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 respondents.

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@ ese consolidated petitions for review on?
?seek in unison to annul and set aside t e
decision of respondent Court of Appeals of November 15, 1996 and its resolution  dated July 31,
1997 in CA-G.R. CV No. 24072, entitled "P ilippine Ports Aut ority, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. Far Eastern
S ipping Company, Senen C. Gavino and Manila Pilots' Association, Defendants-Appellants," w ic
affirmed wit modification t e judgment of t e trial court olding t e defendants-appellants t erein
solidarily liable for damages in favor of erein private respondent.

@ ere is no dispute about t e facts as found by t e appellate court,

t us ²

. . . On June 20, 1980, t e M/V PAVLODAR, flying under t e flags ip of t e USSR, owned and operated
by t e Far Eastern S ipping Company (FESC for brevity's sake), arrived at t e Port of Manila from
Vancouver, Britis Columbia at about 7:00 o'clock in t e morning. @ e vessel was assigned Bert 4 of t e
Manila International Port, as its bert ing space. Captain Roberto Abellana was tasked by t e P ilippine
Port Aut ority to supervise t e bert ing of t e vessel. Appellant Senen Gavino was assigned by t e
Appellant Manila Pilots' Association (MPA for brevity's sake) to conduct docking maneuvers for t e safe
bert ing of t e vessel to Bert No. 4.

Gavino boarded t e vessel at t e quarantine anc orage and stationed imself in t e bridge, wit t e
master of t e vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside im. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of t e
particulars of t e vessel and its cargo, t e vessel lifted anc or from t e quarantine anc orage and
proceeded to t e Manila International Port. @ e sea was calm and t e wind was ideal for docking
maneuvers.

W en t e vessel reac ed t e landmark (t e big c urc by t e @ondo Nort Harbor) one- alf mile from t e
pier, Gavino ordered t e engine stopped. W en t e vessel was already about 2,000 feet from t e pier,
Gavino ordered t e anc or dropped. Kavankov relayed t e orders to t e crew of t e vessel on t e bow.
@ e left anc or, wit two (2) s ackles, were dropped. However, t e anc or did not take old as expected.
@ e speed of t e vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between t e crew members. A brief
conference ensued between Kavankov and t e crew members. W en Gavino inquired w at was all t e
commotion about, Kavankov assured Gavino t at t ere was not ing to it.
 After Gavino noticed t at t e anc or did not take old, e ordered t e engines alf-astern. Abellana, w o
was t en on t e pier apron, noticed t at t e vessel was approac ing t e pier fast. Kavankov likewise
noticed t at t e anc or did not take old. Gavino t ereafter gave t e "full-astern" code. Before t e rig t
anc or and additional s ackles could be dropped, t e bow of t e vessel rammed into t e apron of t e pier
causing considerable damage to t e pier. @ e vessel sustained damage too, (u
?
?u
 ?

 ). Kavankov filed is sea protest (u
?


). Gavino submitted is report to t e C ief
Pilot (u
?
) w o referred t e report to t e P ilippine Ports Aut ority (u
?
). Abellana
likewise submitted is report of t e incident (u
?).

Per contract and supplemental contract of t e P ilippine Ports Aut ority and t e contractor for t e
re abilitation of t e damaged pier, t e same cost t e P ilippine Ports Aut ority t e amount of
P1,126,132.25 (u
?? ?u).

On January 10, 1983, t e P ilippine Ports Aut ority (PPA, for brevity), t roug t e Solicitor General,
filed before t e Regional @rial Court of Manila, Branc 39, a complaint for a sum of money against
Far Eastern S ipping Co., Capt. Senen C. Gavino and t e Manila Pilots' Association, docketed as
Civil Case No. 83-14958,praying t at t e defendants t erein be eld jointly and severally liable to
pay t e plaintiff actual and exemplary damages plus costs of suit. In a decision dated August 1, 1985,
t e trial court ordered t e defendants t erein jointly and severally to pay t e PPA t e amount of
P1,053,300.00 representing actual damages and t e costs of suit.

@ e defendants appealed to t e Court of Appeals and raised t e following issues: (1) Is t e pilot of a
commercial vessel, under compulsory pilotage, solely liable for t e damage caused by t e vessel to
t e pier, at t e port of destination, for is negligence? and (2) Would t e owner of t e vessel be liable
likewise if t e damage is caused by t e concurrent negligence of t e master of t e vessel and t e
pilot under a compulsory pilotage?

As stated at t e outset, respondent appellate court affirmed t e findings of t e court???except t at

if found no employer-employee relations ip existing between erein private respondents Manila
Pilots' Association (MPA, for s ort) and Capt. Gavino. @ is being so, it ruled instead t at t e liability
of MPA is anc ored, not on Article 2180 of t e Civil Code, but on t e provisions of Customs
Administrative Order No. 15-65,  and accordingly modified said decision of t e trial court by olding
MPA, along wit its co-defendants t erein, still solidarily liable to PPA but entitled MPA to
reimbursement from Capt. Gavino for suc amount of t e adjudged pecuniary liability in excess of t e
amount equivalent to seventy-five percent (75%) of its prescribed reserve
fund. 

Neit er Far Eastern S ipping Co. (briefly, FESC) nor MPA was appy wit t e decision of t e Court
of Appeals and bot of t em elevated t eir respective plaints to us via separate petitions for review on?

.

In G. R. No. 130068, w ic was assigned to t e Second Division of t is Court, FESC imputed t at t e

Court of Appeals seriously erred:

1. in not olding Senen C. Gavino and t e Manila Pilots' Association as t e parties solely responsible for
t e resulting damages sustained by t e pier deliberately ignoring t e establis ed jurisprudence on t e
matter;

2. in olding t at t e master ad not exercised t e required diligence demanded from im by t e

circumstances at t e time t e incident appened;

3. in affirming t e amount of damages sustained by t e respondent P ilippine Ports Aut ority despite a
strong and convincing evidence t at t e amount is clearly exorbitant and unreasonable;

4. in not awarding any amount of counterclaim prayed for by t e petitioner in its answer; and
 5. in not granting erein petitioner's claim against pilot Senen C. Gavino and Manila Pilots' Association in
t e event t at it be eld

liable. 

Petitioner asserts t at since t e MV PAVLODAR was under compulsory pilotage at t e time of t e

incident, it was t e compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino, w o was in command and ad complete control in
t e navigation and docking of t e vessel. It is t e pilot w o supersedes t e master for t e time being
in t e command and navigation of a s ip and is orders must be obeyed in all respects connected
wit er navigation. Consequently, e was solely responsible for t e damage caused upon t e pier
apron, and not t e owners of t e vessel. It claims t at t e master of t e boat did not commit any act
of negligence w en e failed to countermand or overrule t e orders of t e pilot because e did not
see any justifiable reason to do so. In ot er words, t e master cannot be faulted for relying absolutely
on t e competence of t e compulsory pilot. If t e master does not observe t at a compulsory pilot is
incompetent or p ysically incapacitated, t e master is justified in relying on t e pilot. 

Respondent PPA, in its comment, predictably in full agreement wit t e ruling of respondent court on
t e solidary liability of FESC, MPA and Capt. Gavino, stresses t e concurrent negligence of Capt.
Gavino, t e arbor pilot, and Capt. Viktor Kabankov, â s ipmaster of MV Pavlodar, as t e basis of
t eir solidary liability for damages sustained by PPA. It posits t at t e vessel was being piloted by
Capt. Gavino wit Capt. Kabankov beside im all t e w ile on t e bridge of t e vessel, as t e former
took over t e elm of MV Pavlodar w en it rammed and damaged t e apron of t e pier of Bert No. 4
of t e Manila International Port. @ eir concurrent negligence was t e immediate and proximate cause
of t e collision between t e vessel and t e pier ² Capt. Gavino, for is negligence in t e conduct of
docking maneuvers for t e safe bert ing of t e vessel; and Capt. Kabankov, for failing to
countermand t e orders of t e arbor pilot and to take over and steer t e vessel imself in t e face of
imminent danger, as well as for merely relying on Capt. Gavino during t e bert ing procedure. 

On t e ot er and, in G.R. No. 130150, originally assigned to t e Court's First Division and later
transferred to t e @ ird Division. MPA, now as petitioner in t is case, avers t at respondent court's
errors consisted in disregarding and misinterpreting Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 w ic
limits t e liability of MPA. Said pilots' association asseverates t at it s ould not be eld solidarily
liable wit Capt. Gavino w o, as eld by respondent court is only a member, not an employee,
t ereof. @ ere being no employer-employee relations ip, neit er can MPA be eld liable for any
vicarious liability for t e respective exercise of profession by its members nor be considered a joint
tortfeasor as to be eld jointly and severally liable.  It furt er argues t at t ere was erroneous
reliance on Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 and t e constitution and by-laws of MPA,
instead of t e provisions of t e Civil Code on damages w ic , being a substantive law, is ig er in
category t an t e aforesaid constitution and by-laws of a professional organization or an
administrative order w ic bears no provision classifying t e nature of t e liability of MPA for t e
negligence its member pilots. 

As for Capt. Gavino, counsel for MPA states t at t e former ad retired from active pilotage services
since July 28, 1994 and as ceased to be a member of petitioner pilots' association. He is not joined
as a petitioner in t is case since is w ereabouts are unknown. 

FESC's comment t ereto relied on t e competence of t e Court of Appeals in construing provisions of

law or administrative orders as bases for ascertaining t e liability of MPA, and expressed full accord
wit t e appellate court's olding of solidary liability among itself, MPA and Capt. Gavino. It furt er
avers t at t e disputed provisions of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 clearly establis ed
MPA's solidary liability. 

On t e ot er and, public respondent PPA, likewise t roug representations by t e Solicitor General,

assumes t e same supportive stance it took in G.R. No. 130068 in declaring its total accord wit t e
ruling of t e Court of Appeals t at MPA is solidarily liable wit Capt. Gavino and FESC for damages,
and in its application to t e fullest extent of t e provisions of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65
in relation to MPA's constitution and by-laws w ic spell out t e conditions of and govern t eir
respective liabilities. @ ese provisions are clear and unambiguous as regards MPA's liability wit out
need for interpretation or construction. Alt oug Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 is a mere
regulation issued by an administrative agency pursuant to delegated legislative aut ority to fix details
to implement t e law, it is legally binding and as t e same statutory force as any valid statute. 

Upon motion  by FESC dated April 24, 1998 in G.R. No. 130150, said case was consolidated wit
G.R. No. 130068.  

