle pictured from its causeway
then moved on to
across Lake Assad
take Little Suwaydiya
to the north of the Taqba damn on the 7th.28,29,30,31,32,33 However, the
latter reverted back to IS control after a successful counterattack
dislodged the SDFs insufficiently fortified position.34,35
In a momentous occasion, the SDF forces from the Tal Samin and
Tishrin fronts met on January 11th, creating an IS controlled pocket
of approximately 45 villages and 20 hamlets. Containing only a token
defensive force, these were overrun by SDF forces the following
day.36,37 The SDF continued to capture the remaining villages north
of the al Rey irrigation channel in the west of Raqqa province. On
January 15th, IS forces attempted a spirited counterattack lasting
many hours, but were ultimately driven back.38,39,40,41
The second phase of the Raqqa offensive has seen SDF forces
capture an impressive 197 villages and 2480 square km of territory,
establishing control of every village north of the western half of al Rey
irrigation channel, except for Big Suwaydiya.42 While the individual
value of these villages is of little consideration, the strategic blow
to the IS narrative of a constantly expanding caliphate cannot be
understated. IS has lost access to an area that harbored major
infrastructure and acted as a bulwark protecting its western flank.
Little by little the walls of the Caliphate are being torn asunder by
an enemy whose advances, in contrast, have been as measured
as ISs were rapid. Ultimately this boils down to a battle of wills
and ideologies; between a Caliphate determined to endure even
through conventional defeat and a Coalition hell bent on breaking
the back of Islamic terrorism in the Levant.
By /u/prky008

31 January 2017, The Week In Review | Page 6 31 January 2017, The Week In Review | Page 7
A TIMELINE OF THE BATTLE FOR MOSUL PART 3
T hree and a half months into the operation to recapture the city of Mosul from
Islamic State (IS) forces, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have secured approximately
half of the city, including its eastern bank. Through superior firepower and greater
numbers, the ISF have overwhelmed the entrenched defenders and are well-
positioned to retake the rest of the city. Casualties on both
Although generals and government officials alike remain optimistic about the
ISFs performance, some analysts have expressed doubt about the overall possible
success of the operation. Shelling and frequent combat have taken a toll on the citys
infrastructure, and the refugee crisis is worsening. Nevertheless, reinforcements
continue to be committed and the campaign marches on as the new year dawns.
December 6th
During a failed offensive on the Salam
Hospital, an Iraqi Counter-Terror Service
(ICTS) convoy was ambushed, suffering
heavy casualties. IS killed at least 20.1
December 7th
ISF advance units seized most of the al-Alam
neighborhood.2 Hospitals in Erbil and Dohuk
reported difficulties dealing with the large
number of dead and wounded soldiers and
civilians.3 Farther west, Hashd al-Shaabi
forces completed the encirclement of Tall
Abtah.4
December 8th
ISF renewed an offensive on the as-Sihah
neighborhood.5
December 9th
IS Inghimasi units skirmished with Federal
Police north of the town of Bakhdida after
a failed attempt by IS to infiltrate the city.6
Heavy clashes were reported in the Hayy al-
Intisar and Aden neighborhoods.7
December 10th
Hashd regiments assaulted and seized the
towns of Tall Abtah and Tall Faris, southwest
of Mosul.8
1 December 11th
Coalition military officials estimated that
up to this point 2,000+ IS fighters had been
killed in the Mosul operation.9 ISF units
clashed with IS in Aden neighborhood and
capture dHayy al-Nour.10
2 December 12th
ISF forces seized and secured the sizable
Aziz Fathi commercial district.11 In the hours
that followed, they also captured Hayy al-
Murur and Hayy Qadisiyah al-Oula.12
December 13th
Hashd military commanders announced the
beginning of the official operation to sweep
the Syrian-Iraqi border of all remaining IS
strongholds.13
December 14th
Following an IS counteroffensive, ISF forces
attempted to seize al-Noor neighborhood
but failed. Heavy clashes occurred in Hayy
al-Falah and near Aziz Fathi.14
31 January 2017, The Week In Review | Page 8
Bysides are mounting.
