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FURLONG, PATRICK J. - Fascism, The Third Reich and Afrikaner Nationalism - An Assessment of The H
FURLONG, PATRICK J. - Fascism, The Third Reich and Afrikaner Nationalism - An Assessment of The H
113
114 PATRICK J. FURLONG
Buntings long-banned Rise of the South Afican Reich? These did not seriously
engage the problem of historical Afrikaner fascism in the pre-1948 period, but
were concerned either with the general phenomenon of Afrikaner nationalism
or with analogies between post-1948 Nationalist policies and the Third Reich.
This approach, which assumes a very loose definition of fascism, has become
generally discredited among serious students of both Afrikaner nationalism and
of comparative fascism in general. Other reasons for the latterday distaste for
the use of the fascistlabel have been the gradual apparent moderation of the
Nationalist regime, fading memories of wartime subversive activities by persons
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later closely associated with that government, and the rise of Marxian revisionist
scholarship, which has questioned the much-vaunted discontinuity between the
post-1948 apartheid regime and earlier segregationist governments.
It is harder to dismiss the case made by Howard Simson? using a
Poulantzian variant of the Marxist theoretical model of fascism as capitalism in
distress, an effort unfortunately limited by its use of only published sources. For
Simson, fascism is simply any capitalist state in which a primarily petty
bourgeois-based mass movement uses a combination of legal measures and
violence to achieve power. The regime thus established is marked by a militantly
anti-working class ideology and a massive expansion of monopoly capital under
the guise of building a strong national economy. In Simsons view, the socio-
economic base and function of Afrikaner nationalism are so close to those of
German Nazism and Italian Fascism that, given the allegedly farcical nature of
electoral politics in apartheid South Africa, the similarities between classical
fascism and what he calls Afrikaner fascism outweigh the differences? This
argument, while theoretically compelling provided that one accepts Simsons
structural Marxist premises, requires the suspension of any scruples about the
seriousness with which Afrikaners have treated their often messily internecine
politics, and the underplaying of the importance of the white working class in
the Nationalists electoral platform until at least the late l%Os. Without a more
thorough grounding in the primary sources, Simsons position therefore remains
problematic.
3. B. Bunting, The Rise of thc South Afrcan Reich (Harmondsworth, 1%9); W.H.Vatcher
devotes a full chapter to the impact of fascism in his white Loagcc The Rise of Afrikrma
N a f i o n a h (New York and London, 1965). A more recent work in this genre is S. Mzimelas
Aparthekt South Afrcan NOrian (New York, 1983). Mzimela recently shifted his allegiances
to the right, becoming an official of the Inkatha Freedom Party.
4. H. Simson, The SocialOriginr ofAfrikme F a s c h and Its Apanheid Policy (Stockholm, 1980).
See also his The Afrikaner Nationalist Movement/Regime in Comparative Perspective
(Unpublished Paper, South Africa in the Comparative Study of Class, Race and Nationalism
Conference, New Yo&, 1982).
5. Simson, Afrikrma Fav9.stn, 3, 14-15 and 16Off.
FASCISM A N D AFRIKANER NATIONALISM 115
By the 1970s such claims had gone out of fashion as the South African
academic left and centre sought what was felt to be more objectively based types
of analysis. From the liberal side of the spectrum, Heribert Adam dismissed the
fascist analogy as unhelpful, even misleading, a position taken up by another
structuralist Marxist, Dan OMeara, in his m u c h - d i i book Volkxkapi-
t u l h e , in which such arguments were rejected as lacking in historical specificity
and as unable to advance theoretical understanding?
The popular press, however, continued to make the most of ongoing
interest in stories of the home front during the Second World War. Former
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on the basis of which J.C. Moll concludes that the post-1948 South African state
and government do not, contrary to the view of Bunting and others, show the
minimum number of characteristics necessary to qualify as fascist.
In addition to the concerns cited above, none of these works has combined
a case-study of connections between fascism and South Africa with a full-scale
examination of relevant archival materials and oral sources. This charge cannot
be made against Frederilc van Heerden, whose monumental doctoral thesis
plumbs a wide variety of Afrikaner nationalist records to demonstrate the
alleged insignificance of fascist influence on mainstream white South African
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Die N a s h u & Pa@: Drel 4 (Bloemfontein, 1986). The biographical literature is no more
helpful, with the most potted coverage of the war years in H.B. Thorns biography, D.J? Molmr
(Cape Town, 1980); Malan himself focuses on the struggle against British imperialism in his
autobiography, Afrikrmn-Volkromheid01 My Ervarings op die Pod Dam;hcen (Cape Town,
1989).The baaicworkr on other key figures are no better. Examples are CM.van den Heever,
G0terolLB.M. Hopog (Johannesburg,1946);J.FJ. van Rensburg, TheirPolhr C m d M k
Menwirsof the Commmrdmtt-GeMalofthe Osrovobrondwag(Johannesburg, 1956);J. Kruger,
Resident C.R Swan (Cape Town,l%l);PJ. Meyer,Nog NU Ver Garoeg NU: n Perroonlike
Rekmkap van v f i g Joar Georgmripecrdc -A (Johannesburg and Cape Town,1984);
and Dirk and Johanna de Villiersr biography of former President Botha, P.W (Cape Town,
1984).