Prefatorily, on matters of compliance wit procedural requirements, it must be mentioned t at t e

conduct of t e respective counsel for FESC and PPA leaves muc to be desired, to t e displeasure
and disappointment of t is Court.

Sec. 2, Rule 42 of t e 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure incorporates t e former Circular No. 28-91
w ic provided for w at as come to be known as t e certification against forum s opping as an
additional requisite for petitions filed wit t e Supreme Court and t e Court of Appeals, aside from t e
ot er requirements contained in pertinent provisions of t e Rules of Court t erefor, wit t e end in
view of preventing t e filing of multiple complaints involving t e same issues in t e Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals or different divisions t ereof or any ot er tribunal or agency.

More particularly, t e second paragrap of Section 2, Rule 42 provides:

xxx xxx xxx

@ e petitioner s all also submit toget er wit t e petition a certification under oat t at e as not
t eretofore commenced any ot er action involving t e same issues in t e Supreme Court, t e Court of
Appeals or different divisions t ereof, or any ot er tribunal or agency;??


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For petitions for review filed before t e Supreme Court, Section 4(e), Rule 45 specifically
requires t at suc petition s all contain a sworn certification against forum s opping as
provided in t e last paragrap of Section 2, Rule 42.

@ e records s ow t at t e law firm of Del Rosario and Del Rosario t roug its associate, Atty. Herbert
A. @ria, is t e counsel of record for FESC in bot G.R. No. 130068 and G.R. No. 130150.

G.R. No. 130068, w ic is assigned to t e Court's Second Division, commenced wit t e filing by
FESC t roug counsel on August 22, 1997 of a verified motion for extension of time to file its petition
for t irty (30) days from August 28, 1997 or until September 27, 1997.  Said motion contained t e
following certification against forum s opping  signed by Atty. Herbert A. @ria as affiant:

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( ??)(

I/we ereby certify t at I/we ave not commenced any ot er action or proceeding involving t e same
issues in t e Supreme Court, t e Court of Appeals, or any ot er tribunal or agency; t at to t e best of my
own knowledge, no suc action or proceeding is pending in t e Supreme Court, t e Court of Appeals, or
any ot er tribunal or agency; t at if I/we s ould t ereafter learn t at a similar action or proceeding as
 been filed or is pending before t e Supreme Court, t e Court of Appeals, or any ot er tribunal or agency,
I/we undertake to report t at fact wit in five (5) days t erefrom to t is Honorable Court.

@ is motion aving been granted, FESC subsequently filed its petition on September 26, 1997,
t is time bearing a "verification and certification against forum-s opping" executed by one
@eodoro P. Lopez on September 24, 1997,  to wit:

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I, @eodoro P. Lopez, of legal age, after being duly sworn, depose and state: 

1. @ at I am t e Manager, Claims Department of Filsov S ipping Company, t e local agent of petitioner in

t is case.

2. @ at I ave caused t e preparation of t is Petition for Review on?
.

3. @ at I ave read t e same and t e allegations t erein contained are true and correct based on t e
records of t is case.

4. @ at I certify t at petitioner as not commenced any ot er action or proceeding involving t e same

issues in t e Supreme Court or Court of Appeals, or any ot er tribunal or agency, 
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Reviewing t e records, we find t at t e petition filed by MPA in G.R. No. 130150 t en pending wit
t e @ ird Division was duly filed on August 29, 1997 wit a copy t ereof furnis ed on t e same date
by registered mail to counsel for FESC.  Counsel of record for MPA. Atty. Jesus P. Amparo, in is
verification accompanying said petition dutifully revealed to t e Court t at ²

xxx xxx xxx

3. Petitioner as not commenced any ot er action or proceeding involving t e same issues in t is

Honorable Court, t e Court of Appeals or different Divisions t ereof, or any ot er tribunal or agency, ?
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undersigned counsel will come to know of any ot er pending action or claim filed or pending e
undertakes to report suc fact wit in five (5) days to t is Honorable Court. (Emp asis supplied.)

Inasmuc as MPA's petition in G.R. No. 130150 was posted by registered mail on August 29, 1997
and taking judicial notice of t e average period of time it takes local mail to reac its destination, by
reasonable estimation it would be fair to conclude t at w en FESC filed its petition in G.R. No.
130068 on September 26, 1997, it would already ave received a copy of t e former and would t en
ave knowledge of t e pendency of t e ot er petition initially filed wit t e First Division. It was
t erefore incumbent upon FESC to inform t e Court of t at fact t roug its certification against forum
s opping. For failure to make suc disclosure, it would appear t at t e aforequoted certification
accompanying t e petition in G.R. No. 130068 is defective and could ave been a ground for
dismissal t ereof.
Even assuming t at FESC ad not yet received its copy of MPA's petition at t e time it filed its own
petition and executed said certification, its signatory did state "t at if I s ould t ereafter learn t at a
similar action or proceeding as been filed or is pending before t e Supreme Court, t e Court of
Appeals or any ot er tribunal or agency, I undertake to report t e fact wit in five (5) days t erefrom to
t is Honorable Court."  Scouring t e records page by page in t is case, we find t at no
manifestation concordant wit suc undertaking was t en or at any ot er time t ereafter ever filed by
FESC nor was t ere any attempt to bring suc matter to t e attention of t e Court. Moreover, it
cannot feign non-knowledge of t e existence of suc ot er petition because FESC itself filed t e
motion for consolidation in G.R. No. 130150 of t ese two cases on April 24, 1998.

It is disturbing to note t at counsel for FESC, t e law firm of Del Rosario and Del Rosario, displays an
unprofessional tendency of taking t e Rules for granted, in t is instance exemplified by its???
compliance t erewit but apparently wit out full compre ension of and wit less t an fait ful
commitment to its undertakings to t is Court in t e interest of just, speedy and orderly administration
of court proceedings.

As between t e lawyer and t e courts, a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good fait to t e court. 
He is an officer of t e court exercising a privilege w ic is indispensable in t e administration of
justice.  Candidness, especially towards t e courts, is essential for t e expeditious administration of
justice. Courts are entitled to expect only complete onesty from lawyers appearing and pleading
before t em.  Candor in all dealings is t e very essence of onorable members ip in t e legal
profession.  More specifically, a lawyer is obliged to observe t e rules of procedure and not to
misuse t em to defeat t e ends of justice.  It be ooves a lawyer, t erefore, to exert every effort and
consider it is duty to assist in t e speedy and efficient administration of justice.  Being an officer of
t e court, a lawyer as a responsibility in t e proper administration of justice. Like t e court itself, e
is an instrument to advance its ends ² t e speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive
adjudication of cases and t e prompt satisfaction of final judgments. A lawyer s ould not only elp
attain t ese objectives but s ould likewise avoid any unet ical or improper practices t at impede,
obstruct or prevent t eir realization, c arged as e is wit t e primary task of assisting in t e speedy
and efficient administration of justice.

Sad to say, t e members of said law firm sorely failed to observe t eir duties as responsible members
of t e Bar. @ eir actuations are indicative of t eir predisposition to take lig tly t e avowed duties of
officers of t e Court to promote respect for law and for legal processes.  We cannot allow t is state
of t ings to pass judicial muster.

In view of t e fact t at at around t e time t ese petitions were commenced, t e 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure ad just taken effect, t e Court treated infractions of t e new Rules t en wit relative
liberality in evaluating full compliance t erewit . Nevert eless, it would do well to remind all
concerned t at t e penal provisions of Circular No. 28-91 w ic remain operative provides,? 
?:

3. 

. ²

xxx xxx xxx

(c) @ e submission of a false certification under Par. 2 of t e Circular s all likewise constitute contempt of
court, wit out prejudice to t e filing of criminal action against t e guilty party. @ e lawyer may also be
subjected to disciplinary proceedings.

It must be stressed t at t e certification against forum s opping ordained under t e Rules is to be

executed by t e?

, and not by counsel. Obviously it is t e petitioner, and not always t e
counsel w ose professional services ave been retained for a particular case, w o is in t e best
position to know w et er e or it actually filed or caused t e filing of a petition in t at case. Hence, a
certification against forum s opping by counsel is a defective certification. It is clearly equivalent to
non-compliance wit t e requirement under Section 2, Rule 42 in relation to Section 4, Rule 45, and
constitutes a valid cause for dismissal of t e petition.

Hence, t e initial certification appended to t e motion for extension of time to file petition in G.R. No.
130068 executed in be alf of FESC by Atty. @ria is procedurally deficient. But considering t at it was
a superfluity at t at stage of t e proceeding, it being unnecessary to file suc a certification wit a
mere motion for extension, we s all disregard suc error. Besides, t e certification subsequently
executed by @eodoro P. Lopez in be alf of FESC cures t at defect to a certain extent, despite t e
inaccuracies earlier pointed out. In t e same vein, we s all consider t e verification signed in be alf
of MPA by its counsel, Atty. Amparo, in G.R. No. 130150 as substantial compliance inasmuc as it
served t e purpose of t e Rules of informing t e Court of t e pendency of anot er action or
proceeding involving t e same issues.

It bears stressing t at procedural rules are instruments in t e speedy and efficient administration of
justice. @ ey s ould be used to ac ieve suc end and not to derail it. 

Counsel for PPA did not make matters any better. Despite t e fact t at, save for t e Solicitor General
at t e time, t e same legal team of t e Office of t e Solicitor General (OSG, for s ort) composed of
Assistant Solicitor General Roman G. Del Rosario and Solicitor Luis F. Simon, wit t e addition of
Assistant Solicitor General Pio C. Guerrero very muc later in t e proceedings, represented PPA
t roug out t e appellate proceedings in bot G.R. No. 130068 and G.R. No. 130150 and was
presumably fully acquainted wit t e facts and issues of t e case, it took t e OSG an inordinately and
almost unreasonably long period of time to file its comment, t us unduly delaying t e resolution of
t ese cases. It took several c anges of leaders ip in t e OSG ² from Silvestre H. Bello III to Romeo
C. dela Cruz and, finally, Ricardo P. Galvez ² before t e comment in be alf of PPA was finally filed.

In G.R. No. 130068, it took eig t (8) motions for extension of time totaling 210 days, a warning t at no
furt er extensions s all be granted, and personal service on t e Solicitor General imself of t e
resolution requiring t e filing of suc comment before t e OSG indulged t e Court wit t e long
required comment on July 10, 1998.  @ is, despite t e fact t at said office was required to file its
comment way back on November 12, 1997.  A closer scrutiny of t e records likewise indicates t at
petitoner FESC was not even furnis ed a copy of said comment as required by Section 5, Rule 42.
Instead, a copy t ereof was inadvertently furnis ed to MPA w ic , from t e point of view of G.R. No.
130068, was a non-party.  @ e OSG fared slig tly better in G.R. No. 130150 in t at it took only six
(6) extensions, or a total of 180 days, before t e comment was finally filed.  And w ile it properly
furnis ed petitioner MPA wit a copy of its comment, it would ave been more desirable and
expedient in t is case to ave furnis ed its t erein co-respondent FESC wit a copy t ereof, if only as
a matter of professional courtesy. 