December 15th
Hashd officers announced the completion
of all mine-clearing and security operations
around Tal Afar airbase.15 IS fighters
recaptured the al-Tamim neighborhood
from ISF forces.16 Several Anbar tribes,
including al-Jughayfa, joined the border-
clearing operation.17
3
December 16th
IS and Federal Police clashed north of
the town of al-Athbah, near Mosul Airport.18
December 18th
Clashes occurred in Hayy al-Wahdat and Ilam
neighborhoods.19 Hashd forces mobilized
for an assault on the western outskirts of
Mosul.20 Tensions rose between Baghdad
and Erbil as PM Abadi refused the release
of emergency funds to the Peshmerga
command.21
4 December 20th
ISF forces counterattacked and drove IS
out of most of Hayy al-Intisar and clashed at
the al-Mithaq neighborhood front.22
December 23rd
500 additional US military personnel
dedicated to training and support arrived in
Erbil.23 Heavy fighting resumed in Hayy al-
Falah.24
December 24th
Hashd and IS forces clashed in and around
Adayah village, with neither able to claim
victory.25 Coalition officials claimed several
more strikes but denied accusations of
inflicting collateral damage.26
5 December 25th
ISF launched a pre-dawn offensive and
seized much of the Aden neighborhood.27
A renewed offensive was also launched on
parts of al-Quds.28 Clashes continued in
Aden throughout the day.29
December 28th
Fighting was heavy in the Judayda al-Mufti
and al-Samr neighborhoods.30 Coalition
officials reported that all five bridges linking
west and east Mosul had been destroyed.31
3 badly damaged fourth bridge.49 Hayy
6 December 29th
ISF lost ground in al-Salam and Hayy al-
Intisar as clashes resumed.32 Coalition aircraft
Filistin and al-Dumiz were captured after IS
forces retreated.50,51
were accused of killing dozens of civilians in January 11th
After a brief pause due to poor weather,
a strike on Salam hospital.33 By nightfall, the
By of the ground in Hayy ISF continued their advance, capturing the
ISF had retaken most
al-Intisar, and fully secured al-Quds.34 al-Sadiq quarter.52 Later in the day, the al-
Maliyah neighborhood was partially taken.53
December 30th
ISF recaptured Hayy al-Intisar in a renewed
offensive.35 13 January 12th
ICTS advance units approached
the outskirts of Mosul University and
December 31st encountered stiff resistance.54 Farther south,
IS and ISF clashed heavily in Hayy al-Intisar Hashd al-Shaabi units advanced in the
and al-Karamah. IS suffered heavy losses.36 Ninawa deserts, and Federal Police captured
Escalating tensions between local Iraqi units the Sumer and Saheroun neighborhoods
and Peshmerga on the Kokjaly frontline was near the river.55,56
reported.37
January 13th
7 January 1st
After heavy fighting, ISF forces
recaptured Karamah apartments.38 Federal
Heavy clashes occurred within Mosul
University as IS and ISF forces struggled for
control of the campus.57 ICTS continued to
police reported that the road between gain ground along the river, seizing a major
Kokjaly and Hayy al-Intisar had been secured commercial district.58
and de-mined.39
January 14th
12,14 January 2nd After heavy fighting, IS retreated from Mosul
IS counterattack on ISF defenses in Hayy al- University, yielding control to the ISF.59
15,16 Intisar failed.40 Clashes in al-Karamah and al-
10
2
Noor were also reported.
January 3rd
14 January 15th
ISF recaptured the Al-Andalus and
Kafaat districts.60
Outside news agencies reported that the
15
January 16th
17 flow of refugees from Mosul was increasing
ISF captured Hayy al-Takafah and
daily, with aid groups struggling to keep
advanced on several other fronts near the
up.41
18 river.61 The Al-Shorta district was retaken by
1,5,8
8 January 4th
ISF forces captured the al-Wahda
Iraqi forces. The badly damaged Prophet
Yunus shrine was secured.62
neighborhood after fierce fighting.42 The
16
January 17th
day was marked by clashes in al-Mithaq and
Judayda al-Mufti.43 Fighting erupted in the early morning
as ISF forces rapidly captured Zirai and
January 5th Faysaliyah districts, prompting a mass IS
9,11 Despite clashes being reported across the retreat.63 By the days end, the government
city, no gains were made by either side.44 controlled nearly all of the eastern bank.64
Only northern neighborhoods remained in
4,6,7
9 January 6th
ISF recaptured al-Muthanna
IS hands.65
14
neighborhood after heavy fighting and
shelling.45 Minor clashes were reported in
other districts.
17 January 18th
ISF forces assaulted and captured the
IS-held pocket of Tell Kayf.66
13
10 January 7th
al-Ghufran, al-Rafaq, and Judayda 18 January 19th
Federal Police, assisted by air support,
15 al-Mufti were captured by the ISF as IS
defenses collapsed under heavy pressure.46
launched an attack on Ninawa International
Hotel.67 Al-Refah palace and adjacent areas
were captured by ISF.68
11
January 8th
ISF forces advanced towards Mosul January 20th
University and secured the Sukkari and Iraqi forces launched an assault on the
Baladiyat districts.47 Farther south, the remaining IS-held checkpoints and
Salam Hospital was surrounded and taken neighborhoods in Eastern Mosul.69
by Federal Police. Iraqi government forces Preparations began for the next stage of the
reached the two southernmost bridges.48 campaign.
12
January 9th
ICTS advance units fully seized the By Trenton S
31 January 2017, The Week In Review | Page 9
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
IN 2016
2016 was a complicated year for American foreign policy in
Syria. There were undeniable gains in the war against
the Islamic State (IS), but violence has continued unabated. Given the
murky, complicated, and constantly shifting dynamics of the conflict,
how can the Obama administrations policies in Syria from the last
year be judged?
February 25, 2016: Secretary of State John Kerry looks on as
U.S. President Barack Obama makes a statement after meeting
with his National Security Council to discuss the situation with
IS and Syria, along with other regional issues.
Starting with the fundamentals, in an interview with Foreign
Policy magazine, Robert Malley, a senior advisor on the counter-IS
campaign and the White House director for the Middle East and
North Africa, laid out three key goals for the administration in Syria.