11. This method is used by J.C.Moll in his impressive little volume, based however only on
secondary wurccd and some newspapers, Fascism.&: Die problcmoriak von V . - :
Fascism.&01 SlCid-Afriko(Bloemfontein, 1985).
12 FJ. van Heerden, NasionaalSosilisme 88 Faktor in die Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948
(DPhil thesis, University of Orange Free State, 1972), 357.
13. Ibid, 357,385.
FASCISM AND AFRIKANER NATIONALISM 117
hand, inadequate source materials limit the value of most existing studies. On
the other hand, the relevant scholarship is essentially either polemical or
apologetic in nature, or otherwise dismissive of the reality of any links between
Afrikaner nationalism and the European authoritarian right. The need for
further serious and detailed work is therefore obvious.
Of the four recent works cited at the beginning of this article, perhaps the
least satisfactory is that of Citino,18 to which I will devote comments of a
14. See for instance K Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Rcich (Berkeley and Los
Angeles, 1973); D.M. McKale, The Swartika OUrJidc Germmy (Kent, Ohio, 1977); and W.
Michalka, N a f i o n a L s o M ~ h Aussenpolifik
c (Darmstadt, 1978).
15. W.W.Schmoke1,Lkam ofEnpinz: Geman Cobniahm 1919-1945 (New Haven and London,
1964) and H. Stoecker, ed., Geman Imperialisin m A w a : From the Beginnhp Unril the
Second World War (London and Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey, 1986).
16. A. Kuma Ndumbe 111, La Politique Africaine de IAllemagne Hitlerienne 1933-1943,2 vok.
(Troisieme cycle doctoral thesis, Lyons University II,1974), available in a published version
as Hider V
& L;rfrique (Paris, 1980);see also h i Afrikapolitik des dritten Reichs,Afrika
Hcurc, 21/22 (Nov. 1972), 456-9; Hitler, LAfrique du Sud et la Menace Imperialisle: Les
Relations Secretes entre Hitler et LAfrique du Sud, teS Temps Modcmes, 29 (Oct. 1973),
published as a separate pamphlet; and, most polemical in nature, a pamphlet for the UN
Centre Against Apartheid, RekAms between Nazi Germmy and SouthAfica: Thdr Infruence
on the De~~bprnuU of the Ideology of Apmthcid (New York, May 1976).
17. For instance, he describes Louis Botha and Jan Smuts as English immigrants: see Hitler,
LAfnque du Sud et la Menace Imperialiste, 13-14.
18. Citino, Germmy and the Union of South A@a.
118 PATRICK J. FURLONG
strategy to pursue, with the Foreign Office keener to pursue friendly relations
with the host country, whereas the Nazi Party Auslandso?ganisationprovided a
constant source of friction with the same government by attempting, however
imperfectly, to provide a miniature state-within-a-state for the local German-
speaking minority. Individual German officials could also make a big difference:
as Hagemann perceptively notes, when the prudent and highly regarded Emil
Wiehl was succeeded at the German Legation in Pretoria by the arrogant
Leitner, not only did tensions with the Union government increase, but it
became increasingly difficult for Berlin to guage accurately the likely response
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of Nazi influence, rather than a much more complex and often opportunistic
response to the growth of anti-Semitic groups such as the various shirt
movements to the right of the party, which may have been more directly
affected by the anti-Jewish propaganda then flooding South Africa from
Germany. Hagemann is no more illuminating on this subject than Citino.
Citinos handling of the Jewish issue underlines his too ready reliance on
the simple black-and-white interpretation of his sources; this is equally true of
his tendency to see Hertzogs United Party as of one mind in its support in 1939
for war with Germany, in contrast with the more sympathetic position of the
Purified Nationalists. The problem of the Hertzog-Smuts divide within the
United Party is not understood with the sensitivity of a scholar more thoroughly
steeped in South African historiography, but this imbalance in knowledge of
European versus South African affairs characterim the book as a whole.