@ is undeniably dilatory disinclination of t e OSG to seasonably file required pleadings constitutes

deplorable disservice to t e tax-paying public and can only be categorized as censurable inefficiency
on t e part of t e government law office. @ is is most certainly professionally unbecoming of t e
OSG.

Anot er t ing t at baffles t e Court is w y t e OSG did not take t e inititive of filing a motion for
consolidation in eit er G.R. No. 130068 or G.R. No. 130150, considering its familiarity wit t e
background of t e case and if only to make its job easier by aving to prepare and file only one
comment. It could not ave been unaware of t e pendency of one or t e ot er petition because,
being counsel for respondent in bot cases, petitioner is required to furnis it wit a copy of t e
petition under pain of dismissal of t e petition for failure ot erwise. 

Besides, in G.R. 130068, it prefaces its discussions t us ²

 Incidentally, t e Manila Pilots' Association (MPA), one of t e defendants-appellants in t e case before t e
respondent Court of Appeals, as taken a separate appeal from t e said decision to t is Honorable Court,
w ic was docketed as G.R. No. 130150 and entitled "Manila Pilots' Association, Petitioner, versus
P ilippine Ports Aut ority and Far Eastern S ipping Co., Respondents." 

Similarly, in G.R. No. 130150, it states ²

Incidentally, respondent Far Eastern S ipping Co. (FESC) ad also taken an appeal from t e said
decision to t is Honorable Court, docketed as G.R. No. 130068, entitled "Far Eastern S ipping Co. vs.
Court of Appeals and P ilippine Ports Aut ority." 

We find ere a lackadaisical attitude and complacency on t e part of t e OSG in t e andling of its
cases and an almost reflexive propensity to move for countless extensions, as if to test t e patience
of t e Court, before favoring it wit t e timely submission of required pleadings.

It must be emp asized t at t e Court can resolve cases only as fast as t e respective parties in a
case file t e necessary pleadings. @ e OSG, by needlessly extending t e pendency of t ese cases
t roug its numerous motions for extension, came very close to ex austing t is Court's forbearance
and as regrettably fallen s ort of its duties as t e People's @ribune.

@ e OSG is reminded t at just like ot er members of t e Bar, t e canons under t e Code of

Professional Responsibility apply wit equal force on lawyers in government service in t e disc arge
of t eir official tasks.  @ ese et ical duties are rendered even more exacting as to t em because, as
government counsel, t ey ave t e added duty to abide by t e policy of t e State to promote a ig
standard of et ics in public service.  Furt ermore, it is incumbent upon t e OSG, as part of t e
government bureaucracy, to perform and disc arge its duties wit t e ig est degree of
professionalism, intelligence and skill  and to extend prompt, courteous and adequate service to t e
public. 

Now, on t e merits of t e case. After a judicious examination of t e records of t is case, t e

pleadings filed, and t e evidence presented by t e parties in t e two petitions, we find no cogent
reason to reverse and set aside t e questioned decision. W ile not entirely a case of first impression,
we s all discuss t e issues 
 and, correlatively by way of a judicial once-over, inasmuc as t e
matters raised in bot petitions beg for validation and updating of well-worn maritime jurisprudence.
@ ereby, we s all write?  to t e endless finger-pointing in t is s ipping mis ap w ic as been
stretc ed beyond t e limits of judicial tolerance.

@ e Port of Manila is wit in t e Manila Pilotage District w ic is under compulsory pilotage pursuant
to Section 8, Article III of P ilippine Ports Aut ority Administrative Order No. 03-85,  w ic provides
t at:

Sec. 8. ?
?
!
. ² For entering a arbor and anc oring t ereat, or passing t roug
rivers or straits wit in a pilotage district, as well as docking and undocking at any pier/w arf, or s ifting
from one bert or anot er, every vessel engaged in coastwise and foreign trade s all be under
compulsory pilotage. . . .

In case of compulsory pilotage, t e respective duties and responsibilities of t e compulsory pilot and
t e master ave been specified by t e same regulation in t is wise:

Sec. 11.  ??!

? ?"??
. ² On compulsory pilotage grounds, t e Harbor Pilot

providing t e service to a vessel s all be responsible for t e damage caused to a vessel or to life and
property at ports due to is negligence or fault. He can only be absolved from liability if t e accident is
caused by force .

or natural calamities provided e as exercised prudence and extra diligence to
prevent or minimize damage.
 @ e Master s all retain overall command of t e vessel even on pilotage grounds w ereby e can
countermand or overrule t e order or command of t e Harbor Pilot on beard. In suc event, any damage
caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports by reason of t e fault or negligence of t e Master s all
be t e responsibility and liability of t e registered owner of t e vessel concerned wit out prejudice to
recourse against said Master.

Suc liability of t e owner or Master of t e vessel or its pilots s all be determined by competent aut ority
in appropriate proceedings in t e lig t of t e facts and circumstances of eac particular case.

Sec. 32. Duties and responsibilities of t e Pilot or Pilots' Association. ² @ e duties and responsibilities of
t e Harbor Pilot s all be as follows: 

xxx xxx xxx

f) a pilot s all be eld responsible for t e direction of a vessel from t e time e assumes is work as a
pilot t ereof until e leaves it anc ored or bert ed safely; !
, owever, t at is responsibility s all
cease at t e moment t e Master neglects or refuses to carry out isorder.

Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 issued twenty years earlier likewise provided in C apter I
t ereof for t e responsibilities of pilots:

Par. XXXIX. ² A Pilot s all be eld responsible for t e direction of a vessel from t e time e assumes
control t ereof until e leaves it anc ored free from s oal: !
, @ at is responsibility s all cease at
t e moment t e master neglects or refuses to carry out is instructions.

xxx xxx xxx

Par. XLIV. ² Pilots s all properly and safely secure or anc or vessels under t eir control w en requested
to do so by t e master of suc vessels.

+?(++?+?/001,

Petitioner FESC faults t e respondent court wit serious error in not olding MPA and Capt. Gavino
solely responsible for t e damages cause to t e pier. It avers t at since t e vessel was under
compulsory pilotage at t e time wit Capt. Gavino in command and aving exclusive control of t e
vessel during t e docking maneuvers, t en t e latter s ould be responsible for damages caused to
t e pier.  It likewise olds t e appellate court in error for olding t at t e master of t e s ip, Capt.
Kabankov, did not exercise t e required diligence demanded by t e circumstances. 

We start our discussion of t e successive issues bearing in mind t e evidentiary rule in American
jurisprudence t at t ere is a presumption of fault against a moving vessel t at strikes a stationary
object suc as a dock or navigational aid. In admiralty, t is presumption does more t an merely
require t e s ip to go forward and produce some evidence on t e presumptive matter. @ e moving
vessel must s ow t at it was wit out fault or t at t e collision was occasioned by t e fault of t e
stationary object or was t e result of inevitable accident. It as been eld t at suc vessel must
ex aust every reasonable possibility w ic t e circumstances admit and s ow t at in eac , t ey did
all t at reasonable care required.  In t e absence of sufficient proof in rebuttal, t e presumption of
fault attac es to a moving vessel w ic collides wit a fixed object and makes a?? 
case of
fault against t e vessel.  Logic and experience support t is presumption:

@ e common sense be ind t e rule makes t e burden a eavy one. Suc accidents simply do not occur
in t e ordinary course of t ings unless t e vessel as been mismanaged in some way. It is nor sufficient
for t e respondent to produce witnesses w o testify t at as soon as t e danger became apparent
everyt ing possible was done to avoid an accident. @ e question remains, How t en did t e collision
occur? @ e answer must be eit er t at, in spite of t e testimony of t e witnesses, w at was done was too
little or too late or, if not, t en t e vessel was at fault for being in a position in w ic an unavoidable
collision would occur. 
 @ e task, t erefore, in t ese cases is to pinpoint w o was negligent ² t e master of t e s ip,
t e arbor pilot or bot .

A pilot, in maritime law, is a person duly qualified, and licensed, to conduct a vessel into or out of
ports, or in certain waters. In a broad sense, t e term "pilot" includes bot (1) t ose w ose duty it is to
guide vessels into or out of ports, or in particular waters and (2) t ose entrusted wit t e navigation of
vessels on t e ig seas.  However, t e term "pilot" is more generally understood as a person taken
on board at a particular place for t e purpose of conducting a s ip t roug a river, road or c annel, or
from a port. 

Under Englis and American aut orities, generally speaking, t e pilot supersedes t e master for t e
time being in t e command and navigation of t e s ip, and is orders must be obeyed in all matters
connected wit er navigation. He becomes t e master??
 ?!
?and s ould give all directions as
to speed, course, stopping and reversing anc oring, towing and t e like. And w en a licensed pilot is
employed in a place w ere pilotage is compulsory, it is is duty to insist on aving effective control of
t e vessel, or to decline to act as pilot. Under certain systems of foreign law, t e pilot does not take
entire c arge of t e vessel, but is deemed merely t e adviser of t e master, w o retains command
and control of t e navigation even in localities w ere pilotage is compulsory. 

It is quite common for states and localities to provide for compulsory pilotage, and safety laws ave
been enacted requiring vessels approac ing t eir ports, wit certain exceptions, to take on board
pilots duly licensed under local law. @ e purpose of t ese laws is to create a body of seamen
t oroug ly acquainted wit t e arbor, to pilot vessels seeking to enter or depart, and t us protect life
and property from t e dangers of navigation. 

In line wit suc establis ed doctrines, C apter II of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65
prescribes t e rules for compulsory pilotage in t e covered pilotage districts, among w ic is t e
Manila Pilotage District,
!2. ²

PARAGRAPH I. ² Pilotage for entering a arbor and anc oring t ereat, as well as docking and
undocking in any pier or s ifting from one bert to anot er s all be compulsory, except Government
vessels and vessels of foreign governments entitled to courtesy, and ot er vessels engaged solely in river
or arbor work, or in a daily ferry service between ports w ic s all be exempt from compulsory pilotage
provisions of t ese regulations:?!
, owever, t at compulsory pilotage s all not apply in pilotage
districts w ose optional pilotage is allowed under t ese regulations.