These were; defeating terrorist organizations, ending the violence
against the Syrian people, and achieving a transition that preserves
state institutions, avoiding chaos.1
Countering the Islamic State
In 2016, America made significant progress towards achieving its
goal of defeating IS and has done so as a key leader of the Operation
Inherent Resolve (OIR) Coalition. The Coalition is made up of allied
forces from dozens of other countries, including Britain, France,
Germany, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. While the terrorist group
was still able to direct and carry out multiple terror attacks abroad,
it is now much weaker than it was at the start of the year.2 According
to recent figures, IS has seen its territory shrink, its revenue streams
slashed, and its access to foreign fighters diminished to virtually
zero.3 The Coalition has also derailed the Islamic States attempts
to establish outposts and acquire territory in other failed states: the
group has been pushed out of its stronghold in Sirte, Libya and has
largely been kept in check in Afghanistan.4,5,6
31 January 2017, The Week In Review | Page 10
The territorial gains achieved by the Coalition were the result of a
deliberate and direct strategic calculation. Throughout the last year,
alongside OIR partners, they have been arming, training and providing
air support for the Kurd-dominated Syrian Defence Forces (SDF) even
in the face of increasing opposition from a fellow member of the OIR
Coalition and NATO ally, the Turkish government. Turkey views the
SDF as a proxy organisation of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a
listed terror organisation. Alongside this, it considers an independent
Kurdistan on the other side of its border with Syria a major national
security threat.7 Still, the SDF has served as critical boots on the
ground for the Coalition in northern Syria. They have delivered an
important victory in Manbij and are laying the foundations for a future
offensive on ISs de-facto capital, Raqqa.8,9
Despite these successes, IS has still carried out and facilitated
major attacks in Belgium, France and Turkey and inspired numerous
others, including in the United States.10 Still, it will be more difficult for
IS to execute and inspire attacks in the west in the future than it was
in 2015 and 2016. The groups capacity to influence and execute has
been reduced in two key ways. First, its midlevel leadership has been
decimated. According to Coalition sources, nearly all of IS leader Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadis deputies have been killed, including the head of
ISs external operations, Abu Muhammad al Adnani.11,12 Second, the
terrorist groups ability to inspire attacks through propaganda has also
been curtailed. Twitter has suspended 400,000 Islamic State-linked
accounts this year, and early research has shown that the suspensions
reduced the influence of their English-language propaganda on the
social network.13,14
Reaching a Ceasefire and Political Transition
The administrations effort to secure a ceasefire and political transition
away from Assad, in contrast to their anti-IS campaign, has largely
been a failure. Over the course of 2016, there were three attempted
ceasefires in Syria, including two reached between the United States
and Russia. Both US-negotiated ceasefires clearly failed in the long-
term to advance American interests. The first, the February Cessation
of Hostilities agreement, on paper appeared to reflect much of
what the United States wanted to achieve in Syria.15 It called for,
amongst other things, an end to the fighting between non-terrorist
opposition groups and the Syrian government as well as a rapid,
safe, unhindered, and sustained flow of humanitarian aid. The
deal proved to be ineffectual. By April, heavy fighting between the
government and opposition had resumed throughout much of the
country and by May only 160,000 of the 1 million people in critical
need of assistance had been reached by aid organisations.16,17 The
second attempt at a deal, negotiated in September, was only sparsely
observed on-the-ground.18
Its worth reflecting on why the February ceasefire did not stop Assads
obduracy. Russia proved either unable or unwilling to convince Assad
to abandon his strategy of siege and strategic relocation, an approach
fundamentally incompatible with improved aid access and a reduced
level of violence.19 While it is true that in the immediate aftermath of
the deal humanitarian access did improve in certain areas, Assad did
little to even feign compliance when any form of military advantage
was at stake.20,21,22 Aid only reached the rebel held and strategically
vital Damascus suburb of Darayya once in May 2016, for example.
Aside from this isolated occurrence, the town was barrel bombed
until negotiators from both sides struck an evacuation agreement
with government forces in August.23,24
The administrations fatal diplomatic misstep in 2016, however, was
misreading Russian incentives. Anthony Blinken, the Deputy Secretary
of State, argued in September that Russia has a profound incentive
in trying to make [the September ceasefire agreement] work. It cant
win in Syria, it can only prevent Assad from losing. If this now gets to
the point where the civil war actually accelerates, all of the outside
patrons are going to throw in more and more weaponry against
Russia. Russia will be left propping up Assad in an ever-smaller piece
of Syria.25,26 With the benefit of hindsight, it can be seen that this
prediction did not come to pass. Assads non-compliance with the
deal strengthened, rather than weakened, his military and political
standing. With the ability to bomb without consequence and deny
aid access with impunity, Assad, with the full backing of his Russian
patrons, was able to grind out a critical victory in Aleppo.27
Blinken, and the Obama administration he represents, assumed that
this would lead to a redoubling of efforts by rebel sponsors such as
Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Instead, Turkey decided to come directly
to the negotiating table with Iran and Russia, greatly weakening
American influence in shaping any potential final settlement to the
conflict. In fact, it all but guaranteed more favourable terms for Assad
than would have been negotiated had the February agreement
succeeded.28 Assuming Russia had planned to fully support Assad
regardless of a deal, it then follows that its willingness to conduct
negotiations over the past year was largely a charade and Secretary
Kerrys well-intentioned efforts were in vain from the beginning.
Put simply, the administrations failure to recognize that Assad thought
he would gain more from non-compliance with both American-
negotiated deals has greatly impeded its capability to lower the level
of violence in Syria. From the American perspective, this has rendered
achieving a favourable political transition in the coming year highly
unlikely.
Military Intervention: A Siren Song?