The scholar wishing to obtain a more thorough attempt to integrate the
diplomatic material with an examination of the problem of fascism in Afrikaner
nationalism must therefore turn to Hagemanns compendious contribution. This
wide-ranging study encompasses several of the areas previously studied
separately by individual scholars, including economic relationships with
Germany, diplomatic affairs, the German minority within South Africa, German
wartime interest in South Africa, South African anti-Semitism and racism, and
the rise of Christian nationalism.
Whereas Citino thoroughly mines a single vein of evidence, Hagemann, an
apparently well-funded historian who studied at the University of Bielefeld, has
been able to draw on a vast range of primary and secondary material in
German, English and Afrikaans. The bibliography indicates that he has searched
files in all the major relevant South African archives (the crucial relevant
Foreign Ministry records, like those for Defence, the Prime Ministers Office,
and the Police were apparently still closed during his research) in addition to
various archives in Germany, the Netherlands, Britain and Namibia.
24. 0.du Plespis, Die Nuwc Suid-A~Xka:Die Revolurie van die Twinrigsrc Eeu (Port Elizabeth,
1941).
FASCISM AND AFRIKANER NATIONALISM 121
with 31 on Nazi subversion in the Union and South-West Africa in the 193os,
31 on trade relations, and 49 on diplomatic relations before the war). On anti-
Semitism, he has not mined Jewish or Afrikaner sources nearly as effectively as
he has his Nazi materials, while on diplomatic relations, such as the neutrality
question, he relies only on published selections from the Smuts Papers and
ignores the equally crucial Hertzog Papers. His book is therefore impressive, but
less than truly magisterial in its command of the sources.
Some of this problem is of course beyond any authors control. Despite the
broad spectrum of materials upon which Hagemann draws, he acknowledges
that some key documents, such as the original version of Count Durckheim-
Montmartins much-cited report to Berlin on bringing South Africa into the
German sphere of influence, have seeminglydisappeared. He does not, however,
deal with the even greater problem that large quantities of German Foreign
Office records were destroyed on Hitlers orders at the end of the war, a fate
which also befell some two truckloads of material on the OB and the Broeder-
bond in the hands of South African Military Intelligence, removed on the orders
of F.C. Erasmus when he took office at the Defence Ministry.= Continuing
difficulties with access to official records at the Central Archives until at least
the late 1980s also pose a problem (with the end of the Emergency and the
advent of the De Klerk era, this situation may be changing); nobody will ever
really know the full scope of South Africans entanglement with wartime fascism
without such materials. Nevertheless, Hagemann makes one of the most
persuasive attempts yet.
He has a simple but compelling thesis: that German-South African
relations, while made closer by their racial ties, were constantly frustrated by
their rivalry for domination of the region and even the continent as a whole,
especially as South Africa sought to carve out a role for itself as a serious player
on the international scene.
25. E.G.Malherbe,Educafion m South Afrca VoL 11: 1923-1975 (CapeTown and Johannesburg,
1977), 683.
122 PATRICK J. FURLONG
become more thoroughly embedded in African history in recent years, there has
been no concomitant attempt to place relevant areas of South African history
in an appropriate extra-African context.
This comment raises the contribution of the late Charles Bloomberg,
brought before the public in an excellent edition by Saul Dubow, who has done
a superlative job of creating order out of what was apparently a vast and
unwieldy manuscript.28 For Bloomberg can understand South African
Christian nationalism only in the context of its roots and parallels in the ultra-
conservative, neo-Cslvinist world of the Dutch Anti-Revolutionary Party before
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its conversion to a more liberal worldview under the heel of wartime Nazi
occupation. Like the Afrikaner Christian nationalists, the ARP showed an
extraordinary ambivalence toward fascism as an admittedly quasi-pagan
manifestation of its revolt against the liberal spirit of 1789.
Bloombergs work has only a few footnotes, limiting the scholars ability
to trace his materials, and suffers from the very difficult conditions under which
this eccentricallybrilliant journalist completed his lifes great work. Errors there
certainly are: Hitler is said to have taken over Austria in 1934 rather than 1938
and the war issue is given as the reason for the formation of the National Party
in 1914; he states that the OB toned down ifs pro-Nazi enthusiasm later in the
war, whereas my own evidence suggests a more explicitly pro-National Socialist
message in that period, he sees the wartime Broederbond executive as
predominantly pro-NP, whereas the executives records suggest a deep split
between a large pro-OB faction and the pro-Nationalist wing.29
For some, Bloombergswork may be a historical curiosity, largely oblivious
to the great changes in historiography of the last two decades. He happily
indulges in all the old shibboleths of a Broederbond conspiracy and the
nineteenth century Calvinist explanation of the Afrikaner worldview, so
thoroughly discredited in the works of Dan OMeara and Andrb du Toitm
Yet this essentially intellectual history, despite perhaps overstretchhg the
analogy between the ARP and the Broederbond, fits a valuable niche in the
literature on the Afrikaner right. It includes a wealth of relevant historical detail
ambivalent toward fascism, but that (unlike the Dutch variety) radical Afrikaner
nationalists were not alienated from fascism by the events of the early war years;
instead, they continued to draw selectively from fascism and Nazism those
elements most congenial to their own history and current needs.