Pursuant t ereto, Capt. Gavino was assigned to pilot MV Pavlodar into Bert 4 of t e Manila
International Port. Upon assuming suc office as compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is eld to t e
universally accepted ig standards of care and diligence required of a pilot, w ereby e assumes to
ave skill and knowledge in respect to navigation in t e particular waters over w ic is license
extends superior to and more to be trusted t an t at of t e master.  A pilot 57 s ould ave a
t oroug knowledge of general and local regulations and p ysical conditions affecting t e vessel in
is c arge and t e waters for w ic e is licensed, suc as a particular arbor or river.

He is not eld to t e ig est possible degree of skill and care, but must ave and exercise t e
ordinary skill and care demanded by t e circumstances, and usually s own by an expert in is
profession. Under extraordinary circumstancesm, a pilot must exercise extraordinary care.  

In 

?!+?

?
$

 ?  ? #
? ".  Mr. Justice Miller spelled out in great detail
t e duties of a pilot:

. . . (@) e pilot of a river steamer, like t e arbor pilot, is selected for is personal knowledge of t e
topograp y t roug w ic e steers is vessel. In t e long course of a t ousand miles in one of t ese
 rivers, e must be familiar wit t e appearance of t e s ore on eac side of t e river as e goes along. Its
banks, towns, its landings, its ouses and trees, are all landmarks by w ic e steers is vessel. @ e
compass is of little use to im. He must know w ere t e navigable c annel is, in its relation to all t ese
external objects, especially in t e nig t. He must also be familiar wit all dangers t at are permanently
located in t e course of t e river, as sand-bars, snags, sunken rocks or trees or abandoned vessels
orbarges. All t is e must know and remember and avoid. @o do t is, e must be constantly informed of
t e c anges in t e current of t e river, of t e sand-bars newly made,of logs or snags, or ot er objects
newly presented, against w ic is vessel mig t be injured.

xxx xxx xxx

It may be said t at t is is exacting a very ig order of ability in a pilot. But w en we consider t e value of
t e lives and property committed to t eir control, for in t is t ey are absolute masters, t e ig
compensation t ey receive, t e care w ic Congress as taken to secure by rigid and frequent
examinations and renewal of licenses, t is very class of skill, we do not t ink we fix t e standard too ig .

@ested t ereby, we affirm respondent court's finding t at Capt. Gavino failed to measure up to suc
strict standard of care and diligence required of pilots in t e performance of t eir duties. Witness t is
testimony of Capt. Gavino:

Court: You ave testified before t at t e reason w y t e vessel bumped t e pier was
because t e anc or was not released immediately or as soon as you ave given t e
order. Do you remember aving srated t at?

A Yes, your Honor.

Q And you gave t is order to t e captain of t e vessel?

A Yes, your Honor.

Q By t at testimony, you are leading t e Court to understand t at if t at anc or was

released immediately at t e time you gave t e order, t e incident would not ave
appened. Is t at correct?

A Yes, sir, but actually it was only a presumption on my part because t ere was a
commotion between t e officers w o are in c arge of t e dropping of t e anc or and t e
captain. I could not understand t eir language, it was in Russian, so I presumed t e
anc or was not dropped on time.

Q So, you are not sure w et er it was really dropped on time or not?

A I am not sure, your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

Q You are not even sure w at could ave caused t e incident. W at factor could ave
caused t e incident?

A Well, in t is case now, because eit er t e anc or was not dropped on time or t e
anc or did not old, t at was t e cause of t e incident, your Honor. 

It is disconcertingly riddled wit too muc incertitude and manifests a seeming indifference for t e
possibly injurious consequences is commands as pilot may ave. Prudence required t at e, as
pilot, s ould ave made sure t at is directions were promptly and strictly followed. As correctly noted
by t e trial court ²

Moreover, assuming t at e did indeed give t e command to drop t e anc or on time, as pilot e s ould
ave seen to it t at t e order was carried out, and e could ave done t is in a number of ways, one of
 w ic was to inspect t e bow of t e vessel w ere t e anc or mec anism was installed. Of course,
Captain Gavino makes reference to a commotion among t e crew members w ic supposedly caused
t e delay in t e execution of t e command. @ is account was reflected in t e pilot's report prepared four
ours later, but Capt. Kavankov, w ile not admitting w et er or not suc a commotion occurred,
maintained t at t e command to drop anc or was followed "immediately and precisely." Hence, t e Court
cannot give muc weig t or consideration to t is portion of Gavino's testimony." 

An act may be negligent if it is done wit out t e competence t at a reasonable person in t e position
of t e actor would recognize as necessary to prevent it from creating an unreasonable risk of arm to
anot er.  @ ose w o undertake any work calling for special skills are required not only to exercise
reasonable care in w at t ey do but also possess a standard minimum of special knowledge and
ability. 

Every man w o offers is services to anot er, and is employed, assumes to exercise in t e
employment suc skills e possesses, wit a reasonable degree of diligence. In all t ese
employments w ere peculiar skill is requisite, if one offers is services e is understood as olding
imself out to t e public as possessing t e degree of skill commonly possessed by ot ers in t e same
employment, and if is pretensions are unfounded e commits a species of fraud on every man w o
employs im in reliance on is public profession. 

Furt ermore, t ere is an obligation on all persons to take t e care w ic , under ordinary
circumstances of t e case, a reasonable and prudent man would take, and t e omission of t at care
constitutes negligence.  Generally, t e degree of care required is graduated according to t e danger
a person or property attendant upon t e activity w ic t e actor pursues or t e instrumentality w ic
e uses. @ e greater t e danger t e greater t e degree of care required. W at is ordinary under
extraordinary of conditions is dictated by t ose conditions; extraordinary risk demands extraordinary
care. Similarly, t e more imminent t e danger, t e ig er t e degree of care. 

We give our imprimatur to t e bases for t e conclusion of t e Court of Appeals t at Capt. Gavino was
indeed negligent in t e performance of is duties:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . As can be gleaned from t e logbook, Gavino ordered t e left anc or and two (2) s ackles dropped at
8:30 o'clock in t e morning. He ordered t e engines of t e vessel stopped at 8:31 o'clock. By t en,Gavino
must ave realized t at t e anc or did not it a ard object and was not clawed so as to reduce t e
momentum of t e vessel. In point of fact, t e vessel continued travelling towards t e pier at t e same
speed. Gavino failed to react, At 8:32 o'clock, t e two (2) tugboats began to pus t e stern part of t e
vessel from t e port side bur t e momentum of t e vessel was not contained. Still, Gavino did not react.
He did not even order t e ot er anc or and two (2) more s ackles dropped to arrest t e momentum of
t e vessel. Neit er did e order full-astern. It was only at 8:34 o'clock, ??%*'? 
, after t e anc or
was dropped t at Gavino reacted. But is reaction was even ( ap azard) because instead of arresting
fully t e momentum of t e vessel wit t e elp of t e tugboats, Gavino ordered merely " alf-astern". It
took Gavino anot er minute to order a "full-astern". By t en, it was too late. @ e vessel's momentum
could no longer be arrested and, barely a minute t ereafter, t e bow of t e vessel it t e apron of t e
pier. Patently, Gavino miscalculated. He failed to react and undertake adequate measures to arrest fully
t e momentum of t e vessel after t e anc or failed to claw to t e seabed. W en e reacted, t e same
was even ( ap azard). Gavino failed to reckon t e bulk of t e vessel, its size and its cargo. He
erroneously believed t at only one (1) anc or would suffice and even w en t e anc or failed to claw into
t e seabed or against a ard object in t e seabed, Gavino failed to order t e ot er anc or dropped
immediately. His claim t at t e anc or was dropped w en t e vessel was only 1,000 feet from t e pier is
but a belated attempt to extricate imself from t e quagmire of is own insouciance and negligence. In
sum, t en, Appellants' claim t at t e incident was caused by "force majeure" is barren of factual basis.

xxx xxx xxx

@ e arbor pilots are especially trained for t is job. In t e P ilippines, one may not be a arbor pilot
unless e passed t e required examination and training conducted t en by t e Bureau of Custom, under
 Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65, now under t e P ilippine Ports Aut ority under PPA
Administrative Order 63-85, Paragrap XXXIX of t e Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 provides
t at "t e pilot s all be eld responsible for t e direction of t e vessel from t e time e assumes control
t ereof, until e leaves it anc ored free from s oal:?!
, t at is responsibility s all cease at
t e.moment t e master neglects or refuse(s) to carry out is instructions." @ e overall direction regarding
t e procedure for docking and undocking t e vessel emanates from t e arbor pilot. In t e present
recourse, Gavino failed to live up to is responsibilities and exercise reasonable care or t at degree of
care required by t e exigencies of t e occasion. Failure on is part to exercise t e degree of care
demanded by t e circumstances is negligence (Reese versus P iladelp ia & RR Co. 239 US 363, 60 L

ed. 384, 57 Am Jur, 2d page 418). 

@ is affirms t e findings of t e trial court regarding Capt. Gavino's negligence:

@ is discussion s ould not owever, divert t e court from t e fact t at negligence in manuevering t e
vessel must be attributed to Capt. Senen Gavino. He was an experienced pilot and by t is time s ould
ave long familiarized imself wit t e dept of t e port and t e distance e could keep between t e
vessel and port in order to bert safely.  

@ e negligence on t e part of Capt. Gavino is evident; but Capt. Kabancov is no less responsible for
t e allision. His unconcerned let argy as master of t e s ip in t e face of troublous exigence
constitutes negligence.

W ile it is indubitable t at in exercising is functions a pilot is in sole command of t e s ip  and

supersedes t e master for t e time being in t e command and navigation of a s ip and t at e
becomes master??
 ?!
of a vessel piloted by im,  t ere is overw elming aut ority to t e
effect t at t e master does not surrender is vessel to t e pilot and t e pilot is not t e master. @ e
master is still in command of t e vessel notwit standing t e presence of a pilot. @ ere are occasions
w en t e master may and s ould interfere and even displace t e pilot, as w en t e pilot is obviously
incompetent or intoxicated and t e circumstances may require t e master to displace a compulsory
pilot because of incompetency or p ysical incapacity. If, owever, t e master does nor observe t at a
compulsory pilot is incompetent or p ysically incapacitated, t e master is justified in relying on t e
pilot, but not blindly. 

@ e master is not w olly absolved from is duties w ile a pilot is on board is vessel, and may advise
wit or offer suggestions to im. He is still in command of t e vessel, except so far as er navigation
is concerned, and must cause t e ordinary work of t e vessel to be properly carried on and t e usual
precaution taken. @ us, in particular, e is bound to see t at t ere is sufficient watc on deck, and
t at t e men are attentive to t eir duties, also t at engines are stopped, towlines cast off, and t e
anc ors clear and ready to go at t e pilot's order. 