Despite the aforementioned failures, its important to remind oneself
that the alternatives were risky and similarly had no guarantees of
success. One mainstream proposal, outlined in a dissent memo
signed by fifty-one State Department diplomats in June, called for
the use of military force as an option to enforce the Cessation of
Hostilities and compel the Syrian regime to abide by its terms as well
as to negotiate a political solution in good faith.29
While this suggestion correctly targets the biggest obstacle towards
American success in Syria Syrian and Russian non-compliance with
the ceasefire it is not clear that the threat of American air strikes
would have changed Assads incentives in a cost-effective manner.
In the spring of 2016, Secretary Kerry repeatedly said that if Assad
did not comply with the Cessation of Hostilities, the United States
would look at Plan B options to boost its support for the Syrian
opposition, including the possibility of using military force.30,31 Still,
as is now known, these threats were inadequate to convince Assad
and Putin that compliance with the deal was in their best interests.
Critics argue that these threats were not credible because of the
administrations failure to intervene after Assad allegedly used
chemical weapons in 2013 and because of the risk-averse nature of
the Obama administrations decision-making in general, but its not
clear that more bellicose rhetoric from the administration would have
meaningfully changed Assads thinking.32
Looking to the future, staging a military intervention in order to
reach a deal or political transition would come with an array of costs
that may now be deemed unacceptable. Refugee flows to Europe
and overall violence might increase. Russia and Iran might use it as
an opportunity to deepen their regional cooperation, presenting a
long-term threat to American interests outside of Syria. Additionally,
the burden of any intervention would not be shared much by allies.
Turkey and Saudi Arabia, key American partners in any theoretical
military intervention against Assad, downgraded their support for the
opposition over the course of 2016. Turkey, roiled by serious internal
divisions, is more concerned about preventing the formation of a
Kurdish state along its border with Syria than starting a direct conflict
with Assad.33 Saudi Arabia, bogged down in a costly war in Yemen
and facing a large budget deficit due to continuing low oil prices,
could not realistically deepen its commitment in a meaningful way.34
Indeed, neither of them were in a strong enough position to support
a substantial push against Assad in 2016, a fact which is unlikely to
change in 2017.
By /u/Sorzer
31 January 2017, The Week In Review | Page 11
A SUMMARY OF THE RECENT FIGHTING IN
THE BARADA RIVER VALLEY
Looking into the mouth of the Barada river spring
The Barada River Valley (Wadi Barada) lies to the north-west of
Damascus. Up until this week it had been controlled by a pocket of
besieged rebel groups including the Al-Qaeda linked Jabhat Fateh
ash-Shaam (JFS).1,2 However, breaking developments indicate that
the pocket has entirely collapsed.3
The Barada river, which originates in the Southern Anti-Lebanon
mountains and winds its way to the nations capital, is surrounded
by mountainous terrain. This river is the main water source for
Damascus, making the valley strategically important. Control of the
mountainous terrain around the river is also important, as urban
areas in the valley are indefensible without securing the high ground.
Rebel groups took control of Wadi Barada in February of 2012, and
have held it since. Government attempts to reclaim the valley in July,
2016, was answered with a systematic execution of 12 Syrian Arab
Army (SAA) soldiers.4 After a brief respite, the government renewed
their offensive in the closing month of 2016.
On December 23rd, 2016, heavy fighting erupted in and around
the valley. On the
same day it was
reported that the
Barada River had been
contaminated with
diesel fuel, polluting
and cutting off
Debris litters the spring following
damage to the surrounding structure Damascus drinking
water. Initial reports
stated that rebel groups operating in the valley had poured the
fuel into the river.5 Alternatively, rebel groups blamed the Syrian
Airforce, claiming that their air strikes in Ain al-Fijeh damaged its
water infrastructure.6 The fog of war makes it difficult to accurately
determine culpability. However, there is evidence supporting both
sides claims.
In the past the rebels have used access to drinking water as
a bargaining chip, even cutting off Damascus in July, 2015.7
Additionally, a video has emerged that allegedly shows a rebel
group in the Baradi Water Tunnel threatening to blow it up should
government troops attack the rebel pocket. However, this video
was uploaded on December 25th, two days after the incident,
making it difficult to ascertain its actual connection to the water
contamination.8
31 January 2017, The Week In Review | Page 12
According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR),
government forces had bombed the valley on December 16th and
20th, lending credence to the rebels claims.9,10 A video uploaded
on December 23rd showed damaged buildings, supposedly water
purification infrastructure, in Ain al-Fijeh.11 A third video, shown
by Al-Jazeera but lacking a timestamp, portrays bombs landing
in Ain al-Fijeh; possibly striking the water infrastructure.12 The
investigative journalism network Bellingcat analysed the evidence
and concluded that Syrian Airforce bombing was the likely cause of
the contamination.13
On January 8th, pro-government forces including Lebanese
Hezbollah captured the mountains to the north of the pocket.14 It
then became possible for pro-government forces to concentrate
heavy firepower on the low ground and shield themselves from
sizeable counter-attacks. Soon after, government forces penetrated
the valley from the south-east and captured the small city of
Basimah.15
Reports in early January of a ceasefire, reconciliation and relocation
had surfaced, though they were denied by rebel groups.16,17 This
failure to negotiate was followed by the January 14th assassination
of the lead negotiator while he was visiting the rebel pocket. Pro-
rebel sources accused Lebanese Hezbollah while pro-government
sources blamed the rebels.18,19 Alternatively, a member of Ahrar ash-
Sham accused the JFS as the perpetrators of the assassination.20 The
fighting in Wadi Barada had brought peace talks in Astana to a halt,
since rebel groups viewed the continued fighting as a government
violation of the ceasefire agreement, and the assassination of the
lead negotiator severely complicated matters.21
It finally became
possible for repair
teams to enter Ain
al-Fijeh on January
13th, however
allegations surfaced
that repair teams
were attacked.22,23 On
Pro-gov forces pose by the spring in
January 28th, pro-
Ain al-Fijeh following its capture
government forces
took control of Ain al-Fijeh and reportedly flew the government flag
over the purification instillation.24,25 At the time of writing, repairs
have yet to be completed and Damascus is still without water.