Bloomberg rightly points out that the quarrel between the OB and the NP
later in the war was not the product of intrinsically different attitudes to the
Third Reich; both were decidedly pro-German, even if both were not necessarily
equally pro-Nazi, and even the OB qualified its support for Nazism. I would add
that absolutely essential to any treatment of the rift between the NP and OB
was that this rested less on different attitudes to fascism than on individual and
organizational jealousy: the NP knew that as the Nazis shifted their interest to
the OB, the threat of a non-party state as advocated by OB boss Hans van
Rensburg had to be met head-on. The NP itself, however, could be just as
authoritarian as the OB, was deeply involved in the drawing up of the famous
Draft Constitution for a republic more in keeping with the New Order
(discussed with great clarity by Bloomberg) and, when the time came to face the
real enemy, Smutss United Party, unofficial OB support was crucial in electing
such well-known NP supporters of authoritarian nationalism as Albert Hertzog
and Nico Diederichs.
The 1948 election became, as Bloomberg perceives it, even if not
necessarily the victory of sometime adherents of fascism (Hagemann, despite all
his qualifications in the preceding chapters, comes very close to this position in
his final paragraph), that of a counter-revolutionary movement rooted as much
in the nineteenth century world of Abraham Kuyper and Paul Kruger as in the
twentieth century world of Hitler, Mussolini or Van Rensburg. For all that, the
reader cannot but note that the ARP was just a generation ahead of Hitler in
31. See AN. Pelzer, Dic Afrikrmcr Broeabbod E m @ 50 Jaar (Cape Town,1979), the official
sanitized account; the controversial works by J.H.P. Serfontein, Brothahood of Power: An
Eqw& of the S a m Afrikrmcr BruederW (Blmmington, Indiana and London, 1978)and H.
Strydom and 1. Wilkins, I7&? S u p w - A ~Inside
: theAfrikamr5mdchmd (Johannesburg,
1978); and, from the unusual perspective of the disaffected far right, B.M.Schoemans Dic
BroeabW in dic Afrikrmcr-Politick (Pretoria, 1982).
FASCISM AND AFRIKANER NATIONALISM 125
Yet Cronjes work was widely hailed in both party and church circles, because
his anti-infection model of full-scale segregation, clothed in quasi-fascist
rhetoric, resonated with one of the oldest excuses of South African governments
for keeping black and white apart, that of preserving public health.
Thus, as Hagemann is so at pains to stress throughout his work, the
common interest in the race question and in preserving their own identity
brought together German Nazis and radical Afrikaner nationalists even when
geo-political concerns or religious scruples limited the scope of their coopera-
tion. Therefore, even though Berlin increasingly questioned the value of the OB,
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let alone of the Np,as a reliable partner in South Africa, and gradually replaced
any prior hopes of replacing the Smuts government with a policy calculated
more to irritate and harrass this remote comer of the Allied war effort,
Afrikaner nationalism did not cease to be affected by the years of dalliance with
the European radical right. The focus of Christian nationalist interest was no
longer English liberal democracy, but the black majority.
With the defeat of the Nazis abroad and the collapse of the South African
far right, the purportedly more moderate NP, deeply involved at home in its
own complex alliances and feuds with ultra-rightist groups such as the
Greyshirts and OB, was certainly the one surviving viable bearer of the radical
Afrikaner nationalist tradition. The NP remained attached to a parliamentary
system of sorts and, as Hagemann notes, it continued to be suspicious of a
fascist-style leadership cult; nor, as he argues, were there any documentable
institutional ties between Nazi Germany and the real force behind the party, the
Broederbond. But individual connections there were aplenty, and those who had
drunk of the waters of authoritarian nationalism found a ready home in the
post-1948NP, especiallyafter the hard-line Verwoerd faction gained ascendancy
in the 1950s.
As Hagemann points out in his closing words, Germans have never
satisfactorily agreed on whether 8 May 1945 was a day of liberation or of
catastrophe for Germany, but those Afrikaner intellectuals who had been such
admirers of Nazi Germany have never asked that question. They did not need
to, for on the contrary, the alleged correctness of their Christian national path
seemed to be realized when, just three years later, Christian nationalism came
to power in South Africa.