A perusal of Capt. Kabankov's testimony makes it apparent t at e was remiss in t e disc arge of is
duties as master of t e s ip, leaving t e entire docking procedure up to t e pilot, instead of
maintaining watc ful vigilance over t is risky maneuver:

Q Will you please tell us w et er you ave t e rig t to intervene in docking of your s ip in
t e arbor?

A No sir, I ave no rig t to intervene in time of docking, only in case t ere is imminent
danger to t e vessel and to t e pier.

Q Did you ever intervene during t e time t at your s ip was being docked by Capt.
Gavino?

A No sir, I did not intervene at t e time w en t e pilot was docking my s ip.

Q Up to t e time it was actually docked at t e pier, is t at correct?

A No sir, I did not intervene up to t e very moment w en t e vessel was docked.

xxx xxx xxx

Atty. Del Rosario (to t e witness)

Q Mr. Witness, w at appened, if any, or was t ere anyt ing unusual t at appened
during t e docking?

A Yes sir, our s ip touc ed i e pier and t e pier was damaged.

Court (to t e witness)

Q W en you said touc ed t e pier, are you leading t e court to understand t at your s ip
bumped t e pier?

A I believe t at my vessel only touc ed t e pier but t e impact was very weak.

Q Do you know w et er t e pier was damaged as a result of t at slig t or weak impact?

A Yes sir, after t e pier was damaged.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Being most concerned wit t e safety of your vessel, in t e maneuvering of your

vessel to t e port, did you observe anyt ing irregular in t e maneuvering by Capt. Gavino
at t e time e was trying to cause t e vessel to be docked at t e pier?

A You mean t e action of Capt. Gavino or is condition?

Court:

Q Not t e actuation t at conform to t e safety maneuver of t e s ip to t e arbor?

A No sir, it was a usual docking.

Q By t at statement of yours, you are leading t e court to understand t at t ere was

not ing irregular in t e docking of t e s ip?

A Yes sir, during t e initial period of t e docking, t ere was not ing unusual t at
appened. 

Q W at about in t e last portion of t e docking of t e s ip, was t ere anyt ing unusual or
abnormal t at appened?

A None Your Honor, I believe t at Capt. Gavino t oug t t at t e anc or could keep or
old t e vessel.

Q You want us to understand, Mr. Witness, t at t e dropping of t e anc or of t e vessel

was nor timely?

A I don't know t e dept of t is port but I t ink, if t e anc or was dropped earlier and wit
more s ackles, t ere could not ave been an incident.

Q So you could not precisely tell t e court t at t e dropping of t e anc or was timery
because you are not well aware of t e seabed, is t at correct?

A Yes sir, t at is rig t.

 xxx xxx xxx

Q Alrig t, Capt. Kavankov, did you come to know later w et er t e anc or eld its
ground so muc so t at t e vessel could not travel?

A It is difficult for me to say definitely. I believe t at t e anc or did not old t e s ip.

Q You mean you don't know w et er t e anc or blades stuck to t e ground to stop t e
s ip from furt er moving?

A Yes sir, it is possible.

Q W at is possible?

A I t ink, t e 2 s ackles were not enoug to old t e vessel.

Q Did you know t at t e 2 s ackles were dropped?

A Yes sir, I knew t at.

Q If you knew t at t e s ackles were not enoug to old t e s ip, did you not make any
protest to t e pilot?

A No sir, after t e incident, t at was my assumption.

Q Did you come to know later w et er t at presumption is correct?

A I still don't know t e ground in t e arbor or t e dept s.

Q So from t e beginning, you were not competent w et er t e 2 s ackles were also

dropped to old t e s ip?

A No sir, at t e beginning, I did not doubt it because I believe Capt. Gavino to be an

experienced pilot and e s ould be more aware as to t e dept s of t e arbor and t e
ground and I was confident in is actions.

xxx xxx xxx

Solicitor Abad (to t e witness)

Q Now, you were standing wit t e pilot on t e bridge of t e vessel before t e inicident
appened, were you not?

A Yes sir, all t e time, I was standing wit t e pilot.

Q And so w atever t e pilot saw, you could also see from t at point of view?

A @ at is rig t.

Q W atever t e piler can read from t e panel of t e bridge, you also could read, is t at
correct?

A W at is t e meaning of panel?

Q All indications necessary for men on t e bridge to be informed of t e movements of t e

s ip?

A @ at is rig t.
Q And w atever sound t e captain . . . Capt. Gavino would ear from t e bridge, you
could also ear?

A @ at is rig t.

Q Now, you said t at w en t e command to lower t e anc or was given, it was obeyed,
is t at rig t?

A @ is command was executed by t e t ird mate and boatswain.

Court (to t e witness)

Q Mr. Witness, earlier in today's earing, you said t at you did not intervene wit t e
duties of t e pilot and t at, in your opinion, you can only intervene if t e s ip is placed in
imminent danger, is t at correct?

A @ at is rig t, I did say t at.

Q In your observation before t e incident actually appened, did you observe w et er or

not t e s ip, before t e actual incident, t e s ip was placed in imminent danger?

A No sir, I did not observe.

Q By t at answer, are you leading t e court to understand t at because you did not
intervene and because you believed t at it was your duty to intervene w en t e vessel is
placed in imminent danger to w ic you did not observe any imminent danger t ereof,
you ave not intervened in any manner to t e command of t e pilot?

A @ at is rig t, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Assuminp t at you disagreed wit t e pilot regarding t e step being taken by t e pilot
in maneuvering t e vessel, w ose command will prevail, in case of imminent danger to
t e vessel?

A I did nor consider t e situation as aving an imminent danger. I believed t at t e vessel

will dock alongside t e pier.

Q You want us to understand t at you did not see an imminent danger to your s ip, is
t at w at you mean?

A Yes sir, up to t e very last moment, I believed t at t ere was no imminent danger.

Q Because of t at, did you ever intervene in t e command of t e pilot?

A Yes sir, I did not intervene because I believed t at t e command of t e pilot to be

correct.

Solicitor Abad (to t e witness)

Q As a captain of M/V Pavlodar, you consider docking maneuvers a serious matter, is it

not?

A Yes sir, t at is rig t.

Q Since it affects not only t e safety of t e port or pier, but also t e safety of t e vessel
and t e cargo, is it not?
A @ at is rig t.

Q So t at, I assume t at you were watc ing Capt. Gavino very closely at t e time e was
making is commands?

A I was close to im, I was earing is command and being executed.

Q And t at you were also alert for any possible mistakes e mig t commit in t e
maneuvering of t e vessel?

A Yes sir, t at is rig t.

Q But at no time during t e maneuver did you issue order contrary to t e orders Capt.
Gavino made?

A No sir.

Q So t at you were in full accord wit all of Capt. Gavino's orders?

A Yes sir.

Q Because, ot erwise, you would ave issued order t at would supersede is own
order?

A In t at case, I s ould t,ke im away from is command or remove t e command from

im.

Court (to t e witness)

Q You were in full accord wit t e steps being taken by Capt. Gavino because you relied
on is knowledge, on is familiarity of t e seabed and s oals and ot er surroundings or
conditions under t e sea, is t at correct?

A Yes sir, t at is rig t.

xxx xxx xxx

Solicitor Abad (to t e witness)

Q And so after t e anc ors were ordered dropped and t ey did not take old of t e
seabed, you were alerted t at t ere was danger already on and?

A No sir, t ere was no imminent danger to t e vessel.

Q Do you mean to tell us t at even if t e anc or was supposed to take old of t e bottom
and it did not, t ere was no danger to t e s ip?

A Yes sir, because t e anc or dragged on t e ground later.

Q And after a few moments w en t e anc or s ould ave taken old t e seabed bur not
done ( ), as you expected, you already were alerted t at t ere was danger to t e s ip,
is t at correct?

A Yes sir, I was alerted but t ere was no danger.

Q And you were alerted t at somebody was wrong?

A Yes sir, I was alerted.

 Q And t is alert vou assumed was t e ordinary alertness t at you ave for normal
docking?

A Yes sir, I mean t at it was usual condition of any man in time of docking to be alert.

Q And t at is t e same alertness w en t e anc or did not old onto t e ground, is t at

correct?

A Yes sir, me and Capt. Gavino (t oug t) t at t e anc or will old t e ground.

Q Since, as you said t at you agreed all t e w ile wit t e orders of Capt. Gavino, you
also t erefore agreed wit im in is failure to take necessary precaution against t e
eventuality t at t e anc or will not old as expected?

Atty. Del Rosario:

May I ask t at t e question . . .

Solicitor Abad:

Never mind, I will reform t e question.

xxx xxx xxx

Solicitor Abad (to t e witness)

Q Is it not a fact t at t e vessel bumped t e pier?

A @ at is rig t, it bumped t e pier.

Q For t e main reason t at t e anc or of t e vessel did not old t e ground as expected?

A Yes sir, t at is my opinion. 

Furt er, on redirect examination, Capt. Kabankov fortified is apat etic assessment of t e situation:

Q Now, after t e anc or was dropped, was t ere any point in time t at you felt t at t e
vessel was in imminent danger.

A No, at t at time, t e vessel was not in imminent, danger, sir. 

@ is cavalier appraisal of t e event by Capt. Kabankov is disturbingly antipodal to Capt. Gavino's

anxious assessment of t e situation:

Q W en a pilot is on board a vessel, it is t e piler's command w ic s ould be followed at

t at moment until t e vessel is, or goes to port or reac es port?

A Yes, your Honor, but it does not take away from t e Captain is prerogative to
countermand t e pilot.

Q In w at way?

A In any case, w ic e t inks t e pilot is not maneuvering correctly, t e Captain always

as t e prerogative to countermand t e pilot's order.

Q But insofar as competence, efficiency and functional knowledee of t e seabed w ic

are vital or decisive in t e safety ( ) bringing of a vessel to t e port, e is not
competent?
 A Yes, your Honor. @ at is w y t ey ire a pilot in an advisory capacity, but still, t e
safety of t e vessel rest(s) upon t e Captain, t e Master of t e vessel.

Q In t is case, t ere was not a disagreement between you and t e Captain of t e vessel
in t e bringing of t e vessel to port?

A No, your Honor.

Court:

May proceed.

