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Hilbert'S Programme: Independence Problem Which May Be Formu
Hilbert'S Programme: Independence Problem Which May Be Formu
Hilbert'S Programme: Independence Problem Which May Be Formu
by Georg KREISEL,Reading
is simply not true even for the very weak sense of t( equivalence of
content )) expressed in statements of formal deducibility and non-
deducibility. Furthermore, we have no idea in what sort of inves-
tigation we could even hope to find a satisfactory answer t o such
a question. Hilbert thought it would be supplied by pure mathe-
matics itself ([GI p. 316). But it seems clear, as Bernays has
expressed it, t h a t the totality of pure mathematics (mathematical
structures) is not itself a mathematical structure ; this is not only
a stumbling block to a mathematical treatment of the conception
of the whole of mathematics, but even to a n exhaustive treatment
of the concept of natural or real number because the characteri-
zation by means of a least (or largest) class refers explicitly t o the
1 It is remarkable t h a t mathematicians have not yet learned t o exploit
the non-constructive methods effectively in t h e following sense : in t h e
famous non-constructive proofs of constructive results (for references, see
\lo]) t h e elimination of t h e non-constructive methods used is finitist, a n d
does not require more sophisticated notions of constructivity. We know
that a more essential use of non-constructive methods must be possible,
and, I believe, closer study of their constructive aspects may give one a
better B feeling )) for them.
2 It is of course possible (and natural) to consider the relevant extremal
clartses as primitive notions in their own right a n d not as part of set theory,
e.g. the (I and only those required by the foregoing rules o in the usual
definitions of natural numbers or recursive ordinals. This is used e.g. in
Hilberts reduction ([S] p. 302) of the principle of induction to t h e reversi-
bility of the formation of numerals. The latter follows from t h e extremal
clause, and in a similar way other principles of proof can be obtained from
such clauses (cf. Lorenzens induction and inversion principles). B u t in t h e
HILBERTS PROGRAMME 353
totality from which these classes are to be taken. If one may use
for orientation the formulation of finitisf proof sketched below, one
would say this: just as it is necessary to use non-finitist concepts
to study the totality of finitist proofs, so it is necessary t o use non-
mathematical concepts, i.e. concepts lacking the precision which
permit mathematical manipulation, for a significant approach t o
foundations. I t is not a t all a question of concepts which are more
(( reliable )) than those of current mathematics, but of concepts
I . Syntactic Analysis
8. We begin by considering what seems to be the main
novelty of Hilberts work in mathematical logic, without which
his conception of the Hilbert programme would have been wholly
unconvincing, namely his proof theory. He wanted proof itself
to be made the object of mathematical study ([S] p. 165). Though
this is needed for a syntactic (combinatorial) formulation of inde-
pendence results, by itself i t is not the crucial point for proof
theory. For, clearly, the traditional independence proofs by means
of models, as in the case of the parallel axiom, or even the impossi-
bility proofs for certain constructions by means of ruler and
but it makes evident a fact of logical reasoning which was basic for
Hilberts programme, namely that in logical reasoning one never
makes full use of the intended meaning of the transfinite symbols,
in the following sense. eZA(y,z) is intended as a choice function
(some z1 which satisfies A(y, z) if such a z1 exists, and an arbitrary
value otherwise), and on this meaning the schema
Rl Ri
Rij Rim
variables. All we need are rules which allow us to infer (2) (Ey)(2)
A(z, y, z ) from A(0, 0, 1) V A(0, 1, 2) V . . . VA(0, R , R + 1) for
each R . The rules required are just Herbrands rules. Thus we
have not only a new formalization of, but also a cogent motivation
for the choice of the rules.-Beth [ 2 ] has used the same idea for
treating arbitrary f o r mu k and arriving a t a variant of Gentzens
rules.
Here one conceives of a counter example to (2) (Ey)(%)A@,y, z)
in terms of satisfying A [0, n,p ( n ) ] for some given disparate
function p and arbitrary numerals n . The impossibility of
obtaining one, i.e. the breakdown of the construction above,
yields a classical proof of (z) (Ey)( z ) A (z,y, z). Another concep-
tion of a counter example is to satisfy (x)(Ey)( z ) A (z,y, z) in
the prenex form (Ex) (y)(Ez) A(z, y, z ) by a constant a and a
function f , i.e. (y) A[a, y, f(y)]. The impossibility of obtaining
one is expressed by (Ey)A [a, y, f(y)] and this can be expressed
explicitly by means of functionals pi(/, a) (terms containing a and f )
such that . . .V A [a, vi(f, a), f { pi ( f , a))]V . . . I-This is only sui-
table for prenex f o r mu k (unless one uses functionals of higher
type) but more suitable for arithmetic than the alternative des-
cribed above.
12. Godels Intervention. There is a totally different analysis
of classical proofs due to Godel. First classical proofs are replaced
by intuitionistic ones of (classically) equivalent theorems [ 5 ] , then
these proofs are analyzed by means of certain simple functionals
of finite type, and these in turn are shown to be well defined by
means of transfinite induction ( < q,for arithmetic with induction,
< w 2 for arithmetic without). In this way the syntactic analysis
is effected in several manageable steps, each of them of interest in
itself 2. For further details see Godels article in the present
volume.
Finifisf Proof
17. Work is in progress on a characterization of finitist proofs
in the usual sense : a formal system is described such that (i) each
formal proof of the system is recognized as a finitist proof, and
(ii) each formula in the notation of the system is asserted to be
provabIe in the system if it is provable by finitist methods at all.