This week, pro-government sources have reported that 2,600
rebels have laid down their arms in exchange for amnesty or the
opportunity of joining the National Defense Forces (NDF), while
buses have arrived to take other militants to Idlib.26,27,28 These same
sources report that other rebels have refused both options and
are still in direct conflict with loyalist government forces.29 None of
these reports have been independently verified. With the fighting
drawing to a close, it remains to be seen how long it will take for the
water to run clear.
By /u/Beansareno1, Andy Jackson
UPDATE:
PALMYRA
SAA forces stationed at the Tiyas (T4) airbase close to Palmyra
Following the collapse of government defensive lines in eastern
Homs to Islamic State (IS) in early December, the battlefronts in the
arid region have mostly stabilized. Overrun in Palmyra and Tadmur,
Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and National Defense Force (NDF) regiments
hastily withdrew to the Tiyas Airbase, where they established a new
defensive line and prepared to go back on the offensive. Although
the retreat was poorly organized, leaving dozens of tanks and other
vehicles behind, government forces managed to hold their ground
at Tiyas against IS advances.1,2,3
March of 2016 saw an extensive
and highly publicised campaign to
retake Palmyra from the resilient
IS defenders. On March 27th, the
government recaptured the city with
substantial Russian assistance in the
form of artillery, special forces, and
close air support from helicopters and
IS fighters overlook T4
SU-25 attack aircraft.4 In celebration
of this success, a concert was broadcast live from the citys ancient
Roman amphitheatre by St. Petersburgs Mariinsky orchestra.5
Elite SAA troops that had taken part in the operation were gradually
diverted to other critical fronts, leaving the NDF militia to take
over guard duties along with a small contingent of SAA soldiers.
The Russians also maintained a small presence of defending troops,
including mine clearance units. Once their operation was finished the
Russians withdrew.6 Soon after, IS attacked with 5,600 fighters and
hundreds of suicide bombers, quickly overrunning the defending
Syrian government forces.7,8 By December 11th, the entire city was
once again in ISs hands.
This certainly raises questions about the military significance
of Palmyra to Russia, which was either unable to detect IS troop
movements or unwilling to commit to blunting their advance. IS had
launched probing attacks against outlying checkpoints and oilfields
in the run-up to attacking Palmyra, which should have triggered an
alarm for Russian-backed Syrian forces.9 Russia predictably blamed
the stalled US-led Coalitions offensive in Mosul for allowing IS to
regroup and mount their attack on Palmyra.10
During ISs occupation of the ancient city, members of the group
have resumed their practice of destroying religious and historical
relics. While most moveable artefacts had already been relocated
to Damascus for safekeeping, IS lost no time in laying waste to
those remaining. So far they have destroyed a tetrapylon and parts
of the Roman amphitheatre. Syria director of antiquities Maamoun
Abdulkarim remarked,
This is a scandal. Palmyra is occupied and there is no outrage
from the international community. We are trying to protect a
civilisation. Its beyond political considerations. There needs
to be international solidarity.11
This is not the first time that IS has sacked Palmyras ancient
sites. In previous occupations they blew up both 2000-year old
Temples of Bel and Baalshamin, parts of the 13th century Palmyra
Castle, demolished the Lion of Al-lat statue, and wrecked a host
of other relics. In addition, they killed Khaled al-Asaad, a leading
archaeologist, after he refused to reveal the location of hidden
artefacts.12
On the military front, it appears that the tables are turning once
again. During the final week of 2016, IS launched fresh attacks
in the vicinity of the airbase, but were beaten back by the Syrian
defenders.13 After the main IS offensive stalled, government forces
refocused their efforts on securing their supply lines surrounding the
rural desert airbase. Toward these ends, on December 30th NDF
soldiers attacked and recaptured the village of Sharifah, while SAA
and Hezbollah cooperated to recapture some of the surrounding
rural territory from IS.14,15
With the pendulum swinging back, IS forces retreated further to
the east and began garrisoning the gas fields in anticipation of a
larger government campaign.16 On January 7th IS probed toward
the isolated desert town of Sharifah, but were easily repelled.17
However, the SAA has not been ready to capitalize on their recent
successes and are instead gathering reinforcements and supplies in
anticipation of a new campaign against the Maher and Shaer gas
fields. These are crucial strategic assets, especially since IS agents
recently destroyed Hayyan Gas Companys main station.18
Following the announcement of a partial withdrawal of Russian
forces critical in assisting the first capture of Palmyra, it is unclear
how extensively the Russian Air Force (RuAF) will support future
operations.19 Although heavy RuAF support would certainly aid
the governments efforts to retake the city, the task will still be
difficult. It remains to be seen how many soldiers and vehicles will
be dedicated to recapturing the lost city, and if successful, whether
they can prevent the repeat of previous errors. A lack of serious
RuAF support would certainly require the government to dedicate
more resources to any potential offensive in order to achieve
success, making the lesson sting all the harder.