Atty. Catris:

In fact, t e Master of t e vessel testified ere t at e was all along in conformity wit t e
orders you, gave to im, and, as matter of fact, as e said, e obeyed all your orders.
Can you tell, if in t e course of giving suc normal orders for t e saf(e) docking of t e MV
Pavlodar, do you remember of any instance t at t e Master of t e vessel did not obey
your command for t e safety docking of t e MV Pavlodar?

Atty. del Rosario:

Already answered, e already said yes sir.

Court:

Yes, e as just answered yes sir to t e Court t at t ere was no disagreement insofar as
t e bringing of t e vessel safely to t e port.

Atty. Catris:

But in t is instance of docking of t e MV Pavlodar, do you remember of a time during t e

course of t e docking t at t e MV Pavlodar was in imminent danger of bumping t e pier?

A W en we were about more t an one t ousand meters from t e pier, I t ink, t e anc or
was not olding, so I immediately ordered to pus t e bow at a fourt quarter, at t e back of
t e vessel in order to swing t e bow away from t e pier and at t e same time, I ordered for a full astern of t e engine.



@ ese conflicting reactions can only imply, at t e very least, unmindful disregard or, worse,
neglectful relinquis ment of duty by t e s ipmaster, tantamount to negligence.

@ e findings of t e trial court on t is aspect is notewort y:

For, w ile t e pilot Gavino may indeed ave been c arged wit t e task of docking t e vessel in t e
bert ing space, it is undisputed t at t e master of t e vessel ad t e corresponding duty to countermand
any of t e orders made by t e pilot, and even maneuver t e vessel imself, in case of imminent danger to
t e vessel and t e port.

In fact, in is testimony, Capt. Kavankov admitted t at all t roug our t e man(eu)vering procedures e
did not notice anyt ing was going wrong, and even observed t at t e order given to drop t e anc or was
done at t e proper time. He even ventured t e opinion t at t e accident occurred because t e anc or
failed to take old but t at t is did not alarm im because.t ere was still time to drop a second anc or.

Under normal circumstances, t e abovementioned facts would ave caused t e master of a vessel to
take c arge of t e situation and see to t e man(eu)vering of t e vessel imself. Instead, Capt. Kavankov
c ose to rely blindly upon is pilot, w o by t is time was proven ill-equipped to cope wit t e situation.

xxx xxx xxx

 It is apparent t at Gavino was negligent but Far Eastern's employee Capt. Kavankov was no lesss
responsible for as master of t e vessel e stood by t e pilot during t e man(eu)vering procedures and
was privy to every move t e latter made, as well as t e vessel's response to eac of t e commands. His
c oice to rely blindly upon t e pilot's skills, to t e point t at despite being appraised of a notice of alert e
continued to relinquis control of t e vessel to Gavino, s ows indubitably t at e was not performing is
duties wit t e diligence required of im and t erefore may be c arged wit negligence along wit
defend;int Gavino. 

As correctly affirmed by t e Court of Appeals ²

We are in full accord wit t e findings and disquisitions of t e Court ?.

In t e present recourse, Captain Viktor Kavankov ad been a mariner for t irty-two years before t e
incident. W en Gavino was (in) t e command of t e vessel, Kavankov was beside Gavino, relaying t e
commands or orders of Gavino to t e crewmembers-officers of t e vessel concerned. He was t us fully
aware of t e docking maneuvers and procedure Gavino undertook to dock t e vessel. Irrefragably,
Kavankov was fully aware of t e bulk and size of t e vessel and its cargo as well as t e weig t of t e
vessel. Kavankov categorically admitted t at, w en t e anc or and two (2) s ackles were dropped to t e
sea floor, t e claws of t e anc or did not itc on to any ard object in t e seabed. @ e momentum of t e
vessel was not arrested. @ e use of t e two (2) tugboats was insufficient. @ e momentum of t e vessel,
alt oug a little bit arrested, continued ( ) t e vessel going straig tforward wit its bow towards t e port
(Ex ibit "A-1 ). @ ere was t us a need for t e vessel to move "full-astern" and to drop t e ot er anc or
wit anot er s ackle or two (2), for t e vessel to avoid itting t e pier. Kavankov refused to act even as
Gavino failed to act. Even as Gavino gave mere " alf-astern" order, Kavankov supinely stood by. @ e
vessel was already about twenty (20) meters away from t e pier w en Gavino gave t e "full-astern" order.
Even t en, Kavankov did not ing to prevent t e vessel from itting t e pier simply because e relied on
t e competence and plan of Gavino. W ile t e "full-astern'' maneuver momentarily arrested t e
momentum of t e vessel, it was, by t en, too late. All along, Kavankov stood supinely beside Gavino,
doing not ing but relay t e commands of Gavino. Inscrutably, t en, Kavankov was negligent.

xxx xxx xxx

@ e stark incompetence of Kavankov is competent evidence to prove t e unseawort iness of t e vessel.

It as been eld t at t e incompetence of t e navigator, t e master of t e vessel or its crew makes t e
vessel unseawort y (@ug Ocean Prince versus United States of America, 584 F. 2nd, page 1151). Hence,

t e Appellant FESC is likewise liable for t e damage sustained by t e Appellee. 

We find strong and well-reasoned support in time-tested American maritime jurisprudence, on w ic

muc of our laws and jurisprudence on t e matter are based, for t e conclusions of t e Court of
Appeals adjudging bot Capt. Gavino and Capt. Kabankov negligent.

As early as 1869, t e U.S. Supreme Court declared, t roug Mr. Justice Swayne, in @ e 

?

 ?!+?3
,  t at it is t e duty of t e master to interfere in cases of t e pilot's intoxication or
manifest incapacity, in cases of danger w ic e does not foresee, and in all cases of great
necessity. @ e master as t e same power to displace t e pilot t at e as to remove any
subordinate officer of t e vessel, at is discretion.

In 1895, t e U.S. Supreme Court, t is time t roug Mr. Justice Brown, emp atically ruled t at:

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t e pilot doubtless supersedes t e master for t e time being in t e command and navigation of t e s ip,
and is orders must be obeyed in all matters connected wit er navigation, t e master is not w olly
absolved from is duties w ile t e pilot is on board, and may advise wit im, and even displace im in
case e is intoxicated or manifestly incompetent. He is still in command of t e vessel, except so far as er
navigation is concerned, and bound to see t at t ere is a sufficient watc on deck, and t at t e men are
attentive to t eir duties.

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?; but t at t ere are certain duties e as to disc arge
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; but t at, w ile t e master sees t at is officers
and crew duly attend to t e pilot's orders,

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In u
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??.,  w ic , like t e present petitions, involved compulsory pilotage, wit a
similar scenario w ere at and prior to t e time of injury, t e vessel was in t e c arge of a pilot wit t e
master on t e bridge of t e vessel beside said pilot, t e court t erein ruled:

@ e aut ority of t e master of a vessel is not in complete abeyance w ile a pilot, w o is required by law to
be accepted, is in disc arge of is functions. . . . It is t e duty of t e master to interfere in cases of t e
pilot's intoxication or manifest incapacity, in cases of danger w ic e does not foresee, and in all cases
of great necessity. @ e master as t e same power to displace t e pilot t at e as to remove any
subordinate officer of t e vessel. He may exercise it, or not, according to is discretion. @ ere was
evidence to support findings t at piaintiff's injury was due to t e negligent operation of t e Atenas, and
t at t e master of t at vessel was negligent in failing to take action to avoid endangering a vessel situated
as t e City of Canton was and persons or property t ereon.

A p ase of t e evidence furnis ed support for t e inferences . . . t at e negligently failed to suggest to

t e pilot t e danger w ic was disclosed, and means of avoiding suc danger; and t at t e master's
negligence in failing to give timelt admonition to t e pilot proximately contributed to t e injury complained
of. We are of opinion t at t e evidence mentioned tended to prove conduct of t e pilot, known to t e
master, giving rise to a case of danger or great necessity, calling for t e intervention of t e master. ?

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, w et er suc danger is to t e vessel upon w ic t e pilot is, or to anot er vessel, or
persons or property t ereon or on s ore. (Emp asis ours.)

Still in anot er case involving a nearly identical setting, t e captain of a vessel alongside t e
compulsory pilot was deemed to be negligent, since, in t e words of t e court, " e was in a position to
exercise is superior aut ority if e ad deemed t e speed excessive on t e occasion in question. I
t ink it was 
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?to any craft moored at Gravell
Dock and t at e s ould ave directed t e pilot to reduce is speed as required by t e local
governmental regulations. )?
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(Emp asis supplied.) @ oug a compulsory pilot mig t be regarded as an independent contractor, e
is at all times subject to t e ultimate control of t e s ip's master. 

In sum, w ere a compulsory pilot is in c arge of a s ip, t e master being required to permit im to
navigate it, if t e master observes t at t e pilot is incompetent or p ysically incapable, t en it is t e
dury of t e master to refuse to permit t e pilot to act. But if no suc reasons are present, t en 

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??? ? ". Under t e circumstances of t is case, if a
situation arose w ere t e master, exercising t at reasonable vigilance w ic t e master of a s ip
s ould exercise, observed, or s ould ave observed, t at t e pilot was so navigating t e vessel t at
s e was going, or was likely to go, into danger, and t ere was in t e exercise of reasonable care and
vigilance an opportunity for t e master to intervene so as to save t e s ip from danger, t e master
s ould ave acted accordingly.  

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Inasmuc as t e matter of negligence is a question of fact,  we defer to t e findings of t e trial court,

especially as t is is affirmed by t e Court of Appeals.  But even beyond t at, our own evaluation is
t at Capt. Kabankov's s ared liability is due mainly to t e fact t at e failed to act w en t e perilous
situation s ould ave spurred im into quick and decisive action as master of t e s ip. In t e face of
imminent or actual danger, e did not ave to wait for t e appenstance to occur before
countermanding or overruling t e pilot. By is own admission, Capt. Kabankov concurred wit Capt.
Gavino's decisions, and t is is precisely t e reason w y e decided not to countermand any of t e
latter's orders. Inasmuc as bot lower courts found Capt. Gavino negligent, by expressing full
agreement t erewit Capt. Kabankov was just as negligent as Capt. Gavino.

In general, a pilot is personally liable for damages caused by is own negligence or default to t e
owners of t e vessel, and to t ird parties for damages sustained in a collision. Suc negligence of t e
pilot in t e performance of duty constitutes a maritime tort.  At common law, a s ipowner is not liable
for injuries inflicted exclusively by t e negligence of a pilot accepted by a vessel compulsorily. @ e
exemption from liability for suc negligence s all apply if t e pilot is actually in c arge and solely in
fault. Since, a pilot is responsible only for is own personal negligence, e cannot be eld
accountable for damages proximately caused by t e default of ot ers,  or, if t ere be anyt ing w ic
concurred wit t e fault of t e pilot in producing t e accident, t e vessel master and owners are
liable.