The variables of the system are of two types (natural numbers and
free function variables from the natural numbers to the natural
numbers though the latter can be avoided), the constants are
particular numerals, certain constant functionals and (finitist)
proof predicates, the last two being introduced only after certain
existential statements have already been established. The idea
To be presented at the International Congress of Mathematicians 1958,
where the characterization of other informal notions of proof will also be
considered.-My interest in a definition of (( finitist proofs )) was reawa-
kened by conversations with K. Godel, 1955-1957.
366 G . KREISEL
- N -
this step is inevitable.-Note in passing that the answer to the
question above is not unique, e.g. [ p -+(q V r ) ] [(- p - + q)
V( p --+ r)] could be added to the propositional axiom schemata
- -
or, again, for primitive recursive A(z), (z) A (x)-+ (Ex) A ( 5 )
though the former is not deducible in Heytings propositional
calculus and the latter is deducible in his arithmetic only if
-
(Ex) A($) V (5)A(z) is too.
There is, I believe, a certain distrust of the reflective position
because the interest of the very conception which is t o be described
may itself be questioned, as in para. 14 above. The well-known
((justificationn of the two tendencies above on grounds of economy
is perhaps popular because it avoids this. We say that the first
368 G . KREISEL
widens the range of applicability of the result and the second sub-
sumes many special cases under one (though this may be (( uneco-
nomical B if a simpler proof applies in the special case). Actually
certain developed parts of metamathematics such as some appli-
cations of the completeness theorem or e.g. those of [lo] have these
virtues. But this justification does not apply if, e.g. we do not
care about the extended range of application, a s with restricted,
so-called elementary, proofs in number theory ; nor if the general
structure (concept) is used t o formulate properties of the special
case or questions about it which could not be formulated without
it : e.g. when we observe t h a t the set of rotations forms a group
we do not use group theory t o obtain new a results o about rota-
tions. The interest of a general structure as a mathematical
concept can be questioned just as the philosophical conceptions
were questioned above. The economic justification is a rough
rationalisation. I do not thereby wish to create an air of mystery ;
on the contrary this view is free from the peculiar mysticism that
every natural and interesting concept always leads to economy of
thought.
I t seems t o me that pure mathematics and philosophy meet
here where there are no practical considerations to guide the for-
mation of mathematical concepts. It is not t h a t philosophy
explains their formation since we hardly get beyond asking hack-
neyed questions about their origin and their justification. Now,
on its most natural interpretation, the former question is not purely
conceptual ; i t requires the study of near-human species in different
environments, which is quite beyond the range of present tech-
nique. And the latter question would seem t o involve a circle, a t
least within the framework of present concepts (cf. end of para. 6).
What seems clear is that philosophy has suggested conceptions of
great generality such as structure, truth, proof, constructivity, in
terms of which we discuss mathematical theories, and pure mathe-
matics has developed them within specific contexts.
Finitist proof is such a conception too. We have no right t o
expect as a matter of course an answer to our questions on t h e
significance of finitist proofs in paras. 4, 14, and 15, and other
mathematical concepts are, in principle, in the same boat. B u t as
HILBERT'S PROGRAMME 369
are two finitist versions of the result, namely (a) if A(P,A, . . ., Pk)
is provable in Z then A(P,, . . ., P,) is provable in the predicate
calculus, or the stronger form ( b ) A(P,A, . . .,Pe) + ((A(P,, . . .,P,)
is provable in the predicate calculus o, the implication being prov-
able in Z for each A where the statement in inverted commas denotes
some natural arithmetization of itself.-It should be remembered
that these versions are not what Hilbert originally required
([6],p. 322), namely that if A(P,, . . ., P,) is not provable in the
predicate calculus, - A(Pf, . . ., P:) should actually be provable
in Z. There is no recursively enumerable extension of the predicate
calculus with this property. (Hilbert evidently assumed Z to be
complete and therefore did not distinguish between these versions
which are equivalent on his assumption.)
Of course, on occasions the extra information contained in the
finitist versions is needed. But the finitist point of view is simply
not appropriate for discussing the general problem of completeness.
HILBERTS
PROGRAMME 371
References
[ 161 SPECTOR C., Recursive ordinals and predicafive set fheory, Summaries
of talks a t the Summer Institute of Symbolic Logic in 1957 a t
Cornell University, vol. 3, pp. 377-382.
[ 171 WANGHao, Formalization of mathemafics,J.S.L. 19(1954), pp. 2.11-266.
372 G. KREISEL
Abstract
Hilberts plan for understanding the concept of infinity required the
elimination of non-finitist machinery from proofs of finitist assertions. The
failure of t h e original plan leads to a hierarchy of progressively less elemen-
tary, but still constructive methods instead of finitist ones (modified Hilbert
programme). A mathematical proof of this failure requires a definition of
(I finitist ,.-The paper sketches the three principal methods for t h e syn-
tactic analysis of non-constructive mathematics, t h e resulting consistency
proofs and constructive interpretations, modelled on Herbrands theorem,
and their mathematical and logical consequences. A characterization of
finitist proofs is sketched. A remark on t h e completeness of t h e predicate
calculus concludes t h e paper. Throughout open problems and alternative
approaches are emphasized.
Zusammenfassung
Hilbert sah das Verstehen des Begriffs des Unendlichen in der Elimi-
nierung nichtfiniter Methoden aus Beweisen finiter Satze. Das Versagen
dieses Unternehmens fuhrt zu einer Hierarchie progressiv weniger elemen-
tarer, aber noch konstruktiver Methoden, s t a t t der finiten (modifiziertes
Hilbertsches Programm). Ein Unmoglichkeitsbeweis des urspriinglichen
Planes setzt eine Definition von Q finit voraus. - Die drei wichtigsten
))