By Trenton S
31 January 2017, The Week In Review | Page 13
BIBLIO & LINKS
AN OVERVIEW OF THE SDF'S RAQQA OFFENSIVE
1. https://www.ypgrojava.org/Democratic-Forces-of-Syria-launch-
https://docs.google.com/document/u/1/d/1PzdVpbiD5O-
sAXVg5Qu4OWLrqDCjWmkFi9zoq2jCycE/pub
2. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/05/syria-armed-
opposition-groups-committing-war-crimes-in-aleppo-city/
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/64274
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forces-bolster-assad-in-aleppo
7. See 4
8. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-aleppo-
idUSKCN11E1ET
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aleppo-offensive-ceasefire
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aleppo-rebels-fearful-air-strikes-escape-routes-infighting-syria-
latest-a7398566.html
11. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/14/aleppo-ceasefire-
syria-civilians-evacuate
A TIMELINE OF THE BATTLE FOR MOSUL PART 3
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38245667?ocid=socialflow_twitter
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killed-gravely-wounded-in-mosul.html
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23. Reuters
24. http://i.imgur.com/l6QDObR.png
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neighborhood-eastern-mosul/
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liberated-isis/
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41. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-
idUSKBN14O150?utm_medium=Social&utm_source=twitter
31 January 2017, The Week In Review | Page 14
42. https://twitter.com/iraqi_day/status/816616229679091712
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62. https://twitter.com/sayed_ridha/status/821036207660371968
63. https://twitter.com/IraqiSecurity/status/821341549854359552
64. https://twitter.com/OIRSpox/status/821392695490990081
65. https://twitter.com/Mogared__Mosul/status/821395383398055937
66. https://twitter.com/iraqi_day/status/822060523097387009
67. https://twitter.com/IraqiSecurity/status/822104331554062336
68. https://twitter.com/IraqiSecurity/status/822101563493797889
69. Reuters
SYRIA'S UNREPORTED ENERGY WAR: OIL, GAS, AND THE BATTLE FOR
THE HOMEFRONT
1. http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/12/middleeast/palmyra-syria-isis-russia/;
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/aleppo-syria-
assad-russia-isis-retake-capture-palmyra-advance-troops-withdrawn-
syria-islamic-state-a7475106.html; http://www.thedailybeast.com/
articles/2016/12/18/the-fall-of-aleppo-is-a-huge-gift-to-isis.html
2. http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/60316, https://www.eia.gov/beta/
international/analysis.cfm?iso=SYR
3. http://country.eiu.com/article.
aspx?articleid=1342349918&Country=Syria&topic=Economy_1;
https://twitter.com/Jacm212/status/807625532686774273
4. http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Why-Russia-And-China-
Are-Intent-On-Salvaging-Syrias-Economy.html
5. http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/55195?lang=en
6. https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=SYR
7. https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_
long/Syria/images/natural_gas_flows.png
8. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16123.pdf; http://
www.globes.co.il/en/article-1000686395
9. https://sy.aliqtisadi.com/847913-%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%B8%D9%85-
%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A9-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D
9%8A%D9%88%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%
AA%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A9/; http://www.enabbaladi.net/
archives/119411
10. http://alkhabar-sy.com/%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%B1-
%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85-
%D9%85%D8%A4%D8%B3%D8%B3%D8%A9-
%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9
%84%D9%83%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A1-
%D9%86%D8%A4%D9%85%D9%86-30-%D9%85%D9%86/
11. http://kassioun.org/economy-and-society/item/19359-2016-12-05-17-
05-30
12. https://microsyria.com/2016/11/09/%D8%A8%D8%
B9%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%B5%D9%88%D9%84-
%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81
%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%84-%D9%87%D9%84-%D9%8A%D8%A-
E%D9%81%D8%B6-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7
%D9%85-%D8%B3%D8%A7/; http://syriahomenews.com/2016/11/03
/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D
8%A1-%D8%AA%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%
D9%81%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%84-%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%-
D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-
%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7/
13. https://sy.aliqtisadi.com/843911-
%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%BA%D9%8A%D9%84-
%D8%A8%D8%A6%D8%B1-%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2-
%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8
%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%B5/
14. https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BzdGQubygdCbaVFzd1lfRnVFRjg/
view
15. http://en.alalam.ir/news/1867168; http://www.syriahr.com/
en/?p=51432
16. http://alwatan.sy/archives/82785
17. https://twitter.com/Jacm212/status/814500104052805632
18. https://twitter.com/Jacm212/status/816684225453785088
19. http://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/118583
20. http://alwatan.sy/archives/82356
21. https://www.facebook.com/eqtsad/photos/
pcb.1219803794771788/1219803358105165/?type=3#
22. http://economy2day.com/new/%D8%AA%D8%BA%
D8%B7%D9%8A%D8%A9-70-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D
9%84%D9%85%D8%A6%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A8-
%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%
BA%D8%A7%D8%B2...%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D
9%81%D8%B7-%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%88%D9%84:-
%D9%87%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%83-%D8%A5%D9%85%D9
%83%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-
%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84
%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%AC!; http://alwatan.sy/
archives/86695
23. http://www.alwatanonline.com/archives/12561; https://www.