Since t e colliding vessel is?? 
?responsible, t e burden of proof is upon t e party claiming
benefit of t e exemption from liability. It must be s own affirmatively t at t e pilot was at fault, and
t at t ere was no fault on t e part of t e officers or crew, w ic mig t ave been conducive to t e
damage. @ e fact t at t e law compelled t e master to take t e pilot does not exonerate t e vessel
from liability. @ e parties w o suffer are entitled to ave t eir remedy against t e vessel t at
occasioned t e damage, and are not under necessity to look to t e pilot from w om redress is not
always ad for compensation. @ e owners of t e vessel are responsible to t e injured party for t e
acts of t e pilot, and t ey must be left to recover t e amount as well as t ey can against im. It
cannot be maintained t at t e circumstance of aving a pilot on board, and acting in conformity to is
directions operate as a disc arge of responsibility of t e owners.  Except insofar as t eir liability is
limited or exempted by statute, t e vessel or er owner are liable for all damages caused by t e
negligence or ot er wrongs of t e owners or t ose in c arge of t e vessel. W ere t e pilot of a vessel
is not a compulsory one in t e sense t at t e owner or master of t e vessel are bound to accept im,
but is employed voluntarily, t e owners of t e vessel are, all t e more, liable for is negligent act. 

In t e United States, t e owners of a vessel are not personally liable for t e negligent acts of a
compulsory pilot, but by admiralty law, t e fault or negligence of a compulsory pilot is imputable to t e
vessel and it may be eld liable t erefor  ?
. W ere, owever, by t e provisions of t e statute t e
pilot is compulsory only in t e sense t at is fee must be paid, and is not in compulsory c arge of t e
vessel, t ere is no exemption from liability. u!
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.  But t e liability of t e s ip  ?
 does not release t e pilot from t e
consequences of is own negligence.  @ e rationale for t is rule is t at t e master is not entirely
absolved of responsibility wit respect to navigation w en a compulsory pilot is in c arge. 

By way of validation and in lig t of t e aforecited guidepost rulings in American maritime cases, we
declare t at our rulings during t e early years of t is century in "?? ?!+?(
,  
 ?
! ?+?4+?!+?,  and Ô? ?5?+?!+? 
 ,
?.  ave wit stood t e
proverbial test of time and remain good and relevant case law to t is day.

"??  stands for t e doctrine t at t e pilot w o was in command and complete control of a
vessel, and not t e owners, must be eld responsible for an accident w ic was solely t e result of
t e mistake of t e pilot in not giving proper orders, and w ic did not result from t e failure of t e
owners to equip t e vessel wit t e most modern and improved mac inery. In 
 ?! ?.,
t e pilot deviated from t e ordinary and safe course, wit out eeding t e warnings of t e s ip captain.
It was t is careless deviation t at caused t e vessel to collide wit a pinnacle rock w ic , t oug
unc arted, was known to pilots and local navigators. Obviously, t e captain was blameless. It was t e
negligence of t e pilot alone w ic was t e proximate cause of t e collision. @ e Court could not but
t en rule t at ²
 @ e pilot in t e case at bar aving deviated from t e usual and ordinary course followed by navigators in
passing t roug t e strait in question, wit out a substantial reason, was guilty of negligence, and t at
negligence aving been t e proximate cause of t e damages, e is liable for suc damages as usually
and naturally flow t erefrom. . . .

. . . (@) e defendant s ould ave known of t e existence and location of t e rock upon w ic t e vessel
struck w ile under is control and management. . . . .

Consistent wit t e pronouncements in t ese two earlier cases, but on a slig tly different tack, t e
Court in Ô? ?5?. exonerated t e pilot from liability for t e accident w ere t e orders of t e pilot
in t e andling of t e s ip were disregarded by t e officers and crew of t e s ip. According to t e
Court, a pilot is ". . . responsible for a full knowledge of t e c annel and t e navigation only so far as
e can accomplis it t roug t e officers and crew of t e s ip, and I don't see c at e can be eld
responsible for damage w en t e evidence s ows, as it does in t is case, t at t e officers and crew
of t e s ip failed to obey is orders." Nonet eless, it is possible for a compulsory pilot and t e master
of t e vessel to be  
" negligent and t us s are t e blame for t e resulting damage as joint
tortfeasors,  but only under t e circumstances obtaining in and demonstrated by t e instant
petitions.

It may be said, as a general rule, t at negligence in order to render a person liable need not be t e
sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient t at is negligence, concurring wit one or more efficient
causes ot er t an piaintiff's, is t e proximate cause of t e injury. Accordingly, w ere several causes
combine to produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability because e is responsible for only
one of t em, it being sufficient t at t e negligence of t e person c arged wit injury is an efficient
cause wit out w ic t e injury would not ave resulted to as great an extent, and t at suc cause is
not attributable to t e person injured. It is no defense to one of t e concurrent tortfeasors t at t e
injury would not ave resulted from is negligence alone, wit out t e negligence or wrongful acts of
t e ot er concurrent rortfeasor.  W ere several causes producing an injury are concurrent and eac
is an efficient cause wit out w ic t e injury would not ave appened, t e injury may be attributed to
all or any of t e causes and recovery may be ad against any or all of t e responsible persons
alt oug under t e circumstances of t e case, it may appear t at one of t em was more culpable,
and t at t e duty owed by t em to t e injured person was not t e same. No actor's negligence
ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed t e negligence of ot er actors.
Eac wrongdoer is responsible for t e entire result and is liable as t oug is acts were t e sole
cause of t e injury. 

@ ere is no contribution between joint tortfeasors w ose liability is solidary since bot of t em are
liable for t e total damage. W ere t e concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or
more persons, alt oug acting independently, are in combination t e direct and proximate cause of a
single injury to a t ird person, it is impossible to determine in w at proportion eac contributed to t e
injury and eit er of t em is responsible for t e w ole injury. W ere t eir concurring negligence
resulted in injury or damage to a t ird party, t ey become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for
t e resulting damage under Article 2194  of t e Civil Code. 

As for t e amount of damages awarded by t e trial court, we find t e same to be reasonable. @ e

testimony of Mr. Pascual Barral, witness for PPA, on cross and redirect examination, appears to be
grounded on practical considerations:

Q So t at t e cost of t e two additional piles as well as t e (two) square meters is already

included in t is P1,300,999.77.

A Yes sir, everyt ing. It is (t e) final cost already.

Q For t e eig t piles.

A Including t e reduced areas and ot er reductions.

Q (A)nd t e two square meters.

A Yes sir.

Q In ot er words, t is P1,300,999.77 does not represent only for t e six piles t at was
damaged as well as t e corresponding two piles.

A @ e area was corresponding, was increased by almost two in t e actual payment. @ at

was w y t e contract was decreased, t e real amount was P1,124,627.40 and t e final
one is P1,300,999.77.

Q Yes, but t at P1,300,999.77 included t e additional two new posts. 

A It was increased. 

Q W y was it increased?

A @ e original was 48 and t e actual was 46.

Q Now, t e damage was somew ere in 1980. It took place in 1980 and you started t e
repair and reconstruction in 1982, t at took almost two years?

A Yes sir.

Q May it not appen t at by natural factors, t e existing damage in 1980 was aggravated
for t e 2 year period t at t e damage portion was not repaired?

A I don't t ink so because t at area was at once marked and no ve icles can park, it was
closed.

Q Even if or even natural elements cannot affect t e damage?

A Cannot, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q You said in t e cross-examination t at t ere were six piles damaged by t e accident,

but t at in t e reconstruction of t e pier, PPA drove and constructed 8 piles. Will you
explain to us w y t ere was c ange in t e number of piles from t e original number?

A In piers w ere t e piles are wit drawn or pulled out, you cannot re-drive or drive piles
at t e same point. You ave to redesign t e driving of t e piles. We cannot drive t e piles
at t e same point w ere t e piles are broken or damaged or pulled out. We ave to
redesign, and you will note t at in t e reconstruction, we redesigned suc t at it
necessitated 8 plies.

Q W y not, w y could you not drive t e same number of piles and on t e same spot?

A @ e original location was already disturbed. We cannot get required bearing capacity.
@ e area is already disturbed.

Q Nonet eless, if you drove t e original number of piles, six, on different places, would
not t at ave sustained t e same load?

A It will not suffice, sir. 

 We quote t e findings of t e lower court wit approval.

Wit regards to t e amount of damages t at is to be awarded to plaintiff, t e Court finds t at t e amount

of P1,053,300.00 is justified. Firstly, t e doctrine of 
?? best expounded upon in t e landmark
case of 
 ?!+?42 ?
!
 ?. (21 SCRA 279) establis es t e presumption t at in t e
ordinary course of events t e ramming of t e dock would not ave occurred if proper care was used. 

Secondly, t e various estimates and plans justify t e cost of t e port construction price. @ e new
structure constructed not only replaced t e damaged one but was built of stronger materials to forestall
t e possibility of any similar accidents in t e future.

@ e Court inevitably finds t at t e plaintiff is entitled to an award of P1,053,300.00 w ic represents

actual damages caused by t e damage to Bert 4 of t e Manila International Port. Co-defendants Far
Eastern S ipping, Capt. Senen Gavino and Manila Pilots Association are solidariiy liable to pay t is
amount to plaintiff. 

@ e Solicitor General rig tly commented t at t e adjudicated amount of damages represents

t e proportional cost of repair and re abilitation of t e damaged section of t e pier. 

Except insofar as t eir liability is limited or exempted by statute, t e vessel or er owners are liable
for all damages caused by t e negligence or ot er wrongs of t e owners or t ose in c arge of t e
vessel. As a general rule, t e owners or t ose in possession and control of a vessel and t e vessel
are liable for all natural and proximate damages caused to persons or property by reason of er
negligent management or navigation. 

FESC's imputation of PPA's failure to provide a safe and reliable bert ing place is obtuse, not only
because it appears to be a mere aftert oug t, being tardily raised only in t is petition, but also
because t ere is no allegation or evidence on record about Bert No. 4 being unsafe and unreliable,
alt oug per aps it is a modest pier by international standards. @ ere was, t erefore, no error on t e
part of t e Court of Appeals in dismissing FESC's counterclaim.

+?(++?+?/0&0

@ is consolidated case treats on w et er t e Court of Appeals erred in olding MPA jointly and
solidarily liable wit its member pilot. Capt. Gavino, in t e absence of employer-employee relations ip
and in applying Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65, as basis for t e adjudged solidary liability of
MPA and Capt. Gavino.

@ e pertinent provisions in C apter I of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 are:

PAR. XXVII. ² In all pilotage districts w ere pilotage is compulsory, t ere s all be created and
maintained by t e pilots or pilots' association, in t e manner ereinafter prescribed, a reserve fund equal
to P1,000.00 for eac pilot t ereof for t e purpose of paying claims for damages to vessels or property
caused t roug acts or omissions of its members w ile rendered in compulsory pilotage service. In
Manila, t e reserve fund s all be P2,000.00 for eac pilot.

PAR. XXVIII. ² A pilots' association s all not be liable under t ese regulations for damage to any vessel,
or ot er property, resulting from acts of a member of an association in t e actual performance of is duty
for a greater amount t an seventy-five per centum (75%) of its prescribed reserve fund; it being
understood t at if t e association is eld liable for an amount greater t an t e amount above-stated, t e
excess s all be paid by t e personal funds of t e member concerned.

PAR. XXXI. ² If a payment is made from t e reserve fund of an association on account of damages
caused by a member t ereof, and e s all ave been found at fault, suc member s all reimburse t e
association in t e amount so paid as soon as practicable; and for t is purpose, not less t an twenty-five
per centum of is dividends s all be retained eac mont until t e full amount as been returned to t e
reserve fund.
 PAR. XXXIV. ² Not ing in t ese regulations s all relieve any pilots' association or members t ereof,
individually or collectively, from civil responsibility for damages to life or property resulting from t e acts of
members in t e performance of t eir duties.

Correlatively, t e relevant provisions of PPA Administrative Order No. 03-85, w ic timery amended
t is applicable maritime regulation, state:

Art. IV

Sec. 17. 6?   ² @ e Pilots in a Pilotage District s all organize t emselves into a Pilots'
Association or firm, t e members of w ic s all promulgate t eir own By-Laws not in conflict wit t e
rules and regulations promulgated by t e Aut ority. @ ese By-Laws s all be submitted not later t an one
(1) mont after t e organization of t e Pilots' Association for approval by t e General Manager of t e
Aut ority. Subsequent amendments t ereto s all likewise be submitted for approval.

Sec. 25. Indemnity Insurance and Reserve Fund ²

a) Eac Pilots' Association s all collectively insure its members ip at t e

rate of P50,000.00 eac member to cover in w ole or in part any liability
arising from any accident resulting in damage to vessel(s), port facilities
and ot er properties and/or injury to persons or deat w ic any member
may ave caused in t e course of is performance of pilotage duties. . . .
.

b) @ e Pilotage Association s all likewise set up and maintain a reserve

fund w ic s all answer for any part of t e liability referred to in t e
immediately preceding paragrap w ic is left unsatisfied by t e
insurance proceeds, in t e following manner:

1) Eac pilot in t e Association s all contribute from is

own account an amount of P4,000.00 (P6,000.00 in t e
Manila Pilotage District) to t e reserve fund. @ is fund
s all not be considered part of t e capital of t e
Association nor c arged as an expense t ereof.

2) Seventy-five percent (75 %) of t e reserve fund s all

be set aside for use in t e payment of damages referred
to above incurred in t e actual performance of pilots'
duties and t e excess s all be paid from t e personal
funds of t e member concerned.

xxx xxx xxx

5) If payment is made from t e reserve fund of an

Association on account of damage caused by a member
t ereof w o is found at fault, e s all reimburse t e
Association in t e amount so paid as soon as
practicable; and for t is purpose, not less t an twenty-
five percentum (25 %) of is dividend s all be retained
eac mont until t e full amount as been returned to
t e reserve fund. @ ereafter, t e pilot involved s all be
entitled to is full dividend.

6) W en t e reimbursement as been completed as

prescribed in t e preceding paragrap , t e ten
percentum (10%) and t e interest wit eld from t e
s ares of t e ot er pilots in accordance wit paragrap
(4) ereof s all be returned to t em.
 c) 4"??6?   ² Not ing in t ese regulations s all
relieve any Pilots' Association or members t ereof, individually or
collectively, from any civil, administrative and/or criminal responsibility for
damages to life or property resulting from t e individual acts of its
members as well as t ose of t e Association's employees and crew in
t e performance of t eir duties.

@ e Court of Appeals, w ile affirming t e trial court's finding of solidary liability on t e part of FESC,
MPA and Capt. Gavino, correctly based MPA' s liability not on t e concept of employer-employee
relations ip between Capt. Gavino and itself, but on t e provisions of Customs Administrative Order
No. 15-65:

@ e Appellant MPA avers t at, contrary to t e findings and disquisitions of t e Court ?, t e Appellant
Gavino was not and as never been an employee of t e MPA but was only a member t ereof. @ e Court
?, it is notewort y, did not state t e factual basis on w ic it anc ored its finding t at Gavino was t e
employee of MPA. We are in accord wit MPA's pose. Case law teac es Us t at, for an employer-
employee relations ip to exist, t e confluence of t e following elements must be establis ed: (1) selection
and engagement of employees; (2) t e payment of wages; (3) t e power of dismissal; (4) t e employer's
power to control t e employees wit respect to t e means and met od by w ic t e work is to be
performed (Ruga versus NLRC, 181 SCRA 266).

xxx xxx xxx

@ e liability of MPA for damages is not anc ored on Article 2180 of t e New Civil Code as erroneously
found and declared by t e Court ? but under t e provisions of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-
65, , in tandem wit t e by-laws of t e MPA. 

@ ere being no employer-employee relations ip, clearly Article 2180  of t e Civil Code is
inapplicable since t ere is no vicarious liability of an employer to speak of. It is so stated in American
law, as follows:

@ e well establis ed rule is t at pilot associations are immune to vicarious liability for t e tort of t eir
members. @ ey are not t e employer of t eir members and exercise no control over t em once t ey take
t e elm of t e vessel. @ ey are also not partners ips because t e members do not function as agents
for t e association or for eac ot er. Pilots' associations are also not liable for negligently assuring t e
competence of t eir members because as professional associations t ey made no guarantee of t e

professional conduct of t eir members to t e general public. 

W ere under local statutes and regulations, pilot associations lack t e necessary legal incidents of
responsibility, t ey ave been eld not liable for damages caused by t e default of a member pilot. 
W et er or not t e members of a pilots' association are in legal effect a copartners ip depends w olly
on t e powers and duties of t e members in relation to one anot er under t e provisions of t e
governing statutes and regulations. @ e relation of a pilot to is association is not t at of a servant to
t e master, but of an associate assisting and participating in a common purpose. Ultimately, t e rig ts
and liabilities between a pilots' association and an individual member depend largely upon t e
constitution, articles or by-laws of t e association, subject to appropriate government regulations. 

No reliance can be placed by MPA on t e cited American rulings as to immunity from liability of a
pilots' association in ljg t of existing positive regulation under P ilippine law. @ e Court of Appeals
properly applied t e clear and unequivocal provisions of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65. In
doing so, it was just being consistent wit its finding of t e non-existence of employer-employee
relations ip between MPA and Capt. Gavino w ic precludes t e application of Article 2180 of t e
Civil Code.

@rue. Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 does not categorically c aracterize or label MPA's
liability as solidary in nature. Nevert eless, a careful reading and proper analysis of t e correlated
provisions lead to t e conclusion t at MPA is solidarily liable for t e negligence of its member pilots,
wit out prejudice to subsequent reimbursement from t e pilot at fault.

Art. 1207 of t e Civil Code provides t at t ere is solidary liability only w en t e obligation expressly
so states, or w en t e law or t e nature of t e obligation requires solidarity. Plainly, Customs
Administrative Order No. 15-65, w ic as an implementing rule as t e force and effect of law, can
validly provide for solidary liability.We note t e Solicitor General's comment ereon, to wit:

. . . Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 may be a mere rule and regulation issued by an
administrative agency pursuant to a delegated aut ority to fix "t e details" in t e execution or enforcement
of a policy set out in t e law itself. Nonet eless, said administrative order, w ic adds to t e procedural or
enforcing provisions of substantive law, is legally binding and receives t e same statutory force upon
going into effect. In t at sense, it as equal, not lower, statutory force and effect as a regular statute

passed by t e legislature. 

MPA's prayer for modification of t e appellate court's decision under review by exculpating petitioner
MPA "from liability beyond seventy-five percent (75 %) of Reserve Fund" is unnecessary because t e
liability of MPA under Par. XXVIII of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 is in fact limited to
seventy-five percent (75 %) of its prescribed reserve fund, any amount of liability beyond t at being
for t e personal account of t e erring pilot and subject to reimbursement in case of a finding of fault
by t e member concerned. @ is is clarified by t e Solicitor General:

Moreover, contrary to petitioner's pretensions, t e provisions of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65
do not limit t e liability of petitioner as a pilots' association to an absurdly small amount of seventy-five per
centum (75 %) of t e member pilots' contribution of P2,000.00 to t e reserve fund. @ e law speaks of t e
entire reserve fund required to be maintained by t e pilots' association to answer (for) w atever liability
arising from t e tortious act of its members. And even if t e association is eld liable for an amount
greater t an t e reserve fund, t e association may not resist t e liability by claiming to be liable only up to
seventy-five per centum (75 %) of t e reserve fund because in suc instance it as t e rig t to be

reimbursed by t e offending member pilot for t e excess. 

WHEREFORE, in view of all of t e foregoing, t e consolidated petitions for review are DENIED and
t e assailed decision of t e Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED  ?.

Counsel for FESC, t e law firm of Del Rosario and Del Rosario, specifically its associate, Atty.
Herbert A. @ria, is REPRIMANDED and WARNED t at a repetition of t e same or similar acts of
eedless disregard of its undertakings under t e Rules s all be dealt wit more severely.

@ e original members of t e legal team of t e Office of t e Solicitor General assigned to t is case,

namely, Assistant Solicitor General Roman G. Del Rosario and Solicitor Luis F. Simon, are
ADMONISHED and WARNED t at a repetition of t e same or similar acts of unduly delaying
proceedings due to delayed filing of required pleadings s all also be dealt wit more stringently.

@ e Solicitor Genral is DIREC@ED to look into t e circumstances of t is case and to adopt provident
measures to avoid a repetition of t is incident and w ic would ensure prompt compliance wit orders
of t is Court regarding t e timely filing of requisite pleadings, in t e interest of just, speedy and
orderly administration of justice.

Let copies of t is decision be spread upon t e personal records of t e lawyers named erein in t e
Office of t e Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

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