unescwa.org/publications/syria-war-five-years
24. http://economy2day.com/new/%D8%AA%D8%BA%
D8%B7%D9%8A%D8%A9-70-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D
9%84%D9%85%D8%A6%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A8-
%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%
BA%D8%A7%D8%B2...%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D
9%81%D8%B7-%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%88%D9%84:-
%D9%87%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%83-%D8%A5%D9%85%D9
%83%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-
%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84
%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%AC
25. http://tishreen.news.sy/?p=67681
26. https://pbs.twimg.com/media/C1bodQfXgAYXRiH.jpg
27. http://www.worldbulletin.net/todays-news/182905/millions-
without-heat-as-isil-explodes-syrian-gas-plant
28. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2017/1/9/is-blows-up-
major-gas-plant-in-syrias-homs
29. http://www.alwatanonline.com/archives/9344
30. http://bit.ly/2jpHLlf
31. http://bit.ly/2k3ypxD
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN 2016
1. https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/15/a-defense-of-obamas-
middle-east-balancing-act-syria-russia-iran-nsc/
2. http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/17/world/mapping-isis-attacks-
around-the-world/
3. http://theglobalcoalition.org/us-led-plenary-meeting-to-discuss-
progress/
4. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/09/islamic-states-
safe-haven-in-sirte-libya-shrinks-to-a-single-neighborhood.php
5. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/05/isis-loses-
control-of-libyan-city-of-sirte
6. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/18/isis-in-
afghanistan-their-peak-is-over-but-they-are-not-finished
7. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/raqqa-
offensive-latest-erdogan-criticises-kurdish-us-assault-a7404831.
html
8. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/syria-sdf-retakes-manbij-
isil-160810070418628.html
9. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/11/21/battle-
isils-syrian-headquarters-huge-test-us-backed-forces/94089936/
10. See 2
11. See 3
12. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/08/islamic-state-
says-senior-official-killed-in-aleppo-syria.php
13. See 3
14. https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Berger_
Occasional%20Paper.pdf
15. https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/05/257295.htm
16. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/05/syria-monitor-
rebels-shoot-down-warplane-south-of-aleppo
17. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/as-deadline-approaches-
no-progress-on-humanitarian-aid-to-syrians/2016/05/26/
c801e0f4-2355-11e6-b944-52f7b1793dae_story.html?utm_term=.
a70973e504bf
18. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-
idUSKCN11P146
19. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/13/irans-syria-
project-pushing-population-shifts-to-increase-influence
20. http://www.wsj.com/articles/humanitarian-aid-deliveries-slow-in-
syria-1458220676
21. https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/05/257295.htm
22. http://abcnews.go.com/International/situation-inside-besieged-
syrian-town-madaya/story?id=42256299
23. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36502159
24. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/26/syria-
evacuation-of-rebels-and-families-from-darayya-under-way
25. http://www.timesofisrael.com/us-official-russia-risks-being-mired-in-
syria-quagmire/
26. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i3wmdqjo_sw
27. http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/12/middleeast/syria-analysis-tim-
lister/
28. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/20/world/middleeast/russia-iran-
and-turkey-meet-for-syria-talks-excluding-us.html
29. http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/06/17/world/middleeast/
document-state-dept-syria.html?_r=0
30. http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-readies-plan-b-to-arm-syria-
rebels-1460509400
31. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-kerry-assad-
idUSKCN0VW1X8
32. http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2016/03/04/john-kerrys-plan-b-
and-u-s-constraints-in-syria/
33. See 7
34. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-22/saudi-
arabia-sees-budget-deficit-falling-to-7-7-of-gdp-in-2017
A SUMMARY OF THE RECENT FIGHTING IN THE BARADA
RIVER VALLEY
1. http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=58216
2. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/02/syria-army-launch-
fresh-offensive-near-damascus-rebel-warning/
3. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/syrian-army-captures-
wadi-barada-170129131830656.html
4. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-nusra-
idUSKCN1002MY?il=0
5. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-water-
idUSKBN14C20Q?il=0
6. https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2017/01/04/wadi-barada-
happened-damascuss-water/
7. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/en/originals/2015/07/syria-
zabadani-regime-advance-opposition-besieged.html
8. https://twitter.com/IvanSidorenko1/status/813074765007192064
9. http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=57126
10. http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=57352
11. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G627ZEeDOIQ
12. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rtfXxRoCldc&feature=youtu.
be&t=91
13. https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2017/01/04/wadi-barada-
31 January 2017, The Week In Review | Page 15
 happened-damascuss-water/
14. https://twitter.com/CivilWarMapPT/status/818171251797688320
15. https://twitter.com/CivilWarMap/status/819661806247575553?s=09
16. https://twitter.com/MIG29_/status/819313677916602368
17. https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=180971475595
8978&id=1409638292633295
18. http://syriadirect.org/news/assassination-of-lead-negotiator-derails-
damascus-water-talks-battles-resume/#.WHuuZNw5vPA.twitter
19. https://twitter.com/MIG29_/status/820328612662484997
20. https://twitter.com/ahrarsham7/status/820383820973228032
21. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/syrian-peace-
talks-170103055420977.html
22. http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=58943
23. https://twitter.com/sayed_ridha/status/819914097063931904
24. http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=59940
25. http://www.euronews.com/2017/01/28/syrian-army-takes-over-water-
spring-near-damascus-hezbollah-run-media-unit
26. https://twitter.com/MIG29_/status/820259453723439105
27. https://twitter.com/MIG29_/status/825325207372103680
28. https://twitter.com/NatDefFor/status/825267568701218816
29. https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201701261050018003-syria-
militants-arms/
UPDATE: PALMYRA
1. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/12/islamic-state-
assaults-syrian-regime-forces-in-homs-province.php
2. https://twitter.com/SyriaWarReports/status/808343396628697088
3. https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/syrian-army-repels-first-isis-
assault-t-4-airbase-prepares-second-wave/
4. http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-syria-idUKKCN0WR0R8
5. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/05/palmyra-
amphitheatre-hosts-russian-concert-after-recapture-by-syrian-forces
6. http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/russian-troops-fled-palmyra-ahead-
of-isis-attack-lsldd09xv
7. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/14/isis-video-claims-
to-show-abandoned-russian-base-in-palmyra
8. http://english.almanar.com.lb/132152
9. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/12/islamic-state-
assaults-syrian-regime-forces-in-homs-province.php
10. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/the-times/russia-blames-
us-for-palmyras-loss-to-islamic-state/news-story/83451acd745330ca85
1fce61bde7a4b6
11. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/20/isis-destroys-
tetrapylon-monument-palmyra-syria
12. Ibid
13. https://twitter.com/raedsyrian002/status/814159680557694976
14. https://twitter.com/CivilWarMap/status/814815777018806272
15. https://twitter.com/ResistanceER/status/815596794411446273
16. http://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13951015000292
17. https://twitter.com/sayed_ridha/status/817798767478878208
18. https://twitter.com/Nidalgazaui/status/818193880285908997
19. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/06/russia-aircraft-
carrier-mediterranean-syria-admiral-kuznetsov
17. http://aranews.net/2016/12/kurdish-led-sdf-forces-expel-isis-from-key-
town-west-raqqa-kill-over-50-jihadists/
18. http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=57461
19. http://en.hawarnews.com/10910-2/
20. http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=57571
21. http://en.hawarnews.com/raqqa-campaign-seven-bomb-laden-
vehicles-destroyed/
22. http://aranews.net/2016/12/at-least-16-isis-militants-killed-by-sdf-fire-
near-raqqa/
23. http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/25122016
24. http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=57753
25. http://www.reuters.com/article/mideast-crisis-syria-euphrates-
idINKBN14G0NW
26. http://aranews.net/2016/12/isis-commander-raqqa-killed-us-airstrike/
27. http://www.reuters.com/article/mideast-crisis-syria-euphrates-
idINKBN14G0NW
28. http://en.hawarnews.com/sdf-fighters-liberate-three-more-raqqa-
villages/
29. http://aranews.net/2017/01/syrian-democratic-forces-seize-more-
ground-west-raqqa-push-to-isis-capital/
30. http://en.hawarnews.com/two-villages-and-two-hamlets-liberated/
31. https://www.yahoo.com/news/kurdish-arab-forces-seize-strategic-
syria-citadel-175514147.html
32. http://en.hawarnews.com/eight-villages-five-hamlets-liberated-in-
raqqa/
33. http://en.hawarnews.com/isis-strategic-stronghold-was-liberated/
34. http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=58595
35. http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=58659
36. http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/110120171
37. http://en.hawarnews.com/45-villages-20-hamlets-liberated-in-raqqa-
campaign/
38. http://en.hawarnews.com/sdf-fighters-liberate-odyan-village-in-raqqa-
campaign/
39. http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=59106
40. http://en.hawarnews.com/isis-attack-thwarted-in-al-raqqa/
41. http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=59123
42. https://twitter.com/CivilWarMap/status/820974884373274624

SECOND PHASE OF RAQQA OFFENSIVE

1. http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/101220162
2. http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=56675
3. http://en.hawarnews.com/wrath-of-euphrates-liberates-6-villages/
4. http://aranews.net/2016/12/kurdish-arab-alliance-captures-new-areas-
raqqa-tells-isis-jihadists-surrender-die/
5. http://en.hawarnews.com/two-villages-liberated-in-al-raqqa/
6. http://en.hawarnews.com/ajaj-and-safakhir-villages-freed/
7. http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=57039
8. http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=57158
9. http://aranews.net/2016/12/syrian-democratic-forces-capture-new-
areas-west-raqqa-amid-isis-retreat/
10. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-raqqa-
idUSKBN1480ZE?il=0
11. http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=57366
12. https://twitter.com/CivilWarMap/status/810207309041463299
13. http://en.hawarnews.com/isis-attack-thwarted-9-mercenaries-killed/
14. https://twitter.com/defenseypg/status/811127104347770880
15. https://twitter.com/CivilWarMap/status/811190997258477569
16. http://aranews.net/2016/12/us-backed-syrian-democratic-forces-
expel-isis-from-97-villages-west-raqqa/

31 January 2017, The Week In Review | Page 16 31 January 2017, The Week In Review | Page 17
 LIST OF CHARITIES RATED "B+"
(72%-74% OF FUNDS RAISED ARE USED FOR THE PURPOSES STATED)
WHO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR SYRIAN HUMANITARIAN RELIEF: